# 1NC v. Christopher Miller

## 1

### K

#### The subject emerges through loss, constitutively unable to express it’s desires through language. That traps the subject in the symbolic, creating a constant desire towards the lost-object. Thus, the role of the ballot is to embrace loss.

McGowan 13 [Todd; Associate Professor of Film Studies at the UVermont; “Enjoying What We Don't Have: The Political Project of Psychoanalysis,” Pg. 26-29; 2013; University of Nebraska Press / Lincoln and London] Justin

The subject as such emerges through the experience of loss. It is the loss of a part of the subject — an initial act of sacrifi ce — that creates both subject and object, the object emerging through this act as what the subject has lost of itself. The subject takes an interest in the object world because it forms this world around its lost object. As Jacques Lacan notes, “Never, in our concrete experience of analytic theory, do we do without the notion of the lack of the object as central. It is not a negative, but the very spring for the relation of the subject to the world.”5 Th e loss of the object generates a world around this loss to which the subject can relate.

Obviously, no one literally creates objects through an initial act of sacrifi ce of an actual body part. Th is would be too much to ask. But the psychical act of sacrifi ce allows for a distinction to develop where none existed before and simultaneously directs the subject’s desire toward the object world. In his breakthrough essay “Negation,” Freud describes this process as follows: “Th e antithesis between subjective and objective does not exist from the fi rst. It only comes into being from the fact that thinking possesses the capacity to bring before the mind once more something that has once been perceived, by reproducing it as a presentation without the external object having still to be there. Th e fi rst and immediate aim, therefore, of reality-testing is, not to fi nd an object in real perception which corresponds to the one presented, but to refi nd such an object, to convince oneself that it is still there.”6 Th ough Freud doesn’t use terms from linguistics, it is clear that he is making reference to the subject’s alienation in language and that he sees this alienation as the key to the emergence of both the subject and the object

When the subject submits to the imperatives of language, it enters into an indirect relation with the object world. Th e speaking being does not relate to books, pencils, and paper but to “books,” “pencils,” and “paper.” Th e signifier intervenes between the subject and the object that the subject perceives. Th e subject’s alienation into language deprives it of immediate contact with the object world. And yet, in the above passage from “Negation,” Freud conceives of the subject’s entrance into language — its “capacity to bring before the mind once more something that has once been perceived, by reproducing it as a presentation without the external object having still to be there” — as the event that produces the very distinction between subject and object. Th is means that the indirectness or mediation introduced by language deprives the subject of a direct relation to the object world that it never had.

Prior to its immersion in the mediation of language, the subject had no object at all — not a privileged relation to objects but a complete absence of relationality as such due to its autoeroticism. In this sense, the subject’s willingness to accede to its alienation in language is the fi rst creative act, a sacrifice that produces the objects that the subject cannot directly access. Language is important not for its own sake but because it is the site of our founding sacrifi ce. We know that the subject has performed this act of sacrifi ce when we witness the subject functioning as a being of language, but the sacrifi ce is not an act that the subject takes up on its own.

Others always impose the entry into language on the subject. Th eir exhortations and incentives to speak prompt the emergence of the speaking subject. But the subject’s openness to alienation in language, its willingness to sacrifi ce a part of itself in order to become a speaking subject, suggests a lack in being itself prior to the entry into language. Th at is, the act through which the subject cedes the privileged object and becomes a subject coincides with language but is irreducible to it. Th e subject engages in the act of sacrifi ce because it does not fi nd its initial autoeroticism perfectly satisfying — the unity of the autoerotic being is not perfect — and this lack of complete satisfaction produces the opening through which language and society grab onto the subject through its alienating process. If the initial autoerotic state of the human animal were perfectly satisfying, no one would begin to speak, and subjectivity would never form. Speaking as such testifi es to an initial wound in our animal being and in being itself.

But subjectivity emerges only out of a self-wounding. Even though others encourage the infant to abandon its autoerotic state through a multitude of inducements, the initial loss that constitutes subjectivity is always and necessarily self-infl icted. Subjectivity has a fundamentally masochistic form, and it continually repeats the masochistic act that founds it. Th e act of sacrifi ce opens the door to the promise of a satisfaction that autoerotic isolation forecloses, which is why the incipient subject abandons the autoerotic state and accedes to the call of sociality. But the term “sacrifi ce” is misleading insofar as it suggests that the subject has given up a wholeness (with itself or with its parent) that exists prior to being lost.

In the act of sacrifi ce, the incipient subject gives up something that it doesn’t have. Th e initial loss that founds subjectivity is not at all substantial; it is the ceding of nothing. Th rough this defi ning gesture, the subject sacrifi ces its lost object into being. But if the subject cedes nothing, this initial act of sacrifi ce seems profoundly unnecessary. Why can’t the subject emerge without it? Why is the experience of loss necessary for the subject to constitute itself qua subject? Th e answer lies in the diff erence between need and desire. While the needs of the human animal are not dependent on the experience of loss, the subject’s desires are.

It is the initial act of sacrifi ce that gives birth to desire: the subject sacrifi ces nothing in order to create a lost object around which it can organize its desire. As Richard Boothby puts it in his unequaled explanation of the psychoanalytic conception of the emergence of desire, “Th e destruction and loss of the object . . . opens up a symbolic dimension in which what was lost might be recovered in a new form.”7 He adds: “Sacrifi ce serves to constitute the very matrix of desire. Th e essential function of sacrifi ce is less do ut des, I give so that you might give, than do ut desidero: I give in order that I might desire.”8 Th e subject’s desire is oriented around this lost object, but the object is nothing as a positive entity and only exists insofar as it is lost. Th is is why one can never att ain the lost object or the object that causes one to desire.9 Th e coming-into-being of this object originates the subject of desire, but, having no substance, the object can never become an empirical object of desire. We may see an object of desire as embodying the lost object, but whenever we obtain this object, we discover its emptiness. Th e lost object is constitutively rather than empirically lost

#### The affs attempts to reduce workplace corruption falls short of an analysis of commodity fetishism. The affs desire to fill the lack inevitably fails and creates a dependency on capitalism.

Böhm and Batta 10 [Steffen; Essex Business School, University of Essex; Aanka; Essex Business School, University of Essex; “Just doing it: enjoying commodity fetishism with Lacan,” Organization; 2010; <https://sci-hub.se/10.1177/1350508410363123>] // Re-Cut Justin

It is within this context that the anti-sweatshop campaign has emerged. It has brought to our attention the difficult working conditions, the exploitation and dehumanization that are part and parcel of the global economy and hence has helped to politicize consumption, to put Nike and other multinationals and their production practices on the spot. One of the aims of this campaign has been to improve the working conditions and wages of the workers in low-cost countries. However, what has also been caught up in this campaign is the call by many Western critics for this production to be brought back ‘home’. That is, multinationals like Nike are criticized—particularly by labour unions—for just running virtual operations in Western countries, concentrating on design and branding. In this way, it is argued, the West simply becomes an ‘experience economy’ (Gilmore et al., 1998)—or we could call it an ‘enjoyment economy’, a kind of big Disneyland—rather than developing its own ‘real economy’, its own industrial and manufacturing strength.

Both the ‘anti-sweatshop’ and ‘bring-our-production-home’ responses are, in our view, limited, as they seem to fall short of a critique of the workings of commodity fetishism. ‘If only Nike would be more of a “real economy” company, paying its workers decent wages and pensions, then things would be better’, some of the campaigners seem to be arguing. Although this kind of argument seems to be particularly attractive in today’s deep economic crisis, we would maintain that some caution needs to be applied. In fact, as we are arguing in this article the workings of commodity fetishism, are proper to all capitalist production and consumption processes, and tie individual consumers and the mass social body as such to a continuous reproduction of capitalist commodity relations. Even if Nike produced its trainers say in the US, paying its workers a decent living wage, there would still be an alienation and perversion at the heart of its commodity relations making it fundamentally problematic. Equally, even if ‘sweatshop’ workers in the so-called ‘third world’ would be paid better wages, commodity fetishism would not disappear, tying individuals to a continuous consumption cycle, which many critics (e.g. Klein, 2000) have shown to have a range of negative effects on people, societies and the environment.

What is important for us is to realize that—in the words of Guy Debord—‘it is not just that the relationship to commodities is now plain to see—commodities are now all that there is to see, the world we see is the world of the commodity’ (1994: 29). That is, humankind is enmeshed in commodity relations. A study of NikeTown in Chicago, for example, argues that a visit to this consumer haven gives one the sense of a ‘festive nature of the processions through the site, with customers cast in the role of explorers and tourists in search of clothing, souvenirs and meanings’ (Peñaloza, 1998: 379). Our perceptual apparatus cannot ‘not see’ the commodity; it is everywhere. The commodity is being produced and reproduced at a variety of different levels of reality and representation, resulting in what Debord calls a ‘spectacle’: ‘The Spectacle is not a collection of images; rather it is a social relationship between people that is mediated by images’ (Debord, 1994: 12). These images—in the form of news, advertising and entertainment—are continuously produced and reproduced by the media and culture industries (Adorno and Horkheimer, 1979), resulting in what Lacanians would call ‘Homo Symbolicus’, which implies a shift from a naturalist to a culturalist conception of need and desire (Stavrakakis, 2006: 89).

The important Lacanian contribution to this debate is that the ‘enjoyment economy’ (Baudrillard, 2001; Gilmore et al., 1998) is not only a post-World War II or ‘postmodern’ invention. Instead, enjoyment must be seen at the heart not only of capitalist organization but also of how human subjectivity and hence society as such function. What is important to realize here is that, for Lacan, desire is located in the realm of the symbolic Other, the relational structure of language that makes up society. As the fetishist deals with his or her anxiety (lack) by accepting the Law of the Nameof-the-Father, the Other becomes, what Deleuze and Guattari (1988) call a ‘desiring machine’ that constitutes the subject. With Lacan—as with Deleuze and Guattari—this fetishization process exits the realm of the Freudian clinic to enter the wider scene of social relations. Lacan’s formula to describe what Deleuze and Guattari (1988) later call the ‘desiring machine’ is $ ◊ a, where ‘$’ is the ‘barred’ or ‘divided’ subject (as the subject, according to Lacan, can never have a full identity) and the small ‘a’ is the object of desire that is, nevertheless, always unattainable. The Nike brand, for example, promises all sorts of amazing experiences and enjoyments when one buys a pair of one of their latest trainers. Yet, once bought, we realize that we cannot jump quite as high as ‘Air Jordan’ or play golf as skillfully as Tiger Woods. The symbolic regime of the Other is thus always lacking, which, however, does not prevent us from desiring and believing in it. This is what Lacan (2007: 108) calls fantasy. It is this fantasy that is at the heart of Lacan and Granoff’s (1956) conception of ‘fetishism’, which they describe as a process of the subject transferring his or her anxiety to a symbolic system, or what Lacan calls the Name-of-the-Father. What contemporary consumer capitalism has arguably achieved is that it has provided a symbolic system onto which the subject’s constitutive anxieties (lack) can be transferred, creating a set of fantasies for people to believe in. Nike and its global brand appeal is at the heart of this relationship.

#### The forwarding of the resolution is a call for recognition---instead of changing violent policies, the 1AC becomes obsessed and dependent on them.

Lundberg 12 – Dr. Christian Lundberg, Co-Director of the University Program in Cultural Studies and Professor of Rhetoric at the University of North Carolina, PhD in Communication Studies from Northwestern University, MA in Divinity from Emory University, BA from the University of Redlands, Lacan in Public: Psychoanalysis and the Science of Rhetoric, p. 174-177 // Re-Cut Justin

Thus, "as hysterics you demand a new master: you will get it!" At the register of manifest content, demands are claims for action and seemingly powerful, but at the level of the rhetorical form of the demand or in the register of enjoyment, demand is a kind of surrender. As a *relation of address* the hysterical demand is more a demand for recognition and love from an ostensibly repressive order than a claim for change. The limitation of the students' call on Lacan does not lie in the end they sought but in the fact that the hysterical address never quite breaks free from its framing of the master. The fundamental problem of democracy is not articulating resistance over and against hegemony but rather the practices of enjoyment that sustain an addiction to mastery and a deferral of desire.

Hysteria is a politically effective subject position in some ways, but it is politically constraining from the perspective of organized political dissent. If not a unidirectional practice of resistance, hysteria is at best a politics of interruption. Imagine a world where the state was the perfect and complete embodiment of a hegemonic order, without interruption or remainder, and the discursive system was hermetically closed. Politics would be an impossibility: with no site for contest or reappropriation, politics would simply be the automatic extension of structure. Hysteria is a site of interruption, in that hysteria represents a challenge to our hypothetical system, refusing straightforward incorporation by its symbolic logic. But, stepping outside this hypothetical non-polity, on balance, hysteria is politically constraining because the form of the demand, as a way of organizing the field of political enjoyment, requires that the system continue to act in certain ways to sustain its logic. Though on the surface it is an act of symbolic dissent, hysteria represents an affirmation of a hegemonic order and is therefore a particularly fraught form of political subjectivization.

The case of the hysteric produces an additional problem in defining jouissance as equivalent with hegemony. One way of defining hysteria is to say that it is a form of enjoyment that is defined by its very disorganization. As Gerard Wajcman frames it, the fundamental analytical problem in defining hysteria is precisely that it is a paradoxical refusal of organized enjoyment by a constant act of deferral. This deferral functions by asserting a form of agency over the Other while simultaneously demanding that the Other provide an organizing principle for hysterical enjoyment, something the Other cannot provide. Hysteria never moves beyond the question or the riddle, as Wajcman argues: the "hysteric ... cannot be mastered by knowledge and therefore remains outside of history, even outside its own .... [I]f hysteria is a set of statements about the hysteric, then the hysteric is what eludes those statements, escapes this knowledge .... [T]he history of hysteria bears witness to something fundamental in the human condition-being put under pressure to answer a question.T'" Thus, a difficulty for a relatively formal/ structural account of hegemony as a substitute for jouissance without reduction: where is the place for a practice of enjoyment that by its nature eludes nanling in the order of knowledge? This account of hysteria provides a significant test case for the equation betweenjouissance and hegemony, for the political promise and peril of demands and ultimately for the efficacy of a hysterical politics. But the results of such a test can only be born out in the realm of everyday politics.

*On Resistance: The Dangers of Enjoying One's Demands*

The demands of student revolutionaries and antiglobalization protestors provide a set of opportunities for interrogating hysteria as a political practice. For the antiglobalization protestors cited earlier, demands to be added to a list of dangerous globophobes uncannily condense a dynamic inherent to all demands for recognition. But the demands of the Mexico Solidarity Network and the Seattle Independent Media project demand more than recognition: they also demand danger as a specific mode of representation. "Danger" functions as a sign of something more than inclusion, a way of reaffirming the protestors' imaginary agency over processes of globalization. If danger represents an assertion of agency, and the assertion of agency is proportional to the deferral of desire to the master upon whom the demand is placed, then demands to be recognized as dangerous are doubly hysterical. Such demands are also demands for a certain kind of love, namely, the state might extend its love by recognizing the dangerousness of the one who makes the demand. At the level the demand's rhetorical function, dangerousness is metonymically connected with the idea that average citizens can effect change in the prevailing order, or that they might be recognized as agents who, in the instance of the list of globalophobic leaders, can command the Mexican state to reaffirm their agency by recognizing their dangerousness. The rhetorical structure of danger implies the continuing existence of the state or governing apparatus's interests, and these interests become a nodal point at which the hysterical demand is discharged. This structure generates enjoyment of the existence of oppressive state policies as a point for the articulation of identity. The addiction to the state and the demands for the state's love is also bound up with a fundamental dependency on the oppression of the state: otherwise the identity would collapse. Such demands constitute a reaffirmation of a hysterical subject position: they reaffirm not only the subject's marginality in the global system but the danger that protestors present to the global system. There are three practical implications for this formation.

First, for the hysteric the simple discharge of the demand is both the beginning and satisfaction of the political project. Although there is always a nascent political potential in performance, in this case the performance of demand comes to fully eclipse the desires that animate content of the demand. Second, demand allows institutions that stand in for the global order to dictate the direction of politics. This is not to say that engaging such institutions is a bad thing; rather, it is to say that when antagonistic engagement with certain institutions is read as the end point of politics, the field of political options is relatively constrained. Demands to be recognized as dangerous by the Mexican government or as a powerful antiglobalization force by the WTO often function at the cost of addressing how practices of globalization are reaffirmed at the level of consumption, of identity, and so on or in thinking through alternative political strategies for engaging globalization that do not hinge on the state and the state's actions.

Paradoxically, the third danger is that an addiction to the refusal of demands creates a paralyzing disposition toward institutional politics. Grossberg has identified a tendency in left politics to retreat from the "politics of policy and public debate.":" Although Grossberg identifies the problem as a specific coordination of "theory" and its relation to left politics, perhaps a hysterical commitment to marginality informs the impulse in some sectors to eschew engagements with institutions and institutional debate. An addiction to the state's refusal often makes the perfect the enemy of the good, implying a stifling commitment to political purity as a pretext for sustaining a structure of enjoyment dependent on refusal, dependent on a kind of paternal "no." Instead of seeing institutions and policy making as one part of the political field that might be pressured for contingent or relative goods, a hysterical politics is in the incredibly difficult position of taking an addressee (such as the state) that it assumes represents the totality of the political field; simultaneously it understands its addressee as constitutively and necessarily only a locus of prohibition.

These paradoxes become nearly insufferable when one makes an analytical cut between the content of a demand and its rhetorical functionality. At the level of the content of the demand, the state or institutions that represent globalization are figured as illegitimate, as morally and politically compromised because of their misdeeds, Here there is an assertion of agency, but because the assertion of agency is simultaneously a deferral of desire, the identity produced in the hysterical demand is not only intimately tied to but is ultimately dependent on the continuing existence of the state, hegemonic order, or institution. At the level of affective investment, the state or institution is automatically figured as the legitimate authority over its domain. As Lacan puts it: "demand in itself ... is demand of a presence or of an absence ... pregnant with that Other to be situated within the needs that it can satisfy. Demand constitutes the Other as already possessing the 'privilege' of satisfying needs, that it is to say, the power of depriving them of that alone by which they are satisfied."46

#### Their attempts to fill the lack by framing death as the ultimate evil denies any value that arises from life.

McGowan 13 [Todd; Associate Professor of Film Studies at the UVermont; “Enjoying What We Don't Have: The Political Project of Psychoanalysis,” Pg. 224-227; 2013; University of Nebraska Press / Lincoln and London] Justin

On the level of common sense, this opposition is not symmetrical. What thinking person would not want to side with those who love life rather than death.3 Everyone can readily understand how one might love life, but the love of death is a counterintuitive phenomenon. It seems as if it must be code language for some other desire, which is how Western leftists often view it. Interpreting terrorist attacks as an ultimately life-affirming response to imperialism and impoverishment, they implicitly reject the possibility of being in love with death. But this type of interpretation can't explain why so many suicide bombers are middle-class, educated subjects and not the most downtrodden victims of imperialist power. 4 We must imagine that for subjects such as these there is an appeal in death itself.

Those who emphasize the importance of death at the expense of life do so because death is the source of value.5 The fact that life has an end, that we do not have an infinite amount of time to experience every possibility, means that we must value some things above others. Death creates hierarchies of value, and these hierarchies are not only vehicles for oppression but the pathways through which what we do matters at all. Without the value that death provides, neither love nor ice cream nor friendship nor anything that we enjoy would have any special worth whatsoever. Having an infinite amount of time, we would have no incentive to opt for these experiences rather than other ones. We would be left unable to enjoy what seems to make life most worth living.

Even though enjoyment itself is an experience of the infinite, an experience of transcending the limits that regulate everyday activity, it nonetheless depends on the limits of finitude. When one enjoys, one accesses the infinite as a finite subject, and it is this contrast that renders enjoyment enjoyable. Without the limits of finitude, our experience of the infinite would become as tedious as our everyday lives (and in fact would become our everyday experience). Finitude provides the punctuation through which the infinite emerges as such. The struggle to assert the importance of death – the act of being in love with death, as bin Laden claims that the Muslim youths are – is a mode of avowing one’s allegiance to the infinite enjoyment that death doesn't extinguish but instead spawns.6

This is exactly why Martin Heidegger attacks what he sees as our modern inauthentic relationship to death. In Being and Time Heidegger sees our individual death as an absolute limit that has the effect of creating value for us. As he puts it, "With death, Dasein stands before itself in its ownmost potentiality-for-being. This is a possibility in which the issue is nothing less than Dasein's Being-in-the-world.”7 Without the anticipation of our own death, we flit through the world and fail to take up fully an attitude of care, the attitude most appropriate for our mode of being, according to Heidegger. Nothing really matters to those who have not recognized the approach of their own death. By depriving us of an authentic relationship to death, an ideology that proclaims life as the only value creates a valueless world where nothing matters to us.

But of course the partisans of life are not actually eliminating death itself. They simply privilege life over death and see the world in terms of life rather than death which would seem to leave the value-creating power of death intact. But this is not what happens. By privileging life and seeing death only in terms of life, we change the way we experience the world. Without the mediation that death provides, the system of pure life becomes a system utterly bereft of value.8 We can see this in the two great systems of modernity – science and capitalism.

Both modern science and capitalism are systems structured around pure life.9 Neither recognizes any ontological limit but instead continually embarks on a project of constant change and expansion. The scientific quest for knowledge about the world moves forward without regard for humanitarian or ethical concerns, which is why ethicists incessantly try to reconcile scientific discoveries with morality after the fact. After scientists develop the ability to clone, for instance, we realize what cloning portends for our sense of identity and attempt to police the practice. After Oppenheimer helps to develop the atomic bomb, he addresses the world with pronouncements of its evil. But this rearguard action has nothing to do with science as such. Oppenheimer the humanist is not Oppenheimer the scientist.10

The same dynamic is visible with capitalism. As an economic system, it promotes constant evolution and change just as life itself does. Nothing can remain the same within the capitalist world because the production of value depends on the creation of the new commodity, and even the old commodities must be constantly given new forms or renewed in some way.11 Capitalism produces crises not because it can't produce enough – crises of scarcity dominate the history of the noncapitalist world, not the capitalist one – but because it produces too much. The crisis of capitalism is always a crisis of overproduction. The capitalist economy suffocates from too much life, from excess, not from scarcity or death. Both science and capitalism move forward without any acknowledged limit, which is why they are synonymous with modernity.12 Modernity emerges with the bracketing of death's finitude and the belief that there is no barrier to human possibility.

The problem with the exclusive focus on life at the expense of death is that it never finds enough life and thus remains perpetually dissatisfied. The limit of this project is, paradoxically, its own infinitude. It evokes what Hegel calls the bad infinite – an infinite that is wrongly conceived as having no relation at all to the finite. We succumb to the bad infinite when we pursue an unattainable object and fail to see that the only possible satisfaction rests in the pursuit itself. The bad infinite -the infinite of modernity- depends on a fundamental misrecognition. We continue on this path only as long as we believe that we might attain the final piece of the puzzle, and yet this piece is constitutively denied us by the structure of the system itself. We seek the commodity that would finally bring us complete satisfaction, but dissatisfaction is built into the commodity structure, just as obsolescence is built into the very fabric of our cars and computers. Like capitalism, scientific inquiry cannot find a final answer: beneath atomic theory we find string theory, and beneath string theory we find something else. In both cases, the system prevents us from recognizing where our satisfaction lies; it diverts our focus away from our activity and onto the goal that we pursue. In this way, modernity produces the dissatisfaction that keeps it going. But it also produces another form of dissatisfaction that wants to arrest its forward movement.

The further the project of modernity moves in the direction of life, the more forcefully the specter of fundamentalism will make its presence felt. The exclusive focus on life has the effect of producing eruptions of death. As the life-affirming logic of science and capitalism structures all societies to an increasing extent, the space for the creation of value disappears. Modernity attempts to construct a symbolic space where there is no place for death and the limit that death represents. As opposed to the closed world of traditional society, modernity opens up an infinite universe.14 But this infinite universe is established through the repression of finitude. Explosions of fundamentalist violence represent the return of what modernity's symbolic structure cannot accommodate. As Lacan puts it in his seminar on psychosis, "Whatever is refused in the symbolic order, in the sense of Verwerfung, reappears in the real.”15 Fundamentalist violence is blowback not simply in response to imperialist aggression, as the leftist common sense would have it. This violence marks the return of what modernity necessarily forecloses.

#### Their form of politics sustains a bad relationship to the death drive, ensuring extinction.

Themi 8 [Tim; Professor in Philosophy Camp; Psychoanalysis from the School of Humanities &amp; Social Sciences at Deakin University, “HOW LACAN’S ETHICS MIGHT IMPROVE OUR UNDERSTANDING OF NIETZSCHE’S CRITIQUE OF PLATONISM: THE NEUROSIS &amp; NIHILSM OF A ‘LIFE’ AGAINST LIFE,” Cosmos and History: The Journal of Natural and Social Philosophy, Vol 4, No 1-2; 2008; http://www.cosmosandhistory.org/index.php/journal/article/view/96/192] EG // Re-Cut Justin

But with our advancements in technological power outmatching by far any correlative advance in the awareness gained as a whole of our prehistoric Thing within: the great 21st century ecological disaster that too many academics and activists now increasingly predict, seems more than just a little possible. But to this increasingly macabre scenario, we must also add the renewed proliferation of nuclear weapons which occurs, no less, amidst a world where vital resources for energy and democracy are wearing thin[50]. For just such reasons, wilful ignorance of the Thing now bares results which Lacan’s Ethics reveals as far too terrifyingly possible to rationally accept; given that we have the Thing armed to the teeth now from that primitive id-like part of the brain, with no Sovereign Good, and all the way into a nuclear age.

CONCLUSION: THE NEUROSIS &amp; NIHILISM OF A ‘LIFE’ AGAINST LIFE.

This is why Lacan proposes that his enquiry into ethics must be one to go “more deeply into the notion of the real”(LE:11). Further into what he would rather call the real, given that previous notions of ‘nature’ have been too far ‘different’––from being far too Platonic––than his own; and because it’s the very exclusions in these previous notions which upon return, as return of excess, are yielding our most tragic problems.

Today when faced with problems of the magnitude of global warming––a special but by no means solo case of adverse environment change at present due to our physical treatment of the planet––we often think the answer is to be more moral, more good, and we are thankful when exponents of the Good in some way bring attention to the problem. However, the idea of the Good as introduced by Plato, and nigh all of its descendants whether secular, rationalist, religious or not, continue to predicate themselves on a radically false picture of the human-condition: if not still of the entire cosmos––which only then lines itself up aside of an age- old repression, a repression of das Ding, that Freudian Thing in our inner real which, when it returns after being disavowed and denied in the name of the Good too long, is even more devastating.

Presently we are accelerating along the path of what Lacan discloses as our civilisation’s “race towards destruction”, a “massive destruction”, “a resurgence of savagery”, snaking the paths traced out before us by the centuries long dominion of Western morality [51]; and the nihilism detected by Nietzsche before the turn of the 20th has never threatened to reach such the grand finale. But what I would have us take from this enquiry here is that this is not because we aren’t in accordance enough with a moral ideal of the Sovereign good, but rather, it’s because we aren’t in accordance enough with a proper understanding of the real. It’s because we still at some level think that being more moral, in accordance with the Good’s inherited repressive structures towards our drives, desire, and truthfulness about the real, is actually the answer to––rather than the source of––our most tragic problems.

The goal here is by no means then to encourage all to let their Things run wild––which would probably be nothing short of an instant conflagration––but this is why and precisely why we must desist from deluding ourselves under the tightening grip of a Sovereign Good, for this is precisely the move which cuts the Thing loose after pressing down for far too long, a slippery hand’s palming on the coils of a spring, forever readying the subsequent explosion. For when that which is really real––as opposed to what Christian-Platonism falsely called the ‘real’––is forced from mind, it can’t really disappear because it is real, and it tends to end up only in our gun-sights as an imaginary overlaying of an external other, when the signifier ‘enmity’ appears. The earth itself can even seem like the enemy after while, one which like Plato in his Phaedo, we might think then to escape from “as if from a prison”, and especially from “the bonds of the body”, in the hope that we may live one day without the earthly altogether[52]. Following such negations to their logical conclusion, life itself becomes enemy too, for as being made up of the earthly and organic, life could never be free of what it is in essence. And what is the death-drive Freud tells from the start, if not to return us sundry to that dust-bowl of the inorganic; as per that “second death”[53] fantasm Lacan salvages from the Monstre de Sade, which wills to go beyond the destruction of mere beings, by destroying too the principle from which fresh sets could emerge. Such negative devaluations of our earthly, organic life though are really of our own construction: as de Sade, like any pervert, is only the mirror which shows expressed what Platonic- neurotics are but hide inside––a cess-pit of loathing contempt for life, built up from the unconscious and disowned, distorted and damned up, built up, instinctual-ideational elements of their own subjective psyches, phobically ferocious of that Thingly real lying not so dormant, and readying within…

But is it now still possible as Nietzsche teaches to say ‘Yes’ to the real of nature both without and within––to return to it!––even though it is more frightful and we are less guaranteed protection of it than the Platonic history of metaphysicians taught? For with the further disclosures of The Ethics of Psychoanalysis––Lacan’s following up and extension of the meta-ethical implications of Freud: perhaps even Nietzsche, our great intellectual übermensch, may too have bitten off more snake- head than he could chew? From certain moments in Nietzsche’s texts we can perhaps interpret that he may have had this Thing in his sights, but saw nothing much to come of it, so instead, elected to turn away, though not without some perhaps hinted at self- amusement.[54]

But with psychoanalysis, rightly or wrongly, such truths are out. It doesn’t seem all positive at first, and perhaps it never entirely will. But we must not let this deeper disclosure desist us now from the core Nietzschean project of locating and overcoming the nihilism which begs us to take cover in idealising fictions, as if life as life is not worth living. Not because nihilism and the annihilation of the species is wrong in the sense of being immoral, but rather because it is bad art, mediocre art, and the ‘knowledge’ claims it trumpets on should only make us flare. If we are at our full intellectual and creative will to power, we can only consider such cultural-civil regressions as we saw on display with that whole propaganda comedy that surrounded the war for more oil in Iraq as infantile; the hapless results of sibling rivalries gone too far astray. But we must also resist being caught up in the imaginary of those who would only re-preach to us now of a return to the Good, who would only redeploy such versions of nihilism’s precursory defensive fictions, the pernicious ones, which would only then re-falsify our data, and leave us disappointed when the truth then re-emerges. Doing more harm than good does Platonism in the end by leaving us untrained for the real, with the habit instead to take some truth as ‘error’, and error as ‘truth’––as ‘real’––to the point even of epistemic dysfunction. Take the grotesque intellectual poverty of that whole Christian middle-ages for example, whence put into relation with the heights of Aristotle and his fellow Greeks, as Augustine and Aquinas amplified some of the worst bits of Platonism, and threw the rest into abyss.

The overcoming of the moralising good of Christian-Platonism though does by no means imply then a subsequent affirmation of all that brutal Roman like greed, slavery, decadence, circus-bread corruption and mindless colonial expansion that we’ve heard all about, and are hardly so free of with our corporate today––just ask a Latin-American for instance![55] For it is possible within the perspectives opened up by Nietzsche, Freud, Lacan, as Silvia Ons puts it, to view a social-historical or individual neurosis of any kind: including the expressed acted-out, perverse-sadistic form that escapes when the Good is temporarily loosed of its repressive grip––and say to the would be Platonist: ‘No, not that, that’s not a cure, that’s a mirage; that’s sheer fantasy, resentment, spite; that’s not a cure it will only make things worse; worse in a different way, but worse nonetheless!’

By greater mindfulness then, with guided affirmation towards even that fearsome Freudian Thing that The Ethics of Psychoanalysis has us find now in our inner natures: we can eventually again say ‘Yes’-to-life in such the way that it overcomes the nihilism of not caring too much whether we as individuals or species live or die, whether we as culture or civilisation advance or decline. But we can only do this with fullest efficacy by freeing ourselves of all that wasted neurosis sickness that feels it must deny our Thing like aspect of the real: because from all those Christian-Platonic prejudices of the Good, it has been taught that such ‘things’ are too far beneath it. We must continue instead to train ourselves to stare the real directly in the face, without flinching, and that’s all we can do at least to start. For unless we can continue to utilise, sublimate, enjoy and get a positive, well-guided jouissance out of all aspects of life––including that Freudian Ding in our real––then the chances are we’re going to be at least in part, happy enough in no longer living it: offering not even a puff of genuine political praxis! We either face up to the death-drive snaking long beneath the dank, hidden history of the un-real, anti-real Good of Platonism––or let the disowned, un-understood drive resurge of its own volition **until it accidentally finishes us**!s Ethics, May 1960.

#### Vote negative to embrace the lack – this requires being open to the anxiety that occurs from an encounter with the real of the other and breaks down fantasy and drives.

McGowan 13 [Todd; Associate Professor of Film Studies at the UVermont; “Enjoying What We Don't Have: The Political Project of Psychoanalysis,” Pg. 26-29; 2013; University of Nebraska Press / Lincoln and London] SJBE Re-Highlighted Justin

The alternative — the ethical path that psychoanalysis identifies — demands an embrace of the anxiety that stems from the encounter with the enjoying other. If there is a certain ethical dimension to anxiety, it lies in the rela- tionship that exists between anxiety and enjoyment. Contra Heidegger, the ethics of anxiety does not stem from anxiety’s relation to absence but from its relation to presence — to the overwhelming presence of the other’s enjoyment. In some sense, the encounter with absence or nothing is easier than the encounter with presence. Even though it traumatizes us, absence allows us to constitute ourselves as desiring subjects. Rather than producing anxiety, absence leads the subject out of anxiety into desire. Confronted with the lost object as a structuring absence, the subject is able to embark on the pursuit of the enjoyment embodied by this object, and this pursuit provides the subject with a clear sense of direction and even meaning. This is precisely what the subject lacks when it does not encounter a lack in the symbolic structure. When the subject encounters enjoyment at the point where it should encounter the absence of enjoyment, anxiety overwhelms the subject.

In this situation, the subject cannot constitute itself along the path of desire. It lacks the lack — the absence — that would provide the space through which desire could develop. Consequently, this subject confronts the enjoying other and experiences anxiety. Unlike the subject of desire — or the subject of Heideggerean anxiety — the subject who suffers this sort of anxiety actually experiences the other in its real dimension.¶

The real other is the other caught up in its obscene enjoyment, caught up in this enjoyment in a way that intrudes on the subject. There is no safe distance from this enjoyment, and one cannot simply avoid it. There is nowhere in the contemporary world to hide from it. As a result, the contem- porary subject is necessarily a subject haunted by anxiety triggered by the omnipresent enjoyment of the other. And yet, this enjoyment offers us an ethical possibility. As Slavoj Žižek puts it, “It is this excessive and intrusive jouissance that we should learn to tolerate.”27 When we tolerate the other’s “excessive and intrusive jouissance” and when we endure the anxiety that it produces, we acknowledge and sustain the other in its real dimension.¶

Tolerance is the ethical watchword of our epoch. However, the problem with contemporary tolerance is its insistence on tolerating the other only insofar as the other cedes its enjoyment and accepts the prevailing symbolic structure. That is to say, we readily tolerate the other in its symbolic dimen- sion, the other that plays by the rules of our game. This type of tolerance allows the subject to feel good about itself and to sustain its symbolic identity. The problem is that, at the same time, it destroys what is in the other more than the other — the particular way that the other enjoys.¶

It is only the encounter with the other in its real dimension — the encounter that produces anxiety in the subject — that sustains that which defines the other as such. Authentic tolerance tolerates the real other, not simply the other as mediated through a symbolic structure. In this sense, it involves the experience of anxiety on the part of the subject. This is a difficult posi- tion to sustain, as it involves enduring the “whole opaque weight of alien enjoyment on your chest.”The obscene enjoyment of the other bombards the authentically tolerant subject, but this subject does not retreat from the anxiety that this enjoyment produces.

If the embrace of the anxiety that accompanies the other’s proximate enjoyment represents the ethical position today, this does not necessarily provide us with an incentive for occupying it. Who wants to be ethical when it involves enduring anxiety rather than finding a way — a drug, a new authority, or something — to alleviate it? What good does it do to sustain oneself in anxiety? In fact, anxiety does the subject no good at all, which is why it offers the subject the possibility of enjoyment. When the subject encounters the other’s enjoyment, this is the form that its own enjoyment takes as well. To endure the anxiety caused by the other’s enjoyment is to experience one’s own simultaneously. As Lacan points out, when it comes to the enjoyment of the other and my own enjoyment, “nothing indicates they are distinct.” Thus, not only is anxiety an ethical position, it is also the key to embracing the experience of enjoyment. To reject the experience of anxiety is to flee one’s own enjoyment.¶

The notion that the other’s enjoyment is also our own enjoyment seems at first glance difficult to accept. Few people enjoy themselves when they hear someone else screaming profanities in the workplace or when they see a couple passionately kissing in public, to take just two examples. In these instances, we tend to recoil at the inappropriateness of the activity rather than enjoy it, and this reaction seems completely justified. The public display of enjoyment violates the social pact with its intrusiveness; it doesn’t let us alone but assaults our senses. It violates the implicit agreement of the public sphere constituted as an enjoyment-free zone. And yet, recoiling from the other’s enjoyment deprives us of our own.¶

How we comport ourselves in relation to the other’s enjoyment indi- cates our relationship to our own. What bothers us about the other — the disturbance that the other’s enjoyment creates in our existence — is our own mode of enjoying. If we did not derive enjoyment from the other’s enjoyment, witnessing it would not bother us psychically. We would sim- ply be indifferent to it and focused on our own concerns. Of course, we might ask an offending car radio listener to turn the radio down so that we wouldn’t have to hear the unwanted music, but we would not experience the mere exhibition of alien enjoyment through the playing of that music as an affront. The very fact that the other’s enjoyment captures our attention demonstrates our intimate — or extimate — relation to it.

This relation becomes even clearer when we consider the epistemo- logical status of the enjoying other. Because the real or enjoying other is irreducible to any observable identity, we have no way of knowing whether or not the other really is enjoying. A stream of profanity may be the result of someone hurting a toe. The person playing the car radio too loud while sitting at the traffic light may have simply forgotten to turn down the radio after driving on the highway. Or the person may have difficulty hearing. The couple’s amorous behavior in public may reflect an absence of enjoyment in their relationship that they are trying to hide from both themselves and the public.¶

Considering the enjoyment of the other, we never know whether it is there or not. If we experience it, we do so through the lens of our own fantasy. We fantasize that the person blasting the radio is caught up in the enjoyment of the music to the exclusion of everything else; we fantasize that the public kisses of the couple suggest an enjoyment that has no concern for the outside world. Without the fantasy frame, the enjoying other would never appear within our experience.¶

The role of the fantasy frame for accessing the enjoying other becomes apparent within Fascist ideology. Fascism posits an internal enemy — the figure of the Jew or some analogue — that enjoys illicitly at the expense of the social body as a whole. By attempting to eliminate the enjoying other, Fascism hopes to create a pure social body bereft of any stain of enjoy- ment. This purity would allow for the ultimate enjoyment, but it would be completely licit. This hope for a future society free of any stain is not where Fascism’s true enjoyment lies, however. Fascists experience their own enjoyment through the enjoying other that they persecute. The enjoy- ment that the figure of the Jew embodies is the Fascists’ own enjoyment, though they cannot avow it as their own. More than any other social form, Fascism is founded on the disavowal of enjoyment — the attempt to enjoy while keeping enjoyment at arm’s length. But this effort is not confined to Fascism; it predominates everywhere, because no subjects anywhere can simply feel comfortable with their own mode of enjoying.¶

The very structure of enjoyment is such that we cannot experience it directly: when we experience enjoyment, we don’t have it; it has us. We experience our own enjoyment as an assault coming from the outside that dominates our conscious intentions. This is why we must fantasize our own enjoyment through the enjoying other. Compelled by our enjoyment, we can’t do otherwise; we act against our self-interest and against our own good. Enjoyment overwhelms the subject, even though the subject’s mode of enjoying marks what is most singular about the subject.¶

Even though the encounter with the enjoying other apprehends the real other through the apparatus of fantasy, this encounter is nonetheless genuine and has an ethical status. Unlike the experience of the nonexistent symbolic identity, which closes down the space in which the real other might appear, the fantasized encounter with the enjoying other leaves this space open. By allowing itself to be disturbed by the other on the level of fantasy, the subject acknowledges the singularity of the real other — its mode of enjoying — without confining this singularity to a prescribed identity.¶

The implications of privileging the encounter with the disturbing enjoy- ment of the real other over the assimilable symbolic identity are themselves disturbing. The tolerant attitude that never allows itself to be jarred by the enjoying other becomes, according to this way of seeing things, further from really encountering the real other than the attitude of hate and mis- trust. The liberal subject who welcomes illegal immigrants as fellow citizens completely shuts down the space for the other in the real. The immigrant as fellow citizen is not the real other. The xenophobic conservative, on the other hand, constructs a fantasy that envisions the illegal immigrant awash in a linguistic and cultural enjoyment that excludes natives. This fantasy, paradoxically, permits an encounter with the real other that liberal tolerance forecloses. Of course, xenophobes retreat from this encounter and from their own enjoyment, but they do have an experience of it that liberals do not. The tolerant liberal is open to the other but eliminates the otherness, while the xenophobic conservative is closed to the other but allows for the otherness. The ethical position thus involves sustaining the liberal’s toler- ance within the conservative’s encounter with the real other.

#### Best brain studies verify psychoanalysis!

Guterl 2 [Fred; “What Freud Got Right,” Newsweek; 11/10/02; <https://www.newsweek.com/what-freud-got-right-142575>] Justin

But a funny thing happened to Freud on the way to becoming a trivia question: as researchers looked deeper into the physical structure of the brain, they began to find support for some of his theories. Now a small but influential group of researchers are using his insights as a guide to future research; they even have a journal, Neuropsychoanalysis, founded three years ago. "Freud's insights on the nature of consciousness are consonant with the most advanced contemporary neuroscience views," wrote Antonio Damasio, head of neurology at the University of Iowa College of Medicine. Note that Damasio did not refer to psychoanalysis or the Oedipus complex. Instead the work is going on at the fundamental level where emotions are born and primitive passions lurk in the shadows of dreams.

Beyond the basic animal instincts to seek food and avoid pain, Freud identified two sources of psychic energy, which he called "drives": aggression and libido (the latter encompasses sexuality but also had a more expansive meaning, involving the desire for stimulation and achievement). The key to his theory is that these were unconscious drives, shaping our behavior without the mediation of our waking minds; they surface, heavily disguised, only in our dreams. The work of the past half-century in psychology and neuroscience has been to downplay the role of unconscious universal drives, focusing instead on rational processes in conscious life. Meanwhile, dreams were downgraded to a kind of mental static, random scraps of memory flickering through the sleeping brain. But researchers have found evidence that Freud's drives really do exist, and they have their roots in the limbic system, a primitive part of the brain that operates mostly below the horizon of consciousness. Now more commonly referred to as emotions, the modern suite of drives comprises five: rage, panic, separation distress, lust and a variation on libido sometimes called seeking. Freud presaged this finding in 1915, when he wrote that drives originate "from within the organism" in response to demands placed on the mind "in consequence of its connection with the body." Drives, in other words, are primitive brain circuits that control how we respond to our environment--foraging when we're hungry, running when we're scared and lusting for a mate.

The seeking drive is proving a particularly fruitful subject for researchers. Although like the others it originates in the limbic system, it also involves parts of the forebrain, the seat of higher mental functions. In the 1980s, Jaak Panksepp, a neurobiologist at Bowling Green State University in Ohio, became interested in a place near the cortex known as the ventraltegmental area, which in humans lies just above the hairline. When Panksepp stimulated the corresponding region in a mouse, the animal would sniff the air and walk around, as though it were looking for something. Was it hunger? No. The mouse would walk right by a plate of food, or for that matter any other object Panksepp could think of. This brain tissue seemed to cause a general desire for something new. "What I was seeing," he says, "was the urge to do stuff." Panksepp called this seeking.

To neuropsychologist Mark Solms of University College in London, that sounds very much like libido. "Freud needed some sort of general, appetitive desire to seek pleasure in the world of objects," says Solms. "Panksepp discovered as a neuroscientist what Freud discovered psychologically." Solms studied the same region of the brain for his work on dreams. Since the 1970s, neurologists have known that dreaming takes place during a particular form of sleep known as REM--rapid eye movement--which is associated with a primitive part of the brain known as the pons. Accordingly, they regarded dreaming as a low-level phenomenon of no great psychological interest. When Solms looked into it, though, it turned out that the key structure involved in dreaming was actually the ventral tegmental, the same structure that Panksepp had identified as the seat of the "seeking" emotion. Dreams, it seemed, originate with the libido--which is just what Freud had believed.

Freud's psychological map may have been flawed in many ways, but it also happens to be the most coherent and, from the standpoint of individual experience, meaningful theory of the mind there is. "Freud should be placed in the same category as Darwin, who lived before the discovery of genes," says Panksepp. "Freud gave us a vision of a mental apparatus. We need to talk about it, develop it, test it." Perhaps it's not a matter of proving Freud wrong or right, but of finishing the job.

## 2


### DA

#### The stock market is booming despite corona – consumer confidence is soaring.

Ziemer 21 [Colin; New York Stock Exchange; The author may be wrong cuz it was placed under a picture so idk if it was the author or picture creds, if not assume DealBook as the author; “What is going on?” Dealbook | Business and Policy; NYTimes; 8/19/20, Updated 5/7/21; <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/19/business/dealbook/stock-market-record-high.html>] Justin

‘This market is nuts’

The S&P 500 is 0.1 percent higher than it was six months ago, setting a record at the close of trading yesterday. That doesn’t seem so momentous — until you consider what happened in between: The blue-chip index shed a third of its value in the early stages of the pandemic and then roared back, soaring more than 50 percent from its low in late March.



What gives? A new market record may seem strange when set against the human and economic devastation of the pandemic. (Or as one analyst put it: “This market is nuts.”). As Andrew explains in a guest appearance in The Morning, our sister newsletter, there are five major considerations that investors are making to justify the rally:

1️⃣ Looking past bad news today and anticipating better conditions 12 to 18 months from now

2️⃣ The continued good fortunes of a few big tech companies

3️⃣ An almighty market pop that would arise from news of a vaccine breakthrough

4️⃣ An accommodating Fed printing money and keeping rates low

5️⃣ The hope that Congress overcomes its divisions and pumps the economy with more stimulus

Can it last? “Markets often operate as something of an experiment in mass psychology,” The Times’s Matt Phillips writes. So what could dampen the mood? • The market is very top-heavy, with just five companies — Alphabet, Amazon, Apple, Facebook and Microsoft — accounting for more than a fifth of the S&P 500’s market value. Those tech giants have gained around 40 percent so far this year, while the 495 other stocks in the index have collectively lost a few percentage points. • Another potentially ominous sign comes from company insiders, who have been selling their holdings in greater numbers. The data platform AlphaSense sifted through regulatory filings for DealBook and found that disclosures of executive stock sales so far this month have already surpassed last month’s total, and are on track to beat the record set in February, when the market set its previous high. Here’s what is happening In case there was any doubt, Joe Biden has been confirmed as the Democratic presidential nominee. He was formally nominated by the party last night at the party’s national convention. Also onscreen: Former President Bill Clinton and Jill Biden rejected President Trump’s handling of the pandemic, Representative Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez highlighted progressive priorities in her cameo appearance, and other Democrats focused on improving health care. Tonight’s agenda includes Senator Elizabeth Warren (more on her below), former President Barack Obama and Senator Kamala Harris, Mr. Biden’s running mate. Cost-cutting measures at the Postal Service were put on hold. Postmaster General Louis DeJoy announced that operational changes, which drew criticism for causing mail delays and for potentially affecting voting by mail, would now take place after the November elections. A Senate panel found extensive links between the 2016 Trump campaign and Russia. The Republican-led Senate Intelligence Committee released a nearly 1,000-page report concluding that some Trump advisers maintained extensive contacts with Russian intelligence officials who sought to disrupt the 2016 election.

The shipping giant A.P. Moller-Maersk raised profit expectations. The world’s biggest container company not only reinstated full-year financial guidance, but pegged it above pre-pandemic levels, a sign that international trade may not be as bad as feared (provided there isn’t a second wave of the virus, the company noted). The Danish company’s shares jumped more than 7 percent in early trading today.

C.E.O. pay reached a seven-year high. The left-leaning Economic Policy Institute found that leaders of the 350 largest American companies earned an average of $21.3 million last year, setting the ratio of C.E.O.-to-worker pay at 320-to-1. Rising stock markets could propel executives’ pay to similarly high levels again this year, despite pandemic-inspired cuts to salaries, which tend to be a small proportion of C.E.O.’s stock and option-based pay packages.

SPACs are so hot right now Another day, another flurry of news about so-called special-purpose acquisition companies, the publicly traded M.&A. machines that are Wall Street’s hot new craze. (How hot? These “blank check” firms have raised more than $30 billion so far this year, according to SPAC Research, compared with $13.6 billion in all of 2019.) Another electric vehicle maker went public by merging with a SPAC. Canoo, which sells van-like vehicles that require a subscription, announced plans to merge with Hennessy Capital Acquisition Corp IV to gain a stock listing. It’s the fourth electric vehicle company to pursue this route, after Nikola, Lordstown Motors and Fisker. More SPACs have been founded, featuring some prominent names: • Starboard Value, the activist hedge fund, announced plans to raise $300 million, following in the footsteps of Bill Ackman and Dan Loeb. • Bill Foley, a longtime financier with plenty of experience with SPACs, raised $1.3 billion, increasing the size of the deal by $100 million. • And Kevin Hartz, the co-founder of Eventbrite, raised $200 million for a new SPAC to buy a tech start-up. Mr. Hartz explained to DealBook the thinking behind his SPAC, and how he’s dealing with the competition. Consumer internet companies, marketplaces and fintech start-ups are on his radar, and the fund’s smaller size allows it to target younger companies with founders that he wants to take a bet on, much like the traditional venture model. Indeed, he is banking on his relationships with venture funds and start-up founders around Silicon Valley to stand out in an increasingly crowded field. (In addition to founding Eventbrite, Mr. Hartz was an early investor in Airbnb and Uber.) • What, in his mind, is driving the SPAC boom? Strong equity markets are helping SPAC deals get done quickly despite pandemic-imposed travel restrictions. “We had our first org meeting with Goldman Sachs on June 18 — we retained our lawyer then — and 60 days later we’re now a public entity in the market ready to go,” Mr. Hartz told Lauren Hirsch, our new DealBook reporter. How to spend it As lockdowns ease, where people are opening their wallets shows how the pandemic is reshaping spending habits. Check out this series of infographics assembled by The Times using location-tracking data from smartphones for state- and store-level details of shopping activity. The revenge of brick-and-mortar retailers. In-store shopping is still (mostly) down from pre-pandemic times, forcing retailers with physical locations to up their online game. For some, that has paid off handsomely: Target reported its strongest sales growth in history this morning, propelled by digital sales that nearly tripled in its most recent quarter. That followed Walmart’s blowout earnings yesterday, in which its U.S. online sales doubled. • New nationwide e-commerce data also reflects this trend, with retailers that sell online as well as in store (Walmart and Target) growing faster than their online-only counterparts (Amazon). As of June, online-only retailers accounted for 55 percent of overall e-commerce sales in the U.S., according to the Census Bureau.

Look out ahead. Walmart executives said that government stimulus was the main “tailwind” driving the jump in sales: They mentioned “stimulus” 13 times on their call with analysts yesterday. Keeping up that red-hot sales streak might depend on lawmakers negotiating a new round of unemployment insurance and support measures, which is shaping up to be less generous than before. “As stimulus funds tapered off toward the end of the quarter, sales started to normalize,” Brett Biggs, Walmart’s C.F.O., said on the call.

#### Best data proves union strike victories statistically cause stock market crash.

Lee and Mas 12 [David; Princeton University and National Bureau of Economic Research; Alexandre; Princeton University and National Bureau of Economic Research; “Long-Run Impacts of Unions on Firms: New Evidence from Financial Markets, 1961–1999,” The Quarterly Journal Of Economics; February 2012; <https://academic.oup.com/qje/article-abstract/127/1/333/1834007?redirectedFrom=fulltext>] Justin

We begin analyzing the stock market reaction to union victories using event-study methodologies. The most distinctive feature of our data—crucial for our research design—is the long panel (up to 48 months before and after the election) of high frequency data on stock market returns for each firm. This feature allows us to use the pre-event data to test the adequacy of the benchmarks used to predict the counterfactual returns in the postevent period. The long panel also allows us to examine returns several months beyond the event, so as to capture the long-run expected effects of new unions, without having to rely heavily on the assumption that the stock price immediately and instantaneously adjusts to capture the expected presence of the unions.9

Our event-study analysis reveals substantial losses in market value following a union election victory—about a 10% decline in market value, equivalent to about $40,500 per unionized worker. According to our calculations, if unionization represented a one-to-one transfer from investors to workers through higher wages, this magnitude would be in line with a union wage premium of 10%. Because the total loss of market value represents the sum of transfers to workers and any other productivity impacts of unionization this implies, for example, that if the true union compensation premium were greater than 10%, there would be positive productivity effects of unions. The evidence supporting our event-study estimates is compelling: we find that these firms’ average returns are quite close to the benchmark returns every month leading up to the election, but precisely at the time of the election, the actual and benchmark returns diverge. The results for these firms are robust to a number of different specifications. In the sample of firms where we know that the union is a small fraction of the workforce, we donot find a similar divergence of returns from the benchmark.

Importantly, we find that the effect takes 15 to 18 months to fully materialize, a somewhat slow market reaction. As we discuss, this short-run mispricing can persist if exploiting the slow reaction is not sufficiently profitable to arbitrageurs. Indeed, our own analysis shows that strategies designed to exploit the mispricing entail a significant degree of fundamental risk. The fact that union victories are sufficiently rare and spread throughout time prevents the necessary diversification that could generate an attractive arbitrage opportunity. For example, our analysis suggests that attempts to exploit the short-lived mispricing would lead to a portfolio that would be dominated by simple buy-and hold strategies

The event-study estimate appears to average a great deal of heterogeneity in the effects. We additionally employ a regression discontinuity (RD) design, implicitly comparing close union victories to close union losses, and consistent with DiNardo and Lee (2004), we find little evidence of a significant discontinuous relationship between the vote share and market returns. If anything, the RD point estimates show a 4% positive (though statistically insignificant) effect of union certification (vis-`a-vis union defeat). The event-study estimates vary systematically by the observed vote share, with the largest negative abnormal returns for cases where the union won the election by a large margin.

#### Crashes lead to a great depression.

Rusoff 21 [Jane; ThinkAdvisor Contributing Editor specializing in interviews with thought leaders. She has written for The New York Times, The Washington Post, USA Today and Esquire, among numerous other publications. Author/co-author of five books, Jane was a staff editor at London Express Features and Billboard’s Merchandising Magazine; “Harry Dent: ‘Biggest Crash Ever’ Likely by End of June,” ThinkAdvisor; 3/10/21; <https://www.thinkadvisor.com/2021/03/10/harry-dent-biggest-crash-ever-likely-by-end-of-june/>] Justin

Why will the downturn that you see be so harsh?

The only reason the 2008 downturn didn’t turn into a depression was that they turned on the monetary spigots so hard and blew us out of it, which kept the bubble going. They kept printing money and put it off. Now we’ve got a bigger bubble. This downturn is going to be the Great Depression that the deep recession of 2008 was [falling into].

How long do you think the depression will last?

If the economy finally falls apart after this much stimulus, economists will flip from being endlessly bullish to endlessly bearish. They’ll say, “Now we’re in a decade-long-plus depression, like the 1930s.” But I’ll say, “Nope, this thing will be hell: It’s going to do its work very fast. By 2024, it will be over.” By 2023 or 2024, we’re going to be coming out of it into what I call the next Spring Boom.

Right now, you favor investing in Treasury bonds. What’s your strategy?

Man, what’s better than sleeping with 30-year Treasury bonds — the safest investment in the reserve currency of a country that’s in big trouble — but not as much as Europe and Japan are in and nowhere near as much as China is in. We’re in the best house in a bad neighborhood.

What will happen to the 30-year Treasury bond during the massive crash you foresee?

It’s going to fall to half a percent and maybe zero. It will expand your money 30%, 40%, 50%, while stocks are crashing 70%, 80%, 90%. Real estate will go down 30%, 40%, 50%. Commodities are already down 50% and are going down another 30% or 40%. Everything is going to default. Cash will preserve your money. The 30-year Treasury will magnify your money.

So, do you think 50% of an investment portfolio should be in Treasurys?

If you’re willing to take more risk, you’ll have one bucket in long-term U.S. Treasury bonds and maybe in a few other good governments, like Sweden or Australia. Triple-A corporates could go in there too. Then you’ll have another bucket — of short stocks, not leveraged.

Stocks are very volatile on the way down. You can also be in REITs that are in very solid areas, like multi-family housing in affordable cities and medical facilities because those will hold up the best.

There’s a discernable euphoria now among investors. But John Templeton, the renowned investor and fund manager, famously said that “bull markets die on euphoria.” Do you agree with that?

Yes. And Jeremy Grantham [GMO co-founder] said [on Jan. 5] this level of euphoria means you’re within months — not years — of a major bubble peak. You’re at the end.

Wil cryptocurrency be part of that huge crash?

Yes. I think Bitcoin is the big thing long term and that crypto and blockchain is a big trend. It’s like the internet of finance — money and assets — instead of information. So it’s a big deal — but in its early stages.

Bitcoin is going to go to 58 [thousand], 60, 80 — and then end up back at 3,000 to 4,000. I would buy it long term, a couple of years from now. I wouldn’t touch it between now and then.

What are your expectations for the economy once the pandemic substantially fades?

Some industries are never going to come back. We’re not back to where we were before COVID — by GDP or any other major indicator. Everybody is acting like “When we get over COVID, we’ll be back better than ever.” The stock market is already anticipating that. But it’s wrong.

The only reason people are spending is because the government handed businesses and consumers tons of money. But it will get to a point where it’s not going to matter how much money is printed — and then you’ll have an avalanche. A huge collapse is coming.

What specifically will cause it?

There’s is no way you can [keep] having fake earnings, fake GDP, fake interest rates and super-high valuations. Financial assets have to come down to reality.

What are the implications?

Loans will fail by the boatload. Then money disappears. That causes bank and business failures. We have to get all the financial leverage, financial assets and debt out of our economy.

Twenty percent of public companies are zombies. They can’t even pay their debt service in a growth economy. They’re already dead. We’ve just keeping them alive with embalming.

#### Extinction.

Liu '18 [Qian; 11/13/18; Managing Director of Greater China for The Economist Group, previously director of the global economics unit and director of Access China for the Economist Intelligence Unit, PhD in economics from Uppsala University; "The next economic crisis could cause a global conflict. Here's why," <https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2018/11/the-next-economic-crisis-could-cause-a-global-conflict-heres-why/>] Justin

The next economic crisis is closer than you think. But what you should really worry about is what comes after: in the current social, political, and technological landscape, a prolonged economic crisis, combined with rising income inequality, could well escalate into a major global military conflict. The 2008-09 global financial crisis almost bankrupted governments and caused systemic collapse. Policymakers managed to pull the global economy back from the brink, using massive monetary stimulus, including quantitative easing and near-zero (or even negative) interest rates. But monetary stimulus is like an adrenaline shot to jump-start an arrested heart; it can revive the patient, but it does nothing to cure the disease. Treating a sick economy requires structural reforms, which can cover everything from financial and labor markets to tax systems, fertility patterns, and education policies. Policymakers have utterly failed to pursue such reforms, despite promising to do so. Instead, they have remained preoccupied with politics. From Italy to Germany, forming and sustaining governments now seems to take more time than actual governing. And Greece, for example, has relied on money from international creditors to keep its head (barely) above water, rather than genuinely reforming its pension system or improving its business environment. The lack of structural reform has meant that the unprecedented excess liquidity that central banks injected into their economies was not allocated to its most efficient uses. Instead, it raised global asset prices to levels even higher than those prevailing before 2008. In the United States, housing prices are now 8% higher than they were at the peak of the property bubble in 2006, according to the property website Zillow. The price-to-earnings (CAPE) ratio, which measures whether stock-market prices are within a reasonable range, is now higher than it was both in 2008 and at the start of the Great Depression in 1929. As monetary tightening reveals the vulnerabilities in the real economy, the collapse of asset-price bubbles will trigger another economic crisis – one that could be even more severe than the last, because we have built up a tolerance to our strongest macroeconomic medications. A decade of regular adrenaline shots, in the form of ultra-low interest rates and unconventional monetary policies, has severely depleted their power to stabilize and stimulate the economy. If history is any guide, the consequences of this mistake could extend far beyond the economy. According to Harvard’s Benjamin Friedman, prolonged periods of economic distress have been characterized also by public antipathy toward minority groups or foreign countries – attitudes that can help to fuel unrest, terrorism, or even war. For example, during the Great Depression, US President Herbert Hoover signed the 1930 Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act, intended to protect American workers and farmers from foreign competition. In the subsequent five years, global trade shrank by two-thirds. Within a decade, World War II had begun. To be sure, WWII, like World War I, was caused by a multitude of factors; there is no standard path to war. But there is reason to believe that high levels of inequality can play a significant role in stoking conflict. According to research by the economist Thomas Piketty, a spike in income inequality is often followed by a great crisis. Income inequality then declines for a while, before rising again, until a new peak – and a new disaster. Though causality has yet to be proven, given the limited number of data points, this correlation should not be taken lightly, especially with wealth and income inequality at historically high levels. This is all the more worrying in view of the numerous other factors stoking social unrest and diplomatic tension, including technological disruption, a record-breaking migration crisis, anxiety over globalization, political polarization, and rising nationalism. All are symptoms of failed policies that could turn out to be trigger points for a future crisis. Voters have good reason to be frustrated, but the emotionally appealing populists to whom they are increasingly giving their support are offering ill-advised solutions that will only make matters worse. For example, despite the world’s unprecedented interconnectedness, multilateralism is increasingly being eschewed, as countries – most notably, Donald Trump’s US – pursue unilateral, isolationist policies. Meanwhile, proxy wars are raging in Syria and Yemen. Against this background, we must take seriously the possibility that the next economic crisis could lead to a large-scale military confrontation. By the logic of the political scientist Samuel Huntington , considering such a scenario could help us avoid it, because it would force us to take action. In this case, the key will be for policymakers to pursue the structural reforms that they have long promised, while replacing finger-pointing and antagonism with a sensible and respectful global dialogue. The alternative may well be global conflagration.

## Solvency

### 1NC – Circumvention

#### Aff gets circumvented.

Lanard 17 [Noah Lanard, editorial fellow. Donald Trump just took another swipe at the labor unions that helped elect him, Mother Jones, 7-19-2017, Accessible Online at http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2017/07/trumps-labor-board-appointments-are-another-blow-for-unions/]

Trump’s NLRB nominees are expected to create further challenges for workers seeking to unionize. Emanuel is a shareholder and longtime lawyer at Littler, the world’s largest management-side employment law firm. Sen. Elizabeth Warren (D-Mass.) has called it is one of the nation’s “most ruthless” union-busters. Emanuel’s clients include Uber and other companies accused of violating workers’ rights, according to his ethics disclosure form.

Outside of his legal practice, Emanuel has decried California’s “terrible climate for job creation,” citing the state’s generous overtime and break requirements for employees.

Kaplan was previously an attorney for the House education and labor committee. In that role, he drafted a bill to reverse an NLRB rule, dubbed the “ambush election rule” by conservative critics, that allowed workers to vote on unionization as soon as 11 days after a petition was submitted. The bill, which did not pass, would have also reversed the board’s recognition of micro-unions.

At Emanuel and Kaplan’s nomination hearing last week, Sens. Al Franken (D-Minn.) and Warren were particularly concerned by Emanuel’s record of defending the mandatory arbitration agreements that Carlson and many others have signed. Pressed by Franken, Emanuel declined to criticize arbitration agreements that prevent women who are sexually harassed from suing their employers in court. In theory, the legality of the arbitration agreements is now in the Supreme Court’s hands. But Ronald Meisburg, a former NLRB board member, has said it’s possible the NLRB could revisit the decision before the court decides. Emanuel told Warren he does not expect to recuse himself if the issue comes up.

The committee’s approval of both nominees along party lines on Wednesday follows other moves under Trump that are less than friendly to labor. Trump’s nominee for deputy labor secretary, Patrick Pizzella, was criticized last week for working with disgraced lobbyist Jack Abramoff to advocate for what was compared to sweatshop labor in the Northern Mariana Islands, a US commonwealth, in the early 2000s. The goods, which were often made by Chinese and Filipino workers, had the advantage of being stamped “Made in the USA.”

Neil Gorsuch, whom Trump appointed to the Supreme Court, has a long record of siding with employers in labor disputes. In the court’s upcoming term, Gorsuch will hear arguments in a case that will decide whether mandatory arbitration agreements violate the National Labor Relations Act.

## Advantage – Climate Change

### 1NC – AT: Climate Policies

#### UQ sucks—

#### Climate strikes aren’t sufficient to reduce reliance on fuels.

Hayes 19 [Jason; Contributor to The Hill, director of environmental policy at the Mackinac Center for Public Policy, a research and education institute in Midland, Mich; “A global climate strike isn't enough,” The Hill; 9/19/19; <https://thehill.com/opinion/energy-environment/461809-a-global-climate-strike-isnt-enough>] Justin

A collective of influential green groups and corporations is supporting a campaign for a global climate strike from Sept. 20-27. The strike pushes young people to walk out of schools and workplaces to protest the energy sources that keep us alive and thriving. That many people are concerned about the global climate is obvious, but how will encouraging them to abandon their jobs or schools for a day or two, or seven, reduce greenhouse gas emissions?

The campaign website — globalclimatestrike.net — tells people they must “demand an end to the age of fossil fuels.” But, in the United States, we rely on these fuels for over 80 percent of the energy we use to provide basic necessities such as food, clean water, heating and air conditioning, medicine, transportation and so much more.

To make things worse, the energy sources offered up as replacements for fossil fuels — typically wind and solar — couldn’t even exist without fossil fuels. Natural gas, oil and coal are needed to mine, refine, process and ship the metals, rare earth minerals, silicone, plastics and various chemicals that go into renewables. Without steel, there are no towers to hold up wind turbines. Without rare earths, there are no solar panels. Adding to this conundrum is the fact that wind and solar cannot provide reliable power. They are intermittent, meaning they must be propped up by more reliable energy sources, such as natural gas.

A group of environmental policy experts has put together MyClimatePledge.com as our response, because we’d like to challenge climate strikers and to help them appreciate that striking won’t be enough.

#### Climate strikers don’t have enough leverage.

Dolsak and Prakash 19 [Nives and Aseem; We write on environmental issues, climate politics and NGOs; “Climate Strikes: What They Accomplish And How They Could Have More Impact,” 9/14/19; Forbes; <https://www.forbes.com/sites/prakashdolsak/2019/09/14/climate-strikes-what-they-accomplish-and-how-they-could-have-more-impact/?sh=2244a9bd5eed>] Justin

But strikers must have the leverage to accomplish their goals

Strikers represent the demand for climate action. But who will supply these policies and what leverage do strikers have over these policymakers? This is where climate strikes could run into a problem.

Strikers have leverage when their absence from work disrupts activities that are valuable to policymakers. If railway workers go on strike, trains cannot run and the public is upset. When airline pilots go on strike, people cannot fly, and airlines lose revenue. By some accounts, the 48-hour strike of British Airways pilots (regarding a pay dispute) in September 2019 will cost the company about £100 million.

What leverage do the climate strikers have? Assuming most of the strikers are students, what costs might their strikes impose on the actors that need to change their climate policies (namely, governments and fossil fuel firms)?

Student strikes probably do not disrupt the government or fossil fuel firms. The main bearer of these costs are the conscientious teachers who need to figure out how they are going to make up for the lost teaching time.

## Advantage – Healthcare

### 1NC – Hospitals Turn

#### Nurse strikes devastates hospitals

Wright 10 Sarah H. Wright July 2010 "Evidence on the Effects of Nurses' Strikes" <https://www.nber.org/digest/jul10/evidence-effects-nurses-strikes> (Researcher at National Bureau of Economic Research)

U.S. hospitals were excluded from collective bargaining laws for three decades longer than other sectors because of fears **that strikes by nurses might imperil patients' health**. Today, while unionization has been declining in general, it is growing rapidly in hospitals, with the number of unionized workers rising from 679,000 in 1990 to nearly one million in 2008. In Do Strikes Kill? Evidence from New York State (NBER Working Paper No. 15855), co-authors Jonathan Gruber and Samuel Kleiner carefully examine the effects of nursing strikes on patient care and outcomes. The researchers match data on nurses' strikes in New York State from 1984 to 2004 to data on hospital discharges, including information on treatment intensity, patient mortality, and hospital readmission. They conclude that nurses' strikes were **costly to hospital patients**: in-hospital mortality **increased by 19.4 percent** and hospital readmissions **increased by 6.5 percen**t for patients admitted during a strike. Among their sample of 38,228 such patients, an estimated **138 more individuals died than would have without a stri**ke, and 344 more patients were readmitted to the hospital than if there had been no strike. "Hospitals functioning during nurses' strikes **do so at a lower quality of patient care,"** they write. Still, at hospitals experiencing strikes, the measures of treatment intensity -- that is, the length of hospital stay and the number of procedures performed during the patient's stay -- show no significant differences between striking and non-striking periods. Patients appear to receive the same intensity of care during union work stoppages as during normal hospital operations. Thus, the poor outcomes associated with strikes suggest that they might reduce hospital productivity. These poor health outcomes increased for both emergency and non-emergency hospital patients, even as admissions of both groups decreased by about 28 percent at hospitals with strikes. The poor health outcomes were not apparent either before or after the strike in the striking hospitals, suggesting that they are attributable to the strike itself. And, the poor health outcomes do not appear to do be due to different types of patients being admitted during strike periods, because patients admitted during a strike are very similar to those admitted during other periods. Hiring replacement workers apparently does not help: hospitals that hired replacement workers **performed no better** during strikes than those that did not hire substitute employees. In each case, patients with conditions that required intensive nursing were more likely to fare worse in the presence of nurses' strikes.

### 1NC – No Impact

#### Biological weapon attacks are too complex --- terrorists will choose not to pursue or will fail

---at: anthrax

---at: crispr

Revill ‘17 [Dr. James Revill, Research Fellow with the Harvard Sussex Program at SPRU, Past as Prologue? The Risk of Adoption of Chemical and Biological Weapons by Non-State Actors in the EU, European Journal of Risk Regulation, 8 (2017), pp. 626–642, https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/6B824CDE0E25FD86AC3D0BD07822A743/S1867299X17000356a.pdf/div-class-title-past-as-prologue-the-risk-of-adoption-of-chemical-and-biological-weapons-by-non-state-actors-in-the-eu-div.pdf]

The second factor is “the perceived complexity of the innovation in terms of adoption and use”.40 This is important in the innovation literature, as Rogers remarked, “[t]he complexity of an innovation, as perceived by members of a social system, is negatively related to its rate of adoption”.41 Several scholars of terrorist innovation have also highlighted the issue of complexity;42 or, as Cragin et al have stated, “[h]ow simple or complex a technology appears affects perceptions of how risky it will be to adopt.”43 In most cases terrorist groups appear to have largely opted for the simplest pathway towards the achievement of their goals and the weapons used tend to be vernacular, functional devices drawing on local and readily-available materials, rather than sophisticated, “baroque” technologies. This is certainly the case with IEDs, the history of which is characterised largely by incremental innovations – although nevertheless frequently effective ones – with many means of delivery recycled from the past.44 Complexity can therefore be seen as important in the adoption of technology by terrorists generally, but is perhaps particularly acute in the case of CBW technology. Some CBW can be relatively simple: “chlorine-augmented, vehicle-borne IEDs,” as employed by Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) from 2006 to 2007 are not sophisticated weapons.45 Attacks on chemical production facilities, an apparent tactic of Serbian forces in the early to mid-1990s,46 employed relatively simple technologies – specifically explosives – with toxicity a secondary by-product. Direct contamination of food,47 drink48 or healthcare products49 does not require particularly sophisticated technology for the purposes of delivery – although may require some considerable skill to culture and scale-up a biological agent – and has been a common approach in European CBW incidents.50 Similarly, the contamination of water systems, something familiar to Europe,51 can also be relatively easily attempted. However, in most cases such methods of dissemination have generated results that are far short of the “mass destruction” that CBW are associated with, although this does not mean such a possibility can be ignored by those working on public health preparedness. Although some relatively simple approaches could cause significant harm, mass casualty attacks still require considerable expertise, something particularly acute in the context of biological weapons.52 The most effective route to weaponising biology is arguably through the process of aerosolising agents, something recognised mid-way through the last century as opening up the theoretical possibility of using biological weapons on a gigantic scale.53 However, realising such theoretical potential is difficult and it took states decades to develop more predictable biological weapons,54 and even then such weapons were acutely vulnerable to environmental factors.55 For non-state groups such complexity has proven a significant barrier to CBW development. By means of an example, one of the best-resourced biological weapons programs, that of Aum Shinrikyo, failed variously because the group acquired the wrong strain, contaminated fermenters and were faced with insurmountable production and dissemination difficulties.56 There are of course exceptions, such as the 2001 anthrax Letter Attacks in the US. However, if one accepts the conclusions of the FBI that this sophisticated attack with aerosolised anthrax in the US postal system was perpetrated by a US biodefence researcher, Dr Bruce Ivins,57 it is an exception that proves the rule. To circumvent the difficulties with aerosolisation, arguably one could use human-to-human transmissible biological agents as part of a suicide bioterror operation. There are good reasons for concern over how crude suicide bioterrorists could employ such a tactic. However, the use of highly contagious agents is also poorly predictable and would have to deal with social factors, such as the “spatial contact process among individuals”, which can spell “out the difference between large-scale epidemics and abortive ones”.58 The counter to this argument is the growing access to data and the changing human geography of the life sciences. Some 83% of European households reportedly are online, effectively allowing access to what is a growing body of available data on CBW, including so-called bioterrorist “recipes” and “blueprints” that are available in both mainstream scientific as well as more subversive literatures online. It is also clear that there is a changing human geography in European life sciences (for peaceful purposes), with the emergence of 30 DIY-bio groups located in Europe59 and some 80 European teams in the international Genetically Engineered Machines (IGEM) competition in 2016.60 This is compounded by reports that groups such as Daesh have deliberately sought to recruit foreign fighters “including some with degrees in physics, chemistry, and computer science, who experts believe have the ability to manufacture lethal weapons from raw substances”.61 Whilst it would be unwise to ignore such developments, there is a need for caution in looking at the extent to which new technologies and geographies will facilitate the adoption of chemical and biological weapons by groups seeking to target European countries. First, data is not information, and information is not knowledge, let alone the tacit knowledge required for CBW.62 In many cases a degree of determination and dedication will be required merely to separate online fantasy from fact and identify operationally useful information (of relevance to the European context) from nonsense (or information pertinent to contexts other than Europe). Second, with new technologies there is the potential for such tools to enable some, but certainly not all, actors, and even then new technologies bring new challenges. CRISPR, gene editing technology is currently seen as a particular source of promise and peril, which purportedly enables “even largely untrained people to manipulate the very essence of life”.63 As much may be technically true, yet “untrained people” would nonetheless require some guidance in identifying suitable areas of genetic structures to manipulate. Moreover, CRISPR would only get aspiring weaponeers so far, with the process of culturing, scaling-up and weaponisation still requiring considerable attention and interdisciplinary skills, typically generated through “large interdisciplinary teams of scientists, engineers, and technicians”,64 in order to be effective. Indeed, for all the progress in science and technology, biological weapons are still not used, in part, because of the complexity of such weapons; and the chemical weapons that are used today are largely the same as the chemical weapons of 100 years ago. As Robinson noted “It remains the case today that, in the design of CBW, increasingly severe technological constraint sets in as the mass-destruction end of the spectrum is approached: the greater and more assured the area-effectiveness sought for the weapon, the greater the practical difficulties of achieving it”.65

#### Won’t get close to extinction

Farquhar et al. 17 – \*director of the Global Priorities Project, M.A in Physics and Philosophy from the University of Oxford, \*\*Global Priorities Project, \*\*\*Research Associate in the FHI at the University of Oxford, Lecturer in Mathematics at St. Hugh’s College, \*\*\*\*PhD in philosophy, Researcher at the Centre for Effective Altruism, \*\*\*\*\*Academic Project Manager, Centre for the Study of Existential Risk, \*\*\*\*\*\*Director of Research at FHI [Sebastian Farquhar\*, John Halstead\*\*, Owen Cotton-Barratt\*\*\*, Stefan Schubert\*\*\*\*, Haydn Belfield\*\*\*\*\*, Andrew Snyder-Beattie\*\*\*\*\*\*, 2017, Global Priorities Project 2017, “Existential Risk Diplomacy and Governance”, <https://www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/Existential-Risks-2017-01-23.pdf>] AMarb

Recent developments in biotechnology may, however, give people the capability to design pathogens which overcome this trade-off. Some gain-of-function research has demonstrated the feasibility of altering pathogens to create strains with dangerous new features, such as vaccine-resistant smallpox40 and human-transmissible avian flu,41 with the potential to kill millions or even billions of people. For an engineered pathogen to derail humanity’s long-term future, it would probably have to have extremely high fatality rates or destroy reproductive capability (so that it killed or prevented reproduction by all or nearly all of its victims), be extremely infectious (so that it had global reach), and have delayed onset of symptoms (so that we would fail to notice the problem and mount a response in time).42 Making such a pathogen would be close to impossible at present. However, the cost of the technology is falling rapidly,43 and adequate expertise and modern laboratories are becoming more available. Consequently, states and perhaps even terrorist groups could eventually gain the capacity to create pathogens which could deliberately or accidentally cause an existential catastrophe.

#### Can’t store, scale up, disseminate, OR overcome countermeasures

Filippa Lentzos 14, PhD from London School of Economics and Social Science, Senior Research Fellow in the Department of Social Science, Health and Medicine at King’s College London, Catherine Jefferson, researcher in the Department of Social Science, Health, and Medicine at King’s College London, DPhil from the University of Sussex, former senior policy advisor for international security at the Royal Society, and Dr. Claire Marris, Senior Research Fellow in the Department of Social Science, Health and Medicine at King's College London, “The myths (and realities) of synthetic bioweapons,” 9/18/2014, http://thebulletin.org/myths-and-realities-synthetic-bioweapons7626

The bioterror WMD myth. Those who have overemphasized the bioterrorism threat typically portray it as an imminent concern, with emphasis placed on high-consequence, mass-casualty attacks, performed with weapons of mass destruction (WMD). This is a myth with two dimensions. The first involves the identities of terrorists and what their intentions are. The assumption is that terrorists would seek to produce mass-casualty weapons and pursue capabilities on the scale of 20th century, state-level bioweapons programs. Most leading biological disarmament and non-proliferation experts believe that the risk of a small-scale bioterrorism attack is very real and present. But they consider the risk of sophisticated large-scale bioterrorism attacks to be quite small. This judgment is backed up by historical evidence. The three confirmed attempts to use biological agents against humans in terrorist attacks in the past were small-scale, low-casualty events aimed at causing panic and disruption rather than excessive death tolls. The second dimension involves capabilities and the level of skills and resources available to terrorists. The implicit assumption is that producing a pathogenic organism equates to producing a weapon of mass destruction. It does not. Considerable knowledge and resources are necessary for the processes of scaling up, storage, and dissemination. These processes present significant technical and logistical barriers. Even if a biological weapon were disseminated successfully, the outcome of an attack would be affected by factors like the health of the people who are exposed and the speed and manner with which public health authorities and medical professionals detect and respond to the resulting outbreak. A prompt response with effective medical countermeasures, such as antibodies and vaccination, can significantly blunt the impact of an attack.