# 1NC – Dysfluency

## 1

### TFW

#### Interp: The affirmative may not garner offense external to the hypothetical implementation that the appropriation of outer space by private entities is unjust.

#### Resolved indicates a policy action.

Parcher 1. [Jeff. 2/26/01. “Re: Jeff P--Is the resolution a question?” <https://web.archive.org/web/20050122044927/http://www.ndtceda.com/archives/200102/0790.html>] Justin

(1) Pardon me if I turn to a source besides Bill. American Heritage Dictionary: Resolve: 1. To make a firm decision about. 2. To decide or express by formal vote. 3. To separate something into constiutent parts See Syns at \*analyze\* (emphasis in orginal) 4. Find a solution to. See Syns at \*Solve\* (emphasis in original) 5. To dispel: resolve a doubt. - n 1. Frimness of purpose; resolution. 2. A determination or decision.

(2) The very nature of the word "resolution" makes it a question. American Heritage: A course of action determined or decided on. A formal statemnt of a deciion, as by a legislature.

(3) The resolution is obviously a question. Any other conclusion is utterly inconcievable. Why? Context. The debate community empowers a topic committee to write a topic for ALTERNATE side debating. The committee is not a random group of people coming together to "reserve" themselves about some issue. There is context - they are empowered by a community to do something. In their deliberations, the topic community attempts to craft a resolution which can be ANSWERED in either direction. They focus on issues like ground and fairness because they know the resolution will serve as the basis for debate which will be resolved by determining the policy desireablility of that resolution. That's not only what they do, but it's what we REQUIRE them to do. We don't just send the topic committtee somewhere to adopt their own group resolution. It's not the end point of a resolution adopted by a body - it's the prelimanary wording of a resolution sent to others to be answered or decided upon.

(4) Further context: the word resolved is used to emphasis the fact that it's policy debate. Resolved comes from the adoption of resolutions by legislative bodies. A resolution is either adopted or it is not. It's a question before a legislative body. Should this statement be adopted or not.

#### The appropriation of outer space is permanent control.

TIMOTHY JUSTIN TRAPP, JD Candidate @ UIUC Law, ’13, TAKING UP SPACE BY ANY OTHER MEANS: COMING TO TERMS WITH THE NONAPPROPRIATION ARTICLE OF THE OUTER SPACE TREATY UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2013 No. 4]

The issues presented in relation to the nonappropriation article of the Outer Space Treaty should be clear.214 The ITU has, quite blatantly, created something akin to “property interests in outer space.”215 It allows nations to exclude others from their orbital slots, even when the nation is not currently using that slot.216 This is directly in line with at least one definition of outer-space appropriation.217 [\*\*Start Footnote 217\*\*Id. at 236 (“Appropriation of outer space, therefore, is ‘the exercise of exclusive control or exclusive use’ with a sense of permanence, which limits other nations’ access to it.”) (quoting Milton L. Smith, The Role of the ITU in the Development of Space Law, 17 ANNALS AIR & SPACE L. 157, 165 (1992)). \*\*End Footnote 217\*\*]The ITU even allows nations with unused slots to devise them to other entities, creating a market for the property rights set up by this regulation.218 In some aspects, this seems to effect exactly what those signatory nations of the Bogotá Declaration were trying to accomplish, albeit through different means.219

#### Violation: they don’t defend the topic – cx proves. At best they’re extra topical which is a voter for exploding limits and inflating aff solvency or effects topical which is worse, since any small aff can spill up to the resolution.

#### Vote neg for competitive equity and clash: changing the topic favors the aff because it destroys the only stasis point and makes prep impossible because any ground is self-serving, concessionary, and from distorted literature bases. Their model allows someone to specialize for 4 years giving them an edge over people who switch every 2 months. Filter this through debate’s nature of being a game where both teams want to win, which becomes meaningless without constraints.

#### Impacts:

#### 1] Procedural fairness outweighs –

#### a) Intrinsicness—debate is a game and equity is necessary to sustain the activity

#### b) Probability—debate can’t alter subjectivity, but it can rectify skews

#### c) Meta-constraint—all your arguments concede fairness since you assume they will be evaluated fairly

#### d) Application—your model only indicts how fairness has been appliednot that it’s intrinsically bad—their model would justify exclusion.

#### 2] Switch Side Debate—they can read it as a K against affirmatives—forces debaters to consider issues from multiple perspectives. Non-topical affs allow individuals to establish their own metrics for what they want to debate leading to dogmatism.

#### 3] Deliberative clash is crucial to overcoming entrenched ableist ideology and can rectify power asymmetries to create egalitarianism.

Amber Knight 15, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Saint Louis University, “Democratizing Disability: Achieving Inclusion (without Assimilation) through “Participatory Parity”,” Hypatia vol. 30, no. 1 (Winter ‘15)

There is ample evidence to suggest that able-bodied people simply miss the mark when they are asked to think about life from the point of view of a person with a disability. A recent poll found that fifty-two percent of Americans would rather be dead than disabled (Disaboom 2008). Yet when you talk with people with disabilities they usually think that their lives are very much worth living. To explain these divergent perspectives, sociologists Gary Albrecht and Patrick Devlieger coined this phenomenon “the disability paradox.” They write, The disability paradox exists in two forms: first, people with disabilities report that they have serious limitations in activities of daily living, problems in performing their social roles and experience persistent discrimination, yet they say that they have an excellent or good quality of life; and, second, the general public, physicians and other health care workers perceive that persons with disabilities have an unsatisfying quality of life despite that fact that over 50% of these people report an excellent or good quality of life. (Albrecht and Devlieger 1999, 982) This paradox serves as a reminder that people are unable to transcend social privilege to think about issues objectively. Instead, it seems that many nondisabled people project their own fears and misconceptions about living with an impairment onto the lives of people with disabilities. As this analysis has shown, it seems that the **best way** to achieve **mutual understanding** **is not through** transcendence, **but by communicating** with others **across differences.** By engaging with those with disabilities, nondisabled citizens may **confront** **their** own **stigmatized ideas about impairment**, **learn to understand important aspects of disabled peoples’ lives, and** hopefully **make** better political decisions in the long run. They may also learn to think of themselves as temporarily able-bodied and come to grips with the reality that they too will likely experience disability at some point in their lives since human beings are unavoidably vulnerable to aging, illness, and impairment. Such a realization may **motivate all citizens** **to consider their own stake in creating just arrangements that enhance everybody’s opportunities to occupy public space.** Therefore, even though Fraser specifically acknowledges that gaps between procedural fairness and substantive justice **may occur**, she cautiously implies that fair deliberation in the absence of structural power asymmetries will foster **mutual understanding** and likely generate outcomes that further **reduce social disparities** (Fraser 2007, 331). This line of thought is certainly circular since substantive policies **that reduce disparities are** necessary **to ensure procedural parity**, **and just procedures are required in order to bring about just outcomes**. To escape this cycle and realistically apply her framework, Fraser proposes the idea of “good enough deliberation.” She explains: This expression refers to deliberation that, while tainted by power asymmetries and thus falling short of procedural parity, is “good enough” to generate outcomes that **reduce disparities**, **so** that the next round **of political argument proceeds on terms that are** somewhat **more fair and can be expected to lead to still better outcomes,** and so on. (Fraser 2007, 332) Fraser therefore remains optimistic that incremental changes **in the relations of deliberation will yield more** egalitarian decisions. From a disability perspective, this concept serves as a reminder that actively working to include people with a range of impairments in formal and informal democratic spaces is paramount to achieving substantive policies that procure social justice. In sum, preserving difference is in democracy’s best interest, since it not only follows through on the promise of preserving human dignity, but also leads to better deliberative outcomes that have the potential to benefit the public at large. The outcomes of deliberations cannot be determined in advance, but it is possible that interactions between able-bodied and disabled individuals may be **progressively transformative**. In any case, if people with disabilities are persistently isolated, marginalized, and excluded, individuals with disabilities are surely denied their human dignity, and the political community will never know what it is denying itself.

#### No impact turns – T is just like a disad or K – just like the cap k that says non-topical affs reinforce capitalism – impositions are inevitable because the negative has the burden of rejoinder – every link says the aff did something wrong and theres a version of the aff that wouldn’t have linked

## 2

### K

#### Capitalism causes massive violence and inevitable extinction – the fundamental task is developing tools for organization and tactics to bring about revolution.

Escalante ‘19

[Alyson, revolutionary Marxist (duh), philosophy at U of Oregon. 09/08/2019. “Truth and Practice: The Marxist Theory of Knowledge”. https://web.archive.org/web/20190910040756/https://failingthatinvent.home.blog/2019/09/08/truth-and-practic-the-marxist-theory-of-knowledge/] pat

The world we live in today is in a dire state. Climate destruction continues at a fast pace, and every with every passing day, capitalism proves itself to be incapable of addressing this. Capitalist production and its endless drive for resources to match artificial market demands has created a climate crisis that leaves us on the brink of potential extinction.

Governments around the world are turning to far right and fascist leaders to assuage their fears of an uncertain future, and the most marginalized and oppressed suffer because of it. Fascism is on the rise, and history tells us very clearly what that can result in without opposition.

The decaying US empire continues to lash out in violence across the globe in a desperate attempt to re-assert its power and hegemony. Whole countries are destroyed in its desperate bids for more fossil fuels. The world burns from America’s white phosphorus weaponry.

The need for a revolutionary movement capable of replacing capitalism with something better has never been so clear. The choice between socialism or barbarism has never been so stark. More and more people are starting to realize that reform cannot save us, that capitalism and imperialism themselves are the problem, and that we must unite and band together to fight for a better world.

The question then is: how will we know what strategies, what tactics, and what ideas to unite around? If the skeptics and postmodernists are correct that knowledge is always relative and localized, then we cannot built a global and universal strategy to unite around. If they are correct then we are doomed to small acts of localized or individual resistance in the face of apocalypse. To embrace such a vision of the world (with its accompanying epistemological skepticism) is to embrace defeat.

The masses do not want to embrace defeat, they want to know how to fight back. Marxism can provide the tools necessary to engage in that fight.

Marxism, with its self criticism and its insistence on incorporating the valuable ideas of its critics has created a means for unifying workers across the globe with anti-colonial and anti-imperialist struggles. The Marxist belief in the possibility of true ideas, tested and verified in practice, creates the possibility for unity on a global scale. The scientific status of Marxism means that as our climate changes, as our world looks more and more grim, Marxism will adapt through struggle and practice; it will provide us with the ideas and tools we need to fight and win.

There will be no victory for the workers of the world without the ability to wield a revolutionary science. What is at stake in questions of Marxist epistemology is the very possibility of creating a philosophical and scientific basis for revolution. We must defend this possibility. We must defend the scientific status of Marxism, and must insist on the possibility of victory.

#### Fantasies of disabled bodies as inherently resistant to capitalism mystifies how disability becomes a site of value extraction and papers over Western privilege.

Puar ‘17 Jasbir Puar is an Associate Professor of Women’s and Gender Studies at Rutgers University and has a Ph.D. in Ethnic Studies from UC Berkeley. “Crip Nationalism: From Narrative Prosthesis to Disaster Capitalism,” Chapter 2 in “The Right to Maim: Debility, Capacity, Disability” Language edited NT 18 rc/pat

Neoliberal investments in the body as portfolio, as site of entrepreneurship, entail transition of some disabled bodies from the disciplinary institutions of containment, quarantine, and expulsion into forms of incorporative biopolitical control. David Mitchell and Sharon Snyder argue that “disabled people have shifted from modernity’s exception (a line of defect to be isolated and eradicated) to postmodernist [neoliberal] exceptionality (failing bodies resuscitated by an increasingly medicalized state). In this latter state, the ontology of disability retrieves a formerly fallen object and makes it newly available for cultural rehabilitation,” a euphemism for producing cultural docility.45 Mitchell and Snyder track this shift of people with disabilities located from “a former era of economic burden” of paternalistic, institutional, and welfare regimes when disabled people were “social pariahs,” to what they term “objects of care” that impel the investment of service economies and neoliberal strategies of intervention and rehabilitation—“a ‘hot’ ticket item for potential research and funding schemes.”

Mitchell and Snyder’s claim situates the disabled body as the site of extreme productivity— and thus, profitability— precisely through its lack of conventional productive laboring value. Once excluded from the labor system because of their “unproductivity,” disabled bodies have become the “sites for the exercise of the primitive accumulation that fuels capitalism.” This productivity is thus not “measured by his or her ability to produce goods and ser vices that satisfy social/human needs,” as Erevelles points out, but rather “based solely on capitalist exploitative demands for increasing profit.”48

And yet, despite this profitability, Mitchell and Snyder argue that the disabled non/laborer is also a resistant non-capacitated body, implicitly challenging the incomplete liberal proj ect of docility by refusing to assimilate into a laboring capacity. In echoing Russell and Malhotra’s conviction that disability reveals a central contradiction, a paradox even, of capitalism, Mitchell and Snyder laud Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri’s rerouting from the worker as the paradigmatic resistant subject in Marxist theory to “living labor” or “non- productive bodies,” as the nascent site of dissent. No longer able to locate a single site of re sis tance to capitalism in a “ simple, agonistic division of labor,” Mitchell and Snyder ask, “Where does re sistance manifest itself once a concept of the workers’ revolution no longer seems tenable and how will this re sis tance govern itself without the institution of new hierarchies of in equality?”49 In other words, the undermining of capitalism will come from those who cannot or will not work, from those whose “capacities make them ‘unfit’ for labor.”50 This unfitness, they argue, proves “imminently productive” because these bodies inhabit and generate alternative biopo liti cal scripts of consumption, family, and nation.51 They evidence this assertion by averring that “the disabled people that we know are some of the worst consumers on the planet because they have neither the means, the interest, nor the gullibility of mistaking meaning with market . . . disabled artists in the U.S. live some of the most sparingly non- consumptive lives and, yet, this is what we admire about them the most.”52

I will leave aside for a moment the geopolitical inflections fueling certitude regarding the passé potential of organized resistance at the point of production. The claim about the inherent resistant capacity of the non-productive disabled laborer bears a complex relation to Mitchell and Snyder’s earlier conviction that disabled bodies have now transitioned into objects of care that represent a unique site for the capture of every element for capitalist profit. Do the individual consumption practices of disabled people (artists) mitigate, even remotely, the profitability of the sites of primitive accumulation that objects of care generate? Further, the resistance of non-consumptive lives pales in a global economic context where, as Gayatri Spivak reminds us, humanistic training in consumerism is foreclosed for populations whose labor creates consumer opportunities for others. The (individual) capacity to consume—or to refuse to consume—is already predicated on the privileged position of the consumer-citizen. Mitchell and Snyder lionize the non-laboring debilitated body as the new threshold of resistance — a crypto- capacity — via their positions as improper producers as well as consumers. But this formulation, as much as it would seem empowering to embrace, actually relies on the occlusion of the centrality of debilitation to the workings of capitalism. It effaces the unflinching need for “social pariahs” available for injury, excluded from the economies that hail certain bodies worthy of being objects of care, however compromised this inclusion may be. There are surely individuals with disabilities [disabled people] who perhaps neither labor nor consume “properly,” but any resistance this may signal is not an a priori feature of being disabled. Further, populations that are not roped into an economy of rehabilitative objects of care are sites of profit precisely for their availability for injury, their inability to labor, their exclusion from adequate health care, and their ideological production as lazy, criminal, and burdensome. While these populations may well enact various forms of resistance to capitalism, they do not escape the violent pro cesses of primitive accumulation that extract profit from the disposability that threatens these exact populations.

Mitchell and Snyder further vacillate between the figures of the resistant non- productive unfit non/worker and that very same worker as incorporated into capitalist sites of profit. They argue that “we are increasingly approaching a time when all that formerly passed as the undesirability of life in a disabled body proves increasingly ‘advantageous’ from the standpoint of an immaterial labor market.” The immaterial labor market is a reference to technologies that allow for productivity to be redefined against the grain of the “laboring body”— for example, fostering virtual participation in workplaces for mobility- impaired individuals. However, these very same technologies, driven by the conventional laboring body, produce vastly debilitated populations across the globe, from Chinese laborers in Apple factories who commit suicide, to wheelchair technology that enhances mobility developed in Israel 48 on the backs of Palestinian oppression and immobility, to the mountains of e-waste hand-sanded by the working poor in India, to the neo colonial extraction of minerals and natural substances from resource- rich areas for the purposes of manufacturing hardware.

Is it possible that the figure of the non-productive disabled body becomes something of a fetish in Mitchell and Snyder’s text, recoding resistance as a form of automatic capacitation, an onto-crypto-capacity? This body occludes, to some extent, populations that are neither positioned as resistant to capitalism nor promoted as objects of care. Rather these populations are constructed as objects of imminent disposability, continually subjected to paternalistic austerity regimes, violent institutionalization, and debilitation that is not in any way redeemable through cultural rehabilitation. (Cultural rehabilitation as an ave nue to normalization can be eschewed only if in fact it is an available possibility to turn away from.) Their debilitation functions as a form of value extraction for otherwise disposable bodies. Lauding the inherent resistance to capitalism of disabled bodies as well as the advantages of the immaterial labor market for people with disabilities both depend on three factors: first, the assumption or invocation of the identity or grouping of disabled people as an a priori given; which then, secondly, entails the substantial occlusion of the manufacturing of disability, that is, capitalist exploitation as an ongoing process of debilitation; which then, thirdly, submerges the supplemental relation between objects of care and social pariahs or objects of disposability — disability as a potential site of cultural incorporation and debilitation of populations made available and/or targeted for injury—in a neoliberal economy that profits from both. The burden-to-care periodization is one that therefore racializes as well as temporospatializes: between eugenics as it has been and the biopolitics of inclusion of the now (described as “post- imperialist”), a split that largely speaks to liberal spaces of privilege; and between the pro gress of the West/developed nations and the disarray of the rest/developing nations. ///

#### Capitalism both explains the rise of Trump and ableism – they’re created out of a drive for productivity and a fear of being unproductive and discarded

Andrew Harnish 17. Professor of English and Creative Writing, University of North Dakota, “Ableism and the Trump phenomenon,” Disability & Society 2017. Vol. 32, No. 3. Pp 423-428. <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/09687599.2017.1288684?needAccess=true>

The rural, white working class offered Donald Trump unprecedented support in the 2016 US presidential campaign (Collingwood 2016). Some analysts have pointed to the power of Trump’s racist rhetoric in winning these voters (Matthews 2016; Yglesias 2016). Others have noted the pull of his populist economic promises (Guo 2016; Casselman 2017). Yet Trump also used ableist rhetoric to court rural, working-class whites; his repeated use of metaphors equating bodily difference with weakness and failure played to a fear of disability that is deeply embedded in rural, white working-class culture. This fear has been magnified by the damage to working-class communities wrought by technological change and the neoliberal policies of deregulation, entitlement ‘reform,’ and disinvestment in the welfare state. Trump’s own bodily difference is also important in any understanding of his popularity with rural, working-class whites. His spectacular and even, at times, debilitated-seeming embodiment mirrors the often debilitated state of many rural, white working-class Americans, whose lack of appreciation for the values of thoroughgoing diversity too often primes them to endorse exclusive definitions of ‘normativity’ that do violence to those who are not ‘like’ them.The work of crip theorist Robert McRuer is essential to understanding the relationship between ableism, neoliberalism, and white working-class communities. His theory of ‘compulsory able-bodiedness’ (McRuer 2006) explains why disability is so often pathologized and why the prospect of bodily difference can seem terrifying in neoliberal environments. According to McRuer (2006, 2), compulsory able-bodiedness elevates ‘normative’ bodily performances and stigmatizes every performance that fails to conform to this standard. For McRuer, compulsory able-bodiedness is enforced by corporations, policy-makers, and citizens, and because neoliberal values dominate government in the United States, those Americans who find themselves in need of assistance – whether economic or bodily, or some combination of the two – are not just stigmatized, but also offered quite limited opportunities for support and care due to the curtailment and/or privatization of government-provided social services. During the campaign, Trump alluded to the harm done by these neoliberal policies, but his Cabinet choices suggest that his legislative agenda will draw on his arch-capitalist roots. This agenda is liable to be even more toxic than his rhetoric for people with disabilities—and Trump’s rhetoric is toxic. The title of his policy guidebook, Crippled America: How to Make America Great Again (Trump 2015), offers the ugliest example of what became a pattern of ableist language over the course of his campaign. The text makes no reference to actual people with disabilities, and offers no explanation as to how the US economic predicament corresponds to authentic crip experience. Instead, throughout, Trump gleefully pathologizes disability by using the title as a metaphor for economic stagnation. For Trump, ‘crippled’ means not being ‘great’ (Trump 2015, ix), not being excellent (2015, xi), and not winning (2015, 1). In Trump’s vision, being ‘crippled’ is equivalent to being ‘a mess’ (2015, 8), getting ‘killed’ (2015, 20), and being weak and submitting (2015, 43). The pattern of Trump’s ableist rhetoric extends to his mockery of the New York Times reporter Serge Kovaleski, his denigration of the conservative pundit and wheelchair user Charles Krauthammer – Trump called him ‘a “loser” who “just sits there”’ (Mizrahi 2015) – and his routine belittling of his opponents’ mental difference. But reprehensible as it is, Trump’s ableist rhetoric plainly has purchase. One reason is simple: many in the white working class – and the working class writ large – are deeply fearful of disability. Until recently, life for rural, white, able-bodied Americans was broadly gratifying. The automation of agriculture, the outsourcing of manufacturing, and the neoliberal assault on social services have left many rural Americans unable to find jobs in their communities and debilitated by the great distances they must travel to find employment. Life in rural America is increasingly precarious, yet rural American culture does not have a strong tradition of valuing bodily difference or conceiving of people as having worth beyond their labor value. While the urban working class has access to a range of (often inadequate) government services, the rural working class often lacks even this limited access. Low population density, limited access to public transportation, and few social service offices make rural communities difficult to navigate for those with disabilities. Yet, at least electorally, rural communities have not generally embraced the services that might make the neoliberal disruptions of the last quarter century more endurable. Part of this is because the culture of rural America remains independent, rooted in family and contemptuous of the costs and diversity of the metropolis, scornful of social investments, the ‘welfare’ that always seems to benefit ‘someone else’ (Williams 2016). Part, too, is due to a powerful conservative media apparatus that is quick to denounce urban entitlements, but seldom, if ever, highlights the government subsidies that benefit its largely rural, white audience. In the face of its own increasing economic and even bodily difference, much of rural America has redoubled its isolation. This is the environment Trump preyed upon with his ableist rhetoric. Rural electoral complicity with the neoliberal assaults on the welfare state has created an environment where disabled working-class voters have few resources to fall back on. It is no wonder that many rural, working-class whites are frightened of disability. The federal government still offers people with disabilities limited financial assistance, $1070 dollars per month for ‘non-blind persons’ and $1800 dollars monthly for ‘blind persons’ (‘Facts and Figures’ 2014), but these sums are so low that many Americans cannot imagine living on them, especially as, in much of the United States, poverty is treated as a moral flaw. So far, the left has not done a good job persuading rural America that more accessible and inclusive communities will increase its flourishing. Hillary Clinton tried to make this case – she spoke directly to people with disabilities. But Donald Trump eschewed this vision, denouncing racial and disabled minorities, and promising to create rural, white working-class jobs, and trounced Clinton in rural communities. Employment seems to promise the ‘independence’ prized in rural, working-class culture. Conveniently for conservatives, these promises are also a substitute for economically costly investments in the built environment of rural communities: in public transportation, social services, and child care, investments that would make those communities more livable for people with disabilities and those with limited economic means. The rural, white working class embraced Donald Trump, but his policies are liable to make all rural Americans more vulnerable, and especially those with disabilities. His ableist rhetoric, capitalizing on an ableist culture, will increase the structural ableism that already obtains in the United States.

#### Vote negative for communist organizing – that requires collective struggle and the establishment of centralized organization to inform both theory and practice.

Kuhn ‘18

[Gabriel, Austrian-born writer and translator living in Sweden. Among his book publications is “All Power to the Councils! A Documentary History of the German Revolution of 1918-1919”. March 2018. “Don't Mourn, Organize! Is Communism a Pipe Dream—or a Viable Future?” <https://brooklynrail.org/2018/03/field-notes/Dont-Morn-Organize-Is-Communism-a-Pipe-Dreamor-a-Viable-Future>] pat

The forms of organization this requires must go further than the affinity group but stop short of the vanguard party. Affinity groups do not answer the demand for mass organizing that mass societies require. But neither do vanguard parties. They attempt to lead the masses, not organize them, and that’s a big difference. The party model might in general be insufficient for mass organizing today. The networks that movementism gave way to are perhaps more appropriate, but only if they can overcome the assumption that the looser the connections are, the better. This assumption is wrong. Loose connections might suit the needs of an ever more flexible market economy, but not of effective political organizing. To “have contacts” is not enough; you need to do something with them. And you need to stay committed to the projects you initiate. I will try to flesh this out by listing the aspects I consider most important in organizing today.

1. We need to leave sectarianism behind. The left is weak and each additional division weakens it further. In a 2011 article titled “Movement, Cadre, and the Dual Power,” Joel Olson made a simple, yet very important observation: “We believe that the old arguments between communists and anarchists are largely irrelevant today.” This must be our point of departure.

2. We need theory that is adapted to our times. It must overcome the false contradiction between “class struggle” and “cultural struggle.” There is a fruitful debate about a “new class politics” in the German-speaking world. Sebastian Friedrich, one of its main proponents, drew these conclusions in an article published by Counterpunch:

A new class politics does not relegate gender, race, and imperial legacy to issues that are supplementary to class relations. These issues, and the struggles they imply, are an integral part of class relations. In fact, feminist, anti-racist, and anti-colonial struggles are the base on which effective unified class struggles must be launched.… A new class politics must clarify where and how the specific experiences of workers based on gender, race, citizenship, and other factors converge. It must reveal the overlapping interests of workers as members of the class. This makes common struggles possible.

3. We must not rely on the “objective forces” identified by historical materialism. Subjective forces are important for change. It is easy to underestimate how much neoliberalism shapes the lives even of people opposed to it. In the Global North, political activism has become a leisure activity that people engage in or not, depending on their mood, the identity they are trying to create for themselves, or the road of “self-improvement” they have chosen. In almost all cases, it is secondary to professional careers and personal comforts. Under such circumstances, it is difficult to get anything done. There is nothing wrong with being “voluntaristic.” Radical change is dependent on people wanting radical change, no matter how much Marxists still insist on economic realities determining individual consciousness and, therefore, individuals’ capacity for political action. An organization’s efficiency relies on the individual qualities of its members, that is, responsibility, reliability, and accountability.

Making Things Concrete

If we want communism to be more than a pipe dream, we have to be willing to face reality, even if it confuses, challenges, or even frightens us. We cannot ignore struggles that refer to communist ideals, simply because they aren’t the struggles we’d like to see. If our enthusiasm for communism remains limited to lecture halls and conference rooms, it won’t be anything the powerful will lose sleep over.

The struggle that currently receives most attention among communists of all stripes in the Global North is the one in Kurdistan. In Rojava (Syrian Kurdistan), forces affiliated with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, PKK, have established a direct-democratic council system, based on the “democratic confederalism” conceived by the imprisoned PKK leader Abduallah Öcalan. Öcalan describes democratic confederalism as “a non-state political administration or a democracy without a state,” and cites Murray Bookchin’s “libertarian municipalism” as a major influence. There are people who celebrate this as a form of anarchism. But as an observant friend of mine noted, an anarchism that is imposed by a leader is a strange kind of anarchism. Besides, there are reports from the ground that challenge the libertarian narrative. The editors of Lower Class Magazine, an online project dedicated to “low budget underground journalism,” travel regularly to Kurdistan and have the following to say:

The Western left sees Rojava as the realization of a democracy “from below”: communes, councils, a confederation; no hierarchies, no party, a spontaneous mass project. Anarchists and “libertarian” communists wax lyrically about the dawn of a direct-democratic Shangri-La. […] Yes, the change in Rojava comes “from below. It is based on the power of the people, no doubt. Communes and councils are at the heart of decision-making, that is true. But as essential is the following: None of this would be happening if it wasn’t for a vanguard leading the way. The revolution in Rojava proves that Leninist vanguardism is correct, not false.

Another European journalist visiting the region noted that the cadres of the People’s Protection Units, YPG, relate to the councils of Rojava in the same way the Bolshevists related to the councils of the Soviet Union. Furthermore, there are troubling pragmatic alliances, which have included collaboration with the U.S. military. Yet the people behind Rojava Solidarity NYC sum up the situation well:

Rojava, an autonomous region in Northern Syrian, the largest revolutionary territory of the 21st century, has projected anarchist and communist ideas to the forefront of political discourse and into the pragmatic and messy reality of everyday life. … From communal relationships to the councils and self-defense units, we can assess numerous potential routes by which we can create liberated communities at home, while learning from their possibilities and pitfalls.

Rojava won’t be the answer to our problems. No single struggle ever is. But the developments in Rojava challenge us to discuss real-life strategies for radical change. It is easy to focus on shortcomings, but if this is all we ever do, where will it get us?

Councils are essential for communist projects. Their power, which is based on the direct involvement and active participation of the masses, is curtailed as soon as political interest groups, such as parties, assume control over them. This conviction separated historical council communism, represented by figures such as Otto Rühle and Anton Pannekoek, from the Bolsheviks. Pannekoek wrote:

The councils are no government; not even the most central councils bear a governmental character. For they have no means to impose their will upon the masses; they have no organs of power. All social power is vested in the hands of the workers themselves.

Unless we want the transition to communism to entail enormous human suffering (which would be utterly absurd), we need to consider the fact that billions of people will need to be fed, sheltered, nursed, provided with access to clean water, and so forth. To produce according to the needs of the people rather than the needs of profit requires enormous efforts in planning, especially if current living standards are to be upheld. (Living standards don’t equal standards of consumption—the standards of consumption in the Global North cannot and should not be upheld, since they are unsustainable.) Furthermore, we must collectively dispose of industrial and nuclear waste, weapons of mass destruction, and ticking environmental bombs. None of this is possible without a level of centralization, no matter how visceral the reactions are that the word might provoke in some circles.

Only a council system can combine the centralization required by the complexity of modern societies with participative democracy. Centralization requires formal structures. Participative democracy requires these structures to be transparent. They need to be bottom-up rather than top-down, and delegates must be directly responsible to their constituencies. The council system is the only administrative framework to provide that.

Romanticizing particular struggles rarely does any good, no matter how council-based they are—or claim to be. If radicals in the Global North fail to address concerns with respect to struggles in the Global South, it is not respectful but condescending. To escape into the intellectual poverty of cultural relativism doesn’t help. We can only evolve from critical engagement. But real-life struggles are our starting point. It makes little sense to demand struggles for communism if we shy away from engaging with the ones that exist. Arundhati Roy put it simply after spending time with Maoist Naxalites in the forests of central India, an experience she chronicled in the book Walking with the Comrades. She said: “I went in because I wanted to tell the story of who these people are.” This informs revolutionary theory and, in turn, improves revolutionary practice. Most importantly, it is crucial for saving communist struggles from betraying their own principles. Everyone can watch failure unfold. The challenge lies in helping to prevent it.

# Case

### 1NC – Presumption

#### Presumption flips neg against K affs – they have the burden of proof since they aren’t defending the rez. That’s key to ensure the neg has a shot at engagement.

#### Vote neg on presumption:

#### 1] Systems--the 1AC says institutions create social realities that replicate violence but in-round discourse does nothing to alter conditions. All you do is encourage teams to write better framework blocks.

#### 2] Spillover--they are missing an internal link as to why they need the ballot or why the reading of the aff forwards change. Empirically denied – judges vote on [x] all the time and nothing happens.

#### 3] Ivory Tower DA--advocating to do nothing and embrace disability ignores millions of disabled people who are suffering in the streets who can’t afford to do nothing. This is ivory tower analysis and re-affirms the impacts they talk about.

#### Debate is good: it gives us the self-reflexivity necessary to pass effective policy by forcing rigorous argument refinement through contestation which allows us to filter out fake news while breaking down biases – proven by debaters like Neal Katayal who made CJR reform or Leslie Wexler who passed climate policy. Destroying debate would destroy the homes of minorities who consider debate a safe space or rely on it for scholarships.

### 1NC – Theory of Power

#### Two disads to their theorizing:

#### 1] Their focus on the body as a site for politics limits emancipatory potential and recreates exclusion

Anna Mollow 4, PhD candidate in English at the University of California, Berkeley. IDENTITY POLITICS ANDDISABILITY STUDIES:A CRITIQUE OF RECENT THEORY quod.lib.umich.edu/cgi/t/text/text-idx?cc=mqr;c=mqr;c=mqrarchive;idno=act2080.0043.218;rgn=main;view=text;xc=1;g=mqrg

The most troubling aspect of Thomson's use of identity politics is her definition of disability as visible physical difference. Extraordinary Bodies locates "the disabled people of the later twentieth-century" at the end of a historical trajectory that begins with "the wondrous monsters of antiquity" and moves to "the fascinating freaks of the nineteenth-century" (58). Undoubtedly, many of the people who appeared in nineteenth-century freak shows might today be described as disabled. But other nineteenth-century constructions that have little to do with visual bodily difference—such as the hysteric or the invalid—are also important to consider in a history of disability. Thomson, however, tends to equate disability with visible difference. She writes that "the disabled body is a spectacle . . . in a complex relation between seer and seen" (136). In literature, she claims, disability "functions only as a visual difference"; and throughout history, female "deviance" is "always attributed to some visible characteristic" (10-11; 28; emphasis added) I do not mean to suggest that Thomson would deny that many people with invisible impairments are disabled; on the contrary, like each of the critics I discuss in this essay, Thomson is committed to combating oppression of people with all forms of disability. In fact, early in the first chapter of her book, she provides a definition of disability that includes a number of non-visible impairments (13). Yet Thomson does not explain in Extraordinary Bodies how her definition of disability as a visual spectacle might be reconciled with her recognition of arthritis as a disability, or with the ADA's inclusion of conditions such as carpal tunnel syndrome, Chronic Fatigue Syndrome, hypertension, and chronic back pain under the category of disability. [24] Thomson's unintentional elision of invisible disability has potentially serious political repercussions; people with unseen disabilities are often objects of suspicion and disbelief. [25] Thomson's narrow definition of disability does not result from a wish to exclude, but rather from the use of an identity politics model. Critics of identity politics point out that the construction of identity is an inevitably exclusionary process; one defines who one is in part by saying what one is not, thus producing what Butler has called a "constitutive outside" (xi). In Extraordinary Bodies, this constitutive outside might be understood as disease. Thomson's construction of a positive disabled identity is facilitated by her emphatic disassociation of disability from disease. She seeks "to recast [disability] from a form of pathology to a form of ethnicity" (6). The title of her conclusion—"From Pathology to Identity"—repeats the call for such a transition in understanding disability.

#### 2] Critical disability studies invariably reifies that which they seek to oppose and confirms liberal individualism which dooms progressive politics.

Anna Mollow 4, PhD candidate in English at the University of California, Berkeley. IDENTITY POLITICS ANDDISABILITY STUDIES:A CRITIQUE OF RECENT THEORY quod.lib.umich.edu/cgi/t/text/text-idx?cc=mqr;c=mqr;c=mqrarchive;idno=act2080.0043.218;rgn=main;view=text;xc=1;g=mqrg

Siebers's reservations about Foucault have important implications for his own arguments about identity politics. A Foucaultian analysis of identity might take Siebers's observation that individualization is a form of subjection a step further, noting that identity categories are themselves the effects of such processes. If, as Foucault claims, "species" such as "the homosexual" or "the delinquent"—or, disability scholars might add, "the handicapped person"—do not exist outside of power, but are instead produced by disciplinary regimes, then to center a political theory on any of these categories—or on variations of them such as "the disabled person," "the lesbian," or "the queer"—is to risk reifying them. This danger becomes evident when Siebers chastises postmodern theorists for their putative preoccupation with pleasure. Like Davis, Siebers formulates a critique of postmodernism that appears to depend in part upon an opposition between disability and sexuality: "Many social constructionists assume that it is extremely difficult to see through the repressive apparatus of modern society to any given body, but when they do manage to spot one, it is rarely disabled. It is usually a body that feels good and looks good—a body on the brink of discovering new kinds of pleasure, new uses for itself, and more and more power" (DT 742). The language in this passage, like that which Davis employs in his critique of "the fashionable discourse of theory," has the effect of reinscribing an opposition between disability and sexuality; that is, between the disabled body and "a body that feels good and looks good" (EN 5; DT 742). This discursive construction of people with disabilities is naturalized when Siebers asserts that the "human ego does not easily accept the disabled body. It prefers pleasure" (DT 742). Such a formulation contributes to an individualization of disability similar to that which Siebers persuasively protests at other moments: ironically, Siebers's construction of the disabled person resembles Freud's description of the narcissistic—"so long as he suffers, he ceases to love" (551). As with Davis, Siebers is not actually arguing for a de-eroticized definition of disability. Rather, it seems clear that the purpose of Siebers's contrast between "the disabled body" and "pleasure" is to highlight the physical pain and the social disempowerment that many people with disabilities face. These realities are important to emphasize, and by doing so, Siebers takes on an important challenge facing disability scholars: the need to theorize bodily pain. It seems equally important, however, to insist that disabled bodies can also be sites of pleasure and power. The passage cited above may risk reifying the figure of "the disabled body" as powerless and asexual; in this way, it illustrates the danger that identity-centered analyses can unintentionally naturalize constructions that might better be contested. Siebers's endorsement of consciousness-raising and his emphasis upon the importance of individual experience also conflict with his more Foucaultian claim that the individualization of disabled people contributes to their oppression. The Foucaultian account of subject formation, according to which the "individual is an effect of power," poses a challenge to the claims of identity politics, which grant a privileged epistemological status to individual experience (TL 98). As Siebers puts it, "representing the individual experiences of unique human kinds is clearly the goal of black studies, women's studies, and disability studies" (TO 6). Personal experience also authorizes Siebers's rejection of Donna Haraway's theory of the cyborg: "I know the truth about the myth of the cyborg, about how able-bodied people try to represent disability as a marvelous advantage, because I am a cyborg myself," he writes (DT 746). While I share Siebers's impulse to resist romanticizing depictions of disability, it nonetheless seems important to note that such romanticization is not exclusively the domain of "able-bodied people." The strategy of representing "disability as a marvelous advantage" is also employed by disability scholars such as Thomson, who identifies herself as disabled and embraces Haraway's cyborg as "the affirmed survivor of cultural otherness, ready to engage the postmodern world on its own terms" (114). And ironically, Siebers himself attributes to disability a marvelous cognitive advantage when he claims, "I know the truth . . . because I am a cyborg myself." Claiming that people with disabilities have privileged access to knowledge may have the potential to subvert assumptions that we need others' advice and intervention. But by over-emphasizing our difference, the strategy risks contributing to our excessive individualization, a process which Siebers accurately identifies as a primary means of our oppression. In addition, the confessional aspects of Siebers's writing also potentially undermine his critique of social constructions of disability as individual and personal. Siebers acknowledges the potentially depoliticizing aspects of personal narrative, but he hopes that personal narratives by people with disabilities will enable "people without disabilities to recognize our reality and theirs as a common one"; this is necessary, he believes, in order for us to gain political recognition (TO 51). Siebers's point is well taken, and his own work demonstrates that personal narrative can be an invaluable component of a political analysis of disability. [15] Yet Foucault's insistence upon the ways in which subjects are "condemned to confess" is also worth considering in relation to disability. The requirement that people with invisible or undiagnosed disabilities routinely provide first-person narratives—explain "what happened," describe "what's wrong" with them, justify their requests for accommodations when they "look fine"—exemplifies a process by which the demand to "speak the truth" contributes to the medicalization of individuals. Moreover, institutional conferral of the identity of "disabled person" often mandates the production of a narrative; many applicants for disability benefits are required to describe in detail their symptoms, daily activities, and medical histories. Identity politics movements also often demand the authentication of one's identity. Consider, for example, Siebers's assertion that "every person with a disability can recount . . . stories" in which disabled bodies "become sources of fear and fascination for able-bodied people, who cannot bear to look at the unruly sight before them but also cannot bear not to look" (DT 746). As I will discuss later, this claim illustrates Butler's argument that the consolidation of identity necessarily operates by a process of exclusion (22). One can assume that Siebers does not mean to suggest that people with unseen impairments are not disabled; but his statement nonetheless implies that only those whose disabilities are visible belong to the group comprising "every person with a disability" (DT 746). The idea that all disabled people can relate similar stories might also be considered in the context of Janet E. Halley's critique of identity politics. Halley suggests that Althusserian interpellation can be instituted, not only by a state apparatus, but also "from within resistant social movements" (44). To support this argument, she draws upon K. Anthony Appiah, who observes: "Demanding respect for people as blacks and as gays requires that there are some scripts that go with being an African-American or having same-sex desires. There will be proper ways of being black and gay, there will be expectations to be met, demands to be made." [16]Indeed, one of the dangers of identity politics is its coercive potential. As Siebers's use of an identity politics model of disability illustrates, coercion can take the form of a requirement to produce certain kinds of stories in order to be identified as disabled; it can also operate through the entrenchment of de-sexualizing and disempowering definitions of disability.

#### Even if politics currently excludes the disabled, discussing questions of implementation can revise it.

Badano 13 [Gabriele, PhD candidate at the Centre for Philosophy, Justice and Health at University College London. April 2013. “Political Liberalism and the Justice Claims of the Disabled: A Reconciliation.” <http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/tHKkbrxhGYIWAxTcJrAW/full#.UxyV-PldX-4>] JCH-PF

I argue that any proposal abandoning the language of political justice would not seem to do enough for those individuals with disabilities who fall outside the basic idea of persons as depicted by Rawls. In fact, the intuitions supporting the idea that concepts like rights and opportunities are indispensable are very strong.11 Let us go back to the examples of individuals falling outside Rawls’s idea of persons because their disabilities prevent them from being a net beneﬁt to social cooperation. They are individuals who need multiple carers to work, or whose disabilities prevent them from providing a beneﬁt to social cooperation that is large enough. To put the point more sharply, it is worth noticing that the disabilities in question are compatible with being in full possession of one’s logical and moral powers. Now, should we accept that those individuals ought to be given no rights or opportunities? An afﬁrmative answer would strike us as implausible, and for a good reason. In a liberal society, having one’s rights, opportunities and basic distributive entitlements acknowledged is one and the same as being recognized as an equal. And what is missing from Rawls’s political liberalism is precisely the idea that falling below a threshold of full cooperation should not be enough to prevent the disabled from being regarded as persons on an equal footing with anyone else. In sum, Rawls’s political liberalism is not amenable to any extension that, keeping the basic ideas of society and persons intact, is able to include a concern with the status of individuals with disabilities. In addition, the proposal that the interests of the disabled are not for public reason to protect is not satisfactory. Consequently, a substantial revision is the only way to reconcile political liberalism with our intuitions concerning what is due to the disabled. Revising political liberalism I: beyond Hartley’s contractualism The aim of this section and the next is to propose a substantial revision of Rawls’s theory that accommodates the justice claims of the disabled while upholding the project of political liberalism. A question that needs to be answered at this point is: why should we uphold the project of political liberalism, rather than endorsing a different model that more neatly ﬁts with our intuitions concerning what is due to the disabled? First, the general project of political liberalism is compelling. Rawls’s political liberalism aims to identify a common ground of political ideas that can work as the basis on which the most important political decisions should be made. This project is of the greatest importance because, if successful, it creates legitimacy by building institutions on the basis of concepts that are acceptable to each reasonable individual. Moreover, it promotes stability in societies that are characterized by deep pluralism. Second, despite Rawls’s failure to take the interests of the disabled into consideration, political liberalism is well suited to support the justice claims of individuals with disabilities. This is because the idea that the disabled are citizens who deserve our respect is part of the common culture of our societies. In other words, there is an overlapping consensus on the idea that rights, opportunities and distributive shares must be granted to individuals who are not fully cooperating members of society, including those who fall below full moral powers. It is widely believed that those with physical disabilities should have the same rights as their fellow citizens, live in a social environment that does not excessively limit their opportunities and receive beneﬁts that help meet their special needs. Besides, although the state or third parties are given exceptional rights to interfere with the autonomy of individuals with severe cognitive disabilities, it is widely recognized that the mentally disabled are citizens whose basic interests must be protected by the law.12 In the public space, any proposal that individuals who are not fully cooperating members of society should have their basic interests neglected would be widely received with outrage. Such proposal would be said to ﬁt a fascist society, not a decent one. Among other legal documents, the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (UN General Assembly, A/61/611) can be taken as the epitome of this widespread attitude. Adopted in 2006, the Convention requires that all individuals with disabilities should share in the enjoyment of equal fundamental rights.

#### Neuroscience proves neural malleability

Masland 20[Richard Masland- Contributing columnist “The Brain Reshapes Our Malleable Senses to Fit the World” <https://www.quantamagazine.org/the-brain-reshapes-our-malleable-senses-to-fit-the-world-20200324/#:~:text=Yet%20with%20modern%20methodologies%2C%20neuroscientists,brain%20neurons%20do%20physically%20change.&text=Studies%20of%20this%20phenomenon%20are,plasticity%20of%20the%20developing%20brain>. March 24th 2020] VHS AI

Yet with modern methodologies, neuroscientists have conclusively proved that the circuits of the brain neurons do physically change. Our senses are malleable because the sensory centers of the brain rewire themselves to strike a useful balance between the capacities of the available neural resources and the demands put on them by incoming sensory impressions. Studies of this phenomenon are revealing that some sensory areas have innate tendencies toward certain functions, but they show just as powerfully the plasticity of the developing brain

#### Psychoanalysis is infinitely regressive, not falsifiable, and too abstract

Gordon 1 – Paul Gordon, accomplished psychotherapist, “Psychoanalysis and Racism: The Politics of Defeat,” RACE & CLASS v. 42 n. 4, 2001, pp. 17-34.

But in the thirty years since Kovel wrote, that attempt to relate mind and society has been fractured by the advent of postmodernism, with its subsumption of the material/historical, of notions of cause and effect, to what is transitory, contingent, free-¯oating, evanescent. Psychoanalysis, by stepping into the vacuum left by the abandonment of all metanarrative, has tended to put mind over society. This is particularly noticeable in the work of the Centre for New Ethnicities Research at the University of East London, which purports to straddle the worlds of the academy and action by developing projects for the local community and within education generally.28 But**,** in marrying psychoanalysis and postmodernism, on the basis of claiming to be both scholarly and action oriented, it degrades scholarship and undermines action, and ends in discourse **analysis a language** in which metaphor passes for reality**.** Cohen's work unavoidably raises the question of the status of psycho- analysis as a social or political theory, as distinct from a clinical one. Can psychoanalysis, in other words, apply to the social world of groups, institutions, nations, states and cultures in the way that it does, or at least may do, to individuals? Certainly there is now a considerable body of literature and a plethora of academic courses, and so on, claim- ing that psychoanalysis is a social theory. And, of course, in popular discourse, it is now a commonplace to hear of nations and societies spoken of in personalised ways. Thus `truth commissions' and the like, which have become so common in the past decade in countries which have undergone turbulent change, are seen as forms of national therapy or catharsis, even if this is far from being their purpose. Nevertheless, the question remains: does it make sense, as Michael Ignatieff puts it, to speak of nations having psyches the way that individuals do? `Can a nation's past make people ill as we know repressed memories sometimes make individuals ill? . . . Can we speak of nations ``working through'' a civil war or an atrocity as we speak of individuals working through a traumatic memory or event?' 47 The problem withthe application ofpsychoanalysis to social institutionsis thatthere can be no testing of the claims made. If someone says, for instance, that nationalism is a form of looking for and seeking to replace the body of the mother one has lost, or that the popular appeal of a particular kind of story echoes the pattern of our earliest relationship to the maternal breast, how can this be proved? Thepioneers of psychoanalysis, from Freud onwards, allderivedtheirideas in the context oftheirwork with individual patients and their ideas can be examined in the everyday laboratory of the therapeutic encounter where the validity of an interpretation, for example, is a matter for dialogue between therapist and patient**.** Outside of the consulting room, there can be no **such** verification process, and the further one moves from the individual **patient,** the less purchase psychoanalyticideas canhave**.** Outside the therapeutic encounter, anything and everything can be true, psychoanalytically speaking. Butif everything is true, then nothing can be false and therefore nothing can be true. An example of Cohen's method is to be found in his 1993 working paper, `Home rules', subtitled `Some re¯ections on racism and nation- alism in everyday life'. Here Cohen talks about taking a `particular line of thought for a walk'. While there is nothing wrong with taking a line of thought for a walk, such an exercise is not necessarily the same as thinking. One of the problems with Cohen's approach is that a kind of free association, mixed with deconstruction, leads not to analysis, not even to psychoanalysis, but to . . . well, just more free association, an endless, indeed one might say pointless, play on words. This approach may well throw up some interesting associations along the way, connections one had never thought of but it is not to be confused with political analysis. In `Home rules', anything and everything to do with `home' can and does ®nd a place here and, as I indicated above, even the popular ®lm Home Alone is pressed into service as a story about `racial' invasion.

#### The world is getting better for folks with disabilities, the ADA and other innovations prove that institutional progress is possible, additionally link turns the K since it proves futurism is good

Lee Lawrence, Christian Science Monitor, “Possibility unbound: 25 years of progress for those with disability,” ’14, http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Society/2014/1116/Possibility-unbound-25-years-of-progress-for-those-with-disability

There is no question that, to many with impairments, **the modern world can still prove a daunting and sometimes downright inhospitable place**. **But** nearly **25 years after** President George H.W. Bush signed the Americans with Disabilities Act (**ADA**), **an increasing number in the United States are living** more empowered, less restricted lives.The telecommunications infrastructure and all those man-made **spaces** collectively referred to as “the built environment” – which includes cities, architecture, transportation, even parks – “**are dramatically more accessible** **today than they were in 1990** when they passed the ADA,” says Andrew Imparato, executive director of the Association of University Centers on Disabilities and former president of the American Association of People with Disabilities. **Services**, too, have **expanded**, **from transit systems** offering riders with disabilities free familiarization and safety programs to **specialized guides** at museums **to** a growing number of designers developing **clothing** with a variety of specific needs in mind. **The ADA** – “our crowning achievement,” as Mr. Imparato calls it – **set the country on a** new course. Those who have come of age since 1990 have “grown up in more integrated settings and generally have higher expectations for what is possible for people with disabilities to achieve in work and in life than did the generations that came before them,” Imparato says. **Advances in technology have triggered a** sea change. **Mainstream innovations** such as Siri double as assistive technologies, while robotics, bionics, and 3-D printers have **revolutionized** the **design and manufacture of prostheses**. And mobile phones and tablets have opened an entirely new field: apps. An ever-growing list of applications ranges from **hearing aids** to **maps** for people with low vision to communications methods for children with autism. Looking forward, **experts point to another major factor in advancing quality of life**: **the bubble of aging baby boomers**. Among people under 65, an estimated 8.5 to 14 percent have a disability. **In the over-65** **population, some estimates are** as high as **50 percent.** Just as baby boomers have set trends in everything from spending habits to dating and child rearing, **boomers with disabilities** **are** **not going to scurry off to the margins of society**. **They’re going to** demand **services and products.** Many believe this will benefit society at large. At the Indiana Institute on Disability and Community, Phil Stafford talks about progress “on the cultural front .... I think that those without disabilities have a kind of a taken-for-granted perspective on the world that we are shocked out of when we understand what daily barriers people might encounter.” This might be an announcement some can’t hear, a website others can’t access, or doorknobs yet others can’t grasp. The light goes on, Mr. Stafford says, when people see “someone use their elbow to open a door that has a lever handle. People might say ‘I never thought of that.’ It’s not great world-shaking change, but it’s those minor encounters that **make us aware.”**

#### **Relationships can occur between able and disabled people so instances of disgust and pity are not all that encompass relations towards disability**