# 1NC Strake Round 4

## 1

### TFW

#### Interp: The affirmative may not garner offense external to the hypothetical implementation that the appropriation of outer space by private entities is unjust.

#### Resolved indicates a policy action.

Parcher 1. [Jeff. 2/26/01. “Re: Jeff P--Is the resolution a question?” <https://web.archive.org/web/20050122044927/http://www.ndtceda.com/archives/200102/0790.html>] Justin

(1) Pardon me if I turn to a source besides Bill. American Heritage Dictionary: Resolve: 1. To make a firm decision about. 2. To decide or express by formal vote. 3. To separate something into constiutent parts See Syns at \*analyze\* (emphasis in orginal) 4. Find a solution to. See Syns at \*Solve\* (emphasis in original) 5. To dispel: resolve a doubt. - n 1. Frimness of purpose; resolution. 2. A determination or decision.

(2) The very nature of the word "resolution" makes it a question. American Heritage: A course of action determined or decided on. A formal statemnt of a deciion, as by a legislature.

(3) The resolution is obviously a question. Any other conclusion is utterly inconcievable. Why? Context. The debate community empowers a topic committee to write a topic for ALTERNATE side debating. The committee is not a random group of people coming together to "reserve" themselves about some issue. There is context - they are empowered by a community to do something. In their deliberations, the topic community attempts to craft a resolution which can be ANSWERED in either direction. They focus on issues like ground and fairness because they know the resolution will serve as the basis for debate which will be resolved by determining the policy desireablility of that resolution. That's not only what they do, but it's what we REQUIRE them to do. We don't just send the topic committtee somewhere to adopt their own group resolution. It's not the end point of a resolution adopted by a body - it's the prelimanary wording of a resolution sent to others to be answered or decided upon.

(4) Further context: the word resolved is used to emphasis the fact that it's policy debate. Resolved comes from the adoption of resolutions by legislative bodies. A resolution is either adopted or it is not. It's a question before a legislative body. Should this statement be adopted or not.

#### The appropriation of outer space is permanent control.

TIMOTHY JUSTIN TRAPP, JD Candidate @ UIUC Law, ’13, TAKING UP SPACE BY ANY OTHER MEANS: COMING TO TERMS WITH THE NONAPPROPRIATION ARTICLE OF THE OUTER SPACE TREATY UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2013 No. 4]

The issues presented in relation to the nonappropriation article of the Outer Space Treaty should be clear.214 The ITU has, quite blatantly, created something akin to “property interests in outer space.”215 It allows nations to exclude others from their orbital slots, even when the nation is not currently using that slot.216 This is directly in line with at least one definition of outer-space appropriation.217 [\*\*Start Footnote 217\*\*Id. at 236 (“Appropriation of outer space, therefore, is ‘the exercise of exclusive control or exclusive use’ with a sense of permanence, which limits other nations’ access to it.”) (quoting Milton L. Smith, The Role of the ITU in the Development of Space Law, 17 ANNALS AIR & SPACE L. 157, 165 (1992)). \*\*End Footnote 217\*\*]The ITU even allows nations with unused slots to devise them to other entities, creating a market for the property rights set up by this regulation.218 In some aspects, this seems to effect exactly what those signatory nations of the Bogotá Declaration were trying to accomplish, albeit through different means.219

#### Violation: They don’t defend the topic – CX proves. At best they’re extra topical which is a voter for exploding limits and inflating aff solvency or effects topical which is worse, since any small aff can spill up to the resolution.

#### Vote neg for competitive equity and clash: changing the topic favors the aff because it destroys the only stasis point and makes prep impossible because any ground is self-serving, concessionary, and from distorted literature bases. Their model allows someone to specialize for 4 years giving them an edge over people who switch every 2 months. Filter this through debate’s nature of being a game where both teams want to win, which becomes meaningless without constraints.

#### Impacts:

#### 1] Procedural fairness outweighs—a) intrinsicness—debate is a game and equity is necessary to sustain the activity b) probability—debate can’t alter subjectivity, but it can rectify skews c) metaconstraint—all your arguments concede fairness since you assume they will be evaluated fairly d) application—your model only indicts how fairness has been appliednot that it’s intrinsically bad—their model would justify exclusion.

#### 2] Switch Side Debate—they can read it as a K against affirmatives—forces debaters to consider issues from multiple perspectives. Non-topical affs allow individuals to establish their own metrics for what they want to debate leading to dogmatism.

#### 3] Deliberative clash is crucial to overcoming entrenched ableist ideology and can rectify power asymmetries to create egalitarianism.

Amber Knight 15, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Saint Louis University, “Democratizing Disability: Achieving Inclusion (without Assimilation) through “Participatory Parity”,” Hypatia vol. 30, no. 1 (Winter ‘15)

There is ample evidence to suggest that able-bodied people simply miss the mark when they are asked to think about life from the point of view of a person with a disability. A recent poll found that fifty-two percent of Americans would rather be dead than disabled (Disaboom 2008). Yet when you talk with people with disabilities they usually think that their lives are very much worth living. To explain these divergent perspectives, sociologists Gary Albrecht and Patrick Devlieger coined this phenomenon “the disability paradox.” They write, The disability paradox exists in two forms: first, people with disabilities report that they have serious limitations in activities of daily living, problems in performing their social roles and experience persistent discrimination, yet they say that they have an excellent or good quality of life; and, second, the general public, physicians and other health care workers perceive that persons with disabilities have an unsatisfying quality of life despite that fact that over 50% of these people report an excellent or good quality of life. (Albrecht and Devlieger 1999, 982) This paradox serves as a reminder that people are unable to transcend social privilege to think about issues objectively. Instead, it seems that many nondisabled people project their own fears and misconceptions about living with an impairment onto the lives of people with disabilities. As this analysis has shown, it seems that the **best way** to achieve **mutual understanding** **is not through** transcendence, **but by communicating** with others **across differences.** By engaging with those with disabilities, nondisabled citizens may **confront** **their** own **stigmatized ideas about impairment**, **learn to understand important aspects of disabled peoples’ lives, and** hopefully **make** better political decisions in the long run. They may also learn to think of themselves as temporarily able-bodied and come to grips with the reality that they too will likely experience disability at some point in their lives since human beings are unavoidably vulnerable to aging, illness, and impairment. Such a realization may **motivate all citizens** **to consider their own stake in creating just arrangements that enhance everybody’s opportunities to occupy public space.** Therefore, even though Fraser specifically acknowledges that gaps between procedural fairness and substantive justice **may occur**, she cautiously implies that fair deliberation in the absence of structural power asymmetries will foster **mutual understanding** and likely generate outcomes that further **reduce social disparities** (Fraser 2007, 331). This line of thought is certainly circular since substantive policies **that reduce disparities are** necessary **to ensure procedural parity**, **and just procedures are required in order to bring about just outcomes**. To escape this cycle and realistically apply her framework, Fraser proposes the idea of “good enough deliberation.” She explains: This expression refers to deliberation that, while tainted by power asymmetries and thus falling short of procedural parity, is “good enough” to generate outcomes that **reduce disparities**, **so** that the next round **of political argument proceeds on terms that are** somewhat **more fair and can be expected to lead to still better outcomes,** and so on. (Fraser 2007, 332) Fraser therefore remains optimistic that incremental changes **in the relations of deliberation will yield more** egalitarian decisions. From a disability perspective, this concept serves as a reminder that actively working to include people with a range of impairments in formal and informal democratic spaces is paramount to achieving substantive policies that procure social justice. In sum, preserving difference is in democracy’s best interest, since it not only follows through on the promise of preserving human dignity, but also leads to better deliberative outcomes that have the potential to benefit the public at large. The outcomes of deliberations cannot be determined in advance, but it is possible that interactions between able-bodied and disabled individuals may be **progressively transformative**. In any case, if people with disabilities are persistently isolated, marginalized, and excluded, individuals with disabilities are surely denied their human dignity, and the political community will never know what it is denying itself.

#### No impact turns – T is just like a disad or K – just like the cap k that says non-topical affs reinforce capitalism – impositions are inevitable because the negative has the burden of rejoinder – every link says the aff did something wrong and theres a version of the aff that wouldn’t have linked

## 2

### K

#### Capitalism causes massive violence and inevitable extinction – the fundamental task is developing tools for organization and tactics to bring about revolution.

Escalante ‘19

[Alyson, revolutionary Marxist (duh), philosophy at U of Oregon. 09/08/2019. “Truth and Practice: The Marxist Theory of Knowledge”. https://web.archive.org/web/20190910040756/https://failingthatinvent.home.blog/2019/09/08/truth-and-practic-the-marxist-theory-of-knowledge/] pat

The world we live in today is in a dire state. Climate destruction continues at a fast pace, and every with every passing day, capitalism proves itself to be incapable of addressing this. Capitalist production and its endless drive for resources to match artificial market demands has created a climate crisis that leaves us on the brink of potential extinction.

Governments around the world are turning to far right and fascist leaders to assuage their fears of an uncertain future, and the most marginalized and oppressed suffer because of it. Fascism is on the rise, and history tells us very clearly what that can result in without opposition.

The decaying US empire continues to lash out in violence across the globe in a desperate attempt to re-assert its power and hegemony. Whole countries are destroyed in its desperate bids for more fossil fuels. The world burns from America’s white phosphorus weaponry.

The need for a revolutionary movement capable of replacing capitalism with something better has never been so clear. The choice between socialism or barbarism has never been so stark. More and more people are starting to realize that reform cannot save us, that capitalism and imperialism themselves are the problem, and that we must unite and band together to fight for a better world.

The question then is: how will we know what strategies, what tactics, and what ideas to unite around? If the skeptics and postmodernists are correct that knowledge is always relative and localized, then we cannot built a global and universal strategy to unite around. If they are correct then we are doomed to small acts of localized or individual resistance in the face of apocalypse. To embrace such a vision of the world (with its accompanying epistemological skepticism) is to embrace defeat.

The masses do not want to embrace defeat, they want to know how to fight back. Marxism can provide the tools necessary to engage in that fight.

Marxism, with its self criticism and its insistence on incorporating the valuable ideas of its critics has created a means for unifying workers across the globe with anti-colonial and anti-imperialist struggles. The Marxist belief in the possibility of true ideas, tested and verified in practice, creates the possibility for unity on a global scale. The scientific status of Marxism means that as our climate changes, as our world looks more and more grim, Marxism will adapt through struggle and practice; it will provide us with the ideas and tools we need to fight and win.

There will be no victory for the workers of the world without the ability to wield a revolutionary science. What is at stake in questions of Marxist epistemology is the very possibility of creating a philosophical and scientific basis for revolution. We must defend this possibility. We must defend the scientific status of Marxism, and must insist on the possibility of victory.

#### Fantasies of disabled bodies as inherently resistant to capitalism mystifies how disability becomes a site of value extraction and papers over Western privilege.

Puar ‘17 Jasbir Puar is an Associate Professor of Women’s and Gender Studies at Rutgers University and has a Ph.D. in Ethnic Studies from UC Berkeley. “Crip Nationalism: From Narrative Prosthesis to Disaster Capitalism,” Chapter 2 in “The Right to Maim: Debility, Capacity, Disability” Language edited NT 18 rc/pat

Neoliberal investments in the body as portfolio, as site of entrepreneurship, entail transition of some disabled bodies from the disciplinary institutions of containment, quarantine, and expulsion into forms of incorporative biopolitical control. David Mitchell and Sharon Snyder argue that “disabled people have shifted from modernity’s exception (a line of defect to be isolated and eradicated) to postmodernist [neoliberal] exceptionality (failing bodies resuscitated by an increasingly medicalized state). In this latter state, the ontology of disability retrieves a formerly fallen object and makes it newly available for cultural rehabilitation,” a euphemism for producing cultural docility.45 Mitchell and Snyder track this shift of people with disabilities located from “a former era of economic burden” of paternalistic, institutional, and welfare regimes when disabled people were “social pariahs,” to what they term “objects of care” that impel the investment of service economies and neoliberal strategies of intervention and rehabilitation—“a ‘hot’ ticket item for potential research and funding schemes.”

Mitchell and Snyder’s claim situates the disabled body as the site of extreme productivity— and thus, profitability— precisely through its lack of conventional productive laboring value. Once excluded from the labor system because of their “unproductivity,” disabled bodies have become the “sites for the exercise of the primitive accumulation that fuels capitalism.” This productivity is thus not “measured by his or her ability to produce goods and ser vices that satisfy social/human needs,” as Erevelles points out, but rather “based solely on capitalist exploitative demands for increasing profit.”48

And yet, despite this profitability, Mitchell and Snyder argue that the disabled non/laborer is also a resistant non-capacitated body, implicitly challenging the incomplete liberal proj ect of docility by refusing to assimilate into a laboring capacity. In echoing Russell and Malhotra’s conviction that disability reveals a central contradiction, a paradox even, of capitalism, Mitchell and Snyder laud Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri’s rerouting from the worker as the paradigmatic resistant subject in Marxist theory to “living labor” or “non- productive bodies,” as the nascent site of dissent. No longer able to locate a single site of re sis tance to capitalism in a “ simple, agonistic division of labor,” Mitchell and Snyder ask, “Where does re sistance manifest itself once a concept of the workers’ revolution no longer seems tenable and how will this re sis tance govern itself without the institution of new hierarchies of in equality?”49 In other words, the undermining of capitalism will come from those who cannot or will not work, from those whose “capacities make them ‘unfit’ for labor.”50 This unfitness, they argue, proves “imminently productive” because these bodies inhabit and generate alternative biopo liti cal scripts of consumption, family, and nation.51 They evidence this assertion by averring that “the disabled people that we know are some of the worst consumers on the planet because they have neither the means, the interest, nor the gullibility of mistaking meaning with market . . . disabled artists in the U.S. live some of the most sparingly non- consumptive lives and, yet, this is what we admire about them the most.”52

I will leave aside for a moment the geopolitical inflections fueling certitude regarding the passé potential of organized resistance at the point of production. The claim about the inherent resistant capacity of the non-productive disabled laborer bears a complex relation to Mitchell and Snyder’s earlier conviction that disabled bodies have now transitioned into objects of care that represent a unique site for the capture of every element for capitalist profit. Do the individual consumption practices of disabled people (artists) mitigate, even remotely, the profitability of the sites of primitive accumulation that objects of care generate? Further, the resistance of non-consumptive lives pales in a global economic context where, as Gayatri Spivak reminds us, humanistic training in consumerism is foreclosed for populations whose labor creates consumer opportunities for others. The (individual) capacity to consume—or to refuse to consume—is already predicated on the privileged position of the consumer-citizen. Mitchell and Snyder lionize the non-laboring debilitated body as the new threshold of resistance — a crypto- capacity — via their positions as improper producers as well as consumers. But this formulation, as much as it would seem empowering to embrace, actually relies on the occlusion of the centrality of debilitation to the workings of capitalism. It effaces the unflinching need for “social pariahs” available for injury, excluded from the economies that hail certain bodies worthy of being objects of care, however compromised this inclusion may be. There are surely individuals with disabilities [disabled people] who perhaps neither labor nor consume “properly,” but any resistance this may signal is not an a priori feature of being disabled. Further, populations that are not roped into an economy of rehabilitative objects of care are sites of profit precisely for their availability for injury, their inability to labor, their exclusion from adequate health care, and their ideological production as lazy, criminal, and burdensome. While these populations may well enact various forms of resistance to capitalism, they do not escape the violent pro cesses of primitive accumulation that extract profit from the disposability that threatens these exact populations.

Mitchell and Snyder further vacillate between the figures of the resistant non- productive unfit non/worker and that very same worker as incorporated into capitalist sites of profit. They argue that “we are increasingly approaching a time when all that formerly passed as the undesirability of life in a disabled body proves increasingly ‘advantageous’ from the standpoint of an immaterial labor market.” The immaterial labor market is a reference to technologies that allow for productivity to be redefined against the grain of the “laboring body”— for example, fostering virtual participation in workplaces for mobility- impaired individuals. However, these very same technologies, driven by the conventional laboring body, produce vastly debilitated populations across the globe, from Chinese laborers in Apple factories who commit suicide, to wheelchair technology that enhances mobility developed in Israel 48 on the backs of Palestinian oppression and immobility, to the mountains of e-waste hand-sanded by the working poor in India, to the neo colonial extraction of minerals and natural substances from resource- rich areas for the purposes of manufacturing hardware.

Is it possible that the figure of the non-productive disabled body becomes something of a fetish in Mitchell and Snyder’s text, recoding resistance as a form of automatic capacitation, an onto-crypto-capacity? This body occludes, to some extent, populations that are neither positioned as resistant to capitalism nor promoted as objects of care. Rather these populations are constructed as objects of imminent disposability, continually subjected to paternalistic austerity regimes, violent institutionalization, and debilitation that is not in any way redeemable through cultural rehabilitation. (Cultural rehabilitation as an ave nue to normalization can be eschewed only if in fact it is an available possibility to turn away from.) Their debilitation functions as a form of value extraction for otherwise disposable bodies. Lauding the inherent resistance to capitalism of disabled bodies as well as the advantages of the immaterial labor market for people with disabilities both depend on three factors: first, the assumption or invocation of the identity or grouping of disabled people as an a priori given; which then, secondly, entails the substantial occlusion of the manufacturing of disability, that is, capitalist exploitation as an ongoing process of debilitation; which then, thirdly, submerges the supplemental relation between objects of care and social pariahs or objects of disposability — disability as a potential site of cultural incorporation and debilitation of populations made available and/or targeted for injury—in a neoliberal economy that profits from both. The burden-to-care periodization is one that therefore racializes as well as temporospatializes: between eugenics as it has been and the biopolitics of inclusion of the now (described as “post- imperialist”), a split that largely speaks to liberal spaces of privilege; and between the pro gress of the West/developed nations and the disarray of the rest/developing nations. ///

#### Capitalism both explains the rise of Trump and ableism – they’re created out of a drive for productivity and a fear of being unproductive and discarded

Andrew Harnish 17. Professor of English and Creative Writing, University of North Dakota, “Ableism and the Trump phenomenon,” Disability & Society 2017. Vol. 32, No. 3. Pp 423-428. <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/09687599.2017.1288684?needAccess=true>

The rural, white working class offered Donald Trump unprecedented support in the 2016 US presidential campaign (Collingwood 2016). Some analysts have pointed to the power of Trump’s racist rhetoric in winning these voters (Matthews 2016; Yglesias 2016). Others have noted the pull of his populist economic promises (Guo 2016; Casselman 2017). Yet Trump also used ableist rhetoric to court rural, working-class whites; his repeated use of metaphors equating bodily difference with weakness and failure played to a fear of disability that is deeply embedded in rural, white working-class culture. This fear has been magnified by the damage to working-class communities wrought by technological change and the neoliberal policies of deregulation, entitlement ‘reform,’ and disinvestment in the welfare state. Trump’s own bodily difference is also important in any understanding of his popularity with rural, working-class whites. His spectacular and even, at times, debilitated-seeming embodiment mirrors the often debilitated state of many rural, white working-class Americans, whose lack of appreciation for the values of thoroughgoing diversity too often primes them to endorse exclusive definitions of ‘normativity’ that do violence to those who are not ‘like’ them.The work of crip theorist Robert McRuer is essential to understanding the relationship between ableism, neoliberalism, and white working-class communities. His theory of ‘compulsory able-bodiedness’ (McRuer 2006) explains why disability is so often pathologized and why the prospect of bodily difference can seem terrifying in neoliberal environments. According to McRuer (2006, 2), compulsory able-bodiedness elevates ‘normative’ bodily performances and stigmatizes every performance that fails to conform to this standard. For McRuer, compulsory able-bodiedness is enforced by corporations, policy-makers, and citizens, and because neoliberal values dominate government in the United States, those Americans who find themselves in need of assistance – whether economic or bodily, or some combination of the two – are not just stigmatized, but also offered quite limited opportunities for support and care due to the curtailment and/or privatization of government-provided social services. During the campaign, Trump alluded to the harm done by these neoliberal policies, but his Cabinet choices suggest that his legislative agenda will draw on his arch-capitalist roots. This agenda is liable to be even more toxic than his rhetoric for people with disabilities—and Trump’s rhetoric is toxic. The title of his policy guidebook, Crippled America: How to Make America Great Again (Trump 2015), offers the ugliest example of what became a pattern of ableist language over the course of his campaign. The text makes no reference to actual people with disabilities, and offers no explanation as to how the US economic predicament corresponds to authentic crip experience. Instead, throughout, Trump gleefully pathologizes disability by using the title as a metaphor for economic stagnation. For Trump, ‘crippled’ means not being ‘great’ (Trump 2015, ix), not being excellent (2015, xi), and not winning (2015, 1). In Trump’s vision, being ‘crippled’ is equivalent to being ‘a mess’ (2015, 8), getting ‘killed’ (2015, 20), and being weak and submitting (2015, 43). The pattern of Trump’s ableist rhetoric extends to his mockery of the New York Times reporter Serge Kovaleski, his denigration of the conservative pundit and wheelchair user Charles Krauthammer – Trump called him ‘a “loser” who “just sits there”’ (Mizrahi 2015) – and his routine belittling of his opponents’ mental difference. But reprehensible as it is, Trump’s ableist rhetoric plainly has purchase. One reason is simple: many in the white working class – and the working class writ large – are deeply fearful of disability. Until recently, life for rural, white, able-bodied Americans was broadly gratifying. The automation of agriculture, the outsourcing of manufacturing, and the neoliberal assault on social services have left many rural Americans unable to find jobs in their communities and debilitated by the great distances they must travel to find employment. Life in rural America is increasingly precarious, yet rural American culture does not have a strong tradition of valuing bodily difference or conceiving of people as having worth beyond their labor value. While the urban working class has access to a range of (often inadequate) government services, the rural working class often lacks even this limited access. Low population density, limited access to public transportation, and few social service offices make rural communities difficult to navigate for those with disabilities. Yet, at least electorally, rural communities have not generally embraced the services that might make the neoliberal disruptions of the last quarter century more endurable. Part of this is because the culture of rural America remains independent, rooted in family and contemptuous of the costs and diversity of the metropolis, scornful of social investments, the ‘welfare’ that always seems to benefit ‘someone else’ (Williams 2016). Part, too, is due to a powerful conservative media apparatus that is quick to denounce urban entitlements, but seldom, if ever, highlights the government subsidies that benefit its largely rural, white audience. In the face of its own increasing economic and even bodily difference, much of rural America has redoubled its isolation. This is the environment Trump preyed upon with his ableist rhetoric. Rural electoral complicity with the neoliberal assaults on the welfare state has created an environment where disabled working-class voters have few resources to fall back on. It is no wonder that many rural, working-class whites are frightened of disability. The federal government still offers people with disabilities limited financial assistance, $1070 dollars per month for ‘non-blind persons’ and $1800 dollars monthly for ‘blind persons’ (‘Facts and Figures’ 2014), but these sums are so low that many Americans cannot imagine living on them, especially as, in much of the United States, poverty is treated as a moral flaw. So far, the left has not done a good job persuading rural America that more accessible and inclusive communities will increase its flourishing. Hillary Clinton tried to make this case – she spoke directly to people with disabilities. But Donald Trump eschewed this vision, denouncing racial and disabled minorities, and promising to create rural, white working-class jobs, and trounced Clinton in rural communities. Employment seems to promise the ‘independence’ prized in rural, working-class culture. Conveniently for conservatives, these promises are also a substitute for economically costly investments in the built environment of rural communities: in public transportation, social services, and child care, investments that would make those communities more livable for people with disabilities and those with limited economic means. The rural, white working class embraced Donald Trump, but his policies are liable to make all rural Americans more vulnerable, and especially those with disabilities. His ableist rhetoric, capitalizing on an ableist culture, will increase the structural ableism that already obtains in the United States.

#### Vote negative for communist organizing – that requires collective struggle and the establishment of centralized organization to inform both theory and practice.

Kuhn ‘18

[Gabriel, Austrian-born writer and translator living in Sweden. Among his book publications is “All Power to the Councils! A Documentary History of the German Revolution of 1918-1919”. March 2018. “Don't Mourn, Organize! Is Communism a Pipe Dream—or a Viable Future?” <https://brooklynrail.org/2018/03/field-notes/Dont-Morn-Organize-Is-Communism-a-Pipe-Dreamor-a-Viable-Future>] pat

The forms of organization this requires must go further than the affinity group but stop short of the vanguard party. Affinity groups do not answer the demand for mass organizing that mass societies require. But neither do vanguard parties. They attempt to lead the masses, not organize them, and that’s a big difference. The party model might in general be insufficient for mass organizing today. The networks that movementism gave way to are perhaps more appropriate, but only if they can overcome the assumption that the looser the connections are, the better. This assumption is wrong. Loose connections might suit the needs of an ever more flexible market economy, but not of effective political organizing. To “have contacts” is not enough; you need to do something with them. And you need to stay committed to the projects you initiate. I will try to flesh this out by listing the aspects I consider most important in organizing today.

1. We need to leave sectarianism behind. The left is weak and each additional division weakens it further. In a 2011 article titled “Movement, Cadre, and the Dual Power,” Joel Olson made a simple, yet very important observation: “We believe that the old arguments between communists and anarchists are largely irrelevant today.” This must be our point of departure.

2. We need theory that is adapted to our times. It must overcome the false contradiction between “class struggle” and “cultural struggle.” There is a fruitful debate about a “new class politics” in the German-speaking world. Sebastian Friedrich, one of its main proponents, drew these conclusions in an article published by Counterpunch:

A new class politics does not relegate gender, race, and imperial legacy to issues that are supplementary to class relations. These issues, and the struggles they imply, are an integral part of class relations. In fact, feminist, anti-racist, and anti-colonial struggles are the base on which effective unified class struggles must be launched.… A new class politics must clarify where and how the specific experiences of workers based on gender, race, citizenship, and other factors converge. It must reveal the overlapping interests of workers as members of the class. This makes common struggles possible.

3. We must not rely on the “objective forces” identified by historical materialism. Subjective forces are important for change. It is easy to underestimate how much neoliberalism shapes the lives even of people opposed to it. In the Global North, political activism has become a leisure activity that people engage in or not, depending on their mood, the identity they are trying to create for themselves, or the road of “self-improvement” they have chosen. In almost all cases, it is secondary to professional careers and personal comforts. Under such circumstances, it is difficult to get anything done. There is nothing wrong with being “voluntaristic.” Radical change is dependent on people wanting radical change, no matter how much Marxists still insist on economic realities determining individual consciousness and, therefore, individuals’ capacity for political action. An organization’s efficiency relies on the individual qualities of its members, that is, responsibility, reliability, and accountability.

Making Things Concrete

If we want communism to be more than a pipe dream, we have to be willing to face reality, even if it confuses, challenges, or even frightens us. We cannot ignore struggles that refer to communist ideals, simply because they aren’t the struggles we’d like to see. If our enthusiasm for communism remains limited to lecture halls and conference rooms, it won’t be anything the powerful will lose sleep over.

The struggle that currently receives most attention among communists of all stripes in the Global North is the one in Kurdistan. In Rojava (Syrian Kurdistan), forces affiliated with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, PKK, have established a direct-democratic council system, based on the “democratic confederalism” conceived by the imprisoned PKK leader Abduallah Öcalan. Öcalan describes democratic confederalism as “a non-state political administration or a democracy without a state,” and cites Murray Bookchin’s “libertarian municipalism” as a major influence. There are people who celebrate this as a form of anarchism. But as an observant friend of mine noted, an anarchism that is imposed by a leader is a strange kind of anarchism. Besides, there are reports from the ground that challenge the libertarian narrative. The editors of Lower Class Magazine, an online project dedicated to “low budget underground journalism,” travel regularly to Kurdistan and have the following to say:

The Western left sees Rojava as the realization of a democracy “from below”: communes, councils, a confederation; no hierarchies, no party, a spontaneous mass project. Anarchists and “libertarian” communists wax lyrically about the dawn of a direct-democratic Shangri-La. […] Yes, the change in Rojava comes “from below. It is based on the power of the people, no doubt. Communes and councils are at the heart of decision-making, that is true. But as essential is the following: None of this would be happening if it wasn’t for a vanguard leading the way. The revolution in Rojava proves that Leninist vanguardism is correct, not false.

Another European journalist visiting the region noted that the cadres of the People’s Protection Units, YPG, relate to the councils of Rojava in the same way the Bolshevists related to the councils of the Soviet Union. Furthermore, there are troubling pragmatic alliances, which have included collaboration with the U.S. military. Yet the people behind Rojava Solidarity NYC sum up the situation well:

Rojava, an autonomous region in Northern Syrian, the largest revolutionary territory of the 21st century, has projected anarchist and communist ideas to the forefront of political discourse and into the pragmatic and messy reality of everyday life. … From communal relationships to the councils and self-defense units, we can assess numerous potential routes by which we can create liberated communities at home, while learning from their possibilities and pitfalls.

Rojava won’t be the answer to our problems. No single struggle ever is. But the developments in Rojava challenge us to discuss real-life strategies for radical change. It is easy to focus on shortcomings, but if this is all we ever do, where will it get us?

Councils are essential for communist projects. Their power, which is based on the direct involvement and active participation of the masses, is curtailed as soon as political interest groups, such as parties, assume control over them. This conviction separated historical council communism, represented by figures such as Otto Rühle and Anton Pannekoek, from the Bolsheviks. Pannekoek wrote:

The councils are no government; not even the most central councils bear a governmental character. For they have no means to impose their will upon the masses; they have no organs of power. All social power is vested in the hands of the workers themselves.

Unless we want the transition to communism to entail enormous human suffering (which would be utterly absurd), we need to consider the fact that billions of people will need to be fed, sheltered, nursed, provided with access to clean water, and so forth. To produce according to the needs of the people rather than the needs of profit requires enormous efforts in planning, especially if current living standards are to be upheld. (Living standards don’t equal standards of consumption—the standards of consumption in the Global North cannot and should not be upheld, since they are unsustainable.) Furthermore, we must collectively dispose of industrial and nuclear waste, weapons of mass destruction, and ticking environmental bombs. None of this is possible without a level of centralization, no matter how visceral the reactions are that the word might provoke in some circles.

Only a council system can combine the centralization required by the complexity of modern societies with participative democracy. Centralization requires formal structures. Participative democracy requires these structures to be transparent. They need to be bottom-up rather than top-down, and delegates must be directly responsible to their constituencies. The council system is the only administrative framework to provide that.

Romanticizing particular struggles rarely does any good, no matter how council-based they are—or claim to be. If radicals in the Global North fail to address concerns with respect to struggles in the Global South, it is not respectful but condescending. To escape into the intellectual poverty of cultural relativism doesn’t help. We can only evolve from critical engagement. But real-life struggles are our starting point. It makes little sense to demand struggles for communism if we shy away from engaging with the ones that exist. Arundhati Roy put it simply after spending time with Maoist Naxalites in the forests of central India, an experience she chronicled in the book Walking with the Comrades. She said: “I went in because I wanted to tell the story of who these people are.” This informs revolutionary theory and, in turn, improves revolutionary practice. Most importantly, it is crucial for saving communist struggles from betraying their own principles. Everyone can watch failure unfold. The challenge lies in helping to prevent it.

#### The alt reorganizes social and economic life around a new concept of work that doesn’t mandate ableist productivity and creates solidarity.

Slorach ‘15

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Disability, as we have seen, is deeply embedded within capitalism and can be overcome only with a fundamental social and economic transformation of society. The need for such change is easily demonstrated. It has been calculated, for example, that as much as half the impairment in the majority world could be prevented by the introduction of effective policies to reduce poverty and malnutrition and improve sanitation, drinking water and working conditions.976 /// The question, here, however, is how people view their oppression in relation to wider social change. Writing in 2.011, M Miles argued that: /// The vast majority of the worlds people with disabilities do not read English and have never heard of any kind of [social model of disability], and probably never will... Even in [the] UK, 'recent research from the Office for Disability issues has shown that only six per cent of disabled people know about the social model of disability', a rise of three per cent since 2003.977 /// It is true that many people—disabled or non-disabled—have never heard of the social model, but many nevertheless believe that disabled people experience discrimination. Disability, as we have seen, is based on the fact that the labour of people with impairments is less profitable for capitalism. To overcome this form of oppression, workers need to break from the common sense ideas associated with this society— such as a "fair day's work for a fair day's pay" or "what's good for the boss is good for me"—which make it easier for employers to intensify exploitation. Accepting this common sense also implies acceptance of the notion that disabled people are an economic burden. On the other hand, many large workplaces now include some disabled workers and most major trade unions in Britain have policies opposing disability discrimination. There is, therefore, at least the potential to win the majority of workers to such a position, as well as to actively fight for it. /// Those who suffer the greatest oppression in society have often emerged to play a central role in revolutionary movements. Irish immigrants and the children of black slaves were among those who led the great Chartist revolt in Britain during the 1830s. Jewish people in Russia, subjected over decades to violent racism including mass pogroms, saw activists such as Trotsky, Zinoviev and Sverdlov elected to the leadership of the revolutions of 1905 and 1917. More recently, gays and lesbians targeted by media hysteria over AIDS made common cause with 120,000 miners in the UK, raising money for and promoting solidarity with them during their epic year-long battle with the Thatcher government in 1984-1985. The mass entry of black people and women into the US and UK workforces has strengthened the fight against racism and women's oppression. From a situation where the early craft-based trade unions often opposed equal pay and status for black people and women in the workplace, it is now commonly expected that trade unions will resist and organise against racism, sexism and homophobia in the workplace. /// The position Marx took in relation to anti-Irish racism (discussed in the previous chapter)—that it undermined the potential strength and unity of the working class movement in England—is true of all forms of oppression. A brief survey of the dominant political climate in many countries today confirms how well this applies to Islamophobia and anti-immigrant racism. It also confirms there is nothing inevitable about the labour movement (broadly conceived of as the trade unions and the political left) taking a consistent position in opposition to all forms of oppression. This is instead a matter of a clear and principled political analysis. /// The Russian revolutionary Lenin, referring to Tsarist Russia as the "prison house of nations", described the need for revolutionaries to be "tribunes of the oppressed"—fighting all forms of national, religious and other forms of oppression as a matter of political principle. The decline and defeat of the 1917 Russian Revolution can be seen from the way in which its historic gains—for example, equality for women and homosexuals, as well as for national, ethnic and religious minorities—were reversed with the rise of Stalinism, which among its many other crimes, ruthlessly incorporated other countries into a new imperial "prison house". /// Many people oppose capitalism because it is a system of production which exists not to meet the needs of society, but to provide profits for a tiny minority. As we have seen, it is this factor which is largely responsible for the exclusion of so many disabled people from the workforce. What part, then, could they play in a future society based first and foremost on meeting human need? /// The negation of the negation /// Alongside his highly effective arguments in relation to impairment and disability (discussed in chapter 2), Paul Abberley also argued that while "Marxism has provided effective tools" to explain the nature of disability discrimination in capitalist societies, its vision of a future "Utopia" presented "profound difficulties for impaired people": /// In the 1875 Critique of the Gotha Programme Marx makes the well known statement that 'in a more advanced phase of communist society... when labour is no longer just a means of keeping alive but has itself become a vital need (we may then have) from each according to his abilities, to each according to his needs.' But this implies that impaired people are still deprived, by biology if not by society. Impairment, since it places a limit upon creative sensuous practice, is alienatory...the ability to labour in some socially recognised sense still seems a requirement of full membership of a future good society based upon Marxist theory.978 /// In Abberley’s view, a small number of people with impairments in a "Marxist Utopia" would remain excluded from the system of production and as a consequence "would still occupy the essentially peripheral relationship to society we do today". /// Marx in fact wrote very little on the nature of post-revolutionary society and was thoroughly dismissive of "Utopian Socialists" who spent their time imagining what such a society would look like. There is good reason, however, to reject Abberley s view that disabled people would continue to be marginalised in a socialist society. As he concedes, a socialist society based on a new and emancipatory concept of labour could and would provide work for the vast majority of people with impairments. Such a society would also have an interest in promoting the fullest possible participation of all its members, enabling each "according to their abilities" to make a contribution. Marx's meaning in the famous "from each/to each" quote differs to that attributed to it by Abberley. This is made clearer in the immediately preceding paragraphs where Marx discusses the concept of equal rights in the context of labour. They are worth quoting in full: /// But one man is superior to another physically, or mentally, and supplies more labour in the same time, or can labour for a longer time; and labour, to serve as a measure, must be defined by its duration or intensity, otherwise it ceases to be a standard of measurement. This equal right is an unequal right for unequal labour...it tacitly recognizes unequal individual endowment, and thus productive capacity, as a natural privilege. It is, therefore, a right of inequality, in its content, like every right. Right, by its very nature, can consist only in the application of an equal standard; but unequal individuals (and they would not be different individuals if they were not unequal) are measurable only by an equal standard insofar as they are brought under an equal point of view, are taken from one definite side only— for instance, in the present case, are regarded only as workers and nothing more is seen in them, everything else being ignored. Further, one worker is married, another is not; one has more children than another, and so on and so forth. Thus, with an equal performance of labour, and hence an equal in the social consumption fund, one will in fact receive more than another, one will be richer than another, and so on. To avoid all these defects, right, instead of being equal, would have to be unequal. /// But these defects are inevitable in the first phase of communist society as it is when it has just emerged after prolonged birth pangs from capitalist society. Right can never be higher than the economic structure of society and its cultural development conditioned thereby. /// In a higher phase of communist society, after the enslaving subordination of the individual to the division of labour, and therewith also the antithesis between mental and physical labour, has vanished; after labour has become not only a means of life but life's prime want; after the productive forces have also increased with the all-around development of the individual, and all the springs of co-operative wealth flow more abundantly—only then can the narrow horizon of bourgeois right be crossed in its entirety and society inscribe on its banners: From each according to his [their] ability, to each according to his [their] needs!979 /// This concept of rights is vital to any discussion of how disability would be addressed in a socialist society. Marx's recognition of differing human abilities formed the very basis of his analysis of capitalism, including how competition at every level of society divides workers. The basis for disability under capitalism is the identification of a distinct layer of people with certain impairments judged to have a substantial impact on their ability to labour. With the use of the social surplus generated by this labour also subject to all manner of disputes, rights can never be truly equal—either in how they are implemented or exercised. /// In seeing [understanding] impairment as a continuum, instead of as the crude "them" and "us" dichotomy of capitalism, a socialist society would take account of differing ability and levels of skill based on a form of democracy incomparably more extensive than anything experienced under capitalism. /// The "negation of the negation" involves overthrowing a system of production which systematically deprives human beings of any control over the manner, nature and product of their labour, the key means through which they affirm their humanity: /// The capitalist mode of appropriation...produces capitalist private property. This is the first negation of individual private property, as founded on the labour of the proprietor. But capitalist production begets...its own negation. It is the negation of negation. This does not re-establish private property for the producer, but gives him individual property based on the acquisitions of the capitalist era: ie, on co-operation and the possession in common of the land and of the means of production.980 /// Revolution, therefore, requires not just the reorganisation of work, but reclaiming it as something workers do for themselves because they see it overwhelmingly as a social good rather than something alien and hostile to them. The concentration of workers in large workplaces and the integrated nature of production under capitalism means that this can only be achieved by collective action to seize control of the productive process and everything associated with it. /// Finally, a socialist society would provide a basis to overcome and dismantle all artificial barriers between work, leisure and education, nourishing and promoting creativity and individuality. In a formulation expressive of its time but whose deeper meaning is nevertheless hugely appealing, Marx described a communist society as one: /// where nobody has one exclusive sphere of activity but each can become accomplished in any branch he wishes, society regulates the general production and thus makes it possible for me to do one thing today and another tomorrow, to hunt in the morning, fish in the afternoon rear cattle in the evening, criticize after dinner, just as I have a mind, without ever becoming hunter, fisherman, shepherd or critic.981 /// In contrast to the systematic division and competition characteristic of capitalist society, socialism would promote a collective and co-operative culture based on common interest. Democratic planning would promote the interests of teachers and students, service providers and users, doctors and patients, architects and the occupants of city and countryside as mutual, interdependent and complementary to each other. Such a society would therefore promote genuine individuality, cultivating rounded human growth in place of a one-sided and fragmented development of skills. /// What force, then, has the power to achieve that change ? /// Agency /// The austerity offensive, under whose impact social and economic inequality has hugely increased, has prompted the development of new political movements. Broadly identifying themselves as anti capitalist, these tend to embrace some variant of autonomist ideas. Current demands for change on the left tend to be couched in terms of "social movements" centred on the vague but powerful notion of unity against the "one per cent" who rule the world. In terms of understanding the current economic crisis, Marxism itself has seen something of a renaissance. The idea of revolution, once seen as the preserve of those on the far left, has become commonly discussed— even if the return of dictatorship in Egypt dampened the optimism of the Arab Spring of zon. /// Increased awareness of a predatory and ruthless international ruling class, however, has also been accompanied by a widespread common sense view that identifies the working class as a spent force, its power fragmented under the impact of globalisation and restructuring. /// As ubiquitous as such ideas are, they are also demonstrably false. As we have seen, capitalism involves a continual reshaping of the working class. The proportion of workers engaged in manufacturing in the advanced countries, for example, has declined significantly for the last two generations. In Britain in the 1970s, workers' power was epitomised by strikes of tens of thousands of car workers. Today's workforce in the car industry is a fraction of what it was then, but investment in automation and robotics has led to hugely improved productivity: /// Overall auto production in the UK has not fallen. The UK remains home to over 30 manufacturers building more than 70 models. Similarly the volume of autos produced in the UK is set to reach an all time high in 2017. Restructuring has enabled increases in productivity to compensate for labour shedding.982 /// This pattern can be shown in every other area of the economy. The power of collective action also extends beyond the manufacturing sector, as demonstrated by the impact of strikes by, for example, oil tanker drivers or transport workers. Prior to the turn of the 20th century, dockers and textile workers were seen as temporary and disposable sections of the workforce—but their militancy inspired the subsequent rapid spread of trade unions in the period known as New Unionism. The "precarious workers" often identified as typical of today's economy can similarly be inspired by modern examples of "new unionism". Walmart is the world's biggest corporation, with US$160 billion in assets and an annual turnover similar in size to the GDP of Norway.983 In September 2012, 38 workers at its largest US distribution centre in Elwood, Illinois, won a three-week strike against their employer, a temping agency subcontractor. Despite the absence of union recognition, they not only won their key demand—reinstatement of all those sacked or suspended for trade union activity—but also full back pay for everyone who participated in the action.984 /// The problem is not that the social and economic power of workers has declined. Rather, it is that an historically low level of strike action has led to a corresponding decline in the belief that workers have or are able to exercise that power. /// Conclusion /// Oxfam reported in January 2014 that 85 billionaires have the same wealth as the bottom half of the worlds population. Its website predicts that the wealth of the 1 percent will overtake that of the othei 99 percent in 2016. This inequality is an inevitable consequence of an entirely unnatural and maddening society. There is nothing natural about oppression, war and environmental destruction; it is all part of "a very capitalist condition". /// Throughout their history, human beings have shown immense adaptability—in the diversity of their living and working environments, in their occupations, social beliefs and customs and even in their more biological functions, such as sleeping or eating. This is also true of living with impairment. /// In one of his fascinating books, Oliver Sacks discusses achromatopsia, or colour blindness. Most people with this very rare condition grow up without knowing (or even knowing of) anyone else who also has it. Sacks tells the story of Knut and his brother and sister, who by a rare genetic chance, were all achromatopic and have reacted and adapted to this in very different ways. Knut, the firstborn, was diagnosed as an infant. As it was felt that he would never see well enough to learn to read, he (and later his siblings) were sent to the local school for the blind: /// Knut rebelled at being regarded as disabled, and refused to learn Braille by touch, instead using his sight to read the raised dots, which cast tiny shadows on the page. He was severely punished for this and forced to wear a blindfold in classes. Soon after, Knut ran away from the school, but, determined to read normal print, taught himself to read at home. Finally, having convinced the school administrators that he would never make a willing student, Knut was allowed to return to regular school. /// Knut's sister, Britt...flourished at the school for the blind as much as Knut hated it, becoming fluent in Braille; and she has spent her professional life as an intermediary between the blind and sighted worlds, supervising the transcription and production of books into Braille at the Norwegian Library for the Blind. Like Knut, Britt is intensely musical and auditory and loves to close her eyes and surrender herself to the nonvisual domain of music; but equally, she relaxes by doing needlework, using a jeweller's loupe attached to her glasses, to keep her hands free.985 /// This kind of individual choice—whether to embrace or reject a "disability identity"—is distorted in current society by discrimination. In a society where such oppression is absent, both of these decisions would be equally valid and unremarkable, informed wholly by individual preference. While this story illustrates how individuals can adapt differently to the presence of a particular impairment, another more celebrated example shows how this can also happen on a social level. /// The island of Martha's Vineyard, off the eastern coast of the US, is today known as a retreat for the rich. For over 250 years beforehand, however, it was a relatively isolated fishing community with an unusual distinction—a strikingly high incidence of hereditary deafness. This originated with families from The Weald, a remote part of Kent in England, who had emigrated and settled there in the 1630s. A recessive deafness gene spread through inbreeding, both in The Weald and on the Vineyard. The probability of an island inhabitant having more than one Kentish ancestor rose with each new generation, with the number of deaf people reaching a peak in the 1840s (after which it rapidly declined).986 /// Nora Ellen Groce, in her classic 1980s study Everyone Here Spoke Sign Language, shows how the presence of deaf people on the Vineyard was taken for granted, with most hearing people fluent in sign language. One older man remarked to her: "I didn't think about the deaf any more than you'd think about somebody with a different voice". When Groce asked another woman in her eighties about those "handicapped" by deafness, she replied emphatically: "these people weren't handicapped. They were just deaf".987 /// As the gene was recessive, deafness could skip one or more generations. Its seemingly random appearance in the population led to deafness being viewed as something that could happen to any family—which it usually did at some point. Hearing people often used sign language even when deaf people were not present and never perceived deafness as an impairment. As another islander said to Groce: "You know, we didn't think anything special about them. They were just like anyone else. When you think about it, the Island was an awfully nice place to live".988 /// This striking—and rather beautiful—example shows that it is entirely possible to create a society where disability is unknown and genuine individuality can flourish. A society which harnessed the latest scientific and technological knowledge to the creative capacities of its citizens, who would debate and decide what is produced and how and for what purpose, would be far more likely to nourish and promote true human potential. /// As capitalism compels its rulers to push for ever-greater profits, so workers are similarly compelled to resist. It is in the course of this resistance that people can discover new truths about themselves and their comrades in struggle and discard the common sense notions of capitalism. Ever since the French Revolution of 1789, apologists for the status quo have associated the spontaneity and intensity of revolt with crazed mobs and irrationality. In words that bring to mind the counter-revolution in Egypt, Laure Murat asks a pertinent question: /// Whether pilloried or tacitly praised, why is the violence of insurrection always associated with madness, whereas the violence of repression never is ? Blanqui was a madman who should be 'put away', whereas Louis Eugene Cavaignac, who turned the events of June 1848 into a bloodbath, was hailed as the savior of the nation. It is singularly crazy to castigate popular uprisings but reward massacres; this weird rule systematically relegates revolution to insanity but attributes to reaction all the virtues of common sense.989 /// This approach has been adopted in the case of other more modest threats to our rulers' interests. Shortly after his election as leader of the Labour Party in autumn 2015, the Daily Mail awarded members of Jeremy Corbyn's new shadow cabinet with a "looney left rating".990 This was an attempt to revive the press campaigns of the 1980s which sought to represent left wing.individuals and ideas "as so deranged and psychotic that they represented a danger to society".991 /// As Marx put it, socialists must prove the "this-sidedness" of their thinking in practice. In other words, the truth or otherwise of the idea that the working class is a force which can transform the world can only be demonstrated by real events. The Russian Revolution of October 1917 provided a unique, if all too brief, example of what a successful workers' revolution could achieve. The preamble of its Education Act of 1918 expressed its spirit and ideals: /// The personality shall remain as the highest value in the socialist culture. This personality however can develop its inclinations in all possible luxury only in a harmonious society of equals. We do not forget the right of an individual to his own peculiar development. It is not necessary for us to cut short a personality, to cheat it, to cast it into iron moulds, because the stability of the socialist community is based not on the uniformity of the barracks, not on artificial drill, not on religious and aesthetic deceptions, but on an actual solidarity of interests.992 /// Tragically, despite inspiring huge struggles across Europe, that revolution did not spread. There is good reason, however, to believe that next time we can win. The sense of a single global enemy is widely shared. On a single day on 15 February 2003, 30 million people around the world marched against imperialist war, sparking a chain of events that led to the Arab Spring and the end of the Mubarak dictatorship in Egypt—an event itself celebrated around the world within minutes.993 In today's more interconnected and globalised economy there is no question that a workers' revolution would have a rapid and inspiring impact. /// This is not an academic question. Capitalism continues its relentless pillage of global resources, hurtling humanity toward self-destruction. An appeal made by Jules Valles after his participation in the Paris Commune in 1871 needs little amending almost 150 years later: ///

# Case

### 1NC – Presumption

#### Presumption flips neg against K affs – they have the burden of proof since they aren’t defending the rez. That’s key to ensure the neg has a shot at engagement.

#### Vote neg on presumption:

#### 1] Systems--the 1AC says institutions create social realities that replicate violence but in-round discourse does nothing to alter conditions. All you do is encourage teams to write better framework blocks.

#### 2] Spillover--they are missing an internal link as to why they need the ballot or why the reading of the aff forwards change. Empirically denied – judges vote on [x] all the time and nothing happens.

#### Reject framing arguments that parameterize content – debate should be an open forum to attack ideas from different directions – anything else brackets out certain modes of knowledge production which their evidence would obviously disagree with.

#### ROB is to vote for the better debater. Only evaluating the consequences of the plan allows us to determine the practical impacts of politics and preserves the predictability that fosters engagement. Rigorous contestation and third and fourth-line testing are key to generate the self-reflexivity that creates ethical subjects.

#### Debate is good: it gives us the self-reflexivity necessary to pass effective policy by forcing rigorous argument refinement through contestation which allows us to filter out fake news while breaking down biases – proven by debaters like Neal Katayal who made CJR reform or Leslie Wexler who passed climate policy. Destroying debate would destroy the homes of minorities who consider debate a safe space or rely on it for scholarships.

### 1NC – Theory of Power

#### Four disads to their theorizing:

#### 1] Their focus on the body as a site for politics limits emancipatory potential and recreates exclusion

Anna Mollow 4, PhD candidate in English at the University of California, Berkeley. IDENTITY POLITICS ANDDISABILITY STUDIES:A CRITIQUE OF RECENT THEORY quod.lib.umich.edu/cgi/t/text/text-idx?cc=mqr;c=mqr;c=mqrarchive;idno=act2080.0043.218;rgn=main;view=text;xc=1;g=mqrg

The most troubling aspect of Thomson's use of identity politics is her definition of disability as visible physical difference. Extraordinary Bodies locates "the disabled people of the later twentieth-century" at the end of a historical trajectory that begins with "the wondrous monsters of antiquity" and moves to "the fascinating freaks of the nineteenth-century" (58). Undoubtedly, many of the people who appeared in nineteenth-century freak shows might today be described as disabled. But other nineteenth-century constructions that have little to do with visual bodily difference—such as the hysteric or the invalid—are also important to consider in a history of disability. Thomson, however, tends to equate disability with visible difference. She writes that "the disabled body is a spectacle . . . in a complex relation between seer and seen" (136). In literature, she claims, disability "functions only as a visual difference"; and throughout history, female "deviance" is "always attributed to some visible characteristic" (10-11; 28; emphasis added) I do not mean to suggest that Thomson would deny that many people with invisible impairments are disabled; on the contrary, like each of the critics I discuss in this essay, Thomson is committed to combating oppression of people with all forms of disability. In fact, early in the first chapter of her book, she provides a definition of disability that includes a number of non-visible impairments (13). Yet Thomson does not explain in Extraordinary Bodies how her definition of disability as a visual spectacle might be reconciled with her recognition of arthritis as a disability, or with the ADA's inclusion of conditions such as carpal tunnel syndrome, Chronic Fatigue Syndrome, hypertension, and chronic back pain under the category of disability. [24] Thomson's unintentional elision of invisible disability has potentially serious political repercussions; people with unseen disabilities are often objects of suspicion and disbelief. [25] Thomson's narrow definition of disability does not result from a wish to exclude, but rather from the use of an identity politics model. Critics of identity politics point out that the construction of identity is an inevitably exclusionary process; one defines who one is in part by saying what one is not, thus producing what Butler has called a "constitutive outside" (xi). In Extraordinary Bodies, this constitutive outside might be understood as disease. Thomson's construction of a positive disabled identity is facilitated by her emphatic disassociation of disability from disease. She seeks "to recast [disability] from a form of pathology to a form of ethnicity" (6). The title of her conclusion—"From Pathology to Identity"—repeats the call for such a transition in understanding disability.

#### 2] Critical disability studies invariably reifies that which they seek to oppose and confirms liberal individualism which dooms progressive politics.

Anna Mollow 4, PhD candidate in English at the University of California, Berkeley. IDENTITY POLITICS ANDDISABILITY STUDIES:A CRITIQUE OF RECENT THEORY quod.lib.umich.edu/cgi/t/text/text-idx?cc=mqr;c=mqr;c=mqrarchive;idno=act2080.0043.218;rgn=main;view=text;xc=1;g=mqrg

Siebers's reservations about Foucault have important implications for his own arguments about identity politics. A Foucaultian analysis of identity might take Siebers's observation that individualization is a form of subjection a step further, noting that identity categories are themselves the effects of such processes. If, as Foucault claims, "species" such as "the homosexual" or "the delinquent"—or, disability scholars might add, "the handicapped person"—do not exist outside of power, but are instead produced by disciplinary regimes, then to center a political theory on any of these categories—or on variations of them such as "the disabled person," "the lesbian," or "the queer"—is to risk reifying them. This danger becomes evident when Siebers chastises postmodern theorists for their putative preoccupation with pleasure. Like Davis, Siebers formulates a critique of postmodernism that appears to depend in part upon an opposition between disability and sexuality: "Many social constructionists assume that it is extremely difficult to see through the repressive apparatus of modern society to any given body, but when they do manage to spot one, it is rarely disabled. It is usually a body that feels good and looks good—a body on the brink of discovering new kinds of pleasure, new uses for itself, and more and more power" (DT 742). The language in this passage, like that which Davis employs in his critique of "the fashionable discourse of theory," has the effect of reinscribing an opposition between disability and sexuality; that is, between the disabled body and "a body that feels good and looks good" (EN 5; DT 742). This discursive construction of people with disabilities is naturalized when Siebers asserts that the "human ego does not easily accept the disabled body. It prefers pleasure" (DT 742). Such a formulation contributes to an individualization of disability similar to that which Siebers persuasively protests at other moments: ironically, Siebers's construction of the disabled person resembles Freud's description of the narcissistic—"so long as he suffers, he ceases to love" (551). As with Davis, Siebers is not actually arguing for a de-eroticized definition of disability. Rather, it seems clear that the purpose of Siebers's contrast between "the disabled body" and "pleasure" is to highlight the physical pain and the social disempowerment that many people with disabilities face. These realities are important to emphasize, and by doing so, Siebers takes on an important challenge facing disability scholars: the need to theorize bodily pain. It seems equally important, however, to insist that disabled bodies can also be sites of pleasure and power. The passage cited above may risk reifying the figure of "the disabled body" as powerless and asexual; in this way, it illustrates the danger that identity-centered analyses can unintentionally naturalize constructions that might better be contested. Siebers's endorsement of consciousness-raising and his emphasis upon the importance of individual experience also conflict with his more Foucaultian claim that the individualization of disabled people contributes to their oppression. The Foucaultian account of subject formation, according to which the "individual is an effect of power," poses a challenge to the claims of identity politics, which grant a privileged epistemological status to individual experience (TL 98). As Siebers puts it, "representing the individual experiences of unique human kinds is clearly the goal of black studies, women's studies, and disability studies" (TO 6). Personal experience also authorizes Siebers's rejection of Donna Haraway's theory of the cyborg: "I know the truth about the myth of the cyborg, about how able-bodied people try to represent disability as a marvelous advantage, because I am a cyborg myself," he writes (DT 746). While I share Siebers's impulse to resist romanticizing depictions of disability, it nonetheless seems important to note that such romanticization is not exclusively the domain of "able-bodied people." The strategy of representing "disability as a marvelous advantage" is also employed by disability scholars such as Thomson, who identifies herself as disabled and embraces Haraway's cyborg as "the affirmed survivor of cultural otherness, ready to engage the postmodern world on its own terms" (114). And ironically, Siebers himself attributes to disability a marvelous cognitive advantage when he claims, "I know the truth . . . because I am a cyborg myself." Claiming that people with disabilities have privileged access to knowledge may have the potential to subvert assumptions that we need others' advice and intervention. But by over-emphasizing our difference, the strategy risks contributing to our excessive individualization, a process which Siebers accurately identifies as a primary means of our oppression. In addition, the confessional aspects of Siebers's writing also potentially undermine his critique of social constructions of disability as individual and personal. Siebers acknowledges the potentially depoliticizing aspects of personal narrative, but he hopes that personal narratives by people with disabilities will enable "people without disabilities to recognize our reality and theirs as a common one"; this is necessary, he believes, in order for us to gain political recognition (TO 51). Siebers's point is well taken, and his own work demonstrates that personal narrative can be an invaluable component of a political analysis of disability. [15] Yet Foucault's insistence upon the ways in which subjects are "condemned to confess" is also worth considering in relation to disability. The requirement that people with invisible or undiagnosed disabilities routinely provide first-person narratives—explain "what happened," describe "what's wrong" with them, justify their requests for accommodations when they "look fine"—exemplifies a process by which the demand to "speak the truth" contributes to the medicalization of individuals. Moreover, institutional conferral of the identity of "disabled person" often mandates the production of a narrative; many applicants for disability benefits are required to describe in detail their symptoms, daily activities, and medical histories. Identity politics movements also often demand the authentication of one's identity. Consider, for example, Siebers's assertion that "every person with a disability can recount . . . stories" in which disabled bodies "become sources of fear and fascination for able-bodied people, who cannot bear to look at the unruly sight before them but also cannot bear not to look" (DT 746). As I will discuss later, this claim illustrates Butler's argument that the consolidation of identity necessarily operates by a process of exclusion (22). One can assume that Siebers does not mean to suggest that people with unseen impairments are not disabled; but his statement nonetheless implies that only those whose disabilities are visible belong to the group comprising "every person with a disability" (DT 746). The idea that all disabled people can relate similar stories might also be considered in the context of Janet E. Halley's critique of identity politics. Halley suggests that Althusserian interpellation can be instituted, not only by a state apparatus, but also "from within resistant social movements" (44). To support this argument, she draws upon K. Anthony Appiah, who observes: "Demanding respect for people as blacks and as gays requires that there are some scripts that go with being an African-American or having same-sex desires. There will be proper ways of being black and gay, there will be expectations to be met, demands to be made." [16]Indeed, one of the dangers of identity politics is its coercive potential. As Siebers's use of an identity politics model of disability illustrates, coercion can take the form of a requirement to produce certain kinds of stories in order to be identified as disabled; it can also operate through the entrenchment of de-sexualizing and disempowering definitions of disability.

#### 3] Disability isn’t ontological – social context determines disability discrimination.

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V. Disabilities in Social Context Proponents of a social model seem to support the idea that disability is a product of wrong interpretation of impairments (Reindal, 1995) related to disabling social structures. Our question is very simple: Assuming that we have an ideal, perfect, caring society, will disabilities no longer exist? If we followed the arguments of the social model, in an ideal society we would have only impairments but not disabilities! Unfortunately, we do not think that it would be possible to eradicate disabilities by changing only the sociopolitical context. Why? Because the dichotomy between impairment and disability is methodological; it is not ontological. The names we give to physical or mental conditions do not create disabilities or turn disabilities into abilities (Kauffman et al., 2008; Kauffman, 2011). Of course, names have their importance, because they circulate in a social context and turn back on the named people. Also, a much better social context can substantially improve the quality of life of people with disabilities, and this is not a trivial matter. But whatever names we use in our societies, the most profound restrictions related to intrinsic factors will remain for the vast majority of people with disabilities. Nevertheless, the discussion about social context is an important issue. Disabilities should be viewed as embedded in their social context in many different ways. First, a certain disability is conceptualized within a specific social context and characterized by a discrepancy between the individual’s performance and the expectations or demands of the social group to which the person belongs. This brings social values into the appreciation of disabilities. Any conceptualization of disability, whether physical or mental, is inevitably value-laden. Disabilities naturally arouse children’s curiosity, but social perceptions can change. The recognition of disabilities can take different directions according to social values. Zola, an American sociologist, has eloquently described it: “Children spontaneously express an interest in wheelchairs and leg braces, but as they grow older they are taught that . . . it’s not nice to ask [about] such things” (1982, 200). Values and attitudes exert profound influence on the way nondisabled people perceive others with disabilities, as Zola stated: When the “able-bodied” confront the “disabled,” they often think with a shudder, “I’m glad it’s not me” . . . The threat to be dispelled is the inevitability of one’s own failure. The discomfort that many feel in the presence of the aged, the suffering, and the dying is the reality that it could just as well be them. (1982, 202) Second, social decisions about the border between disability and normality are difficult because of the statistical phenomena involved. In many cases, the border is both vague and rather arbitrary (Kauffman and Hallahan, 2005; Anastasiou and Kauffman, 2011; Kauffman and Lloyd, 2011 ). Defining the qualitative differences we call disabilities by making binary decisions (yes or no, has or does not have) requires making judgments about people, even though the quantitative data are continuous statistical distributions. The identification of a disability depends on judgment, and judgment means that one arrives at a cutpoint on continuously distributed abilities. Inevitably social values are linked to the judgmental identification of disabilities. However, not making such a judgment precludes the kind of assistance we consider necessary for social justice (Anastasiou and Kauffman, 2011). Third, although categorizing and labeling have become major issues in disability and special education debates, the debate is often misguided. Kauffman (2002, 2011) and Kauffman et al. (2008) have argued analytically for the inevitability of labeling, given that we really want to offer special services and benefits to specific individuals. We simply cannot offer extra or better services to individuals without speaking about difference or special needs, and this is as true for disabilities as it is for economic assistance or any social program. For this reason, an individual-based perspective is necessary for identifying people with special needs for certain services (Reindal, 1995). Without a definition based on individual criteria of disability, the rights of people with disabilities cannot be fully guaranteed (see Kauffman and Landrum, 2009). Even in Norway, a country with an extended safety net of social welfare services, the identification of benefits to be received is based on judgment of individual need (Reindal, 1995). Antilabelists imagine services without labels. But even in an ideal communitarian society with enough resources, we cannot offer excellent services according to the old socialistic principle “from each according to his/her ability, to each according to his/her needs” without any need identification process. Perhaps the process is more obvious in an antagonistic society with a plurality of interests and unequal distribution of power, status, and wealth. Those who want to avoid all labels commit a great mistake in confusing the relationship between education and social change. Public education, by its nature, is a rather conservative institution that reflects the mainstream values of society and represents an adopted social agenda. It is a trailer and not a leader in political, economic, and social change. Historically great social changes precede important educational changes. Imagining the opposite relationship and neglecting today’s predominant sociopolitical forces is a political fallacy. The danger is that without labels the needs of individuals with disabilities will be ignored (see Kauffman, 2011). Surely labeling is not trivial, because labels are used to describe human beings as well as things. Labels often carry unintended stigma to receivers of services. And in many cases, the experiences of being disabled are socially constructed, mirroring the thoughts, feelings, and values of the social milieu. Indeed, the institutional response to disabilities is difficult. The “dilemma of difference” has been underlined in special education’s literature. If we emphasize existing differences (including disabilities), then we are in danger of unjustified discrimination; if we ignore the existence of disabilities or pretend that they do not exist, then we are in danger of leaving critical humans’ needs untreated (Hallahan and Kauffman, 1994; Kauffman and Badar, forthcoming). Fourth, disabilities are defined in a specific sociopolitical context and a system of social relations. Many dimensions of disabilities are part of the social process by which the social meanings of disability are negotiated (Zola, 1989). Public policy has a great impact on the lives of people with disabilities, and the formulation of disability strategy in education and public arena is of huge importance (Anastasiou and Kauffman, 2010, 2011). In summary, disabilities are sealed within their social context. And many concepts about disabilities, whether involving low-incidence disabilities (e.g., severe intellectual disabilities) or high-incidence disabilities (e.g., mild intellectual disabilities, specific learning disability), have socially constructed aspects. It is not accidental that they have been classified and reclassified, defined and redefined according to the status of scientific knowledge and social values (e.g., Bruno Bettelheim’s theory of “refrigerator mothers” as a cause of autism—that autism was caused by cold, distant, and unconsciously rejecting mothers). Using the reasoning of Hacking (1999), we could make a distinction between the idea of autism (and the surrounding conceptual context) as socially constructed and autistic behaviors, which are real. Social construction does not give us insight into the severely restricted communication and social interaction of children with autism. Recognizing the influence of social context does not mean that there are no other viable ideas about disabilities. Social factors such as biomedical technology and special education can interact with biological factors, codetermining the evolution of disabilities as atypical predicaments. Thus, social and individual explanations of disabilities should be seen not as mutually exclusive but as codeterminants of development of people who have disabilities (Williams, 1999).

#### 4] It’s not static – conceptions of disability aren’t concrete but fluid over time – for example ADHD wasn’t diagnosed as disability until more recent medicine, and there’s no clear brightline or definition of disability.