# 1NC UT Round 1

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#### The Atlantic slave trade marked the birth of modern logistics and racial capitalism that was characterized by endless access and a drive for endless control. Even through this global regime of racialized violence, logistics is vulnerable to logisticality – a glitch amongst those in the grips of total access.

Harney et al. 18 Stefano Harney in conversation with Niccolò Cuppini and Mattia Frapporti, September 2018, “Logistics Genealogies: A Dialogue with Stefano Harney,” Social Text 136 • Vol. 36, No. 3, DOI 10.1215/01642472-6917802 Recut Justin

Modern logistics is a commercial logistics, with all the multiple sources that feed what Cedric Robinson calls racial capitalism. And it’s a capitalist science. Even today’s military logistics is most commonly outsourced to commercial rms, who make huge prfiots off the logistics of contempo- rary permanent war. As a commercial logistics, as a capitalist science, it can be traced directly and emphatically to the Atlantic slave trade. The Atlantic slave trade was the birth of modern logistics, as it was also the birth of a new kind of war on our species being, and the birth of racial cap- italism, which amounts to saying the same thing. This trade entailed the first global movement of mass commodities, voluminous and grotesque. Moreover, these humans were also perishable and volatile commodities that could “go missing” and were hard “to extract,” requiring complex, even diabolical, logistical technologies, supported by finance, insurance, law, and of course state and extrastate violence. Ian Baucom locates the origins of modern insurance in the Atlantic slave trade in his important work Spectres of the Altantic. We know from Sergio Bologna how much contemporary finance and logistics are entwined in today’s overleveraged global shipping industry, but this was true of the Atlantic slave trade too, where speculative finance was already at work. The story of the Zong slave ship is central to Baucom’s account and is also beautifully, unbearably rendered by M. NourbeSe Philip in her book-length poem Zong!, captur- ing what the birth of modern logistics did to any possible project of the human by bringing finance and logistics together in a devilish alliance over the commodity that really “could speak,” the “thing” that talks or is somehow in touch, neither subject nor proper object, a massive, subter- ranean, ethereal, undercommon threat to the individuation of modern “Man” emerging at the same time. But the Atlantic slave trade was also the birth of modern logistics because modern logistics is not just about how to transport large amounts of commodities or information or energy, or even how to move these ef- ficiently, but also about the sociopathic demand for access: topographical, jurisdictional, but as importantly bodily and social access. The nearly complete access that was imposed upon the African enslaved, upon the African continent, and upon the lands and indigenous peoples settled for plantations, this kind of access remains the ambition of logistics today, and it is for this reason that the slave trade remains so contemporary, that abolition as Jared Sexton rightly says is yet to come. And we might add that this abolition requires the abolishment of logistics which in its flows created a people without standing anywhere. We act in abolition not for a ground to stand on but for groundations beyond standing. Modern logistics, with its warehousing and its containers, is as much about controlling the flow as ensuring the flow, as much about the interface of movement of commodities and financialization of commodities as it is about just get- ting goods somewhere. That interface is an opportunity for speculation, and today the line itself, the supply line and the assembly line, their speed, efficiency, and metrics, are a source of massive financial speculation. This is also the horrific legacy of the Atlantic slave trade, the containerization of people, of the sociopathic access demanded to labor and sex, and the storage, in forts, in the hold. And even more murderously, the elimination of goods, of cargo, when the price falls, or considerations of finance as in the incident of the slave ship the Zong, in which 133 enslaved persons were thrown overboard for insurance purposes during a logistical operation. In short, this aggregated access allowed for the most evil calculations about the perishability of goods, the planned obsolescence of products, and the cost of replacement, in a word, financial speculation on the supply line that was in the case of the African enslaved in the Atlantic trade often indis- tinguishable from the assembly line. Marx said the rst thing the worker makes is himself. The slave was worker on the line and at the same time the supply coming off the line and into the line. The same concerns with speculation on the line, the line as a modulation of investment and exploi- tation of labor are still found today at Walmart or Starbucks, not so far from their origins, at least for the most part. As Susan Zieger reminds us in her study of “Box” Brown and logistics — he was the slave who mailed himself in a box to “freedom” from the slave-plantation South to the slave-dependent North in the United States — logistics incorporates loss in its logics. As Fred Moten and I say, logistics tracks us because it assumes fugitivity. Indeed, what is called surveillance might also be called preemptive logistics. It is possible that all we know of surveillance studies, including its most incisive work in black surveillance like Simone Browne’s, could also go under the name preemptive logistics, even predictive logistics, the anticipation not of resistance but of a kind of impenetrability even in the give. In other words, our entangled, indeterminate, undercommon rub- up of curvy lines, kinks, loops, and crooked lines summons logistics. It reacts to our sumptuous tangle. Our entanglement requires them to draw up contingency plans, which are plans to make our indeterminacy mere contingency, to account for what goes missing. Logistics is the science of loss, the science of their lost means, which is to say it will always be the white science and the science of being white. Logistics is the science of their loss, not ours, though we, and those closest to blackness in particu- lar, suffer horrific losses from their loss. However, it was not just modern logistics that was born in this hell-fire. It was also the birth of what Fred and I call logisticality, a social capacity found most intensely amongst those who found themselves, who found each other, under the duress of almost total access but in the grip of each other. As Frank Wilderson writes at the end of Incognegro, his brilliant more-than-memoir: “Something happened to us in the hold.” And not just in the hold. In her heart-breaking but unavoidable book Lose Your Mother, Saidiya Hartman speaks of the fugitivity that the ungoverned and the ungovernable of Africa were forced to invent because of the reach of the Atlantic slave trade. Those captured by the trade either were or became the people Cedric Robinson understands in Africa as living by a principle of “individual” incompleteness. Such peoples existed everywhere, as James Scott asserts in The Art of Not Being Governed. Scott details how highland peoples in Southeast Asia avoided the massive slave trade of the padi states, at trade that dominated precolonial Southeast Asia to the point that slaves became not only the biggest trade but currency itself. In many languages of the padi states these peoples were already known by the name slave before they were enslaved. These peoples refused to form political societies, have leaders, or see land as owned or even shared in ownership. They gathered, and they wandered. No written languages, they sought refuge with each other. But the hold, the middle passage, the ­fire that African peoples went through, those who were captured, and those who became fugitive, created something perhaps unprecedented in its total span across societies and histories. This is what Fred and I call logisticality, the ability to fi­nd each other, to move together, to break the rule of Newtonian time and space, disorder it, and legislate new time and space to disorder, to gather, stranded into refuge together. A people came into existence without origin — anoriginal, as Nahum Chandler would say — who were “in touch,” whose response to the sociopathic demand for access was paradoxically and necessarily a radical opening of being, a practice of touch without surface or border or edge, a practice of hapticality. Fred and I understand hapticality as a kind of touch without surface that undoes, that saps the fever of individuation, in a sometimes violent and profane exorcism. It is not a reassuring touch. It unensures precisely because it’s a loving touch. In a sense, African slaves who came through the ­re could be said to have reversed logistics and overturned it. Now the slaver sought this logisticality, sought but could not fully capture something that had been produced in capture but also preceded it as Robinson and Scott suggest, calling capture into being in all its murderous regulatory force. We can understand this logisticality in two registers, as I’ve suggested: First, in C. L. R. James’s famous contention that slaves ran the plantations in the Caribbean — that it was the slaves who had the capacity and know-how to work across half a dozen African and European languages in this early crucible of world capitalism — it was the slaves who worked the nascent capitalist machinery of the sugar mills and who handled the logistics of transport to the ships, and sometimes on the ships. It was the slaves who worked in exchanges of different currencies, commodities, and calculations of the future, with world prices. The slaves also ran the households, providing the care, nurturing, and attention. Now as James would be quick to point out, all this occurred despite the unbounded inhumanity and cruelty of the owners, as for instance he details in his chapter on owners and on the property in the Black Jacobins. All of this was also going on in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries at a time when, as James notes, most of our families in Italy and across Europe, as we might say, “still only knew the bell tower.” This logisticality — the quantum ­nding, this hapticality, this feel without surface that hurts and loves — could also be understood as a capacity to recreate Robinson’s principle of incompleteness and, indeed, to detect and translate such principles of incompleteness and ungovernability, of the unregulated, the disorderly and the unruled, to feel these things, and feel others feeling you being undone. This hapticality was never going to be fully enslaved, even when American slavery turned to its speci­c Taylorist brutality and slave breeding with the rise of the cotton trade and industrial capitalism at the end of the eighteenth century. But more importantly, it survives as the basis of the black radical tradition, in radical social poesis, as Laura Harris says. It survives in/as blackness. So the shipped, the containerized, the accessed of the Atlantic slave trade gave birth to modern logistics but also conjured something in the break of this massive enclosure of those who lived together by the principle of incompleteness. And despite this, it is fundamentally necessary to place that hapticality against what Christina Sharpe, writing recently about the slave ship and its wake, might call its “weather,” the pervasive antiblack racism that this founding of modern logistics also bequeathed the contemporary world and perpetuates today.

#### Endless access is inextricably tied to the logic of improvement and the Algorithm of work broadly – the demand for the right to strike is subsumed by logistical capitalism.

Moten and Harney 15 [Fred, Professor of Performance Studies for the Tisch School of the Arts at NYU, PhD in English from UC Berkeley, 2020 MacArthur Genius Fellow, Stefano, Professor of Strategic Management for the Lee Kong Chian School of Business at Singapore Management University, PhD in Social and Political Sciences from the University of Cambridge, co-founder of Ground Provisions—a curatorial collective, founder of the School for Study—a nomadic study collective, 2015, “Mikey the Rebelator,” Performance Research, 20:4, 141-145, DOI: 10.1080/13528165.2015.1071057] Justin

Paolo Friere thought our incompleteness is what gave us hope.7 It is our incompleteness that inclines us toward one another. For Friere, the more we think of ourselves as complete, finished, whole, individual, the more we cannot love or be loved. Is it too much to put this the other way around? To say, by way of Friere, that love is the undercommon self-defence of being-incomplete? This seems important now when our incompleteness is something we are invited and then compelled to address and improve, when we are told to be impatient with it, and embarrassed by it. We need to be intact. We’re told to raise our buzz because we’re all fucked up. But in our defence we love that we are complete only in a plained incompletion, which they would have undone, finished, owned, and sent on down the line. We do mind working because we do mind dying. THE CONSU LTANT The consultant is not here to provide solutions, innovation or even advice. The consultant exists to demonstrate access in the era of logistical capitalism. The consultant is not an ideologue. Ideology operates here only for the consultant himself. He is demonstrably the only one who believes his bullshit, but fortunately for him this is not the point, not his point. The consultant literalizes access to workplaces, demonstrating their openness by showing up in their midst, like a drone. One day you come to work and there he is sitting next to the boss. Nothing she says or does is as important as this demonstration of access. What the consultant introduces into the imposed, exposed workers’ corp is the algorithm. The consultant bears the algorithm, which violates in the name of completion. When the consultant brings his algorithmic charge, the body of the workers, that undesired and constantly invaded enclosure, is finished. We are rendered complete, made free, by the work, in the work, of the algorithm. We are done, and done in by, the consultant’s forced, aggressive incorporation of an undoing that was of and for itself, of and for ourself, the undoing we keep on making in the face of every sovereign invasion, every violent ascription of words and worth and (the) work. The consultant completes, so that he can access the private loop of a thwarted desire to be intact. It is not the product or even the organization that interests the algorithm of work. It is the production line’s infinite curvature. The algorithm of work is a demonstration within a demonstration. With access comes (the necessity of) improvement, which always takes the form of a demand for more access. As the introduction of the consultant inside the organization demonstrates access, so the introduction of the algorithm demonstrates improvement. The algorithm is the machine of self-improvement; as such, it is the only machine that makes new machines. There is a mirror – marking and instantiating self-envisaging’s shared exclusivity, that scary, silly, Stuart Smalleyish binary solipsism – that stands between it and man, the other only machine that makes new machines and, in so doing, improves itself. The mirror between man, the mirror, and The Man, man’s mirror, is the algorithm. Meanwhile, the inhuman, which is our fleshly inherence and inhabitation in the general mechanics of a general disregard for self-reflection, makes machines because it does not want to improve. Before the algorithm, machines came from strikes, from resistance, from sabotage. Machines made from the algorithm do not wait for the class struggle. The algorithm of work subjects every labour process on the production line to undoing, disassembly and incompletion, in order to demand it be completed better, assembled better, done better. It leaves behind not an improved organization but a metric to ensure the organization will never be satisfied. The metric measures everything against its last instance, ensuring that the last instance never comes. The metric demands more access, more measurement of access, more movement, more assembly, more measure of the last instance, which is given in and as enclosure. The consultant is still talking but it does not matter now what he says. The algorithm of work has arrived, algorithmic surplus has gone viral. If the settler could not be heard over the screams of primitive accumulation, and the citizen could not be heard over the noise of the machines, the consultant cannot be heard over the click of the metrics. Mikey heard this noise and walked the other way, another way, so the algorithm could not pass through, so we could hold him up and pass him along. Nahum Chandler reminds us of a term W. E. B. DuBois invented and employed; ‘democratic despotism’8 . When the consultant cannot demonstrate access, and therefore the algorithm cannot demonstrate improvement, the consultant calls for policy as once (and still) the citizen calls for heteropatriachal nationalism or the settler for racist manifest destiny. Policy is past all that, even though all that’s not past. Policy comes in to diagnose what’s blocking access, and what’s blocking access are ‘those people’. What’s wrong with those people in Detroit who want water, in British Columbia who want land, in Manila who want some place to stay? Policy says there is something wrong with those people that makes it so that the consultant can’t get access. But it is the other way around. The consultant is denied access – those people deny him access – because they embrace the general access-in-antagonism that he denies. And so policy must be called. Selfdefence becomes the disease. Love becomes the problem because love is the problem, the self-defence of the accessible. But, hey, maybe governance can help, which is to say maybe those practising self-defence may be willing to self-diagnose, self-reflect, self-improve! One way or another policy will proscribe, or policy will get posed – as democracy, as democratic despotism, where everyone is given the chance to say there is something wrong with those people. Democratic despotism is the imposition of policy and its violent possibilities and impossibilities on the wrong(ed). Because the thing is, the consultant’s not wrong, the algorithm of work is not malfunctioning, the policy hustler is not misdiagnosing. We’re wrong, which is why we’re wronged. We are incomplete. Moreover, they got the very idea of incompleteness from us! Another word for incompleteness is study, or more precisely, revision. The consultant gets this revision from us, from study, from our sumptuous revisions of one another out of existence, as existence. Study happens and it don’t stop. In study, we are engaged consciously and unconsciously. We revise, and then again. This is not just about distinguishing improvement as capitalist efficiency. That is too easy to dismiss. It is about improvement itself, the time-concept, the moral imperative, the aesthetic judgement, which is to say capitalist improvement founded in and on black flesh, its female informality. Revision has no end and no connection to improvement, never mind efficiency. So the consultant does and undoes institutions but can’t access instituted life, can’t open black life, can’t uncover queer life, can’t expose feminist planning around the ‘kitchen table’ as Barbara and Beverly Smith called it and Tiziana Terranova calls to it again, all noting certain paradoxes of freedom and sequestration in little general intellects of surreal life.9 He can’t access open secrets, can’t incomplete what is already incomplete, can’t deform what is always informal already and yet; they can’t believe and this leads to the state emergency that goes under such names as resilience and preparedness. When democratic despotism fails, simple despotism in the name of democracy must be imposed. Resilience is the name for the violent destruction of things that won’t give, won’t return to form, won’t bend when access is demanded, won’t be flexible and (com)pliant. Stopping when you are told to stop and moving along when you are told to move along demonstrates resilience and composure; but broken, breaking, dissed assembly demonstrates itself openly, secretly, dissembling in captured but inaccessible glance, for us, to us, as incomplete and much more than complete. Its daimonic performance can’t be individuated and won’t be performed. HOL D SHE It’s not about who’s holding you down when you try to jay-walk; it’s about who’s holding you up. This is the question of hapticality. The police can’t hold what’s already held. At the same time, what’s already held is all that we can hold. That’s our haptic institution. Watching mama listen to a song, you’re instituted. Here go that Michael Jackson song she turned up to teach me how to dance. In the photograph, they containerize her but she is uncontained. They bend her because access and logistics strive to be one. The more she is captured by the police, the photographer, the viewer, the more she is shipped. But the more she is shipped, the more she is held, the more she is handed.

#### Specifically, regulating the strike into the right to strike allows the state to dictate revolution – that diffuses planning into policy and subverts radicality.

Crépon 19 Mark Crépon (French philosopher), translated by Micol Bez “The Right to Strike and Legal War in Walter Benjamin’s ‘Toward the Critique of Violence,’” Critical Times, 2:2, August 2019, DOI 10.1215/26410478-7708331 Recut Justin

If we wish to understand how the question of the right to strike arises for Walter Benjamin in the seventh paragraph of his essay “Zur Kritik der Gewalt,” it is impor­ tant to first analyze the previous paragraph, which concerns the state’s monopoly on violence. It is here that Benjamin questions the argument that such a monopoly derives from the impossibility of a system of legal ends to preserve itself as long as the pursuit of natural ends through violent means remains. Benjamin responds to this dogmatic thesis with the following hypothesis, arguably one of his most impor­ tant reflections: “To counter it, one would perhaps have to consider the surprising possibility that law’s interest in monopolizing violence vis­à­vis the individual is explained by the intention not of preserving legal ends, but rather of preserving law itself. [This is the possibility] that violence, when it does not lie in the hands of law, poses a danger to law, not by virtue of the ends that it may pursue but by virtue of its mere existence outside of law.”1 In other words, nothing would endanger the law more than the possibility of its authority being contested by a violence over which it has no control. The function of the law would therefore be, first and foremost, to contain violence within its own boundaries. It is in this context that, to demonstrate this surprising hypothesis, Benjamin invokes two examples: the right to strike guaranteed by the state and the law of war. Let us return to the place that the right to strike occupies within class struggle. To begin with, the very idea of such a struggle implies certain forms of violence. The strike could then be understood as one of the recognizable forms that this violence can take. However, this analytical framework is undermined as soon as this form of violence becomes regulated by a “right to strike,” such as the one recognized by law in France in 1864. What this recognition engages is, in fact, the will of the state to control the possible “violence” of the strike. Thus, the “right” of the right to strike appears as the best, if not the only, way for the state to circumscribe within (and via) the law the relative violence of class struggles. We might consider this to be the per­ fect illustration of the aforementioned hypothesis. Yet, there are two lines of ques­ tioning that destabilize this hypothesis that we would do well to consider. First, is it legitimate to present the strike as a form of violence? Who has a vested interest in such a representation? In other words, how can we trace a clear and unequivocal demarcation between violence and nonviolence? Are we not always bound to find residues of violence, even in those actions that we would be tempted to consider nonviolent? The second line of questioning is just as important and is rooted in the distinction established by Georges Sorel, in his Reflections on Violence, between the “political strike” and the “proletarian general strike,” to which Benja­ min dedicates a set of complementary analyses in §13 of his essay. Here, again, we are faced with a question of limits. What is at stake is the possibility for a certain type of strike (the proletarian general strike) to exceed the limits of the right to strike— turning, in other words, the right to strike against the law itself. The phenomenon is that of an autoimmune process, in which the right to strike that is meant to protect the law against the possible violence of class strugles is transformed into a means for the destruction of the law. The diference between the two types of strikes is nevertheless introduced with a condition: “The validity of this statement, however, is not unrestricted because it is not unconditional,” notes Benjamin in §7. We would be mistaken in believing that the right to strike is granted and guaranteed uncondi­ tionally. Rather, it is structurally subjected to a conflict of interpretations, those of the workers, on the one hand, and of the state on the other. From the point of view of the state, the partial strike cannot under any circumstance be understood as a right to exercise violence, but rather as the right to extract oneself from a preexisting (and verifiable) violence: that of the employer. In this sense, the partial strike should be considered a nonviolent action, what Benjamin named a “pure means.” The interpretations diverge on two main points. The first clearly depends on the alleged “violence of the employer,” a predicate that begs the question: Who might have the authority to recognize such violence? Evidently it is not the employer. The danger is that the state would similarly lack the incentive to make such a judgment call. It is nearly impossible, in fact, to find a single instance of a strike in which this recognition of violence was not subject to considerable controversy. The political game is thus the following: the state legislated the right to strike in order to con­ tain class strugles, with the condition that workers must have “good reason” to strike. However, it is unlikely that a state systematically allied with (and accomplice to) employers will ever recognize reasons as good, and, as a consequence, it will deem any invocation of the right to strike as illegitimate. Workers will therefore be seen as abusing a right granted by the state, and in so doing transforming it into a violent means. On this point, Benjamin’s analyses remain extremely pertinent and profoundly contemporary. They unveil the enduring strategy of governments confronted with a strike (in education, transportation, or healthcare, for example) who, afer claiming to understand the reasons for the protest and the grievances of the workers, deny that the arguments constitute sufcient reason for a strike that will likely paralyze this or that sector of the economy. They deny, in other words, that the conditions denounced by the workers display an intrinsic violence that jus­ tifies the strike. Let us note here a point that Benjamin does not mention, but that is part of Sorel’s reflections: this denial inevitably contaminates the (socialist) lef once it gains power. What might previously have seemed a good reason to strike when it was the opposition is deemed an insufcient one once it is the ruling party. In the face of popular protest, it always invokes a lack of sufcient rationale, allow­ ing it to avoid recognizing the intrinsic violence of a given social or economic situ­ ation, or of a new policy. And it is because it refuses to see this violence and to take responsibility for it that the left regularly loses workers’ support.

#### That continuous improvement paradoxically necessitates racialized genocide and ecological destruction.

**Moten and Harney 21** [Fred Moten, Professor of Performance Studies for the Tisch School of the Arts at NYU, PhD in English from UC Berkeley, 2020 MacArthur Genius Fellow, Stefano Harney, Professor of Strategic Management for the Lee Kong Chian School of Business at Singapore Management University, PhD in Social and Political Sciences from the University of Cambridge, co-founder of Ground Provisions—a curatorial collective, founder of the School for Study—a nomadic study collective, 2021, *All Incomplete*, pp 13-18] GZ Recut Justin

What does it mean to stand for improvement? Or worse, to stand for what business calls **a ‘commitment to continuous improvement‘?** It **means** to stand for **the brutal speciation of all**. To take a stand for speciation is the beginning of a **diabolical usufruct**. **Improvement comes to us by way of an innovation in land tenure**, where **individuated ownership, derived from increasing the land’s productivity, is given in the perpetual**, and thus arrested, becoming of exception’s miniature. This is to say that from the outset, **the ability to own** – and that ability’s first derivative, **self-possession** – **is entwined with the ability to make more productive**. In order to be improved, to be rendered more productive, **land must be violently reduced to its productivity**, which is the **regulatory diminishment and management of earthly generativity**. Speciation is this general **reduction of the earth to productivity** and **submission of the earth to techniques of domination** that isolate and enforce particular increases in and accelerations of **productivity**. In this regard, (necessarily European) man, in and as the exception, imposes speciation upon himself, in an operation that **extracts and excepts himself from the earth** in order to confirm his supposed **dominion over it**. And just as **the earth must be forcefully speciated to be possessed**, man must **forcefully speciate himself** in order to enact this kind of possession. This is to say that **racialization is present in the very idea of dominion over the earth**; in the very idea and enactment of the exception; **in the very nuts and bolts of possession-by-improvement**. Forms of racialization that both Michel Foucault and, especially and most vividly, Robinson identify in medieval Europe become *usufructed* with modern possession through improvement. Speciated humans are **endlessly improved** through the **endless work** they do on their **endless way to becoming Man**. This is the usufruct of man. In early modern England, establishing title to land by making it more productive meant **eliminating biodiversity** and isolating and breeding a species – barley or rye or pigs. Localized ecosystems were aggressively transformed so that **monocultural productivity smothers anacultural generativity**. **The emergent relation between speciation and racialization is the very conception and conceptualization of the settler**. Maintenance of that relation is his vigil and his eve. For the encloser, possession is established through improvement – this is true for the possession of land and for the possession of self. **The Enlightenment is the universalization/ globalization of the imperative to possess and its corollary, the imperative to improve**. However, this productivity must always confront its contradictory impoverishment: the **destruction of its biosphere** and its **estrangement in, if not from, entanglement**, both of which combine to ensure **the liquidation of the human differential that is already present in the very idea of man, the exception**. To stand for such improvement is to **invoke policy**, which attributes depletion to the difference, which is to say the wealth, **whose simultaneous destruction and accumulation policy is meant to operationalize**. **This attribution of a supposedly essential lack**, an inevitable and supposedly natural diminution, is achieved alongside **the imposition of possession-by-improvement**. **To make policy is to impose speciation upon everybody and everything, to inflict impoverishment in the name of improvement, to invoke the universal law of the usufruct of man**. In this context, continuous improvement, as it emerged with decolonization and particularly with the defeat of national capitalism in the 1970s, is the continuous crisis of speciation in the surround of the general antagonism. This is the contradiction Robinson constantly invoked and analyzed with the kind of profound and solemn optimism that comes from being with, and being of service to, your friends.

#### We affirm Anarcho-Blackness as an undercommon insurgency.

Bey 20 Marquis Bey, 2020, “Anarcho-Blackness: Notes Toward a Black Anarchism,” AK Press, SJBE

IT IS MISGUIDED TO PRESUME THAT AN ANARCHIC WORLD, A WORLD IN which, for classical anarchists, the State is eliminated—or a world in which, for Black queer feminist anarchists, racial capitalism and cisheteronormative patriarchy is overturned —is the “end” of anarchist pursuits. Anarcho-Blackness, with its disruptive disorderly conduct—its mode of conducting itself as, in other words, disorderly—advances a critical praxis that answers the fundamental political question, “What is to be done?” Kind of. The question “What is to be done?” demands an answer, not that the texture, tenor, or terms of that answer can be readily discerned. Nor does admitting this exculpate us from needing to, nevertheless, provide an answer. So again: what is to be done? Indeed, accosted by right-wing populism, virulent white supremacy, transantagonism, heteronormative patriarchy, and the litany of other violent regimes in our midst, we so earnestly want them to cease. We demand that it all end, now, and for justifiable reasons. I, though, animated by anarchism’s critical praxis—its practice of a criticality—do not place my crosshairs on a moment beyond now, when things might come to a close. This is not motivated by a nihilistic pessimism about the fate of the current political moment, where I cannot fathom cessation or even mitigation of various violences; this is not motivated by a perverse infatuation with the bounding persistence of hegemonic terrors. It is motivated by a kind of zeal, in fact, one where refusing an end allows for a perpetual openness that enables, always, the possibility of another beginning. Black anarchism’s emphasis on the constitutivity of the concepts of critical and praxis is fundamental here, as it itself is constituted through an indebtedness to Black queer and trans feminisms. This project is deeply theoretical, but also practical and material, because there is nothing more theoretically practical than trying to figure out how to fundamentally change the very system by which we live; indeed, to quote Zoé Samudzi, “What does it mean to create community that is safe for Black women, for Black trans women? That’s an incredibly theoretical exercise because that requires that we have all of these conversations and start to create material politics around misogynoir and trans misogynoir.”1 So the critical praxis and its theoretical heft is a ruthless interrogation of the established and institutionalized—in the vein of Marx’s 1843 call for die rücksichtlose Kritik alles Bestehenden (the ruthless criticism of all that exists); and if praxis is a doing, an agential enactment that bears on sociality, then a critical praxis marks an interrogative social enactment. What kind of politics might this lead to? What kind of world might this engender, and who might show up to this promiscuous gathering? The space cultivated by this critical praxis is where a Black anarchic politics and those subjectivated by an anarcho-Blackness, its attendant Black queer feminist electrical circuitry, show up. Those maroons, subversive intellectuals, fugitives, queers, feminists, anarchists, and rebellious workers meet to conspire together in the undercommons: a non-place where everyone is Black, queer, anarchic, because they are changed by the undercommons, which is not a place you enter but a groove that enters you. Critical praxis becomes a radical invitation to not only do but to be done by the undercommon insurgency that makes its own demands. And such an interrogation must suspend the presumption of an end goal. We know from Moten and Harney, and Jack Halberstam, that what we think we want before the crisis that precipitates our insurgency will necessarily shift after we’ve attained the limits of what our coalitional knowledge could compile. It is not because we are insufficient, as if insufficiency is a deficiency rather than a willingness to risk getting at the outer limits of what we dared to think; it is because we cannot, and must not, assume that the logics and rubrics we have when moving within the maelstrom of the hegemonic—radically altered as they may be—can operate to our benefit when we’ve unseated the hegemon. We will need new rubrics and metrics, unrubrics and unmetrics, because a radically other-world requires radically other means to love it, to caress it, to be all the way in it. So why is there no “end”? To assert this might seem to sidestep what Foucault claims in the Preface of Anti- Oedipus: to be “less concerned with why this or that than with how to proceed.” Refusing to bank on the “end” is, at least in part, how to proceed. “An abdication of political responsibility?” Moten and Harney write, anticipating the accusation. “OK. Whatever. We’re just anti-politically romantic about actually existing social life.”2 I submit that one’s concern must be an ethical one that—to supplement an oversight in Moten and Harney—not only sets its sights on social life that “actually” (I shiver at the hubris of this word) exists but, more substantively, fertilizes the conditions of possibility for otherwise and unsung and unknown emergence. There is no “end” because to know the end is to think one knows the totality of the landscape, a line of thinking that cannot account for that which falls outside the dictates of legibility. There might always be something else just outside, and we cannot close the discussion when we think it is over. Fugitive planning plans for what it cannot plan for by refusing to plan for it. So there is no end in sight because sight is not the only sense available to us. (But there is also no end in touch, smell, feel, or taste—or any other “sense.”) There is no end in sight because our end may only be someone else’s beginning or middle. Thus, our critical praxis, our interrogative social enactment, does something precisely when it commits to a political endeavor proliferating life where no life is said to be found. And the “where” of “life where no life is said to be found” is the place brought about by abolition. Abolition is fundamentally anarchic, as will be discussed at greater length in the final chapter. It is the eradication “of a society that could have prisons, that could have slavery, that could have the wage, and therefore not abolition as the elimination of anything but abolition as the founding of a new society.”3 This entails, to put it simply, the eradication of society inasmuch as “Society” is predicated on, constituted by, the existence of these things. Anarchism is the ground on which we assert the destitution of the terrain, a destitution that marks, according to the Invisible Committee, “a rupture in the fatality that condemns revolutions to reproduce what they have driven out, shattering the iron cage of counter-revolution.”4 Following this line of thinking, we might also say that destitution is another name for the position of Blackness, that “irreparable disturbance.”5 Destituting the world-as-is, the Blackening of the world, shifts what counts as the “real” terrain of politics. To be ungoverned is a quotidian practice (a way of life), and the space in which that practice is lived is a space of anarchy—not nihilism or chaos but life by other means. Anarcho-life. What Black anarchists seek to do is to found a new society, not necessarily by bringing about the destruction of myriad edifices of terror, violence, circumscription, and normativity but by cultivating the spaces and places that, by dint of their existence, instantiate the impossibility of the normative bastions that now surround us. We might call this justice, might call this a non-utopic utopia, a sanctuary. We might call it the undercommons. How, then, to do this? Upon a re-reading of The Undercommons, I was drawn, obsessively, to one phrase, one that struck me at first as dangerously wrongheaded. But, then, the revolutionary will always be dangerous. The revolutionary call that Moten and Harney require and that I’ve been obsessed with is this: they insist that our radical politics, our anarchic world-building must be “unconditional—the door swings open for refuge even though it may let in police agents and destruction.”6 As my grandmother might quip, what kind of foolishness is this? But it is not foolishness precisely because the only ethical call that could bring about the radical revolutionary overturning we seek is one that does not discriminate or develop criteria for inclusion and, consequently, exclusion. If the door swings open without a bouncer checking names, it means that whoever shows up will be let in, unconditionally, without conditions. The ethical demand here is to be monstrously inclusive, a lesson learned in the Black Radical Tradition, Black feminisms, and trans activism. Yes, the Law might send agents to infiltrate our conspiratorial sessions. Or, even worse, as has happened, our enemy might show up and sit with us in prayer before gunning us down. But, at the same time, a salvational figure might show up or, better yet, a fugitive might show up, asking us to provide her refuge and a safe harbor. And we must let her in—this is what is to be done—we must feed and shelter her, because this fugitive, any fugitive, might be the one we didn’t know we were doing all this insurgent conspiratorial work for. Answering “What is to be done?” carries a deeply ethical valence. The manner by which things get done and the result of the doing inflects to whom we owe allegiances, who is or is not on our minds, and most fundamentally for whom we wish to see the world changed. The doing we seek is committed to making a world for people we don’t yet know, people who might need a drastically different world, while understanding that even our idea of “worldness” might be predicated on the logics of normative regimes that limit our horizons. It is imperative, then, to commit to the work without presuming to know who the work is for, only committing to the work because it might allow for those we did not know existed to finally live. When we volunteer at the soup kitchen we must turn no one away, even and especially when they look like they just ate a hearty bowl of soup; when we are faced with imminent violence we must refuse to proliferate violence, because we’ve come into being via a violation and this bestows upon us the ethical commitment to mitigate that violence; when we hear a knock at the door and someone asking for help because they are being chased we must let them in. Again, “the door swings open...” Each entity that crosses the threshold is another possible signatory on our missives for “the antipolitics of dissent.”7 To take praxis seriously, a praxis that has as its never-‐ ending end the proliferation of nonnormative life and the livelihood of the unemerged, is to risk what we ultimately come to. We cannot be afraid of what we find in our critical praxis precisely because, if it commits to the aforementioned, it will indeed be scary and impossible to prepare for. That is the work of the monstrous—a liberatory, unanticipated salvation, that troubling interrogation of gender Susan Stryker finds in the trans; that divine portent that Derrida would argue is unannounceable, which is to say untamable, unable to be absorbed into existing logics; that claimable thingliness that Hortense Spillers says might “rewrite after all a radically different text.”8 Critical praxis in the undercommons—insurgent work being done by folks who were let in without paperwork and without vouchers because they, despite where they came from, got down to work for the revolution—is work for monsters, monstrous work. In the end, what I am asking for is assemblic work for those who are impoverished in spirit, who come together, an intimate proximity reached because we are doing the work not because of an ontologized accident. What I am asking for is a willingness to move toward becoming subjectivated by an analytical queerness, a radical transitivity, an anoriginal Blackness, where Blackness names a sociopoetic force of subversive irregularity and, as Moten expressed to me in an email exchange, “must be claimed by any and every body” who seeks to do anarchic work. What is being asked for, what is to be done, is a Blackening that inducts all those who live and be in the undercommons, stealing life so it can steal more life, pilfering resources and asking no permission, taking no responsibility, because the ones who need this stuff might not know they need it, and neither do we. But if we must hack into government security systems and disseminate the firewalled information, that is what is to be done; if we must lie about the destination of funding we are given, allocating it to unauthorized and unadvised and undisclosed locations, that is what is to be done; if we must sully ourselves by hanging around a bad crowd that is bad only because the good’s violent optics and ethics deem it so, then that is what is to be done.

#### Our interp is that the affirmative is an object of research and the role of the negative is to test their research model. The ballot should be a question of whose research paradigm is better. It’s most logical—Debate is a site of scholarship production, not policymaking 101. They don’t get to weigh case since this debate is a question of whether their scholastic endeavor is epistemically accessible. Prefer –

#### 1] Speech Choice: It’s necessary to hold debaters accountable for speech choices – winning the round because "the plan is good" despite relying on antiblack structures is an inherently exclusionary model of debate – o/w’s since accessibility is an impact filter to everything. Its under-limiting – you choose the discourse and structure of the 1AC

#### 2] Real world: The plan never happens but the structure it relies upon is real and the way we research and think about policies informs our ideologies. Fairness claims are self-serving because structural inequalities are inevitable– only our model creates portable skills since it teaches non-black debaters how to represent themselves in an anti-black world.

## 1NC – AT: Case

### 1NC – T/L

#### 1] No internal link—just because I have to value my own freedom does not mean I have to value everyones

#### 2] Tailoring objection—I can tailor my maxims to become specific enough to be universal. For example, I can will the maxim of lying in a specific circumstance only, as when universalized that would not create a contradiction in willing since not everyone would lie constantly.

#### 3] Schmagency Objection – we can refuse to act on our agency and be schmagents, meaning Kant isn’t binding.

#### 4] Inaction DA – Deontology can't tell us what to do with objects or resources. Your FW violates core moral intuition by justifying inaction in the face of clearly preventable evils if doing so would cause even a minimal violation.

#### 5] Policing one right of difference between agents and others is what Harney critiques – its independently mutually exclusive with the undercommons because we embrace the difference they exclude

#### 6] Prioritize materialism over ideal theory – it’s the only way to account for status quo inequalities without using utopian fiat to assume everyone acts rationally as a perfect agent – their orientation discredits massive structural violence which is an indite to their epistemological starting point

#### 7] Kantian philosophy is homophobic—universality justifies homophobic actions since Kant held that actions like gay sex weren’t universizable and means you should reject their fw because its bad for inclusion – a) you set a precedent for people being allowed to use oppressive theories within debate – makes debate actively unsafe and pushes marginalized groups out of debate – that’s an independent reason to drop you because the judge has an apriori obligation to reject oppression to make debate more inclusive – access is a multiplier to all your impacts b) any other model of debate leads to a race to the bottom where debaters say “this is not bad enough” which is bad for inclusion and also pushes marginalized debaters out

### 1NC – AT: Underview

#### 1] Reasonability on 1AR shells – 1AR theory is very aff-biased because the 2AR gets to line-by-line every 2NR standard with new answers that never get responded to– reasonability checks 2AR sandbagging by preventing really abusive 1NCs while still giving the 2N a chance.

#### 2] RVIs on 1AR theory – 1AR being able to spend 20 seconds on a shell and still win forces the 2N to allocate at least 2:30 on the shell which means RVIs check back time skew – outweighs on quantifiability

#### 3] No new 1AR theory paradigm issues – A] the 1NC has already occurred with current paradigm issues in mind so new 1ar paradigms moot any theoretical offense

#### 4] Reject infinite abuse claims – a] spikes solve—there are only so many theoretical issues anyway, b] infinite abuse doesn't exist since there are a finite number of rounds, c] if I win, I can't engage in 1AR theory then you could never check infinite abuse since we can't use your shells to determine what's abusive d] Functional limits solves – I only have 7 minutes so I can’t be infinitely abusive

### 1NC – AT: Contention

#### T/L – They have no offense based on strikes in the abstract, just based on the consequences – read their card, they are based on what happens after a strike, not the strike itself.

#### 1] Strikes fail to fulfill duty

Fourie 17 Johan Fourie 11-30-2017 "Ethicality of Labor-Strike Demonstrates by Social Workers" <https://www.otherpapers.com/essay/Ethicality-of-Labor-Strike-Demonstrates-by-Social-Workers/62694.html> (Johan Fourie is professor of Economics and History at Stellenbosch University.) JG

Kantian Ethics Kantian ethics suggest that actions are morally permissible based on **whether it fulfils a person's duty** (Banks, 2006). To further the concept of duty, Kantian ethics held the notion of Categorical Imperatives which is believed to determine the morality of duties as it enforces and commands adherence, complicity and application. The Categorical Imperatives consist of three formulas. Once such a formula is to "act only on the maximum whereby at the same time you can will that it become a universal law" (Parrott, 2006, p. 51). Through this perspective, Kant held that persons are to engage in actions that they are willing to allow others to engage in as well without conditions and exceptions. Applying this formula to the ethicality of social workers **participating in labor strike** demonstrations, it becomes evident that such an action is **not morally permissible or executing its duty**. Arguably, as much as social workers are trained professionals and rendering services that are crucial to the functioning and well-being of society, they remain ordinary citizens who also at some point will **require crucial services**. Examples of these crucial services that may cause significant harm because of its absence due to labor strike action are **medical personnel, suicide watch centers, mental health care professionals, law enforcement, court systems**, municipal service delivery, etc. With these services not available, social workers will experience suffering, frustration, unhappiness, harm as the clients will do with their absence from the office. To this regard, participating and demonstrating labor strike action is not adhering to duty or morally permissible.

#### 2] Violates the commitment to not cause harm

Fourie 17 Johan Fourie 11-30-2017 "Ethicality of Labor-Strike Demonstrates by Social Workers" <https://www.otherpapers.com/essay/Ethicality-of-Labor-Strike-Demonstrates-by-Social-Workers/62694.html> (Johan Fourie is professor of Economics and History at Stellenbosch University.) JG

In addition to the above, engaging in a labor strike demonstration is a gross violation of the **prima facie duty of the social worker**, nonmaleficence: **to not cause harm**, and display a commitment to the well-being of the client, organization as well as society. As Social Workers withdraw their labor, services are ceased, and automatic disruption occurs which can inflict serious harm on clients, organizational functioning as well as society. According to Mehta and Swell (2014), examples of the harm caused to clients and organizational functioning include severe and fatal delays in executing or developing timeous interventions **for at-risk clients,** miscommunication, and no service delivery. Moreover, by withdrawing their labor in a strike demonstration, ethical principles such as beneficence and social justice are also not adhered to as no acts of kindness, empathy is shown, and the most vulnerable members of society **will be impacted the most**.

#### 3] Strikes in essential services hurt the patient but not the employer which reduces the patient to a mere means to an end.

Loewy 2K, Erich H. "Of healthcare professionals, ethics, and strikes." Cambridge Q. Healthcare Ethics 9 (2000): 513. (Erich H. Loewy M.D., F.A.C.P., was born in Vienna, Austria in 1927 and was able to escape first to England and then to the U.S. in late 1938. He was initially trained as a cardiologist. He taught at Case Western Reserve and practiced in Cleveland, Ohio. After 14 years he devoted himself fully to Bioethics and taught at the University of Illinois for 12 years. In 1996 he was selected as the first endowed Alumni Association Chair of Bioethics at the University of California Davis School of Medicine and has taught there since.) JG

“Essential” Work and Strikes Healthcare professionals, garbage collectors, and other “essential” workers have a responsibility that is considered to be different from, say, the responsibilities of workers in a supermarket chain. There are almost certainly other supermarkets, but there is generally only one municipal garbage collection service**, one police force, and one fire department; and in general, only one healthcare system available to us. In the medical setting, furthermore, workers are much more apt to deal with identified lives**: they know their patients and often have known them for some time. Striking against their employer (even if it is done in part to benefit the patient) is **denying meaningful and often essential services to some of these identified lives**. We tend to relate differently with those lives we know and therefore call “identified” from those whom we consider “unidentified” or statistical lives, in part, because we have obligations as a result of relationships; in part because we fail to recognize that these so-called unidentified lives are not in fact unidentified but are merely not identified by us.4 When strikes are called by healthcare professionals, both types of lives are apt to be injured or, at least, severely inconvenienced. Except in the pocketbook, strikes in the healthcare setting generally do not directly hurt the employer. The employer **is hurt through the** **patient**. The patient thus becomes a **means toward the employees’ ends**, a football being kicked between two contending parties—**even if one of the employees’ goals is to serve the good of patients in general.** Theoretically, patients will then bring pressure on the employer (be it the government or a managed care organization), thus, quite frankly, using the patient as a means toward the ends of the health professionals.5 The dilemma, of course, is that without significantly inconveniencing or even endangering patients, no pressure is likely to be brought and, therefore, no amelioration of working conditions is effected. To be effective, a strike of healthcare professionals has to “hurt” patients and often patients known to the healthcare professionals.

#### 4] Freedom to strike cannot come at the expense of others AND they might not have ethical motivations.

Muñoz 14, Cristian Pérez. "Essential Services, Workers’ Freedom, and Distributive Justice." Social Theory and Practice 40.4 (2014): 649-672. (Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Florida) JG

The second objection suggests that the freedom to strike is a fundamental value for a liberal society. Restrictions or prohibitions on this par ticular freedom are equivalent to interfering with basic freedoms such as the freedom of speech and association. This objection presupposes, of course, that preserving individual freedom **possesses a value of high priority.** But it is difficult to defend this idea when the respect for this freedom **potentially causes harm to the recipient populations of essential services**. The only way to defend this position is to show that the benefits of protecting the freedom to strike (for the specific workers under question) are comparatively larger than the harm (for the recipient populations) it might potentially cause. For example, it should be shown that the objectives of a strike among physicians are in the best interest of the patients they service. The idea is that this bargaining instrument might aid physicians in obtaining the resources they require to improve the services they provide to their patients. However, **that is not always the case**. The motivation behind strikes may **not be directly associated** with the objective of improving the quality of the service that physicians provide.

#### 5] An “unconditional” right to strike treats all strikes as morally neutral – certain strikes are prima facie bad

Loewy 2K, Erich H. "Of healthcare professionals, ethics, and strikes." Cambridge Q. Healthcare Ethics 9 (2000): 513. (Erich H. Loewy M.D., F.A.C.P., was born in Vienna, Austria in 1927 and was able to escape first to England and then to the U.S. in late 1938. He was initially trained as a cardiologist. He taught at Case Western Reserve and practiced in Cleveland, Ohio. After 14 years he devoted himself fully to Bioethics and taught at the University of Illinois for 12 years. In 1996 he was selected as the first endowed Alumni Association Chair of Bioethics at the University of California Davis School of Medicine and has taught there since.) JG

It would seem then that the ethical considerations for workers striking in an industry such as a shoe factory or a chain grocery store are quite different from the ethical considerations for workers in sanitation, police, or fire departments, or for professionals such as teachers or those involved directly in healthcare. Even in the latter “professional” category, there are subtle but distinct differences of “rights” and obligations. However, one cannot conclude that for workers in essential industries strikes are simply ethically not permissible, whereas they are permissible for workers in less essential industries. Strikes, by necessity, injure another, and injuring another cannot be ethically neutral. Injuring others is prima facie ethically problematic—that is, unless a good and weighty argument for doing so can be made, injuring another is not ethically proper. Striking by a worker, in as much as doing so injures another or others, is only a conditional right. A compelling ethical argument in favor of striking is needed as well as an ethical argument in favor of striking at the time and in the way planned. It remains to delineate the conditions under which strikes, especially strikes by workers in essential industries and even more so by persons who consider themselves to be “professionals,” may legitimately proceed and yet fulfill their basic purpose.

#### 6] The 1AC’s offense is bogus – it conflates “right to strike” with “right to quit” – striking is not a legitimate right and is fundamentally unfair.

**Gourevitch, 16** (Alex Gourevitch, associate professor of political science at Brown University, 6-13-2016, accessed on 10-12-2021, *Perspectives on Politics*, "Quitting Work but Not the Job: Liberty and the Right to Strike", <https://sci-hub.se/10.1017/S1537592716000049>) \*brackets in original //D.Ying

The right to strike is peculiar. It is not a right to quit. The right to quit is part of freedom of contract and the mirror of employment-at-will. Workers may quit when they no longer wish to work for an employer; employers may fire their employees when they no longer want to employ them. Either of those acts severs the contractual relationship and the two parties are no longer assumed to be in any relationship at all. The right to strike, however, assumes the continuity of the very relationship that is suspended. Workers on strike refuse to work but do not claim to have left the job. After all, the whole point of a strike is that it is a collective work stoppage, not a collective quitting of the job. This is the feature of the strike that has marked it out from other forms of social action. If a right to strike is not a right to quit, what is it? It is the right that workers claim to refuse to perform work they have agreed to do while retaining a right to the job. Most of what is peculiar, not to mention fraught, about a strike is contained in that latter clause. Yet, surprisingly, few commentators recognize just how central and yet peculiar this claim is. 16 Opponents of the right to strike are sometimes more alive to its distinctive features than defenders. One critic, for instance, makes the distinction between quitting and striking the basis of his entire argument: the unqualified right to withdraw labour, which is a clear right of free men, does not describe the behaviour of strikers.… Strikers … withdraw from the performance of their jobs, but in the only relevant sense they do not withdraw their labour. The jobs from which they have withdrawn performance belong to them, they maintain. 17 On what possible grounds may workers claim a right to a job they refuse to perform? While many say that every able-bodied person should have a right to work, and they might say that the state therefore has an obligation to provide everyone with a job, the argument for full employment never amounts to saying that workers have rights to specific jobs from specific private employers. For instance, in 1945, at the height of the push for federally-guaranteed full employment, the Senate committee considering the issue took care to argue that “the right to work has occasionally been misinterpreted as a right to specific jobs of some specific type and status.” After labeling this a “misinterpretation,” the committee’s report cited the following words from one of the bill’s leading advocates: “It is not the aim of the bill to provide specific jobs for specific individuals. Our economic system of free enterprise must have free opportunities for jobs for all who are able and want to work. Our American system owes no man a living, but it does owe every man an opportunity to make a living.” 18 These sentences remind us how puzzling, even alarming, the right to specific jobs can sound. In fact, in a liberal society the whole point is that claims on specific jobs are a relic of feudal thinking. In status-based societies, specific groups had rights to specific jobs in the name of corporate privilege. Occupations were tied to birth or guild membership, but not available to all equally. Liberal society, based on freedom of contract, was designed to destroy just that kind of unfair and oppressive status-based hierarchy. A common argument against striking workers is that they are latter-day guilds, protecting their sectional interests by refusing to let anyone else perform “their jobs.” 19 As one critic puts it, the strikers’ demand for an inalienable right to, and property in, a particular job cannot be made conformable to the principles of liberty under law for all … the endowment of the employee with some kind of property right in a job, [is a] prime example of this reversion to the governance of status. 20

#### 7] The right to strike implies a right to coercion which is a contradiction in conception.

**Gourevitch, 16** (Alex Gourevitch, associate professor of political science at Brown University, 6-13-2016, accessed on 10-12-2021, *Perspectives on Politics*, "Quitting Work but Not the Job: Liberty and the Right to Strike", https://sci-hub.se/10.1017/S1537592716000049) //D.Ying

A second problem follows on the first. If workers have rights to the jobs they are striking then they must have some powers to enforce those rights. Such powers might include mass picketing, secondary boycotts, sympathy strikes, coercion and intimidation of replacement workers, even destruction or immobilization of property—the familiar panoply of strike actions. While workers have sometimes defended such actions without using the specifically juridical language of “rights,” in many cases they have used that kind of appeal. 21 Even when they have not employed rights discourse, they have invoked some related notion of demanding fair terms to their job. 22 Each and any of the above listed activities of a strike—pickets, boycotts, sympathy actions—are part of the way workers not only press their demands but claim their right to the job. Strikers regularly implore other workers not to cross picket lines and take struck jobs. These are more than speech acts. At the outer edges, they amount to intimidation and coercion. Or at least, workers claim the right to intimidate and coerce if the state will not itself enforce this aspect of their right to strike. Liberal societies rarely permit a group of individuals powers that come close and even cross over into rights of private coercion. It is no surprise that regulation and repression of these strike activities have been the source of some of the most serious episodes of labor-related violence in U.S. and European history. 23 So, alongside the unclear basis for the strikers’ rights to their jobs, the problem for a liberal society is that this right seems to include private rights of coercion or at least troubling forms of social pressure.