# 1NC Glenbrooks Round 4

## 1

### T

#### Our Interpretation is the affirmative should instrumentally defend the resolution – hold the line, CX and the 1AC prove there’s no I-meet – anything new in the 1AR is either extra-T since it includes the non-topical parts of the Aff or effects-T since it’s a future result of the advocacy which both link to our offense. They should only get offense from a government legalizing a right to strike.

#### Government

Oxford Lexico. Definition of government in English. <https://www.lexico.com/en/definition/government>

The governing body of a nation, state, or community. ‘an agency of the federal government’

#### Recognize

Oxford Lexico. Definition of recognize in English. <https://www.lexico.com/en/definition/recognize>

Acknowledge the existence, validity, or legality of. ‘the defense is recognized in Mexican law’

#### Resolved requires policy action

Louisiana State Legislature (<https://www.legis.la.gov/legis/Glossary.aspx>) Ngong

**Resolution**

**A legislative instrument** that generally is **used for** making declarations, **stating policies**, and making decisions where some other form is not required. A bill includes the constitutionally required enacting clause; a resolution **uses the term "resolved".** Not subject to a time limit for introduction nor to governor's veto. ( Const. Art. III, §17(B) and House Rules 8.11 , 13.1 , 6.8 , and 7.4 and Senate Rules 10.9, 13.5 and 15.1)

#### [2] Standards to Prefer:

#### First - Fairness – radically re-contextualizing the resolution lets them defend any method tangentially related to the topic exploding Limits, which erases neg ground via perms and renders research burdens untenable by eviscerating predictable limits. Procedural questions come first – debate is a game and it makes no sense to skew a competitive activity as it requires effective negation which incentivizes argument refinement, but skewed burdens deck pedagogical engagement.

#### Second - Clash – picking any grounds for debate precludes the only common point of engagement, which obviates preround research and incentivizes retreat from controversy by eliminating any effective clash. Only the process of negation distinguishes debate and discussion by necessitating iterative testing and effective engagement, but an absence of constant refinement dooms revolutionary potential.

#### TVA – [Affirm a right to strike to reduce the digital colonization of information to feed the World Computer] right to strike for tech workers which allows them to collapse the grid and the world computer right to strike read a whole res aff with adv about strikes being key to socialist organization

#### TVA is terminal defense – proves our models aren’t mutually exclusive - any response to the substance of the TVA is offense for us because it proves our model allows for clear contestation. Form over Content doesn’t take it out since we don’t restrict Form, just the substantive burden of the Aff.

#### Prefer Competing Interpretations – reasonability is arbitrary and causes a race to the bottom. This means reject Aff Impact Turns predicated on their theory since we weren’t able to adequately prepare for it.

## 2

### PIC

#### Advocacy – We affirm a Communicative Strike against the World Computer. To Clarify – this is a PIK out of their demand for Legal Government Recognition.

#### Solves 100% of their Aff – Ctl-F Test for “Right” or “Recognize” appears four times, none of them in the context of “Legal Recognition”, all of their evidence is about the power of current, status quo communicative strikes against the system being good – they have card zero saying Legal Recognition is key to any of that.

#### The Net Benefit is De-Radicalization. Legally recognizing the right to strike renders it ineffective by de-radicalizing movements, decks solvency and turns case.

White 18 (, A., 2018. Its Own Dubious Battle: The Impossible Defense of an Effective Right to Strike. [online] Colorado Law Scholarly Commons. Available at: <https://scholar.law.colorado.edu/articles/1261/> [Accessed 7 November 2021] Ahmed White is the Nicholas Rosenbaum Professor of Law. Before arriving at the University of Colorado, he was a visitor at Northwestern University in 1999. He has also taught at Villanova Law School. Earlier in his career, Professor White's research focused heavily on the fate of rule of law norms and the rule of law concept in capitalist society, and on the role of criminal law and punishment as mechanisms of social control of the working class. More recently, Professor White's scholarship has taken a more definite historical turn. Much of his work concerns the history of law and labor relations from the early Twentieth Century through the New Deal period, as well as the viability of a functional system of labor rights in liberal society. The subjects of many of his articles over the last decade or so, these themes are central to his recent, acclaimed book, The Last Great Strike: Little Steel, the CIO, and the Struggle for Labor Rights in New Deal America (Oakland: University of California, 2016). They also feature in his second book, tentatively titled The Romance and the Suffering: Law, Violence, and the Tragic Fate of Radical Industrial Unionism in Twentieth Century America, which will be published by the University of California Press in 2021.)-rahulpenu

The Wagner Act purported, for the first time in American history, to extend a definite, readily enforceable right to strike to most American workers. Not coincidentally, the years surrounding its enactment featured the most intense wave of labor conflict in the country’s history. When the statute became effective in 1937 (having been widely ignored by employers and blocked by hostile courts), the violence of strikes began to diminish, though not so much their frequency. For much of the period after the Second World War, strikes remained common even as they also became less ambitious in their aims and less militant in their conduct. Beginning about forty years ago, things changed again. Strikes suddenly became rare as well, to the point that workers today basically do not strike at all. From 1947 through 1976, the government documented an average of just over 300 “major work stoppages” (strikes and lockouts involving at least 1000 workers) every year; over the last decade, the annual average was only 14.10 Even the much-ballyhooed mini-strike wave of 2018 appears to be largely an illusion built on a combination of wishful thinking and a convenient misconstruction of a string of well-reported, and sometimes impressive, strikes, as a trend.11 In any event, militancy of the sort that was commonplace when Steinbeck wrote his book, along with the open strife and bloodshed that made the novel a work of undeniable realism, are nearly unheard of today. The waning of bloody battles may be a good thing. But there is not much to celebrate about the overall demise of strikes—not if you are a worker or care about the working class. For strikes are the most important mode of working class protest, the best way, it seems, for workers to directly challenge capitalist hegemony by their own hand, to alter the terms of exploitation if not to build a new world. As they have declined, so has the strength of the labor movement and, with this, the ability of workers to contest the power that employers wield over their work lives and economic fortunes. And so it is that with the demise of strikes, union representation has plummeted, wages have stagnated, economic inequality skyrocketed, and the everyday caprices and tyrannies of capitalist management have been entwined in the web of demeaning indignities, patronizing indulgences, and suffocating bureaucratic rules that define the contemporary workplace. Nevertheless, in most quarters the decline in strikes has been taken in stride, if noticed at all. For most people, **strikes** are hardly more than **historical** **relics** or quaint curiosities that seldom affect their daily lives or command much of their attention. Ironically, this is probably one reason the very modest labor conflict of the last year has been so **overcharacterized**. Once a preoccupation of newspaper editorialists, lawyers, and other commentators, a concern of government, and the subject of numerous hearings and reports, abundant litigation, and seemingly endless attempts at legislation, strikes are now **rarely** **of** **any** **interest** in any of these quarters. Where judges, politicians, and editorialists once worried greatly over how to deal with strikes of the kind that Steinbeck fictionalized, how to protect the economy (not to mention the interests of individual capitalists) from the disruptive effects of labor unrest, and sometimes how to preserve the ability of workers to strike in meaningful ways, their successors stand mute in the context of the near extinction of this form of protest. It has been two decades since Congress, which once grappled with these issues on a regular basis, has seriously confronted the question of strikes.12 Its last engagement with the right to strike attempts, in the early 1990s, to enact modest changes in the law relative to employers’ use of replacement workers during strikes. And even this effort, which collapsed in the mid 1990s, hardly seemed possessed of the kind of urgency that characterized earlier forays on these issues.13 Among the few Americans who well remember what strikes are and why they are important are labor scholars. For them, at least, strikes remain a preoccupation. Prominent students of labor like James Atleson, Julius Getman, Karl Klare, and James Pope—to name the most notable of this group—have expended much effort over the past few decades identifying and critiquing **legal** **doctrines** which have **undermined** the **right** **to** **strike**. Important to them in this regard are doctrines that give employers the prerogative to easily replace striking workers; that allow employers to enjoin and even fire strikers on the ground that they have engaged in coercive “misconduct,” or because they have protested the wrong issue or in the wrong way; that prohibit sympathy strikes and general strikes, and spontaneous “wildcat” strikes; and that funnel labor disputes off of picket lines and into legal proceedings and arbitrations.14 These doctrines have eviscerated a once-vital right to strike, these scholars tell us, subverting a prerogative that earlier in the century was central to improving conditions for workers and lending legitimacy to the very idea that workers have rights to claim in the first place. Indeed, in the 1930s and 1940s, especially, a massive and sustained campaign of strikes proved crucial to the formation of the modern labor movement, the political and legal validation of the Wagner Act, and ultimately the survival of the New Deal itself. This was true even as the Wagner Act itself seemed to play a crucial role in conveying to workers, for the first time, an effective right to strike. But the problem as far as the right to strike goes, we are told, is that the statute was later weakened and corrupted by the connivances of judges and Congress, urged on by a business community relentless in its contempt for organized labor, and abetted at times by inept or corrupt union leaders and a weak and politically diffident National Labor Relations Board (NLRB, the entity with primary authority for enforcing the labor law). And so the Wagner Act is said to have had a great potential, only to have been tragically “deradicalized,” as Klare puts it; and workers are said to have “lost” the right to strike, in Pope’s words, with devastating consequences for workers today and ominous portents for generations ahead.15 Critically, these authors argue, an effective **right** **to** **strike** must be **restored** **at** the **expense** **of** these **unjustified** **impositions**.16 Only then will the labor law regain its relevance and the labor movement its ability to improve the lives of workers. Early on, this attempt to defend an effective right to strike was the object of mean-spirited criticism by more conventional scholars who, in the guise of unmasking its interpretative shortcomings, rejected its radicalism and recoiled at its underlying supposition that law is not only malleable and untethered to its formal, elite iterations, but within the province of workers to reshape around their own interests and visions.17 Despite these efforts, which focused on the work of Klare and Katherine Stone, whose critique of post-war “industrial pluralism” shared a similar reasoning—or maybe, to some extent, anyway, because of them—**support for** this campaign to restore **the right to strike seems like a mandate** among scholars and commentators who purport to take seriously the interests of workers.18 And yet **for all its appeal**, **this project** nevertheless **suffers from** a remarkably negligent oversight, one that has nothing to do with morality of its pretense that the law is malleable and that workers can remake it—a proposition that is broadly true and eminently defensible. Instead, it has to do with its **practical feasibility**. In fact, as this Article argues, a critical reflection on this question suggests that the effort to realize **an effective right to strike is** actually quite **impossible** **and** that **attempts to do so**, however earnest and thoughtful they may be, **represent** as **dubious a battle** as the hopeless walkout dramatized in Steinbeck’s book. This doleful conclusion rests on a frank understanding of the legal and political realities in which strikes necessarily play out. There are many kinds of strikes, but those that are apt to be successful in challenging employers’ power and interests entail a level of militancy that sets them against well-entrenched notion of property and public order. This was true in the 1930s and 1940s when these values **contradicted**, at once, **strike** **militancy** and whatever radical potential the Wagner Act may have had. Ironically, it is perhaps even truer today, now that workers do in fact enjoy the right to strike, albeit only in more conventional ways. Seen in this light, those doctrines that have undermined the right to strike are not aberrations or jurisprudential failings—not mistakes in any sense, in fact, nor a retreat from some earlier, truer iteration of the labor law. Rather, they represent a **settling of the labor law** on bedrock precepts of the American life. However **illegitimate** those **precepts** may be from a vantage that **questions capitalism’s essential legitimacy** and **takes the rights of workers seriously**, they reign supreme, **foreclosing** an **effective right to strike**. All of this, as I argue in this Article, is made plainly evident by a critical review of the history of strikes and striking. To anticipate a bit more of the argument that follows, **the strikes most crucial** to the building of the labor movement in the 1930s and 1940s **were not** **built** only **around** **peaceful picketing** **and a withholding of labor**. Rather, they were sit-down strikes and strikes built on mass picketing, as well as, to some extent, secondary boycotts. And **strikes** of this kind were **never considered lawful or politically appropriate**. Ironically, it was these strikes that legitimated the Wagner Act itself and the New Deal. But they could not legitimate themselves. Those who call for resurrecting the right to strike contend that the flourishing of strike militancy reflected, if not the inherent politics of the original Wagner Act before it was “de-radicalized,” then at least its potential. To be sure, it is clear that the Wagner Act was a remarkable document which did more to advance workers’ rights than any statute in American history; and it was at least ambiguous on the question of the legal status of strike militancy. But what seemed like its support for worker militancy was not a product of any particular potential. Rather, it was a reflection of the difficulty that judges, legislators, and other authorities, who dedicated themselves to restraining these strikes even as they flourished, encountered in prosecuting these values amid the unique economic and political conditions of the 1930s and 1940s. These obstructive conditions were quite temporary, though, and the authorities’ efforts culminated soon enough in the near-categorical prohibition of the tactics that had made strikes so effective. It is in this way that the history of strikes shows less in the way of **de-radicalization** than an encounter with the unyielding outer boundaries of what labor protest and labor rights can be in liberal society. As this all played out, it **left** in its wake **a right to strike**, but one **whose power** **consists** almost **entirely of the ability of workers to pressure employers** by withholding labor, while also maybe publicizing the workers’ issues and bolstering their morale. But while publicity and morale are not irrelevant, in the end they are **not effective weapons** in their own right. **Nor are they** generally **advanced when strikes are broken**. Moreover, the withholding of labor, unless it could be managed on a very large scale—something the law also tends to prohibit by its restrictions on secondary boycotts, by barring sympathy strikes and general strikes—is inherently ineffective in all but a small number of cases where workers remain irreplaceable. Of course, **striking in such a conventional way** accords with liberal notions of property and social order; but precisely because of this it **is** simply **not coercive enough to be effective**. And it is bound to remain ineffective, particularly in a context where workers far outnumber decent jobs, where mechanization and automation have steadily eaten away at the centrality of skill, where the perils that employers face in the course of labor disputes are as impersonal as the risks to workers are not, where employers wield overwhelming advantages in wealth and power over workers, where the state’s machinery for enforcing property rights and social order have never been more potent—where, in fact, capital is capital and workers are workers. From this perspective, **the quest for an effective right to strike emerges as a fantasy**—an appealing fantasy for many, but a fantasy no less, steeped in a **misplaced** and exaggerated **faith in the law** and a misreading of the class politics of modern liberalism. The **campaign to resurrect** such **a right appears**, too, not only as a dead-end and **a distraction**, but an undertaking that **risks blinding** those who support viable **unionism** and the interests of the working class **to** the more important and fundamental fact that **liberalism and the legal system** are, in the end, **antithetical to a meaningful system of labor rights**. It is for this reason that **the call for** an effective **right to strike should be set aside** **in favor of more direct endorsement of militancy and** a **turn away from the law** and instead towards a political program that might advance the interests of the working class regardless of what the law might hold. The argument that follows further elaborates these main contentions about the history of striking and the nature of strikes in liberal society, augmented by a discussion of the legal terrain on which all of this has played out. It unfolds in three main parts. Part I describes how the concept of a right to strike developed in concert with the history of striking itself, how both were influenced by the evolving condition of labor, and how this history created the circumstances under which it became possible to conceive of an effective right to strike without making this possible in fact. Part II consists of a critical review of the fate of coercive and disorderly strikes, especially those featuring sit-down tactics and mass picketing. It considers how the courts, the NLRB, and Congress confronted these strikes, and how they moved with increasing vigor to proscribe them as soon as these strikes emerged as effective forms of labor protest. Part III looks more carefully at the underpinnings of this repudiation of strike militancy, finding in court rulings and other pronouncements against the strikes an opposition to coercion and disorder that, even if sometimes invoked disingenuously, is nonetheless firmly anchored in modern liberalism and its conception of the appropriate boundaries of class protest and labor conflict. On this rests the argument that an effective right to strike is impossible and the pursuit of it, problematic. The final part is a brief conclusion that sums up some of the implications of this argument.

#### The Aff may be radical in content but the form of it is co-opted into the University – this means their situation of the refusal within debate de-radicalizes their entire method.

Webb, Darren. "Bolt-holes and breathing spaces in the system: On forms of academic resistance (or, can the university be a site of utopian possibility?)." Review of Education, Pedagogy, and Cultural Studies 40.2 (2018): 96-118. (Senior Lecturer in Education at the University of Sheffield)//Elmer

It is easy to be seduced by the language of the undercommons. Embodying and enacting it, however, is difficult indeed. Being within and against the university, refusing the call to order through insolent obstructive unprofessionalism, is almost impossible to sustain. Halberstam (2009, 45) describes the undercommons as “a marooned community of outcast thinkers who refuse, resist, and renege on the demands of rigor, excellence, and productivity.” A romantic and appealing notion for sure but **refusing and reneging on “the university of excellence” will cost you your job.** When Moten **describes subversion** as a “series of immanent upheavals” expressed through “vast repertoires of high-frequency complaints, imperceptible frowns, withering turns, silent sidesteps, and ever-vigilant attempts not to see and hear” (2008, 1743), **one is reminded instantly of Thomas Docherty, disciplined and suspended for his negative vibes.**7 Being with and for the maroon community is difficult too. First of all, “Where and how can we find/see the Undercommons at work?” (Ĉiĉigoj, Apostolou-Hölscher, and Rusham 2015, 265). Where and how can one find those liminal spaces of sabotage and subversion, and how does one occupy them in a spirit of hapticality, study, and militant arrhythmia that brings the utopic underground to the surface of the fierce and urgent now? Beautiful language, but how does one live it? Networks do, of course, exist—the Undercommoning Collective, the Edu-Factory Collective, the International Network for Alternative Academia, to name but a few. These are promising spaces for bringing together and harboring the maroons and the fugitives. But networks are typically **short-lived**, and—as Harney and Moten warned—**there is a danger of institutionalization, of taking institutional practices with you** into alternative spaces “**because we’ve been inside so much**” (Harney and Moten 2013, 148). And so, predictably, **meetings of the fugitives come with structure, order, an official agenda**, and circulated minutes. The outcasts convene in conventional academic conferences, with parallel sessions, panels of papers, lunch breaks, wine and nibbles (e.g., Edu-Factory 2012). These spaces offer time out, welcome respite, a breathing space, a trip abroad, and then one returns to work. If hapticality, the touch of the undercommons, is “a visceral register of experience … the feel that what is to come is here” (Bradley 2014, 129–130), then this seems elusive. It is hard to detect a sense of the utopic undercommons rising to the surface of the corporate-imperial university. Moten describes the call to disorder and to study as a way to “excavate new aesthetic, political, and economic dispositions” (Moten 2008, 1745). But this notion of excavating is highly problematic. It is common within the discourse of “everyday utopianism”—finding utopia in the everyday, recovering lost or repressed transcendence in “everydayness” (Gardiner 2006)—to describe the process of utopian recovery in terms of excavating: excavating repressed desires, submerged longings, suppressed histories, untapped possibilities. But the fundamental questions of where to dig and how to identify a utopian “find” are never adequately addressed (see Webb 2017). Gardiner defines utopia as “a series of forces, tendencies and possibilities that are immanent in the here and now, in the pragmatic activities of everyday life” (2006, 2). But how are these forces, tendencies and possibilities to be identified and recovered? For Harney and Moten, **it is through study, hapticality and militant arrhythmia**. These are slippy concepts, however, evading concrete material referents. What is it to inhabit the undercommons? Those who have written of their experiences refer to “small acts of marronage” such as poaching resources and redeploying them in ways at odds with the university’s designs and demands (Reddy 2016, 7), or exploiting funding streams “to form cracks in the institution that enable the Others to invade the university” (Smith, Dyke, and Hermes 2013, 150). For Adusei-Poku (2015), the undercommons is a space of refuge which is all about survival (2015, 4–5). We who feel homeless in the university are forced into refuge. We gather together to survive. We may gain satisfaction from small acts of marronage, but this is less about bringing the utopic common underground to the surface as it is a form of “radical escapism” (Adusei-Poku 2015, 4). Benveniste (2015, v) tells us that: “The undercommons has no set location and no return address. There is no map for entering and no guide for staying. The only condition is a living appetite. Listen to its hunger for difference.” We need more than poetry, however. And **we need more than a series of minor acts of resistance**. As Srnicek and Williams rightly emphasize, resistance is a defensive, reactive gesture, resisting against. Resistance is not a utopian endeavour: “We do not resist a new world into being” (Srnicek and Williams 2016, 47). The undercommons, when one can find it, is a bolt hole, a place of refuge, a breathing space in the system. We need something more. The occupation Can the occupied building operate as a site of utopian possibility within the corporate-imperial university? Reflections on, and theorizations of, two recent waves of occupation—“Occupied California” 2009–2010 and the UK Occupations 2010–2011—have answered this question affirmatively. The “occupation” should not be understood here as solely or necessarily “student occupation.” It goes without saying—though sadly so often does need saying —that “faculty also have a responsibility to fight with and for students” (Smeltzer and Hearn 2015, 356). Though led by a new historical subject, “the graduate without a future” (Schwarz-WeinStein 2015, 11), the importance of faculty support for the occupations was emphasized on both sides of the Atlantic (Research and Destroy 2010, 11; Dawson 2011, 112; Holmes and R&D and Dead Labour 2011, 14; Ismail 2011, 128; Newfield and EduFactory 2011, 26). Long before Occupy took shape in Zuccotti Park, “occupation” was being heralded as the harbinger of a new society and a new way of being. If we return to the notion of creating utopian spaces, the key aim for some of the occupiers was to create communes within the university walls—to communize space (Inoperative Committee 2011, 6).8 Communization here is understood as a form of insurrectionary anarchism that refuses to talk of a transition to communism, insisting instead upon the immediate formation of zones of activity removed from exchange, money, compulsory labor, and the impersonal domination of the commodity form (Anon 2010a, 5). As one pamphlet declared: We will take whatever measures are necessary both to destroy this world as quickly as possible and to create, here and now, the world we want: a world without wages, without bosses, without borders, without states. (Anon 2010d, 34) This is a revolutionary anarchism that takes the university campus as the site for a practice—communization—that not only prefigures but also realizes the vision of a free society. Heavily influenced by The Coming Insurrection (Invisible Committee 2009), but tapping into a long tradition of anarchist theory and practice from Hakim Bey’s Temporary Autonomous Zones (Bey 1985) to David Graeber’s Direct Action (Graeber 2009), occupation becomes “the creation of a momentary opening in capitalist time and space, a rearrangement that sketches the contours of a new society” (Research and Destroy 2010, 11). It is “an attempt to imagine a new kind of everyday life” (Hatherley 2011, 123). Firth (2012) refers to these momentary openings as critical, experimental utopias: Such utopias are … simultaneously immanent and prefigurative. They are immanent insofar as they allow space for the immediate expression of desires, satisfaction of needs and also the articulation of difference or dissent. They are prefigurative to the extent that they allow one to practice and exemplify what one would like to see at a more proliferative range in the future (26) The ultimate aim is for the practice to spread beyond the campus through a dual process of provocative rupture—the idea that insurrectionary moments can unleash the collective imagination and stimulate an outpouring of creativity that blows apart common sense and offers glimpses of a future world (Gibson-Graham 2006, 51; Shukaitis and Graeber 2007, 37)—and “contaminationism,” that is, spreading by means of example (Graeber 2009, 211). It may well have been the case that communism was realized on the campuses of Berkeley and UCL, that a momentary opening in capitalist space/time appeared through which another world could be glimpsed. The occupation, however—whether California, London, or anywhere else—is likely always to remain a localized temporary disruptive practice. A practice with utopian potency, for sure, in terms of suspending normalized forms of discipline and opening new egalitarian discursive spaces (Rheingans and Hollands 2013; Nişancioğlu and Pal 2016). In terms of wider systemic change, however, “small interventions consisting of relatively non-scalable actions are highly unlikely to ever be able to reorganise our socioeconomic system” (Srnicek and Williams 2016, 29). What “the occupation” demonstrates more than anything is the reality of the corporate-imperial university, as the institutional hierarchy, backed by the carceral power of the police and criminal justice system, inevitably disperses the occupiers—often using militarized force—and repossesses the occupied space in a strong assertion of its ownership rights not only to university buildings but also to what constitutes legitimate thought and behavior within them (on this see Docherty 2015, 90). The significance, and utopian potential, one attaches to campus occupations depends in part upon the significance one attaches to the university as a site of struggle. For the Edu-Factory Collective: As was the factory, so now is the university. Where once the factory was a paradigmatic site of struggle between workers and capitalists, so now the university is a key space of conflict, where the ownership of knowledge, the reproduction of the labour force, and the creation of social and cultural stratifications are all at stake. This is to say the university is not just another institution subject to sovereign and governmental controls, but a crucial site in which wider social struggles are won and lost. (Caffentzis and Federici 2011, 26) Clearly, if this is true, then the form the struggle takes, and the example it sets, is of immense significance. Srnicek and Williams describe as “wishful thinking” the idea that the occupation might spread beyond the campus by means of rupture or contamination (2016, 35). However, if the university really is a key site of class struggle (Seybold 2008, 120; Haiven and Khasnabish 2014, 38), a site through which wider struggles are refracted and won or lost, then the transformative potential of the occupation needs to be attended to seriously. The analysis of the university offered by the Edu-Factory Collective is, however, outdated. Sounding like Daniel Bell writing in 1973 about how universities had become the “axial structures” of post-industrial society (Bell 1973, 12), the analysis does not hold water today. Moten overdoes it when he tells us that “the university is a kind of corpse. It is dead. It’s a dead institutional body” (Moten 2015, 78). What is clear, however, is that “focusing on the university as a site of radical transformation is a mistake” (Holmes and R&D and Dead Labour 2011, 13). As has been widely noted, there is very little distinguishing universities from other for-profit corporations (Readings 1996; Lustig 2005; Washburn 2005; Shear 2008, Tuchman 2009). What does separate them is their inefficiency, due in large part to the fact that universities operate also as medieval guilds, with faculties “ruled by masters who lord over journeymen and apprentices in an artisanal system of production” (Jemielniak and Greenwood 2015, 77). If the university is a sinister hybrid monstrosity—part medieval guild, part criminal corporation—which has no role other than reproducing its own privilege, then no special status can be attributed to campus protests. In this case, “A free university in the midst of a capitalist society is like a reading room in a prison” (Research and Destroy 2010, 10). A reading room in a prison. Another apposite metaphor. The occupation is a safe space, offering temporary respite, a place to hide, a refuge, a bolt-hole, a breathing space. As with the utopian classroom and the undercommons, what the occupation suggests is that “defending small bunkers of autonomy against the onslaught of capitalism is the best that can be hoped for” (Srnicek and Williams 2016, 48). Conclusion Zaslove was right to characterize utopian pedagogy within the corporateimperial university as the search for bolt-holes and breathing spaces in the system. He himself suggests that, “All university classes should become dialogic-experiential models that educate by expanding the zones of contact with wider communities” (2007, 102). Like so many others, Zaslove sees dialogic-experiential models of education beginning in the classroom then expanding outward. The literature is full of references to “exceeding the limits of the university classroom” (Coté, Day, and de Peuter 2007a, 325), “extend [ing] beyond the boundaries of the campus” (Ruben 2000, 211), and “breeching the walls of the university compounds and spilling into the streets” (Research and Destroy 2010, 10). This all brings to mind Giroux’s notion of academics as border crossers (Giroux 1992), but it also paints a picture of academics taking as their starting point the university and from there crossing the border into the community and the street. The University can be the site for fleeting, transitory, small-scale experiences of utopian possibility—in the classroom, the undercommons, the occupation. It cannot be the site for transformative utopian politics. It cannot even be the starting point for this. Given the corporatization and militarization of the university, academics are increasingly becoming “functionaries of elite interests” inhabiting a culture which serves to reproduce these interests (Shear 2008, 56). Within the university, “radical” initiatives or movements will soon be co-opted, recuperated, commodified, and neutralized (Gibson-Graham 2006, xxvi; Seybold 2008, 123; Neary 2012b, 249; Rolfe 2013, 21). Institutional habitus weights so heavily that projects born in the university will be scarred from the outset by a certain colonizing “imaginary of education” (Burdick and Sandlin 2010, 117). And we have long known that the university is but one space of learning, and perhaps not a very important one at that.

## Case

### 1NC – AT: Solvency

#### Top level – they do not get to solve for anything outside of the 1AC advocacy hold the 1ac to only being to solve the amount of racial capitalism that recognizing a right to strike can solve for which is 0 since the 1ac has not read any piece of evidence explaining why a right to strike is key

#### Vote Negative on Presumption – this is a sequencing question to evaluating their Solvency for Offense on FW AND a reason you should Vote Neg to invert the Aff’s form of Value via Negation.

#### 1] They link back to everything they’ve critiqued---they’ve engaged in positivist forms of communications, risk calculus followed debate evidence and line by line norms

#### 2] Voting aff maintains the world computer---inputs the “1s and 0s” on tabroom follow normal technological procedures---voting for the wrong team solves the aff better

#### 3] Strikes are inevitable – the aff is nonunique change should solve in the squo

#### 4] Voting aff doesn’t access social change, but voting neg resolves our procedural impacts.

Ritter ‘13 (JD from U Texas Law (Michael J., “Overcoming The Fiction of “Social Change Through Debate”: What’s To Learn from 2pac’s Changes?,” National Journal of Speech and Debate, Vol. 2, Issue 1)//rct Joey

The structure of competitive interscholastic debate renders any message communicated in a debate round virtually **incapable of creating any social change**, either in the debate community or in general society. And to the extent that the fiction of social change through debate can be proven or disproven through empirical studies or surveys, academics instead have analyzed debate with **nonapplicable** rhetorical **theory** that **fails to account for the unique aspects** of competitive interscholastic debate. Rather, the current debate relating to activism and competitive interscholastic debate concerns the following: “What is the best model to promote social change?” But a more fundamental question that must be addressed first is: **“Can debate cause social change?”** Despite over two decades of opportunity to conduct and publish empirical studies or surveys, academic proponents of the fiction that debate can create social change have chosen **not to prove this fundamental assumption**, which—as this article argues—is **merely a fiction** that is **harmful in** most, if not **all, respects**. The position that competitive interscholastic debate can create social change is more properly characterized as a **fiction** than an argument. A fiction is an invented or fabricated idea purporting to be factual but is **not provable** by any human senses or rational thinking capability or is unproven by valid statistical studies. An argument, most basically, consists of a claim and some support for why the claim is true. If the support for the claim is false or its relation to the claim is illogical, then we can deduce that the particular argument does not help in ascertaining whether the claim is true. Interscholastic competitive debate is premised upon the assumption that debate is argumentation. Because fictions are necessarily not true or cannot be proven true by any means of argumentation, the competitive interscholastic debate community should be **incredibly critical** of those fictions and adopt them only if they promote the activity and its purposes.

#### 5] The “strike” is a movie that Beller is reviewing---no relation to modern capitalism AND was written before 95% of Bellers work. We read blue

**1AC Beller 95** – Jonathan Beller is Adjunct Professor of English, Film Studies, and Women’s Gender and Sexuality Studies at Barnard.

Jonathan Beller, “The Spectatorship of the Proletariat” Boundary 2, 22(3), 171, 1995 // sam

stop powertagging lol, the card says nothing

The **Strike** **remains** an **important** **film** in cinema history for reasons inherent in its design and function as a mediator of social forces. It is a work of art conceived as a productive technology. For this reason, I am less inter- ested in the "meaning" of The Strike as a text to be read and interpreted in the traditional way, and rather more interested in the specific significance of The Strike as an index of the potentialities of **film** **technology** **during** the **1920s** and following. For the Stalinist state to take its final form, the potential dictators had to be made over into spectators; their labor power had to be taken from them before, and through, their eyes. Bent by the exigencies of capital, the work of Eisenstein was, when understood on the largest historical canvas, the conversion of workers into spectators. To see this significance, it is nec- essary to "think" The Strike in a new way-not merely to interpret it but to understand it as a mediation, a form of agency. Hence, the kind of meanings in The Strike that, for example, allegorize the circumstances around the suicide of the worker-organizer whose stolen micrometer, according to the film, might be imagined to have initiated the wave of strikes under the 1907 czarist regime, are only of secondary importance here. That the micrometer was secretly stolen by the factory foreman in order to harass the workers and to create an excuse for increased surveillance in the factory seems to me, despite its practical and historical validity, as unimportant in the present context as Eisenstein's ingenious idea of employing such an instrument- designed to measure tiny differences-to function as the cinematic sign for an infinitesimally small, yet crucial, moment in a larger process: the unjust removal of the micrometer serves as the flash point for a worldwide confron- tation between labor and capital. These **aspects** **of** Eisenstein's **film**, though brilliant, must be **stripped** **away** if we are to approach the significance of The Strike in a new way, that is, at the level of its consequences for political economy.

#### 6] Illegal strike activity in the status quo solves the affirmative – the aff is an attempt to regulate the ongoing strike wave

**Olivier 10/28**

Indigo Olivier is a Brooklyn-based freelance journalist covering politics, labor, and higher education. “Striketober: America’s workers are rising up”, <https://conversationalist.org/2021/10/28/striketober-americas-workers-are-rising-up/>, published 10-28-21, accessed 11-4-21 // mk

Workers across the United States are finally saying they’ve had enough. Nineteen months into the pandemic, 24,000 of them are exercising the strongest tool they have: the power to withhold their labor. With the country already facing severe supply chain disruptions, these strikes have put added pressure on employers to improve wages and working conditions. At the John Deere factories in Iowa, Kansas, and Illinois, 10,000 employees represented by the United Auto Workers (UAW) went on strike after rejecting a proposed contract that included wage increases below inflation levels and the elimination of pensions for new employees. Other strikes include 2,000 [healthcare](https://www.cbsnews.com/news/mercy-hospital-nurses-strike-labor-shortage-2021/) workers at Buffalo’s Mercy Hospital; 1,800 telecom workers at California’s Frontier Communications; and 1,400 production workers at several Kellogg’s cereal plants. Thousands of additional workers have authorized strike votes. Earlier this month, an overwhelming majority of workers in the International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees (IATSE), which represents over 60,000 people in the film and TV industry, [voted in favor](https://iatse.net/by-a-nearly-unanimous-margin-iatse-members-in-tv-and-film-production-vote-to-authorize-a-nationwide-strike/) of a strike. A few days later, [24,000](https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2021/10/11/24000-kaiser-permanente-workers-authorize-strike-over-pay-working-conditions/) Kaiser Permanente healthcare workers in California and Oregon followed suit. Harvard’s graduate student union, with roughly 2,000 members, also authorized a strike with a 92 percent vote. “Workers are fed up working through the pandemic under the conditions they’ve been working in,” says Joe Burns, a former union president and [author of](https://www.akpress.org/strikebackupdated.html) “Strike Back: Using the Militant Tactics of Labor’s Past to Reignite Public Sector Unionism Today.” The strike wave “also reflects that there’s a tight labor market.” “We’ve noticed a considerable uptick in the month of October,” says Johnnie Kallas, a PhD student at Cornell’s School of Industrial and Labor Relations (ILR) and Project Director for the ILR [Labor Action Tracker](https://striketracker.ilr.cornell.edu/about.html). The ILR has tracked 189 strikes this year. Of those, 42 are ongoing in October while 26 were initiated this month Kallas and his team have been collecting data on strikes and labor protests since late 2020; they officially launched the Labor Action Tracker on May Day of this year. “There’s a lack of adequate strike data across the United States, says Kallas. “We thought this was a really important gap to fill.” The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), he explains, only keeps track of work stoppages involving 1,000 employees or more, and which last an entire shift. “As you can imagine, this leaves out the vast majority of labor activity,” Kallas says. Workers are demanding higher wages, adequate benefits like healthcare and pensions, improved safety and working conditions, especially concerning COVID-19, and reasonable working hours. The ILR Tracker has also been keeping tabs on “labor protests” —i.e., “collective action by a group of people as workers but without withdrawing their labor” —which aren’t recorded by BLS at all. The federal minimum wage has been stagnant at $7.25 an hour since 2009, even as inflation has increased by 28 percent since then. Meanwhile, over the past year consumers have seen a sharp increase in the cost of everyday goods such as bacon, gasoline, eggs, and toilet paper due to the pandemic. This means workers’ wages aren’t going nearly as far as they used to. For months, the media has been [reporting](https://www.reuters.com/business/no-end-sight-labor-shortages-us-companies-fight-high-costs-2021-10-26/) on a “labor shortage” that has purportedly left employers unable to fill jobs. Fast food restaurants have [posted signs](https://twitter.com/ABC15Patrick/status/1382415576006496264?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1382415576006496264%7Ctwgr%5E%7Ctwcon%5Es1_&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.the-sun.com%2Fnews%2F2741287%2Fsonic-viral-sign-workers-dont-want-to-work%2F) that read: “We are short-staffed. Please be patient with the staff that did show up. No one wants to work anymore.” Small business owners and corporate CEOs alike have gone on cable news to complain about the hundreds of thousands of people who prefer to live on government assistance rather than find a job. But the truth, said Kallas, is that there’s [no shortage of labor](https://www.orlandoweekly.com/Blogs/archives/2021/10/20/a-florida-man-applied-for-60-entry-level-jobs-in-a-month-to-prove-the-so-called-labor-shortage-is-a-myth). Rather, employers can’t find people to work [for the wages they’re offering](https://www.orlandoweekly.com/Blogs/archives/2021/10/20/a-florida-man-applied-for-60-entry-level-jobs-in-a-month-to-prove-the-so-called-labor-shortage-is-a-myth). Saturation coverage of the labor shortage has come at the expense of amplifying the human cost of the government’s having cut unemployment benefits for 7.5 million workers on Labor Day, while an additional three million lost their weekly $300 pandemic unemployment assistance. Time magazine [called it](https://time.com/nextadvisor/in-the-news/unemployment-benefits-expire-in-september/) the “largest cutoff of unemployment benefits in history.” Just two weeks earlier, a [flurry](https://www.cnbc.com/2021/08/23/ending-unemployment-benefits-had-little-impact-on-jobs-study-says.html) of newly published [studies](https://www.nytimes.com/2021/08/20/business/economy/unemployment-benefits-economy-states.html) showed that states that chose to withdraw earlier from federal benefits did not succeed in pushing people back to work. Instead, they [hurt their own economies](https://www.businessinsider.com/cutting-off-unemployment-hurts-states-did-not-help-employment-research-2021-9) as households cut their spending to compensate for the lost benefits. In Wisconsin, instead of increasing benefits or raising the minimum wage, state legislators have decided to address the labor shortage by putting children to work. Last week, the state senate [approved a bill](https://www.businessinsider.com/labor-shortage-wisconsin-senate-jobs-work-teenagers-child-labor-hours-2021-10) that would allow 15 and 16-year-olds to work as late as 9 p.m. on school nights and 11 p.m. on days that aren’t followed by a school day. The only state legislator to speak out against the bill was Senator Bob Wirch, who [said that](https://wisconsinexaminer.com/2021/10/21/senate-votes-to-extend-work-hours-for-some-teens-under-16/) “kids should be doing their homework, being in school, instead of working more hours.” Despite these setbacks, the tight labor market has given workers considerable leverage. “Workers are more confident that they can strike and not be replaced,” says Burns. In places where non-union labor, or “scabs,” have been brought in to replace striking workers, there have been several incidents that underscore the importance of a union in creating a safe work environment. Jonah Furman, a labor activist who has been covering the John Deere strike closely, reported that poorly trained replacement workers brought in to a company facility were involved in a serious [tractor accident](https://labor411.org/411-blog/scab-crashes-tractor-on-day-1-of-john-deeres-replacement-of-striking-workers/) on the morning of their first day. A higher profile and more deadly incident occurred last week when the actor Alec Baldwin fatally shot cinematographer Halyna Hutchins with a prop gun that was supposed to contain only blank rounds. According to [several](https://www.insider.com/rust-camera-crew-walked-off-protest-hours-before-fatal-shooting-2021-10) [reports](https://www.motherjones.com/media/2021/10/rust-alec-baldwin-strike-labor-gun-iatse/) on the incident, the union camera crew quit their jobs and walked off the set earlier that day to protest abysmal safety standards—and were immediately replaced with inexperienced, non-union labor. “Corners were being cut — and they brought in nonunion people so they could continue shooting,” one crew member told the [LA Times](https://www.latimes.com/entertainment-arts/business/story/2021-10-22/alec-baldwin-rust-camera-crew-walked-off-set). Kallas says the incident “clearly demonstrates the importance of workplace safety and the significance of capturing both strikes and labor protests” when collecting data. “What’s becoming increasingly common are these walkouts and mass resignations,” he says. He mentioned a Burger King in Nebraska where the entire [staff walked out](https://globalnews.ca/news/8023338/burger-king-sign-quit-employees-lincoln-nebraska/#:~:text=Fed%2Dup%20Burger%20King%20staff,%E2%80%9CSorry%20for%20the%20inconvenience.%E2%80%9D) to protest poor working conditions that included a broken air conditioner in 90° F temperatures and staff shortages. They left a note on the door that said, “We all quit. Sorry for the inconvenience.” In another non-strike labor action, dozens of non-union school bus drivers in Charles County, Maryland [called in sick](https://www.wusa9.com/article/news/education/150-school-bus-routes-affected-friday-in-charles-county-after-rumoured-driver-sick-out-maryland/65-88bf184f-0cf1-4182-aa06-05e983188934) to protest their low wages and lack of benefits. Over 160 bus routes were affected by the action. Meanwhile, adjacent school districts that are critically short of bus drivers find themselves unable to attract new candidates because of the perceived risk associated with driving a bus crowded with children during the pandemic. In an [Opinion piece](https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2021/oct/13/american-workers-general-strike-robert-reich) for The Guardian US, former Secretary of Labor Robert Reich suggested that the United States was in the grips of an unofficial general strike, with workers quitting their jobs “at the highest rate on record.” Why? Because they were “burned out,” fed up with “back-breaking or mind-numbing low-wage shit jobs.” The pandemic, asserted Reich, was “the last straw.” In July, an anonymous group [called for a](https://boldtv.com/cheyenner/2021/07/19/did-you-know-theres-going-to-be-a-general-strike-in-2021/) general strike on October 15, but the day came and went without much fanfare. “Traditionally, general strikes happen because workers actually want to go on strike, and not because someone declares it on Facebook or Twitter,” says Burns. Rosa Luxemburg, the German socialist and philosopher who rose to prominence at the beginning of the last century, believed general strikes were the tool to usher in social revolution after developing class consciousness through the patient building of worker organizations, such as unions. “That’s not happening today,” says Burns. The 24,000 striking workers today pale in comparison to the mass strikes of the early to mid-twentieth century, when workers shut down production by the hundreds of thousands. Some [4.6 million workers](http://www.rochesterlabor.org/strike/) went on strike in 1946, accounting for 10 percent of the workforce. Today things aren’t as simple. In August 1981, President Ronald Reagan fired over 11,000 air traffic controllers who went on strike after negotiations between the Federal Aviation Administration broke down. These workers were prohibited from ever working for the federal government again, creating a chilling effect among unions. Reagan’s action set the tone for labor relations for the next four decades, while his administration ushered in a new era of corporate dominance, known as neoliberalism. Today, corporations such as Amazon regularly [use threats](https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/16/technology/amazon-unions-virginia.html), [intimidation tactics](https://nowthisnews.com/news/amazon-accused-of-intimidating-workers-after-warehouse-votes-to-not-unionize), and [surveillance](https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2021/mar/02/mcdonalds-unions-workers-rights) against employees to prevent them from unionizing. “When workers engage in a true strike wave, politicians want to step in and regulate it and establish some procedures,” says Burns. The Taft-Hartley Act was passed one year after the [general strikes of 1946](https://www.encyclopedia.com/history/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/strike-wave-united-states), making wildcat strikes, secondary boycotts, and union donations to federal political campaigns illegal. The act also allowed states to pass right-to-work laws, severely limiting effective union organizing, and required union officers to sign affidavits pledging they were not communists. The Red Scare, initially sparked by the Russian Revolution of 1917, resulted in sustained attacks against organized labor, particularly the leftist Industrial Workers of the World, or “Wobblies.” By the end of the Second World War, with labor militancy intensifying and the power of the Soviet Union growing, the Red Scare had morphed into a reign of terror against an “internal enemy.” Reagan later used language from the Taft-Hartley Act that prohibited workers from striking against the government to declare the air traffic controllers’ strike illegal. Today, workers face serious legal barriers to organizing under a system of labor law that favors the employer. Over the years, these laws have restricted the scale with which strikes can be organized and the total number of workers who belong to unions. At the peak of organized labor in 1954, [34.8 percent of](https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/02/20/for-american-unions-membership-trails-far-behind-public-support/) American wage and salary workers belonged to a union; by 2020, that number was down [to](https://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.nr0.htm#:~:text=The%20number%20of%20wage%20and,workers)%2C%20or%206.7%20percent.) 10.8 percent, a trend that has been closely linked to decreased wages over the last few decades. Against these grim numbers, legislation like the [Protecting the Right to Organize (PRO) Act](https://www.npr.org/2021/03/09/975259434/house-democrats-pass-bill-that-would-protect-worker-organizing-efforts) could make a huge difference to labor organizing. The PRO Act would allow workers to engage in secondary boycotts, restrict right-to-work laws, ban anti-union captive audience meetings and exact financial penalties against companies found to be in violation of the law. The bill is something President Joe Biden campaigned on during the 2020 presidential election and has pushed to include in his Build Back Better agenda. “I’m skeptical based on actual history that we’re gonna see a legislative fix to this problem,” says Burns. “**When workers are militant and engaged in activity, legislation will follow.** Not the other way around.” The strike wave we’re witnessing today speaks to a growing militancy against several decades of sustained corporate combat. It’s an uphill battle that no one union can win in isolation. With organized labor depleted and battle weary, the only path forward is to enlist other workers to fight by organizing new unions and activating those that already exist. Only by growing its numbers will labor enact the systemic change necessary to put working people on better footing. As labor activists have long proclaimed, “**there’s no such thing as an illegal strike, only an unsuccessful one.”**

### 1NC – AT: Racial Cap

#### Racial capitalism fails as a theory.

Go 21 – Professor of Sociology at the University of Chicago (Julian, “Three Tensions in the Theory of Racial Capitalism”, Sociological Theory, Vol. 39, No. 1, pp. 38-47, 2021)

What Is the “Race” in Racial Capitalism? We can now turn to the three tensions in the racial capitalism literature, beginning with the issue of race. This is critical. If the term racial capitalism is to have implications for social theory, it must offer rigorously defined concepts constituting a transposable conceptual apparatus. Surely one of those concepts would have to do with “race.” But what exactly is “race”? The problem is that “race” is not typically defined in the existing literature, so it is unclear whether other categories marking difference, such as ethnicity, are more appropriate than race. Should we be thinking about “ethnic capitalism” rather than racial capitalism? Robinson’s (2000) work is a prime example. Nearly all scholars claim that one of Robinson’s key contributions is to show that capitalism was forged from precapitalist racial divisions in Europe. Capitalism is “racial,” according to Robinson, “because racialism had already permeated Western feudal society,” and capitalism was built upon that racialism (Kelley 2017; Táíwò and Bright 1996). The problem is that Robinson himself was not entirely clear that precapitalist social differences were actually “racial.” On one hand, he did use the term race in his analysis. “Racism,” Robinson (2000:2; see also pp. 26–27, 66–67) wrote, served to structure “the ‘internal’ relations of European peoples” prior to capitalism, and capitalism seized on racism as it developed. On other hand, when discussing some of the presumably “racial” groups in feudal Europe, Robinson (2000:10–11) referred to linguistic rather than phenotypical differences, thus equating racial groups with linguistic groups. In fact, when discussing how migratory and immigrant labor formed the basis for the armies of the Absolutist states and for the production of value in early agrarian capitalism, he oscillated between calling them “races” and “ethnic” groups. For instance, Robinson (2000:23) used the phrase “ethnic divisions of sixteenth century immigrant labor,” and he referred to “national” differences when presumably speaking about premodern “racial” differences. Given these ambiguities, Robinson’s argument could be read differently from how it is conventionally taken. It is not that capitalism was built on prior racial differences; rather, capitalism served to racialize the preexisting ethnic division of labor, thereby turning religious, cultural, or linguistic differences into “racial” ones to legitimate its new exploitative structure. In this view, racialization—the process of turning groups into biological entities called “races”—was a part of modern capitalism, not its precursor (cf. Omi and Winant 1986). In some passages, Robinson (2000) said this exactly: “the tendency of European civilization through capitalism was thus not to homogenize but to differentiate—to exaggerate regional, subcultural, and dialectical differences into ‘racial’ ones” (p. 26). Of course, whether “race” preexisted capitalism does not alter the larger argument of the racial capitalism approach, which is that racial differentiation and capitalism are mutually supportive. Still, the tension in Robinson’s work manifests the deeper issue of whether “racial” capitalism refers to race or other identities. This issue permeates Walzer’s (2020) recent criticism of the racial capitalism concept. Walzer points to examples such as Russia and China, where capitalism does not rely on racial differences but rather on ethnic and religious differentiation. “It may be that Muslims are among the most exploited workers in Russia,” he wrote, “but they are mostly Caucasian (some of them the original Caucasians), so we would have to talk about religious capitalism—where Orthodox Christians, not white people, are the privileged group.” On this basis, Walzer rejected the racial capitalism concept as limited at best and analytically debilitating at worse. Skeptics of Walzer have offered a rebuke: his argument misses the global dimensions of capitalism. At issue is not whether racial stratification articulates with capitalism within any single country but whether it permeates the world-capitalist system. Proponents of this argument could readily assemble evidence to show that, on a global scale, the vast majority of the world’s proletariat, subproletariat, and dispossessed—whether cultivating grapes or coffee on the farms of the Americas, cleaning up office floors in London, or making clothes in the sweatshops of New Delhi—are, to borrow DuBois’s (1935) phrase, “yellow, brown and black.” Against Walzer, this would retain the main claim of the racial capitalism approach that race and capitalism are intertwined. Yet this scaling upward of capitalism to a global level brings its own complications. It carries the danger of what Bourdieu and Wacquant (1999) called “the cunning of imperialist [racialist] reason”: an analytic operation by which U.S.-centered scholars impose presumably U.S.-centric classifications (in this case, “race”) onto the rest of the world, thereby imposing racial classifications into contexts where they might not be operative. We would be obliged, for instance, to impose racial classifications onto Latin American contexts such as Brazil, where the salience of racial classifications is debatable (Loveman 1999; Wimmer 2015). In short, if we are to insist on the global character of racial capitalism, we must assume that analysts’ racial classifications are global as well. They may very well be, but racial capitalism’s founding texts, and more recent discussions, have not sufficiently problematized this tension.2 Can this tension be resolved? One way to do so is to raise the possibility that the racial capitalism concept works best for groups that have been undoubtedly racialized, such as members of the African diaspora in North America.3 Racial capitalism would thus refer mainly to the black ex-slave population, which has suffered some of the clearest and most virulent forms of racism. This might explain why the literature on racial capitalism has focused on African Americans and transatlantic slavery rather than other groups elsewhere in the world. Yet this seeming resolution would significantly reduce the scope of the racial capitalism concept. Racial capitalism would no longer depict a global system. Perhaps the best resolution is one that arrives through more reflexive research. We can explore how “race” is connected to capitalism in diverse sites and across historical periods, but we must be more conscious about whether we are referring to analysts’ definition of race or a category of practice. Put simply, we can arrive at a resolution only through careful research that more clearly defines “race.” The Inadequacy of Existing Theory A second tension in the racial capitalism literature has to do with the relationship between this literature and existing social theories of capitalism, in particular, Marxian theories of capitalism. Animating the racial capitalism approach is the claim that Marxian theories of capitalism are inadequate because they obfuscate the racial foundations of capitalism. For Robinson (2000), “Western Marxism . . . has proven insufficiently radical to expose and root out the racialist order that contaminates its analytic and philosophic applications” (p. 317). Historians’ use of the racial capitalism approach is premised on the idea that Marxism does not adequately acknowledge slavery’s role in capitalism or the ongoing importance of colonialism and “primitive accumulation,” which Marx presumably relegated to the margins of his theory (Smallwood 2018). This is exactly why scholars in this tradition insist on the term racial capitalism: because Marxian theory fails to theorize race, we must add the qualifier race to the signifier capitalism. But what if Marxian theory does in fact take into account race, slavery, imperialism, and colonialism, and proponents of the racial capitalism approach merely misread Marx? If so, the warrant, if not the entire premise, for Robinson’s and others’ work on racial capitalism would crater by an unfortunate misreading of Marxian theory. A number of scholars, in fact, already push against the notion that Marxist thought does not account for race, slavery, or colonialism. Drawing largely on Marx’s journalistic writings, they show that Marx not only discussed race, slavery, and colonialism but saw them as central for capitalism. According to this argument, Marx saw race as so crucial for capitalism that his theory saw the true proletariat as black, brown, and yellow—directly contrary to Robinson’s claim that Marxist theory only saw the white European proletariat as the true subject of history (Anderson 2010; Foster, Holleman, and Clark 2020; Ralph and Singhal 2019). If true, the racial capitalism literature is based on a “misguided reading of Marx” (Ralph and Singhal 2019:864). How might this apparent aporia in Marxian theory be resolved, if at all? It is imperative here to register a distinction between Marx’s theory of capital and his theory of capitalism. 4 The former is sketched in Marx’s mature social theory in Capital and related writings such as The Grundrisse (Postone 1996). These writings offer a formalized and abstract representation of the inner workings of capital, its accumulation, its contradictions, and its necessary demise through a series of central categories that capture the key elements of the capitalist system. At this level of abstraction, the main categories of the theory (e.g., “value,” “surplus value,” “concrete labor,” “abstract labor,” “capital,” “socially necessary labor time”) are devoid of any historical specificity or social content and as such can be applied to distinct historical phases or social formations (e.g., capitalism in the eighteenth-century transatlantic world or Russia in 1998, or the twenty-first-century global system). Categories of race, gender, or ethnicity are therefore not central, because they are too concrete. Alternatively, a theory of capitalism refers to capitalist development and dynamics in their empirical specificity. It is meant to explain and describe specific capitalist formations and developments as they really exist in the world, not their abstract conceptual form. This theory can be extracted from Marx’s journalistic writings and other essays, and it is here where issues such as slavery and ethnicity arise: the essays refer to real events and pressing issues in actually existing capitalism, such as the Civil War or the Irish question (Anderson 2010). But these observations or statements on concrete processes and relations such as slavery in actually existing capitalism—that is, Marx’s theory of capitalism—do not disturb or reconfigure his theory of capital, which remains focused on the relations of wage labor induced to a highly abstract level from his analysis of textile production. If and when he did discuss things such as slavery, such as in “The Working Day” section in Capital, he treated slavery as a passing phase or outside capital’s inner logic, a sort of heuristic to better apprehend and illuminate the latter (Marx [1867] 1906:328–30; on slavery as a heuristic, see Smallwood 2018). This distinction between Marx’s theory of capitalism and his theory of capital helps us better approach the debate generated by the racial capitalism literature. When Robinson or other proponents of the racial capitalism idea critique Marx’s theory for eliding or deliberately occluding race, slavery, and colonialism, they are critiquing his theory of capital, not his theory of capitalism. Here proponents of the racial capitalism approach are on solid ground. Marx’s theory of capitalism does take into account race, slavery, and colonialism, but his theory of capital renders these things marginal at best.5 Hence the warrant for the racial capitalism approach: because Marx’s theory of capital does not center race, the racial capitalism concept and the research and theorizing that go under its banner can fill the void. The concept may provide the basis for an alternative theory not only of racial capitalism but also of racialized capital. Necessity, Contingency, and Difference The final tension within racial capitalism is whether the interconnectedness of racial difference and capitalism is a logical or contingent necessity.6 If, as the racial capitalism literature suggests, slavery and its associated logics of racism have been crucial for the development of capitalism, and if global capitalism today remains intertwined with racial stratification, to what extent are these relations intrinsic to capitalism or accidental? Put differently, is capitalism necessarily racist (Fraser 2019; Lemann 2020)?7 For some, the relationship is only contingent. Walzer (2020) argued that in some countries, capitalism proceeds along just fine without racial difference, and if there is racial difference on a global scale, it is historically contingent. Although the vast majority of workers are nonwhite, Walzer suggested that this is not due to any intrinsic logic of capitalism but rather the accident of demographics (because most of the world is nonwhite, the majority of the world’s workers will be nonwhite). For this reason, Walzer suggested we disavow the racial capitalism concept. Alternatively, others claim that racism is indeed intrinsic to capitalism.8 There are two versions of this claim. One is that racism is necessary to divide the working class and legitimate the rule of the bourgeoisie. Racism is an ideological necessity of capitalism, justifying its unequal relations (Camp, Heatherton, and Karuka 2019; McCarthy 2016; Taylor 2016). “Capitalism requires inequality,” suggested Gilmore (2015), “and racism enshrines it.” A very different version, coming most predominantly from Fraser (2019), is that capitalism necessarily entails relations of exploitation and expropriation that feed off each other. Exploitation is the extraction of value from “free subjects” through wage labor. But expropriation, which includes slavery and colonialism, extracts value from racialized “dependent subjects” and is what enables exploitation to happen in the first place. Expropriation is “a necessary background condition for the exploitation of ‘workers’” (Fraser 2019) and therefore for capitalism itself. Capitalism is thus logically dependent upon racism.9 So what is the answer? Again, it helps differentiate between a theory of capital and a theory of capitalism. A theory of capitalism might demonstrate that race has been historically necessary for capitalist accumulation by reference to empirical reality: historically, capitalism and race have always been intertwined. But the claim that race is a logical necessity to capitalism would have to derive from a theory of capital, not from empirics alone. One would have to deduce, from the categories of Marx’s theory, the necessity of racism or racial differentiation in society. On this score, the arguments for the logical necessity of capitalism’s entanglements with race fall short. Consider the argument that racism is necessary for capitalism because capitalism requires racist ideology to divide the working class. This is a functionalist argument that is not functionalist enough, for it effaces the logical possibility of functional substitution. We may find that racism has historically always functioned to divide the working class, but in theory other “isms” could serve the same function. There is nothing inherent to the logic of capital that requires race to be the ideology of division (Lebowitz 2006:39).10 Why not ethnicity? Why not sexuality? Consider Fraser’s argument that expropriation is intrinsic to capitalism and that racial differentiation must be too. It is plausible and indeed persuasive to claim that expropriation is necessary for capitalism, but it is less persuasive to claim that racial difference is logically necessary for expropriation. Gender could easily serve as the main axis of dependent classification (and, to feminist-Marxist thought, it has served that function), as could ethnicity, religion, sexuality, or citizenship. Fraser would have to show that expropriation, and hence capitalism, requires a racial classification as opposed to other social categories. This is a task left unfulfilled.11 A different and possibly more productive route would be to reframe the issue as one of social difference rather than race. Is racism necessary for capitalism? There are good reasons, as just mentioned, to think not. But is social difference of various types (from race to gender to ethnicity) necessary for capitalism?12 This is more demonstrable, both empirically (by reference to actually existing capitalism) and theoretically (by reference to the logic of capital accumulation). For example, Fraser’s argument about expropriation could be reformulated in the following manner: expropriation is logically necessary for exploitation, which is in turn necessary for capital accumulation, and expropriation requires differentiation among workers. This differentiation could be along racial lines, or it could be along other lines such as gender, but differentiation there must be. Note that this argument logically insinuates a racial component but remains abstract enough to account for other possible identities across different capitalist formations. It can account for racialized slave labor in the eighteenth-century transatlantic world (where “race” was a key axis of differentiation), twentieth-century Russia (where ethnicity or religion might be the important axis), or gender across all these formations. This is just one possibility. There are others. Chakrabarty (1993), for instance, seized on Marx’s categories of “abstract” and “real” labor to write difference into Marx’s theoretical architecture. “Abstract labor” generated by capitalism refers to a homogeneity among different and otherwise incommensurable labors. It is the register of the juridical free subject. But “real” labor marks have heterogeneity that registers the incommensurability of different labors. It therefore refers to a difference that stands “only as a Derridean trace of something that cannot be enclosed” (Chakrabarty 1993:1096). Exactly how persuasive is Chakrabarty’s rereading remains to be seen. The point is that this effort, and others like it, speak to theoretical possibilities that the racial capitalism literature opens up but has yet to pursue thoroughly. More could be done.13

### 1NC – AT: World Computer

#### The reorientation to technology solves---all of their offense is about usage, but rejecting tech in its entireity fails

Paul Buckermann 17 {Sociologist interested in art and technology. Research assistant in NCCR eikones at University of Lucerne. “On Socialist Cybernetics, Accelerationist Dreams, and Tiqqun’s Nightmares.” http://networkcultures.org/longform/2016/12/19/communication-control-communism-on-socialist-cybernetics-accelerationist-dreams-and-tiqquns-nightmares/}//Comrade-JM

Srnicek and Williams deliver some practical hints for navigating towards radical futures, too. In general, they propose a counter-hegemonic strategy including radical think tanks, propaganda, alternative economics, hierarchical organizations, utopian pop-culture and all kinds of technological experimentation. Srnicek and Williams propose that representative parties should work together with mass movements and the state should be turned into a meaningful tool for the people. The authors shortly mention Chile’s Cybersyn and soviet cybernetics, which are analyzed in the next section, praising them as outstanding positive examples and seeing technological and political constraints as reasons for their failure. I want to offer deeper insights into decisive problems with these projects, problems that are related to political and bureaucratic structures in which innovations were implemented. COMMUNISM IS SOVIET POWER PLUS THE COMPUTERIZATION OF THE WHOLE COUNTRY Cybernetics and Computer-Based Socialist Economy in the Soviet Union Questions of economic calculation and cybernetic control were assessed politically in post-WWII Soviet Union. In the early 1950s both cybernetics as well as information theory – having emerged from military research in the US – were called pseudo-scientific, reactionary and idealistic. As seen in Tiqqun’s work, cybernetics was nevertheless also conceived as the enemy’s powerful ideological and technological weapon. Traditional soviet academics battled the idea of disciplinary take-overs, and media comments imagined the rise of robot-soldiers without conscience and robot-workers without class-consciousness. After Stalin’s death in 1953, the discourse successively changed. Nikita Khrushchev recognized cybernetics as a new form of governing technique and as a way to overcome the weak economic situation of the post-Stalin era. In 1957 the Soviet Academy of Sciences demanded an accelerated development and broader usage of computers and statistics for planning. In this era the so-called ‘cyberspeak’ gained an aura of objectivity and cybernetics became a powerful scientific paradigm in the Soviet Union. The soviet economy was also conceptualized by cybernetic ideas and planning was understood as a control system with various feedback loops. Especially the engineer Anatolii Kitov, deputy head of the Computation Center No. 1 of the Ministry of Defense wanted to reduce staff, inefficient data processing and administrative redundancies by building large computer networks between economic production and political decision patterns. Kitov wrote to Khrushchev in 1959, that computerization ‘make[s] it possible to use to the full extent the main economic advantages of the socialist system: planned economy and centralized control. The creation of an automated management system […] would ensure a complete victory of socialism over capitalism.’ Kitov soon lost his academic position and party membership because of formal and power-related reasons after he proposed a dual-use network of the military and civil sector. Military authorities criticized Kitov heavily, because they were not interested in any associations to potential economic weakness. Political authorities were concerned about their loss of direct control and the lack of ideology in automated management. In 1961, the Communist Party adopted their program’s third version at the 22nd party congress, including this passage: ‘automation will be effected on a mass scale, with increasing emphasis on fully automated shops and factories, making for high technical and economic efficiency. […] Cybernetics, electronic computer and control systems will be widely applied in production processes in industry, building, and transport, in scientific research, planning, designing, accounting, statistics, and management.’ Within this new party politics Viktor Glushkov was contacted by officials and started to work on new ideas (see also Glushkov’s personal reminiscences). His plan for a computer network all over the Soviet Union for monitoring labor, production and retailing would integrate a number of existing informational infrastructures and included more than 100 regional network nodes interconnected by wide-band channels as well as over twenty thousand local computer centers. The structure would additionally provide a distributed data bank accessible from everywhere. This idea for data compiling, storing and processing, later specified together with Nikolai Fedorenko, was crucial to the whole concept and would have meant a major shift in soviet bureaucracy. Instead of collecting raw economic data and feeding different administrative channels, Glushkov and Federenko thought of single storage in central data banks, which would then be made accessible for all different kinds of usage. But Glushkov’s plans reached even further: to reorganize the whole bureaucracy and, for example, to abolish material money. The opposition against such proposals quickly increased. The plans were criticized from three positions. First, bureaucrats and factory managers did not feel attracted to more observation and standardized control over their daily work and general efficiency. Second, more liberal economists saw a new rise of centralization and extensive planning from above. Finally, the building of a universal computerized data network was confronted with resistance from top political level in order to preserve the administrative status quo. With an eye on the US-American ARPANET in the late 1960s, Glushkov developed and promoted OGAS (Russian abbreviation for Statewide Automated Management System for Collection and Processing of Information), a cybernetic design for controlling all civil production and retailing of the Soviet Union. OGAS included the former plans of thousands of computer centers, the connection of automation networks and the installation of a powerful supervising agency. Driven by the wish to conserve the balance of power and authority over strictly divided competences, the general cybernetic idea of OGAS was fragmented into separate technological tools. After the 24th Party Congress of 1971, several ministries, agencies, the party and the military increased their individual implementation of networks and information technology for their particular needs. They all focused on the technological aspects and neglected the comprehensive cybernetic management models. The different programs were not compatible to each other, both on hardware and software levels. Beside the secret and non-transparent systems of the military sector, there were single and incompatible networks constructed for aviation, banking, weather prediction, as well as numerous state and party bodies. I want to emphasize one particular insight that is central for the progress of cyber-communist approaches. Technological and scientific insufficiencies were not the prime problem for building a general cybernetic system for the Soviet economy. Instead, political mechanisms of power, information exclusivity and competence skirmishes prevented a technologically bolstered, cybernetic re-coordination of the economy. The political, academic and military divisions showed a tendency for applying only parts of the large-scale innovations for their particular purpose. Computer technology, information networks and especially cybernetic modeling are by definition general ideas applicable to various problems. Military authorities, economics, politicians and scientists did all anticipate benefits for their particular needs in the Cold War. One problem in the Soviet Union was, for example, the lack of standardization and coordination for computer networks. In the US and the Western World, general communication protocols, like TCP/IP, or addressing systems, like DNS, were widely implemented over a battled period spanning into the 1980s. Without such standards for digital communication and because of incompatible hardware and software the bunch of different soviet networks were never to be connected. Each one was sheltered and veiled by intransparency and the fear of losing already gained privileges.

#### Cede the Political DA – only state engagement stops the worst excesses of cybernetics.

Hughes 2 (James, PhD in Public Policy @ Trinity College. “Democratic Transhumanism 2.0” <http://www.changesurfer.com/Acad/DemocraticTranshumanism.htm> //shree)

What then of arguments from within the transhumanist worldview?

First, state action is required to address catastrophic threats from transhumanist technologies. Most transhumanists acknowledge that nanotechnology, genetic engineering and artificial intelligence could cause catastrophes if used for terrorist or military purposes, or accidentally allowed to reproduce in the wild. Contemplation of these catastrophic scenarios has led prominent transhumanists, such as Max More the founder and president of the Extropy Institute, to move away from libertarianism and to endorse prophylactic government policies. Requiring nanotechnology firms to take out insurance against the accidental destruction of the biosphere just isn’t very practical. What insurance policy covers accidental destruction of the biosphere? How could the externalities of bioterrorism be internalized into a cost accounting of a gene therapy firm? Only governments are in a position to create the necessary levels of prophylaxis, and most transhumanists can agree on this point.

Second, only believable and effective state-based policies to prevent adverse consequences from new technologies will reassure skittish publics that they do not have to be banned. Because of the weakness of social democracy in the U.S., current technology policy is dominated by ignorant hysteria on one side and greed on the other, politicians feeding off of populist Luddite hysteria and corporate anti-regulatory lobbyists. Publics must be offered a choice other than that of unfettered free-market technology versus bans. If transhumanists do not acknowledge the legitimacy of regulation, and attempt to craft and support responsible legislation, they cede the field to the Luddites. These choices require strong social democratic governments, such as those of Europe, that can act independent of corporate interests and vocal extremists. We need a strong social democratic regulatory apparatus that does not block transhuman technologies for Luddite reasons, but that also will ensure that transhuman technologies are safe and effective. The case of cryonics shows how spectacular frauds or iatrogenic disasters can set back acceptance of transhuman technology altogether. Human enhancements must be proven safe before being used, but not held hostage to vague Luddite anxieties.

Third, social policies must explicitly address public concerns that biotechnology will exacerbate social inequality. Libertarian transhumanists have a forceful answer to the challenge that biotechnology will be used for totalitarian applications: in a liberal society, each individual will choose for themselves whether to adopt the technologies. But what is their answer to the threat of growing class polarization? Biotechnologies will make it possible for the wealthy to have healthier, stronger, more intelligent and longer-lived children. Overcoming popular resistance to technology will require not only assuring publics that they are safe and will not be forced on anyone, but also that there will be universal, equitable access to their benefits through public financing. In other words, genetic choice and enhancement technologies must be included in a national health insurance program.

Nanotechnology and artificial intelligence will also exacerbate inequality by contributing to structural unemployment through automation. Work will be increasingly unnecessary in the 21st century. If techno-optimists do not work to ameliorate structural unemployment through expansions in the welfare state, job retraining, establishing a shorter work-week and work-life, and a guaranteed social income, then we are likely to see the return of old-school Luddism, machine-smashing by the unemployed.

Fourth, monopolistic practices and overly restrictive intellectual property law can seriously delay the development of transhuman technologies, and restrict their access. Applications of intellectual property law that are over-generous to corporations may restrict access to information and tools in ways that slow innovation. By engaging with law and public policy, transhumanists can protect the public commons in biomedical information essential to the advance of science.

Fifth, only a strong liberal democratic state can ensure that posthumans are not persecuted. The posthuman future will be as threatening to unenhanced humans as gay rights or women’s liberation have been to patriarchs and homophobes, or immigrant rights are to nativists. While libertarian transhumanists may imagine that they will be able to protect themselves if they are well-armed and have superior reflexes, they will be severely outnumbered. Nor is civil war an attractive outcome. Rather transhumanists must understand their continuity with the civil rights movements of the past and work to build coalitions with sexual, cultural, racial and religious minorities to protect liberal democracy. We need a strong democratic state that protects the right of avantgarde minorities to innovate and experiment with their own bodies and minds.

Transhumanists must also come to some terms with congenial wing of the animal rights movement since, like animal rights, transhumanism is opposed to anthropocentrism. But rather than rights for all life, transhumanist ethics seeks to establish the solidarity of and citizenship for all intelligent life. Transhumanists look forward to a society in which humans, post-humans and intelligent non-humans are all citizens of the polity. Consistent with this would be the demands of the Great Ape Project for an extension of human level protections to the great apes.

Sixth, libertarian transhumanists are inconsistent in arguing for the free market. The dominant argument for the free market on the part of libertarian transhumanists comes from Hayek: that the market is a naturally evolved, emergent phenomenon without conscious guidance, which allocates resources better than planning. But the goal of transhumanism is precisely to supplant the natural with the planned, replacing chance with design. The key to transhumanism is faith in reason, not in nature.

In any case, the assertion that the market s naturally evolved while governance structures and polities are artificial impositions on nature is bad sociology. All functioning markets require norms, rules, laws, legislatures, police, courts and planning. All democratic polities require the action of millions of autonomous agents aggregating their interests, expressing themselves in voluntary behavior, and creating an emergent political system. The market is not any more natural than democracy, even if being “natural” was a transhumanist virtue.

**Technological progress is self sustaining and corrective**

**Teixeira** 3-7-**2017** – PhD in sociology @ U W-Madison, author or co-author of six books (Ruy, “The Optimistic Leftist: Why the 21st Century Will Be Better Than You Think,” Kindle Reader)

Of course, Naam's views may be rejected by some on the left because he is unabashedly a techno- optimist. Well, what's wrong with that? The fact of the matter is that almost everything people like about the modern world, including relatively high living standards, is traceable to technological advances and the knowledge embodied in those advances. From smart phones, flat screen TVs and the internet to air and auto travel to central heating and air conditioning to the medical devices and drugs that cure disease and extend life to electric lights and the mundane flush toilet—the list is endless—technology has dramatically transformed people's lives, making them both much better and much longer than they ever have been before. It is difficult to argue that the average person today is not far, **far better off** than her counterpart in the past. As the Northwestern University economic historian Joel Mokyr puts it, the so-called good old 42 days were old but they were not good. And what do we have to thank for all these spectacular advances? Technology! Technology has both enabled the new goods, machines, medicine and so on that we consume and enabled the economic growth that allows us to consume at such a high level. Of course, economists debate endlessly about the exact mechanisms connecting technology to growth and what social and institutional conditions must be met for technology to maximize its effect on growth, but at the end of the day the growth we have seen—and the living standards we enjoy—would simply not have been possible without the massive breakthroughs and continuous improvements we have seen in the technological realm. Given all this and given the central importance of economic growth to the left's prospects, one would think that the left would embrace techno- optimism rather than shying away from it. After all, if the goal is to be successful and improve people's lives, rapid technological advance is surely something to promote enthusiastically. But the left has been oddly circumspect about the possibilities of new and better technologies, allowing the techno-optimism space to be dominated by libertarian-minded denizens of Silicon Valley.43 As British science journalist Leigh Phillips puts it: Once upon a time, the left ... promised more innovation, faster progress, greater abundance. One of the reasons I believe that the historically fringe ideology of libertarianism is today so surprisingly popular in Silicon Valley and with tech-savvy young people more broadly ... is that libertarianism is the only extant ideology that so substantially promises a significantly materially better future. There are several reasons for the left's ambiguous relationship to technology. One has already been mentioned: the left has tended to underestimate the importance of economic growth in the recent past, believing incorrectly that they can achieve their social objectives in an era of a tepid and poorly distributed growth. That leads naturally to an underestimation of the importance of technological change, since one of its chief attributes is promoting growth. Second, and worse, many on the left tend to regard technological change with dread rather than hope. They see technology as a force facilitating inequality rather than growth, disadvantaging manual workers rather than leading to skilled job creation, turning consumers into corporate pawns rather than information-savvy citizens and destroying the planet in the process. We are far, far away from the traditional left attitude that welcomed technological change as the handmaiden of abundance and increased leisure. Or, for that matter, from the liberal optimism that permeated the culture of the 1950s and '60s with tantalizing visions of flying cars and obedient robots. Third, the left has become infected with general pessimism about prospects for growth, acceding, as we have seen, to the idea that growth can't really be much greater than it already is. Just as this devalues the role of policy it also devalues the role of technological change. Why be optimistic about technological change if it's not likely to have much effect anyway? Feeding right into these sentiments is the growth of academic techno-pessimism. The leading light in this emerging school of thought is economist Robert Gordon, coincidentally in the same department at Northwestern University where leading techno-optimist Mokyr teaches. In his 2012 paper, "Is Economic Growth Over?: Faltering Innovation Confronts the Six Headwinds," and then in a number of follow-up papers and a massive book, Gordon argues that economic growth on the level we've been used to in the last 200 years may in fact be a historical anomaly and that strong growth has only been possible because of dramatic new innovations that have turbocharged economic advance—"industrial revolutions" in his terminology.45 The first industrial revolution was 1750—1830, based around steam engines, cotton spinning and railroads. The second revolution was 1870—1900, featuring electricity, the internal combustion engine and running water with indoor plumbing. He believes that both these industrial revolutions took about 100 years to work their way through the economy and generate their full effects. For example, the second industrial revolution was still giving us advances like air conditioning, home appliances and the interstate highway system in the 1950—70 period. The third industrial revolution is centered on computers and the internet. Gordon is not impressed with this revolution. He thinks all the really important, transformative stuff came from the first two revolutions, especially the second. He is fond of posing this question in his public lectures: which would you be willing to give up, your iPhone or the flush toilet? He thinks the post-1970 slowdown in productivity growth (it dropped by about half) is traceable to the relative triviality of the computer/internet revolution. And when we finally got a burst of productivity growth in the 1996—2004 period, it quickly petered out. The reason, he believes, is that the third industrial revolution has already run out of gas (no 100-year phase-in here) and just doesn't have much more to give us. Because of this and because of his six "headwinds" to growth (demographic burdens, stagnating educational attainment, high levels of inequality, globalization, rising energy and environmental costs, and high levels of household and government debt), he projects an ongoing decline in per capita economic growth to a meager 0.2 percent per year this century. But is it really true that all the cool stuff has already been invented? This does not seem likely. Mokyr points to emerging fields of innovation such as 3-D printing, genetic modification and custom- designed materials.46 There is also the rapid development of self-driving cars and ever-more sophisticated robots and artificial intelligence systems. Even more significantly, technology related to the generation and storage of clean energy has been advancing by leaps and bounds. For example, the price of solar power has been declining exponentially for years; according to Naam, the price of electricity from new solar declines by about 16 percent every time solar capacity doubles.4Z And progress has also been extremely rapid in making battery storage of renewable energy inexpensive, reliable and large- scale. Surely cheap, renewable energy qualifies as a breakthrough innovation. More generally, it is worth noting that by the end of the twentieth century more technological advances had been made in the previous hundred years than in all of history before 1900. As physicist Michio Kaku argues in his book Visions: How Science Will Revolutionize the 21st Century, there is no good reason to believe that this breakneck pace will slow in the twenty-first century, since we are just on the verge of mastering knowledge gleaned from technological revolutions in three interwined areas: computer science, biomolecular science/engineering, and quantum physics 48 Indeed, as we transition from an era where we have discovered the basic laws and building blocks in these fields to an era where we apply that knowledge, the pace of innovation, if anything, may accelerate. Currently underdeveloped fields like biotechnology, nanotechnology and quantum computing may leap forward in ways we cannot exactly anticipate but that are likely to have a big impact. Rather than correctly predicting a long-term innovation slowdown, it seems more likely that Gordon and his co-thinkers will join the long list of economic pessimists that have been proven wrong over the last 150 years.49 As blogger Kevin Drum cogently puts it: I can somehow imagine a circa-1870 version of Gordon arguing that all this folderol about electricity is ridiculous. Why, we've been studying electricity for over a century, and what do we have to show for it? Some clunky batteries, the telegraph, a few arc lamps with limited use, and a steady supply of techno-optimist inventors who keep telling us that any day now they'll invent a practical generator that will replace steam engines and change the world. Don't believe it, folks. 5 Interestingly, Drum, despite his bracing critique, is himself a sort of techno-pessimist—or, more precisely, a pessimistic techno-optimist. In an influential article for Mother Jones magazine, provocatively titled "Welcome Robot Overlords: Please Don't Fire Us?" Drum envisions robots growing smarter and more capable at an exponential rate so that by, say 2040, there will not be much need for human workers.51 Result: mass unemployment and social dysfunction despite unprecedented technological advance. Thus Drum goes to the other extreme from Gordon. Not only will there not be an innovation slowdown but there will be such a drastic innovation speedup that it will put everybody out of work. But this is just as unrealistic as Gordon. As Anthony Carnevale and Stephen Rose point out in their detailed study of the technological transformation of the U.S. economy, instead of assuming a virtual vanishing of growth as Gordon does, Drum is implicitly assuming economic growth in the neighborhood of 10 percent per year as smart machines generate greater and greater 52 output without human intervention. This seems unlikely to say the least. Yet this point of view is not without influence on the left, where a sort of neo-Luddism has become increasingly common. Drum himself has remarked: "The Luddites weren't wrong. They were just 200 years too early."53 Martin Ford's 2015 book, Rise of the Robots: Technology and the Threat of a Jobless Future, which predicts half of U.S. workers will be replaced by robots in the next 20 years, was widely 54 and respectfully reviewed in liberal outlets. Coming after a spell of high unemployment from the Great Recession, which is just lifting in the United States (and still hasn't in much of Europe), this seems like a very odd thing for those on the left to worry about. It is especially odd when the history of technological advance is full of transformations that put workers out of jobs in one sector only to have more jobs created in others as demand for new products and services grew.55 It's time for the left to discard both the Gordon and Drum forms of techno-pessimism and firmly embrace techno-optimism. Continuing technological advance is not only probable but good; instead of a future of no jobs it will be a future of different and more highly skilled jobs. These advances will likely transform our lives dramatically—in some ways we can already see and some we cannot anticipate. **They will be a key to human liberation and critically to the growth that will facilitate the pursuit of social justice and a higher standard of living for all**. Techno-optimism is too important to be left to the libertarians.

### 1NC – AT: Cap

#### 1] Growth is sustainable – we’re decoupling BUT degrowth unleashes global disaster.

Bailey 18 [Ronald; February 16; B.A. in Economics from the University of Virginia, member of the Society of Environmental Journalists and the American Society for Bioethics and Humanities, citing a compilation of interdisciplinary research; Reason, “Is Degrowth the Only Way to Save the World?” https://reason.com/2018/02/16/is-degrowth-the-only-way-to-save-the-wor; RP]//Re-cut by Elmer

Unless us folks in rich countries drastically reduce our material living standards and distribute most of what we have to people living in poor countries, the world will come to an end. Or at least that's the stark conclusion of a study published earlier this month in the journal Nature Sustainability. The researchers who wrote it, led by the Leeds University ecological economist Dan O'Neill, think the way to prevent the apocalypse is "degrowth." Vice, pestilence, war, and "gigantic inevitable famine" were the planetary boundaries set on human population by the 18th-century economist Robert Thomas Malthus. The new study gussies up old-fashioned Malthusianism by devising a set of seven biophysical indicators of national environmental pressure, which they then link to 11 indicators of social outcomes. The aim of the exercise is to concoct a "safe and just space" for humanity. Using data from 2011, the researchers calculate that the annual per capita boundaries for the world's 7 billion people consist of the emission of 1.6 tons of carbon dioxide per year and the annual consumption of 0.9 kilograms of phosphorus, 8.9 kilograms of nitrogen, 574 cubic meters of water, 2.6 tons of biomass (crops and wood), plus the ecological services of 1.7 hectares of land and 7.2 tons of material per person. On the social side, meanwhile, the researchers say that life satisfaction in each country should exceed 6.5 on the 10-point Cantril scale, that healthy life expectancy should average at least 65 years, and that nutrition should be over 2,700 calories per day. At least 95 percent of each country's citizens must have access to good sanitation, earn more than $1.90 per day, and pass through secondary school. Ninety percent of citizens must have friends and family they can depend on. The threshold for democratic quality must exceed 0.8 on an index scale stretching from -1 to +1, while the threshold for equality is set at no higher than 70 on a Gini Index where 0 represents perfect equality and 100 implies perfect inequality. They set the threshold for percent of labor force employed at 94 percent. So how does the U.S. do with regard to their biophysical boundaries and social outcomes measures? We Americans transgress all seven of the biophysical boundaries. Carbon dioxide emissions stand at 21.2 tons per person; we each use an average of 7 kilograms of phosphorus, 59.1 kilograms of nitrogen, 611 cubic meters of water, and 3.7 tons of biomass; we rely on the ecological services of 6.8 hectares of land and 27.2 tons of material. Although the researchers urge us to move "beyond the pursuit of GDP growth to embrace new measures of progress," it is worth noting that U.S. GDP is $59,609 per capita. On the other hand, those transgressions have provided a pretty good life for Americans. For example, life satisfaction is 7.1; healthy life expectancy is 69.7 years; and democratic quality stands at 0.8 points. The only two social indicators we just missed on were employment (91 percent) and secondary education (94.7 percent). On the other hand, our hemisphere is home to one paragon of sustainability—Haiti. Haitians breach none of the researchers' biophysical boundaries. But the Caribbean country performs abysmally on all 11 social indicators. Life satisfaction scores at 4.8; healthy life expectancy is 52.3 years; and Haitians average 2,105 calories per day. The country tallies -0.9 on the democratic quality index. Haiti's GDP is $719 per capita. Other near-sustainability champions include Malawi, Nepal, Myanmar, and Nicaragua. All of them score dismally on the social indicators, and their GDPs per capita are $322, $799, $1,375, and $2,208, respectively. The country that currently comes closest to the researchers' ideal of remaining within its biophysical boundaries while sufficient social indicators is…Vietnam. For the record, Vietnam's per capita GDP is $2,306. "Countries with higher levels of life satisfaction and healthy life expectancy also tend to transgress more biophysical boundaries," the researchers note. A better way to put this relationship is that more wealth and technology tend to make people happier, healthier, and freer. O'Neill and his unhappy team fail drastically to understand how human ingenuity unleashed in markets is already well on the way toward making their supposed planetary boundaries irrelevant. Take carbon dioxide emissions: Supporters of renewable energy technologies say that their costs are already or will soon be lower than those of fossil fuels. Boosters of advanced nuclear reactors similarly argue that they can supply all of the carbon-free energy the world will need. There's a good chance that fleets of battery-powered self-driving vehicles will largely replace private cars and mass transit later in this century. Are we about to run out of phosphorous to fertilize our crops? Peak phosphorus is not at hand. The U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) reports that at current rates of mining, the world's known reserves will last 266 years. The estimated total resources of phosphate rock would last over 1,140 years. "There are no imminent shortages of phosphate rock," notes the USGS. With respect to the deleterious effects that using phosphorus to fertilize crops might have outside of farm fields, researchers are working on ways to endow crops with traits that enable them to use less while maintaining yields. O'Neill and his colleagues are also concerned that farmers are using too much nitrogen fertilizer, which runs off fields into the natural environment and contributes to deoxygenated dead zones in the oceans, among other ill effects. This is a problem, but one that plant breeders are already working to solve. For example, researchers at Arcadia Biosciences have used biotechnology to create nitrogen-efficient varieties of staples like rice and wheat that enable farmers to increase yields while significantly reducing fertilizer use. Meanwhile, other researchers are moving on projects to engineer the nitrogen fixation trait from legumes into cereal crops. In other words, the crops would make their own fertilizer from air. Water? Most water is devoted to the irrigation of crops; the ongoing development of drought-resistant and saline-tolerant crops will help with that. Hectares per capita? Humanity has probably already reached peak farmland, and nearly 400 million hectares will be restored to nature by 2060—an area almost double the size of the United States east of the Mississippi River. In fact, it is entirely possible that most animal farming will be replaced by resource-sparing lab-grown steaks, chops, and milk. Such developments in food production undermine the researchers' worries about overconsumption of biomass. And humanity's material footprint is likely to get smaller too as trends toward further dematerializatio**n** **take hold**. The price system is a superb mechanism for encouraging innovators to find ways to wring ever more value out less and less stuff. Rockefeller University researcher Jesse Ausubel has shown that this process of absolute dematerialization has already taken off for many commodities. After cranking their way through their models of doom, O'Neill and his colleagues lugubriously conclude: "If all people are to lead a good life within planetary boundaries, then the level of resource use associated with meeting basic needs must be dramatically reduced." They are right, but they are entirely backward with regard to how to achieve those goals. Economic growth provides the wealth and technologies needed to lift people from poverty while simultaneously lightening humanity's footprint on the natural world. **Rather than degrowth, the planet**—and especially its poor people—**need** more and faster economic growth.

#### 2] Growth leads to Innovation that solves warming

Liebreich 18 Michael Liebreich 18, Visiting Professor at Imperial College’s Energy Future Lab, “The Secret of Eternal Growth,” 10/29/18, <http://ifreetrade.org/article/the_secret_of_eternal_growth_the_physics_behind_pro_growth_environmentalism> //Elmer

The earth, however, is not an isolated system. It may be nearly closed, exchanging limited matter across the planetary boundary, but it is far from isolated, as it receives a huge daily flux of energy from the sun and radiates almost as much away to space. In his book, Georgescu-Roegen even acknowledged the existence of huge solar energy fluxes, but that didn’t stop him from basing his seminal work on a scientific error. Later in his career, after ruefully acknowledging his mistake, he invented a Fourth Law of Thermodynamics, claiming that “material entropy” would forever prevent materials from being perfectly recycled. Pure fake science. Around the same time as Georgescu-Roegen was making up thermodynamic laws, a group of concerned environmentalists calling themselves the Club of Rome invited one of the doyens of the new field of computer modelling, Jay Forrester, to create a simulation of the world economy and its interaction with the environment. In 1972 his marvellous black box produced another best-seller, Limits to Growth (iv), which purported to prove that almost every combination of economic parameters ended up not just with growth slowing, but with an overshoot and collapse. This finding, so congenial to the model’s commissioners, stemmed entirely from errors in its structure, as pointed out by a then fresh-faced young economics professor at Yale, William Nordhaus. A third foundational work in the degrowth canon is Steady State Economics (v) by Herman Daly, later Senior Economist in the Environment Department of the World Bank. In it he explains that “the economy is an open subsystem of a finite and nongrowing ecosystem. Any subsystem of a finite nongrowing system must itself at some point also become nongrowing.” It’s a repeat of Georgescu-Roegen’s error. Daly must have known it too, since he noted that six days’ worth of radiation from the sun contained more useful energy (or exergy, to give it its correct name) than that embodied in all the fossil fuel reserves known at the time. The point here is not that solar power is the key to endless growth, though it could well be - nuclear fission and fusion are other strong contenders. The point is that when you scratch the surface of any of the seminal tracts of the degrowth movement, you find they are based on the same fake science, right through to the present day. Jeremy Rifkin’s 1980 Entropy: a New World View (vi) states that “here on earth material entropy is continually increasing and must ultimately reach a maximum”. In 2009, Professor Tim Jackson, the favourite anti-capitalist of the TED generation, published Prosperity Without Growth (vii). In it he pays homage to Daly’s “pioneering case for a ‘steady state economy’” and cheerfully recommends it to students hungering for alternative wisdom – either not understanding or not caring that it is based on a fallacy. This matters because, for all that the neo-liberal world economy has delivered extraordinary improvements in living standards – in life span, levels of education, infant survival, maternal health, poverty reduction, leisure, and so on (viii) – it is currently failing to address severe, systemic environmental challenges, first and foremost among them climate change. Unless the free-trade, pro-growth, pro-trade right offers a coherent plan, it is ceding the argument to the degrowth, anti-capitalist, anti-trade left. Climate change is real, serious, and urgent. That recent IPCC 1.5°C report is based on rigorous research. Of course climate change is being co-opted by the “Academic Grievance Studies” brigade (ix), but that doesn’t make the underlying physical science less real. As the world continues to burn through its remaining carbon budget, as temperatures continue to rise, as the ‘signal’ of climate damage becomes clearer against the background ‘noise’ of weather, the demand for dramatic action will only increase. Limiting the impact of **climate change will require** the application of technology, both new and yet-to-be-developed, on a heroic scale. Destroying the ability of the world economy to deliver these solutions **is the very opposite** of what we should be doing. And that is where Nordhaus and Romer come in. Romer’s great contribution was to identify the contribution of knowledge to economic growth. Before his Endogenous Growth Theory, no one could explain differences in growth rates of as much as 10 percent between countries at a similar stage of development. Romer’s work is the perfect riposte to those who think that economic growth is the same thing as ever-increasing physical material use and pollution; it is also the perfect riposte to those who believe that extractive industries can ever deliver long-term wealth and those who believe the same of agricultural subsidies and import tariffs. Nordhaus, for his part, was the creator of the first Integrated Assessment Models, bringing together the physics of climate change, its economic impact, and the functioning of the economy. He was also the first person to suggest that attaching a cost to emissions – low at first but rising – would squeeze greenhouse gases out of the economy. Nordhaus is no climate fundamentalist, famously diverging from the view propounded in the Stern Review, that the world needs super-high carbon taxes immediately. Nordhaus accepted that environmental challenges and climate change will act as a drag on the economy but, unlike others before him, he quantified the drag and showed that it is highly unlikely to reverse economic growth. Nordhaus and Romer are not the only Nobel Prize-winners whose work suggests that an open, liberal, trade-friendly economy – though one pricing in externalities – **will do a better job of addressing climate** change and other environmental problems than stalling or reversing economic growth. Simon Kuznets, who won the 1971 Nobel Prize for Economics (x), described how a variable can get worse in the early phases of a country’s development, and then improve as growth continues. He focused mainly on inequality, but the Environmental Kuznets Curves has been shown to govern most forms of local pollution. Ilya Prigogine won the 1977 Nobel Prize in Chemistry for his research into non-equilibrium “dissipative” structures – how a flow of energy across closed system can drive the creation of “order out of chaos” (xi). This is a real scientific expert on entropy proving that the economy can grow for as long as there is still a sun in the sky (which would give us about another five billion years).