# 1NC Glenbrooks Round 1

## Case

### 1NC – AT: Agriculture

#### No Indo China conflict *or* doesn’t go nuclear

Jones 11 [Rodney, Jones Policy Architects International. The report is the product of collaboration between the Defense Threat Reduction Agency’s Advanced Systems and Concepts Office and Policy Architects International. Nuclear Escalation Ladders in South Asia. 2011]

Until relatively recently, China appears to have regarded India strategically as a third order concern, rather than a high priority. China has given a more strategic importance to India only since the turn of the century, roughly correlated with its growing commercial maritime dependence on distant sources of petroleum and minerals, especially in the Middle East and Africa, but also more recently in Latin America. India’s nuclear break out in 1998 may have been an added factor, but probably not a driving one. The growing U.S. interest in India over three administrations also played a part. China’s reach for oil, gas, and minerals has not been exclusively maritime but has also gone over land, and resulted in successful oil and gas pipelines connecting Central Asia to western China in the last three years. Nevertheless, the bulk carriage on maritime routes remains crucial. India’s geographical position which can influence the security of these routes from China’s littoral on the Pacific Ocean past Singapore and the Malacca Straits, and onward through the Indian Ocean to Africa and the Persian Gulf, gives India potential naval leverage that China would be foolish to ignore. China has also encouraged a rapidly growing and mutually beneficial trade relationship with India, with a total value reaching about S60 Billion in 2010, so their relationship has important cooperative dimensions, and is not overwhelmingly zero-sum. Both have worked to tamp down bilateral issues of potential confrontation.

That said, both India and China are pursuing blue-water naval expansion, including aircraft carriers and nuclear-powered submarines. At least in some cases, their longdistance submarines are, or are expected to be, nuclear weapon-equipped. Modern naval development is so costly, however, that the R&D and production schedules on both sides stretch over many years. India has expanded the naval share of its defense budget, but China has more money to spend, and is already exercising its military access to the Arabian Sea with rotating, conventionally-armed naval flotillas (primarily destroyers and frigates, but also some landing-support ships). In the longer term, maritime nuclear escalation ladders for India and China will come into play and should be mapped. They probably will not be exclusively dyadic, however, because many other national navies, including the U.S. Navy, operate in the same waters.

For the time being, Indian and Chinese maritime escalation ladders do not reflect the operational deployment of strategic nuclear platforms within the Indian Ocean and their operational conventional naval assets would not impinge much on their land border confrontations in the Himalayas. Some day this picture is likely to change. But the bilateral escalation ladders that matter operationally between them today have a land warfare focus.

#### No Extinction – 1AC Gettleman never says goes nuclear – at best hundreds of soldiers die

#### Not Reverse causal – Strong Indian economy solves China war but collapse doesn’t cause it

### 1NC – AT: Environment

#### No tipping point

* Permian-Triassic extinction proves resiliency
* No data on tipping points
* Ecosystems never outright collapse
* 600 models prove no ecosystem collapse

Hance 18 [Jeremy Hance, wildlife blogger for the Guardian and a journalist with Mongabay focusing on forests, indigenous people, climate change and more. He is also the author of Life is Good: Conservation in an Age of Mass Extinction. Could biodiversity destruction lead to a global tipping point? Jan 16, 2018. https://www.theguardian.com/environment/radical-conservation/2018/jan/16/biodiversity-extinction-tipping-point-planetary-boundary]

Just over 250 million years ago, the planet suffered what may be described as its greatest holocaust: ninety-six percent of marine genera (plural of genus) and seventy percent of land vertebrate vanished for good. Even insects suffered a mass extinction – the only time before or since. Entire classes of animals – like trilobites – went out like a match in the wind.

But what’s arguably most fascinating about this event – known as the Permian-Triassic extinction or more poetically, the Great Dying – is the fact that anything survived at all. Life, it seems, is so ridiculously adaptable that not only did thousands of species make it through whatever killed off nearly everything (no one knows for certain though theories abound) but, somehow, after millions of years life even recovered and went on to write new tales.

Even as the Permian-Triassic extinction event shows the fragility of life, it also proves its resilience in the long-term. The lessons of such mass extinctions – five to date and arguably a sixth happening as I write – inform science today. Given that extinction levels are currently 1,000 (some even say 10,000) times the background rate, researchers have long worried about our current destruction of biodiversity – and what that may mean for our future Earth and ourselves.

In 2009, a group of researchers identified nine global boundaries for the planet that if passed could theoretically push the Earth into an uninhabitable state for our species. These global boundaries include climate change, freshwater use, ocean acidification and, yes, biodiversity loss (among others). The group has since updated the terminology surrounding biodiversity, now calling it “biosphere integrity,” but that hasn’t spared it from critique.

A paper last year in Trends in Ecology & Evolution scathingly attacked the idea of any global biodiversity boundary.

“It makes no sense that there exists a tipping point of biodiversity loss beyond which the Earth will collapse,” said co-author and ecologist, José Montoya, with Paul Sabatier Univeristy in France. “There is no rationale for this.”

Montoya wrote the paper along with Ian Donohue, an ecologist at Trinity College in Ireland and Stuart Pimm, one of the world’s leading experts on extinctions, with Duke University in the US.

Montoya, Donohue and Pimm argue that there isn’t evidence of a point at which loss of species leads to ecosystem collapse, globally or even locally. If the planet didn’t collapse after the Permian-Triassic extinction event, it won’t collapse now – though our descendants may well curse us for the damage we’ve done.

Instead, according to the researchers, every loss of species counts. But the damage is gradual and incremental, not a sudden plunge. Ecosystems, according to them, slowly degrade but never fail outright.

“Of more than 600 experiments of biodiversity effects on various functions, none showed a collapse,” Montoya said. “In general, the loss of species has a detrimental effect on ecosystem functions...We progressively lose pollination services, water quality, plant biomass, and many other important functions as we lose species. But we never observe a critical level of biodiversity over which functions collapse.”

#### No water wars

* Most water crises don’t cause conflict
* Often results in collaboration through water sharing agreement development
* Main causation for water wars is weak institutional capacity and political and economic dynamics

Gleick 18 [Peter Gleick, MacArthur “Genius” Fellowship and was elected to the U.S. National Academy of Sciences, world-renowned expert, innovator, and communicator on water and climate issues, cofounded the Pacific Institute, which he led as president until mid-2016, pHd from UC Berkeley, and Charles Iceland, s Director, Global and National Water Initiatives with WRI’s Food, Forests, and Water Programs, “Water, Security, & Conflict”, https://pacinst.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/Water-Security-and-Conflict\_Aug-2018-2.pdf]

3.2. The Role of Governance in Water Security

Most water crises do not end in conflict, migration, or acute food insecurity. Instead, people muddle through until the crises recede. Some crises even generate cooperation among local or regional parties. Understanding why water crises lead to adverse outcomes in some places and better outcomes in others will help inform strategies for reducing the risks of conflict. Why, for example, did Syria sink into civil war following a record-breaking five-year drought, while .Iordan and Lebanon avoided strife following that same drought (Adams et al. 2018)? This requires integrating analyses of meteorological and resource-related events with the diverse social, political, and economic dynamics at play.

We can postulate—based on research conducted by Wolf and his colleagues (2003) on transboundary basins— that when rapid change, either on the institutional side or in the physical system, outpaces the institutional capacity to absorb that change, the stage is set for possible water insecurity. Therefore, when we go looking for water insecurity, we need to be on the lookout for large-scale water-related change and low capacity to handle such change (this Is what the Water, Peace, and Security [WPS] consortium is attempting to do via the development of a near realtime global early warning system for potential water-related threats to human security—more on this further on in this brief).

#### No Indo-Pak War – Specific scenarios don’t solve, they will never escalate

* Leaders know risks and deescalate
* US, Soviet Union, China, Britain, France are historical examples of deescalating dyads
* South Asia doesn’t fight large scale wars anymore
* Impact is too large so neither side even considers starting war

Shellenberger 2/21/19 [Michael Shellenberger, Time Magazine “Hero of the Environment,” Green Book Award Winner, and President of Environmental Progress, a research and policy organization. His writings have appeared in The New York Times, Washington Post and Wall Street Journal, Scientific American, Nature Energy, and PLOS Biology. His TED talks have been viewed over 1.5 million times. Stop Letting Your Cartoon Fears Of Nuclear Bombs Kill The Planet. Februrary 21, 2019. https://www.forbes.com/sites/gradsoflife/2019/03/04/to-end-the-ever-growing-skills-gap-employers-must-change-their-outdated-hiring-practices/#7fa29a8f2d16]

But then political leaders in India and Pakistan considered the likely impacts of nuclear war and frightened each other into peace, just as the US, Soviet Union, China, Britain, and France had done before them.

Vox’s Dylan Matthews asked India-Pakistan expert, Sumit Ganguly, a professor of political science at University of Indiana, what the impact of nuclear weapons proliferation on the region was.

“In South Asia,” Ganguly said, “it has, for all practical purposes, done away with the prospect of full scale war. It's just not going to happen. The risks are so great as a consequence of the nuclearization of the subcontinent that neither side can seriously contemplate starting a war.”

### 1NC – AT: Democracy

#### Democracy causes war.

#### A. Backsliding causes great power nuclear war.

Muller 15 [Director of the Peace Research Institute in Frankfurt, professor of International Relations at Goethe University, 15, Harald, Democracy, Peace, and Security, Lexington Books pp. 44-49]

My own proposal for solving the problem. developed together with my colleague Jonas Wolff (Müllcr 2004. Muller/Wolff 2006). turns the issue upside down: We do not start with explaining mutual democratic peacefulness, but its opposite. the proven capability of democracies to act aggressively against non-democracies. We note that—apart from self-defense where there is no difference between democracies and non-democracies——democratic states go to war—in contrast to non-democracies—to uphold international law (or their own interpretation thereof), to prevent anarchy through state failure, to “save strangers” when dictatorships massacre their own people, and to promote democracy. None of these acts is likely to find its target in a democracy. Since the use of force by democracies is hardly possible without public justification, even the rhetorical use of the said reasons will not stand public scrutiny when uttered against a democracy—people will not believe it, War other than for self-defense thus can only be fought by democracies against non-democracies because against a fellow democracy justification would fail. Because whether this is the case or not to a degree that justifies war as the ‘ultimate means” must rely on practical judgments. and practical judgments can differ among even reasonable people. democracies might disagree whether or not the judgment applies in specific cases. Democracies also show variance in that regard due (o a systematic. political-culturally rooted different propensity to judge situations as justifing war or not, and to participate in such wars (Gels et al, 2013). It should also be noted that, given the continuum between autocracy, anocracy and democracy, whether a given state is a democracy or not can be subject to interpretation. and this interpretation may even change over time (Oren 1995, Hayes 2013). The fact is that there are a couple of fairly warlike democracies, and that the democracies participating most frequently in military disputes (apart from the special case of Israel) are, by and large. major powers such as the United States, the United Kingdom. France. or India. This pattern is important to keep in mind when the question of the utility of democratic peace for today ‘s world problems is to be answered. Transnational terrorism, failed states, civil wars and the like dominate the international agenda on war and peace. At the classical level of international relations, in the relationships among major powers. developments arc undcr way which potentially pose an even greater threat than this diverse collection of non-interstate problems presently does. We are living in an era of rather rapid and disturbing power change (Tammcn et al. 2000). The United States are still the leading power of the world with unprecedented militany and economic poer. But others are coming closer: China. India. Braiil and Indonesia, China is at the top of this cohort, All major power changes chal lenge existing structures and thus contain the potential for great disturbance. The leading power may start to fear for its dominant position and take measures to ensure its position at the lop. These actions may frustrate emerging powers and even lead to the perception that their security is endangered. which would motivate counter-measures that further propel a political escala tion spiral. An increasingly focused competition in which a true power change appears increasingly possible. that is. a change of position at the top of the international hierarchy, has an even greater risk potential. If the inherent dangers are not contained—which remains always a possibility major power war may ensue defying all propositions that major war has become obsolete or that nuclear deterrence will prevent this calamity once and for all. Of course, states can grow peacefully into roles of higher responsibility. status and influence on the world stage. There arc no natural laws saving that changes in the world’s power structure must end in war, despite all distur bances and ensuing risks (Rauch 2014). The less conflict an emerging power experiences with established ones, and with peer challengers that emerge simultaneously, the better the chances that the rise will travel a peaceful trajectory. Looking through this lens. thc relations of only one emerging power with the present hegemon appear to be partially conflict-pronc. and seriously so: it concerns the pair China/United States. The Iwo great powers are rivals for preponderance in East and South East Asia and eventually for being the number one at the global level. There is also Chinese resentment stemming from the US role in China’s past as a victim of Western imperialism. On the other hand. China’s authoritarian system of rule and ensuing violations of human and political rights trigger the liberal resentment discussed in the first part of this chapter. which is rooted particularly strongly in US political culture. The Chinese—US relationship is thus thc key to a peaceful. tense or even violent future at the world stage. A small group of major powers. Including the United States and China, is interconnected today by a complex conflict system. China has territorial claims against Japan, South Korea, Vietnam. the Philippines. Brunci. and India which it pursues by a variety of means, not shying away from the limited, small scale usc of militan force in some cases, notably against obviously weaker counterparts (Ellcman ci al. 2012). China’s relation (o wards Japan is the one most burdened by China’s past as a victim of Japanese oppression and related cruelties, and the propcnsit of the conservative part of Japan’s elite to display cavalier attitudes towards this past or even sort of celebrate it (as through visits to the notorious Yasukuni shrine hosting the remnants of war criminals) only adds to anti-Japanese feelings in China (Russia. another great power. also openly pursues a revisionist agenda. as vividly shown in the recent Crimean move, but these territorial ambitions are not part of the most virulent conflict complex in Asia). Territorial claims are always emotionalized and dangerous. Territorial claims by a major power bear particular risks, because threatened countries look for protective allies which are, by necessity, major powers with the capability to project power into the region of concern. The great power claimant and the great power protector then position themselves on the opposite sides of the conflict. A classical constellation of great power conflict results that looks far more traditional than all the talk about post-modern global relations in which state power struggles fade into oblivion would suggest. In the Asian conflict complex that structures the shape of the US—Chinese contest (Foot/Walter 201 1). Japan. South Korea and the Philippines arc for mall allied ith the United Slates. India and Vietnam today entertain rda (ions ith the United States that can be depicted as cordial entente, already include military cooperation, and might move further towards an alliance. depending on deelopmens in Asia. The United States is also a protector of Taiwan. officially a Chinese province, factualh an independent political entity. and the main object of Chinese interest because of the unfinished agenda of national re-unification. Given the enormous asymmetries between China and Taiwan. the latter’s independence depends fully and unambiguously on the US guarantee. Russia and China have a fairly ambivalent relation with each other that is officially called a strategic partnership. Ambiguous as this relationship is, it is predictable that the more the West and Russia are at loggerheads, the closer the Russian—Chinese relations might become. On the other hand. Chi na is the stronger partner and harbors not completely friendly feelings to wards Moscow. as Russia took part in China’s humiliation during the imperi alist period no less than the United States did. Russian fears concerning covert immigration into Eastern Siberia and demographic repercussions and political consequences that might result therefrom add to the uneasiness. China and India arc natural rivals for regional preponderance in Asia (Gilbov/Hcginbotham 2012). Both arc developing rapidly. with China still ahead. Territorial disputes. India’s liospitalit Lo TibeLan exiles including the Dalai Lama. China’s close relation to Pakistan and a growing naval rivalry spanning the Indian Ocean from the Strait of Malacca to Iranian shores (Garofano/Dew 2013) run parallel to rapidly growing economic relations and ostensible efforts lo present the relationship if not as amiable then at least as partner-like. The United States, China, Russia and India even today conduct a multi- pronged nuclear arms race (Fingar 2011: Gangul /Thompson 2011: O’Neill 2013. Müllcr 2014). In this race, conventional components like missile de fense. Intercontinental strike options, space-based assets and the specter of cbcr war play their role, as does the issue of extended dcterrcncc The general US militar’ superiority induces Russia and China to improve their nuclear arsenals, while India tries not to be left too far behind the Chinese in terms of nuclear capability. Pakistan and North Korea ork as potential spoilers at the fringe of this arms race. They are not powerful but thc arc capable of stirring up trouble, whenever they move. In tems of the military constellation, the most disquieting development is the drafting of pre-emptive strategies of a first (most likely conventional) strike by the United States and China, on either side motivated by the per ceived need to keep the upper hand early in a potential clash close to Chinese shores (such as in the context of a Taiwan conflict). China is building up middle-range ballistic capabilities to pre-empt US aircraft carrier groups from coming into striking distance and to desiroy US Air Force assets in Okinawa. while the United States is developing means to neutralize exactly these Chinese capabilities. They are steering towards a hair-trigger security dilemma in which the mutual postures cry out for being used first before the enemy might destroy them (Goldstein 2013: Le Miôre 2012). It cannot be excluded that this whole conflict system might collapse into two opposing blocks one da the spark for a major violent cataclysm could even be lighted by uncontrolled non-state actors inside some of the powers. or—in analogy to the role of Serbia in 1914— a ‘spoiler” state with a particularly idios ncralic agenda. Pakistan. North Korea or Tai an arc con ceivable in this role. Even Japan might be considered, if nationalism in Nippon grows further and seeks confrontation with the old rival China. If anything. this constellation does not look much better than the one which drove Europe into World War I a century ago. and it contains a nuclear component. To trust in the infallibility of nuclear deterrence in this mufti- pronged constellation needs quite a lot of optimism Can democratic peace be helpful in this constellation? Our conflict system includes democracies—the United States, India, Japan. Indonesia and non- democracies such as China. Russia, and Vietnam, but not necessarily on the same side. Should the European theater become connected to the Asian one through continuous US—Russian disputes and a Russian—Chinese entente. defective democracies like Ukraine and Georgia may feature rather importantly as potential triggers for a worsening of relationships. While democracy is useful in excluding certain conflict dyads in the whole complex, such as India and the United States. Japan and the United States. Japan and India. from the risk that they might escalate into a violent conflict, and as democratic peace is pacifying parts of the world. such as South America or Europe. it helps little in disputes between democracies and non-democracies. To the contrary: as discussed above, democracies have a more or less moral-emotional inclination to demonize non-democracies once they dis agree, and to feel a missionary drive to turn them democratic. This might exacerbate the existing, more interest-based conflicts between democracies and non-democracies, and it creates fears in the hearts of autocratic leaders that they might be up for democratization sooner or later. The close inter- democratic relations which democratic peace tends to produce, in turn, only exacerbate these fears as democracies tend to be rich, well organized, and powerful and dispose together of much more potent military capabilities than their potential non-dcnwcratic counterparts. Rather than helping with peace. the inter-democratic consequences of the democratic peace tend to exacerbate the security dilemma which exists between democracies and non-democracics an way. This non-peaceful dark side of democratic peace has escaped the attention of most academic writings on this subject and certainly all political utterances about democratic peace in our political systems. But democratic militancy is the Siamese twin of democratic peace as the Bush Administration unambiguously taught us (Gels et al. 2013: Müllcr 2014b).

#### B. Fractured states, perpetual intervention, and terrorism.

Michael Neiberg 18, Chair of War Studies in the Department of National Security and Strategy at the United States Army War College, 06-19-18, (“Predicting War,” Lawfare, [https://www.lawfareblog.com/predicting-war](about:blank)) Justin

Whether influenced by Hollywood or Santa Monica (the California headquarters of RAND), the history of war as Freedman relates it is essentially conceptual. The end of the dominant Cold War paradigm is a case in point. The ahistorical euphoria of the supposed “end of history” misled many western experts into predicting that an age of perpetual peace would at long last come into view because, as one specialist in this period wrote, the “absence of war between democracies comes as close as anything we have to an empirical law in international relations,” thus undergirding the rise of global governance ideals of liberal internationalism. The way forward in those early years after the fall of the Iron Curtain seemed therefore not technological, but conceptual. The key to peace lay in finding ways to help this one supposedly empirical historical law to take hold. Rather than bring peace, however, the pursuit of the concept of perpetual security through democracy only produced a new idea of war. It convinced western leaders of the need to advance the speed of historical progress through carefully managed military action against a select number of dictators. As prosecuted by George W. Bush, Tony Blair, and their advisers, the new paradigm not only made it possible for great powers to consider meddling in the domestic politics of smaller states, it impelled them to do so. By making more states democratic, through the use of force if necessary, these interventions would make the world safer. The idea was at least as old as Woodrow Wilson, but the eras of the world wars and the Cold War had made it too difficult to put in practice. After 1989, with the seemingly insurmountable dominance of western military organizations, the absence of a Soviet Union to balance western intervention, and the general post-Cold War hubris of western leaders, the environment was right for it to return. The result, of course, has not been an end of history and perpetual peace, but an extension of conflict and a reawakening of older grievances. The central problem, as “The Future of War” depicts it, was an all-too-eager willingness to accept the basic principle of democratic peace theory without thinking through the limits of the theory or fully examining alternatives. One clear alternative theory had already begun to emerge from the minds of theorists like Mary Kaldor and Rupert Smith. Their works essentially argued that war as once understood no longer existed. The future belonged to the side that could best exploit the disintegration of state authority, control the messaging, and work among the people in the new megacities. Anne-Marie Slaughter saw the inevitable splintering of the “sovereign state” into sub-sovereign centers of governance power, thereby squeezing out sovereignty in favor of power exercised by non-sovereign or less-than-sovereign institutions, on the one hand, and the ascendant rule of supra-national institutions, on the other. One might argue, although Freedman does not, that Hezbollah, FARC, Hamas, al-Qaeda, the Islamic State, and others have been able to survive against much more technologically sophisticated states because they have indeed made the intellectual shift to the kind of conflict that Kaldor and Smith described. The west has struggled against such adversaries not on the technological level but on the conceptual one. The west had two models on which to draw, neither of which helped them conceptualize the central problem. The “aid to civil power” model suggested building up the capabilities of local authorities so that they could care for their own security needs and maybe even become an exporter of regional security. The second model focused on “peacekeeping,” which required armies to act impartially even when, as in Yugoslavia, such a model indirectly empowered malicious actors like Slobodan Milosevic. Both models were frustrating, but they had just enough successes to keep them viable and allow them to survive intellectual challenges like the ones posed by Kaldor and Smith.

#### **DPT is false.**

#### A. Strategic rivalry – stats.

Sambuddha Ghatak 17 – Department of PoliSci, Univeristy of Tennessee, Aaron Gold, Department of Political Science, University of Tennessee and Brandon C. Prins, Howard Baker Jr. Center for Public Policy, Department of Political Science, University of Tennessee (“External Threat and the Limits of Democratic Pacifism,” CONFLICT MANAGEMENT AND PEACE SCIENCE v. 34 n. 2, 2017, p. 151-154) Justin

It has become a stylized fact that dyadic democracy lowers the hazard of armed conflict. While the Democratic Peace has faced many challenges, we believe the most significant challenge has come from the argument that the pacifying effect of democracy is epiphenomenal to territorial issues, specifically the external threats that they pose. This argument sees the lower hazards of armed conflict among democracies not as a product of shared norms or institutional structures, but as a result of settled borders. Territory, though, remains only one geo-political context generating threat, insecurity, and a higher likelihood of armed conflict. Strategic rivalry also serves as an environment associated with fear, a lack of trust, and an expectation of future conflict. Efforts to assess democratic pacifism have largely ignored rivalry as a context conditioning the behavior of democratic leaders. To be sure, research demonstrates rivals to have higher probabilities of armed conflict and democracies rarely to be rivals. But fundamental to the Democratic Peace is the notion that even in the face of difficult security challenges and salient issues, dyadic democracy will associate with a lower likelihood of militarized aggression. But the presence of an external threat, be that threat disputed territory or strategic rivalry, may be the key mechanism by which democratic leaders, owing to audience costs, resolve and electoral pressures, fail to resolve problems nonviolently. This study has sought a ‘‘hard test’’ of the Democratic Peace by testing the conditional effects of joint democracy on armed conflict when external threat is present. We test three measures of threat: territorial contention, strategic rivalry, and a threat index that sums the first two measures. For robustness checks, we use two additional measures of our dependent variable: fatal MID onset, and event data from the Armed Conflict Database, which can be found in our Online Appendix. As most studies report, democratic dyads are associated with less armed conflict than mixed-regime and autocratic dyads. In every one of our models, when we control for each measure of external threat, joint democracy is strongly negative and significant and each measure of threat is strongly positive and significant. Here, liberal institutions maintain their pacific ability and external threats clearly increase conflict propensities. However, when we test the interactive relationship between democracy and our measures of external threat, the pacifying effect of democracy is less [prominent] ~~visible~~. Park and James (2015) find some evidence that when faced with an external threat in the form of territorial contention, the pacifying effect of joint democracy holds up. This study does not fully support the claims of Park and James (2015). Using a longer timeframe, we find more consistent evidence that when faced with an external threat, be it territorial contention, strategic rivalry, or a combination, democratic pacifism does not survive. What are the implications of our study? First, while it is clear that we do not observe a large amount of armed conflict among democratic states, if we organize interstate relationships along a continuum from highly hostile to highly friendly, we are probably observing what Goertz et al. (2016) and Owsiak et al. (2016) refer to as ‘‘lesser rivalries’’ in which ‘‘both the frequency and severity of violent interaction decline. Yet, the sentiments of threat, enmity, and competition that remain—along with the persistence of unresolved issues—mean that lesser rivalries still experience isolated violent episodes (e.g., militarized interstate disputes), diplomatic hostility, and non-violent crises’’ (Owsiak et al., 2016). Second, our findings show that the pacific benefits of liberal institutions or externalized norms are not always able to lower the likelihood of armed conflict when faced with external threats, whether those hazards are disputed territory, strategic rivalry, or a combination of the two. The structural environment clearly influences democratic leaders in their foreign policy actions more than has heretofore been appreciated. Audience costs, resolve, and electoral pressures, produced from external threats, are powerful forces that are present even in jointly democratic relationships. These forces make it difficult for leaders to trust one another, which inhibits conflict resolution and facilitates persistent hostility. It does appear, then, that there is a limit to the Democratic Peace.

#### B. Democratization doesn’t lead to peace.

Stephen M. **Walt, 17** – Professor at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government (June 2, 2017, Retrieved Apr. 14, 2019, from <https://bigthink.com/design-for-good/why-promoting-human-rights-may-not-be-the-way-to-a-better-world>) Justin

I think liberal democracy is the best form of government to live under, but it’s not a particularly good way to promote peace. First of all, democracies start as many wars as non-democracies do. Think of the United States, for example, where we have not been bashful about using military force and sometimes initiating conflicts, even when we weren’t attacked. So, spreading democracy doesn’t necessarily guarantee peace. Finally, once democracies get into a big war, like World War I and World War II, they kill just as many people, including just as many civilians as non-democracies do. If the way you are spreading democracy is through military force, you have something of a contradiction there. There are better ways to promote peace than trying to aggressively create democracies.

#### Pursuit is unsustainable.

#### A. Russia backlashes – ensures extinction through nuke war.

Babayan 15 (Nelli Babayan is a senior researcher at the Center for Transnational Relations, Foreign and Security Policy at the Otto Suhr Institute of Political Science, Freie Universita¨t Berlin. “The return of the empire? Russia's counteraction to transatlantic democracy promotion in its near abroad” Democratization, 2015 Vol. 22, No. 3, 438 – 45)

How did Russia counteract EaP in Armenia? Since its independence from the Soviet Union, Armenia has welcomed democracy promotion efforts and committed to the regional policies of the EU and the US, including democracy promotion. The expulsion of Russian military bases from Georgia after the 2008 conflict and their move to Armenia made the latter last remaining stronghold of Russian military power in the region. The entire spectrum of Russia's instruments in counteracting democracy promotion or for that matter any EU/US policy deemed as challenging were particularly evident in the case of Armenia's 2013 “U-turn”59 from the EU AA to Russia's Customs Union. The case of Armenia demonstrates that Russia is most prone to counteract the EU and the US when faced with imminent effectiveness of democracy promotion supported by local actors or when faced with challenges to its geostrategic interests. As Delcour and Wolczuk show in this special issue, this logic also applies to Russia's actions in Georgia and Ukraine. By the employment of economic and military instruments and through the promotion of alternative regional institutions, Russia counteracted EU policy, which has also been supported by the US. Thus, Russian efforts for counteracting the initiatives within the EaP peaked with success in September 2013: Armenia turned to the Eurasian Customs Union and in November 2013 Ukraine withdrew from initialling the AA despite a wave of domestic protests in both countries.60 Energy, more specifically gas, and the protracted conflicts are the main pressure points used by Russia in Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus. Devoid of natural energy resources and with a protracted conflict at hand, Armenia makes a compliant target for Russia's energy and military pressures. In the mid-2000s Russia successfully blocked the diversification of Armenia's gas sources by imposing restrictions on the pipeline from Iran.61 Regular Armenian concessions in terms of infrastructure and cooperation with other neighbours secured comparatively lower gas prices. However, after Armenia concluded the sixth round of DCFTA negotiations leading to the initialling of the AA, in July 2013 Russia threatened to increase gas prices by 60%, while suggesting that the costs may be subsidized and not increase in the next five years should Armenia join the Customs Union.62 Consequently, Armenia entered negotiations for an 18% rise. It allowed Russian gas-monopoly Gazprom to acquire the remaining 20% of shares of the gas procuring company ArmRusGazprom, which had previously belonged to the Armenian government. Russian media, which is also widely viewed in Armenia, publicized a number of preferential agreements and possible subsidies promised by Putin to Armenia's President Serzh Sargsyan in return for joining the Customs Union. In addition, Russia promised larger investments into prolonging the exploitation of the Armenian nuclear power plant and other factories, regarded as obsolete or environmentally hazardous by the EU and the US.63 Besides economic threats, Russia has also been taking advantage of the protracted conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno Karabakh region. While Azerbaijan's energy industry has allowed it to exponentially multiply its military budget, Armenia has been largely reliant on Russia for its security against possible military actions by Azerbaijan. While Armenia showed growing interest in its partnership with the EU and did not attend a June 2013 meeting of the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization, Russia subsequently increased its arms export to Azerbaijan by US$1 billion.64 This move served as a clear warning to Armenia that Russia may no longer support it in the framework of the conflict. Regularly playing two sides of the conflict against each other using the promise or threat of arms sales, Russia has managed to keep the South Caucasus divided and hindered regional projects of the EU and the US. Armenia backpedalled on AA after two years of preparations and previously expressed confidence by the Armenian authorities that “the AAs with some partner countries, including Armenia, will be initialled” in November 2013.65 The EU delegation in Armenia confirmed that the latter was on track for signing the AA. Former Prime Minister Tigran Sarkisian also repeatedly argued against Armenian entry into the Customs Union, due to the lack of common borders with Russia, Belarus, or Kazakhstan.66 Thus, the decision to reject initialling the AA bewildered both the EU and the Armenian public, which took to the streets in protest (even if with limited coverage by Western media). Given the pressures coming from the Kremlin, Armenian officials attempted to frame the decision in pragmatic terms, calling Russia the “military security choice” and the DCFTA the “economic choice”, since “in terms of security, Armenia is tied to Russia”.67 However, while the Armenian government and the Kremlin have attempted to present the Customs Union as a better economic and trade choice for Armenia,68 the benefits of joining it are hardly identifiable. Due to its closed borders with Azerbaijan and Turkey, and lack of a border with Russia, Armenia conducts most of its trade through Georgia. Since Georgia signed the DCFTA in summer 2014, these two neighbouring countries will now have to abide by different tariffs and agreements, further straining Armenia's already weak economy. The stagnation of democracy in post-Soviet countries has been the result of a set of factors, such as low resonance of democracy, high adaptation costs to democracy, protracted conflicts, weak institutions, or illiberal elites. Yet, through economic sanctions, military threats, and even through such formal institutions as the Eurasian Union, Russia has contributed to the stagnation of democratization in its near abroad. It counteracted democracy promotion or, for that matter, any other Western policies, which it considered a threat to its geostrategic interests and ambitions for restoring its great power status. At the same time, even if the level of democracy in its near abroad has gradually deteriorated, there is no evidence of Russia promoting autocracy or any other regime alternative to democracy. Russia's actions are hardly surprising. For centuries under the direct influence of Russia, the regions of Eastern Europe, the South Caucasus, and Central Asia did not only constitute parts of the Russia-led Soviet Union but also of the earlier Russian Empire. The exposure to Western principles (along with material incentives) and democratization under the guidance of the EU or the US may potentially steer the allegiance of its near abroad away from Russia. Moreover, just as the EU and the US have continuously preferred stability over democracy,69 Russia has also strived to maintain the status quo and safeguard its interests in its own neighbourhood. At the same time, the EU and the US currently do not match either the level of political prowess – borderline blackmail – or the type of economic or security pressures employed by Russia in its near abroad.

#### The transition works and is better.

#### A. Group constraints.

Rosato 11 PhD, Department of Political Science, The University of Chicago, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Notre Dame. The Handbookon the Political Economy of War By Christopher J. Coyne, Rachel L. Mathers

There is also little evidence for Ihe other implication of the group constraint claim, namely that group constraints must be weaker in autocracies than in democracies. If the mechanism is to explain why democracies remain at peace but autocracies do not, then there must be good evidence that democratic leaders face greater group constraints. The evidence suggests, however, that autocratic leaders often respond to groups - themselves or their supporters that have powerful incentives to avoid war. One reason for autocrats to shy away from conflict is that wars are expensive and the best way to pay for them is to move to a system of consensual taxation, which in turn requires the expansion of the franchise. In other words, autocratic leaders have a powerful incentive to avoid wars lest they trigger political changes that may destroy their hold on power. Another reason to avoid war is that it allows civilian autocrats to maintain weak military establishments, thereby reducing the chances that they will be overthrown. Different considerations inhibit the war proneness of military dictators. First, because they must often devote considerable effort to domestic repression, they have fewer resources available for prosecuting foreign wars. Second, because they are used for repression their militaries often have little societal support, which makes them ill equipped to fight external wars. Third, military dictators are closely identified with the military and will therefore be cautious about waging war for fear that they will be blamed for any subsequent defeat. Finally, time spent fighting abroad is time away from other tasks on which a dictator's domestic tenure also depends. Thus there may be fewer groups with access to the foreign policy process in autocracies - in extreme cases only the autocrat himself has a say - but these often have a vested interest in avoiding war. This being the case, it is not clear that group constraints are weaker in autocracies than they are in democracies

#### B. Risk-aversion.

Rosato 11 PhD, Department of Political Science, The University of Chicago, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Notre Dame. The Handbookon the Political Economy of War By Christopher J. Coyne, Rachel L. Mathers

In assessing whether leaders are accountable, proponents of the democratic peace focus exclusively on their chances of losing office as a result of waging a losing or costly war (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 1999, p. 794). Logically, however, accountability depends on a leader's likelihood of removal and the costs that he or she will incur when removed. It is not clear, for example, that leaders who are likely to be voted out of office for prosecuting a losing or costly war, but are unlikely to be exiled, imprisoned or killed in the process will feel more accountable than leaders who are unlikely to lose office, but can expect severe punishment in the unlikely event that they are in fact removed. Put somewhat differently, it is not clear that their expected costs, which are a function of the likelihood that they will be removed and the costs they will incur if they are removed, are substantially different.20 If we focus on expected costs, democrats do not appear to be more accountable than autocrats. An analysis of the fate of all leaders in all the wars in the Correlates of War (COW) dataset, reveals that democratic leaders who lose a war or embroil their state in a costly war are marginally more likely to be removed from office than their autocratic counterparts (37 percent to 35 percent), but considerably less likely to be exiled, imprisoned, or killed (5 percent to 28 percent).21 Thus there is little evidence that democratic leaders face greater expected costs for waging losing or costly wars and are therefore more accountable than their autocratic counterparts. Giacomo Chiozza and Hein Goemans reach a similar conclusion in their examination of how defeat in war affects the tenure of democratic and nondemocratic leaders between 1919 and 1999. Defeat in war does not significantly affect the tenure of democrats, but does significantly reduce the tenure of autocrats (Chiozza and Goemans 2004, p. 613). Similarly, in her analysis of domestic audience costs, Jessica Weeks (2008, p. 59) finds that leaders in most nondemocracies are just as accountable as their democratic counterparts.

### 1NC – Warming Good

#### No Extinction from Warming – new studies prove over-hype and tech solves.

* Extinction Tipping Point is implausible – we’re on track for 3 degrees, not 4-5 degrees
* Tech and Energy Modernization Solve – Renewable Energy is replacing Fossil Fuels which reduces Climate Mortality by a rate of 5.

Nordhaus 20 Ted Nordhaus 1-23-2020 “Ignore the Fake Climate Debate” <https://www.wsj.com/articles/ignore-the-fake-climate-debate-11579795816>, found by BPS, (American author, environmental policy expert, and the director of research at The Breakthrough Institute, citing new climate change forecasts)//Re-cut by Elmer

Beyond the headlines and social media, where Greta Thunberg, Donald Trump and the online armies of climate “alarmists” and “deniers” do battle, there is a real climate debate bubbling along in scientific journals, conferences and, occasionally, even in the halls of Congress. It gets a lot less attention than the boisterous and fake debate that dominates our public discourse, but it is much more relevant to how the world might actually address the problem. In the real climate debate, no one denies the relationship between human emissions of greenhouse gases and a warming climate. Instead, the disagreement comes down to different views of climate risk in the face of multiple, cascading uncertainties. On one side of the debate are optimists, who believe that, with improving technology and greater affluence, our societies will prove quite adaptable to a changing climate. On the other side are pessimists, who are more concerned about the risks associated with rapid, large-scale and poorly understood transformations of the climate system. But most pessimists do not believe that runaway climate change or a hothouse earth **are plausible** scenarios, much less that human extinction is imminent. And most optimists recognize a need for policies to address climate change, even if they don’t support the radical measures that Ms. Thunberg and others have demanded. In the fake climate debate, both sides agree that economic growth and reduced emissions vary inversely; it’s a zero-sum game. In the real debate, the relationship is much more complicated. Long-term economic growth is associated with both rising per capita energy consumption and slower population growth. For this reason, as the world continues to get richer, higher per capita energy consumption is likely to be offset by a lower population. A richer world will also likely be more technologically advanced, which means that energy consumption should be less carbon-intensive than it would be in a poorer, less technologically advanced future. In fact, a number of the high-emissions scenarios produced by the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change involve futures in which the world is relatively poor and populous and less technologically advanced. Affluent, developed societies are also much better equipped to respond to climate extremes and natural disasters. That’s why natural disasters kill and displace many more people in poor societies than in rich ones. It’s not just seawalls and flood channels that make us resilient; it’s air conditioning and refrigeration, modern transportation and communications networks, early warning systems, first responders and public health bureaucracies. New research published in the journal Global Environmental Change finds that global economic growth over the last decade has reduced climate mortality by a factor of five, with the **greatest benefits documented in the poorest nations.** In low-lying Bangladesh, 300,000 people died in Cyclone Bhola in 1970, when 80% of the population lived in extreme poverty. In 2019, with less than 20% of the population living in extreme poverty, Cyclone Fani killed just five people. “Poor nations are most vulnerable to a changing climate. The fastest way to reduce that vulnerability is through economic development.” So while it is true that poor nations are most vulnerable to a changing climate, it is also true that the fastest way to reduce that vulnerability is through economic development, which requires infrastructure and industrialization. Those activities, in turn, require cement, steel, process heat and chemical inputs, all of which are impossible to produce today without fossil fuels. For this and other reasons, the world is unlikely to cut emissions fast enough to stabilize global temperatures at less than 2 degrees above pre-industrial levels, the long-standing international target, much less 1.5 degrees, as many activists now demand. But recent forecasts also suggest that many of the worst-case climate scenarios produced in the last decade, which assumed unbounded economic growth and fossil-fuel development, are also very unlikely. There is still substantial uncertainty about how sensitive global temperatures will be to higher emissions over the long-term. But the best estimates now suggest that the world is on track for 3 degrees of warming by the end of this century, not 4 or 5 degrees as was once feared. That is due in part to slower economic growth in the wake of the global financial crisis, but also to decades of technology policy and energy-modernization efforts. “We have better and cleaner technologies available today because policy-makers in the U.S. and elsewhere set out to develop those technologies.” The energy intensity of the global economy continues to fall. **Lower-carbon natural gas has displaced coal as the primary source of new fossil energy**. The **falling cost of wind and solar energy** has begun to have an effect on the growth of fossil fuels. Even **nuclear energy** has made a modest comeback in Asia.

#### Variations natural and CO2 effects are overstated.

* 10,000 years prove natural range of warming
* No Co2 effect on Warming – No Net Warming despite 8 Percent increase of Co2
* Solar Radiation has net greater effect – close correlation over past 150 years

Carter et al. 15 Robert M Carter 4-12-2015 “Why Scientists Disagree About Global Warming The NIPCC Report on Scientific Consensus” (Craig D. Idso, Ph.D. Robert M. Carter, Ph.D. S. Fred Singer, Ph. D. Chairman Emeritus Fellow Chairman Center for the Study Institute of Public Affairs Science and of Carbon Dioxide Australia) Environmental Policy and Global Change Project (USA) (USA))//Elmer

Modern Warming Is Not Unprecedented IPCC’s second false postulate is that the late twentieth century warm peak was of greater magnitude than previous natural peaks. Comparison of modern and ancient rates of natural temperature change is difficult because of the lack of direct measurements available prior to 1850. However, high-quality proxy temperature records from the Greenland ice core for the past 10,000 years demonstrate a **natural range of warming** and cooling rates between +2.5 and -2.5 °C/century (Alley, 2000; Carter, 2010, p. 46, figure7), significantly greater than rates measured for Greenland or the globe during the twentieth century. Glaciological and recent geological records contain numerous examples of ancient temperatures up to 3°C or more warmer than the peak reported at the end of the twentieth century. During the Holocene, such warmer peaks included the Egyptian, Minoan, Roman, and Medieval warm periods (Alley, 2000). During the Pleistocene, warmer peaks were associated with interglacial oxygen isotope stages 5, 9, 11, and 31 (Lisiecki and Raymo, 2005). During the Late Miocene and Early Pliocene (6–3 million years ago) temperature consistently attained values 2–3°C above twentieth century values (Zachos et al., 2001). Figure 10 summarizes these and other findings about surface temperatures that appear in Chapter 4 of Climate Change Reconsidered-II: Physical Science. Figure 10 Key Facts about Surface Temperature # Whether today’s global surface temperature is seen to be part of a warming trend depends upon the time period considered. # Over (climatic) time scales of many thousand years, temperature is cooling; over the historical (meteorological) time scale of the past century temperature has warmed. Over the past 18 years, there has been no net warming despite an increase in atmospheric CO2 of 8 percent – which represents 34 percent of all human-related CO2 emissions released to the atmosphere since the industrial revolution. # Given an atmospheric mixing time of ~1 year, the facts just related represent a test of the dangerous warming hypothesis, which test it fails. # Based upon the HadCRUT dataset favored by IPCC, two phases of warming occurred during the twentieth century, between 1910–1940 and 1979–2000, at similar rates of a little over 1.5°C/century. The early twentieth century warming preceded major industrial carbon dioxide emissions and must be natural; warming during the second (prima facie, similar) period might incorporate a small human-related carbon dioxide effect, but warming might also be inflated by urban heat island effects. # Other temperature datasets fail to record the late twentieth century warming seen in the HadCRUT dataset. # There was nothing unusual about either the magnitude or rate of the late twentieth century warming pulses represented on the HadCRUT record, both falling well within the envelope of known, previous natural variations. # No empirical evidence exists to support the assertion that a planetary warming of 2°C would be net ecologically or economically damaging. Source: “Chapter 4. Observations: Temperatures,” Climate Change Reconsidered II: Physical Science (Chicago, IL: The Heartland Institute, 2013). **CO2 Does Not Lead Temperature** IPCC’s third false postulate is that increases in atmospheric CO2 precede, and then force, parallel increases in temperature. The remarkable (and at first blush, synchronous) parallelism that exists between rhythmic fluctuations in ancient atmospheric temperature and atmospheric CO2 levels was first detected in polar ice core samples analyzed during the 1970s. From the early 1990s onward, however, higher-resolution sampling has repeatedly shown these historic temperature changes precede the parallel changes in CO2 by several hundred years or more (Mudelsee, 2001; Monnin et al., 2001; Caillon et al., 2003; Siegenthaler et al., 2005). A similar relationship of temperature change leading CO2 change (in this case by several months) also characterizes the much shorter seasonal cyclicity manifest in Hawaiian and other meteorological measurements (Kuo et al., 1990). In such circumstances, changing levels of CO2 cannot be driving changes in temperature, but must either be themselves stimulated by temperature change, or be co-varying with temperature in response to changes in another (at this stage unknown) variable. Solar Influence Is Not Minimal IPCC’s fourth false postulate is that solar forcings are too small to explain twentieth century warming. Having concluded solar forcing alone is inadequate to account for twentieth century warming, IPCC authors infer CO2 must be responsible for the remainder. Nonetheless, observations indicate variations occur in total ocean–atmospheric meridional heat transport and that these variations are driven by changes in solar radiation rooted in the intrinsic variability of the Sun’s magnetic activity (Soon and Legates, 2013). Incoming solar radiation is most often expressed as Total Solar Insolation (TSI), a measure derived from multi-proxy measures of solar activity (Hoyt and Schatten, 1993; extended and re-scaled by Willson, 2011; Scafetta and Willson, 2013). The newest estimates, from satellite-borne ACRIM-3 measurements, indicate TSI ranged between 1360 and 1363 Wm-2 between 1979 and 2011, the variability of ~3 Wm-2 occurring in parallel with the 11-year sunspot cycle. Larger changes in TSI are also known to occur in parallel with climatic change over longer time scales. For instance, Shapiro et al. (2011) estimated the TSI change between the Maunder Minimum and current conditions may have been as large as 6 Wm-2. Temperature records from circum-Arctic regions of the Northern Hemisphere show a close correlation with TSI over the past 150 years, with both measures conforming to the ~60–70 year multidecadal cycle. In contrast, the measured steady rise of CO2 emissions over the same period shows little correlation with the strong multidecadal (and shorter) ups and downs of surface temperature around the world. Finally, **IPCC ignores x-ray, ultraviolet, and magnetic flux variation, the latter having particularly important implications for the modulation of galactic cosmic ray influx and low cloud formation** (Svensmark, 1998; Kirkby, et al., 2011). Figure 11 summarizes these and other findings about solar forcings from Chapter 3 of Climate Change Reconsidered II: Physical Science.Figure 11 Key Facts about Solar Forcing # Evidence is accruing that changes in Earth’s surface temperature are largely driven by variations in solar activity. Examples of solar-controlled climate change epochs include the Medieval Warm Period, Little Ice Age, and Early Twentieth Century (1910–1940) Warm Period. # The Sun may have contributed as much as 66 percent of the observed twentieth century warming, and perhaps more. # Strong empirical correlations have been reported from around the world between solar variability and climate indices including temperature, precipitation, droughts, floods, streamflow, and monsoons. # IPCC models do not incorporate important solar factors such as fluctuations in magnetic intensity and overestimate the role of human-related CO2 forcing. # IPCC fails to consider the importance of the demonstrated empirical relationship between solar activity, the ingress of galactic cosmic rays, and the formation of low clouds. # The respective importance of the Sun and CO2 in forcing Earth’s climate remains unresolved; current climate models fail to account for a plethora of known Sun-climate connections. # The recently quiet Sun and extrapolation of solar cycle patterns into the future suggest a planetary cooling may occur over the next few decades. Source: “Chapter 3. Solar Forcing of Climate,” Climate Change Reconsidered II: Physical Science (Chicago, IL: The Heartland Institute, 2013). Warming Would Not Be Harmful IPCC’s fifth false postulate is that warming of 2°C above today’s temperature would be harmful. The suggestion that 2°C of warming would be harmful was coined at a conference organized by the British Meteorological Office in 2005 (DEFRA, 2005). The particular value of 2°C is entirely arbitrary and was proposed by the World Wildlife Fund, an environmental advocacy group, as a political expediency rather than as an informed scientific opinion. The target was set in response to concern that politicians would not initiate policy actions to reduce CO2 emissions unless they were given a specific (and low) quantitative temperature target to aim for. Multiple lines of evidence suggest a 2°C rise in temperature would not be harmful to the biosphere. The period termed the Holocene Climatic Optimum (c. 8,000 ybp) was 2–3°C warmer than today (Alley, 2000), and the planet attained similar temperatures for several million years during the Miocene and Pliocene (Zachos et al., 2001). Biodiversity is encouraged by warmer rather than colder temperatures (Idso and Idso, 2009), and higher temperatures and elevated CO2 greatly stimulate the growth of most plants (Idso and Idso, 2011). Despite its widespread adoption by environmental NGOs, lobbyists, and governments, no empirical evidence exists to substantiate the claim that 2°C of warming presents a threat to planetary ecologies or human well-being. Nor can any convincing case be made that a warming will be more economically costly than an equivalent cooling (either of which could occur for natural reasons), since any planetary change of 2°C magnitude in temperature would result in complex local and regional changes, some being of economic or environmental benefit and others being harmful. \* \* \* We conclude neither the rate nor the magnitude of the reported late twentieth century surface warming (1979–2000) lay outside normal natural variability, nor was it in any way unusual compared to earlier episodes in Earth’s climatic history. Furthermore, solar forcings of temperature change are likely more important than is currently recognized, and evidence is lacking that a 2°C increase in temperature (of whatever cause) would be globally harmful.

#### CO2 is key to agriculture – stops extinction

Ferrera 14 Peter Ferrera 2-24-2014 “The Period Of No Global Warming Will Soon Be Longer Than the Period of Actual Global Warming” <http://www.forbes.com/sites/peterferrara/2014/02/24/the-period-of-no-global-warming-will-soon-be-longer-than-the-period-of-actual-global-warming/#42cc9ebf8bf0> (J.D. Harvard Law, contributor to Forbes on climate and public policy, Director of Entitlement and Budget Policy for the Heartland Institute, Senior Advisor for Entitlement Reform and Budget Policy at the National Tax Limitation Foundation, General Counsel for the American Civil Rights Union, and Senior Fellow at the National Center for Policy Analysis, served in the White House Office of Policy Development under President Reagan, and as Associate Deputy Attorney General of the United States under President George H.W. Bush)//Elmer

In addition, CO2 is actually essential to all life on the planet. Plants need CO2 to grow and conduct photosynthesis, which is the natural process that creates **food for animals and fish** at the bottom of the food chain. The increase of CO2 in the atmosphere that has occurred due to human emissions has actually increased agricultural growth and output as a result, causing actually an increased greening of the planet. So has any warming caused by such human emissions, as minor warming increases agricultural growth. The report states, “CO2 is a vital nutrient used by plants in photosynthesis. Increasing CO2 in the atmosphere ‘greens’ the planet and helps feed the growing human population.”

#### Best studies prove

Ballonoff 14, Paul. "A fresh look at climate change." Cato J. 34 (2014): 113. (consultant, international energy development)//Elmer

While in fact heating has not occurred as the IPCC forecasted, greatly increased global biomass is indeed demonstrated. Well documented evidence shows that concurrently with the **increased CO2** levels, extensive, large, and continuing increase in **biomass is taking place globally**—reducing deserts, turning grasslands to savannas, savannas to forests, and expanding existing forests (Idso 2012). That survey covered 400 peer-reviewed empirical studies, many of which included surveys of dozens to hundreds of sources. Comprehensive study of global and regional relative greening and browning using NOAA data showed that shorter-term trends in specific locations may reflect either greening or browning, and also noted that the rapid pace of greening of the Sahel is due in part to the end of the drought in that region. Nevertheless, in nearly all regions and globally, the overall effect in recent decades is **decidedly toward greening** (de Jong et al. 2012). This result is also the opposite of what the IPCC expected.

#### Food Shortages case Extinction and outweigh

Cribb 10, Julian. The coming famine. University of California Press, 2010. (principal of JCA, fellow of the Australian Academy of Technological Sciences and Engineering)//Elmer

The character of human conflict has also changed: since the early 1990S, **more wars have been triggered by disputes over food,** land, and water than over mere political or ethnic differences. This should not surprise US: people have fought over the means of survival for most of history. But in the abbreviated reports on the nightly media, and even in the rarefied realms of government policy, the focus is almost invariably on the players—the warring national, ethnic, or religious factions—rather than on the play, the deeper subplots building the tensions that ignite conflict. Caught up in these are groups of ordinary, desperate people fearful that there is no longer sufficient food, land, and water to feed their children—and believing that they must fight ‘the others” to secure them. At the same time, the number of refugees in the world doubled, many of them escaping from conflicts and famines precipitated by food and resource shortages. Governments in troubled regions tottered and fell. The coming famine is **planetary** because it involves both the immediate effects of hunger on directly affected populations in heavily populated regions of the world in the next forty years—and also the impacts of war, government failure, refugee crises, shortages, and food price spikes that will affect all human beings, no matter who they are or where they live. It is an emergency because unless it is solved, **billions will experience great hardship**, and not only in the poorer regions. Mike Murphy, one of the world’s most progressive dairy farmers, with operations in Ireland, New Zealand, and North and South America, succinctly summed it all up: “Global warming gets all the publicity but the real imminent threat to the human race **is starvation** on a massive scale. Taking a 10—30 year view, I believe that food shortages, famine and huge social unrest are probably the greatest threat the human race has ever faced. I believe future food shortages are a far bigger world threat than global warming.”2° The coming famine is also complex, because it is driven not by one or two, or even a half dozen, **factors but rather by the confluence of many large and profoundly intractable causes that tend to amplify one another**. This means that it cannot easily be **remedied by “silver bullets”** **in the form of technology, subsidies, or single-country policy changes**, because of the synergetic character of the things that power it.

#### Deaths from cold outweigh heat.

Ridley 13 (Matt, Climate Journalist. “Why Climate Change is Good for the World” October 19th 2013, <http://www.spectator.co.uk/2013/10/carry-on-warming/)>

Climate change has done more good than harm so far and is likely to continue doing so for most of this century. This is not some barmy, right-wing fantasy; it is the consensus of expert opinion. Yet almost nobody seems to know this. Whenever I make the point in public, I am told by those who are paid to insult anybody who departs from climate alarm that I have got it embarrassingly wrong, don’t know what I am talking about, must be referring to Britain only, rather than the world as a whole, and so forth. At first, I thought this was just their usual bluster. But then I realised that they are genuinely unaware. Good news is no news, which is why the mainstream media largely ignores all studies showing net benefits of climate change. And academics have not exactly been keen to push such analysis forward. So here follows, for possibly the first time in history, an entire article in the national press on the net benefits of climate change. There are many likely effects of climate change: positive and negative, economic and ecological, humanitarian and financial. And **if you aggregate them all, the overall effect is positive today — and likely to stay positive until around 2080**. That was the conclusion of Professor Richard Tol of Sussex University **after he reviewed 14 different studies of the effects of future climate trends**. To be precise, Prof Tol calculated that climate change would be beneficial up to 2.2˚C of warming from 2009 (when he wrote his paper). This means approximately 3˚C from pre-industrial levels, since about 0.8˚C of warming has happened in the last 150 years. The latest estimates of climate sensitivity suggest that such temperatures may not be reached till the end of the century — if at all. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, whose reports define the consensis, is sticking to older assumptions, however, which would mean net benefits till about 2080. Either way, it’s a long way off. Now Prof Tol has a new paper, published as a chapter in a new book, called *How Much have Global Problems Cost the World?*, which is edited by Bjorn Lomborg, director of the Copenhagen Consensus Centre, and was reviewed by a group of leading economists. In this paper he casts his gaze backwards to the last century. He concludes that climate change did indeed raise human and planetary welfare during the 20th century. You can choose not to believe the studies Prof Tol has collated. Or you can say the net benefit is small (which it is), you can argue that the benefits have accrued more to rich countries than poor countries (which is true) or you can emphasise that after 2080 climate change would probably do net harm to the world (which may also be true). You can even say you do not trust the models involved (though they have proved more reliable than the temperature models). But what you cannot do is deny that this is the current consensus. If you wish to accept the consensus on temperature models, then you should accept the consensus on economic benefit. Overall, Prof Tol finds that **climate change in the past century improved human welfar**e. By how much? He calculates **by 1.4 per** cent of global economic output, rising to 1.5 per cent by 2025. For some people, this means the **difference between survival and starvation**. It will still be 1.2 per cent around 2050 and will not turn negative until around 2080. In short, my children will be very old before global warming stops benefiting the world. Note that if the world continues to grow at 3 per cent a year, then the average person will be about nine times as rich in 2080 as she is today. So low-lying Bangladesh will be able to afford the same kind of flood defences that the Dutch have today. The chief benefits of global warming include: **fewer winter deaths**; **lower energy costs**; **better ag**ricultural yields; probably **fewer droughts**; maybe **richer biodiversity**. It is a little-known fact that winter deaths exceed summer deaths — not just in countries like Britain but also those with very warm summers, including Greece. Both Britain and Greece see mortality rates rise by 18 per cent each winter. Especially cold winters cause a rise in heart failures far greater than the rise in deaths during heatwaves. **Cold, not the heat, is the biggest killer**. For the last decade, Brits have been dying from the cold at the average rate of 29,000 excess deaths each winter. Compare this to the heatwave ten years ago, which claimed 15,000 lives in France and just 2,000 in Britain. In the ten years since, there has been no summer death spike at all. Excess winter deaths hit the poor harder than the rich for the obvious reason: they cannot afford heating. And it is not just those at risk who benefit from moderate warming. Global warming has so far cut heating bills more than it has raised cooling bills. If it resumes after its current 17-year hiatus, and if the energy efficiency of our homes improves, then at some point the cost of cooling probably will exceed the cost of heating — probably from about 2035, Prof Tol estimates. The greatest benefit from climate change comes not from temperature change but from carbon dioxide itself. It is not pollution, but the raw material from which plants make carbohydrates and thence proteins and fats. As it is an extremely rare trace gas in the air — less than 0.04 per cent of the air on average — plants struggle to absorb enough of it. On a windless, sunny day, a field of corn can suck half the carbon dioxide out of the air. Commercial greenhouse operators therefore pump carbon dioxide into their greenhouses to raise plant growth rates. The increase in average carbon dioxide levels over the past century, from 0.03 per cent to 0.04 per cent of the air, has had a measurable impact on plant growth rates. It is responsible for a startling change in the amount of greenery on the planet. As Dr Ranga Myneni of Boston University has documented, using three decades of satellite data, 31 per cent of the global vegetated area of the planet has become greener and just 3 per cent has become less green. This translates into a 14 per cent increase in productivity of ecosystems and has been observed in all vegetation types. Dr Randall Donohue and colleagues of the CSIRO Land and Water department in Australia also analysed satellite data and found greening to be clearly attributable in part to the carbon dioxide fertilisation effect. Greening is especially pronounced in dry areas like the Sahel region of Africa, where satellites show a big increase in green vegetation since the 1970s. It is often argued that global warming will hurt the world’s poorest hardest. What is seldom heard is that the decline of famines in the Sahel in recent years is partly due to more rainfall caused by moderate warming and partly due to more carbon dioxide itself: more greenery for goats to eat means more greenery left over for gazelles, so entire ecosystems have benefited. Even polar bears are thriving so far, though this is mainly because of the cessation of hunting. None the less, it’s worth noting that the three years with the lowest polar bear cub survival in the western Hudson Bay (1974, 1984 and 1992) were the years when the sea ice was too thick for ringed seals to appear in good numbers in spring. Bears need broken ice. Well yes, you may argue, but what about all the weather disasters caused by climate change? Entirely mythical — so far. The latest IPCC report is admirably frank about this, reporting ‘no significant observed trends in global tropical cyclone frequency over the past century … lack of evidence and thus low confidence regarding the sign of trend in the magnitude and/or frequency offloads on a global scale … low confidence in observed trends in small-scale severe weather phenomena such as hail and thunderstorms’. In fact, the death rate from droughts, floods and storms has dropped by 98 per cent since the 1920s, according to a careful study by the independent scholar Indur Goklany. Not because weather has become less dangerous but because people have gained better protection as they got richer: witness the remarkable success of cyclone warnings in India last week. That’s the thing about climate change — we will probably pocket the benefits and mitigate at least some of the harm by adapting. For example, experts now agree that malaria will continue its rapid worldwide decline whatever the climate does. Yet cherry-picking the bad news remains rife. A remarkable example of this was the IPCC’s last report in 2007, which said that global warming would cause ‘hundreds of millions of people [to be] exposed to increased water stress’ under four different scenarios of future warming. It cited a study, which had also counted numbers of people at reduced risk of water stress — and in each case that number was higher. The IPCC simply omitted the positive numbers. Why does this matter? Even if climate change does produce slightly more welfare for the next 70 years, why take the risk that it will do great harm thereafter? There is one obvious reason: climate policy is already doing harm. Building wind turbines, growing biofuels and substituting wood for coal in power stations — all policies designed explicitly to fight climate change — have had negligible effects on carbon dioxide emissions. But they have driven people into fuel poverty, made industries uncompetitive, driven up food prices, accelerated the destruction of forests, killed rare birds of prey, and divided communities. To name just some of the effects. Mr Goklany estimates that globally nearly 200,000 people are dying every year, because we are turning 5 per cent of the world’s grain crop into motor fuel instead of food: that pushes people into malnutrition and death. In this country, 65 people a day are dying **because they cannot afford to heat their homes properly**, according to Christine Liddell of the University of Ulster, yet the government is planning to double the cost of electricity to consumers by 2030. As Bjorn Lomborg has pointed out, the European Union will pay £165 billion for its current climate policies each and every year for the next 87 years. Britain’s climate policies — subsidising windmills, wood-burners, anaerobic digesters, electric vehicles and all the rest — is due to cost us £1.8 trillion over the course of this century. In exchange for that Brobdingnagian sum, we hope to lower the air temperature by about 0.005˚C — which will be undetectable by normal thermometers. The accepted consensus among economists is that every £100 spent fighting climate change brings £3 of benefit. So we are doing real harm now to impede a change that will produce net benefits for 70 years. That’s like having radiotherapy because you are feeling too well. I just don’t share the certainty of so many in the green establishment that it’s worth it. It may be, but it may not.

#### Ag Solves – Plants act as carbon sinks which offsets Warming

Harris and Gibbs 21 Nancy Harris and David Gibbs 1-21-2021 "Forests Absorb Twice As Much Carbon As They Emit Each Year" <https://www.wri.org/insights/forests-absorb-twice-much-carbon-they-emit-each-year> (Nancy is Research Manager for Global Forest Watch (GFW) within the Food, Forests and Water program. GFW is an international initiative originated by WRI to provide improved data and information about the world’s forests by merging the latest technology with on-the-ground partnerships. Nancy works to identify thematic and geographic research priorities for GFW and leads the acquisition and generation of new data and analytical content. She also supports in-country capacity building efforts and collaborates with GFW staff and partners to produce and communicate original, policy-relevant research that further advances global understanding of critical drivers and dynamics of forest change. Prior to joining WRI, Nancy worked as a Carbon and Land Use Specialist in the Ecosystem Services unit of Winrock International, where she managed Winrock’s spatial analysis team, published several peer-reviewed papers on forest carbon cycling and spatial modeling of land cover change, and provided technical guidance to multiple stakeholders on climate change mitigation options in the land sector.)//Elmer

The world is getting a better understanding of just how important forests are in the global **fight against climate change**. New research, published in Nature Climate Change and available on Global Forest Watch, found that the world’s forests **sequestered** about **twice as much carbon** dioxide **as they emitted** between 2001 and 2019. In other words, forests provide a “carbon sink” that absorbs a net **7.6 billion metric tonnes** of CO2 per year, **1.5 times more carbon than the United States** emits annually. Before now, scientists estimated these global “carbon fluxes” from the sum of country-reported data, creating a coarse picture of the role forests play in both carbon emissions and sequestration. With these new data that combine ground measurements with satellite observations, we can now quantify carbon fluxes consistently over any area, from small local forests to countries to entire continents. Using this more granular information, we found that the world’s forests emitted an average of 8.1 billion metric tonnes of carbon dioxide into the atmosphere each year due to deforestation and other disturbances, and absorbed 16 billion metric tonnes of CO2 per year. Here’s a look at what else the new maps tell us about forests and carbon: Only One Major Tropical Rainforest Remains a Strong Carbon Sink Tropical rainforests are far and away the most important ecosystems for mitigating climate change. Tropical rainforests collectively sequester more carbon from the atmosphere than temperate or boreal forests, but they’re also increasingly destroyed for agricultural expansion. The world’s three largest tropical rainforests are located in the Amazon, Congo River basin and Southeast Asia. Over the past 20 years, forests across Southeast Asia have collectively become a net source of carbon emissions due to clearing for plantations, uncontrolled fires and drainage of peat soils. The Amazon River basin, which stretches across nine countries in South America, is still a net carbon sink, but teeters on the edge of becoming a net source if forest loss continues at current rates. The Amazon basin has experienced heightened deforestation in the last four years due to clearing for cattle pasture and degradation from fires. Of the world’s three largest tropical rainforests, only the Congo has enough standing forest left to remain a strong net carbon sink. The Congo’s tropical rainforest **sequesters 600 million metric tonnes** more carbon dioxide per year than it emits, equivalent to about one-third of the CO2 emissions from all U.S. transportation. Protecting the remaining forests in all three regions **is critical to mitigating climate change**.

#### Co2 solves ice age – extinction

Marsh 12 Gerald Marsh 2012 “The Coming of a New Ice Age” <http://www.winningreen.com/site/epage/59549_621.htm> (Retired Physicist from the Argonne National Laboratory and a former consultant to the Department of Defense on strategic nuclear technology and policy in the Reagan, Bush, and Clinton Administration)//Re-cut by Elmer

CHICAGO — Contrary to the conventional wisdom of the day, the real danger facing humanity is not global warming, but more likely the coming of a new Ice Age. What we live in now is known as an interglacial, a relatively brief period between long ice ages. Unfortunately for us, most interglacial periods last only about ten thousand years, and that is how long it has been since the last Ice Age ended. How much longer do we have before the ice begins to spread across the Earth’s surface? Less than a hundred years or several hundred? We simply don’t know. Even if all the temperature increase over the last century is attributable to human activities, the rise has been relatively modest one of a little over one degree Fahrenheit — an increase well within natural variations over the last few thousand years. While an enduring temperature rise of the same size over the next century would cause humanity to make some changes, it would undoubtedly be within our ability to adapt. Entering a new ice age, however, would be catastrophic for the continuation of modern civilization. One has only to look at maps showing the extent of the great ice sheets during the last Ice Age to understand what a return to ice age conditions would mean. Much of Europe and North-America were covered by thick ice, thousands of feet thick in many areas and the world as a whole was much colder. The last “little” Ice Age started as early as the 14th century when the Baltic Sea froze over followed by unseasonable cold, storms, and a rise in the level of the Caspian Sea. That was followed by the extinction of the Norse settlements in Greenland and the loss of grain cultivation in Iceland. Harvests were even severely reduced in Scandinavia And this was a mere foreshadowing of the miseries to come. By the mid-17th century, glaciers in the Swiss Alps advanced, wiping out farms and entire villages. In England, the River Thames froze during the winter, and in 1780, New York Harbor froze. Had this continued, history would have been very different. Luckily, the decrease in solar activity that caused the Little Ice Age ended and the result was the continued flowering of modern civilization. There were very few Ice Ages until about 2.75 million years ago when Earth’s climate entered an unusual period of instability. Starting about a million years ago **cycles of ice ages** lasting about 100,000 years, separated by relatively short **interglacial periods,** like the one we are now living in became the rule. Before the onset of the Ice Ages, and for most of the Earth’s history, it was far warmer than it is today. Indeed, the Sun has been getting brighter over the whole history of the Earth and large land plants have flourished. Both of these had the effect of dropping carbon dioxide concentrations in the atmosphere to the lowest level in Earth’s long history. Five hundred million years ago, carbon dioxide concentrations were over 13 times current levels; and not until about 20 million years ago did carbon dioxide levels dropped to a little less than twice what they are today. It is possible that moderately increased carbon dioxide concentrations could extend the current interglacial period. But we have not reached the level required yet, nor do we know the optimum level to reach. So, rather than call for arbitrary limits on carbon dioxide emissions, perhaps the best thing the UN’s Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change and the climatology community in general could do is spend their efforts on determining the optimal range of carbon dioxide needed to extend the current interglacial period indefinitely. NASA has predicted that the solar cycle peaking in 2022 could be one of the weakest in centuries and should cause a very significant cooling of Earth’s climate. Will this be the trigger that initiates a new Ice Age? We ought to carefully consider this possibility before we wipe out our current prosperity by spending trillions of dollars to combat a perceived global warming threat that may well prove to be only a will-o-the-wisp.