# 1NC Round 4 Apple Valley

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#### Their basic frame for politics reconfirms the failures of the Left, turning debate into a Vampires’ Castle where the propagation of guilt and cycles of pseudo-activity overcome meaningful theorizing and political change – this destroys resistance to capitalism.

**Fisher 13** (Mark Fisher, commissioning editor at Zer0 Books, programme Leader of the MA in Aural and Visual Cultures at Goldsmiths, University of London, lecturer at the University of East London, “Exiting the Vampire Castle,” The North Star, November 22, 2013)

Inside the Vampires’ Castle The first configuration is what I came to call the Vampires’ Castle. **The Vampires’ Castle specialises in propagating guilt**. It is driven by **a priest’s desire to excommunicate and condemn**, **an academic-pedant’s desire to be the first to be seen to spot a mistake**, and **a hipster’s desire to be one of the in-crowd**. The danger in attacking the Vampires’ Castle is that **it can look as if** – and **it will do everything it can to reinforce this thought** – **that one is also attacking the struggles against racism, sexism, heterosexism**. **But, far from being the only legitimate expression of such struggles, the Vampires’ Castle is best understood as a bourgeois-liberal perversion and appropriation of the energy of these movements**. **The Vampires’ Castle was born the moment when the struggle not to be defined by identitarian categories became the quest to have ‘identities’ recognised by a bourgeois big Other.** The privilege I certainly enjoy as a white male consists in part in my not being aware of my ethnicity and my gender, and it is a sobering and revelatory experience to occasionally be made aware of these blind-spots. **But, rather than seeking a world in which everyone achieves freedom from identitarian classification, the Vampires’ Castle seeks to corral people back into identi-camps, where they are forever defined in the terms set by dominant power, crippled by self-consciousness and isolated by a logic of solipsism which insists that we cannot understand one another unless we belong to the same identity group.** I’ve noticed a fascinating **magical inversion projection-disavowal mechanism** whereby **the sheer mention of class** is now **automatically treated as if that means one is trying to downgrade the importance of race and gender**. **In fact, the exact opposite is the case, as the Vampires’ Castle uses an ultimately liberal understanding of race and gender to obfuscate class**. In all of the absurd and traumatic twitterstorms about privilege earlier this year **it was noticeable that the discussion of class privilege was entirely absent**. The task, as ever, **remains the articulation of class, gender and race – but the founding move of the Vampires’ Castle is the dis-articulation of class from other categories. The problem that the Vampires’ Castle was set up to solve is this: how do you hold immense wealth and power while also appearing as a victim, marginal and oppositional?** **The solution was already there – in the Christian Church**. **So the VC has recourse to all the infernal strategies, dark pathologies and psychological torture instruments Christianity invented,** and which Nietzsche described in The Genealogy of Morals. **This priesthood of bad conscience, this nest of pious guilt-mongers, is exactly what Nietzsche predicted when he said that something worse than Christianity was already on the way. Now, here it is … The Vampires’ Castle feeds on the energy and anxieties and vulnerabilities of young students, but most of all it lives by converting the suffering of particular groups – the more ‘marginal’ the better – into academic capital**. **The most lauded figures in the Vampires’ Castle are those who have spotted a new market in suffering** – **those who can find a group more oppressed and subjugated than any previously exploited will find themselves promoted through the ranks very quickly. The first law of the Vampires’ Castle is: individualise and privatise everything**. While **in theory it claims to be in favour of structural critique, in practice it never focuses on anything except individual behaviour**. Some of these working class types are not terribly well brought up, and can be very rude at times. Remember: condemning individuals is always more important than paying attention to impersonal structures. The actual ruling class propagates ideologies of individualism, while tending to act as a class. (Many of what we call ‘conspiracies’ are the ruling class showing class solidarity.) The VC, as dupe-servants of the ruling class, does the opposite: it **pays lip service to ‘solidarity’ and ‘collectivity’**, **while always acting as if the individualist categories imposed by power really hold**. **Because they are petit-bourgeois to the core, the members of the Vampires’ Castle are intensely competitive, but this is repressed in the passive aggressive manner typical of the bourgeoisie**. What holds them together is not solidarity, but mutual fear – the fear that they will be the next one to be outed, exposed, condemned. **The second law of the Vampires’ Castle is: make thought and action appear very, very difficult**. **There must be no lightness, and certainly no humour. Humour isn’t serious, by definition, right**? **Thought is hard work, for people with posh voices and furrowed brows**. **Where there is confidence, introduce scepticism**. **Say: don’t be hasty, we have to think more deeply about this. Remember: having convictions is oppressive, and might lead to gulags. The third law of the Vampires’ Castle is: propagate as much guilt as you can**. **The more guilt the better**. **People must feel bad: it is a sign that they understand the gravity of things**. It’s OK to be class-privileged if you feel guilty about privilege and make others in a subordinate class position to you feel guilty too. You do some good works for the poor, too, right? The fourth law of the Vampires’ Castle is: **essentialize**. **While fluidity of identity, pluarity and multiplicity are always claimed on behalf of the VC members** – partly to cover up their own invariably wealthy, privileged or bourgeois-assimilationist background – **the enemy is always to be essentialized**. **Since the desires animating the VC are in large part priests’ desires to excommunicate and condemn, there has to be a strong distinction between Good and Evil, with the latter essentialized. Notice the tactics**. X has made a remark/ has behaved in a particular way – these remarks/ this behaviour might be construed as transphobic/ sexist etc. **So far, OK**. But it’s the next move which is the kicker**. X then becomes defined as a transphobe/ sexist etc. Their whole identity becomes defined by one ill-judged remark or behavioural slip**. **Once the VC has mustered its witch-hunt, the victim (often from a working class background, and not schooled in the passive aggressive etiquette of the bourgeoisie) can reliably be goaded into losing their temper, further securing their position as pariah/ latest to be consumed in feeding frenzy. The fifth law of the Vampires’ Castle: think like a liberal (because you are one).** **The VC’s work of constantly stoking up reactive outrage consists of endlessly pointing out the screamingly obvious: capital behaves like capital (it’s not very nice!), repressive state apparatuses are repressive**. We must protest! Neo-anarchy in the UK The second libidinal formation is neo-anarchism. By neo-anarchists I definitely do not mean anarchists or syndicalists involved in actual workplace organisation, such as the Solidarity Federation. **I mean, rather, those who identify as anarchists but whose involvement in politics extends little beyond student protests and occupations, and commenting on Twitter**. Like the denizens of the Vampires’ Castle, neo-anarchists usually come from a petit-bourgeois background, if not from somewhere even more class-privileged. They are also overwhelmingly young: in their twenties or at most their early thirties, and what informs the neo-anarchist position is a narrow historical horizon. Neo-anarchists have experienced nothing but capitalist realism. By the time the neo-anarchists had come to political consciousness – and many of them have come to political consciousness remarkably recently, given the level of bullish swagger they sometimes display – the Labour Party had become a Blairite shell, implementing neo-liberalism with a small dose of social justice on the side. **But the problem with neo-anarchism is that it unthinkingly reflects this historical moment rather than offering any escape from it**. It forgets, or perhaps is genuinely unaware of, the Labour Party’s role in nationalising major industries and utilities or founding the National Health Service. Neo-anarchists will assert that ‘parliamentary politics never changed anything’, or the ‘Labour Party was always useless’ while attending protests about the NHS, or retweeting complaints about the dismantling of what remains of the welfare state. **There’s a strange implicit rule here: it’s OK to protest against what parliament has done, but it’s not alright to enter into parliament or the mass media to attempt to engineer change from there**. Mainstream media is to be disdained, but BBC Question Time is to be watched and moaned about on Twitter. **Purism shades into fatalism**; **better not to be in any way tainted by the corruption of the mainstream, better to uselessly ‘resist’ than to risk getting your hands dirty.** It’s not surprising, then, that so many neo-anarchists come across as depressed. This depression is no doubt reinforced by the anxieties of postgraduate life, since, like the Vampires’ Castle, neo-anarchism has its natural home in universities, and is usually propagated by those studying for postgraduate qualifications, or those who have recently graduated from such study. **What is to be done?** Why have these two configurations come to the fore? **The first reason is that they have been allowed to prosper by capital because they serve its interests**. **Capital subdued the organised working class by decomposing class consciousness, viciously subjugating trade unions while seducing ‘hard working families’ into identifying with their own narrowly defined interests instead of the interests of the wider class**; but **why would capital be concerned about a ‘left’ that replaces class politics with a moralising individualism, and that, far from building solidarity, spreads fear and insecurity?** The second reason is what Jodi Dean has called **communicative capitalism**. **It might have been possible to ignore the Vampires’ Castle and the neo-anarchists if it weren’t for capitalist cyberspace**. **The VC’s pious moralising has been a feature of a certain ‘left’ for many years** – **but, if one wasn’t a member of this particular church, its sermons could be avoided**. Social media means that this is no longer the case, and there is little protection from the psychic pathologies propagated by these discourses. So what can we do now? **First of all, it is imperative to reject identitarianism, and to recognise that there are no identities, only desires, interests and identifications**. Part of the importance of the British Cultural Studies project – as revealed so powerfully and so movingly in John Akomfrah’s installation The Unfinished Conversation (currently in Tate Britain) and his film The Stuart Hall Project – **was to have resisted identitarian essentialism**. **Instead of freezing people into chains of already-existing equivalences, the point was to treat any articulation as provisional and plastic**. **New articulations can always be created**. **No-one is essentially anything**. Sadly, the right act on this insight more effectively than the left does. **The bourgeois-identitarian left knows how to propagate guilt and conduct a witch hunt, but it doesn’t know how to make converts**. But that, after all, is not the point. The aim is not to popularise a leftist position, or to win people over to it, but to remain in a position of elite superiority, but now with class superiority redoubled by moral superiority too. **‘How dare you talk – it’s we who speak for those who suffer!’** But **the rejection of identitarianism can only be achieved by the re-assertion of class**. **A left that does not have class at its core can only be a liberal pressure group**. Class consciousness is always double: it involves a simultaneous knowledge of the way in which class frames and shapes all experience, and a knowledge of the particular position that we occupy in the class structure. **It must be remembered that the aim of our struggle is not recognition by the bourgeoisie, nor even the destruction of the bourgeoisie itself**. **It is the class structure** – **a structure that wounds everyone, even those who materially profit from it** – **that must be destroyed**. **The interests of the working class are the interests of all**; **the interests of the bourgeoisie are the interests of capital**, **which are the interests of no-one**. **Our struggle must be towards the construction of a new and surprising world, not the preservation of identities shaped and distorted by capital.** If this seems like a forbidding and daunting task, it is. But **we can start to engage in many prefigurative activities right now**. Actually, **such activities would go beyond pre-figuration – they could start a virtuous cycle, a self-fulfilling prophecy in which bourgeois modes of subjectivity are dismantled and a new universality starts to build itself**. We need to learn, or re-learn, how to build comradeship and solidarity instead of doing capital’s work for it by condemning and abusing each other. **This doesn’t mean**, of course, **that we must always agree** – on the contrary, **we must create conditions where disagreement can take place without fear of exclusion and excommunication**. We need to think very strategically about how to use social media – always remembering that, despite the egalitarianism claimed for social media by capital’s libidinal engineers, that this is currently an enemy territory, dedicated to the reproduction of capital. But **this doesn’t mean that we can’t occupy the terrain and start to use it for the purposes of producing class consciousness**. **We must break out of the ‘debate’ that communicative capitalism in which capital is endlessly cajoling us to participate in, and remember that we are involved in a class struggle**. **The goal is not to ‘be’ an activist, but to aid the working class to activate –**

#### Their investment in sociality and endurance represents a disinvesment from the present, papering over austerity, and reinvest in communal forms that harness and displaces psychologically affective energies in destructive ways.

**Fax 16** Joanna Fax, PhD in English and Postdoctoral Fellow @ Program in Writing and Communication, Rice University.  Sexual Deregulation: Reading U.S. Subjects of Affective Labor from the Early Cold War to the Neoliberal Era”, p. 119-124, 134-136)//TR

Desert of the Heart is also a novel about social reproduction from a lesbian standpoint that extends the feminist argument for viewing nonwage care work as a site of surplus accumulation. My reading, which contextualizes lesbian reproduction within the story’s wider setting of Reno as a town built from the casino business, attends to the novel’s depictions of the unmet needs created the wake of enterprise. As a worker, Ann is vital to Reno’s casino economy. Ann’s caring labor inside and outside of Frank’s Club where she works and her search for kinship within this framework reveal her reproduction as worker and as lesbian to be both a sign of and supplement to Reno’s deregulated economy. My analysis of lesbian social reproduction extends the feminist insight into the private family’s intimate relation to the market. Kathi Weeks elaborates the arguments of Maria Dalla Costa and Selma James on this point: “the ideology of the family performs a kind of mopping-up function, enabling us to accept the legitimacy of the wage system despite its shortcomings by encouraging us to imagine that it can provide for those capable of living up to its norms of family form and responsibility” (Weeks The Problem with Work 121). Neoliberal deregulation taps into cultural aspirations toward nonconventional, nonheteronormative kinship in ways that re-code and mask its relation to capital’s requirement for supplemental, devalued affective labor. As the casino’s deregulated enterprise pulls every strand of Reno’s social life into its orbit, Ann’s attentive labor outside of the casino functions to corroborate sexual deregulation through the deregulation of her labor, which becomes re-absorbed into the narrative as lesbian kinship. Sexual deregulation in the form of nonheteronormative kinship reaches its crisis point in moments where Ann confronts the hidden limits of the casino as an economic enterprise, which invariably require the fixed yet flexible compliance of its workers in exchange for the casino’s regulation of Reno’s inhabitants. Desert of the Heart is in many ways a literary counterpart to Betty Friedan’s The Feminine Mystique (1963), which made its critical point in part through a differentiation between domestic and paid forms of labor. Read together, Friedan’s and Rule’s writings document, respectively, second-wave feminist and lesbian critical engagements with the working subject-as-enterprising subject. The enterprising subject is one that rests upon a late-capitalist ideological distinction between “enterprise” and “labor.” Most importantly, as Franco Berardi reminds us, enterprise is a concept predicated upon the invisibility of industrial relations in late-capitalist value production: In its capitalistic meaning, the word enterprise acquires new nuances, although it never loses its sense of free and constructive action. These new nuances all pertain to the opposition of labor and enterprise. Enterprise means invention and free will. Labor is repetition and executing action. Enterprise is an investment of capital generating new capital, thanks to the valorization that labor makes possible. Labor is a wage-earning service that valorizes capital but devalues workers. (77) Berardi’s framework explains the late-capitalist notion that enterprise – as a category connoting creativity and growth as capital produces more capital – is detached from its concrete foundation in labor, thereby obscuring the material conditions upon which enterprise is established. As he suggests, not only does this mystification compartmentalize capital’s material basis, but it also eclipses the very nature of capital, rendering invisible its perpetual need to expand to new markets and territories. In this light, enterprise names an ideological development that masks capital’s most insidious precepts. While Berardi begins his analysis with the digital industry of the 1980s, Betty Friedan’s (1963) “left-conservatism” (Nancy Holmstrom 165) documents a similar mystification of labor at an earlier point. Published a year prior to Edge of Twilight, Friedan’s Feminine Mystique begins with the now-famous inquiry into “the problem that has no name” to take aim at the limited possibilities for women exemplified in “the domestic routine of the housewife” (Friedan 30). Friedan articulates particular forms of women’s work outside the home – sometimes phrased as “creative work of her own”– as the primary means through which the trapped woman may come to “know herself as a person” (344) As she claims, “if a job is to be the way out of the trap as part of a life plan, it must be a job that she can take seriously as part of a life plan, work in which she can grow as part of society” (345). The enterprise in which Friedan is most interested is an enterprise of self-care and personal development through paid work of a certain caliber. Notably, Friedan calls this process a way for women to realize their full “capacities” as human beings. Framing capacity as the ability for personal growth, The Feminine Mystique emphasizes the affective component of labor as something that is achieved through a feeling of satisfaction and is only operationalized once women enter into waged work outside of the home. In one respect, then, Friedan’s argument recognizes that such capacities, while constituting a form of labor, are nonetheless commonly unwaged (as in unpaid housework). At the same time, once these labors are valued in wage form, Friedan’s logic reframes them as the means for a woman’s self-realization. In so doing, she overwrites her own tacit but crucial understanding that domestic care work and paid labor constitute two sides of the same coin in both the production of surplus value and the devaluation of feminized labor. With its near-militant heterosexual worldview, The Feminine Mystique appears on the surface to have little in common with Desert of the Heart, published the following year. Much as Friedan describes, however, the service labor Ann performs in the casino reflects the reorientation of her feminized capacities via the free market, even as value outside of those environs remains obscured. As I will discuss below, Frank’s Club produces Ann’s caring capacities as entities to be developed through the market rather than those always at risk of being used up by it. Framed in self-affirming terms evocative of Friedan, Ann’s service labor-as-enterprise illustrates Riccardo Bellofiore’s insight regarding the nature of “the command of capital over labor [to] assume a semblance of a control of workers over themselves. The valorization of capital can masquerade as the self-valorization of labor” (109). While it is likely that the particular kinds of labor represented in Desert of the Heart would have been left out of Feminine Mystique, it is nonetheless instructive to consider Friedan’s ideas as posing uneven but sometimes surprising points of entry for a writer such as Rule. To that end, the casino’s role as a place of reproduction establishes the novel’s overall line of argument as it pertains to non-heterosexual motherhood both within and beyond the workplace. Scholarship on Desert of the Heart from the early 1980s on has taken up various aspects of the novel’s “subtle subversion” of heterosexuality through unsettling psychoanalytic categories, surrender of poetic voice to deviant desire, or promotion of alternate, lesbian non-reproductive models of maternity.23 \*BEGIN FOOTNOTE\* See, for instance, Elaine T. Hansen’s examination of “nonprocreative motherhood” where Hansen claims, as Ann and Evelyn come together in the plot, their respective childlessness is revalued. In tandem they represent the possibility of maternal feelings and experiences, detached from procreation, no longer exclusively or essentially defining their womanhood but nevertheless critical to the complex drives and choices that sustain their relationship (40). Hansen argues that the novel’s rendering of the successful lesbian nonprocreative form challenges heterosexual convention through the failure of biological reproduction, since “those women [in the story] who try to care for children to whom they have given birth seem doomed to fail and suffer” (Hansen 46). \*END FOOTNOTE\* Critical acknowledgment of failed biological kinship in Desert of the Heart is important, but reading these moments apart from Ann’s attentive labor at the casino only tells half of the story. An examination of Desert of the Heart’s rendition of biological kinship in conjunction with Ann’s work reveals one of the novel’s overlooked, yet key, problematics: that is, non-procreative kinship’s contradictory significance as something that is not only allowed but increasingly mandated as an effect of the casino industry’s broadening regulation of Reno’s economic and social existence. In this light, Ann’s ability to perform the duties of the non-biological caregiver reveals the exacerbation of social need under deregulated enterprise, which requires Ann’s inattention to the causes that demand her supplemental care for those who have been disinherited from Reno’s main enterprise. In these moments, the novel’s depiction of Ann’s maternal role at work constituting an alternative to blood-line kinship is both initiated by and articulated through the regulatory framework of the casino. These developments follow the logic of deregulation writ large: Ann’s formerly regulated care work at the casino increasingly becomes flexible beyond its domain. In one example, Ann is assigned to be the relief worker at Frank’s for the night, a job, which requires her to rotate from station to station and take over as each of her co-workers takes their break. Even though it was a “foul job,” Ann is willing to take it because, as her boss tells her, Ann is “the easiest [employee] to move” (93). Part of the foulness of the job entails the requirement that Ann “sacrifice her own time off” if her co-workers’ breaks run long. As Frank’s flexible surrogate for the evening, Ann carries her change apron “like a fetus in its seventh month, careful to lift and turn the weight as if it were her own flesh” (94). The image calls on readers to register its irony obliquely through Ann’s lesbianism, which the text takes for granted as excluding her from biological motherhood: instead, Ann’s closest proximity to motherhood is through her capacity as a caregiver at, and attentive supplement to, the casino’s operation. Even more poignantly, however, the passage positions Ann as the subject of maternity without a signified object of care: like the change that flows into and out of her apron, her attention is exhaustively disseminated throughout the whole of Frank’s Club. Her labors model a form of deregulated care, par excellence, because her caring is defined by her a requirement to remain flexible and accommodating toward whatever needs arise in the moment. What is invoked here, then, is not a portrayal of Ann’s propensity for nonconventional motherhood, but the casino’s ability to absorb the affective and figurative trappings of conventional motherhood within its own regulatory schema. The fact that Ann’s exploitation might register as the former and not the latter pivots on her identity as a lesbian and the supposedly sympathetic notion that Frank’s allows her to exhibit her motherly tendencies, regardless. **[SHE CONTINUES]** As Edge of Twilight and Desert of the Heart demonstrate, early neoliberal lesbian subjectivity depended upon forms of affective regulation and social reproduction already in play in this period. In their professional labor and desire, Val’s and Ann’s affective capacities are de- and re-regulated, flourishing most when these women come into close proximity with deregulation’s disenfranchised others. In The Feeling of Kinship, David L. Eng describes “queer liberalism” as “a product of late capitalist rationalization [that] functions as a supplement to capital, but in a desexualized, repackaged, and contained form.” Eng continues, “we might say that neoliberalism enunciates (homo)sexual difference in the register of culture – a culture that is freely exchanged (purchased) and celebrated (consumed)” (30). For Eng, homosexual difference and neoliberalism are complicit to the extent that – as recent consumable TV and fashion phenomena demonstrate – “queerness” has become an “aestheticized lifestyle predicated on choice” and consumerism (29–30). As this chapter has argued, however, sexual difference under neoliberalism extends beyond these claims, which largely view its supplemental properties as “contained” and primarily operational on the side of consumerism. Christian’s and Rule’s representations of late-capitalist lesbian identity go beyond the commodification of homosexual difference. In their documentations of deregulated sexuality, we see lesbianism as a supplement to late-capitalist expansion through the lens of value production and those affective forms of labor at work in a system of exploitation with a vested interest in the versatile, non-contained capacity freed up at the intersection of sexual and economic deregulation. My readings of Edge of Twilight and Desert of the Heart locate a point where lesbian identity’s supplemental operations entail more than cultural capital in neoliberalism. Indeed, these novels suggest that sexual deregulation’s contemporary ideological force is an extension of a historical development within and adjacent to the formalized extraction of attentive labor required by the deregulated service industry. Christian and Rule reveal is a historical juncture where the contradictory promises and pitfalls of professional self-management and enterprise are enacted and made legible through their overlap with the freeing up and re-regulating of lesbian identifications and desires. To read Edge of Twilight and Desert of the Heart historically, then, is to remain skeptical and ever vigilant of modernity’s promise, which increasingly requires the implementation and erasure of flexible laboring and desiring subjects to make good on its guarantee of freedom. In what follows, I track contemporary culture’s absorption of this complex history.

#### The aff’s investment into self-care as a form of struggle is detached from material conditions – that colludes with neoliberal austerity logics of self-help to intensify the violence of racial capitalism.

Mitchell ‘13

[Nick, Ethnic Studies at UC Santa Cruz. 05/14/2013. “On Audre Lorde’s Legacy and the ‘Self’ of Self-Care, Part 2 of 3,” https://www.lowendtheory.org/post/50428216600/on-audre-lordes-legacy-and-the-self-of] pat – footnote 3 included in {these things}

To reiterate, these death-making conditions serve as a motor for racial capitalism not only through the erasure, devaluation, and naturalization of life-making and life-sustaining (also called "reproductive”) work that women are expected to learn to do, to do, and to love doing, but also because through the erasure of “women’s work” as work, they serve to compel and coerce workers to accept waged labor above and beyond the work they already perform. This compulsion and coercion regularly takes the form of the form of the stigmatization and surveillance of poor people and poor women especially, who use governmental assistance to survive. And again, here, black women bear the brunt of the burden of capitalism’s stigmatization of the poor (of color). "Welfare,“ as Dorothy Roberts puts it, "has become a code word for race.” By which she means: a code word for blackness. Think here of the sheer prominence of the “welfare queen” stereotype (and its deployment to make common sense out of the notion that black women who use governmental assistance are parasitic on the social body). Think here, also, how the racializing and gendering of that stereotype authorizes the constant surveillance to which welfare recipients are regularly and systematically subjected, surveillance whose purpose it is to call into doubt the ability of welfare recipients to make fitting choices in deciding how and what to feed themselves (and those that depend upon them), how and what they should consume.

It matters that Audre Lorde, by virtue of a class mobility that materialized in the form of advanced degrees, international recognition and renown, and semi-stable employment with what were clearly circumscribed “health benefits,” may have been able to escape the worst of the state-sanctioned, Reaganomics-fueled state surveillance directed towards poor black women. And it also matters that the racializing and gendering project of the capitalism that underwrites that surveillance also shaped the conditions in which she lived and died in ways that are too rarely recognized. We in the U.S. left are well trained to express outrage when black lives are stolen in spectacular events—not only in the assassinations of “our” Malcolms and Martins, but even in the executions of our less famed Emmetts and Oscars and Trayvons. Yet we are not always best equipped to organize against the politics that produce deaths not in spectacular (and regular), direct, face-to-face expressions of violence but rather, through other, less readily visible, rhythms and structures of everyday life. To ask that we regard Audre Lorde’s death as the outcome of a politics (and not just a disease) is both to invoke Lorde less as an exceptional figure than as a powerfully exemplary one, and to direct our attention to how the murderousness of capitalism expresses itself where it is most mundane.[3]

{[3] The mundane murderousness of neoliberalism takes shape in a social context in which the state colludes with industry in the development and optimization of technologies and institutions that overwhelmingly take black community as their target, through the combination of austerity measures that buttress, intensify, and exploit (by racializing and gendering) inequality through enhanced forms of policing, surveillance, and incarceration.}

Mundane murderousness, slow death (which may in many cases not be slow at all), has taken institutional form in part as a consequence of the consolidation of health care as a for-profit industry that defines health as the capacity to work. “Health,” in this context, is measured by the health of racial capitalism. Such a definition means that being healthy is understood as having the capacity to optimize your ability to be exploited. No medical leave, then, for the English prof who’s battling cancer. No capacity, then, to decide for herself what her health needs are and to act on that decision—the social infrastructure of neoliberalism has already coded giving its workers that much freedom, that kind of autonomy, as an unaffordable extravagance.

Care as extravagance. Historically speaking, it is here, in the Reagan era, that the “self” of self-care emerged. Donald Vickery and James Fries’s bestseller Take Care of Yourself: A Consumer’s Guide to Medical Care was published in 1981, and formed part of a larger explosion of “self-help” publications that encouraged a readership increasingly clobbered by a neoliberal assault—against liveable wages, workers rights, social services, and the welfare state writ large—to take it upon themselves to manage the consequences of that clobbering. And I would argue that the “self” of self-care came into being precisely as an effect of that management, as well as of the clobbering that both preceded and accompanied it. It euphemizes as a goodwill gesture (the benevolent “take care of yourself!”) an imperative that, if elaborated, looks much more like a relation of coercion and discipline (“take care of yourself or your job will go to someone who does”; “take care of yourself lest you fall ill and get saddled with medical debt”; “take care of yourself because you have no right to expect that society will”; “take care of yourself…or else”). The self of self-care, all of this is to say, has a history that should serve as a caution toward attempts to make self-care an unqualified good. It is a self that is specifically calibrated as a defensive reaction to the combination of austerity politics with reinvigorated forms of gendered racism that cut across the entire social formation.

Especially for those of us who were born and/or grew up in the Reagan and Bush I eras, the self of self-care was the form of selfhood that hegemonic institutions taught us to internalize. This is not to say that there is nothing of value to be found in the language of practice of self-care. It is to suggest, rather, that self-care is not simply a form of struggle but the outcome of various struggles that have played out on a larger scale than we tend to acknowledge when we speak of it. This struggle involved, among other things, the disqualification of initiatives by the radical labor movement to establish universal health care as a right rather than a “benefit” restricted to and contingent upon employment in certain sectors. It involved the marginalization of years of efforts by the Black Panther Party and the National Welfare Rights Organization both to establish community clinics and to redefine health care not as a commodity but as both a fundamental question of justice and a condition of community self-determination.

With all of this said, what do we make of this Audre Lorde quote?: “Caring for myself is not self-indulgence, it is self-preservation, and that is an act of political warfare.” It is both thrilling and affirming, I think, to sit with the possibilities of redefining self-care as though it were going on the political offensive. This may especially be the case in a context where the dominant meaning of “care” either has become industrialized in such a way that it consolidates (instead of contests) one’s alienation from her conditions of existence, or from the means necessary to inform herself about, determine, and pursue the course of care and wellbeing that she needs.

But what I think is especially important about this now regularly cited quotation is what comes before the first comma, what comes before, that is, the moment when self-care finds its euphemistic, sunny resolution as “political warfare”: the disavowal of self-care as “self indulgence.” What, after all, is wrong with self-indulgence, with stealing time to enjoy the self, to pursue ways of being and living that are not necessarily productive, even if to do so is to steal away from the justifiably voracious appetites of left political desire? Lorde’s rewriting of self-care as political warfare seems to me to be symptomatic of a philosophy of movement building that has an unacknowledged investment in surveilling the behavior of its members (and demanding that they surveil themselves), a philosophy that is so deeply committed to the idea that everything is political that it cannot see the ways it enforces that definition through the implicit demand that its members justify all their behavior on its terms. Everything is political, in other words, can be a particularly disciplinary and disciplining definition of the political because of the way that it privileges a kind of ruthless scrutiny, assessment, and justification of one’s behaviors on the basis of whether or not they generate political value. At the same time, it tends to regard the political less as a contestation over social transformation than as the sum total of “good” or “bad” political behaviors.

At worst, everything is political can privilege a kind of left version of austerity logic, one that calls implicitly for the abstention from behaviors that don’t serve the Higher Purpose of generating and assessing individual behavior in the form of political value. It can only handle self-indulgence and extravagance when those things can be given a justifiable political form, when they can be commended or valorized, in other words, for how radical they are. It can only handle self-indulgence and extravagance, in other words, when they cease to be self-indulgent or extravagant at all, and claim, on the flip, to be productive and progressive.

Austerity logics, whether they come from the left or the right, get articulated through the bodies of black women by making certain kinds of demands on them. An important thing to understand about these demands is that they do not simply take the form of general devaluation. They do not simply take the form of the welfare queen stereotype. They can also take the form of a general overinvestment or hypervaluation—in feelings and performances of excessive admiration, deference, and high regard. They can inhabit the expectation—an expectation that, again, can have the force of a demand—that black women embody a kind of superhuman strength, or that they inherently possess an exceedingly resolute political consciousness. Unlike the bad faith that underwrites the demonization of black women as unproductive, this leftist hypervaluation of black women often takes the form of love.

Love: Killing love, perhaps. It is the kind of love that solicits a constant performance from black women, one that demands that they be endlessly productive, endlessly working, for the movement, even after death. It is for this reason that I spent some time in the last post attempting to contest the deification of Lorde: I want to make visible just how much work is implicitly called for in the desire for black women to be adequate to what is asked of them–which they very well may also want of themselves. The point is that any politics that seeks to celebrate the seemingly superhuman accomplishments of black women can become the unwitting collaborator with the entire field of the political that we might want to contest, a field in which the superhuman demands placed on black women are nothing short of murderous. The point is, while it may appear to honor the Audre Lordes (1934-1992) and the Barbara Christians (1943-2000) and the VèVè Clarks (1944-2007) and the Sherley Anne Williamses (1944-1999) with the demand that they rest in power, there may also be an ethics, if not also a justice, in insisting on their right to rest in peace.

And the point is that our discussions about self care are particularly impoverished when they fail to engage broader questions about the structure of health care, the social distribution of wealth, and the conditions in which we live and work. This is the thread I’ll pick up in the third and final installment of this piece by addressing last year’s series of debates on self-care and community care.

#### Viewing race as ontological forecloses the strategic alliances empirically necessary for broad social progress --- that locks in neoliberal politics that seek only to ensure the 1% is appropriately diverse while strengthening their stranglehold on global power

Reed 18 [Adolph Reed Jr., professor of political science at the University of Pennsylvania, “Antiracism: a neoliberal alternative to a left,” *Dialectical Anthropology*, June 2018, Volume 42, Issue 2, p. 105–115]

Most of all, the gains that black Americans have won have been the product of **alliances condensed around** broad **egalitarian agendas**. Historian Touré F. Reed notes: Emancipation and even Reconstruction were produced by a convergence of interests among disparate constituencies—African Americans, abolitionists, business, small freeholders, and northern laborers— united under the banner of free labor. The civil rights movement was the product of a consensus created by the New Deal that presumed the appropriateness of government intervention in private affairs for the public good, the broad repudiation of scientific racism following World War II, and the political vulnerabilities Jim Crow created for the United States during the Cold War. To be sure, Reconstruction, the New Deal, the War on Poverty, and even the civil rights movement failed to redress all of the challenges confronting blacks. But the limitations of each of these movements reflected political constraints imposed on them, in large part, by capital (Reed 2018). As A. Philip Randolph, Bayard Rustin, Martin Luther King, Jr., and two generations of labor-oriented black activists—including the entire spectrum of radical to conservative black civic elites and trade union leaders collected in historian Rayford Logan’s 1944 volume, What the Negro Wants—understood, first, the exploitation and oppression of black Americans was linked to more general dynamics of exploitation and oppression and, second, the only way to attain and especially to secure benefits for black Americans is to win them for everyone. That lesson has been lost for many antiracist activists and commentators enamored with contemporary race reductionism; instead, they channel the performative militance associated with Black Power politics as the insurgent, racially authentic tendency in the late 1960s and 1970s. Yet Black Power politics consolidated as a less potentially transformative, class-skewed alternative to the black-labor-left, social-democratic approach advocated by Rustin, Randolph, and others (A. Philip Randolph Institute 1966; Randolph 2014a, b; Rustin 1965, 1966; Reed 2015, 2016a, 2017a; Le Blanc and Yates 2013; Logan 1944). Black Power politics was fundamentally a petition politics, albeit a loud and flamboyant one. For all their overheated rhetoric about self-determination, including even in some cases what now might be called cosplay fantasies of armed struggle, Black Powerites generally depended on ruling class largess for realization of their programmatic objectives. That was their alternative to trying to form broad, popular coalitions and to navigate the compromises and constraints that sort of politics requires. As a practical politics, Black Power was fundamentally directed toward government institutions, private or philanthropic funding sources, and other agencies capable of conferring or ratifying claims to represent a generic “black community” (some referred to the style at the time as “militant begging”; I suppose today it could be considered an institutional species of aggressive panhandling.) Contemporaneous critics like Harold Cruse (1968, 193–260) and Robert L. Allen (1969) pointed out the Black Power program’s class character, and Rustin presciently suggested that its most likely outcome would be “creation of a new black establishment” (1966, 36) (emphasis in original). Black Power, at least in the ethnic pluralist form in which it congealed as “black politics,” was at bottom a Bookerite politics of elite-brokerage, as is the essence of ethnic pluralism. The core Bookerite project, under the rubric of racial uplift or advancement, has always been—since Washington and the stratum of black racial advocates that emerged from the context of disfranchisement at the turn of the twentieth century—“substitution of black professionals, managers, and intellectuals for their white counterparts within those institutions charged with administering to the needs of black populations.” The political goal, that is, was establishment of “managerial authority of the nation’s Negro problem” within whatever larger political and economic order prevailed (Warren 2003, 27). Warren’s critique, which he elaborated further in What Was African American Literature (2012), sheds light on contemporary antiracists’ singular commitment to the reductionist view that race/racism is the foundation and source of all injustice and inequality affecting black Americans. It also thus helps to make sense of the affective power that explaining current inequalities through analogy to slavery or Jim Crow has in antiracist discourse. **Antiracist politics is a class politics**; it is rooted in the social position and worldview, and material interests of the stratum of race relations engineers and administrators who operate in Democratic party politics and as government functionaries, the punditry and commentariat, education administration and the professoriate, corporate, social service and nonprofit sectors, and the multibillion-dollar diversity industry. **That stratum comes together around a commonsense commitment to the centrality of race**—**and other categories of ascriptive identity**—**as the appropriate discursive framework through which to articulate norms of justice** and injustice and through which to formulate remedial responses. It has grown and become deeply embedded institutionally throughout the society as an entailment of the victories of the 1960s. As the society moves farther away from the regime of subordination and exclusion on explicitly racial terms to which race-reductionist explanations were an immediately plausible response, race has become less potent as the dominant metaphor, or blanket shorthand, through which class hierarchy is lived. And as black and white elites increasingly go through the same schools, live in the same neighborhoods, operate as peers in integrated workplaces, share and interact in the same social spaces and consumption practices and preferences, they increasingly share another common sense not only about frameworks of public policy but also about the proper order of things in general. Those quotidian realities put pressure on the reductionist premise that racial subordination remains the dominant ideological or material framework generating and sustaining systemically reproduced inequalities and class power. This tension underlies a source the appeal of ontological views of racism as an animate force that transcends time and context. Because it is an evanescent Evil that is disconnected from specific human purposes and patterns of social relations, racism, again like “terrorism,” can exist anywhere at any time under any manifest conditions and is a cause that needs no causes or explanation. That is why statistical demonstration of apparent racial disparities seems within antiracist discourse to be self-sufficient evidence of the persistence of racism’s paramount impact on black Americans, despite the fact that findings of disparity: (1) are not surprising considering how entrenched inequalities work; (2) do not tell us much, if anything, about the proximate sources of the disparities; and (3) do not point to remedial responses, although those retailing the findings often present them as though they do. As Chowkwanyun and I indicate, moreover, relentless commitment to finding disparities and insistence that manifest inequalities be understood in those terms despite those interpretive failings suggests the presence of other ideological factors: [Disparitarian discourse’s] commitment to a fundamentally essentialist and ahistorical race-first view is betrayed in the constantly expanding panoply of neologisms – “institutional racism,” “systemic racism,” “structural racism,” “colourblind racism,” post-racial racism,” etc. – intended to graft more complex social dynamics onto a simplistic and frequently psychologistic racism/antiracism political ontology. Indeed, these efforts bring to mind [Thomas] Kuhn’s account of attempts to accommodate mounting anomalies to salvage an interpretive paradigm in danger of crumbling under a crisis of authority. And in this circumstance as well the salvage effort is driven by powerful material and ideological imperatives (Reed and Chowkwanyun 2012, 167). **That ontological view of racism** is what **enabled Bell’s insistence that nothing has changed for black Americans** since 1865 without having to confront apparently disconfirming evidence of his own biography and the context of his declaration. It also underlies the preference for invoking historical analogies in lieu of argument. **The point of those analogies is not to explain the mechanisms through which contemporary inequalities are reproduced. It is to preserve the interpretive framework that identifies racism as the definitive source of those inequalities**. Antiracism’s class character helps to understand why its adherents are so intensely committed to it even though it is so deeply flawed analytically and has generated so little popular traction politically. One layer of its appeal derives simply from habit buttressed with a simulacrum of familiarity engendered by the naïve conceptions of black political history that prompted Willie Legette’s deathless observation that “**The only thing that hasn’t changed about black politics since 1965 is how we think about it**” (Warren et al. 2016). People think about black politics as a unitary, transhistorical “freedom movement” or “liberation struggle” because that is how scholarly and popular discussion of black Americans’ political activity has been framed almost universally since the academic study of black politics and political thought took shape during the 1950s and 1960s, and especially after the institutionalization of black studies as a field of study in the academic mainstream through the 1970s to 1990s. The guild interest in carving out and protecting the boundaries of a field of study and interpretive authority over its subject matter converges with the broader class interest in maintaining managerial and interpretive authority in the political economy of race relations (Reed 2004). Crucial to making sense of the current political moment and how to navigate the real perils that face us after November 2016 is recognition that, no matter how it may have been aligned in the past, **antiracist politics now is fundamentally antagonistic to a left politics of broadly egalitarian social transformation**. Key elements of the black professional-managerial strata have been embedded in and are agents and minions of what we now call neoliberalism—as public functionaries, contractors, and aspirants—since its emergence in the 1970s and 1980s. In the 1980s and 1990s, underclass ideology rationalized claims to a special tutelary role for the black professional-managerial class in relation to a rank-and-file black population that that politics rendered invisible as postal workers, teachers, truck drivers, carpenters, clerks, warehouse workers, electricians or line workers, nurses, cable technicians, etc. or members of a constantly expanding industrial reserve army and represented as an undifferentiated mass to be ventriloquized and “uplifted.” Underclass ideology came with a remedy of inculcating “personal responsibility,” which conveniently permits public officials to deflect concerns with retreat from social service provision and other social wage policies in an era increasingly defined by regressive transfer. Neoliberal privatization also has produced greatly expanded commercial and career opportunities for black (and Latino, female, etc.) entrepreneurs under the rubric of community “empowerment,” “role modeling,” or “social entrepreneurialism” in a vast third sector economy driven by a nonprofit sector likely as not committed to privatizing public goods in the name of localist authenticity and doing well by doing good, as well as the steadily growing diversity industry. These developments legitimize an ideal of social justice shriveled to little more than enhancement of opportunity for individual upward mobility—**within the strictures of neoliberal accumulation by dispossession**. Black professional-managerial class embeddedness has become increasingly solidified with the Clinton/Obama/Emanuel wing of the Democratic party’s aggressive commitment to a left-neoliberalism centered on advancement of Wall Street and Silicon Valley economic interests and strong support for social justice defined in identity group terms. But that is necessarily a notion of social justice and equality that is disconnected from political economy and the capitalist class dynamics that generate the most profound inequalities in the society. And militant opposition to conventional left norms of justice that center on economic equality unites the Clintonite neoliberal Democrats and race-reductionist antiracists. In this regard, the most telling moments of the 2016 Democratic presidential nomination campaign included when the random, self-selected Black Lives Matter activists attacked Sanders for supposedly not declaring his opposition to racism in a way that suited their tastes and when former civil rights movement icon Rep. John Lewis (D-GA) and other prominent black functionaries denounced Sanders’s calls for greatly expanding social wage policy and shifting national priorities toward addressing the needs of working people as irresponsible. Perhaps most telling of all, though, was when and most of all how Hillary **Clinton blithely and disingenuously blew off Sanders’s concerns with economic injustice**. On the eve of the Nevada primary, she declared to a rally of her supporters “Not everything is about an economic theory, right? If we broke up the big banks tomorrow – and I will, if they deserve it, if they pose a systemic risk, I will – would that end racism? Would that end sexism? Would that end discrimination against the LGBT community? Would that make people feel more welcoming to immigrants overnight? Would that solve our problem with voting rights, and Republicans who are trying to strip them away from people of color, the elderly, the young?” (Weigel 2016). Since the election, **that alliance against class politics has become even more aggressive in red-baiting Sanders and the left via a new sort of race-baiting**—attacking socialism, and advocates of socialism or social-democratic politics, as racist or white supremacist. It has closed ranks around condemnation of working-class whites who voted for Trump as loathsome and irredeemable racists with whom political solidarity is indefensible and in the process reducing “working class” to a white racial category and synonym for backwardness and bigotry. Antiracists and neoliberal Democrats unite in high moral dudgeon to denounce suggestions that more than racism operated to generate the Trump vote and that some working people, particularly those whom Les Leopold describes as Obama/Sanders/Trump voters—and not necessarily only white ones—felt betrayed by both parties (Leopold 2017; Lopez 2016; Parenti 2016; Edwards-Levy 2017; Shepard 2017; Skelley 2017; Cohn 2017). **The practical upshot of that moral stance is that there can be no political alternative outside neoliberalism. That is why it is important, as we look toward the daunting prospect of building a movement capable of changing the terms of debate in American politics to center the interests and concerns of working people**—**of all races, genders, sexual orientations, and whatever immigration status**—**who are the vast majority of the country**, **that we recognize that race-reductionist politics is the left wing of neoliberalism and nothing more. It is openly antagonistic to the idea of a solidaristic left. It is more important than ever to acknowledge that reality and act accordingly**.

#### Capitalism causes war, violence, environmental destruction and extinction

**Robinson 14** (William I., Prof. of Sociology, Global and International Studies, and Latin American Studies, @ UC-Santa Barbara, “Global Capitalism: Crisis of Humanity and the Specter of 21st Century Fascism” The World Financial Review)

Cyclical, Structural, and Systemic Crises ¶ Most commentators on the contemporary crisis refer to the “Great Recession” of 2008 and its aftermath. Yet the causal origins of **global crisis** are to be found in over-accumulation and also in **contradictions of state power**, or in what Marxists call the internal contradictions of the capitalist system. Moreover, because the system is now global, crisis in any one place tends to represent crisis for the system as a whole. The system cannot expand because the marginalisation of a significant portion of humanity from direct productive participation, the downward pressure on wages and popular consumption worldwide, and the polarisation of income, has reduced the ability of the world market to absorb world output. At the same time, given the particular configuration of social and class forces and the correlation of these forces worldwide, national states are hard-pressed to regulate transnational circuits of accumulation and offset the explosive contradictions built into the system. ¶ Is this crisis cyclical, structural, or systemic? Cyclical crises are recurrent to capitalism about once every 10 years and involve recessions that act as self-correcting mechanisms without any major restructuring of the system. The recessions of the early 1980s, the early 1990s, and of 2001 were cyclical crises. In contrast, the 2008 crisis signaled the slide into a structural crisis*. Structural crises* reflect deeper contra- dictions that can only be resolved by a major restructuring of the system. The structural crisis of the 1970s was resolved through capitalist globalisation. Prior to that, the structural crisis of the 1930s was resolved through the creation of a new model of redistributive capitalism, and prior to that the struc- tural crisis of the 1870s resulted in the development of corpo- rate capitalism. A systemic crisis involves the replacement of a system by an entirely new system or by an outright collapse. A structural crisis opens up the possibility for a systemic crisis. But if it actually snowballs into a systemic crisis – in this case, if it gives way either to capitalism being superseded or to a breakdown of global civilisation – is not predetermined and depends entirely on the response of social and political forces to the crisis and on historical contingencies that are not easy to forecast. This is an historic moment of extreme uncertainty, in which collective responses from distinct social and class forces to the crisis are in great flux. ¶ Hence my concept of global crisis is broader than financial. There are multiple and mutually constitutive dimensions – economic, social, political, cultural, ideological and ecological, not to mention the existential crisis of our consciousness, values and very being. There is a crisis of social polarisation, that is, of *social reproduction.* The system cannot meet the needs or assure the survival of millions of people, perhaps a majority of humanity. There are crises of state legitimacy and political authority, or of *hegemony* and *domination.* National states face spiraling crises of legitimacy as they fail to meet the social grievances of local working and popular classes experiencing downward mobility, unemployment, heightened insecurity and greater hardships. The legitimacy of the system has increasingly been called into question by millions, perhaps even billions, of people around the world, and is facing expanded counter-hegemonic challenges. Global elites have been unable counter this erosion of the system’s authority in the face of worldwide pressures for a global moral economy. And a canopy that envelops all these dimensions is a crisis of sustainability rooted in an ecological holocaust that has already begun, expressed in **climate change and the impending collapse of centralised agricultural** systems in several regions of the world, among other indicators. By a crisis of humanityI mean a crisis that is approaching systemic proportions, **threatening the ability of billions of people to survive**, and raising the specter of a collapse of world civilisation and degeneration into a new “Dark Ages.”2 ¶ This crisis of humanity shares a number of aspects with earlier structural crises but there are also several features unique to the present: ¶ 1. The system is fast reaching the **ecological limits of its reproduction**. Global capitalism now couples human and natural history in such a way as to threaten to bring about what would be the sixth mass extinction in the known history of life on earth.3 This mass extinction would be caused not by a natural catastrophe such as a meteor impact or by evolutionary changes such as the end of an ice age but by purposive human activity. According to leading environmental scientists there are nine “planetary boundaries” crucial to maintaining an earth system environment in which humans can exist, four of which are experiencing at this time the onset of irreversible environmental degradation and three of which (climate change, the nitrogen cycle, and biodiversity loss) are at “tipping points,” meaning that these processes have already crossed their planetary boundaries. ¶ 2. The magnitude of the means of **violence** and social control **is unprecedented**, as is the concentration of the means of global communication and symbolic production and circulation in the hands of a very few powerful groups. **Computerised wars, drones, bunker-buster bombs**, star wars, and so forth, have changed the face of warfare. Warfare has become normalised and sanitised for those not directly at the receiving end of armed aggression. At the same time we have arrived at the panoptical surveillance society and the age of thought control by those who control global flows of communication, images and symbolic production. The world of Edward Snowden is the world of George Orwell; *1984 has arrived;* ¶ 3. Capitalism is reaching apparent limits to its extensive expansion. There are no longer any new territories of significance that can be integrated into world capitalism, de-ruralisation is now well advanced, and the commodification of the countryside and of pre- and non-capitalist spaces has intensified, that is, converted in hot-house fashion into spaces of capital, so that *intensive* expansion is reaching depths never before seen. Capitalism must continually expand or collapse. How or where will it now expand? ¶ 4. There is the rise of a vast surplus population inhabiting a “planet of slums,”4 alienated from the productive economy, thrown into the margins, and subject to sophisticated systems of social **control and to destruction** - to a mortal cycle of dispossession-exploitation-exclusion. This includes **prison-industrial and immigrant-detention complexes, omnipresent policing, militarised gentrification**, and so on; ¶ 5. There is a disjuncture between a globalising economy and a nation-state based system of political authority. Transnational state apparatuses are incipient and have not been able to play the role of what social scientists refer to as a “hegemon,” or a leading nation-state that has enough power and authority to organise and stabilise the system. The spread of **w**eapons of **m**ass **d**estruction and the unprecedented militarisation of social life and conflict across the globe makes it hard to imagine that the system can come under any stable political authority that assures its reproduction. ¶ Global Police State ¶ How have social and political forces worldwide responded to crisis? The crisis has resulted in a rapid political polarisation in global society. Both right and left-wing forces are ascendant. Three responses seem to be in dispute. ¶ One is what we could call “reformism from above.” This elite reformism is aimed at stabilising the system, at saving the system from itself and from more radical re- sponses from below. Nonetheless, in the years following the 2008 collapse of the global financial system it seems these reformers are unable (or unwilling) to prevail over the power of transnational financial capital. A second response is popular, grassroots and leftist resistance from below. As social and political conflict escalates around the world there appears to be a mounting global revolt. While such resistance appears insurgent in the wake of 2008 it is spread very unevenly across countries and regions and facing many problems and challenges. ¶ Yet another response is that I term *21st century fascism*.5 The ultra-right is an insurgent force in many countries. In broad strokes, this project seeks to fuse reactionary political power with transnational capital and to organise a mass base among historically privileged sectors of the global working class – such as white workers in the North and middle layers in the South – that are now experiencing heightened insecurity and the specter of downward mobility. It involves **militarism, extreme masculinisation, homophobia, racism and racist mobilisations**, including the search for scapegoats, such as immigrant workers and, in the West, Muslims. **Twenty-first century fascism** evokes mystifying ideologies, often involving race/culture supremacy and xenophobia, embracing an idealised and mythical past. Neo-fascist culture **normalises and glamorises warfare** and social violence, indeed, generates a fascination with domination that is portrayed even as heroic.

**Join the Party---a praxis with an unflinching communist orientation**

**Escalante 18**

(Alyson Escalante is a Marxist-Leninist, Materialist Feminist and Anti-Imperialist activist. “PARTY ORGANIZING IN THE 21ST CENTURY” September 21st, 2018<https://theforgenews.org/2018/09/21/party-organizing-in-the-21st-century/> cVs)

I would argue that within the base building movement, there is a move towards party organizing, but this trend has not always been explicitly theorized or forwarded within the movement. My goal in this essay is to argue that base building and dual power strategy can be best forwarded through party organizing, and that party organizing can allow this emerging movement to solidify into a powerful revolutionary socialist tendency in the United States. One of the crucial insights of the base building movement is that the current state of the left in the United States is one in which revolution is not currently possible. There exists very little popular support for socialist politics. A century of anticommunist propaganda has been extremely effective in convincing even the most oppressed and marginalized that communism has nothing to offer them. The base building emphasis on dual power responds directly to this insight. By building institutions which can meet people’s needs, we are able to concretely demonstrate that communists can offer the oppressed relief from the horrific conditions of capitalism. Base building strategy recognizes that actually doing the work to serve the people does infinitely more to create a socialist base of popular support than electing democratic socialist candidates or holding endless political education classes can ever hope to do. Dual power is about proving that we have something to offer the oppressed. The question, of course, remains: once we have built a base of popular support, what do we do next? If it turns out that establishing socialist institutions to meet people’s needs does in fact create sympathy towards the cause of communism, how can we mobilize that base? Put simply: **in order to mobilize the base which base builders hope to create, we need to have already done the work of building a communist party.** It is not enough to simply meet peoples needs. Rather, we must build the institutions of dual power in the name of communism. We must refuse covert front organizing and instead have a public face as a communist party. When we build tenants unions, serve the people programs, and other dual power projects, we must make it clear that we are organizing as communists, unified around a party, and are not content simply with establishing endless dual power organizations. We must be clear that our strategy is revolutionary and in order to make this clear we must adopt party organizing. By “party organizing” I mean an organizational strategy which adopts the party model. Such organizing focuses on building a party whose membership is formally unified around a party line determined by democratic centralist decision making. The party model creates internal methods for **holding party members accountable**, unifying party member action around democratically determined goals, and for educating party members in communist theory and praxis. A communist organization utilizing the party model works to build dual power institutions while simultaneously educating the communities they hope to serve. Organizations which adopt the party model focus on propagandizing around the need for revolutionary socialism. They function as the forefront of political organizing, empowering local communities to theorize their liberation through communist theory while organizing communities to literally fight for their liberation. A party is not simply a group of individuals doing work together, but is a formal organization unified in its fight against capitalism. Party organizing has much to offer the base building movement. By working in a unified party, base builders can ensure that local struggles are tied to and informed by a unified national and international strategy. While the most horrific manifestations of capitalism take on particular and unique form at the local level, we need to remember that our struggle is against a material base which functions not only at the national but at the international level. The formal structures provided by a democratic centralist party model allow individual locals to have a voice in open debate, but also allow for a unified strategy to emerge from democratic consensus. Furthermore, **party organizing allows for local organizations and individual organizers to be held accountable for their actions.** It allows criticism to function not as one independent group criticizing another independent group, but rather as comrades with a formal organizational unity working together to sharpen each others strategies and to help correct **chauvinist** ideas and actions. In the context of the socialist movement within the United States, such **accountability is crucial**. As a movement which operates within a settler colonial society, imperialist and colonial ideal frequently infect leftist organizing. Creating formal unity and party procedure for dealing with and correcting these ideas allows us to address these consistent problems within American socialist organizing. Having a formal party which unifies the various dual power projects being undertaken at the local level also allows for base builders to not simply meet peoples needs, but to pull them into the membership of the party as organizers themselves. The party model creates a means for sustained growth to occur by unifying organizers in a manner that allows for skills, strategies, and ideas to be shared with newer organizers. It also allows community members who have been served by dual power projects to take an active role in organizing by becoming party members and participating in the continued growth of base building strategy. It ensures that there are formal processes for educating communities in communist theory and praxis, and also enables them to act and organize in accordance with their own local conditions. We also must recognize that the current state of the base building movement precludes the possibility of such a national unified party in the present moment. Since base building strategy is being undertaken in a number of already established organizations, it is not likely that base builders would abandon these organizations in favor of founding a unified party. Additionally, it would not be strategic to immediately undertake such complete unification because it would mean abandoning the organizational contexts in which concrete gains are already being made and in which growth is currently occurring. What is important for base builders to focus on in the current moment is building dual power on a local level alongside building a national movement. This means aspiring towards the possibility of a unified party, while pursuing continued local growth. The movement within the Marxist Center network towards some form of unification is positive step in the right direction. The independent party emphasis within the Refoundation caucus should also be recognized as a positive approach. It is important for base builders to continue to explore the possibility of unification, and to maintain unification through a party model as a long term goal. In the meantime, individual base building organizations ought to adopt party models for their local organizing. Local organizations ought to be building dual power alongside recruitment into their organizations, education of community members in communist theory and praxis, and the establishment of armed and militant party cadres capable of defending dual power institutions from state terror. Dual power institutions must be unified openly and transparently around these organizations in order for them to operate as more than “red charities.” Serving the people means meeting their material needs while also educating and propagandizing. It means radicalizing, recruiting, and organizing. **The party model** remains the most useful method for achieving these ends. The use of the party model by local organizations allows base builders to gain popular support, and most importantly, to mobilize their base of popular support towards revolutionary ends, not simply towards the construction of a parallel economy which exists as an end in and of itself. It is my hope that we will see future unification of the various local base building organizations into a national party, but in the meantime we must push for party organizing at the local level. If local organizations adopt party organizing, it ought to become clear that **a unified national party will have to be the long term goal of the base building movement.** Many of the already existing organizations within the base building movement already operate according to these principles. I do not mean to suggest otherwise. Rather, my hope is to suggest that we ought to be explicit about the need for party organizing and emphasize the relationship between dual power and the party model. Doing so will make it clear that the base building movement is not pursuing a cooperative economy alongside capitalism, but is pursuing a revolutionary socialist strategy capable of fighting capitalism. The long term details of base building and dual power organizing will arise organically in response to the conditions the movement finds itself operating within. I hope that I have put forward a useful contribution to the discussion about base building organizing, and have demonstrated the need for party organizing in order to ensure that the base building tendency maintains a revolutionary orientation. The finer details of revolutionary strategy will be worked out over time and are not a good subject for public discussion. I strongly believe party organizing offers the best path for ensuring that such strategy will succeed. My goal here is not to dictate the only possible path forward but to open a conversation about how the base building movement will organize as it transitions from a loose network of individual organizations into a unified socialist tendency. These discussions and debates will be crucial to ensuring that this rapidly growing movement can succeed.

## Case

### 1NC – Presumption

#### Vote neg on presumption –

#### A] Nothing spills over – there’s no connection between the ballot and chancing people’s attitudes. You encourage more teams to read framework which turns your offense and prevents the alteration of mindsets.

#### B] No warrant for a ballot – the competitive nature of debate coopts any ethical value of advocating the aff – winning rounds only makes it look like they just want to win which proves framework and means advocating by losing is more effective.

#### C] Debate – none of their evidence is specific to it – sets a high threshold for solvency and ignores how communicative norms operate.

#### D] The role of the ballot is to vote for the better debater – anything else is self serving, arbitrary and begs the question of the rest of the debate

#### E] If the 1ar shifts to debate bad – the purpose of debate is not subject formation, Harvard MS read cap k’s all the time and one of them ended up in a big ass heg fund. Also 0 warrant for that in the aff – it will be so new u shld hold the line

### 1NC – AT: 1AC

#### Gumbs’s survival politics inadvertently reifies the subject in the context of domination.

Griffin ‘12

REVIEW OF GUMBS – Sarah Mantilla Griffin is a mother and a literary critic. She holds a Ph.D. in English from the University of Pennsylvania and a B.A. with honors in American Studies from Stanford University. Her research primarily focuses on African-American literature, with special interests in women’s writing, black feminist theory, and sound theory. Review of “101 Things That Are Not True About The Most Famous Black Women Alive” by Alexis Pauline Gumbs – Feminist Wire – Dec 19th – http://thefeministwire.com/2012/12/book-review-101-things-that-are-not-true-about-the-most-famous-black-women-alive/

Despite her efforts, Gumbs does not fully escape the bind of truth. By presenting what is not true, she provides the poetic equivalent to a photographic negative, which leaves space for a positive image to be constructed. This negative space, however, is outlined by the claims of the untruth and thus has its limits. If they are definitively untrue, then her statements hold the opposite truths within them. These inner truths directly contradict prevailing images but are no less defining. The untruths are, in their own ways, statements of fact and therefore inflexible. Although Gumbs’s untruths offer new avenues for thinking about these women, they rigidly define the boundaries of this thinking. In this way, Gumbs may, at times, reproduce the type of strictures that the collection aims to disrupt. These constraints reorient discourse around these women, but occasionally leave conspicuous gaps in the conversations. Notably near-absent are moments of critique. Constructive criticism deriving from a place of, as Gumbs puts it, “loving black women,” could have deepened the impact of the poems by further expanding the possibilities for thinking and speaking about the most famous black women alive, while still creating distance from typical evaluations of these women.

#### Institutional engagement critical to untangle structural domain of power that reproduces black women’s exclusion - creates meaningful state reforms and empirics prove its effective - also answers institutional access

Hill-Collins 9(Patricia, Distinguished University Professor of Sociology at the University of Maryland, College Park, “Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge, Consciousness and the Politics of Empowerment”, page 277-280, https://uniteyouthdublin.files.wordpress.com/2015/01/black-feminist-though-by-patricia-hill-collins.pdf)

**The structural domain of power encompasses how** **social institutions are organized to reproduce Black women’s subordination** over time. One characteristic feature of this domain is its emphasis on large-scale, interlocking social institutions. An impressive array of U.S. social institutions lies at the heart of the structural domain of power. Historically, in the United States, the policies and procedures of the U.S. legal system, labor markets, schools, the housing industry, banking, insurance, the news media, and other social institutions as interdependent entities have worked to disadvantage African-American women. For example, **Black women’s long-standing exclusion from the best jobs, schools, health care, and housing illustrates the broad array of social policies designed to exclude Black women from full citizenship rights**. **These interlocking social institutions have relied on multiple forms of segregation**—by race, class, and gender—**to produce these unjust results**. For AfricanAmerican women, racial segregation has been paramount. Racial segregation rested on the “separate but equal” doctrine established under the 1896 ruling of Plessy v. Ferguson where the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of segregation of groups. This ruling paved the way for a rhetoric of color-blindness (Crenshaw 1997). Under the “separate but equal” doctrine, Blacks and Whites as groups could be segregated as long as the law was color-blind in affording each group equal treatment. Despite the supposed formal equality promised by “separate but equal,” subsequent treatment certainly was separate, but it was anything but equal. As a result, **policies and procedures with housing, education, industry, government, the media, and other major social institutions have worked together to exclude Black women** from exercising full citizenship rights. **Whether this social exclusion has taken the form of relegating Black women to inner-city neighborhoods** poorly served by social services, **to poorly funded and racially segregated public schools**, **or to a narrow cluster of jobs in the labor market, the intent was to exclude**. Within the structural domain of power, **empowerment cannot accrue to individuals and groups without transforming U.S. social institutions that foster this exclusion**. **Because this domain is large-scale, systemwide, and has operated over a long period of time** via interconnected social institutions, **segregation of this magnitude cannot be changed overnight**. **Structural forms of injustice that permeate the entire society yield only grudgingly to change**. Since they do so in part when confronted with wide-scale social movements, wars, and revolutions that threaten the social order overall, **African-American women’s rights have not been gained solely by gradual reformism**. A civil war preceded the abolition of slavery when all efforts to negotiate a settlement failed. Southern states routinely ignored the citizenship rights of Blacks, and even when confronted with the 1954 Brown v. Board of Education Supreme Court decision that outlawed racial segregation, many dug in their heels and refused to uphold the law. Massive demonstrations, media exposure, and federal troops all were deployed to implement this fundamental policy change. The reemergence of White supremacist organizations in the 1990s, many of which recirculate troubling racist ideologies of prior eras, speaks to the deep-seated resentment attached to Black women, among others, working toward a more just U.S. society. Events such as these indicate how deeply woven into the very fabric of American society ideas about Black women’s subordination appear to be. In the United States, **visible social protest of this magnitude, while often required to bring about change**, **remains more the exception than the rule**. For U.S. Black women, social change has more often been gradual and reformist, punctuated by episodes of systemwide upheaval. **Trying to change the policies and procedures themselves**, typically through social reforms, **constitutes an important cluster of strategies within the structural domain**. **Because the U.S. context contains a commitment to reformist change by changing the laws**, **Black women have used the legal system in their struggles for structural transformation**. **African-American women have aimed to challenge the laws that legitimate racial segregation**. As Chapter 9’s discussion of Black women’s activism suggests, **African-American women have used various strategies to get laws changed.** **Grassroots organizations**, **forming national advocacy organizations**, **and event-specific social protest** such as boycotts and sit-ins **have all been used**, **yet changing the laws and the terms of their implementation have formed the focus of change**. **Even the development of parallel social institutions** such as Black churches and schools **have aimed to prepare African-Americans for full participation in U.S. society when the laws were changed**. **African-American women have experienced considerable success not only in getting laws changed**, **but in stimulating government action to redress past wrongs**. **The Voting Rights Act** of 1964, **the Civil Rights Act** of 1965, **and other important federal, state, and local legislation have outlawed discrimination by race, sex, national origin, age, or disability status.** **This changed legal climate granted African-American women some protection from the widespread discrimination that we faced in the past**. **At the same time**, **class-action lawsuits against discriminatory housing**, **educational**, **and employment policies have resulted in tangible benefits for many Black women**.

#### Black motherhood is not exclusive with tactical movement-building.

Patricia **Hill** Collins 17, Distinguished University Professor of Sociology at the University of Maryland, 4-5-2017, "On violence, intersectionality and transversal politics," Ethnic And Racial Studies Volume 40, 2017 - Issue 9, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01419870.2017.1317827

Towards transversal politics: flexible solidarity and coalition building When I wrote “The Tie That Binds”, I hoped that developing intersectionality’s theoretical contours might contribute to ameliorating violence as a social problem. Yet intersectional analyses, on their own, are unlikely to yield more effective political solutions to violence. Analysis is important, yet action also matters. Because “thinking” one’s way out of domination is unrealistic, I now ask, how might more sophisticated analyses of power that take into account the ties linking violence, intersecting oppressions and domination facilitate more robust analyses of political resistance? In “The Tie That Binds”, I discussed transversal politics as a form of political engagement that had important implications for understanding organized political resistance. Here I return to that argument via a brief discussion of solidarity and coalition-building. The responses of African American women and similarly historically subordinated groups to intersecting oppressions illuminates the nature of political domination as well the transversal politics it might engender. For example, African American women’s intellectual and political traditions raise some provocative questions concerning the nature of political solidarity. The trajectory of Black feminism within African American communities suggests that Black women’s responses to racial violence moved beyond racial solidarity that was centred exclusively on racism. Black feminist agendas regarding gender and sexuality existed much earlier than when they became visible to a broader public. The story of how Black feminism’s analyses of gender and sexuality advanced intersectional arguments is well-known. Yet the ways in which Black feminist understandings of political solidarity may have been shaped by intersectional analyses remains less familiar. In my recent work, I have returned to issues of political solidarity and coalition politics within African American women’s history (see e.g. Collins forthcoming 2017). Black women’s experiences with violence provide guidance, not as a universal case for oppressed groups, but rather as a catalyst for theoretical insight concerning the interconnections of domination and resistance. Because contemporary forms of violence visited upon African American women have become so routinized in U.S. social institutions and normalized within public hate speech, it is easy to overlook the centrality of violence to the origins and history of African Americans as a U.S. population group. African Americans became Black people in the context of a forced migration within global capitalist expansion, the differential exploitation of productive and reproductive labour of men and women during slavery, and the subsequent structural disadvantages have shaped African American life. Ghettoization and racial segregation were key to African American domination in the U.S. context. Persistent high levels of residential, educational and employment segregation in the U.S. constitute fundamental structural features that contribute to racial hierarchy. Violence was essential to forming Black people as a population as well as the shared meanings that were associated with this political Blackness. For African American women, these social conditions catalysed a particular form of politics, one characterized on the one hand by a stance of dissemblance from the external world whereby Black women hid the harm they experienced from rape, abuse and forms sexual violence (Hine 1989); and on the other hand, a distinctive Black feminist politics that reflected Black women’s analyses and actions in response to the ever-present threat of violence. As a collectively, Black women in the U.S. could not ignore how anti-Black hate speech and routinized racial violence took gender-specific forms. In this social context, Black women developed a more strategic, dynamic and sophisticated approach to solidarity that refutes understandings of solidarity as ideological uniformity that, within African American communities, took patriarchal and homophobic forms. Yet many Black feminist intellectual-activists never fully accepted this kind of group-think that define solidarity through the ideological lens of a homogeneous blackness that privileged masculinity and heterosexuality. Instead, Black women were more likely to see the ways in which they were simultaneously in solidarity with Black men regarding racism as well as the ways in which such solidarity was problematic regarding sexism and homophobia. Historically, Black women intellectual-activists developed forms of political action that were characterized by a flexible solidarity, one where alliances within African American communities have been grounded in ongoing relationships of compromise and contestation (Collins forthcoming 2017). Black women’s community work in particular fostered a commitment to Black solidarity as a core feature of African American women’s political engagement both within and on behalf of Black communities (Collins 2006, 123–160). Without solidarity among African Americans, political struggles to upend racial domination were doomed. Yet for Black women, an unquestioned solidarity could be neither inherently desirable nor effective when it rested on male-dominated, intergenerational gender hierarchies. Such solidarity was hierarchical, rigid, often backed up by religious theology or tradition, and created roadblocks for effective political action. Black women saw the need for solidarity, yet calibrated their ideas and actions to hone critical understandings of solidarity that were better suited for specific political projects, for example, opposing both lynching and rape because they were interconnected practices of violence. Solidarity was not an essentialist category, a bundle of rules that was blindly applied across time and space. Instead, a flexible understanding of solidarity enabled African American women to work with the concept, moulding it to the particular challenges at hand. Working within African American organizations often sensitized Black women to inequalities of gender and sexuality within African American communities as well as within broader society. This awareness catalysed a deepening analysis of intersectionality during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Moreover, these intellectual and political understandings of solidarity were also worked out over time, primarily through everyday, organized political behaviour within African American communities. Stated differently, sustaining political vigilance in the face of racism required being attuned to the political implications both of ideology and strategy. This idea of flexible solidarity within Black feminism lays a foundation for the kind of elasticity that Nira Yuval-Davis assigns to transversal politics (Yuval-Davis 1997, 125–132). Drawing on the work of Italian feminists, Yuval-Davis concludes her book Gender and Nation with a section sketching out several political and intellectual projects that seem to point toward a transversal politics. Rereading Yuval-Davis’s arguments, especially in light of the shifting interpretive climate of hate speech, the more visible connections between hate speech and actions, and the scope of routinized violence, suggests that revisiting the main ideas of transversal politics may be especially constructive. Several points stand out that merit review. For one, Yuval-Davis eschews understandings of groups that are based solely on self-chosen identities or identifications. Instead, she focuses on the authority of nation-states in creating and reproducing historically constituted, socially stratified population groups. She notes, “the boundaries of the groupings were determined not by an essentialist notion of difference, but by a concrete and material political reality” (Yuval-Davis 1997, 129). In the 1980s and into the 1990s, an emerging feminist literature on intersectionality engaged nationalism, examining topics such as how the public policies of nation-states were inherently intersectional, how the national identities of various nation-states relied on intersecting systems of power, and how differential citizenship rights underlay social inequalities (see e.g. Anthias and Yuval-Davis 1992). Scholars in the 1990s seemingly moved away from the literature on nation-states and nationalism, especially its emphasis on the structures of state power. Rereading Yuval Davis in the aftermath of this discursive turn shows how she places far more emphasis on historically constituted groups and the opportunities and constraints they bring to coalition politics than contemporary emphases on individuals and their rights. Bringing groups back into analysis creates space to analyse inter-group politics. Yuval-Davis describes the structured yet dynamic sense of coalitions as being “rooted” in a particular social context but also “shifting” in order to engage in transversal dialogues and politics. Yuval-Davis’s depiction of transversal politics requires processes of shifting that do not mean losing one’s own rooting within historically situated communities and the intellectual and political sensibilities that rooting engenders. In this sense, ideas about intersectionality and flexibility that Black women develop within African American communities need not be jettisoned when shifting toward transversal politics. Far from one of subordinating one’s issues into some greater good, as suggested within prevailing understandings of solidarity, remaining rooted while shifting constitutes a viable if not essential political option. Another dimension of shifting is equally significant: the process of shifting must maintain the multiplicity of perspectives both within a group and across groups. This is the difficult challenge, one that recognizes that some coalitions may not be possible. My reading of the historical trajectory of Black feminism in the U.S. is that the flexible solidarity that Black women exhibit across many historical periods, and that informs intersectionality, constitute a missing dimension of transversal politics. Instead, the flexible solidarity by Black women within African American communities, when coupled with Yuval Davis’s framework of the rooting and shifting of transversal politics, potentially facilitates thinking through coalition politics within a context of intersecting power relations. How might the concept of flexible solidarity honed through Black women’s politics within African American communities and the idea of transversal politics as a framework for coalitions among groups inform anti-violence initiatives? Flexible solidarity and transversal politics remain abstract, and some might argue, unrealistic aspirational constructs. One construct seems wedded to past practices (flexible solidarity) whereas the other points toward an as yet unrealized future (transversal politics). Perhaps, however, both constructs inform contemporary anti-violence initiatives. Take, for example, the effective political mobilization of the Black Lives Matter movement against state-sanctioned violence (Cobb 2016). This movement illustrates how the ideas of intersectionality and flexible solidarity honed within Black feminism suggest a move toward transversal politics as a way to resist violence. Initially led by three queer African American women who created the hashtag #BlackLivesMatter, the stellar growth of Black Lives Matter from 2012 to 2016 illustrates how the legacy of Black feminism has been brought to bear on the contemporary social problem of state-sanctioned racial violence. The deaths of several young African American men, widely shared on social media, was the spark that catalysed the movement. Yet Black women have been visible within the Black Lives Matter movement, from the initial leadership of the movement, to the large numbers Black women participating in the protests, demonstrations and urban rebellions that sustained the vitality of the movement. In essence, Black women who catalysed this movement drew upon the legacy of a Black feminism’s long history of resisting violence targeted toward Black people. At its inception, the Black Lives Matter movement also invoked the idea of intersectionality to expand the categories of Black people who should be respected by the movement. Historically, Black women themselves had used the idea of flexible solidarity to choose strategic moments to broaden Black solidarity to address issues of gender. The initial hashtag #BlackLivesMatter expressed a similar deepening of an intersectional analysis of Blackness, now expanded to highlight the issues of groups that were historically subordinated within Black communities. The web site of the Black Lives Matter movement has undergone substantial updating as the organization has grown, yet the initial intersectional description of their mission has remained constant: Rooted in the experiences of Black people in this country who actively resist our dehumanization, #BlackLivesMatter is a call to action and a response to the virulent anti-Black racism that permeates our society. Black Lives Matter is a unique contribution that goes beyond extrajudicial killings of Black people by police and vigilantes … Black Lives Matter affirms the lives of Black queer and trans folks, disabled folks, black-undocumented folks, folks with records, women and all Black lives along the gender spectrum. It centers those that have been marginalized within Black liberation movement. (blacklivesmatter.com) The movement as laid out by the founders of #BlackLivesMatter is clearly intersectional by highlighting how all Black individuals within Black communities were worthy of political protection. Their intersectional mandate deepens analysis of how different sub-groups within Black communities experience racial domination. It is rooted in a collective Black past, yet not one that is uncritically celebrated or that mandates knee-jerk adherence to solidarity. Significantly, as the movement has grown, its organizational practices also illustrate the goal of drawing upon flexible solidarity to strengthen both its own organizational capacities as a political community as well as those of other Black political communities. As the movement has evolved, it rejected the hierarchical bureaucracies of traditional civil rights organizations in favour of a more fluid decentralized organizational structure that allows it to draw upon the flexibility of networks. This focus on flexible coalitions within a Black movement sets the stage for potential coalitions with external groups. In this sense, Black Lives Matter remains rooted in its anti-violence project, yet embraces a form of flexible solidarity within its practices that sees coalitions as always under construction and not as ideologically fixed. This orientation positions it to remain rooted in the needs of its own praxis. Black Lives Matter points to the necessary interconnectedness of intersectionality and flexible solidarity within its own praxis as well as the continued challenges of using these ideas within broader social movements. This example also signals the challenges of future coalition building with other groups that have been inspired by this movement, yet must find ways to bring more sophisticated understandings of their own group histories to the transversal politics that might ensue. Developing more complex analyses of intersectionality as a form of critical inquiry and praxis that resists violence promises to be a long-term intellectual and political project. Because violence is so deeply embedded into the fabric of society, it is unlikely to yield to the efforts of any one theory or group of social actors. Yet just as intersecting oppressions are far from static, forms of political resistance that are similarly flexible are well-positioned for such sustained intellectual and political struggle. In this endeavour, continuing to focus on violence should illuminate new connections between intersecting systems of power and on new possibilities for political resistance.

#### It’s false and essentializing to say the State always already excludes black women. Longitudinal studies disproves the thesis of continuity.

Brown 94 Elsa Barkley Brown. Associate Professor of History and Women’s Studies and Affiliate Faculty in African American Studies and American Studies at the University of Maryland. She identifies as an African-American Woman – “Negotiating and Transforming the Public Sphere: African American Political Life in the Transition from Slavery to Freedom” – Public Culture 1994, 7: p. 107-146

Scholars’ assumptions of an unbroken line of exclusion of African American women from formal political associations in the late-nineteenth century has obscured fundamental changes in the political understandings within African American communities in the transition from slavery to freedom. Women in First African and in other arenas were seeking in the late-nineteenth century not a new authority but rather a lost authority, one they now often sought to justify on a distinctively female basis. As these women petitioned for their rights within the church and as other women formed voluntary associations in turn-of-thecentury Richmond they were not, as often depicted in the scholarly literature, emerging into the political arena through such actions. Rather these women were attempting to retain space they traditionally had held in the immediate postemancipation period. This essay explores the processes of public discourse within Richmond and other southern black communities and the factors which led to increasingly more clearly gendered and class spaces within those communities to understand why women by the 1880s and 1890s needed to create their own pulpits from which to speak-to restore their voices to the community. This exploration suggests how the ideas, process, meanings and practice of freedom changed within late-nineteenth-century southern African American communities and what the implications of those changes may be for our visions of freedom and for the possibilities of African American community in the late-twentieth century. After emancipation, African American men, women and children, as part of black communities throughout the South struggled to define on their own terms the meaning of freedom and in the process to construct communities of struggle. Much of the literature on Reconstruction portrays freed African Americans as rapidly and readily adopting a gendered private-public dichotomy .2 Much of the literature on the nineteenth-century public sphere constructs a masculine liberal bourgeois public with a female “counterpublic”.This essay, focusing on the civic geography of post-Civil War black Richmond suggests the problematic of applying such generalizations to African American life in the late-nineteenth century South. In the immediate post-emancipation era black Richmonders enacted their understandings of democratic political discourse through mass meetings attended and participated in (including voting) by men, women and children and through mass participation in Republican Party conventions. They carried these notions of political participation into the state Capitol engaging from the gallery in the debates on the constitutional convention floor.

#### The Rage Debate proper:

#### Top-Level – Black Rage is the Status Quo – BLM protests and CeCe McDonald proves– the Aff’s u/q arg is from 2015 – means there’s no reason the Aff’s performance of Rage is uniquely more important or avoids the faults of those instances of Rage

#### 2 Turns:

#### a] Rage is counterproductive even if its personally satisfying – results in echo-chamber politics and creates cycles of mutual antagonism

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The remedy must help us counter what can best be called rhetorical rage: the phenomenon of one form of extremist rhetoric breeding another, counterextremist rhetoric. Here is an example that illustrates how far rhetorical rage has spread–in this case, to scientists–in a country whose citizens are overwhelmingly moderate and reasonable. Creationism is often communicated in extremist terms, as part of a comprehensive divine plan, and as such is impervious to the mountain of evidence that refutes its claims to being a scientific theory that disproves the theory of evolution. Recently, in response to creationism, an opposite form of extremism–which calls itself science but really is scientism–has emerged and gained a following. Scientism expresses an equal and opposite certainty, which also defies reason, that all human understanding derives from the comprehensive rational value of scientific inquiry. It treats religion–and religious believers–with open contempt. Richard Dawkins, for example, proclaims that “faith is one of the world’s great evils.”10 Sam Harris and Christopher Hitchens indict all organized religions for inciting hatred and abetting humanity’s propensity for cruelty and murder. With single-minded fury, all three drive democratic discourse deeper into the cycle of mutual disrespect and denigration. Trading one kind of extremism in for another–creationism for scientism–does not bode well for an informed public policy. Worse than rhetorical rage are extreme political responses to extremist rhetoric. The French parliament, for example, adopted a bill in 2006 making it a crime to deny that Armenians suffered genocide at the hands of the Turks. This is an extreme reaction to extremism. Democracy’s most reasonable hope for countering demagogy is the democratic lure of morally engaged pluralism. The vast majority of American citizens realize that they have multiple interests, ideals, and preferences. And they are more satisfied when democratic politics attends to those interests, ideals, and preferences. How can American democracy take better advantage of the lure of morally engaged pluralism? Well-educated citizens can practice what Dennis Thompson and I describe as “an economy of moral disagreement.” When we argue about controversial issues, we should defend our views vigorously while expressing mutual respect for our adversaries. We can do this by not preemptively rejecting everything for which our political adversaries stand. Take the controversy over creationism. I can staunchly defend evolution against creationism as a scientific theory while also recognizing that science does not have answers to most of the great cosmological questions that religion addresses. Nothing will thereby be lost, and much will be gained. Practicing “an economy of moral disagreement” engenders mutual respect across competing viewpoints and, as important, makes room for moral compromise. No democracy can function–let alone flourish–without moral compromise over reasonable differences. Can morally engaged pluralism be an effective rhetorical strategy? The reasonable hope lies in the fact that most democratic citizens are not extremists. And respecting multiple points of view carries more lasting and long-term benefits in democratic politics than playing exclusively to a narrow political base. However, morally engaged pluralists must not check all emotions at the door. “Rationality is a bond between persons,” the philosopher Stuart Hampshire observed, “but it is not a very powerful bond, and it is apt to fail as a bond when there are strong passions on two sides of a conflict.” Rationality alone is apt to fail as a bond, but morally engaged pluralists have every reason to be passionate as well as rational in their rhetoric. The moral stakes in pursuing the public interest could not be higher; life, liberty, opportunity, and mutual respect are the lifeblood of a flourishing democracy. For morally engaged pluralists to be effective, we must be passionate as well as reasonable in our rhetoric. Passion supported by reason elevates democratic debate while also making it more alluring and effective. In searching for antidotes to extremism, there is therefore no substitute for a better democratic education in robust, reasoned, and respectful political controversy and debate. We need to teach students how to engage with one another over controversial issues. Students must first learn how to recognize demagogic rhetoric and then how to counter it, both individually and institutionally. Well-designed democratic institutions can dramatically reduce the toxic effects of extremist rhetoric. We need to support institutional structures whose incentives encourage respectful controversy. Less partisan gerrymandering would foster more representative democratic rhetoric. Well-structured debates and factcheck.org blogs can expose extremist and extreme rhetoric that is deceptive and subversive of the democratic pursuit of the public interest. Democratic citizens should not wait for the media and our political leaders to reform themselves. All pluralists–the vast majority of democratic citizens–can play an important part today in criticizing extreme and extremist rhetoric and in defending a more democratic, less demagogic rhetoric of morally engaged pluralism. We can do so both reasonably and passionately in keeping with our character as morally engaged pluralists. This never-ending pursuit of the public interest in a democracy is not a value-neutral enterprise. Pluralist citizens are committed to upholding the spirit of constitutional democracy beyond what the letter of the law requires us to do. We must recognize that demonizing and demeaning our opponents to mobilize like-minded people in democratic politics is a legal but nonetheless demagogic way of driving constitutional democracy into the ground. Democracy’s saving grace is that most citizens are put off by demagogues and their techniques. By recognizing that the person with whom we disagree, far from being an “ignorant slut,” typically has a valid point worth considering, we can work together as fellow citizens who respectfully disagree with one another to give our great constitutional democracy a longer lease on life.

#### b] The valorization of rage as a political move leads to a vicious cycle of repetitive violence

Wenning 09 (Mario, Phd., Assistant professor of philosophy @ the University of Macau, “The Return of Rage,” Parrhesia No. 8 pg. 89-99)

The valorization of erotic emotions and virtues over thymotic ones is as old as philosophy itself. Aristotle already insists that the virtuous person cultivates mildness of temper “the even tempered person confesses to be calm and not carried away by his feelings, but to be cross only in the way, at the things, and for the length of time that reason dictates.” 15 Compassion is introduced as an antidote to revenge. The virtuous character does not lose the control that is **necessary to provide for a self-sufficient emotional economy**, which is the precondition for achieving a life that is marked by wisdom, even-temperedness, and justice. Seneca’s influential work on rage, De ira, which was immensely influential for Christian and humanist ethics, calls for a Stoic control of the dangerous affect. The general suspicion against the destructive consequences of this aggressive emotion is not limited to the European tradition. Confucius already warns his students “to let a sudden fit of anger make you forget the safety of your own person or even that of your parents, is that not misguided judgment?” 16 Daoism and ZenBuddhism promote meditative practices and compassion to overcome our fixation on the need of being angry with ourselves and the world surrounding us. More recently, Martha Nussbaum argued that we should aim to understand “how to channel emotional development in the direction of a more mature and inclusive and **less ambivalent type of love**.” 17 According to Nussbaum, anger should at best operate as a tool of compassion. Acts of punishment are then seen as merciful rather than vindictive because they aim at the good of the victim. These representative examples illustrate that the erotization of the psyche replaced what is regarded as archaic forms of militancy that, it is contended, mistakenly suggest that honor, pride and craving for recognition (and the rage that results from the violation of these) has been considered to be more important than a concern for justice, equality and compassion. We might think that the dislike of negative emotions in general and potentially aggressive ones in particular results from an insight into the misfortunes these emotions bring about. Revenge, then, is undesirable because it tends to be too costly in producing long term damages. Hegel, for example, reminds us in the Philosophy of Right of the infinite chain of violence, the ec**onomy of pay-back that results from** blind vengeance **and selfadministered acts of justic**e. 18 The **excesses of rage** can easily lead to tragic repetitions of an original act of violence that might be impossible to get out of. Honor killings often lead to new honor killings rather than the reestablishment of justice and the fight against terror breed more terrorists.

#### The Gumbs Evidence – a] Doesn’t say Rage once so not offense for them, b] Turn - Survival focused on the short-term always fails because it begs the question of why black bodies have to worry about dying the next day – only our spill-up arguments can create a safe feeling free from surveillance and violence and c] Survival can be within policy-making since you can weaponize the undercommons of the USFG to subvert it from within