## **2n**

#### Overview to the T debate:

#### Here’s how you evaluate the T flow:

#### No 2ar weighing because of Time Skew they have 3 minutes to weigh any impact – even if we did weighing for the entire 2N they have multiple impacts and we wouldn’t be able to catch up and put 3 minutes on every impact the 1ar had.

#### No new 2ar arguments because of Fairness they could literally lie for 3 minutes and we would have no way of checking since we don’t have a 3N – means at best you should be extremely skeptical of any new 2ar extrapolations. If it wasn’t in the 1AR do not evaluate it – they’ll say these arguments are new in the 2n so they new arguments to respond but no I’m just explaining how the round should be evaluated not giving offensive reasons why you should negate.

#### Paradigm issues –

#### Topicality is drop the debater because their abuse skewed the entire debate beginning from the 1AC – we couldn’t engage even in the 1N because they were not topical.

#### Use Competing Interps on Topicality – a) Logic - Topicality is a yes no binary you cannot be in the middle ground of topicality or be reasonably topical you are either topical or you are not. b) Intervention Reasonability pushes the limits of how much abuse you can get away that outweighs on infinite abuse. This means that if we win any marginal offense on the topicality flow you negate – even if they win some blippy mitigatory defense if we have any offense you negate because we have proven our interpretation is better even if minimally.

#### Here is the T flow:

#### Extend our interpretation: Affirmatives may not specify a democracy because the phrase “a democracy” is generic because the word A in the resolution is being used as a generic indefinite article. A few warrants –

**(only go for 1 or 2)**

#### [XT- Contradiction Test]

#### Extend the contradiction test from Nebel 1- if you read a statement and it’s converse together and the two don’t contradict then the statement is existential but saying “In a democracy, voting ought to be compulsory” and “In a democracy voting ought not be compulsory” is contradictory so the statement cannot be referring to an specific noun.

#### [A=specification] Takes out their definitions since even if “a” implies specification in some instances the contradiction test accounts for the entirety of the resolutions wording which outweighs on specificity

### 2N - Limits O/W

#### Limits categorically o/w’s their offense

#### A] Sequencing- Limits questions the ability to have equivalent prep-burdens which is a basic pre-requisite to being able to compete and do well in-round

#### B] Magnitude- Skewing over 1NC strategy construction is the worst form of abuse since the 1NC controls the direction of the round and is the first truly responsive speech

#### C] Constitutivism- It’s the constitutive role of the negative to test the affirmative which means allowing the negative to have the ability to respond is an axiomatic aspect of debate. Constutivism outweighs since it’s an inescapable role we have as participants.

#### D] Err negative- It’s still early in the topic so we don’t have an exact idea of what affirmatives will look like or what the most common subsets will be so strict limits is the only way to ensure the neg isn’t left in the dark

#### E] Structural Skew- The aff has infinite prep before round so only making sure they are sufficiently limited in what they can prepare is key to overcome their structural advantage. That o/w on reversibility since we can’t change the structure of debate.

#### PICs are inevitable and good -

#### PICs are inevitable – people will still engage with the aff but your interpretation means their prep doesn’t link anymore so people start reading PICs without solvency advocates, analytic PICs, and miscut PICs.

#### You get 1AR Theory – someone reading a PIC is just granting you a new ballot story

#### Strategic Case Writing – it forces the affirmative to find specific evidence for advantages that can’t be PICed out of.

#### Philosophical Education – Whole rez affs can be justified through a multitude of different frameworks for example a Deleuze aff, Wynter aff, Kant aff, or a Rawls aff – that outweighs on longevity because everyone makes daily decisions and philosophical education teaches you better ways of making those decisions.

#### Negative testing – PICs allow the negative to test the affirmative in as many possible angles as they can – which outweighs on portable skills because it forces you to do more prep and make more 1ARs – those research skills stay with you even when you graduate.

### 2N – A2 Functional Limits

#### Functional Limits are subjective - Bad affs are still run – even if an aff is substantively horrible debaters will still run them proven by tricks debaters, traditional debaters who don’t disclose and win off surprise tactics and novices who don’t know the aff is bad

#### Empirical claim without an empirical warrant – just because you can’t find the topic literature for the aff doesn’t mean the literature doesn’t exist

#### Literature is ever-growing – it’s impossible to make a claim about the literature because someone could be publishing something as we debate

#### Logic – if we win semantics functional limits doesn’t matter because even if the abuse is minimal it’s still abuse

## **1**

#### Interpretation: Affirmatives may not specify a democracy

#### “A Democracy” is generic

#### A] It doesn’t pass the contradiction test

Nebel 1[Jake Nebel- Jake Nebel is an Assistant Professor of Philosophy at the University of Southern California. Jake works mainly in moral philosophy but has also published work in the philosophy of language in The Philosophical Review. He holds a PhD in Philosophy from New York University, an AB in Philosophy from Princeton University, and a BPhil in Philosophy from Oxford University, where he was a Marshall Scholar. As a coach, Jake’s students have won the Tournament of Champions, the NDCA National Championship, the Dukes & Bailey Cup, the Glenbrooks, the Harvard Round Robin, the New York City Invitational, the Barkley Forum at Emory, the TFA State Tournament, and other national, regional, and local championships. As a debater, he won the Glenbrooks (twice), Greenhill (twice), Harvard, Emory, Bronx, the Bronx Round Robin, the MBA Round Robin, the VBT Round Robin, and the Florida State Tournament, was in finals of NSDA Nationals, and was top speaker at the Tournament of Champions, Greenhill, Harvard, Bronx (twice), the Bronx Round Robin (twice), Yale (twice), the Vassar Round Robin, the Crestian Classic, and the Florida State Tournament. He attended VBI three times as a student and has worked at 35 sessions. “Indefinite Singular Generics in Debate” VBI Briefs. 2020] UT AI\* Note: These were from a brief. Text me or any of my kids and they’ll send it to you.

First, consider another existential use of the indefinite: “A cat is on the mat.” One way to tell that this use is existential is that the sentence “A cat is on the mat, and a cat is not on the mat” is consistent (or, at least, has a consistent reading), as in noncontradictory.2 It means the same thing as “Some cat is on the mat, and some cat is not on the mat,” which could be true if one cat is on the mat and one cat is not. So suppose that “a democracy” in the resolution is existential. Then the sentence “In a democracy, voting ought to be compulsory, and in a democracy, voting ought not be compulsory” should be consistent. But it’s not consistent—it’s contradictory. This shows that the resolution doesn’t mean “In some democracy, voting ought to be compulsory,” because “In some democracy, voting ought to be compulsory, and in some democracy, voting ought not be compulsory” is consistent but “In a democracy, voting ought to be compulsory, and in a democracy, voting ought not be compulsory” is not. So “a democracy” in the resolution cannot be existential after all.

#### B] it fails the upper entailment test- replacing “democracy” with a general noun changes the meaning.

Nebel 2[Jake Nebel- Jake Nebel is an Assistant Professor of Philosophy at the University of Southern California. Jake works mainly in moral philosophy but has also published work in the philosophy of language in The Philosophical Review. He holds a PhD in Philosophy from New York University, an AB in Philosophy from Princeton University, and a BPhil in Philosophy from Oxford University, where he was a Marshall Scholar. As a coach, Jake’s students have won the Tournament of Champions, the NDCA National Championship, the Dukes & Bailey Cup, the Glenbrooks, the Harvard Round Robin, the New York City Invitational, the Barkley Forum at Emory, the TFA State Tournament, and other national, regional, and local championships. As a debater, he won the Glenbrooks (twice), Greenhill (twice), Harvard, Emory, Bronx, the Bronx Round Robin, the MBA Round Robin, the VBT Round Robin, and the Florida State Tournament, was in finals of NSDA Nationals, and was top speaker at the Tournament of Champions, Greenhill, Harvard, Bronx (twice), the Bronx Round Robin (twice), Yale (twice), the Vassar Round Robin, the Crestian Classic, and the Florida State Tournament. He attended VBI three times as a student and has worked at 35 sessions. “Indefinite Singular Generics in Debate” VBI Briefs. 2020] UT AI\* Note: These were from a brief. Text me or any of my kids and they’ll send it to you.

Second, existential uses of the indefinite, such as “A cat is on the mat,” are upwardentailing. 3 This means that if you replace the noun with a more general one, such as “An animal is on the mat,” the sentence will still be true. So let’s do that with “a democracy.” Does the resolution entail “In a society, voting ought to be compulsory”? Intuitively not, because you could think that voting ought to be compulsory in democracies but not in other sorts of societies. This suggests that “a democracy” in the resolution is not existential.

#### Semantics outweigh and are an independent voter

#### A] Stasis – it’s the only stasis for predictability and pragmatics – sequencing negates

#### B] Inherency – It’s the only thing inherent to the topic – pragmatics are just reasons to change the topic not reasons why our interp is wrong

#### Violation: They only make voting compulsory in Japan

#### Now Negate-

#### 1] Limits-There are over 150 democracies around the world. In each of these democracies there are several possible scenarios in which objectivity and advocacy are good – infinite affs are impossible to prep out

#### 2] Ground- I lose access to core negative ground like elections DA’s, racism Das and topic CPs – means that NC prep is impossible. Disclosure doesn’t check because it’s not comfirmable and 30 mins preround isn’t enough to cut a full 1n

#### Paradigm issues

#### 1 - T is DTD –their abusive advocacy skewed the debate from the start

#### 2 - Comes before 1AR theory — A - If we had to be abusive it’s because it was impossible to engage their aff, B - T outweighs on scope because their abuse affected every speech that came after the 1AC

#### 3 - Use competing interps on T – A - topicality is a yes/no question, you can’t be reasonably topical, B - reasonability invites arbitrary judge intervention and a race to the bottom of questionable argumentation

#### 4 - No RVIs – A - Forcing the 1NC to go all in on the shell kills substance education and neg strat, B - discourages checking real abuse C - Encourages baiting – outweighs because if the shell is frivolous, they can beat it quick

## **2**

#### Settler colonialism is a permeating structure that operates via the promotion of the nation-state – it thrives off of the elimination of indigenous people and their relationship to land – that appropriation turns them into ghosts

Tuck and Yang 12 (Eve Tuck and Wayne Yang; 2012; Decolonization: Indigeneity, Education & Society Vol. 1, No. 1, 2012, pp. 1-40; *“Decolonization is not a metaphor”*; accessed 12/7/21; <https://clas.osu.edu/sites/clas.osu.edu/files/Tuck%20and%20Yang%202012%20Decolonization%20is%20not%20a%20metaphor.pdf>; Eve Tuck is a Unangax̂ scholar in the field of Indigenous studies and educational research. Tuck is the associate professor of critical race and indigenous studies at the Ontario Institute for Studies in Education at the University of Toronto; K. Wayne Yang is Provost of John Muir College and Professor of Ethnic Studies at the University of California, San Diego; pages 5-7) HB \*brackets in original\* \*They use masculine pronouns to describe the settler not through direct association of the settler as a man but rather a dominating subject characterized as hypermasculine\*

Our intention in this descriptive exercise is not be exhaustive, or even inarguable; instead, we wish to emphasize that (a) decolonization will take a different shape in each of these contexts - though they can overlap4 - and that (b) neither external nor internal colonialism adequately describe the form of colonialism which operates in the United States or other nation-states in which the colonizer comes to stay. Settler colonialism operates through internal/external colonial modes simultaneously because there is no spatial separation between metropole and colony. For example, in the United States, many Indigenous peoples have been forcibly removed from their homelands onto reservations, indentured, and abducted into state custody, signaling the form of colonization as simultaneously internal (via boarding schools and other biopolitical modes of control) and external (via uranium mining on Indigenous land in the US Southwest and oil extraction on Indigenous land in Alaska) with a frontier (the US military still nicknames all enemy territory “Indian Country”). The horizons of the settler colonial nation-state are total and require a mode of total appropriation of Indigenous life and land, rather than the selective expropriation of profit-producing fragments. Settler colonialism is different from other forms of colonialism in that settlers come with the intention of making a new home on the land, a homemaking that insists on settler sovereignty over all things in their new domain. Thus, relying solely on postcolonial literatures or theories of coloniality that ignore settler colonialism will not help to envision the shape that decolonization must take in settler colonial contexts. Within settler colonialism, the most important concern is land/water/air/subterranean earth (land, for shorthand, in this article.) Land is what is most valuable, contested, required. This is both because the settlers make Indigenous land their new home and source of capital, and also because the disruption of Indigenous relationships to land represents a profound epistemic, ontological, cosmological violence. This violence is not temporally contained in the arrival of the settler but is reasserted each day of occupation. This is why Patrick Wolfe (1999) emphasizes that settler colonialism is a structure and not an event. In the process of settler colonialism, land is remade into property and human relationships to land are restricted to the relationship of the owner to his property. Epistemological, ontological, and cosmological relationships to land are interred, indeed made pre-modern and backward. Made savage. In order for the settlers to make a place their home, they must destroy and disappear the Indigenous peoples that live there. Indigenous peoples are those who have creation stories, not colonization stories, about how we/they came to be in a particular place - indeed how we/they came to be a place. Our/their relationships to land comprise our/their epistemologies, ontologies, and cosmologies. For the settlers, Indigenous peoples are in the way and, in the destruction of Indigenous peoples, Indigenous communities, and over time and through law and policy, Indigenous peoples’ claims to land under settler regimes, land is recast as property and as a resource. Indigenous peoples must be erased, must be made into ghosts (Tuck and Ree, forthcoming). At the same time, settler colonialism involves the subjugation and forced labor of chattel slaves5 , whose bodies and lives become the property, and who are kept landless. Slavery in settler colonial contexts is distinct from other forms of indenture whereby excess labor is extracted from persons. First, chattels are commodities of labor and therefore it is the slave’s person that is the excess. Second, unlike workers who may aspire to own land, the slave’s very presence on the land is already an excess that must be dis-located. Thus, the slave is a desirable commodity but the person underneath is imprisonable, punishable, and murderable. The violence of keeping/killing the chattel slave makes them deathlike monsters in the settler imagination; they are reconfigured/disfigured as the threat, the razor’s edge of safety and terror. The settler, if known by his actions and how he justifies them, sees himself as holding dominion over the earth and its flora and fauna, as the anthropocentric normal, and as more developed, more human, more deserving than other groups or species. The settler is making a new "home" and that home is rooted in a homesteading worldview where the wild land and wild people were made for his benefit. He can only make his identity as a settler by making the land produce, and produce excessively, because "civilization" is defined as production in excess of the "natural" world (i.e. in excess of the sustainable production already present in the Indigenous world). In order for excess production, he needs excess labor, which he cannot provide himself. The chattel slave serves as that excess labor, labor that can never be paid because payment would have to be in the form of property (land). The settler's wealth is land, or a fungible version of it, and so payment for labor is impossible.6 The settler positions himself as both superior and normal; the settler is natural, whereas the Indigenous inhabitant and the chattel slave are unnatural, even supernatural. Settlers are not immigrants. Immigrants are beholden to the Indigenous laws and epistemologies of the lands they migrate to. Settlers become the law, supplanting Indigenous laws and epistemologies. Therefore, settler nations are not immigrant nations (See also A.J. Barker, 2009). Not unique, the United States, as a settler colonial nation-state, also operates as an empire - utilizing external forms and internal forms of colonization simultaneous to the settler colonial project. This means, and this is perplexing to some, that dispossessed people are brought onto seized Indigenous land through other colonial projects. Other colonial projects include enslavement, as discussed, but also military recruitment, low-wage and high-wage labor recruitment (such as agricultural workers and overseas-trained engineers), and displacement/migration (such as the coerced immigration from nations torn by U.S. wars or devastated by U.S. economic policy). In this set of settler colonial relations, colonial subjects who are displaced by external colonialism, as well as racialized and minoritized by internal colonialism, still occupy and settle stolen Indigenous land. Settlers are diverse, not just of white European descent, and include people of color, even from other colonial contexts. This tightly wound set of conditions and racialized, globalized relations exponentially complicates what is meant by decolonization, and by solidarity, against settler colonial forces. Decolonization in exploitative colonial situations could involve the seizing of imperial wealth by the postcolonial subject. In settler colonial situations, seizing imperial wealth is inextricably tied to settlement and re-invasion. Likewise, the promise of integration and civil rights is predicated on securing a share of a settler-appropriated wealth (as well as expropriated ‘third-world’ wealth). Decolonization in a settler context is fraught because empire, settlement, and internal colony have no spatial separation. Each of these features of settler colonialism in the US context - empire, settlement, and internal colony - make it a site of contradictory decolonial desires7 . Decolonization as metaphor allows people to equivocate these contradictory decolonial desires because it turns decolonization into an empty signifier to be filled by any track towards liberation. In reality, the tracks walk all over land/people in settler contexts. Though the details are not fixed or agreed upon, in our view, decolonization in the settler colonial context must involve the repatriation of land simultaneous to the recognition of how land and relations to land have always already been differently understood and enacted; that is, all of the land, and not just symbolically. This is precisely why decolonization is necessarily unsettling, especially across lines of solidarity. “Decolonization never takes place unnoticed” (Fanon, 1963, p. 36). Settler colonialism and its decolonization implicates and unsettles everyone

#### Journalistic objectivity relies on the narrative of a “view from nowhere” which papers over individuals material connection – that enables the continuance of false narratives that upholds a history of erasure

Brake 21 (Justin Brake; 7/5/21; Briarpatch Magazine; *“Built on a foundation of white supremacy”*; accessed 3/4/22; <https://briarpatchmagazine.com/articles/view/built-on-a-foundation-of-white-supremacy>; Justin Brake is an independent journalist from Ktaqmkuk (Newfoundland) who presently lives and works in unceded Algonquin territory. A settler with Mi’kmaq ancestry, much of Justin’s work focuses on Indigenous rights and liberation. He is a writer and editor with the Breach and a regular contributor to the Independent) HB \*Brackets in original\*

The criminalization of Indigenous land defence – and of the journalism that reported on it – forced me and the land protectors through years of court hearings. In the end, the dam was built and Innu and Inuit living downstream now suffer the consequences of the violence inflicted upon their river and their ways of life. Some talked about the occupation’s silver linings: Innu, Inuit, and settler Labradorians “know now that they need to stick together to be heard and to be strong,” Innu land defender David Nuke told APTN in 2018. A 2019 decision from the Court of Appeal of Newfoundland and Labrador in my case recognized the special role journalists play when they cover Indigenous land defence. When granting an injunction, the judges wrote, courts must be careful not to infringe on Canadians’ constitutionally protected right to a free press. But in the years since 2016, as I’ve watched media coverage of Wet’suwet’en, Haudenosaunee, and Secwepemc land defence, I’m not sure a lack of press freedom is the main issue hindering good reporting on Indigenous resistance. As the reckoning with racism in Canadian newsrooms over the last year shows us, when the journalism industry is built on a foundation of white supremacy, publications and reporters become unwilling – maybe even unable – to acknowledge their biases and the ways their work upholds colonialism. Objectivity and settler colonialism “Watch your language.” That was the warning, written into an op-ed title, given by a daily newspaper columnist who took issue with my and other journalists’ use of the term “land protector” in our coverage of the Muskrat Falls resistance. “Reporters should avoid such language, laden as it is with inherent subjectivity,” the columnist went on. “[T]he last thing any journalist wants is to fuel those who are perpetually coiled and ready to yell ‘Media bias!’” The debate over the utility and legitimacy of objectivity in journalism is almost as old as the ideal itself. Objectivity “hinges on a more fundamental belief that there is a knowable world, a way of seeing that, once we set aside our own subjectivities, can be universally achieved or at least universally agreed upon,” journalist Lewis Raven Wallace writes in The View From Somewhere. Defenders of objectivity, like The Elements of Journalism authors Bill Kovach and Tom Rosenstiel, argue that “[o]bjectivity was not meant to suggest that journalists were without bias. To the contrary, precisely because journalists could never be objective, their methods had to be. In the recognition that everyone is biased, in other words, the news, like science, should flow from a process for reporting that is defensible, rigorous, and transparent.” But too often, objectivity is conflated with the views of those in positions of power. In Seeing Red: A History of Natives in Canadian Newspapers, Mark Cronlund Anderson and Carmen L. Robertson detail how, over the course of this country’s short history, Canadian newspapers have supported and advanced settler colonialism. Under the guise of “objective” reporting, journalists have consistently othered and stereotyped Indigenous Peoples, misrepresented them, and outright erased their histories and cultures. “The colonial stereotypes have endured in the press, even flourished,” the authors noted a decade ago. “That the prose may have become less ‘blatant’ however suggests that the audience has become more familiar with the genre conventions of colonial discourse. To put it another way: the nation has been built.” Robert Ballantyne, a Cree-Mohawk grad student at Carleton University and former CBC and Toronto Star journalist, is researching anti-colonial reporting methods. He says objectivity “makes it difficult for journalists to confront their own work, as if they are somehow capable of transcending their own backgrounds, biases, and communities.” Armed with what Ballantyne calls a perceived “superpower of fairness,” journalists’ indoctrination in objectivity “can create an almost impossible situation to have difficult conversations and create change if someone believes they are beyond reproach.” Tałtan journalist Candis Callison and her colleague Mary Lynn Young argue in their book Reckoning: Journalism’s Limits and Possibilities that “what journalists think happened is deeply related to who they are and where they’re coming from in broad and specific senses – and that there are multiple truths and perspectives that contribute to understanding what ‘really’ happened,” they write. Instead of pretending to be objective, they suggest journalists could be transparent about who they are and where they come from. “Recognizing individual and collective social and historical location needs to become part of the methodology for journalists in order to situate themselves, their knowledge, and expertise within a wider web of relations and entanglements.” The land and the economy Though non-Indigenous journalists benefit from colonization by living on stolen lands and reaping the benefits of Canada’s economy, we rarely – if ever – hear about land as anything but a resource to exploit. Within settler colonialism, Eve Tuck and K. Wayne Yang write, “Land is what is most valuable, contested, required. This is both because the settlers make Indigenous land their new home and source of capital, and also because the disruption of Indigenous relationships to land represents a profound epistemic, ontological, cosmological violence. This violence is not temporally contained in the arrival of the settler but is reasserted each day of occupation.” “There are dominant narratives” in journalism, explains IndigiNews managing editor Emilee Gilpin, a Michif journalist of Cree-Métis, Filipina, and settler descent. Gilpin previously worked as the National Observer’s lead on its First Nations Forward series and is committed to decolonizing journalism and the media. She points to Canada’s economy as an example of a dominant narrative and notes few journalists ever question its nature or legitimacy when reporting on Indigenous land defence. Everything journalists report is in relation to the economy, she says, “as if that’s just the assumed reality, as if that’s the world view that we’re all working from.” In a 2020 interview for TVO, Seeing Red author Carmen Robertson told Kanyen’kehá:ka journalist Shelby Lisk that while some journalists have improved their coverage of Indigenous land defence, there remains a “disconnect [between] what land means from a settler perspective — a possession, a way to improve economics in this country — and then the notion of land as something other than that, which is a relational or kinship tie, which many Canadians, for the most part, just can’t even fathom.” As a result of that disconnect, Robertson says, “we see those stereotypes bubble through, because the fact that they’re ‘stopping progress,’ they’re stopping the economy, that doesn’t play well [with Canadians].” Countering extractive journalism When Ukwehu:we journalist Karl Dockstader embedded with Haudenosaunee land defenders at Six Nations of the Grand River last summer, he didn’t fully appreciate the significance of what he was doing. “I’ve always seen myself as an outsider when it comes to journalism, and I never realized what an asset that was until I set up a tent at 1492 Land Back Lane,” he says, recalling the early days of the land reclamation in opposition to the construction of a new housing development on the outskirts of Caledonia, Ontario. Dockstader and Sean Vanderklis, who co-host One Dish, One Mic on Niagara radio station Newstalk 610 CKTB, took a different approach to their reporting. “We believed we had a responsibility to follow traditional protocol before inviting land defenders on to the radio,” Dockstader says. As Indigenous journalists, he and Vanderklis are accountable to the communities they cover, Dockstader explains, which involves developing relationships and earning trust. When the pair visited the site, they played “LaGolf” – a lacrosse-golf hybrid game – with land defenders. “I sat around the fire, I jammed out a couple horn rattle tunes and water drum, traditional songs, with one of the singers there. And we just got to know the camp,” Dockstader recalls. The pair’s newsgathering and reporting methodologies stand in stark contrast to how most journalists do their work. “The extractive approach to journalism treats facts like coal in a mine, using sources and places the way mining companies use land – as a resource to dig into, and then leave behind,” writes Wallace in The View From Somewhere. Extractive journalism “goes hand in hand with ‘objectivity’: the outside observer objectifies the people and places the stories are about, who become ‘sources’ rather than human beings.” Courtney Skye, who is Mohawk Turtle Clan from Six Nations and a researcher, policy analyst, and consultant, has supported 1492 Land Back Lane’s efforts. She praises Dockstader and Vanderklis’ approach to covering the land defence. “They did a really professional job of reminding people of their role and their work, but at the same time they are Indigenous reporters,” she says, pointing out that the Oneida Nation, of which Dockstader is a citizen, is one of the six that comprise Six Nations of the Grand River. “When you are in your home territory and you have familial connections and responsibilities to people, and you understand what those are – our laws, our ways of being should mean more and should supersede the expectations of colonial professionalism,” she says. For his work, Dockstader was charged with mischief and failure to comply with a court injunction that was intended to get land defenders off the construction site. The Canadian Association of Journalists and Canadian Journalists for Free Expression immediately condemned, “in the strongest possible terms, the Ontario Provincial Police’s decision to arrest and lay charges against an award-winning Indigenous journalist.” Three and a half months later, the Crown withdrew the charges, saying there was no reasonable prospect of conviction. In its 2021 World Press Freedom Index report, Reporters Without Borders noted the ongoing criminalization of journalists who cover Indigenous land defence in its critique of Canada’s track record on press freedom. Making power visible Journalists covering land defence stories often report on “divisions” within communities as a way to represent the diverse ideas and perspectives Indigenous people have on issues like resource development, land stewardship, and protection of collective rights. But without historical context and an eye to power, journalists often end up supporting colonial power structures, says Hayden King, who is Anishinaabe from Beausoleil First Nation and the executive director of the Yellowhead Institute, an Indigenous-led research centre at Ryerson University. “This whole notion of factionalism can be its own narrative trope,” he explains. “If reporters had the tools to critically assess who will benefit from the story [they’re] telling, it might offer some correctives to how that story is told.” Six Nations’ most recent chief and council – elected by less than 10 per cent of eligible voters – signed an accommodations agreement with the housing developer in 2019. However, the Haudenosaunee Confederacy Chiefs Council, which represents Six Nations’ traditional governance system, has never consented to the development and has publicly supported 1492 Land Back Lane. Skye says it’s crucial that journalists reporting on the land reclamation recognize the ways colonialism has disrupted Haudenosaunee decision-making processes. “Through the imposition of the Indian Act, certain people have been elevated into positions of power, [into] systems of hierarchies,” she explains. “It’s one of the ways that colonialism continues to hold Indigenous people back.” People often respond to colonial oppression by conforming to the system in order to access power, Skye says. “A lot of people see that as a way to our safety, a way to our success, and I try to always remember that and not to hold a person personally responsible for it. But you have to have that simultaneous contextualization of where people sit and the kind of access to powers that they have, which ultimately informs their opinions and their positions.” For Wallace, simply incorporating different perspectives into a story isn’t good enough. “We don’t need more ‘both sides’ reporting as a matter of course. We need a reckoning with the cultural forces of white supremacy and patriarchy themselves – these animating fantasies of superiority,” they write. “That requires a new framework for journalism – one that doesn’t shy away from analyzing and naming power and oppression.”

#### The construction of the end of the world relies on an all lives matter discourse which distorts the perception of events – that ignores the material reality that the global south experiences extinction level events every day which injects the notion of white heroism

Mitchell and Chaudry 20 (Audra Mitchell and Aadita Chaudry; 2020; International Relations, Vol. 34, Issue 3; *“Worlding beyond ‘the’ ‘end’ of ‘the world’: white apocalyptic visions and BIPOC futurisms”*; accessed 1/27/22; <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0047117820948936>; Audra Mitchell is a settler scholar living on Haudenosaunee, Anishinaabe, and Attawandaron lands in what is currently called Canada. She holds the Canada Research Chair in Global Political Ecology at the Balsillie School of International Affairs. Audra has published widely on the subjects of extinction, large-scale ecological harms, more-than-human ethics, ecological thought, and violence studies. Audra’s current work focuses on understanding the role of colonization, genocide, land-based gendered and sexual violence and extractivism in driving global patterns of extinction; Aadita Chaudhury is a settler PhD candidate in science and technology studies at York University, in Tkaronto (Toronto) in what is now Canada. She is currently completing her dissertation project on exploring global theory and praxis around managing ecosystem fires and narratives surrounding combustion through the lens of capitalism and colonialism.; pages 311-315) HB

White subjectivities Discourses that predict the imminent ‘end of the world’ are not as universal as they often claim to be. The futures they fear for, seek to protect and work to construct are rooted in a particular set of global social structures and subjectivities: whiteness. Whiteness is not reducible to skin pigmentation, genetics or genealogy. It is a set of cultural, political, economic, normative, and subjective structures derived from Eurocentric societies and propagated through global formations such as colonization and capitalism. These multi-scalar structures work by segregating bodies through the inscription of racial difference, privileging those they recognize or construct as ‘white’4 and unequally distributing harms to those that they do not.5 Whiteness is also a form of property6 that accrues benefits – including material, physical, and other forms of security – and pervasive forms of power, across space, time, and social structures. Due in part to its trans-formation through long-duration, global patterns of violence and conquest, whiteness takes unique forms wherever and whenever it coalesces, so it should not be treated as universal – despite its own internal claims to this status. Most of the leading contributors to mainstream ‘end of the world’ discourses discussed in this article are rooted in Euro-American cultural contexts, and in particular in settler colonial and/or imperial states such as the United States, Canada, Australia, and the United Kingdom. As such, the forms of whiteness they embody are linked to particular histories of settlement, frontier cultures, resource-based imperialisms, genocides of Indigenous communities, histories of slavery, and modes of anti-Blackness. Whiteness is remarkable in its ability to render itself invisible to those who possess and benefit from it. Many, if not most, of the (often liberal humanitarian) authors of ‘end of the world’ discourses seem unaware of its integral influence on their thinking, and would almost certainly be horrified at the thought of their work entrenching racialized injustices. We are not suggesting that these authors espouse explicit, intentional and/or extreme racist ideals, on which much public discussion by white people of racism tends to focus.7 Nor do we wish to homogenize or present as equivalent all of the viewpoints discussed in this paper, which display a range of expressions of whiteness and levels of awareness thereof.8 On the contrary, we work to center broad, everyday, structural ways in which underlying logics of whiteness and white supremacy frame and permeate mainstream paradigms and discourses, including those identified as liberal, humanitarian, or progressive. Even amongst white people who consciously and explicitly disavow racism, unconscious, habitual, normalized, structurally-embedded assumptions circulate, and are reproduced in ways that perpetuate race9 as a global power structure. This includes one of the authors of this paper (Mitchell), who, as a white settler,10 continues to benefit from and participate – and thus ‘invest’11 – in structures of whiteness, and therefore has a continual responsibility to confront them (although total divestment is not possible).12 The ‘habits’ of racism13 are reflected strongly in the way that contemporary ‘end of the world’ narratives frame their protagonists: those attributed with meaningful agency and ethical status in the face of global threats; those whose survival or flourishing is prioritized or treated as a bottom line when tradeoffs are imagined and planned; and, crucially, those deemed capable of and entitled to ‘save the world’ and determine its future. This is expressed in several key features of the genre, including its domination by white thinkers; the forms of subjectivity and agency it embraces; and the ways it contrasts its subjects against BIPOC communities. First, contributors to fast-growing fields like the study of ‘existential risk’ or ‘global catastrophic risk’ are overwhelmingly white. As we will see, almost all of the authors identified by the literature review on which this paper is based, and certainly the most influential thinkers in the field, are white. For example, the seminal collection Global Existential Risk, 14 which claims to offer a comprehensive snapshot of this field, is edited by two white male Europeans (Nick Bostrom and Milan Circovic) and authored by an almost entirely white (and all-male) group of scholars. Likewise, the most senior positions within influential think tanks promoting the study of ‘existential risk’, such as the Future of Humanity Institute, the Cambridge Center for the Study of Existential Risk and Humanprogress.org, are dominated by white men, with few exceptions.15 Another expression of this tendency toward epistemic whiteness is found in the habit, prominent amongst white academics, of citing all or mostly-white scholars, which entrenches a politics of citation16 that privileges whiteness and acknowledges only some intersectionalities as relevant.17 As mentioned above, Mitchell’s (2017)18 work offers an example of this tendency: while it engages critical, feminist, and queer postapocalyptic visions written by white authors, it does not center BIPOC perspectives or knowledge systems. These examples do not simply raise issues of numerical representation, nor can whiteness necessarily be dismantled simply by altering these ratios. More importantly, all-white or majority white spaces create epistemes in which most contributors share cultural backgrounds, assumptions, and biases that are rarely challenged by alternative worldviews, knowledge systems or registers of experience. In such epistemes the perceived boundaries of ‘human thought’ are often elided with those of Euro-centric knowledge. For example, influential American settler journalist David Wallace-Wells19 contends that there exists no framework for grasping climate change besides ‘mythology and theology’. In so doing, he ignores centuries of ongoing, systematic observation and explicit articulations of concern by BIPOC knowledge keepers about climactic change. The bracketing of BIPOC knowledges not only severely limits the rigor of discourses on global crises, but also, as bi-racial organizer and thinker adrienne maree brown20 argues, it produces distorted outcomes. For instance, it smuggles normative judgments that ‘turn Brown bombers into terrorists and white bombers into mentally ill victims’ into apparently ‘objective’ claims. Similarly, the influential work of Black American criminologist Ruth Wilson Gilmore21 demonstrates how white imaginaries of the threat posed by BIPOC bodies has produced the massive global penal complex and the radically unequal distribution of life chances. In short, imaginaries create worlds, so it matters greatly whose are privileged, and whose are excluded. Further, emerging narratives of the ‘end of the world’ explicitly center figures of whiteness as their protagonists – as the survivors of apocalypse, the subjects capable of saving the world from it, and as those most threatened. In these discourses, ‘survivors’ are framed as saviors able to protect and/or regenerate and even improve Western forms of governance and social order by leveraging resilience, scientific prowess, and technological genius. For example, the cover of American settler scientists Tony Barnosky and Elizabeth Hadley’s book Tipping Points for Planet Earth features a stylized male ‘human’ whom they identify as former California governor Jerry Brown (a powerful white settler politician) holding the earth back from rolling over a cliff.22 Similarly, presenting a thought experiment about the planet’s future, Homer-Dixon23 asks his readers to imagine ‘an average male – call him John’ (in fact, the most popular male name globally at the time of writing was Mohammed). This is followed by images of a Caucasian male dressed in safari or hiking gear – both emblematic of symbols colonial conquest24 – tasked with choosing from two forks on a path, as imagined by white American poet Robert Frost. This image of rugged masculine whiteness, embodied in physical strength, colonial prowess, and the ability to dominate difficult landscapes is mirrored in his framing of his former co-workers on oil rigs in the Canadian prairies25 as models of resilience. Similarly, American settler science writer Annalee Newitz26 proposes the Canadian province of Saskatchewan as a ‘model for human survival’, based on her perceptions of the resilience, persistence and collaborative frontier attitudes of its people. Saskatchewan is a notoriously racist part of Canada, in which violence against Indigenous people continues to be integral to its white-dominated culture27 – yet this polity and its culture are held up by Newitz as a model of ‘human’ resilience. By imagining subjects in whom whiteness is elided with resilience and survival, these discourses not only normalize and obscure the modes of violence and oppression through which perceived ‘resilience’ – or, in blunt terms, preferential access to survival – is achieved. They also work to displace the threat of total destruction ‘onto others who are seen as lacking the resourcefulness of the survivor’.28 In addition, many ‘end of the world’ narratives interpellate subjects of white privilege by assuming that readers are not (currently) affected by the harms distributed unequally by global structures of environmental racism. For instance, Barnosky and Hadley29 (italics ours) state, ‘if you are anything like we are, you probably think of pollution as somebody else’s problem. . . you probably don’t live near a tannery, mine dump or any other source of pollution’. For many people of color, living near a source of pollution may be nearly inescapable as a result of structural-material discrimination, including zoning practices and the accessibility of housing.30 Viewing ecological harms as ‘someone else’s problem’ is a privilege afforded to those who have never been forced contemplate the destruction of their communities or worlds.31 At the same time, these authors – along with many others working in the genre – invoke narratives akin to ‘all lives matter’ or ‘colour-blindness’32 that erase unequal distributions of harm and threat. For instance, during their international travels for scientific research and leisure, Barnosky and Hadley (italics ours) describe a dawning awareness that ‘the problems we were writing about. . . were everybody’s problems. . .no one was escaping the impacts. . . including us’. They go on to frame as equivalent flooding in Pakistan that displaced 20million people and killed 2000 with the inconveniences caused by the temporary flooding of the New York subway system in 2012. In addition, they cite evidence of endocrine disruption in American girls caused by pollution, stating that the youngest of the cohort are African American and Latina but that ‘the most dramatic increase is in Caucasian girls’33 (italics ours). In this framing, even though BIPOC children remain most adversely affected, white children are pushed to the foreground and framed as more urgently threatened in relative terms. These comparisons background the disproportionate burden of ecological harm born by BIPOC, and reflect a stark calculus of the relative value of white and BIPOC lives. The ‘all lives matter’ logic employed here constructs ‘a universal human frailty’34 in which responsibility for ecological threats is attributed to ‘humans’ in general, and the assignment of specific culpability is avoided. While Newitz avers that ‘assigning blame [for ecological harm] is less important than figuring out how to. . . survive’,35 we argue that accurately attributing responsibility is crucial to opening up futures in which it is possible to dismantle the structural oppressions that unequally distribute harms and chances for collective survival. Preoccupation with the subjects of whiteness in ‘end of the world’ discourses is also reflected in the framing of BIPOC communities as threats to the survival of ‘humanity’. These fears are perhaps most simply and starkly expressed in anxieties over population decline within predominantly white countries, paired with palpable fear of rising birth rates amongst BIPOC communities. Chillingly, such fears are often connected to the mere biological survival of BIPOC, and the reproductive capacities of Black and Brown bodies – especially those coded as ‘female’, and therefore ‘fertile’ within colonial gender binaries.36 For instance, in his treatise on ‘over’-population, American settler science writer Alan Weisman addresses the ‘problem’ raised by the likely significant increase of survival rates (especially amongst children) as a result of widely-available cures for illnesses such as malaria or HIV. Since, he avers, it would be ‘unconscionable’ to withhold these vaccines, Weisman suggests that malaria and HIV research funding should also promote family planning – that is, control of BIPOC fertility – since ‘there’s no vaccine against extinction’.37 Here, BIPOC survival and reproductivity is literally – even if not strictly intentionally – framed as an incurable disease that could culminate in ‘extinction’. Although some of these discussions examine total growth in human populations globally,38 much of this research focuses on relative population sizes, usually of BIPOCmajority places to those inscribed as white. For instance, British doctor John Guillebaud predicts a ‘birth dearth’ in Europe while likening ‘unremitting population growth’ in other parts of the world to ‘the doctrine of the cancer cell’.39 Although these regions are described in various ways throughout the genre – for instance, as ‘poor’ or ‘developing’, the areas slated for growth are almost always BIPOC-majority. For example, Hungarian demographer Paul Demeny (italics ours) argues that Europe’s population is steadily shrinking ‘while nearby populations explode’.40 Drawing on Demeny’s work, HomerDixon warns of a future 3:1 demographic ratio between North Africa/West Asia and Europe, along with 70% growth in Bangladesh, 140% growth in Kenya, and a doubling of the populations of Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Nigeria. Directly after sharing these statistics, he appends a list of international news reports referring to, for example, clashes between Indigenous communities in Kenya, riots in Shanghai, and murder rates in Mexico.41 In so doing, he directly juxtaposes BIPOC population growth with stereotypes of violence and ‘incivility’. BIPOC are often represented in these narratives as embodiments of ecological collapse and threat, embedding the assumption that ‘black people don’t care about the environment’,42 and that the global ‘poor’ will always prioritize short-term economic needs above ecological concerns. This belief is reflected in travelogue-style descriptions of ecological devastation, including Barnosky and Hadley’s musings, while on holiday in Utah, that the ancient Puebloan society collapsed because they had run out of water – a situation which they project onto future Sudan, Somalia, and Gaza. In addition, they diagnose the fall of what they call the ‘extinct’ Mayan community to overpopulation and over-exploitation of resources – despite the survivance43 of over 6million Mayan people in their Ancestral lands and other places at the time of writing.44 These descriptions chime with the common refrain on the part of settler states that BIPOC are unable to care properly for their land, even in the absence of conflicting data. This constructed ignorance allows those states to frame BIPOC territories as ‘wasteland’ awaiting annexation or improvement, or as dumping grounds for the externalities of capitalism.45 What’s more, the use of BIPOC communities as cautionary tales for planetary destruction strongly suggests that the redistribution of global power, land ownership, and other forms of agency toward BIPOC structures would result in ecological disaster.

#### The alternative is a refusal of the affirmative – an engagement in the process of decentering settler subjectivities and injecting indigenous knowledge – in this project, refusal constitutes a multi-faceted method towards decolonization

Grande 18 (Sandy Grande; 2018; Routledge Publishing; *“Refusing the University,”* a chapter in the series of essays *“Toward What Justice?: Describing Diverse Dreams of Justice in Education”*; accessed 12/22/21; ask me for the pdf; Sandy Grande is associate professor and Chair of the Education Department at Connecticut College. Her research interfaces critical Indigenous theories with the concerns of education; 58-62) HB

Taking into account the power relations of both capitalism and white supremacy, Indigenous scholars posit refusal as a positive stance that is: less oriented around attaining an affirmative form of recognition… and more about critically revaluating, reconstructing and redeploying culture and tradition in ways that seek to prefigure… a radical alternative to the structural and psycho-affective facets of colonial domination. (Coulthard, 2007, p. 456) In this way, Indigenous refusal both negatively rejects the (false) promise of inclusion and other inducements of the settler state and positively asserts Indigenous sovereignty and peoplehood. In Mohawk Interruptus (2014), Audra Simpson theorizes refusal as distinct from resistance in that it does not take authority as a given. More specifically, at the heart of the text, she theorizes refusal at the “level of method and representation,” exposing the colonialist underpinnings of the “demand to know” as a settler logic. In response, she develops the notion of ethnographic refusal as a stance or space for Indigenous subjects to limit access to what is knowable and to being known, articulating how refusal works “in everyday encounters to enunciate repeatedly to ourselves and to outsiders that ‘this is who we are, this is who you are, these are my rights’” (Simpson, 2007, p. 73). Mignolo (2011) and Quijano (1991) similarly take up refusal in relation to knowledge formation, asserting Indigenous knowledge itself as a form of refusal; a space of epistemic disobedience that is “delinked” from Western, liberal, capitalist understandings of knowledge as production. Gómez-Barris (2012) theorizes the Mapuche hunger strikes as “an extreme bodily performance and political instantiation” of refusal, an act wherein their starving bodies upon the land literally enact what it means to live in a state of permanent war (p. 120). Understood as expressions of sovereignty, such acts of refusal threaten the settler state, carrying dire if not deadly consequences for Indigenous subjects. As noted by Ferguson (2015), “capitalist settler states prefer resistance” because it can be “negotiated or recognized,” but refusal “throws into doubt” the entire system and is therefore more dangerous. While within the university the consequences of academic refusal are much less dire, they still carry a risk. To refuse inclusion offends institutional authorities offering “the gift” of belonging, creating conditions of precarity for the refuser. For example, refusal to participate in the politics of respectability that characterizes institutional governance can result in social isolation, administrative retribution, and struggles with self-worth. Similarly, the refusal to comply with the normative structures of tenure and promotion (e.g., emphasizing quantity over quality; publishing in “mainstream” journals) can and does lead to increased marginalization, exploitation, and job loss.16 And, in a system where Indigenous scholars comprise less than 1% of the professorate, such consequences not only bear hardships for individuals but also whole communities. That said, academic “rewards” and inducements accessed through recognition-based politics can have even deeper consequences. As Jodi Byrd (2011) reminds us, the colonization of Indigenous lands, bodies, and minds will not be ended by “further inclusion or more participation” (Byrd, 2011, p. xxvi). The inspirational work of Black radical and Indigenous scholars compels thinking beyond the limits of academic recognition and about the generative spaces of refusal that not only reject settler logics but also foster possibilities of co-resistance. The prospect of coalition re-raises one of the initial animating questions of this chapter: What kinds of solidarities can be developed among peoples with a shared commitment to working beyond the imperatives of capital and the settler state? Clearly, despite the ubiquitous and often overly facile calls for solidarity, building effective coalitions is deeply challenging, even among insurgent scholars. Within this particular context, tensions between Indigenous sovereignty and decolonial projects and anti-racist, social justice projects, raise a series of suspicions: whether calls for Indigenous sovereignty somehow elide the a priori condition of blackness (the “unsovereign” subject),17 whether anti-racist struggles sufficiently account for Indigenous sovereignty as a land-based struggle elucidated outside regimes of property, and whether theorizations of settler colonialism sufficiently account for the forces and structures of white supremacy, racial slavery, and antiblackness. Rather than posit such tensions as terminally incommensurable, however, I want to suggest a parallel politics of dialectical co-resistance. When Black peoples can still be killed but not murdered; when Indians are still made to disappear; when (Indigenous) land and Black bodies are still destroyed and accumulated for settler profit; it is incumbent upon all those who claim a commitment to refusing the white supremacist, capitalist, settler state, to do the hard work of building “interconnected movements for decolonization” (Coulthard, 2014). The struggle is real. It is both material and psychological, both method and politics, and thus must necessarily straddle the both/and (as opposed to either/or) coordinates of revolutionary change. In terms of process, this means working simultaneously beyond resistance and through the enactment of refusal—as fugitive, abolitionist, and Indigenous, sovereign subjects. Within the context of the university, this means replacing calls for more inclusive and diverse, safe spaces within the university with the development of a network of sovereign, safe houses outside the university. Kelley reminds us of the long history of this struggle, recalling the Institute of the Black World at Atlanta University (1969), the Mississippi Freedom Schools, and the work of Black feminists Patricia Robinson, Donna Middleton, and Patricia Haden as inspirational models. As a contemporary model, he references Harney and Moten’s vision of the undercommons as a space of possibility: a fugitive space wherein the pursuit of knowledge is not perceived as a path toward upward mobility and material wealth but rather as a means toward eradicating oppression in all of its forms (Undercommoning Collective). The ultimate goal, according to Kelley (2016), is to create in the present a future that overthrows the logic of neoliberalism. Scholars within Native studies similarly build upon a long tradition of refusing the university, theorizing from and about sovereignty through land-based models of education. Whereas a fugitive flees and seeks to escape, the Indigenous stands ground or, as Deborah Bird points out, “to get in the way of settler colonization, all the native has to do is stay at home” (as cited in Wolfe, 2006, p. 388). The ultimate goal of Indigenous refusal is Indigenous resurgence; a struggle that includes but is not limited to the return of Indigenous land. Again, while the aims may be different (and in some sense competing), efforts toward the development of parallel projects of co-resistance are possible through vigilant and sustained engagement. The “common ground” here is not necessarily literal but rather conceptual, a corpus of shared ethics and analytics: anti-capitalist, feminist, anti-colonial. Rather than allies, we are accomplices—plotting the death but not murder of the settler university. Toward this end, I offer some additional strategies for refusing the university: First and foremost, we need to commit to collectivity—to staging a refusal of the individualist promise project of the settler state and its attendant institutions. This requires that we engage in a radical and ongoing reflexivity about who we are and how we situate ourselves in the world. This includes but is not limited to a refusal of the cycle of individualized inducements—particularly, the awards, appointments, and grants that require complicity or allegiance to institutions that continue to oppress and dispossess. It is also a call to refuse the perceived imperative to self-promote, to brand one’s work and body. This includes all the personal webpages, incessant Facebook updates, and Twitter feeds featuring our latest accomplishments, publications, grants, rewards, etc. etc. Just. Make. It. Stop. The journey is not about self—which means it is not about promotion and tenure—it is about the disruption and dismantling of those structures and processes that create hierarchies of individual worth and labor. Second, we must commit to reciprocity—the kind that is primarily about being answerable to those communities we claim as our own and those we claim to serve. It is about being answerable to each other and our work. One of the many things lost to the pressures of the publish-or-perish, quantity-over-quality neoliberal regime is the loss of good critique. We have come to confuse support with sycophantic praise and critical evaluation with personal injury. Through the ethic of reciprocity, we need to remind ourselves that accountability to the collective requires a commitment to engage, extend, trouble, speak back to, and intensify our words and deeds. Third, we need to commit to mutuality, which implies reciprocity but is ultimately more encompassing. It is about the development of social relations not contingent upon the imperatives of capital—that refuses exploitation at the same time as it radically asserts connection, particularly to land. Inherent to a land-based ethic is a commitment to slowness and to the arc of inter-generational resurgence and transformation. One of the many ways that the academy recapitulates colonial logics is through the overvaluing of fast, new, young, and individualist voices and the undervaluing of slow, elder, and collective ones. And in such a system, relations and paradigms of connection, mutuality, and collectivity are inevitably undermined. For Indigenous peoples, such begin and end with land, centering questions of what it means to be a good relative. Toward this end, I have been thinking a lot lately about the formation of a new scholarly collective, one that writes and researches under a nom de guerre—like the Black feminist scholars and activists who wrote under and through the Combahee River Collective or the more recent collective of scholars and activists publishing as “the uncertain commons.”18 If furthering the aims of insurgence and resurgence (and not individual recognition) is what we hold paramount, then perhaps one of the most radical refusals we can authorize is to work together as one; to enact a kind of Zapatismo scholarship and a balaclava politics where the work of the collectivity is intentionally structured to obscure and transcend the single voice, body, and life. Together we could write in refusal of liberal, essentialist forms of identity politics, of individualist inducements, of capitalist imperatives, and other productivist logics of accumulation. This is what love as refusal looks like. It is the un-demand, the un-desire to be either of or in the university. It is the radical assertion to be on: land. Decolonial love is land.

#### The role of the ballot should be to center indigenous scholarship – any project of research should begin and end with placing the indigenous demands and resistance at it’s forefront. Our role as settlers specifically obligates us to center our politics in the context of ensuring accountability

Carlson 16 (Elizabeth Carlson; 10/21/16; Settler Colonial Studies; *“Anti-colonial methodologies and practices for settler colonial studies”*; accessed 12/28/21; ask me for the pdf; Elizabeth Carlson is an Assistant Professor at the School of Social Work at Laurentian University; pages 9-10) HB

Relational and epistemic accountability to Indigenous peoples Arlo Kempf says that ‘where anticolonialism is a tool used to invoke resistance for the colonized, it is a tool used to invoke accountability for the colonizer’. 42 Relational accountability should be a cornerstone of settler colonial studies. I believe settler colonial studies and scholars should ethically and overtly place themselves in relationship to the centuries of Indigenous oral, and later academic scholarship that conceptualizes and resists settler colonialism without necessarily using the term: SCT may be revelatory to many settler scholars, but Indigenous people have been speaking for a long time about colonial continuities based on their lived experiences. Some SCTs have sought to connect with these discussions and to foreground Indigenous resistance, survival and agency. Others, however, seem to use SCT as a pathway to explain the colonial encounter without engaging with Indigenous people and experiences – either on the grounds that this structural analysis already conceptually explains Indigenous experience, or because Indigenous resistance is rendered invisible.43 Ethical settler colonial theory (SCT) would recognize the foundational role Indigenous scholarship has in critiques of settler colonialism. It would acknowledge the limitations of settler scholars in articulating settler colonialism without dialogue with Indigenous peoples, and take as its norm making this dialogue evident. In my view, it is critical that we not view settler colonial studies as a new or unique field being established, which would enact a discovery narrative and contribute to Indigenous erasure, but rather take a longer and broader view. Indigenous oral and academic scholars are indeed the originators of this work. This space is not empty. Of course, powerful forces of socialization and discipline impact scholars in the academy. There is much pressure to claim unique space, to establish a name for ourselves, and to make academic discoveries. I am suggesting that settler colonial studies and anti-colonial scholars resist these hegemonic pressures and maintain a higher anti-colonial ethic. As has been argued, ‘the theory itself places ethical demands on us as settlers, including the demand that we actively refuse its potential to re-empower our own academic voices and to marginalize Indigenous resistance’. 44 As settler scholars, we can reposition our work relationally and contextually with humility and accountability. We can centre Indigenous resistance, knowledges, and scholarship in our work, and contextualize our work in Indigenous sovereignty. We can view oral Indigenous scholarship as legitimate scholarly sources. We can acknowledge explicitly and often the Indigenous traditions of resistance and scholarship that have taught us and provided the foundations for our work. If our work has no foundation of Indigenous scholarship and mentorship, I believe our contributions to settler colonial studies are even more deeply problematic.

## Case

### Method

1. Extinction narratives bad – cause the inability to make policy decisions because they don’t know which threat to address first

#### **Ukraine overwhelms the link – the Polish want the PiS because of the rally effect**

Szczerbiak 3/3 ((Aleks Szczerbiak; 3/3/22; The London School of Economics and Political Science; *“How will the war in Ukraine affect Polish politics?”*; accessed 3/10/22; https://notesfrompoland.com/2022/03/03/how-will-the-war-in-ukraine-affect-polish-politics/; Aleks Szczerbiak is Professor of Politics and Contemporary European Studies at the University of Sussex. He is author of Poland Within the European Union? New Awkward Partner or New Heart of Europe?(Routledge, 2012) and ‘Politicising the Communist Past: The Politics of Truth Revelation in Post-Communist Poland‘ (Routledge 2018). He blogs regularly about developments on the Polish political scene) HB

However, the war in Ukraine has now completely overshadowed all of these issues and is likely to consolidate support for PiS. The ruling party will probably benefit from what political scientists call the “rally effect”: an inevitable psychological tendency for worried citizens to unite around their political leaders and institutions as the embodiment of national unity when they feel that their country faces a dramatic crisis or external threat. It is too early to tell how significant, or long-lasting, a boost for PiS the crisis might provide. But there were already some indications that the party’s polling numbers had started to tick up, even before the outbreak of armed hostilities. According to the E-wybory website, which aggregates voting intention surveys, PiS averaged 34% opinion poll support in February – an increase of 3% compared to January, although still well short of the 40% average that it enjoyed until autumn 2020, and which would allow the party to secure an outright parliamentary majority. Warsaw’s raised international profile PiS argues that it has taken a series of measures to make Poland more militarily self-sufficient. The latest of these is the so-called “homeland defence law” (ustawa o obronie ojczyzny) which, if approved by parliament, will accelerate the pace of increased defence spending and double the size of the Polish armed forces. However, much of the media spotlight has focused on the government’s international role in trying to resolve the crisis. This has provided Warsaw with an opportunity to raise its diplomatic and military profile as a key strategic regional player. Given Poland’s critical geographical location, and the fact that it is NATO’s largest member and top defence spender in the region, the country plays a pivotal role in the alliance’s security relationship with Moscow. The Polish government and PiS-backed President Andrzej Duda have been at the forefront of efforts to persuade the Western international community to develop a common, robust response to what they always saw as Russian President Vladimir Putin’s neo-imperialist de-stabilisation of the region, and specifically to ensure that sanctions on Moscow were maintained and extended. PiS has, for a long time, criticised Germany and other Western powers for their over-conciliatory approach towards developing economic and diplomatic relations with Moscow over the heads of their European allies. This was exemplified by the controversial Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline, which runs directly from Russia to Germany across the bed of the Baltic Sea bypassing Poland and Ukraine; and which Berlin has now belatedly suspended approval of. Indeed, some observers argued that pressure from the Polish government, and specifically prime minister Mateusz Morawiecki, played a pivotal role in persuading Germany to make an abrupt change of course after the invasion started by agreeing to reverse its historical non-intervention policy and send weapons to Ukraine, as well to increase defence spending to over 2% of the country’s GDP (a level considered a minimum by NATO), and block Russian access to the Swift international payments system (having initially opposed such tough economic sanctions). The crisis has also been an opportunity to improve Warsaw’s fraught relations with the US Biden administration. PiS enjoyed very strong ties with Joe Biden’s predecessor Donald Trump, whom it came to see as a conservative ideological soulmate. This, together with Biden’s pivot back to developing stronger ties with the EU political establishment (especially Germany), made it considerably more difficult for Warsaw to pursue its international policy agenda. However, Polish-US relations already started to improve last December when Duda vetoed a controversial media law that the USA felt threatened the commercial interests of the American-owned Polish TVN broadcaster, which takes a strongly anti-PiS editorial line. Now Poland has become the main destination for new US troops arriving in the region since January to strengthen NATO’s Eastern flank. The Biden administration also announced a $6 billion weapons sale to Warsaw, which included 250 M1 Abrams tanks. A tricky situation for the opposition At the same time, the opposition parties lack the instruments to exert any real influence at the international level, and, for the sake of national unity, have largely refrained from criticising the government overtly, for the moment at least. Moreover, all the main Polish political groupings share the goal of strengthening Ukraine’s pro-Western orientation and countering Russian expansionism. Eastern policy has generally emerged in the context of domestic politics as a so-called ‘valence’ issue: where parties agree on overall objectives but compete over which of them is the most competent to deliver on these shared goals. However, while agreeing with the government’s assessments of Russia’s actions and the potential threat that they pose to Polish national security, some sections of the opposition have tried to develop talking points critical of PiS. For example, the liberal-centrist Civic Platform (PO) – the country’s governing party between 2007-14 and currently the main opposition grouping – called upon PiS to end its conflict with the EU political establishment over “rule of law” issues as quickly as possible, by abandoning its controversial judicial reforms. PiS has been in an ongoing dispute with the EU institutions who agree with the criticisms levelled by Poland’s legal establishment and most opposition parties that these reforms undermine judicial independence and threaten the key democratic principle of the constitutional separation of powers. PO has argued that PiS’s conflict with the EU political establishment undermined national security by weakening Poland’s anchoring in the West and efforts to build alliances within Europe. The Ukrainian conflict, they said, also highlighted the fact that the main threat to Poland came from Moscow not Brussels or Berlin. The government’s supporters countered that raising the “rule of law” dispute at this time made PO’s appeals for national unity appear hollow, particularly as the opposition party also implied an equivalence between PiS’s reforms and the lack of judicial independence in Russia. Moreover, PiS rejected the opposition’s critique of its reforms arguing that, following Poland’s flawed transition to democracy in 1989, the judiciary, like many key Polish institutions, was expropriated by and represented the interests of an extremely well-entrenched, and often deeply corrupt, post-communist elite, which then co-opted a new legal establishment that perpetuated its legacy. PiS’s supporters also argued that the EU political establishment had used the “rule of law” issue as a pretext and that the root of the conflict stemmed from the fact that the Polish government had, they said, adopted a more robust and assertive approach towards defending and advancing the country’s national identity and interests within the EU. At the same time, however, over the last few weeks the PiS government and President Duda have been making a concerted effort to de-escalate the dispute with Brussels. This was mainly to secure Polish access to EU funds that the European Commission is blocking, but also to help the West present a united front in the face of Russian aggression in Ukraine. Moreover, by raising the “rule of law” issue, the opposition misread the national mood which, for the moment at least, seems to want its political leaders to focus solely on the Ukrainian crisis and put other contentious issues to one side. Disputes over international party links Previously, opposition parties also strongly criticised attempts by PiS to develop links with right-wing Eurosceptic parties that have enjoyed close ties with Moscow, such as Marine Le Pen’s French National Rally and the Hungarian Fidesz grouping led by Viktor Orbán, the ruling party’s closest EU ally. For example, in January PO leader Donald Tusk, a former European Council President and Polish prime minister between 2007 and 2014, criticised Morawiecki for attending a summit meeting in Madrid involving these and other parties, which he described as “a de facto meeting of the anti-Ukrainian international”. PiS countered by acknowledging that these parties sometimes had a different view of Moscow to Poland, but also pointing out that the Madrid summit’s final declaration unequivocally condemned Russian military operations on Ukraine’s border (although the version posted on Le Pen’s website apparently made no mention of this). PiS also argued that, in terms of practical policy preferences, the parties represented at the Madrid summit were no more pro-Moscow than many European centre-right and centre-left parties with whom the Polish opposition was closely allied and whose leaders often had business interests in, and close economic ties with, Russia. Indeed, immediately prior to the Russian invasion, Morawiecki called upon Tusk to resign as president of the centre-right European People’s Party (EPP) transnational federation, which he dubbed the “Nord Stream 2 party” due to the critical role played by the German Christian Democrats (the grouping’s leading member) in the development of the controversial Russo-German pipeline. Leaving a lasting political footprint? The Russian invasion of Ukraine has completely dominated political debate in Poland, overshadowing all other issues. In addition to benefiting from the “rally effect”, PiS has been able to portray Warsaw as a key regional player while the opposition has no instruments to exert any real international influence. Politicians are also acutely aware that most Poles feel that traditional partisan political divides pale into insignificance when the country faces such a major geopolitical security threat. Given this overwhelming imperative for national unity, for the moment at least disputes over PiS’s “rule of law” conflict and other previously salient domestic political issues are on the back-burner. The same is true of disputes over the two main parties’ international links which, until just before the Russian invasion, were also a source of bitter political disagreement.

#### The PiS will retain support – media shifts are a drop in the bucket

* Law and Justice is the english translation of the PiS party

Szczerbiak 19 (Aleks Szczerbiak; 10/1/19; The London School of Economics and Political Science; *“Why is Poland’s Law and Justice party still so popular?”*; accessed 3/10/22; <https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2019/10/01/why-is-polands-law-and-justice-party-still-so-popular/>; Aleks Szczerbiak is Professor of Politics and Contemporary European Studies at the University of Sussex. He is author of Poland Within the European Union? New Awkward Partner or New Heart of Europe?(Routledge, 2012) and ‘Politicising the Communist Past: The Politics of Truth Revelation in Post-Communist Poland‘ (Routledge 2018). He blogs regularly about developments on the Polish political scene) HB

So why is Law and Justice still so popular? Firstly, and perhaps most importantly, the party is trusted by voters on the socio-economic issues that they care most about because it has delivered on many of the high-profile social spending pledges which were the key to Law and Justice’s 2015 election success. The most significant of these was its extremely popular flagship ‘500 plus’ child subsidy programme which was extended this year to cover all families with any number of children. The ‘500 plus’ programme has had an important symbolic effect, providing a significant and clearly identifiable financial boost to many low-income households who felt frustrated that they had not shared sufficiently in Poland’s post-communist economic transformation. Many Poles feel that, while politicians often promised to help the less well-off, Law and Justice is the first governing party to actually deliver on these pledges on such a scale. At the same time, although the government’s opponents argue that the huge expansion of social spending and tax cuts places a massive strain on public finances, economic growth is strong, unemployment at its lowest for years, and increased tax revenues have actually led to a reduction in the state budget deficit. At a September election rally launching the party’s plans to build a ‘prosperous state’ (państwo dobrobytu) grounded in social solidarity, Law and Justice augmented its array of social welfare commitments by announcing plans to almost double the minimum wage by the end of 2023, and introduce regular annual cash bonus payments for pensioners and retirees. Together with earlier social welfare spending pledges, these programmes are aimed at raising the electoral stakes for key groups of Law and Justice core voters, thereby encouraging them to vote in October out of fear that the opposition may water them down or abandon them if it were to win office. Defending national identity and traditional values Secondly, Law and Justice has put itself at the head of a moral crusade projecting the party as the defender of the traditional family, Polish national identity, and Christian values and culture. These, it argues, stabilise the social order and promote the common good but are threatened by ‘a great offensive of evil’ (wielka ofensywa zła). Initially, this could be seen in the party’s strong opposition to the EU’s extremely unpopular compulsory migrant relocation scheme in the run-up to the 2015 election, when Law and Justice argued that Muslim migrants from the Middle East and North Africa would be difficult to assimilate and threatened Poland’s national security. More recently, the party has opposed what it terms ‘LGBT ideology’: an allegedly aggressive movement and policy agenda based on foreign ideas promoted by left-wing enemies of western civilisation. These are certainly polarising issues that strike an emotional chord with many Poles because they involve a clash of basic moral-cultural values and map on to some of the deepest divisions in Polish society. A defence of traditional moral codes and pushing back against western cultural liberalism has always been a key element of Law and Justice’s appeal to more socially conservative voters. Consequently, raising the issue’s salience (according to the opposition, cynically as a pretext to create an atmosphere of moral panic) certainly helps to mobilise the party’s core supporters in smaller towns and rural areas where such values still hold considerable sway. But Law and Justice has framed its arguments so that they do not simply mobilise its core electorate but also win broader public support for the party. The vast majority of Poles supported the Law and Justice government’s strong opposition to the EU’s mandatory relocation scheme, keen to avoid the kind of cultural and security problems that they felt western European countries have experienced through admitting large numbers of Muslim migrants. The fact that, unlike in many western European cities, there have been no Islamist terrorist attacks in Poland increased Poles’ sense that they lived in a relatively safe country and that this was threatened by alleged EU-imposed multi-culturalism. Similarly, while Poles appear to be increasingly tolerant of LGBT lifestyles, popular acceptance starts to decline when the agenda moves beyond how individuals choose to live their private lives into areas which they feel belong to the realm of family life, such as proposals that appear to diminish the role of parents as the primary educators of their children in matters of sexual relations and morality. While Poles are fairly evenly divided on the question of legal recognition of same-sex civil partnerships, a substantial majority oppose same-sex marriage (set out in the Polish Constitution as the union of a man and woman) and are overwhelmingly against granting adoption rights to same-sex couples. Many, including those who are not especially religious, are also extremely hostile to the profanation of Catholic symbols by LGBT activists, as in Poland many of these are also regarded as broader national symbols. Re-distributing prestige Thirdly, the negative publicity surrounding various allegations of government scandals, and the abuse of public office by Law and Justice politicians for partisan or private ends, does not appear to have damaged the ruling party to any great extent. Law and Justice has generally been quick off-the-mark in acting decisively to neutralise these scandals, if necessary by dismissing the implicated officials. For example, in July Marek Kuchciński was forced to resign as Law and Justice parliamentary speaker following allegations that he had used an official aeroplane for private flights. The party’s supporters appear to regard such allegations as either false, the occasional lapses of a generally honest party, or endemic to Polish politics with Law and Justice at least attempting to ensure that it was not only the governing elites that shared in the fruits of economic transformation. Similarly, Law and Justice has been tactically adroit in knowing when to defuse, and not expend too much political capital on, contentious issues, and retreat when the party does not consider these to be priorities or core elements of its governing programme. A good example of this was the abortion issue when, although they personally supported tightening Poland’s already-restrictive law, in autumn 2016, facing an unexpectedly large groundswell of public opposition, Law and Justice parliamentarians voted down legislation sponsored by Catholic civic organisations representing the party’s core ‘religious right’ electorate to make the practice illegal in all cases except when the mother’s life was at risk. Fourthly, Poles have been prepared to cut Law and Justice a lot of slack. For sure, the party has robustly denied the opposition’s allegations that it has undermined democracy and the rule of law. Many Poles accept the government’s argument that its actions were necessary to restore pluralism and balance to institutions which, they said, had been expropriated by extremely well-entrenched, and often deeply corrupt, post-communist elites. Moreover, even if they have misgivings about some of the government’s specific measures, particularly its approach to constitutional issues and civic rights, many others still feel that, for all its faults, Law and Justice was at least attempting to tackle some of the apparently intractable problems with, and shortcomings of, the Polish state which have been ignored by previous administrations. An important element of this – that was linked to but went beyond the simple question of financial transfers – was what some commentators termed the ‘re-distribution of prestige’: whereby many ordinary Poles who previously felt themselves to be second-class citizens started to regain a sense of dignity and that, as they saw it, their government finally cared about the less well-off and was trying to restore an elementary sense of justice and moral order. A weak and unconvincing opposition Finally, Law and Justice has benefited from the fact that the liberal-centrist opposition has failed to develop a convincing and attractive programmatic alternative on key socio-economic issues. The opposition also lacks a convincing figurehead around whom it can rally. Civic Platform leader Grzegorz Schetyna is as an extremely effective behind-the-scenes political operator but lacks dynamism and charisma and is currently Poland’s least trusted politician. Recognising his lack of wider appeal, Mr Schetyna has taken a back-seat in the election campaign with Civic Platform promoting the more emollient but low-key former parliamentary speaker Małgorzata Kidawa-Błońska as its prime ministerial candidate. Opposition strategists recognise that, rather than trying to outbid Law and Justice’s huge expansion of individual social transfers and welfare benefit programmes (although it has promised to continue with them), they should focus instead on improving the quality of public services, especially health and education. However, while many Poles feel that these services have been neglected, they are also dubious as to whether the opposition – which is too associated with the previous, discredited Civic Platform administration – offers a credible alternative and would actually deliver any improvements. Law and Justice’s election victory reflected widespread disillusionment with the country’s ruling elite and a strong prevailing mood that it was time for change, and the ruling party simply has much greater credibility on these social policy issues having implemented most of the spending promises on which it was elected.

#### Democracy no longer solves war---new tech, non-state actors, military autonomy, and eroding institutional constraints overwhelm the internal link---winning one is sufficient because they’re self-reinforcing

Potter, 16 - Assistant Professor in the Department of Politics at the University of Virginia (Philip B.K. Potter, "Four Trends That Could Put the Democratic Peace at Risk," *Political Violence at a Glance*, 10-14-2016,

The point is that it’s not democracy alone that matters. Rather it is the limits that these regimes can put on their leaders to force them to be careful and selective when doing things like making threats and starting fights. This also means it’s not a baked-in advantage that a democracy can take lightly – even well-meaning leaders in democracies have every incentive to figure out how to slip these constraints. Limits yield long-term advantages, but in the immediate term they tie leaders’ hands, preventing them from engaging with the international problems or opportunities that they feel they should.

There are four trends that indicate this process is well under way and is putting the “democratic advantage” at risk.

Militaries are less closely tied to voters

Democratic advantages in conflict are commonly traced to the nature of democratic militaries and their relationship with political power. Going all the way back to Kant, there has been the notion that societies with citizen soldiers and the vote are not going to support unnecessary wars when they are going to bear the costs. The problem is that Kant’s vision isn’t what modern armies look like, and they’re intentionally moving away from the target rather than toward it.

In the US, military service is all-volunteer, and the recruits are increasingly drawn from concentrated segments of society. This divorces the consequences of fighting from the day-to-day experience of most voters. Increasingly, this is a limited force supplemented by private sector contractors, placing even more distance between the individual with the gun and the democratic process.

The emphases on covert operations, Special Forces, and technological superiority further water down the link between society and soldiers. This was, in fact, part of the point of moving to an all-volunteer force and one of the rationales for investments in stealth, information technology, and precision guided munitions, e.g. the precision strike complex. By replacing bodies with dollars, planners have consistently sought to increase the flexibility that the US has in its use of force. In the immediate term, that goal makes sense – it allows policy makers to do what they believe needs to be done without having to worry about a fickle public. But over the long term, it has the potential to lead to less caution and selectivity when engaging in conflicts.

Adversaries are proliferating and changing

The emergence of non-state actors as a primary threat has further loosened constraints on leaders. The shift from the possibility of total war with the Soviet Union to myriad smaller-scale challenges accelerated the transition from a mass military to an elite, highly specialized force more isolated from society. Compounding the challenge, this type of adversary and conflict leads to more significant informational advantages for leaders, which make democratic constraints less binding. Citizens and political opposition are always playing catch-up with the executive when it comes to foreign policy information, but the challenge is harder when the adversaries are less familiar, the engagements shorter, and the issues more complex.

Technology is reducing constraint

New technologies are driving citizens and political opposition ever further out of the loop. The extraordinary rise of unmanned vehicles in combat reduces the risk of casualties and extends the range for projecting force. This has undeniable strategic advantages, but there is less visibility and, accordingly, less accountability associated with the use of this technology. This means leaders worry less about the ex-post constraints and costs that typically come with casualties.

Institutions and practices increasingly favor the president

The recent nuclear agreement with Iran was an executive agreement rather than a treaty. This is the norm – most international agreements are now unilateral actions of the president. A polarized Congress is ever more cautious in its exercise of what little foreign policy power it has; two years into the campaign against Islamic State and Congress still hasn’t weighed in one way or the other. In the US this is an expansion of the widely accepted argument that there are two presidencies – a constrained one in domestic politics and a relatively autonomous one abroad. What’s unappreciated is that this growing presidential autonomy (which may well be needed to run a Superpower) also decreases constraint and with it the foreign policy “advantages” we associate with democracy.

While these advantages are real, they are also fragile. Key institutional constraints – such as a robust political opposition and a knowledgeable citizenry – are susceptible to seemingly minor changes in institutions and/or practices that loosen the limits of leaders’ foreign policy decisions. As technologies advance, threats shift, and institutional constraints wax and wane, the foreign policy advantages embedded within democratic systems may begin to erode. The potential for such a shift is a possibility that should not be taken lightly.

### DemoPromo Bad

#### Demopromo antagonizes China – they’re currently peacefully cooperating on issues, but trying to sideline them on the world stage makes risk management impossible.

Burrows and Manning ‘21

[Matthew Burrows, American intelligence and strategic foresight expert and author, and Robert Manning, senior fellow at the Atlantic Council. 07/27/2021. “The Problem with Biden’s Democracy Agenda,” <https://warontherocks.com/2021/07/the-problem-with-bidens-democracy-agenda/>] pat

Mobilizing allies and likeminded partners into a coalition to shape updated rules and norms on specific issues is, indeed, the requisite beginning of any viable U.S. strategy. But in a multipolar world of diffused power, it is not sufficient as an organizing principle for world order because dealing with any of the global challenges from climate change and nuclear proliferation to future pandemics will require establishing a basis for cooperation with China, along with other autocracies like Russia and the Gulf countries. Dividing the world on the basis of ideology is ill-advised since democracies are not identical and uniting them is hardly as easy or predictable as many seem to think. The past couple of decades of squabbling, sanctions, and tensions over gas pipelines, the Iraq War, and Western relations with Russia and China — to mention only a few contentious issues — demonstrate that shared values between the United States and its closest allies are no guarantee of comity. Other examples include the myriad U.S.-European disputes over climate policy, vaccine nationalism, tech taxation and regulation, Iran, and the Nord Stream 2 pipeline.

Nations, of course, have interests as well as values. Countries — regardless of political system — calculate their interests based on geography, economics, history, and culture as much as values. As Lord Palmerston famously said of the British Empire: “We have no eternal allies, and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual.” Biden, and it seems much conventional wisdom in Washington, wants to turn Lord Palmerston’s words on their head. Promoting democracy has been a key part of U.S. foreign policy rhetoric ever since Woodrow Wilson proclaimed that the United States was making the world safe for democracy by entering World War I. However, the United States is no longer the dominant power it once was and the increasingly contested “rules-based order” is unraveling. The notion that an alliance of democracies can itself define the global order, excluding non-democratic major powers, threatens international stability and global cooperation on the major challenges facing humanity.

Moving forward, the Biden administration should certainly try to generate a common approach on global issues with its allies and partners. However, this should only be as a first step toward negotiating with China, Russia, and others on how to deal with pressing challenges like trade, international and regional security, and climate change. Believing that the United States or the world’s democracies writ large can sideline China and Russia is a recipe for division and strife.

#### It’s specifically true on emerging tech issues which turns their other impact scenario.

Burrows and Manning ‘21

[Matthew Burrows, American intelligence and strategic foresight expert and author, and Robert Manning, senior fellow at the Atlantic Council. 07/27/2021. “The Problem with Biden’s Democracy Agenda,” <https://warontherocks.com/2021/07/the-problem-with-bidens-democracy-agenda/>] pat

Nonetheless, the logic of uniting Western efforts against Chinese technology has limits. First, not all technologies are strategic or dominated by the West. Moreover, although the gap is narrowing, there are significant differences in export controls among the G-7, more so with other democracies, but China’s coercive economic policies are narrowing the gaps. Selling China chips for Huawei cellphones is not necessarily a national security threat, but some Huawei equipment may pose security risks. Technological decoupling should be discrete and selective, not broad-brush.

The Biden administration’s efforts on climate change may actually lead to more interdependence with China. As a recent Financial Times analysis explained, China dominates the sourcing, production, and processing of key clean energy minerals worldwide and is the leader in clean tech manufacturing. It controls some 70 percent or more of lithium-ion battery metals and processing and 90 percent of the rare earth elements that are used in both high-technology weapons systems and offshore wind turbines, and it makes three-quarters of the world’s solar panels.

Most of all, emerging technologies — including AI, 5G, and biosciences — require global standards. The United States and European Union need to overcome divergent technology and regulatory standards (e.g., on privacy and regulating U.S. Big Tech). Separate standards by allied democracies on the one hand and China/Russia on the other on AI or biotechnology would spark a lose-lose race to the bottom.