# Gvine 5

## 1

#### Interpretation: “medicines” is a generic bare plural. The aff may not defend that member nations of the World Trade Organization ought to reduce intellectual property protections for a medicine or subset of medicines.

Nebel 19. [Jake Nebel is an assistant professor of philosophy at the University of Southern California and executive director of Victory Briefs. He writes a lot of this stuff lol – duh.] “Genericity on the Standardized Tests Resolution.” Vbriefly. August 12, 2019. <https://www.vbriefly.com/2019/08/12/genericity-on-the-standardized-tests-resolution/?fbclid=IwAR0hUkKdDzHWrNeqEVI7m59pwsnmqLl490n4uRLQTe7bWmWDO_avWCNzi14> TG

Both distinctions are important. Generic resolutions can’t be affirmed by specifying particular instances. But, since generics tolerate exceptions, plan-inclusive counterplans (PICs) do not negate generic resolutions.

Bare plurals are typically used to express generic generalizations. But there are two important things to keep in mind. First, generic generalizations are also often expressed via other means (e.g., definite singulars, indefinite singulars, and bare singulars). Second, and more importantly for present purposes, bare plurals can also be used to express existential generalizations. For example, “Birds are singing outside my window” is true just in case there are some birds singing outside my window; it doesn’t require birds in general to be singing outside my window.

So, what about “colleges and universities,” “standardized tests,” and “undergraduate admissions decisions”? Are they generic or existential bare plurals? On other topics I have taken great pains to point out that their bare plurals are generic—because, well, they are. On this topic, though, I think the answer is a bit more nuanced. Let’s see why.

“Colleges and universities” is a generic bare plural. I don’t think this claim should require any argument, when you think about it, but here are a few reasons.

First, ask yourself, honestly, whether the following speech sounds good to you: “Eight colleges and universities—namely, those in the Ivy League—ought not consider standardized tests in undergraduate admissions decisions. Maybe other colleges and universities ought to consider them, but not the Ivies. Therefore, in the United States, colleges and universities ought not consider standardized tests in undergraduate admissions decisions.” That is obviously not a valid argument: the conclusion does not follow. Anyone who sincerely believes that it is valid argument is, to be charitable, deeply confused. But the inference above would be good if “colleges and universities” in the resolution were existential. By way of contrast: “Eight birds are singing outside my window. Maybe lots of birds aren’t singing outside my window, but eight birds are. Therefore, birds are singing outside my window.” Since the bare plural “birds” in the conclusion gets an existential reading, the conclusion follows from the premise that eight birds are singing outside my window: “eight” entails “some.” If the resolution were existential with respect to “colleges and universities,” then the Ivy League argument above would be a valid inference. Since it’s not a valid inference, “colleges and universities” must be a generic bare plural.

Second, “colleges and universities” fails the [upward-entailment test](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/generics/#IsolGeneInte) for existential uses of bare plurals. Consider the sentence, “Lima beans are on my plate.” This sentence expresses an existential statement that is true just in case there are some lima beans on my plate. One test of this is that it entails the more general sentence, “Beans are on my plate.” Now consider the sentence, “Colleges and universities ought not consider the SAT.” (To isolate “colleges and universities,” I’ve eliminated the other bare plurals in the resolution; it cannot plausibly be generic in the isolated case but existential in the resolution.) This sentence does not entail the more general statement that educational institutions ought not consider the SAT. This shows that “colleges and universities” is generic, because it fails the upward-entailment test for existential bare plurals.

Third, “colleges and universities” fails the adverb of quantification test for existential bare plurals. Consider the sentence, “Dogs are barking outside my window.” This sentence expresses an existential statement that is true just in case there are some dogs barking outside my window. One test of this appeals to the drastic change of meaning caused by inserting any adverb of quantification (e.g., always, sometimes, generally, often, seldom, never, ever). You cannot add any such adverb into the sentence without drastically changing its meaning. To apply this test to the resolution, let’s again isolate the bare plural subject: “Colleges and universities ought not consider the SAT.” Adding generally (“Colleges and universitiesz generally ought not consider the SAT”) or ever (“Colleges and universities ought not ever consider the SAT”) result in comparatively minor changes of meaning. (Note that this test doesn’t require there to be no change of meaning and doesn’t have to work for every adverb of quantification.) This strongly suggests what we already know: that “colleges and universities” is generic rather than existential in the resolution.

#### Violation: They spec “medicines to the point that discoverable biological elements are not patentable” – cx and the 1ac prove

#### Standards:

#### [1] precision – the counter-interp justifies them arbitrarily doing away with random words in the resolution which decks negative ground and preparation because the aff is no longer bounded by the resolution. Independent voter for jurisdiction – the judge doesn’t have the jurisdiction to vote aff if there wasn’t a legitimate aff.

#### [2] Limits and ground – their model allows affs to defend anything from Covid vaccines to HIV drugs to Insulin— there's no universal DA since each has different functions and political implications — that explodes neg prep and leads to random medicine of the week affs which makes cutting stable neg links impossible — limits key to reciprocal engagement since they create a caselist for neg prep and it takes out ground like DAs to certain medicines which are some of the few neg generics when affs spec medicines.

#### [3] TVA solves – you could’ve read your plan as an advantage under a whole res advocacy.

#### Fairness – debate is a competitive activity that requires fairness for objective evaluation. Outweighs because it’s the only intrinsic part of debate – all other rules can be debated over but rely on some conception of fairness to be justified.

#### Drop the debater – a] deter future abuse and b] set better norms for debate.

#### Competing interps – [a] reasonability is arbitrary and encourages judge intervention since there’s no clear norm, [b] it creates a race to the top where we create the best possible norms for debate.

#### No RVIs – a] illogical, you don’t win for proving that you meet the burden of being fair, logic outweighs since it’s a prerequisite for evaluating any other argument, b] RVIs incentivize baiting theory and prepping it out which leads to maximally abusive practices

## 2

#### Empire has shifted from the administration of death to the production of life – the affs restructuring of global medical intervention is the new logic of biopolitical governance – no longer is imperialism a question of borders and military power, but rather the protection of bodies.

Ahuja ‘16

[Neel, English @ UNC Chapel Hill. 2016. “Bioinsecurities”] pat

One element common to this biopolitics of empire is an anxiety about the dependence of the human body on forces that appear inhuman, even inhumane: medical technologies to extend, optimize, or end life; markets and institutions that unequally distribute resources for sustaining life; environmental processes that support, deprive, or injure bodies. Such concerns were, of course, entirely common to twentieth-century modernist fears of alienation from nature, as well as to liberal, socialist, and fascist states that each proclaimed to defend the life of the people in the major imperial wars. Yet due to the ongoing expansion of government into life through technological, economic, and environmental interventions, a growing number of crises that advertise dreaded risks to life as we know it—climate change, nuclear toxicity, disease pandemics, biological weapons, and financial speculation, to name a few—have recently pressed critical studies of empire to think politics and agency at queer scales of relation, from the grand vantage of planetary geology and climate, through the lively migrations of commodities and animals, all the way down to the microbial, molecular, and quantum worlds of matter in which advanced sciences produce new technologies and knowledge. In an era in which excessive hope is invested in the idea that empire’s so-called free markets will inevitably deliver resources for improving life, discussions of risk and security increasingly provoke concern about how bodies are either threatened or safeguarded in links to other species, to ecology, and to technology. Public fears and hopes are thus invested in questions about how bodies interface beyond the skin of the organism. The living body is not only an ecology reproduced by constituent species (think of the life-sustaining work of gut bacteria or the ingested flesh of animals or plants). It is also an assemblage crosscut by technological, economic, and environmental forces (medical technologies, insurance markets, agricultural systems, toxic pollution) that render the body vulnerable as they reproduce its conditions of possibility.

Yet there remains a sense of tension concerning how social theorists frame the vulnerability of human life between biopolitics and these emerging posthumanist ideas. While biopolitical analysis foregrounds the contested figure of the human, emphasizing that the human body is an effect of power crafted through the social reproduction of nationality, race, sex, and/or class factors conjoined in inhuman fields of power, emerging posthumanist and newmaterialist fields including animal studies, environmental humanities, and object-oriented ontology more often emphasize the agency of the nonhuman and the surprising liveliness of physical matter. As such, despite the avowed critique of the human, they may take for granted the apparent universality of the human lifeworld from which they flee, foreclosing attention to the processes that anthropomorphize the human in order to characterize the human’s sovereign domination of the nonhuman. This move allows some posthumanist critics to project upon an outside, the nonhuman (in the form of environment, animal, machine, or other object), the possibility of resistance to anthropocentrism. Such thinking might be seen as a ruse of transcendence—an assumption that turning attention from the human to the nonhuman could bypass Marxist, feminist, critical race, and postcolonial critiques of imperial systems that proliferate inequality under the guise of universal human freedom.

Despite this liberal, idealist trend among posthumanists (which is more pronounced in the humanities than it is in the social sciences), studies of empire increasingly confront the fact that the apparent exteriority of the subject (the worlds of body, physical matter, and interspecies exchange) has more often formed the center of the politics of empire rather than its excluded outside. It is thus my hope that the collision of biopolitical and posthumanist thought may be salvaged in a practical if unexpected crossing: a more robust accounting of the ways in which politics, including the liberal and neoliberal politics of empire, is embedded in living bodies and planetary environments, which are themselves constituted as objects of knowledge and intervention for imperial science. Such an understanding goes beyond an assertion that life is controlled by human government, which would embrace the strong postEnlightenment division between government and life, human and nonhuman. I instead hope to explore the queer hypothesis that the adaptability, risk, and differentiation central to life increasingly constitute the very matter of politics. This book is about how disease outbreaks, medical technologies, and the relations between humans, animals, bacteria, and viruses galvanized racialized fears and hopes that determined the geopolitical form of US empire during the long twentieth century, following the continent-wide establishment of Euro-American settler networks. Before explaining that argument, however, this brief preface explores how—in addition to established methods of postcolonial study that define empire through histories of conquest, settlement, and the exploitation of labor and resources—the inequalities and violences of imperialism can productively be understood from the vantage of species, the field of life itself.

Research on colonial environmental history and disease control is long established in postcolonial studies, even as today there is growing attention to Global South environmental activism, advanced biotechnologies, and human-animal and human-plant interactions as significant concerns in the planetary routes of European and US empire. Yet my sense of an interspecies politics is still relatively unfamiliar from even the vantage of these studies. Extant studies have long highlighted questions of representation, agency, influence, and domination, explaining the unequal distribution of the privileges accorded for being anthropomorphized, for being made human through colonial ideological and social processes. While maintaining focus on such racialized inequalities fracturing the figure of the human in the worldwide routes of European and US imperialisms, it is the aim of this book to articulate an additional sense of the political as a lively zone of embodied connection and friction. “Interspecies relations form the often unmarked basis upon which scholarly inquiry organizes its objects, political interventions such as ‘human rights’ stake their claims, and capitalist endeavors maneuver resources and marshal profit.” A critique of the interspecies zone of the political—which at its broadest would expand beyond the human-animal and human-microbial relations discussed in this book to include the diversity of living species, matter, energies, and environmental systems that produce everyday life out of biosocial crossings—helps us understand the persistence of empire in a postcolonial age precisely because it conjoins power to forces that retreat into the seemingly natural and ahistorical domains of body and matter. From this vantage, empire appears not only as a process of territorial and economic accumulation across international divisions of labor and sovereignty, but also as a reproductive process managing bodies in unequal planetary conjunctions of life and death. Tracing this second phenomenon requires analysis of biosocial forms of exchange among microbes, plants, animals, and humans, as well as models of power and representation recognizing that bodies are not empty containers of human political subjects, but are lively, transitional assemblages of political matter.

There are risks in attempting to theorize a political process like empire via the material shape it takes in life and matter, anticipated in long-standing liberal and Marxist distinctions between human and natural history. Must such a move necessarily turn away from issues of interest, hegemony, violence, representation, and inequality that often define organized decolonial struggles? I would argue that this need not be so, and that vitalizing colonial discourse studies through an accounting of empire’s living textures may actually give a more grounded account of imperial power as well as the strategies of representation that have persistently masked its material articulations. To this end, I explore empire as a project in the government of species. Broadly, this idea refers to how interspecies relations and the public hopes and fears they generate shape the living form and affective lineaments of settler societies, in the process determining the possibilities and foreclosures of political life. In practice, the government of species has historically optimized and expanded some life forms (human or otherwise) due to biocapital investments in national, racial, class, and sex factors. Operating through interspecies assemblages known as bodies, such investments selectively modify and reproduce life forms and forms of life, extracting “the human” out of the planetary field of interspecies relation. Once securitized, this form is constantly under pressure from the unpredictable and inhuman risks of life in a world of ecological, economic, and political complexity. These forces in turn contribute to the ways publics experience and interpret their futures as more or less livable.

An account of the government of species thus explains that empire can be understood as a project in the management of affective relations—embodied forms of communication and sensation that may occur independently of or in tandem with sentient forms of thought and discourse. These affective relations cross the divisions of life and death, human and animal, media and bodies, and immune and environmental systems. In the process of forming the human out of cacophonous biosocial relations, empire often persists—even after the formal conclusion of colonial occupation or settlement—in part because it invests public hope in the management of bodily vulnerability and orients reproductive futures against horizons of impending risk, a phenomenon I call dread life. In such processes by which bodily vulnerability is transmuted into political urgency, techniques proliferate for managing the relations of populations and the living structures of species (human, animal, viral). As such, empire involves the control of life through accumulation of territory and capital, which may be securitized by activating life’s relational potential. Lauren Berlant describes a “lateral agency” that moves across bodies and populations rather than in the top-down fashion of sovereign power; it may, then, be possible to understand empire’s force of securitization not only through conventional dramas of domination and resistance, but rather through embodied processes of coasting, differentiating, adapting, withering, transition, and movement. These are processes that subtly determine how bodies take form, and to what extent they are able to reproduce themselves in space-time relation. They also more radically stretch the body beyond the organic lifetime and into evolutionary, environmental, and informational domains where life/death distinctions blur.

However, the intimate connection between the governmental imperatives to make live and to make die, which Jasbir Puar names “the bio-necro collaboration,” has long been obscured in social and political theories. It thus remains commonplace for biopolitical analyses to view power as either repressive or productive in essence. In his classic work on the topic, French philosopher and social theorist Michel Foucault argued that by the eighteenth century, a political form had emerged in Europe targeting the human as biological species as the central object of power. Power was no longer simply about the repressive force of the state and its controlling interests wielding the right to kill. Power was increasingly vested in the productive reshaping of the biological life of human organisms by institutions such as clinics, prisons, and asylums and their related forms of scientific knowledge; power meant letting live, albeit in constrained form. Foucault recognized the embedding of biopower across species, calling for a social history that incorporated “the evolution of relations between humanity, the bacillary or viral field, and the interventions of hygiene, medicine, and the different therapeutic techniques.” In the notes to his late lectures, he even speculated that neoliberalism involved a governmentality that can “act on the environment and systematically modify its variables.”

Foucault’s description of the rise of biopower is the inspiration for a number of studies in sociology and anthropology that assess new biopolitical shifts involving advanced biomedical technologies. Given that these biopolitical studies focus largely on the United States, western Europe, China, and India— states that have built biotechnology sectors as engines of unequal neoliberal growth—it is perhaps not surprising that a concomitant line of critique has emerged acknowledging vast and growing world sectors of biological and economic precarity. Building on a number of key postcolonial/feminist studies of the 1990s exploring Foucault’s theory beyond European borders, these necropolitical critiques announce that politics today often emerges as the specter of death. The world’s poor, as well as a growing “precariat” carved from shrinking national bourgeoisies, appear less often as the objects of technological uplift than as the human surplus of the political order of things, populations at risk for displacement, dispossession, captivity, and premature death. The precaritization of sweated labor, the subjection of agrarian populations to the twin scourges of neoliberal structural adjustment and environmental devastation, the proliferation of deterritorialized war and ethnic cleansing, and the growth of predatory industries and rents to recycle capital from surplus populations all reveal that those humans targeted for biopolitical optimization constitute a shrinking population who reproduce through the cannibalistic appropriation of life elsewhere. But necropower is not simply about the distribution of death; it is also about the accumulation of social or economic capital through death and precarity. For example, when suicide passes on social force through the deathly body, or when life insurance capitalizes death, death itself thus gives form to life.

#### compulsory licensing is a neoliberal ploy to both legitimize the WTO as a governing apparatus while covertly authorizing economic retaliation against nations who invoke it.

Ferrer ‘19

[Cory, MFA Candidate, University of Colorado Department of Communication. 2019. “THE RHETORIC OF “BALANCE”: NEOCOLONIALISM AND RESISTANCE IN THE GLOBAL BATTLE FOR GENERIC DRUGS,” www.proquest.com/openview/5cbb5aa35aec157b3cdf8b03d5d269b7/1?pq-origsite=gscholar&cbl=18750&diss=y] Harun + pat

Recall also, that compulsory licensing is only a limited solution to the problem of accessing patented drugs in poorer countries. As the Doha Declaration explains: “We recognize that WTO Members with insufficient or no manufacturing capacities in the pharmaceutical sector could face difficulties in making effective use of compulsory licensing under the TRIPS Agreement” (2). As long as a country doesn’t have the means to produce the drugs, there is no one to whom the government could issue a compulsory license. So long as TRIPS restricts patented medicines from crossing international borders, compulsory licenses fall far short of addressing the need for patented medicines in countries that have little or no manufacturing capacity. In what is possibly the most depressing sentence of the Doha Declaration, the document goes on to offer, not a solution, but an instruction to the TRIPS Council to “find an expeditious solution to this problem and to report to the General Council before the end of 2002” (2). In other words, these negotiations were not able reach a compromise, and so they simply left this for future negotiations.

Also conspicuously absent from the Doha Ministerial declaration is any language addressing the rights of countries who take advantage of these flexibilities and remain free from bilateral pressure for doing so. While one could easily argue that if the US chooses to impose sanctions on a country of their own accord, rather than initiate dispute proceedings through the WTO, then this doesn’t necessarily concern the TRIPS agreement. However, given WTO secretary general Mike Moore’s stated concern with countries “feeling secure” in taking advantage of these flexibilities, and given that the issue of “bilateral pressure” was raised as an obstacle to this security during the TRIPS Council negotiations, the absence of any language addressing this issue appears to be a hard concession to the interests of the US and its allies, allowing them to continue holding the threat of economic sanctions over any nation that takes advantage of the flexibilities granted by this declaration (Moore; “Governments”).

Overall, the Doha declaration makes some significant concessions to the demands of the Global South’s coalition yet stops well short of fully authorizing WTO Members to take full advantage of all public health policies that would put affordable medicines into the hands of their people. The declaration recognizes that it falls short and puts a pin in the issue until the next negotiation, having failed to create a suitable compromise between nations who profit from IP protection and nations who suffer from it. The results of these later negotiations will be discussed in the conclusion to this thesis. Ultimately, the Doha Declaration—and WTO policy in general—are constrained by the demand for a standard of consensus which leaves ultimate veto power in the hands of powerful nations profiting at the others’ expense.

‌Conclusion: What does “Balance” Do?

In the context of the Doha round of negotiations, we see “balance” invoked towards several different ends. The TRIPS agreement invokes “balance” as a form of strategic ambiguity, attempting to please multiple stakeholders by allowing competing interpretations of the same international law to clear the procedural hurdles of consensus. The WTO officers and the EU’s position paper invoked “balance” to build legitimacy for the TRIPS agreement, the deliberative process that produced it, and by extension, the global patent system itself. If the TRIPS agreement strikes a carefully negotiated balance between health and IP protection, then the current balance is presumed sufficient. The paper submitted by the US and its allies invoked “balance” only as a description of strong and effective IP enforcement, a passing nod to balance that ultimately served to build the moral credibility of their strong IP enforcement agenda. For the coalition of the Global South, balance means mutual advantage, but one that must be demonstrated. Their position did not presume the benefit of IP to public health outcomes and argued that when IP protection conflicted with public health outcomes, governments have a standing right to choose public health.

Balance is therefore a deeply contested signifier: both a site of neo-colonial domination, and a site of counter-colonial resistance. However, all these conceptions of balance have one thing in common. They all, in some way, reinforce the legitimacy of the TRIPS agreement and the WTO as a governing institution of the global economy. Though the DCGP openly challenged Western Hegemony of these forums, it did so by drawing on specific provisions of the TRIPS agreement and claiming a position as an authoritative interpreter of international law to which Western nations are (on paper) equally beholden. Instead of challenging the legitimacy of the WTO and TRIPS agreements, the governments of the Global South are claiming that legitimacy for themselves in a counter-colonial push to assert themselves as equal governors and rightsholder of the neo-liberal world order. Though “balance” is typically invoked as a resolution to conflict, it is in fact the very site of that conflict it’s supposed to resolve.

#### This culminates in a form of dread life which organizes and deploys disaster biopolitics to justify constant interventionism, health apartheid, and antagonistic subject formation that turns and outweighs the aff.

Debrix ‘18  
(François Debrix, Professor and director of ASPECT, College of Liberal Arts and Human Sciences, Virginia Tech. “End piece: Dealing with disastrous life” in Biopolitical Disaster. Ed. Jennifer L. Lawrence and Sarah Marie Wiebe. 2018 Routledge forthcoming. cVs) rc/pat

Disastrous biopolitics makes possible dread life. I borrow the term “dread life” from Neel Ahuja’s recent study of the racialized dimensions of the governance and management of anxiety, particularly with regards to the fear of infectious diseases (Ahuja 2016). Dread life is a life that has grown accustomed to and has placed its trust in governance discourses that promise that life can be cared for or preserved through a series of social, political, economic, cultural, or technological interventions at the level of collective and individual bodies. Dread life is a life that has become reliant on discourses and representations of crises, looming dangers, impending catastrophes, and ongoing disasters (whether they are visible or not). As Ahuja puts it, dread life emerges as a result of discourses and representations “that (1) posit the environment as an unruly site of perpetual risk, and (2) shore up an imperial optimism in the force of the state that tends to far outstrip its actual ability to control [the crisis]” (Ahuja 2016: 9). Discourses that produce dread life abound because they keep the crisis or the disaster alive, productive, and always active. Through these discourses, the presence of dread life is a constant reminder of the fact that humanity remains under the spell cast by a bad or evil star, that, as fate has it, disasters will always be around. But, just as crucially, dread life also enables the production of an array of configurations, objects, and objectives, and subjectivities that help to make disastrous biopolitics into a set of tangible, material, and generable operations on a day-to-day basis. Thus, dread life breaks down into a series of subsets of disastrous life and living conditions. Depending on how, where, or when the crisis or disaster is mobilized (as many of this volume’s chapters have detailed), dread life can morph into resilient life, or into triaged life, or perhaps into deracinated life, or possibly into toxic life, or sometimes into emergency life, or maybe into a life suspended between disease and death. Any instance whereby dread life is placed in front of “an unruly site of perpetual risk” (as Ahuja puts it) is potentially productive of one of these (and other) subsets of disastrous life/living. Moreover, for any subset of dread life one finds a corresponding modality of governance/governmentality best suited (or so we are told) to manage the crisis or the disaster and, as such, most apt at keeping alive as dread. Thus, for example, resilient life calls for, justifies, and makes effective operations, technologies, and strategies of resilience. Secure life instantiates and authorizes security practices, policies, and politics. Toxic life requires responses in the form of environmentally conscious purifying or cleansing remedies that typically mobilize various layers of scientific expertise. Triaged life often calls for and normalizes clinical and administrative gazes that can sort bodies in order to repurpose them for upcoming disaster challenges (wars, future diseases, weather emergencies, etc.) Dread life is also productive of a range of subjects and subjectivities in charge of determining which types of interventions at the level of populations and bodies are more likely to cope with the disaster of deciding how the governing strategy that has been adopted (resilience, sustainable development, security, etc.) is to be deployed. This is precisely the point where what Ahuja calls “the optimism in the force of the state” (2016:9) is maximized. The state or, better yet, all sorts of agents/agencies in charge of the governance of dread life both depend on and become a function of the production of multiple instances of dread life so that they can serve as the ultimate guarantors of the safety, security, resilience, or sustainability of life itself (even if, more often than not, such a maintenance of dread life implies the culling of other bodies whose lives are not even worthy of being subjected to dread). Thus, as most of this volume’s chapters have revealed, one cannot think life under conditions of disaster without accounting for a series of governing or managing agents/agencies (the state, in some cases, but also various neoliberal assemblages such as corporations, environmental organizations, militaries and other security and enforcement agents, laws, policies and policy statements, extractive technologies, regimes of health, communities of experts, scientific pronouncements, etc.) that come together to make sure that dread life will be maintained as dread life and that disasters will be kept as productive discursive modalities for more dread life (and disasters) to come. This is not necessarily to say that these agents or agencies of governance of dread life are the instigators of dread life or of disastrous biopolitics. Rather, it is to say that these agents/agencies of biopolitical governance are active assemblages that are produced by discourses of disaster maintenance and by the need created in these discourses for life to remain tethered to disaster. Yet, these active assemblages of productive governance of dread life through disaster management display an actancy (through their active/creative performances) that enables discourses of disastrous biopolitics to be reproduced, re-imagined, or redeployed.

#### The alternative is autoaesthetics – liberal biopolitics is a form of resilient living that subverts human potential into endless dangers to be secured – voting negative reintroduces death to the question of life – ask yourself, what would it mean to have a death well lived?

Evans and Reid ‘14

[Brad Evans, International Relations at the University of Bristol, and Julian Reid, International Relations at University of London. 2014. “Resilient Life”] pat – DM me for the PDF

Even through a brief social detour on fire, however, we can see how the continual framing of life in terms of its biological vulnerability has a more contested history. Indeed, even though the compulsion to view life biologically developed to be one of the defining features of modernity, throughout this period there was nevertheless some belief that the subject was able to secure itself from the problems of the world. This was backed up by the proliferation of various myths about belonging that were central to the creation of political communities. Liberalism, in contrast, operates as if it is ‘limitless’. Its reach, growth and development demand more, and more, and more. However, instead of relating this to a new-found metaphysical awakening that allows us to think that there is more to life than its biological endowment, contemporary liberal biopolitics turns infinite potentiality into a source of limitless endangerment such that all there is to think about is the sheer necessity and survivability of things. In this sense, it is more proper to describe liberal biopolitics as limitless. For rather than taking the open horizon as a space for the infinitely possible, everything is internalized such that it is haunted by whatever remains irreducible to its current sensibility. This inevitably brings us to the vexed question of a death well lived.

We don’t need grand theorizing to make the point that mediations on death have a profound impact upon the way we live. Anybody who has known a person with a terminal illness and becomes anxiously consumed with the prospect of dying will appreciate how the thought and presence of death effectively stops them living. They cannot live because the very uncertainties (physical and intellectual) presented by the mere thought of death are a burden that proves too difficult to carry. Hence, working in an opposite direction to Heidegger’s much debated claim that the ‘absolute impossibility’ of thinking about death constitutes the very possibility of being, the possibility of its occurrence is sufficient to instill what in fact is less a fear of death but more a fear of living. But we cannot simply stop there. As we have suggested, what makes the art of living so dangerously fascinating today is that it requires us to live through the source of our endangerment. Trauma and anxiety as such become our weapons, as vulnerability is amplified and played back to us with increasing frequency to their point of normalization. The political significance of this should not be underestimated.

Our argument is that the political debasement of the subject through strategies of resilience more than puts the very question of death into question by removing it from our critical gaze. In doing so, it represents nothing short of a profound assault on our ability to think metaphysically. This in turn represents a direct attack upon our abilities to transform the world beyond the catastrophic condition in which we are now immersed. After all, how can we even conceive of different worlds if we cannot come to terms with the death and extinction of this one? Resilience as such is what we may term a ‘lethal ecology of reasoning’, for in taking hold and seeking to intervene in all the elements upon which life is said to depend, it puts the living on a permanent life support system that is hard, soft and virtually wired into the most insecure of social fabrics to the evacuation of all possible alternative outcomes. To open, then, a much debated but still yet to be resolved conflict in the history of political and philosophical thought, we maintain that if the biopoliticization of life represents the triumph of techne over poiesis, and if this very biopoliticization today thrives on the technical production of vulnerable subjects which learn to accept that fate, there is a need to resurrect with confidence the idea that what remains irreducible to life can be the starting point for thinking about a more poetic alternative art for living. As Peter Sloterdijk writes on the all too gradual demise of metaphysics:

Ever since the end of the eighteenth century, this has become a twilight zone where it was also possible to see the growth of nihilism, and it was precisely because there that art began to assume an enormous importance, and precisely because art makes it clear that it has a non-nihilistic way of coming to terms with the fact that we ourselves are responsible for the creation of what we think of as the essential. Art defends the truth of life against flat empiricism and deadly positivism, which are no longer capable of an awareness of anything more than the facts and which are therefore incapable of culling the energy to create new inter-relationships of vital or living forces.

Life as a Work of Art

So where does this leave us in our attempts to move beyond the resilient subject? How may we revitalize the very meaning of the political out of the torment of its catastrophic condition? What is further required so that post-biopolitical forms of living may be entertained? How, in other words, may we resurrect with affirmative vigour Nietzsche’s delightful and no less poignant provocation that life itself may become a work of art? We are yet to truly grasp the magnificence of Nietzsche’s work as it may play out in the field of politics. While the stylistic artistry of his particular interventions largely remained tied to the literary field, as witnessed most notably in the figure of Zarathustra, he nevertheless demanded with affirmative vigour rejoicing in the fullness of an experience that embraces the poetic and the aesthetic. Not only does this stake a claim to the creative power of transformation, it also gives over to life the political possibility that its aesthetical qualities may have both an affirmative and resistive potential to challenge dogmatic images of thought. Never has this calling seemed more pressing.

What is at stake here is not simply the ‘aesthetics of existence’ wherein life conforms to some glorious representational standard of beautification. Such constructed imaginaries always grey the magnificent colours of the earth. What is demanded is the formulation of alternative modes of existence that are not afraid to have reasons to believe in this world. As Deleuze succinctly put it, ‘In every modernity and every novelty, you find conformity and creativity; an insipid conformity, but also “a little new music”; something in conformity with the time, but also something untimely – separating the one from the other is the task of those who know how to love, the real destroyers and creators of our day’. Deleuze invariably provides a purposeful nod here to the Nietzchean idea of a poetic subject:

that he himself is really the poet who keeps creating this life... as a poet, he certainly has vis contemplative and the ability to look back upon his work, but at the same time also and above all vis creative, which the active human being lacks... We who think and feel at the same time are those who really continually fashion something that had not been there before: the whole eternally growing world of valuations, colours, accents, perspectives, scales, affirmations, and negations’.

What Nietzsche acknowledges in this passage is that ‘aestheticizing of life entails its artful, stylish disappropriation, a free fall into metaphor and un-self-ness. Autoaesthetics, the artful and chimerical fabrication of the (un)self, means development of strategies of self-mastery, power over one’s art and production, a convergence with self at the locus of the creation (and interpretation) of art’. This was not lost on Foucault, who was also of the opinion that ‘from the idea that the self is not given to us, I think that there is only one practical consequence: we have to create ourselves as a work of art... We should not have to refer the creative activity of somebody to the kind of relation he has to himself, but should relate the kind of relation one has to oneself to a creative activity’.

We may argue that conceiving of life as a work of art stands in direct contrast to the nihilism, indifference and alienation of the catastrophic subject. It resurrects Nietzsche’s claim about the death of God in a way that seeks to find new forms of meaning to life that are necessarily revelatory in nature. And it challenges head on the positivist conceit that a meaningful life can only be progressively reasoned on account of its biopolitical existence. This demands an account of the subject that is more than a historical unfolding of survivability. As Simon Critchley puts it, by drawing upon one of his arch provocateurs, Oscar Wilde, ‘When I think of religion at all, I feel as if I would like to found an order for those who cannot believe: the Confraternity of the Faithless, one might call it, where on an altar, on which no taper burned, a priest, in whose heart peace had no dwelling, might celebrate with unblessed bread and a chalice of empty wine. Everything to be true must become a religion. And agnosticism should have its ritual no less than faith’. This acceptance that there is something to existence that is less explicable to the prevailing logics of secularity, as Todd May explains, requires a more nuanced understanding of philosophical enquiry that moves away from ‘thinking metaphysics’ and all its ways of stupefying and rendering incapable the subject, towards questioning how we might live differently:

We don’t want to reduce it simply to a morally good life, as though a meaningful life were simply an unalienated moral life. Meaningful lives are not so limited and are sometimes more vexed. So we must ask what lends objective worthiness to a life outside the moral realm. Here is where the narrative character of a life comes into play... There are narrative values expressed by human lives that are not reducible to moral values. Nor are they reducible to happiness; they are not simply matters of subjective feeling. Narrative values are not felt, they are lived. And they constitute their own arena of value, one that has not been generally recognized by philosophers who reflect on life’s meaningfulness.

There are a number of qualifications that need to be made here. We cannot be content to see artistic production as something which fosters a negative response to the realities of the world. Creativity must precede any account of the dialectic. Nor must we confuse the art of living with the conforming arts that merely perform a well-rehearsed dance. Life as a work of art is necessarily affirmative in a sense that it appeals to the yet to be revealed. It has no taste for the simulacrum. Neither is it content to accept the need to live dangerously such that we are forced to live with déjà vu all over again. The self is to be actively produced as a non-stable subject that does not seek to emulate some normative standard, but instead forcefully challenges the vulnerable ground which it is said to occupy. So believing in the irreducibility of existence? Certainly. Hostile to all reactive and enslaving forces? Undeniably. Unapologetic in willing the event of its ongoing emergent existence? Steadfast. Openly committed to the affirmative potential of the autonomous subject? Categorically. A believer in a more affective notion of history that is forever in the making? Unreservedly. A student of the eschatological? Earnestly. Appreciative of the transformative political power of fabulation? Truly. A lover of the poetic over the mathematical? Wholeheartedly. Welcoming our coming into the world? Without reservation.

It would be wrong, however, to argue here simply in favour of life as if its very nature exhibited something of the poetic. As we have insisted, never before have we witnessed so many mediations on the value of life. Life, it is now said, constitutes the very meaningfulness of existence as broadly conceived. Without any engagement with the problem of life, there is nothing but a retreat into the abstract deceit of sovereign entrapments. This is now the default setting for global liberal governance on a planetary scale. Whilst critical philosophers once argued that life holds the capacity and the will to resist that which it finds intolerable to its existence, no longer can we have such confidence in the subject as framed in terms of its living qualities alone. Life continually desires that which it should find oppressive. It wilfully gives over to processes of desubjectivization on the promise of better futures to come. Life also shamefully compromises with power to the subjugation of both the self and others. It happily allows itself to be the principal referent object for political strategies which, promising freedom, render life with a difference thoroughly dangerous. Indeed, when power takes life to be its principal object, it often returns with claims to vulnerability that contemporary forms of power find easy to accommodate and turn to their own advantage. Neoliberalism, after all, thrives in situations that are insecure by design. What is at stake here is not simply some mediation on life such that the meaningfulness of life may be thought anew. However tempting this may appear to us, we need to focus more clearly on the affirmative and poetic qualities of existence that are by their very nature ‘irreducible to life’ against those strategies which take life in order to render it deducible – hence deductable as a living entity that demands continuous intervention on account of its endless imperfections.

Needless to say, this art of living that finds political value in those poetic expressions that remain irreducible to life as such stands in marked contrast to the conformist arts which seek to resemble the world. Much of contemporary art, it is fair to say, is what money makes of it. Indeed, if Andy Warhol epitomized what Walter Benjamin aptly termed the work of art in the age of mechanical reproduction, no artist resembles the resilient logic of the times better than Damien Hirst. Beyond his penchant for self-valuation and shameless taking of ideas for self-gratification and self-glorification, Hirst’s work has a well-documented affinity with the medical and the taxidermical. His series of figures in formaldehyde, in particular, can be seen to represent the catastrophic topography of the times. Suspended in perfect animation, while suffocated beneath the weight of a liquid modern embrace, the various animalistic subjects of Hirst’s choosing are devoid of any political agency. Spectacularly simplistic in their mundane and catatonic gaze, their manufactured commitment to a death without the chance of credible decay tells less a tale of philosophical enquiry than the story of a finitude that refuses to accept the notion that finality may be transformative. They are literally ‘set’ in a perpetually fixed catastrophic plot. Nothing original is produced here. Life is merely taken as something to be exhibited without agential content or capacity for transformation. All the while it is condemned to a suspended sentence that is imagined to last for infinity. Hirst’s work thus resembles a Kantian dream and Nietzschean nightmare in the very same move. For here the object is completely immobile such that we become aware of our shared vulnerabilities without asking what we may do differently to challenge them, let alone move beyond the tragedy of their artificial supports.

#### The Role of the Judge is to give up hope.

#### Hopeful affirmation warps within the biomedical sphere to structure policy toward the governance of difference – voting neg refuses to play into the affirmation of life for the sake of it

Ehlers and Krupar ‘14

[Nadine Ehlers, Women's and Gender Studies at Georgetown University, and Shiloh Krupar, Geographer and Provost's Distinguished Associate Professor at Georgetown University. Fall 2014. “Hope Logics: Biomedicine, Affective Conventions of Cancer, and the Governing of Biocitizenry,” <https://ro.uow.edu.au/lhapapers/1849/>] pat

Hope carries utopian promise; it offers possibilities of a “not yet,” a “to come,” and an imagining of life otherwise. In contemporary critique, hope has often been deployed as the means to effect radical social transformation and the reinvention of contemporary reality. It is seen as a way of reaching beyond the stymied conditions of today by orienting toward the horizon of an alternative tomorrow. Hope is invoked as an incantation, under conditions of uncertainty; it is an insistent affirmation of the ability to effect change. This change can be imagined politically and economically, psychologically and corporeally. Indeed, hope is ubiquitous in contemporary culture, from US President Barack Obama’s political memoir—The Audacity of Hope—to international food drives—the “Convoy of Hope”4—to biomedical understandings of illness and health. As in the above quotation from “Banners of Hope” (an online outreach for children with life-threatening diseases), hope is the panacea for chronic or terminal illness. Hope might be seen to operate as a logic within the biomedical arena, one that structures subjectivities, social realities, and corporeal states. It incites particular behaviors; it induces certain forms of community and belonging; it seduces us to believe in the possible transcendence of bodily limits and/or temporal constraints. As we explore in this essay, hope is the guiding principle of biomedicine’s telos toward the affirmation of life.

This essay argues that hope is conventionalized in particular ways that work in the service of biopolitical imperatives to govern life, and to secure, optimize, and speculate on that life. We orient the investigation toward the regulation of affect within the US biomedical arena to consider how affective conventions—that is, the perceptual, emotional, and corporeal modes of managing and responding to events—of hope perform a governing function. In relation to illness, for example, they condition responses to bodily vulnerability and uncertainty, manage the present for the future, and relentlessly affirm life. We ground these broad claims in an examination of the dominant affective conventions of hope at work in cancer activism and treatment. Documenting the ways in which hope is increasingly militarized, commodified, routinized, and delimited in the neoliberal era, the essay explores how such conventions of hope are actively made and maintained through aspects of cancer-related biomedical encounters—what we call infrastructures of care and bioethics of faith within oncology. The essay concludes by considering alternative hope tactics—“hoping for other things”—in relation to cancer.

## Case

### Adv 1

#### Biopiracy inev in the world of the aff – not just pharmecuticals but food, materials etc reentrench the colonial nature of material mining

#### Lack of environmental catastrophe forces evolution to crawl, making species and ecosystems vulnerable when change inevitably does occur – ecological destruction is the only way to ensure stability

Boulter, 02(Michael Boulter - professor for paleobiology at the Natural History Museum and the University of East London, former editor to the Palaeontological Association, former secretary to the International Organization of Palaeobotany, and UK representative at the International Union of Biological Sciences, “Extinction: Evolution and the End of Man,” pg. 27, CM)

In the tranquil times of the Jurassic and Cretaceous there were very few and undramatic environmental changes. Temperature and CO, concentrations steadily increased well above today's values. The vicious battles between individuals and groups of Mesozoic monsters did not encourage major evolutionary changes. New species took over from earlier ones, a few new Families originated when there was a major altercation in battle with other animals or with any of the rare environmental changes. A few species and even genera became extinct. There was peace and relative quietness on Earth: evolution happened on a small scale, origins mainly at the species level, a few genera and were Families. Without big environmental changes there are few, if any, big evolutionary advances. Especially during the middle of the Jurassic there were only small and subtle changes in the marine and terrestrial environments. Without catastrophe there were only small evolutionary changes during the time, usually at the level of the species and genus. Of many important things to be learnt from these most tranquil ages, there is one that most people do not expect. A popular view is that all the fighting, all the business of one thing eating up another, is the primary drive of evolution. They say it leads to the evolution of man and our seeing ourselves as the most powerful beings, sitting it the top of the evolutionary tree. This is not how nature works. The ammonites that ate most fish or resisted attacks from a soaring Pteranodon's beak didn't necessarily do any better than the more compromising species. So the bravest ammonites, charging off to battle in the front lines, perished in larger numbers than the more modest cowards who had found a safe niche. What did survive were those most able to succeed when the environment changed. So the creatures that come to dominate at any given moment do so, not by power of fighting but by change. They have just happened to fit into new surroundings at that particular time better than the others. As the environment, or internal biology, or social behavior, changed, so they just happened to be in the right place at the right time with the right kind of biology. Now, humans think we are at the peak, just as the dinosaurs were through these Mesozoic times before the Cretaceous-Tertiary mass extinction. But once again the environment is changing dramatically.

### Adv 2

#### Presumption – bioprospecting in other areas exists – companies will just shift to patenting it as part of agriculture, materials science, renewables/biofuels, etc – err neg here – if they’re right about those companies being invested in colonialism, obviously they wouldn’t just give up.

#### The WTO is a eurocentric institution used to objectify and make dispensible non-european subjects – appeals to international law only garner it legitimacy which turns the case.

Mignolo 9 (Walter, Professor of Literature and Romance Studies at Duke University,Dispensible and Bare Lives. Coloniality and the Hidden Political/Economic Agenda of Modernity. HUMAN ARCHITECTURE: JOURNAL OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF SELF-KNOWLEDGE, VII, 2, SPRING 2009, 69-88)

International Law is an integral part of¶ coloniality: it legalizes the rhetoric of modernity while simultaneously enforcing the¶ logic of coloniality. It was prompted by the¶ “discovery” of unknown lands and unknown people; and by trafﬁc of enslaved¶ Africans to the New World. In 1979, U.O.¶ Umozurike, from the University of Nigeria,¶ published a report on International Law and¶ Colonialism in Africa. The book was published by Nwamife Publisher Limited, in¶ Enugu, Nigeria. Given the book-market¶ and the trade-names of European and US¶ scholars and intellectual, the book did not¶ get much attention, beyond a numerical¶ minority interested in the topic. In the¶ 1990s Siba N’Zatioula Grovogui, an African¶ political theorist based at John Hopkins¶ University, followed up on the issue re viewing international law in the modern/¶ colonial world from the histories of colonial¶ Africa and the colonial experience of Africans. For the purpose at hand, here is a¶ lengthy paragraph that would help us in¶ unveiling the interconnections between international law, dispensable and bare lives: ¶ As a constituent element of Western culture, the law of nations has¶ been integral to a discourse of inclusion and exclusion. In this regard, international law has formed¶ its subject and objects through an¶ arbitrary system of signs. As rhetoric of identity, it has depended¶ upon metaphysical associations¶ grounded on religious, cultural, or¶ racial similarities and differences.¶ The legal subject, for the most part,¶ has been composed of a Christian/¶ European self. In contrast, the European founders of the law of nations created an opposite image of¶ the self (the other) as a legal object.¶ They materialized this legal objectiﬁcation of non-Europeans¶ through a process of alterity. The¶ other has comprised, at once, nonEuropean communities that Europe has accepted as its mirror image and those it has considered to¶ be either languishing in a developmental stage long since surpassed¶ by Europe or moving in historical¶ progression toward the model provided by the European self (Grovogui, 1996, 65). ¶ The simultaneous epistemic process of¶ inclusion/exclusion, led ﬁrst by Christian¶ theology, later on by philosophy and science, and lately by political economy supported by political theory, of which¶ international law was and continues to be a¶ key instrument, is at the historical foundation of the modern/colonial world, of modernity/coloniality and of imperial¶ capitalism. Francisco de Vitoria in Salamanca, Spain, in the mid sixteenth century;¶ Hugo Grotius in the Netherland at the beginning of the seventeenth century; and¶ Seraphin de Freitas, in Portugal, critically¶ responding to Hugo Grotious, constitute¶ three pillars of International Law in the historical foundation of the modern/colonial¶ world. Subjects whose subjectivities and¶ sensibilities have not been formed by the¶ European memories of Greece and Rome,¶ of Greek and Latin, and by its modern imperial languages (Italian, Portuguese,¶ Spanish, French, German and English), began to be constructed, in the European discourse of international law, as legal objects.¶ “Legal objects” have been stripped of their¶ language, religions, families, communities,¶ sensibilities, memories—in sum, legal objects became, for European international¶ law, not only bare but above all dispensable¶ lives. If non-European people were and are¶ targets of commodiﬁcation of human lives,¶ they are also targets to be outlawed. As legal objects, non-European subjects had no¶ say in International Law, unless they¶ agreed with the terms stipulated by European law-makers

#### the 1AC cant successfully decolonize the state or the actions that the state takes – only the alt solves any impacts on the 1AC

Fukuda ‘10

[Yasuo, Economics at Hitotsubashi University, Tokyo. January 2010. “WTO REGIME AS A NEW STAGE OF IMPERIALISM: DECAYING CAPITALISM AND ITS ALTERNATIVE,” <https://hermes-ir.lib.hit-u.ac.jp/rs/bitstream/10086/22161/1/0101106701.pdf>] pat

There is no colonization occurring under the WTO regime. Modern capitalism lacks the fifth pillar of early 20th century imperialism. However, this does not mean that modern capitalism is without imperialism. Monopoly capital has gained new methods of obtaining the governing power over developing countries in place of colonization.

First, major multinational corporations subcontract to firms in developing countries, thereby assimilating these firms into global business networks. For example, big food retailers such as Wal-Mart and Tesco have established global supply chain management networks which subcontract to farmers in developing countries, thereby bringing these farmers under centralized managerial control (South Centre and Traidcraft 2008). Here, prices fetched at farm gates are determined by monopolists at the top of the supply chain.

Second, monopoly capital now dictates the rules of trade by directly involving itself in the crafting of trade policy. Big business coalitions took part in drafting the WTO Agreements. In the case of GATS, multinational corporations, including Citigroup, J. P. Morgan Chase, and Barclays Bank, drafted the proposal under the authorization of US and EU governments, and then used lobbying to push the agreement through at the time of negotiations (Balanyá et al. 2003). In the case of the negotiations for the agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), it was the US Intellectual Property Committee (USIPC), a US business group, which wrote the initial draft