### T

**Interp: The affirmative must defend all member nations of the WTO reducing IPPs**

#### Violation: their plan is just the EU

**Definitive articles like “the” mean the entirety of the subject – similar to the use of the word “all”**

**Konig 18** König, Ekkehard. "Definite articles and their uses: ". Aspects of Linguistic Variation, edited by Daniël Olmen, Tanja Mortelmans and Frank Brisard, Berlin, Boston: De Gruyter Mouton, 2018, pp. 165-184. <https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110607963-006> Ekkehard König is a German linguist and Professor Emeritus at the Free University of Berlin, specializing in linguistic typology, semantics, and the linguistics of English.

Definite articles have traditionally been identified and described for modern Eu-ropean languages (Germanic, Romance, Celtic, Basque, Hungarian, Bulgarian) and for Semitic languages. Moreover, emergent articles can be found in the pe-riphery of Europe, i.e., Finnish (Chesterman 1991), Sorbian and Polish (Heine and Kuteva 2006). In fact, definite articles and their contrasts to indefinite ones are often considered to be one of the most characteristic features of Europe as a lin-guistic area (cf. Haspelmath 2001). The relevant grammatical category was ab-sent, however, in earlier stages of Indo-European languages, with the exception of Classical, post-Homeric Greek. Typological studies have recently shown that something like definite articles is also found elsewhere (in Central Africa, Meso-America and the Pacific). On the basis of his rich collections of data, Dryer (2005; 2014) has provided a comprehensive description of the diversity found in the forms and uses of definite articles in the world. In one of his contributions to the World atlas of language structures, he identifies definite articles cross-linguistically on the basis of the following syntactic criteria: they are free or bound morphemes, constituents of noun/determiner phrases, derived but different from adnominal demonstratives, typically forming an opposition with indefinite articles, and they cannot occur on heir own (i.e., they cannot be heads in the traditional sense of the term) (Dryer 2005: 154). These formal criteria are clearly applicable to the invariant pre-nomi-nal article in English (the), to the definite articles in French, which inflect for gen-der (le, la) and number (le, les) and to the definite articles in German, which in-flect for gender (der, die, das), number (die) and case (der, des, dem, den and so on). They also apply to the post-posed articles of Scandinavian (-en), Bulgarian (-ta, -to, -te), Romanian (-ul, -a and so on) and Basque (-a, -ak). Dryer’s semantic criteria, by contrast, are much more general and less restric-tive: definite articles encode “definiteness” and have at least an anaphoric use, i.e., they can have the same referent as an antecedent found in a preceding sen-tence or text. This definition and the typology it underlies have been criticized as being too broad and too vague and as being therefore applicable to languages which do not meet the criteria generally subsumed under the term “definiteness”, such as “uniqueness”, “familiarity” and “inclusiveness” (cf. Davis, Gillon and Matthewson 2014). In a more elaborate follow-up article to the brief general sketch required by the World atlas of language structures format, Dryer (2014) ex-plains that he wanted to uncover a wider diversity in the use of definite articles than is presented in earlier descriptions and to show that languages with a binary contrast between definite and indefinite articles of the sort found in English are uncommon outside of Europe and the Middle East. As already mentioned, the main focus of my paper is on European languages. Its goal is to establish more solid semantic foundations for a comparative study of definite articles and to reconstruct the development of these expressions on the basis of available data and plausible processes of semantic change and gram-maticalization. The implementation of these goals will be a first step toward a more fine-grained typology of definite articles and ultimately provide a better ba-sis for extending the scope of such a typology to the specific articles of Polynesian languages (cf. Mosel and Hovdhaugen 1992; Moyse-Faurie 1997) and other sys-tems discussed in Dryer (2014). Moreover, it will also be pointed out that, even in the restricted area of Europe, we find a remarkable diversity in the use of definite articles. The concept “definiteness” that is used in the label for the relevant class of functional expressions is by no means a basic or primitive concept and therefore in need of explication. Using this label in the analysis of articles does not say much more than that an expression of a specific language is translated by the definite article the in English. Various attempts to explicate this notion in terms of more elementary ones can be found in philosophical studies (Russell 1905; Frege 1984; Neale 1990), in linguistic studies such as Hawkins (1978) and Abbott (2004) and, more recently, in formal semantic studies such as Elbourne (2010; 2012), Gisborne (2012) and Coppock and Beaver (2015). This is not the place for a detailed discussion of the relevant formalisms. So let me just point out that the more elementary notions used in the relevant explications are the following: “uniqueness”, “salience”, “existence”, “identifiability” and “inclusiveness”. Of these elementary notions, “uniqueness” is the most important one. Whenever we use a definite article, as in (1), we presuppose that reference is made to an object or entity that is unique and therefore clearly identifiable in a given context. (1)a.Could you pass me thesalt?b.Let’s have a look at thechurch!c.Thebook I bought yesterday is on the short-list for a prize.An additional criterion of salience is important for those cases where several ob-jects meet the description ‘church’ in (1b) or ‘book I bought yesterday’ in (1c). In those cases, it has been shown that interlocutors, even at an early age, look for an additional property that distinguishes one entity from the others.1 Further-more, in nearly all cases where a unique object is referred to, there is also a pre-supposition of existence. Nevertheless, it is possible to construct examples where this presupposition is not met, like in (2), where a book has been written by two authors so that there is no “single author” (Coppock and Beaver 2015). (2)Houellebecq is not theonly author of La vie en rose.The criterion of inclusiveness or exhaustivity is relevant for plural contexts, where the definite article is quite similar to universal quantifiers like all. A re-quest like (3) would generally be meant to include all the cushions outside. (3)It is raining. Could you bring in the cushions! Since plural contexts pose additional problems, we will not consider them any further in what follows. Nor will we consider such quantificational uses as are exemplified by (4), where the definite article is in the scope of and bound by the quantifier each. or all of the concepts discussed above, there are precise formal explications in the relevant literature – in some cases, controversial in their details. In summary and without going into the details of a rich literature and complex discussion, we can say that it is the presupposition of uniqueness that is the most important in-gredient of the meaning of definite articles. This assumption of uniqueness guar-antees that the referent is identifiable for the interlocutor. In the terminology of pragmatics, more specifically in the view of Relevance Theory (Sperber and Wil-son 1996), definite articles “come with a guarantee of identifiability”. Given this requirement of uniqueness in a given context, let us now consider the various ways in which a context may identify a unique object. The most im-portant contextual types are described in the following list: (5)presupposition of uniqueness and identifiability in a certain context:a.identification through the situation of speech or universe of discourse (situational use, visibility or general background knowledge)b.identification through sufficient description (cataphoric use)c.identification by the preceding context (anaphoric use)d.identification through appeal to personal memory, partial description (recognitional use, emploi mémoriel)e.identification by association with an identifiable entity (associative use)These different ways of contextually identifying the referent of a definite article can be illustrated by the following examples: (6)a.Pass me thesalt. Today thesun is shining. ThePope will come to Paris.b.Thebook I bought yesterday is under discussion for the Nobel Prize.c.Somebody stole my bike yesterday but they have already found thethief.d.You remember therestaurant we went to recently. That is where I found a wallet.e.We laid out the picnic. Thecoffee was still warm.These are the five context types most frequently distinguished in the literature (cf. Hawkins 1978; Löbner 1985; Himmelmann 1998; De Mulder and Carlier 2011). In (5) and (6), they are listed in the order of their historical development. The most basic way in which a referent might be unique and thus identifiable is its pres-ence in the context of speech, as in (1a) and (6a). A slight extension of this domain of identification then leads to referents that are unique in a universe of discourse: he Pope, the sun, the government, the weather and so on.2 We know that there are many suns in the universe but there is only one that is of interest in the con-text of our weather. A dedicated militant of a political party will simply speak of “the party”, whenever she makes reference to her own group and can even give that identification a high scalar value by stressing the definite article (THE [ði:] party). In the anaphoric and cataphoric uses of the definite articles, the referents are given in the co-text, in the preceding co-text for anaphoric reference, as in (6c), and in the following co-text for cataphoric reference, as in (6b). Note that definite descriptions, i.e., the identification of a referent through a description of its salient properties, is simply regarded here as an instance of cataphora. The recognitional use (emploi mémoriel) requires a search in the memory of interloc-utors rather than in the co-text or the non-verbal context. According to Himmel-mann (1997), this use of demonstratives has played the decisive role in the devel-opment of the definite article. A characteristic feature of this use is the explicit appeal to the hearer to search for the relevant context in his/her memory. Finally, the associative use requires that a referent is identifiable through its association with another one given in a context (cf. Clark and Marshall 1981). There are many relations between entities that provide such a bridge: part-whole, as in (6e), or action-instrument, as in examples like (7).

#### WTO member nations are the following countries NOT THE EU

**WTO no date – see the list in the doc** https://www.wto.org/english/thewto\_e/whatis\_e/tif\_e/org6\_e.htm#collapseI

\*\*NOTE: This list is taken from the WTO’s website linked above

Members Afghanistan Albania Angola Antigua and Barbuda Argentina Armenia Australia Austria Bahrain, Kingdom of Bangladesh Barbados Belgium Belize Benin Bolivia, Plurinational State of Botswana Brazil Brunei Darussalam Bulgaria Burkina Faso Burundi Cabo Verde Cambodia Cameroon Canada Central African Republic Chad Chile China Colombia Congo Costa Rica Côte d’Ivoire Croatia Cuba Cyprus Czech Republic Democratic Republic of the Congo Denmark Djibouti Dominica Dominican Republic Ecuador Egypt El Salvador Estonia Eswatini European Union (formerly EC) Fiji Finland France Gabon Gambia Georgia Germany Ghana Greece Grenada Guatemala Guinea Guinea-Bissau Guyana Haiti Honduras Hong Kong, China Hungary Iceland India Indonesia Ireland Israel Italy Jamaica Japan Jordan Kazakhstan Kenya Korea, Republic of Kuwait, the State of Kyrgyz Republic Lao People’s Democratic Republic Latvia Lesotho Liberia Liechtenstein Lithuania Luxembourg Macao, China Madagascar Malawi Malaysia Maldives Mali Malta Mauritania Mauritius Mexico Moldova, Republic of Mongolia Montenegro Morocco Mozambique Myanmar Namibia Nepal Netherlands New Zealand Nicaragua Niger Nigeria North Macedonia Norway Oman Pakistan Panama Papua New Guinea Paraguay Peru Philippines Poland Portugal Qatar Romania Russian Federation Rwanda Saint Kitts and Nevis Saint Lucia Saint Vincent and the Grenadines Samoa Saudi Arabia, Kingdom of Senegal Seychelles Sierra Leone Singapore Slovak Republic Slovenia Solomon Islands South Africa Spain Sri Lanka Suriname Sweden Switzerland Chinese Taipei Tajikistan Tanzania Thailand Togo Tonga Trinidad and Tobago Tunisia Turkey Uganda Ukraine United Arab Emirates United Kingdom United States Uruguay Vanuatu Venezuela, Bolivarian Republic of Viet Nam Yemen Zambia Zimbabwe

**Grammar comes first:**

1. **Stasis Point: using the grammatically correct interpretation of the resolution allows for a fixed stasis point that ensures a predictable division of ground.**
2. **Resolvability: in grammar there is a definitive right and wrong interpretation which allows for an easily resolved debate. This ensures there is less judge intervention and increases topic education because it encourages less muddled T debates.**

**Vote neg:**

1. **Procedural fairness: They explode limits, opening the floodgates to an almost infinite scope of possible affs. They can cherry pick any member nation of the WTO to have reduce IP protections which makes it impossible for us to have a strat. This kills neg ground and creates a side bias for the aff. Debate is fundamentally a competitive game which means that fairness is a d-rule and a pre-req to evaluating aff offense.**
2. **Clash: their aff doesn’t allow for sufficient clash - EU countries are too small a subset of the WTO to allow for all topic Das and CPs**

**TVA solves - they could just read the aff as an advantage. Terminal defense against the aff and Das to the TVA are offense for us – means its debatable**

**Drop the debater: key to deter abuse and the aff is the debater**

**CI: reasonability causes a rase to the bottom and its impossible to be reasonably topical**

**No RVIS: You shouldn’t win for following the rules and RVIS would lead to a chilling effect preventing a check on legitimate abuse.**

## K

#### Empire has shifted from the administration of death to the production of life – the affs restructuring of global medical intervention is the new logic of biopolitical governance – no longer is imperialism a question of borders and military power, but rather the protection of bodies.

Ahuja ‘16

[Neel, English @ UNC Chapel Hill. 2016. “Bioinsecurities”] pat

One element common to this biopolitics of empire is an anxiety about the dependence of the human body on forces that appear inhuman, even inhumane: medical technologies to extend, optimize, or end life; markets and institutions that unequally distribute resources for sustaining life; environmental processes that support, deprive, or injure bodies. Such concerns were, of course, entirely common to twentieth-century modernist fears of alienation from nature, as well as to liberal, socialist, and fascist states that each proclaimed to defend the life of the people in the major imperial wars. Yet due to the ongoing expansion of government into life through technological, economic, and environmental interventions, a growing number of crises that advertise dreaded risks to life as we know it—climate change, nuclear toxicity, disease pandemics, biological weapons, and financial speculation, to name a few—have recently pressed critical studies of empire to think politics and agency at queer scales of relation, from the grand vantage of planetary geology and climate, through the lively migrations of commodities and animals, all the way down to the microbial, molecular, and quantum worlds of matter in which advanced sciences produce new technologies and knowledge. In an era in which excessive hope is invested in the idea that empire’s so-called free markets will inevitably deliver resources for improving life, discussions of risk and security increasingly provoke concern about how bodies are either threatened or safeguarded in links to other species, to ecology, and to technology. Public fears and hopes are thus invested in questions about how bodies interface beyond the skin of the organism. The living body is not only an ecology reproduced by constituent species (think of the life-sustaining work of gut bacteria or the ingested flesh of animals or plants). It is also an assemblage crosscut by technological, economic, and environmental forces (medical technologies, insurance markets, agricultural systems, toxic pollution) that render the body vulnerable as they reproduce its conditions of possibility.

Yet there remains a sense of tension concerning how social theorists frame the vulnerability of human life between biopolitics and these emerging posthumanist ideas. While biopolitical analysis foregrounds the contested figure of the human, emphasizing that the human body is an effect of power crafted through the social reproduction of nationality, race, sex, and/or class factors conjoined in inhuman fields of power, emerging posthumanist and newmaterialist fields including animal studies, environmental humanities, and object-oriented ontology more often emphasize the agency of the nonhuman and the surprising liveliness of physical matter. As such, despite the avowed critique of the human, they may take for granted the apparent universality of the human lifeworld from which they flee, foreclosing attention to the processes that anthropomorphize the human in order to characterize the human’s sovereign domination of the nonhuman. This move allows some posthumanist critics to project upon an outside, the nonhuman (in the form of environment, animal, machine, or other object), the possibility of resistance to anthropocentrism. Such thinking might be seen as a ruse of transcendence—an assumption that turning attention from the human to the nonhuman could bypass Marxist, feminist, critical race, and postcolonial critiques of imperial systems that proliferate inequality under the guise of universal human freedom.

Despite this liberal, idealist trend among posthumanists (which is more pronounced in the humanities than it is in the social sciences), studies of empire increasingly confront the fact that the apparent exteriority of the subject (the worlds of body, physical matter, and interspecies exchange) has more often formed the center of the politics of empire rather than its excluded outside. It is thus my hope that the collision of biopolitical and posthumanist thought may be salvaged in a practical if unexpected crossing: a more robust accounting of the ways in which politics, including the liberal and neoliberal politics of empire, is embedded in living bodies and planetary environments, which are themselves constituted as objects of knowledge and intervention for imperial science. Such an understanding goes beyond an assertion that life is controlled by human government, which would embrace the strong postEnlightenment division between government and life, human and nonhuman. I instead hope to explore the queer hypothesis that the adaptability, risk, and differentiation central to life increasingly constitute the very matter of politics. This book is about how disease outbreaks, medical technologies, and the relations between humans, animals, bacteria, and viruses galvanized racialized fears and hopes that determined the geopolitical form of US empire during the long twentieth century, following the continent-wide establishment of Euro-American settler networks. Before explaining that argument, however, this brief preface explores how—in addition to established methods of postcolonial study that define empire through histories of conquest, settlement, and the exploitation of labor and resources—the inequalities and violences of imperialism can productively be understood from the vantage of species, the field of life itself.

Research on colonial environmental history and disease control is long established in postcolonial studies, even as today there is growing attention to Global South environmental activism, advanced biotechnologies, and human-animal and human-plant interactions as significant concerns in the planetary routes of European and US empire. Yet my sense of an interspecies politics is still relatively unfamiliar from even the vantage of these studies. Extant studies have long highlighted questions of representation, agency, influence, and domination, explaining the unequal distribution of the privileges accorded for being anthropomorphized, for being made human through colonial ideological and social processes. While maintaining focus on such racialized inequalities fracturing the figure of the human in the worldwide routes of European and US imperialisms, it is the aim of this book to articulate an additional sense of the political as a lively zone of embodied connection and friction. “Interspecies relations form the often unmarked basis upon which scholarly inquiry organizes its objects, political interventions such as ‘human rights’ stake their claims, and capitalist endeavors maneuver resources and marshal profit.” A critique of the interspecies zone of the political—which at its broadest would expand beyond the human-animal and human-microbial relations discussed in this book to include the diversity of living species, matter, energies, and environmental systems that produce everyday life out of biosocial crossings—helps us understand the persistence of empire in a postcolonial age precisely because it conjoins power to forces that retreat into the seemingly natural and ahistorical domains of body and matter. From this vantage, empire appears not only as a process of territorial and economic accumulation across international divisions of labor and sovereignty, but also as a reproductive process managing bodies in unequal planetary conjunctions of life and death. Tracing this second phenomenon requires analysis of biosocial forms of exchange among microbes, plants, animals, and humans, as well as models of power and representation recognizing that bodies are not empty containers of human political subjects, but are lively, transitional assemblages of political matter.

There are risks in attempting to theorize a political process like empire via the material shape it takes in life and matter, anticipated in long-standing liberal and Marxist distinctions between human and natural history. Must such a move necessarily turn away from issues of interest, hegemony, violence, representation, and inequality that often define organized decolonial struggles? I would argue that this need not be so, and that vitalizing colonial discourse studies through an accounting of empire’s living textures may actually give a more grounded account of imperial power as well as the strategies of representation that have persistently masked its material articulations. To this end, I explore empire as a project in the government of species. Broadly, this idea refers to how interspecies relations and the public hopes and fears they generate shape the living form and affective lineaments of settler societies, in the process determining the possibilities and foreclosures of political life. In practice, the government of species has historically optimized and expanded some life forms (human or otherwise) due to biocapital investments in national, racial, class, and sex factors. Operating through interspecies assemblages known as bodies, such investments selectively modify and reproduce life forms and forms of life, extracting “the human” out of the planetary field of interspecies relation. Once securitized, this form is constantly under pressure from the unpredictable and inhuman risks of life in a world of ecological, economic, and political complexity. These forces in turn contribute to the ways publics experience and interpret their futures as more or less livable.

An account of the government of species thus explains that empire can be understood as a project in the management of affective relations—embodied forms of communication and sensation that may occur independently of or in tandem with sentient forms of thought and discourse. These affective relations cross the divisions of life and death, human and animal, media and bodies, and immune and environmental systems. In the process of forming the human out of cacophonous biosocial relations, empire often persists—even after the formal conclusion of colonial occupation or settlement—in part because it invests public hope in the management of bodily vulnerability and orients reproductive futures against horizons of impending risk, a phenomenon I call dread life. In such processes by which bodily vulnerability is transmuted into political urgency, techniques proliferate for managing the relations of populations and the living structures of species (human, animal, viral). As such, empire involves the control of life through accumulation of territory and capital, which may be securitized by activating life’s relational potential. Lauren Berlant describes a “lateral agency” that moves across bodies and populations rather than in the top-down fashion of sovereign power; it may, then, be possible to understand empire’s force of securitization not only through conventional dramas of domination and resistance, but rather through embodied processes of coasting, differentiating, adapting, withering, transition, and movement. These are processes that subtly determine how bodies take form, and to what extent they are able to reproduce themselves in space-time relation. They also more radically stretch the body beyond the organic lifetime and into evolutionary, environmental, and informational domains where life/death distinctions blur.

However, the intimate connection between the governmental imperatives to make live and to make die, which Jasbir Puar names “the bio-necro collaboration,” has long been obscured in social and political theories. It thus remains commonplace for biopolitical analyses to view power as either repressive or productive in essence. In his classic work on the topic, French philosopher and social theorist Michel Foucault argued that by the eighteenth century, a political form had emerged in Europe targeting the human as biological species as the central object of power. Power was no longer simply about the repressive force of the state and its controlling interests wielding the right to kill. Power was increasingly vested in the productive reshaping of the biological life of human organisms by institutions such as clinics, prisons, and asylums and their related forms of scientific knowledge; power meant letting live, albeit in constrained form. Foucault recognized the embedding of biopower across species, calling for a social history that incorporated “the evolution of relations between humanity, the bacillary or viral field, and the interventions of hygiene, medicine, and the different therapeutic techniques.” In the notes to his late lectures, he even speculated that neoliberalism involved a governmentality that can “act on the environment and systematically modify its variables.”

Foucault’s description of the rise of biopower is the inspiration for a number of studies in sociology and anthropology that assess new biopolitical shifts involving advanced biomedical technologies. Given that these biopolitical studies focus largely on the United States, western Europe, China, and India— states that have built biotechnology sectors as engines of unequal neoliberal growth—it is perhaps not surprising that a concomitant line of critique has emerged acknowledging vast and growing world sectors of biological and economic precarity. Building on a number of key postcolonial/feminist studies of the 1990s exploring Foucault’s theory beyond European borders, these necropolitical critiques announce that politics today often emerges as the specter of death. The world’s poor, as well as a growing “precariat” carved from shrinking national bourgeoisies, appear less often as the objects of technological uplift than as the human surplus of the political order of things, populations at risk for displacement, dispossession, captivity, and premature death. The precaritization of sweated labor, the subjection of agrarian populations to the twin scourges of neoliberal structural adjustment and environmental devastation, the proliferation of deterritorialized war and ethnic cleansing, and the growth of predatory industries and rents to recycle capital from surplus populations all reveal that those humans targeted for biopolitical optimization constitute a shrinking population who reproduce through the cannibalistic appropriation of life elsewhere. But necropower is not simply about the distribution of death; it is also about the accumulation of social or economic capital through death and precarity. For example, when suicide passes on social force through the deathly body, or when life insurance capitalizes death, death itself thus gives form to life.

#### Threats of economic collapse shuts down deliberation in favor of immediate response, creating a violent state of exception.

Hanan ‘10

Ph.D, Prof of Communication @ Temple (Joshua Stanley, “Managing the Meltdown Rhetorically: Economic Imaginaries and the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008”, dissertation The University of Texas at Austin)

By framing the proposed legislation in this particular light, Bush offers us a first example of how the neoliberal state of exception is manifested rhetorically in the sphere of policy. By describing the crisis as “extraordinary times” in need of “decisive action,” he is able to side step his administration’s problematic relationship to Wall Street and the present crisis. Since the economy is not operating normally but is instead in a state of disarray and chaos, the downturn must be addressed without normal argumentative debate. In his desire to postpone deliberation by emphasizing the exceptional nature of the crisis, Bush taps into a more general narrative that emerged during the creation and passage of EESA, namely ethical pragmatism. Like moral critique, ethical pragmatism deploys the state of exception enthymematically as a way of justifying EESA legislation. Unlike moral critique, however, ethical pragmatism links the exception to a completely different set of values. By bringing attention to temporary nature of the present situation, ethical pragmatism argues that deliberation and critique are the enemies. Since the Bush Administration is “working with Congress to address the root cause behind much of the instability in our markets,” this narrative contends the worst thing citizens can do right now is challenge the administration.304 The primary difference between these two rhetorical accounts can thus be located in the way they deploy the state of exception as an enthymeme to explain EESA and the government’s reaction to the present crisis. Whereas the moral critique implies that a state of exception has become a permanent practice under Bush, the latter tries to frame the state of exception as temporary action. Hence, insofar as the narrative of ethical pragmatism attempts to exempt itself from the problem by emphasizing authentic deliberation at a future point in time, it relies on a different model of the state of exception that is more justifiable. Turning now to our second policy artifact—that of Secretary Paulson—we see an additional rendering of ethical pragmatism. Delivered on September 23rd 2008 to the Senate Banking Committee, Paulson’s widely publicized address is particularly useful in illustrating how a temporary understanding of state of exception can be used as an enthymeme to circumvent moral critique.305By emphasizing the “urgent response” that the crisis demands, the former Goldman Sach’s CEO centers his argument on how EESA provides “market stability,” Organizing his narrative around a series of binaries, Paulson’s ethical pragmatism is predicated on the opposition between a healthy and sick economy. By arguing that “illiquid mortgage-related assets … are choking off the flow of credit which is so vitally important to our economy,” for example, Paulson renders the financial system a living entity that has been invaded by foreign agents.306 Through a viral process of multiplication, he illustrates how “[t]hese bad loans have created a chain reaction” that now threatens “the very health of our economy.”307In the same way that a virus can weaken a person’s entire immune system, Paulson wants his audience to see the economy as having been infected by a rapidly proliferating disease—one that must be eradicated quickly by experts, and without debate. By explaining the financial crisis through such metaphors, Paulson is able to argue that his legislation is aimed at excising these "troubled assets from the system.”308The measure is “designed for immediate implementation and [to] be sufficiently large to have maximum impact and restore market confidence.”309 Thus, by addressing the “underlying problem”—troubled assets that are dragging down the entire economy—he has devised an expert program to stabilize the financial system. This plan, while putting taxpayers on the line, will cost American families “far less than the alternative—a continuing series of financial institution failures and frozen credit markets unable to fund everyday needs and economic expansion.”310 It is at the end of Paulson’s speech, however, that we realize the primary goal of his narrative: the desire to frame EESA as a temporary state of exception. In spirit of the “bipartisan consensus for an urgent legislative solution,”311 Paulson argues that there is no time to deliberate and contest the parameters of this bill. Since this “troubled asset purchase program on its own is the single most effective thing we can do to … stimulate our economy,” we must trust Paulson’s authority as Treasury Secretary and pass the bill immediately.312 While it is true that “[w]hen we get through this difficult period…our next task must be to address the problems in our financial system through a reform program that fixes our outdated financial regulatory structure,” Paulson contends that “we must get through this period first.”313 Through his appeals to urgency and expedient action, Paulson’s narrative enthymematically invokes a seemingly temporary state of exception. Since the economy is sick and its pathogen is multiplying rapidly, debate and deliberation about whether EESA is the right form of interventionism must be postponed to a later point in time. While “[w]e must [eventually] have that critical debate” now is not the time to question the crisis of neoliberalism.314 As part of Bush’s executive branch we must trust Paulson when he says he has the “best interest of all Americans” in mind and not risk making the situation even worse. Despite residing in a different sphere of policy than Bush and Paulson, the third rhetor—Fed Chair Ben Bernanke—demonstrates how the narrative of ethical pragmatism can emerge in governmental avenues outside the Executive Branch. Delivered to multiple Congressional committees on September 24 and 25, 2008, Bernanke’s testimony represents perhaps the most explicit attempt to grapple with the contradiction between the Federal government's neoliberal history and its looming Keynesian intervention.315“Despite the efforts of the Federal Reserve, the …global financial markets remain under extraordinary stress," declares Bernanke, rationalizing why, in the case of the present downturn, the neoliberal privileging of monetary policy over fiscal policy will no longer suffice.316 Viewing capitalism through a rhetorical lens similar to that of Paulson, Bernanke describes how "stresses in financial markets have been high and have recently intensified significantly."317 As "rising mortgage delinquencies" spiral out of control and intersect other financial venues "the implications for the broader economy could be quite adverse."318 Bernanke thus declares that "[a]ction by the Congress is urgently required to stabilize the situation."319 If action is not taken immediately to avert the economy’s growing crisis, the situation may become even bleaker. Like Bush and Paulson, central to Bernanke's attitude toward EESA is the need for immediate action. While he acknowledges "the shortcomings and weaknesses of our financial markets and regulatory system" now is not the time to debate the policies underscoring the bill.320 The "development of a comprehensive proposal for reform would require careful and extensive analysis that would be difficult to compress into a short legislative timeframe now available."321 Bernanke thus believes that it "is essential to deal with the crisis at hand" and focus later on building a "stronger, more resilient, and better regulated financial system."322 While Bernanke believes the urgency of the situation is enough of a justification for passing EESA, he does have a response for those who may be critical of the bill’s interventionist tendencies: “Government assistance should be given with the greatest of reluctance,” adding that in the present case such attempts have already been exhausted.323Since the Federal Reserve already “attempted to identify private-sector approaches” but none were forthcoming, the government has no other choice but to bail out the financial sector. By rationalizing EESA as the only possible option, then, Bernanke's narrative of ethical pragmatism is meant to close off the possibility of dissent. For those that feel interventionism is a disgrace to free market capitalism, Bernanke has made it clear that "private-sector arrangements" were taken into account. On the other hand, for who those critique the government for "bailing out Wall Street," Bernanke's appeals imply that debate and deliberation will come at a later point in time. Thus through his stifling of opposition from all sides, Bernanke’s narrative of ethical pragmatism invokes the state of exception as the temporary justification for the government’s economic actions. The Exceptionality of Ethical Pragmatism Bush, Paulson and Bernanke all provide accounts that, while told in slightly different ways, use the strategy of ethical pragmatism to try to suspend critique and discussion. Whether emphasizing “extraordinary times,” “urgency,” or “lack of options,” Bush, Paulson, and Bernanke all invoke the state of exception as the enthymematic justification for their actions. The “exceptional” frame underscoring this series of arguments, then, offers an additional way to grasp why the dissenting narrative—moral critique—may have had so little impact on EESA’s legislation. By rendering of EESA as an emergency measure to save the economy, ethical pragmatism was able to defer debate. Moreover, since ethical pragmatism emerged from the very same sphere in which EESA was introduced—that of policy—it was able to supersede dissident narratives about the bill at an institutional level. Since the former, not the latter, narrative defined the parameters of the policy debate; ethical pragmatism had both a material and discursive advantage. Moral critique’s failure can thus be observed simultaneously in two different rhetorical/institutional contexts. In respect to its own rhetorical argument, moral critique’s use of the state of exception as an explanation for EESA’s passage negated its own critique by affirming that this technique of power does indeed exist. At the same time, through the narrative frame of ethical pragmatism, moral critique was deferred from the realm of policy. Since the “exceptionality” of the situation demanded a suspension of deliberation, it became justified to pass the bill without proper economic argument. We are thus left to conclude that the state of exception has both a discursive and extra-discursive reality since the institutional forms and discourses coincide with one another.

#### The aff’s investment in public health as a response to the threat of disease sanctions a more sinister form of biopolitical racism whereby “unhealthy” populations are subject to ethnic cleansing and state-sanctioned violence.

Elbe ‘5

[Stefan, international relations at the University of Sussex. 2005. “AIDS, Security, Biopolitics,” <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0047117805058532>] pat

Why does it matter that the securitization of HIV/AIDS is biopolitical? It matters because, their humanitarian appeals to ‘life’ and ‘health’ notwithstanding, biopolitical strategies have historically been Janus-faced. They have led to the construction of hospitals and the design of universal healthcare systems, but they have also led to the justification of eugenics and mass death. Some of those advancing the securitization of HIV/AIDS clearly do so in the hope that this will have important humanitarian benefits for persons living with HIV/AIDS around the world by bolstering international AIDS initiatives. Peter W. Singer argues that presenting HIV/AIDS as a security threat ‘strengthens the call for serious action against the menace of AIDS. It is not just a matter of altruism, but simple cold self-interest.’ Many policymakers agree, including the executive director of UNAIDS, who has similarly argued that framing HIV/AIDS as a security issue is not merely an academic exercise but ‘defines how we respond to the epidemic, how much is allocated to combating it, and what sectors of government are involved in the response’. Foucault’s historical analyses, however, point to the need for a greater degree of caution regarding these normative aspirations because biopolitical strategies have in the past also engendered serious dangers that continue to accompany recent efforts to think of security in terms of the health of populations.

One of these dangers is that the biopolitical imperative of optimizing the health of populations effectively constitutes disease – and by extension the diseased – as a social and political problem that needs to be addressed, but without specifying exactly how this problem should be dealt with. Unfortunately the creation of universal healthcare programmes to treat the ill is just as compatible with a biopolitical logic as is the purging of populations of the diseased by more sinister means, such as killing them or letting them gradually die. As counter-intuitive and ironic as it may seem, a biopolitical society based on the enhancement of ‘life’ and ‘health’ can still sanction and justify instances of mass death. The European era of biopower, after all, coincided with 20th-century political projects demanding the deaths of millions. Foucault later came to understand this bizarre confluence only on the basis of a new racism that biopolitical orders can give rise to. ‘Racism’, he contended from a biopolitical perspective, ‘is primarily a way of introducing a break into the domain of life that is under power’s control: the break between what must live and what must die.’ The reason biopolitical orders can still sanction mass death is because they can generate a powerful new form of racism that pits the ‘healthy’ members of the population against the ‘unhealthy’ who are deemed to sap the strength and vitality of the population as a whole. The underlying principle of this new biopolitical racism is thus not the primacy of cultural difference, as with many more traditional forms of racism, but rather the more subtle idea ‘that the death of others makes one biologically stronger insofar as one is a member of a race or a population’. The insistence on maximizing the health of populations can thus be dangerous for those who are deemed to be unhealthy.

The Nazi movement demonstrated the extreme ends to which this darker side of biopolitics can be taken when it carved up the European continent using the dubious criterion of ‘blood’ for deciding which populations could be usefully ‘Germanized’ and thus spared, and which ones would have to perish. It remains one of the most disconcerting testaments to the dangers of thinking security in biological terms, or on the basis of health and sickness. In Nazi Germany, moreover, this new biological racism was also projected internally to Jews who were no longer persecuted solely because of their Judaism, but also because their quasi-biologically defined ‘Jewishness’ was deemed to be undermining the purity and strength of the Aryan race. Enhancing the strength and vitality of the latter, by this logic, required the elimination of the former. In some ways this biopolitical racism is even more pernicious than a culturally defined one because, as Hannah Arendt once pointed out in her memorable phrase, whereas in the past ‘Jews had been able to escape from Judaism into conversion; from Jewishness there was no escape’. A biopolitical society aimed at promoting ‘life’ and ‘health’ still has to make decisions about whose life is worth preserving and whose life will be allowed to perish, and the function of racism in a biopolitical age is to make this very distinction not necessarily according to the principle of cultural difference, but according to the maxim of whose survival will maximize the strength and wellbeing of the population, and whose will undermine it.

By way of extension, the concomitant danger with the securitization of HIV/AIDS as a biopolitical strategy is that while it clearly dramatizes the need to address the problem of disease at the global level, it does so without specifying exactly how this is to be achieved. The securitization of HIV/AIDS may increase attention and resources for charitable and humanitarian global AIDS initiatives, and may lead to more universal access to treatment, but these, alas, are not the only outcomes that would be consistent with a security approach to the pandemic. Indeed, there are at least three more disconcerting ways in which the securitization of HIV/AIDS could – at least hypothetically – follow the path of earlier biopolitical strategies and give rise to a new biopolitical racism between the ‘healthy’ (HIV-negative) and the ‘unhealthy’ (HIV-positive) segments of a population.

#### This culminates in a form of dread life which organizes and deploys disaster biopolitics to justify constant interventionism, health apartheid, and antagonistic subject formation that turns and outweighs the aff.

Debrix ‘18  
(François Debrix, Professor and director of ASPECT, College of Liberal Arts and Human Sciences, Virginia Tech. “End piece: Dealing with disastrous life” in Biopolitical Disaster. Ed. Jennifer L. Lawrence and Sarah Marie Wiebe. 2018 Routledge forthcoming. cVs) rc/pat

Disastrous biopolitics makes possible dread life. I borrow the term “dread life” from Neel Ahuja’s recent study of the racialized dimensions of the governance and management of anxiety, particularly with regards to the fear of infectious diseases (Ahuja 2016). Dread life is a life that has grown accustomed to and has placed its trust in governance discourses that promise that life can be cared for or preserved through a series of social, political, economic, cultural, or technological interventions at the level of collective and individual bodies. Dread life is a life that has become reliant on discourses and representations of crises, looming dangers, impending catastrophes, and ongoing disasters (whether they are visible or not). As Ahuja puts it, dread life emerges as a result of discourses and representations “that (1) posit the environment as an unruly site of perpetual risk, and (2) shore up an imperial optimism in the force of the state that tends to far outstrip its actual ability to control [the crisis]” (Ahuja 2016: 9). Discourses that produce dread life abound because they keep the crisis or the disaster alive, productive, and always active. Through these discourses, the presence of dread life is a constant reminder of the fact that humanity remains under the spell cast by a bad or evil star, that, as fate has it, disasters will always be around. But, just as crucially, dread life also enables the production of an array of configurations, objects, and objectives, and subjectivities that help to make disastrous biopolitics into a set of tangible, material, and generable operations on a day-to-day basis. Thus, dread life breaks down into a series of subsets of disastrous life and living conditions. Depending on how, where, or when the crisis or disaster is mobilized (as many of this volume’s chapters have detailed), dread life can morph into resilient life, or into triaged life, or perhaps into deracinated life, or possibly into toxic life, or sometimes into emergency life, or maybe into a life suspended between disease and death. Any instance whereby dread life is placed in front of “an unruly site of perpetual risk” (as Ahuja puts it) is potentially productive of one of these (and other) subsets of disastrous life/living. Moreover, for any subset of dread life one finds a corresponding modality of governance/governmentality best suited (or so we are told) to manage the crisis or the disaster and, as such, most apt at keeping alive as dread. Thus, for example, resilient life calls for, justifies, and makes effective operations, technologies, and strategies of resilience. Secure life instantiates and authorizes security practices, policies, and politics. Toxic life requires responses in the form of environmentally conscious purifying or cleansing remedies that typically mobilize various layers of scientific expertise. Triaged life often calls for and normalizes clinical and administrative gazes that can sort bodies in order to repurpose them for upcoming disaster challenges (wars, future diseases, weather emergencies, etc.) Dread life is also productive of a range of subjects

#### The alternative is autoaesthetics – liberal biopolitics is a form of resilient living that subverts human potential into endless dangers to be secured – voting negative reintroduces death to the question of life – ask yourself, what would it mean to have a death well lived?

Evans and Reid ‘14

[Brad Evans, International Relations at the University of Bristol, and Julian Reid, International Relations at University of London. 2014. “Resilient Life”] pat – DM me for the PDF

Even through a brief social detour on fire, however, we can see how the continual framing of life in terms of its biological vulnerability has a more contested history. Indeed, even though the compulsion to view life biologically developed to be one of the defining features of modernity, throughout this period there was nevertheless some belief that the subject was able to secure itself from the problems of the world. This was backed up by the proliferation of various myths about belonging that were central to the creation of political communities. Liberalism, in contrast, operates as if it is ‘limitless’. Its reach, growth and development demand more, and more, and more. However, instead of relating this to a new-found metaphysical awakening that allows us to think that there is more to life than its biological endowment, contemporary liberal biopolitics turns infinite potentiality into a source of limitless endangerment such that all there is to think about is the sheer necessity and survivability of things. In this sense, it is more proper to describe liberal biopolitics as limitless. For rather than taking the open horizon as a space for the infinitely possible, everything is internalized such that it is haunted by whatever remains irreducible to its current sensibility. This inevitably brings us to the vexed question of a death well lived.

We don’t need grand theorizing to make the point that mediations on death have a profound impact upon the way we live. Anybody who has known a person with a terminal illness and becomes anxiously consumed with the prospect of dying will appreciate how the thought and presence of death effectively stops them living. They cannot live because the very uncertainties (physical and intellectual) presented by the mere thought of death are a burden that proves too difficult to carry. Hence, working in an opposite direction to Heidegger’s much debated claim that the ‘absolute impossibility’ of thinking about death constitutes the very possibility of being, the possibility of its occurrence is sufficient to instill what in fact is less a fear of death but more a fear of living. But we cannot simply stop there. As we have suggested, what makes the art of living so dangerously fascinating today is that it requires us to live through the source of our endangerment. Trauma and anxiety as such become our weapons, as vulnerability is amplified and played back to us with increasing frequency to their point of normalization. The political significance of this should not be underestimated.

Our argument is that the political debasement of the subject through strategies of resilience more than puts the very question of death into question by removing it from our critical gaze. In doing so, it represents nothing short of a profound assault on our ability to think metaphysically. This in turn represents a direct attack upon our abilities to transform the world beyond the catastrophic condition in which we are now immersed. After all, how can we even conceive of different worlds if we cannot come to terms with the death and extinction of this one? Resilience as such is what we may term a ‘lethal ecology of reasoning’, for in taking hold and seeking to intervene in all the elements upon which life is said to depend, it puts the living on a permanent life support system that is hard, soft and virtually wired into the most insecure of social fabrics to the evacuation of all possible alternative outcomes. To open, then, a much debated but still yet to be resolved conflict in the history of political and philosophical thought, we maintain that if the biopoliticization of life represents the triumph of techne over poiesis, and if this very biopoliticization today thrives on the technical production of vulnerable subjects which learn to accept that fate, there is a need to resurrect with confidence the idea that what remains irreducible to life can be the starting point for thinking about a more poetic alternative art for living. As Peter Sloterdijk writes on the all too gradual demise of metaphysics:

Ever since the end of the eighteenth century, this has become a twilight zone where it was also possible to see the growth of nihilism, and it was precisely because there that art began to assume an enormous importance, and precisely because art makes it clear that it has a non-nihilistic way of coming to terms with the fact that we ourselves are responsible for the creation of what we think of as the essential. Art defends the truth of life against flat empiricism and deadly positivism, which are no longer capable of an awareness of anything more than the facts and which are therefore incapable of culling the energy to create new inter-relationships of vital or living forces.

Life as a Work of Art

So where does this leave us in our attempts to move beyond the resilient subject? How may we revitalize the very meaning of the political out of the torment of its catastrophic condition? What is further required so that post-biopolitical forms of living may be entertained? How, in other words, may we resurrect with affirmative vigour Nietzsche’s delightful and no less poignant provocation that life itself may become a work of art? We are yet to truly grasp the magnificence of Nietzsche’s work as it may play out in the field of politics. While the stylistic artistry of his particular interventions largely remained tied to the literary field, as witnessed most notably in the figure of Zarathustra, he nevertheless demanded with affirmative vigour rejoicing in the fullness of an experience that embraces the poetic and the aesthetic. Not only does this stake a claim to the creative power of transformation, it also gives over to life the political possibility that its aesthetical qualities may have both an affirmative and resistive potential to challenge dogmatic images of thought. Never has this calling seemed more pressing.

What is at stake here is not simply the ‘aesthetics of existence’ wherein life conforms to some glorious representational standard of beautification. Such constructed imaginaries always grey the magnificent colours of the earth. What is demanded is the formulation of alternative modes of existence that are not afraid to have reasons to believe in this world. As Deleuze succinctly put it, ‘In every modernity and every novelty, you find conformity and creativity; an insipid conformity, but also “a little new music”; something in conformity with the time, but also something untimely – separating the one from the other is the task of those who know how to love, the real destroyers and creators of our day’. Deleuze invariably provides a purposeful nod here to the Nietzchean idea of a poetic subject:

that he himself is really the poet who keeps creating this life... as a poet, he certainly has vis contemplative and the ability to look back upon his work, but at the same time also and above all vis creative, which the active human being lacks... We who think and feel at the same time are those who really continually fashion something that had not been there before: the whole eternally growing world of valuations, colours, accents, perspectives, scales, affirmations, and negations’.

What Nietzsche acknowledges in this passage is that ‘aestheticizing of life entails its artful, stylish disappropriation, a free fall into metaphor and un-self-ness. Autoaesthetics, the artful and chimerical fabrication of the (un)self, means development of strategies of self-mastery, power over one’s art and production, a convergence with self at the locus of the creation (and interpretation) of art’. This was not lost on Foucault, who was also of the opinion that ‘from the idea that the self is not given to us, I think that there is only one practical consequence: we have to create ourselves as a work of art... We should not have to refer the creative activity of somebody to the kind of relation he has to himself, but should relate the kind of relation one has to oneself to a creative activity’.

We may argue that conceiving of life as a work of art stands in direct contrast to the nihilism, indifference and alienation of the catastrophic subject. It resurrects Nietzsche’s claim about the death of God in a way that seeks to find new forms of meaning to life that are necessarily revelatory in nature. And it challenges head on the positivist conceit that a meaningful life can only be progressively reasoned on account of its biopolitical existence. This demands an account of the subject that is more than a historical unfolding of survivability. As Simon Critchley puts it, by drawing upon one of his arch provocateurs, Oscar Wilde, ‘When I think of religion at all, I feel as if I would like to found an order for those who cannot believe: the Confraternity of the Faithless, one might call it, where on an altar, on which no taper burned, a priest, in whose heart peace had no dwelling, might celebrate with unblessed bread and a chalice of empty wine. Everything to be true must become a religion. And agnosticism should have its ritual no less than faith’. This acceptance that there is something to existence that is less explicable to the prevailing logics of secularity, as Todd May explains, requires a more nuanced understanding of philosophical enquiry that moves away from ‘thinking metaphysics’ and all its ways of stupefying and rendering incapable the subject, towards questioning how we might live differently:

We don’t want to reduce it simply to a morally good life, as though a meaningful life were simply an unalienated moral life. Meaningful lives are not so limited and are sometimes more vexed. So we must ask what lends objective worthiness to a life outside the moral realm. Here is where the narrative character of a life comes into play... There are narrative values expressed by human lives that are not reducible to moral values. Nor are they reducible to happiness; they are not simply matters of subjective feeling. Narrative values are not felt, they are lived. And they constitute their own arena of value, one that has not been generally recognized by philosophers who reflect on life’s meaningfulness.

There are a number of qualifications that need to be made here. We cannot be content to see artistic production as something which fosters a negative response to the realities of the world. Creativity must precede any account of the dialectic. Nor must we confuse the art of living with the conforming arts that merely perform a well-rehearsed dance. Life as a work of art is necessarily affirmative in a sense that it appeals to the yet to be revealed. It has no taste for the simulacrum. Neither is it content to accept the need to live dangerously such that we are forced to live with déjà vu all over again. The self is to be actively produced as a non-stable subject that does not seek to emulate some normative standard, but instead forcefully challenges the vulnerable ground which it is said to occupy. So believing in the irreducibility of existence? Certainly. Hostile to all reactive and enslaving forces? Undeniably. Unapologetic in willing the event of its ongoing emergent existence? Steadfast. Openly committed to the affirmative potential of the autonomous subject? Categorically. A believer in a more affective notion of history that is forever in the making? Unreservedly. A student of the eschatological? Earnestly. Appreciative of the transformative political power of fabulation? Truly. A lover of the poetic over the mathematical? Wholeheartedly. Welcoming our coming into the world? Without reservation.

It would be wrong, however, to argue here simply in favour of life as if its very nature exhibited something of the poetic. As we have insisted, never before have we witnessed so many mediations on the value of life. Life, it is now said, constitutes the very meaningfulness of existence as broadly conceived. Without any engagement with the problem of life, there is nothing but a retreat into the abstract deceit of sovereign entrapments. This is now the default setting for global liberal governance on a planetary scale. Whilst critical philosophers once argued that life holds the capacity and the will to resist that which it finds intolerable to its existence, no longer can we have such confidence in the subject as framed in terms of its living qualities alone. Life continually desires that which it should find oppressive. It wilfully gives over to processes of desubjectivization on the promise of better futures to come. Life also shamefully compromises with power to the subjugation of both the self and others. It happily allows itself to be the principal referent object for political strategies which, promising freedom, render life with a difference thoroughly dangerous. Indeed, when power takes life to be its principal object, it often returns with claims to vulnerability that contemporary forms of power find easy to accommodate and turn to their own advantage. Neoliberalism, after all, thrives in situations that are insecure by design. What is at stake here is not simply some mediation on life such that the meaningfulness of life may be thought anew. However tempting this may appear to us, we need to focus more clearly on the affirmative and poetic qualities of existence that are by their very nature ‘irreducible to life’ against those strategies which take life in order to render it deducible – hence deductable as a living entity that demands continuous intervention on account of its endless imperfections.

Needless to say, this art of living that finds political value in those poetic expressions that remain irreducible to life as such stands in marked contrast to the conformist arts which seek to resemble the world. Much of contemporary art, it is fair to say, is what money makes of it. Indeed, if Andy Warhol epitomized what Walter Benjamin aptly termed the work of art in the age of mechanical reproduction, no artist resembles the resilient logic of the times better than Damien Hirst. Beyond his penchant for self-valuation and shameless taking of ideas for self-gratification and self-glorification, Hirst’s work has a well-documented affinity with the medical and the taxidermical. His series of figures in formaldehyde, in particular, can be seen to represent the catastrophic topography of the times. Suspended in perfect animation, while suffocated beneath the weight of a liquid modern embrace, the various animalistic subjects of Hirst’s choosing are devoid of any political agency. Spectacularly simplistic in their mundane and catatonic gaze, their manufactured commitment to a death without the chance of credible decay tells less a tale of philosophical enquiry than the story of a finitude that refuses to accept the notion that finality may be transformative. They are literally ‘set’ in a perpetually fixed catastrophic plot. Nothing original is produced here. Life is merely taken as something to be exhibited without agential content or capacity for transformation. All the while it is condemned to a suspended sentence that is imagined to last for infinity. Hirst’s work thus resembles a Kantian dream and Nietzschean nightmare in the very same move. For here the object is completely immobile such that we become aware of our shared vulnerabilities without asking what we may do differently to challenge them, let alone move beyond the tragedy of their artificial supports.

#### The Role of the Judge is to give up hope.

#### Hopeful affirmation warps within the biomedical sphere to structure policy toward the governance of difference – voting neg refuses to play into the affirmation of life for the sake of it

Ehlers and Krupar ‘14

[Nadine Ehlers, Women's and Gender Studies at Georgetown University, and Shiloh Krupar, Geographer and Provost's Distinguished Associate Professor at Georgetown University. Fall 2014. “Hope Logics: Biomedicine, Affective Conventions of Cancer, and the Governing of Biocitizenry,” <https://ro.uow.edu.au/lhapapers/1849/>] pat

Hope carries utopian promise; it offers possibilities of a “not yet,” a “to come,” and an imagining of life otherwise. In contemporary critique, hope has often been deployed as the means to effect radical social transformation and the reinvention of contemporary reality. It is seen as a way of reaching beyond the stymied conditions of today by orienting toward the horizon of an alternative tomorrow. Hope is invoked as an incantation, under conditions of uncertainty; it is an insistent affirmation of the ability to effect change. This change can be imagined politically and economically, psychologically and corporeally. Indeed, hope is ubiquitous in contemporary culture, from US President Barack Obama’s political memoir—The Audacity of Hope—to international food drives—the “Convoy of Hope”4—to biomedical understandings of illness and health. As in the above quotation from “Banners of Hope” (an online outreach for children with life-threatening diseases), hope is the panacea for chronic or terminal illness. Hope might be seen to operate as a logic within the biomedical arena, one that structures subjectivities, social realities, and corporeal states. It incites particular behaviors; it induces certain forms of community and belonging; it seduces us to believe in the possible transcendence of bodily limits and/or temporal constraints. As we explore in this essay, hope is the guiding principle of biomedicine’s telos toward the affirmation of life.

This essay argues that hope is conventionalized in particular ways that work in the service of biopolitical imperatives to govern life, and to secure, optimize, and speculate on that life. We orient the investigation toward the regulation of affect within the US biomedical arena to consider how affective conventions—that is, the perceptual, emotional, and corporeal modes of managing and responding to events—of hope perform a governing function. In relation to illness, for example, they condition responses to bodily vulnerability and uncertainty, manage the present for the future, and relentlessly affirm life. We ground these broad claims in an examination of the dominant affective conventions of hope at work in cancer activism and treatment. Documenting the ways in which hope is increasingly militarized, commodified, routinized, and delimited in the neoliberal era, the essay explores how such conventions of hope are actively made and maintained through aspects of cancer-related biomedical encounters—what we call infrastructures of care and bioethics of faith within oncology. The essay concludes by considering alternative hope tactics—“hoping for other things”—in relation to cancer.

## Case

### Util

#### The debrix ev on case answers this – using util allows for govs and orgs to max some life but min others – they use imperialist tactics to show what they care ab

#### Extinction doesn’t ow – allows for things like us \*thinking\* theres bioweapons in the middle east and killing kids because of it – means it’s a forefront for violent tactics

#### K ow – apartheid and war causes extinction and conflict now – larger scale than any possible econ decline

#### Whistleblowers are already protected but the plan fails because individual states won’t implement

Junck 21. Ryan Junck (Ryan Junck is the head of Skadden’s European Government Enforcement and White Collar Crime Group), 6-3-2021, "Blowing the Whistle: Protections Under EU Law," Skadden, https://www.skadden.com/insights/publications/2021/06/blowing-the-whistle sean!

On 23 October 2019, the European Parliament and the European Council adopted the Whistleblower Protection Directive (Directive) to set a minimum standard for the protections EU member states must provide to whistleblowers. For the first time, whistleblowers are protected under EU law, but implementation at the member state level has been slow. While 19 of the 27 member states had prepared draft legislation by the one-year anniversary of the Directive coming into force, no member state has implemented the new regime at a national level. A report by Transparency International in March 2021 ranked only the Czech Republic as having made substantive progress in transposing the Directive into national law.1 France adopted a law in 2016 to protect whistleblowers but has yet to transpose the Directive in full. Having left the EU on 31 January 2020, the UK currently has no plans to implement the Directive, but UK companies with a footprint in the EU must consider whether their whistleblower policies and procedures implemented pursuant to UK law are sufficient to meet new standards in the member states in which they operate. With just over six months until the deadline by which member states are required to introduce national legislation to implement the Directive (i.e., 17 December 2021), companies operating in the EU should ensure their policies and procedures are compliant with the new regime. This note sets out the key provisions of the Directive and the steps businesses should take now to update or introduce whistleblower reporting channels. To whom does the Directive apply? The Directive affects all businesses and government bodies with 50 or more employees. Companies with 250 or more employees must comply with the Directive beginning 17 December 2021. Businesses with between 50 and 249 workers will have to begin complying with the Directive by 17 December 2023. There currently are no plans at the EU level to apply the Directive to companies with fewer than 50 employees. Whom does the Directive protect? Any person working in the private or public sector who, having received information related to a breach of EU law in a work-related context, makes a report regarding alleged wrongdoing will be afforded protection from retaliation under the Directive. The person must make the report in good faith and have reasonable grounds for believing that the content of the disclosure is true at the time of making the report. The scope of the protection is wide, including current, former and prospective employees, as well as contractors and unpaid trainees or volunteers. The Directive also extends protection beyond the whistleblower to individuals who may have facilitated the whistleblowing, such as colleagues and relatives, in a work-related context. What protections does the Directive introduce? Member states must implement measures to prohibit retaliation against whistleblowers. Retaliation is interpreted broadly, including dismissal, demotion, suspension, disciplinary action, intimidation, discrimination or the withholding of training. Companies should ensure their policies and procedures protect the identity of the whistleblower to safeguard against potential retaliation. The Directive is silent on the issue of anonymous reports. The Directive does not define “whistleblowing” but refers to protecting individuals who report breaches of EU law. The scope of the Directive, while broad, is limited to public procurement, financial services, money laundering, corporate tax, transport, environment, food and animal welfare, public health, consumer protection, privacy, financial interests of the EU and the internal market.

#### None of their IL ev is about trade secrets – the plan doesn’t solve whistleblowing against corruption

Teracol 21. Marrie Teracol, Transparency International, 24 March 2021, ARE EU COUNTRIES TAKING WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION SERIOUSLY? <https://www.transparency.org/en/blog/are-eu-countries-taking-whistleblower-protection-seriously> sean!

Since the COVID-19 emergency began, constant concerning reports of threats against health care professionals speaking out about the realities of the pandemic have emerged across Europe, from Poland to the Czech Republic to Slovenia. Widespread corruption in health care and public procurement during the pandemic highlights just how much we need whistleblowers to expose abuses to safeguard public health and funds. With government spending going through the roof, from millions of euros to purchase health equipment to billions in economic stimulus packages, it is more essential than ever to ensure public funds are allocated democratically and reach intended beneficiaries.

### disease

#### No extinction from diseases

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For most of human history, natural pandemics have posed the greatest risk of mass global fatalities.37 However, there are some reasons to believe that natural pandemics are very unlikely to cause human extinction. Analysis of the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) red list database has shown that of the 833 recorded plant and animal species extinctions known to have occurred since 1500, less than 4% (31 species) were ascribed to infectious disease.38 None of the mammals and amphibians on this list were globally dispersed, and other factors aside from infectious disease also contributed to their extinction. It therefore seems that our own species, which is very numerous, globally dispersed, and capable of a rational response to problems, is very unlikely to be killed off by a natural pandemic. One underlying explanation for this is that highly lethal pathogens can kill their hosts before they have a chance to spread, so there is a selective pressure for pathogens not to be highly lethal. Therefore, pathogens are likely to co-evolve with their hosts rather than kill all possible hosts.39

### DeDev!

#### Collapse of industrial society is inevitable---forcing a transition is key to avoid a total collapse that ends civilization

Nafeez M. Ahmed 17, Executive Director of the Institute for Policy Research and Development, *Failing States, Collapsing Systems: BioPhysical Triggers of Political Violence*, 2017, pp. 11-13

Today, human civilization under late capitalism maintains its increasing distance from thermodynamic equilibrium via the throughput of vast quantities of increasingly depleted fossil fuel reserves, along with other finite and increasingly scarce resources such as metal ores, radionucleotides, rare earth elements, phosphate fertilizer, arable land, and fresh water (Nekola et al. 2013). One indicator of the system’s growing complexity today is the measure of material throughput, or economic growth—Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Under capitalist social-property relations, GDP must continuously increase through the maximization of private sector profits, simply for businesses to survive in the competitive marketplace and for the economy to maintain its ability to meet the consumption requirements of a growing population. However, as the complexity of human civilization has advanced, the continual growth in material throughput is correlated with an escalating rate of depletion of energy and raw materials, as well as an acceleration in the dissipation of energy through intensifying greenhouse gas emissions. Robust scientific assessments now demonstrate that the continuation of those biophysical processes of environmental degradation in a business-as-usual scenario will, before the end of the twenty-first century, fundamentally undermine the biophysical basis of human civilization in its current mode of material organization and structural complexity. Further, the uncontrolled energy releases generated by these biophysical processes are manifested in climate change,

#### Try or die means the transition’s worth it – our evidence does the impact calculus

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While Tainter’s theory of social complexity has much to commend it, in this chapter I wish to examine and ultimately challenge Tainter’s conclusion that voluntary simplification is not a viable path to sustainability. In fact, I will argue that it is by far our best bet, even if the odds do not provide grounds for much optimism. Part of the disagreement here turns on differing notions of ‘sustainability’. Whereas Tainter seems to use sustainability to mean *sustaining the existing civilisation*, I use sustainability to mean *changing the form of civilisation* through voluntary simplification, insofar as that is required for humanity to operate within the carrying capacity of the planet (Vale and Vale, 2013). Given that Tainter (1988) seems to accept, as we will see, that his own conception of sustainability will eventually lead to collapse, I feel he is wrong to be so dismissive of voluntary simplification as a strategy for potentially avoiding collapse. It is, I argue, our only alternative to collapse, and if that is so, voluntary simplification ought to be given our most rigorous attention and commitment, even if the chances of success do not seem high. I feel Tainter is flippant about our best hope, and given what is at stake, his dismissal of voluntary simplification should be given close critical attention. Furthermore, even if attempting to sustain the existing civilisation through ever-increasing complexity continues to be humanity’s dominant approach to solving societal problems, I maintain the alternative path of voluntary simplification remains the most effective means of building ‘resilience’ (i.e., the ability of an individual or community to withstand societal or ecological shocks). This is significant because it justifies the practice and promotion of voluntary simplification, *irrespective of the likelihood*