#### Our interpretation is the topic should determine the division of aff and neg ground – winning that voting ought not be compulsory should always be sufficient condition for voting negative – hold the line, CX and the 1AC prove there’s no I-meet.

#### “Resolved” is a formal decision.

Merriam-Webster

[Unlike Words and Phrases ’64, this card actually exists on the internet! <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/resolved>] pat

a: to declare or decide by a formal resolution and vote

b: to change by resolution or formal vote

the house resolved itself into a committee

#### Nations are defined territories with governments

**Merriam Webster** [Merriam Webster, 8-22-2021, accessed on 9-6-2021, Merriam-webster, "Definition of NATION", <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/nation>] Adam

Definition of nation

 (Entry 1 of 2)

1a(1): [NATIONALITY sense 5a](https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/nationality)three Slav peoples … forged into a Yugoslavia without really fusing into a Yugoslav nation— Hans Kohn

(2): a politically organized [nationality](https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/nationality)

(3)in the Bible : a non-Jewish nationalitywhy do the nations conspire— Psalms 2:1 (Revised Standard Version)

b: a community of people composed of one or more [nationalities](https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/nationalities) and possessing a more or less defined territory and government Canada is a nation with a written constitution— B. K. Sandwell

c: a territorial division containing a body of people of one or more nationalities and usually characterized by relatively large size and independent statusa nation of vast size with a small population— Mary K. Hammond

2archaic : [GROUP](https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/group), [AGGREGATION](https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/aggregation)

3: a tribe or federation of tribes (as of American Indians)the Seminole Nation in Oklahoma

#### Medicines refer to physical substances.

American Heritage Dictionary of Medicine 18 The American Heritage Dictionary of Medicine 2018 by Houghton Mifflin Harcourt Publishing Company <https://www.yourdictionary.com/medicine> //Elmer

"A **substance**, **especially a drug**, **used to treat** the signs and symptoms of a **disease**, condition, or injury."

#### There are 4 types of IP the aff could reduce.

**Brewer 19** [Trevor Brewer, 5-16-2019, accessed on 8-11-2021, BrewerLong, "What Are The 4 Types of Intellectual Property Rights? BrewerLong", <https://brewerlong.com/information/business-law/four-types-of-intellectual-property/>] Adam

There are four types of intellectual property rights and protections (although multiple types of intellectual property itself). Securing the correct protection for your property is important, which is why consulting with a lawyer is a must. The four categories of intellectual property protections include:

TRADE SECRETS

Trade secrets refer to specific, private information that is important to a business because it gives the business a competitive advantage in its marketplace. If a trade secret is acquired by another company, it could harm the original holder.

Examples of trade secrets include recipes for certain foods and beverages (like Mrs. Fields’ cookies or Sprite), new inventions, software, processes, and even different marketing strategies.

When a person or business holds a trade secret protection, others cannot copy or steal the idea. In order to establish information as a “trade secret,” and to incur the legal protections associated with trade secrets, businesses must actively behave in a manner that demonstrates their desire to protect the information.

[Trade secrets are protected without official registration](https://www.wipo.int/sme/en/ip_business/trade_secrets/protection.htm); however, an owner of a trade secret whose rights are breached–i.e. someone steals their trade secret–may ask a court to ask against that individual and prevent them from using the trade secret.

PATENTS

As defined by the[U.S. Patent and Trademark Office](https://www.uspto.gov/help/patent-help#patents) (USPTO), a patent is a type of limited-duration protection that can be used to protect inventions (or discoveries) that are new, non-obvious, and useful, such a new process, machine, article of manufacture, or composition of matter.

When a property owner holds a patent, others are prevented, under law, from offering for sale, making, or using the product.

COPYRIGHTS

Copyrights and patents are not the same things, although they are often confused. A copyright is a type of intellectual property protection that protects original works of authorship, which might include literary works, music, art, and more. Today, copyrights also protect computer software and architecture.

Copyright protections are automatic; once you create something, it is yours. However, if your rights under copyright protections are infringed and you wish to file a lawsuit, then registration of your copyright will be necessary.

TRADEMARKS

Finally, the fourth type of intellectual property protection is a trademark protection. Remember, patents are used to protect inventions and discoveries and copyrights are used to protect expressions of ideas and creations, like art and writing.

Trademarks, then, refer to phrases, words, or symbols that distinguish the source of a product or services of one party from another. For example, the Nike symbol–which nearly all could easily recognize and identify–is a type of trademark.

While patents and copyrights can expire, trademark rights come from the use of the trademark, and therefore can be held indefinitely. Like a copyright, registration of a trademark is not required, but registering can offer additional advantages.

#### The Role of the Ballot is to vote for whoever does the better debating – any alternative framework must explain why we switch sides, why there has to be a winner and a loser, and why there are structural rules. The frame for evaluating offense is that debate is a game and we’re all here to win – that means procedural questions come first.

#### Vote neg for clash – abdicating government actions sanctions picking any interpretation for debate – incentivizes retreat from controversy and forces the neg to first characterize the aff and then debate it which eliminates the benefit of preround research. A common point of engagement ensures effective clash, which is a linear impact – negation is the necessary condition for distinguishing debate from discussion, but negation exists on a sliding scale. The topic of discussion is up to the affirmative, but depth and nuanced engagement is determined by negative ground. Any impact intrinsic to debate, not just discussion, comes from negation because it starts the process of critical thinking, reflexivity, and argument refinement.

#### TVA and switch-side solve the 1AC –The TVA could be that IPPs are bad bc they perpetuate covid, and more covi means more anti asian sentimenr

#### Any 1AR response to the substance of the TVA is offense for us because it proves our model allows for clear contestation and reading the rest of their theory on the negative solves their offense.

### 2

#### Capitalism causes massive violence and inevitable extinction – the fundamental task is developing tools for organization and tactics to bring about revolution.

Escalante ‘19

[Alyson, revolutionary Marxist (duh), philosophy at U of Oregon. 09/08/2019. “Truth and Practice: The Marxist Theory of Knowledge”. https://web.archive.org/web/20190910040756/https://failingthatinvent.home.blog/2019/09/08/truth-and-practic-the-marxist-theory-of-knowledge/] pat

The world we live in today is in a dire state. Climate destruction continues at a fast pace, and every with every passing day, capitalism proves itself to be incapable of addressing this. Capitalist production and its endless drive for resources to match artificial market demands has created a climate crisis that leaves us on the brink of potential extinction.

Governments around the world are turning to far right and fascist leaders to assuage their fears of an uncertain future, and the most marginalized and oppressed suffer because of it. Fascism is on the rise, and history tells us very clearly what that can result in without opposition.

The decaying US empire continues to lash out in violence across the globe in a desperate attempt to re-assert its power and hegemony. Whole countries are destroyed in its desperate bids for more fossil fuels. The world burns from America’s white phosphorus weaponry.

The need for a revolutionary movement capable of replacing capitalism with something better has never been so clear. The choice between socialism or barbarism has never been so stark. More and more people are starting to realize that reform cannot save us, that capitalism and imperialism themselves are the problem, and that we must unite and band together to fight for a better world.

The question then is: how will we know what strategies, what tactics, and what ideas to unite around? If the skeptics and postmodernists are correct that knowledge is always relative and localized, then we cannot built a global and universal strategy to unite around. If they are correct then we are doomed to small acts of localized or individual resistance in the face of apocalypse. To embrace such a vision of the world (with its accompanying epistemological skepticism) is to embrace defeat.

The masses do not want to embrace defeat, they want to know how to fight back. Marxism can provide the tools necessary to engage in that fight.

Marxism, with its self criticism and its insistence on incorporating the valuable ideas of its critics has created a means for unifying workers across the globe with anti-colonial and anti-imperialist struggles. The Marxist belief in the possibility of true ideas, tested and verified in practice, creates the possibility for unity on a global scale. The scientific status of Marxism means that as our climate changes, as our world looks more and more grim, Marxism will adapt through struggle and practice; it will provide us with the ideas and tools we need to fight and win.

There will be no victory for the workers of the world without the ability to wield a revolutionary science. What is at stake in questions of Marxist epistemology is the very possibility of creating a philosophical and scientific basis for revolution. We must defend this possibility. We must defend the scientific status of Marxism, and must insist on the possibility of victory.

#### The aff’s fear of vertical organizing is a reactionary infatuation with failure – naming oneself as a comrade is key to disciplined communist organizing.

Dean ‘19

[Jodi, politics at Hobart and William Smith Colleges. 04/11/2019. “Jodi Dean Comrade,” <http://stateofnatureblog.com/jodi-dean-comrade/>] pat – finders credit to Townes – interviewer questions are in italics

You are absolutely correct that that sort of thinking is the obstacle. It reflects an anti-communist, capitalist, reactionary mind-set that dooms the Left – the clue is the term ‘totalitarian’ which today is used to create a false equivalence between the USSR and Nazi Germany.

Part of the falsity also lies in the delusion that parties are outmoded. Political power is still achieved via parties. The Right knows this. But stupidly too much of the Left abandoned the party form, which then ceded the space to the Right. All over the world there are still communist and socialist parties. The Left embrace of failure is a cop out, a refusal to engage in politics. And the result is that the Right becomes the force channelling popular anger.

Communism is the name we have for the positive alternative to capitalism. It says that we cannot compromise with capitalism. There is no such thing as capitalism with a human face. Capitalism relies on exploitation. It’s as simple as that. Is it hard today to organise under the name communism in Europe and the US? Yes. It’s always been hard. And it has gotten particularly hard in Poland where a law has been passed outlawing the promotion of totalitarianism. Why, if communism had been defeated, was it necessary for the right-wing ruling party to pass this law? Anti-communism is being used to ward off opposition to capitalism; it’s being used to defeat democracy.

*In the book you explain that the comrade has ‘four primary characteristics: discipline, joy, enthusiasm, and courage.’ Are these the qualities that you feel are currently missing from much of contemporary Left political struggle? How might their resurgence change the kinds of political action we partake in and how we relate to it?*

I would say that it’s the combination that is missing. So there are of course courageous fighters on the Left. For starters think of Black Lives Matter, Standing Rock, all the environmental and climate activists who are fighting against coal, oil, and gas corporations, many of whom who have been killed. I’d also say that there is enthusiasm and joy: people come out for marches; they make hilarious signs; they demonstrate amazing creativity.

Discipline, though, may be what is missing. I don’t mean individual discipline: as every organiser knows, political work takes enormous discipline — showing up, getting people to show up, this isn’t easy. There’s always something else to do and it’s easy to get discouraged, like, will this protest even make a difference? The challenge is in a broader collective discipline where people realise that it’s good and important and necessary to follow a common line, pursue a common strategy.

Too many think that everyone needs to provide their original individual hot take, and that this hot take must be a take down. This kills Left solidarity. Some on the Left also think of discipline as bad, perhaps from (mis)reading Foucault or from embracing a view of the multitude they take from Hardt and Negri. But discipline generates capacity. The more coordinated and disciplined we are, the more we can pursue a collective strategy. And the more prepared we can be after we win.

*Another aspect you consider is how a politics built around comradeship works in relation to identity politics, clearly defined group struggles, and the notion of political ‘allies’. How does comradeship work as a unifying factor here without homogenising the particular issues and contradictions faced by different groups?*

It’s a matter of perspective. Comrade names a relation between people on the same side of a political struggle. It doesn’t name a relation between people and what they are struggling for or against. So comrade doesn’t say anything about particular issues.

One of the examples I use in the book comes from the Communist Party of the United States and its fight against white supremacy and lynching and for black people’s right of self-determination. This was a struggle that the whole party was instructed to pursue. No exceptions. That a comrade was white didn’t exempt them from the requirement to oppose white supremacy in all its forms, everywhere and all the time, that is, in personal life as well as political life. There’s no homogenising here. The struggle was against white supremacy and comrades were told that they had to be willing to act in defence of any black person. I should add that the CP’s work in this area was path-breaking – in the 1930s it was the leading interracial group fighting for black liberation.

The ‘allies’ idea makes politics seem like a possession, something that belongs to a person or group naturally, by virtue of their ascribed identity. Politics is somehow naturalised, as if everyone who shares an identity politics shares a politics – but of course we know that is not true. Politics has to be built, constructed.

*What is the relationship between comrades and party? How does the comrade ensure that the party does not become hierarchical, or a kind of superego figure, demanding ever greater fidelity, commitment and discipline?*

There are no guarantees, not in life, not in politics. The thing to keep in mind is that comrade operates as an interior force. We internalise the perspective of our comrades. So the force we feel is what we impose on ourselves. Our actual comrades are generally far more tolerant and forgiving than the internalised comrade. In fact, the comrade always becomes a super-ego figure demanding greater fidelity, commitment, and discipline. That’s part of the power of comradeship: our comrades (internalised) make us do more than we would otherwise.

And given the world we are in, given the absolute imperative of the fight for communism on a vastly unequal and warming world, we should embrace this. It follows directly from a Left analysis of the present as one of exploitation and inequality – why would we think that anything but commitment and discipline is demanded by our situation?

*A recent review of Comrade in Jacobin raises some similar questions: ‘Are there times when the comradely perspective can undermine socialist organisation? Can comradeship’s ego ideal become so persuasive in practice that it blinds us to dysfunction, discrimination, and abuse among ostensible comrades? Is it more useful than harmful to think of ourselves as equal and the same in contexts where we obviously aren’t?*’

I don’t see how a comradely perspective could undermine socialist organisation. The question doesn’t even make sense to me; there is no socialist organisation absent a comradely perspective. There might be a bunch of individuals who think of themselves as socialists who have paid dues to an association that claims to pursue socialist goals. I wouldn’t call that a socialist organisation myself, but even if it were, how would comradeship undermine rather than activate and inspire it?

The next question about being blind to dysfunction, discrimination, and abuse – comradeship is what lets us see dysfunction and abuse. And it provides us with the norm of equality through which to address it. A great example comes from Claudia Jones in her famous article, ‘An End to the Neglect of the Problems of the Negro Woman!’ She appeals to her white men and women and black men comrades for their failure to treat black women in the Party as equals.

And on the last bit: to think of ourselves as equal does not mean to posit an identity of capacity and experience. The context of comradeship is being on the same political side. For communists and socialists, this side has been organised in terms of party belonging. Equality is an attribute of this belonging: all are equally obliged to carry out the party’s work; all are equally important for the party’s work.

#### The 1AC’s emphasis on cultural production of Asian-american identity fuels neoliberal multiculturalism that emphasizes fragmentation and the power of aestheticized resistance that turns case.

Raymundo, 17 [Emily Raymundo, PhD in philosophy @ University of Southern California, “REORIENTING ASIAN AMERICA: RACIAL FEELING IN A MULTICULTURAL ERA,” 2017, ProQuest]//Townes

Reorienting Asian America takes up these questions, and I use the work of Asian American Studies theorists to hone my own inquiry into how the racial and ethnic category “Asian American” is being produced. Yet I also want to return to one of the foundational questions of the Blu’s controversy: what does the term “Asian American” mean—how does it become meaningful, and what meanings does it produce? To whom does it apply, and when, and why? That is, this dissertation centers the term “Asian American” as a productive, rather than descriptive, designation. Following Laura Hyun Yi Kang, Mark Chiang, Colleen Lye, and others, I argue that “Asian America,” rather than being a discrete and knowable entity—an object—is instead a discursive construction that appears under certain conditions to do cultural work: as an ideological “racial form” that coheres national and global preoccupations, anxieties, and desires; as a disciplinary figure that inscribes subjects and prescribes behavior; and as a strategy for capital accumulation, either for those to whom the term adheres or for those to whom the term does not (and sometimes both).13

To do so, I read Asian American Studies not just as theory but as itself an archive, one that simultaneously serves as a repository for the various historical moments that “Asian America” has emerged into visibility and itself continuously produces Asian America and invests it with meaning. On the one hand, I examine the ways in which the reiteration of the term Asian American throughout the field’s history has had, despite an emphasis on difference and heterogeneity, the unintentional effect of producing Asian America as a coherent and knowable subject. Laura Hyun Yi Kang and Roderick Ferguson have both argued that interdisciplinary departments, like Women’s and Gender Studies and ethnic studies, are often inadvertently “complicit with disciplinary power’s penchant for surveillance, documentation, and categorization.” 14 Thus Asian American Studies, under the aegis of resisting universalizing narratives that center whiteness, produces proliferating accounts of Asian American subjects, bodies, experiences, cultural products, texts, and lives that “are more often bound up with, not liberated from, disciplinary regimes of codification and documentation.”15 In part because that documentary practice now entails the usage of the term Asian American without a rigorous examination of the implications of that term, I argue throughout the dissertation that slippages in meaning and usage, produced not in one text but through reiteration and aggregation, have resulted in a narrowing of interpretative mechanisms and object selection that does not fully capture the reality of Asian American cultural production or experience. Indeed, I argue that not only do these narrowed mechanisms produce a limited understanding of the contemporary meaning and function of Asian America, but, on occasion, they actively obscure alternative understandings or interpretations.

That is, throughout the dissertation, I trace the ways in which the field’s turn to fragmentation, nonresolution, and disorientation as analytical modes that can achieve, or at least imagine, the political aims of the field tend to limit the field to examining “Asian American culture” that can, at its base, be read as working towards those same political aims. Viet Thanh Nguyen refers to this as an “ideological rigidity,” in which partially because of Asian American critics’ “professional histories, political priorities, and institutional locations,” “Asian American intellectuals as a whole have tended to see Asian America as a place of resistance and have not been capable of articulating a theoretical framework that can address Asian America’s ideological diversity and contradictions.”16 That is, because Asian American critics themselves prioritize resistance to the forces of state, nation, and capital (among other things), they tend to both select cultural texts that can be interpreted as reflecting those priorities, and also deploy interpretive mechanisms that assure such a reading even when other readings are possible.

I also explore the racial effects of Asian American Studies beyond the closed circuit of academic intellectual production. Alongside Laura Hyun Yi Kang and Rod Ferguson, Jodi Melamed has argued that the university has been an important site for generating racial knowledges and racial meanings, particularly in the era of what Melamed calls neoliberal multiculturalism (explored in more depth below). That is, in part because civil rights demands for equal representation under the law were accompanied by demands for equal representation in higher education, and specifically for the creation of African American, Latino, Asian American and ethnic studies departments broadly, the university has become a key location for the management and mediation of those civil rights demands and their afterlives. The fictive nature of Asian American as an identity marker means that it is largely produced by and within institutional sites, and, in particular, the university. That is, many people who claim the label “Asian American” (as opposed to ethnically/nationally specific labels, like Chinese American, etc.) do so only when, and because, they have come into contact with the Asian American apparatus enabled and installed in universities—not just Asian American studies, but Asian American student activity groups, Asian American programming, and/or diversity initiatives that “hail” them as Asian Americans.17 This is particularly true of contemporary Asian American writers, who are also much more likely to have gone through M.F.A. programs that further shuttle them towards identifying as Asian American writers and participating in Asian American creative spaces, like the Asian American Writers’ Workshop and Kundiman, two organizations dedicated to workshopping, funding, promoting, and occasionally publishing Asian American writing.18 Thus Asian American Studies is deeply imbricated in the production of Asian American identity and Asian American culture even beyond the actual bounds of the university.

The porousness between Asian American cultural production and Asian American academic production has facilitated a familiarity with the critical practices and expectation of Asian American Studies among Asian American writers. As I argue in the first three chapters, David Henry Hwang, Chang-rae Lee, and Tao Lin—three writers whose work I examine in detail—are all highly cognizant of the fact that their work will be labeled “Asian American,” both by white critics and by Asian American critics. In different ways, each author playfully acknowledges, accommodates, transforms, and yes, resists the schema of expectations and 9 interpretive mechanisms they know will be brought to bear upon their work by Asian American critics. This interplay between cultural texts and the field of Asian American Studies, I argue, produces multiple visions of Asian America; some that can be, and indeed are intended to be, read by the current strictures of Asian American studies; and some that, utilizing this knowledge, exceed or evade interpretation by Asian American Studies.

As I elaborate in Chapters 2 and 4, a familiarity with the core concepts and languages of Asian American Studies, or even ethnic studies broadly, does not necessarily lead to an alignment with the politics of the field. That is, just because a writer (or, in the case of Chapter 4, a lawyer) can competently traffic in or reproduce the language and concepts of the field does not mean they do so in service of a common political goal—yet Asian American Studies’ interpretive mechanisms, which skew ideologically towards resistance and social justice, often miss or obscure those ideological distinctions. In fact, as I argue in Chapter 4 in depth, there is nothing inherently political about disorganization, fragmentation, contradiction and nonresolution, either as modes of analysis or as cultural strategies. Indeed, those very strategies are the ones upon which neoliberal multiculturalism depends to do its own racial work.

ASIAN AMERICA AND NEOLIBERAL MULTICULTURALISM

As I explore in more detail in Chapter 1, Asian American Studies is usually pegged as originating in the student protest movements of 1968. The activists, students, and artists leading the movement were primarily at least second generation immigrants, and almost exclusively of Chinese and Japanese origin. They drew on their shared experiences of exclusion and alienation to formulate a pan-ethnic collectivity, and formed the field of Asian American Studies around these two central premises. Yet even as Asian American Studies was consolidating within elite institutions and emerging as a legible, legitimate cultural formation, changes to U.S. immigration law were radically reshaping the class, national, and ethnic characteristics of the Asian American population. Where once Japanese and Chinese American communities were relatively homogenous in their characteristics—both communities having been present in the U.S. since the 1800s, and both having experienced abrupt changes to their legal status in the U.S. that prevented their economic or social flourishing for generations—the flow of Asian immigrants to the U.S. after the 1965 Immigration Act ended Asian exclusion was characterized by huge class striations and ever-increasing heterogeneity. Lowe’s formulation of heterogeneity, hybridity, and multiplicity was in part a response to the fact that, by 1996, it was undeniable that Asian America was much more heterogenous than it had been at the inception of the field, and would only continue to diversify.

The story of changing Asian American demographics and their effect on the field of Asian American Studies is but one piece of a very large puzzle, which Jodi Melamed and Grace Hong, among others, call neoliberal multiculturalism.19 Neoliberal multiculturalism is both a cultural and economic ideology and a “global racial formation,” one that emerged in response to first, the “racial break” instantiated by the Civil Rights movement, in which the U.S. state moved from governing through overt white supremacy to governing through formal racial equality, and, second, the globalization of capital.20 At its heart, neoliberal multiculturalism is an “official antiracism” that nonetheless depends on racial difference in order to do its economic and institutional work.21 Thus neoliberal multiculturalism consists of a number of technologies and governance tactics that function to stabilize this global racial formation, including 1) substituting “aesthetic and cultural representation” for political representation, so that it is now common sense that equalizing cultural representation (e.g., equalizing the number of Asian American 11 actors in Hollywood films) will translate into equalized political and economic conditions;22 2) selectively incorporating elite individuals from oppressed classes or peoples into visible positions of power based on their worth within “neoliberal circuits of value,” e.g. their ability to prove themselves “flexible,” “rational,” “feminist,” and “law-abiding,”;23 3) commodifying and proliferating social identities, including racial, gender, sexual, and sub-cultural identities, in order to expand economic markets and guarantee full participation in those markets;24 4) embedding market rationality into analytics of inequality, so that an individual’s success or failure (economic, social, physical, etc.) is seen not as a result of structural inequities or impediments, but as a result of their capacity to behave as a rational economic subject by investing their resources properly, maximizing their returns, and managing their needs by consuming commodities; and 5) promoting the previous four technologies as the result of a successful state-led campaign to end racism (and, similarly, misogyny and homophobia) that then justifies the U.S.’s military and economic intervention into states and governments deemed insufficiently multicultural, feminist, gay-friendly, etc.25 The net effect of these strategies is that older racial formations, which emerged in relation to an overtly white supremacist U.S. state, are not only not resolved by neoliberal multiculturalism, but in fact stabilized and, often, exacerbated. At the same time, new racial cleavages and formations are emergent in relation to neoliberal multiculturalism, premised on its new schema of worth and dignity, which both overlay older formations and cut new schisms through racialized populations.

Neoliberal multiculturalism then depends on heterogeneity, fragmentation, and the proliferation of difference in order to continuously expand its reach and perfects its strategies of governance. It is not a coincidence that, as I observed above, neoliberal multiculturalism and Asian American Studies share an investment in logics of differentiation and multiplicity.26 12 Instead, I argue throughout the dissertation that the two formations are foundationally enmeshed, such that the economic and political relationship between “Asia” and America fundamentally shaped the structures of neoliberal multiculturalism, and the racializing processes of neoliberal multiculturalism were practiced and perfected on Asian Americans. Asian American Studies is thus an archive of the history of the interrelationship between the two formations, while also being embedded in and shaping their intertwining.

#### Labor competition was the foundation of Asian exploitation – their language games are meaningless and cede the question to neoliberal ends.

San Juan Jr. ‘91

(E, PhD. “Beyond Identity Politics: The Predicament of the Asian American Writer in Late Capitalism”. American Literary History, Vol. 3, No. 3 (Autumn, 1991), pp. 542-565) rc/Pat

With the presumed collapse of the transcendental grounds for universal standards of norms and values, proponents of the postmodern “revolution” in cultural studies in Europe and North America have celebrated differance, marginality, nomadic and decentered identities, indeterminacy, simulacra and the sublime, undecidability, ironic dissemination, textuality, and so forth. A multiplicity of power plays and language games supposedly abounds. The intertextuality of power, desire, and interest begets strategies of positionalities. So take your pick. Instead of the totalizing master narratives of Enlightenment progress, postmodern thinkers valorize the local, the heterogeneous, the contingent and conjunctural. Is it still meaningful to speak of truth? Are we still permitted to address issues of class, gender, and race? What are the implications of this postmodern “transvaluation” of paradigms for literary studies in general and minority/ ethnic writing in particular? One salutary repercussion has been the questioning of the Eurocentric canonical archive by feminists, peoples of color, dissenters inside and outside. The poststructuralist critique of the self-identical Subject (by convention white, bourgeois, patriarchal) has inspired a perspectivalist revision of various disciplinary approaches in history, comparative aesthetics, and others. To cite three inaugural examples: Houston Baker’s text-specific inventory of the black vernacular “blues” tradition presented in Blues, Ideology and Afro-American Literature (1984), Arnold Krupat’s foregrounding of oral tribal allegory in American Indian autobiographies enabled by a “materially situated historicism” in The Voice in the Margin (1989), and Ramon Saldivar’s dialectical assessment of Chicano narrative as an “oppositional articulation” of the gaps and silences in American literary history, a thesis vigorously argued in Chicano Narrative (1990). Premised on the notion that everything is socio-discursively constructed, these initiatives so far have not been paralleled by Asian American intellectuals. Who indeed will speak for this composite group? One would suspect that the rubric “Asian American,” itself an artificial hypostasis of unstable elements, would preemptively vitiate any unilateral program of systematization. In addition, Asian Americans’ being judged by media and government as a “model minority,” some allegedly whiter than whites (see Themstrom 252; Lee), makes their marginality quite problematic. Perhaps more than other peoples of color, Asian Americans find themselves trapped in a classic postmodern predicament: essentialized by the official pluralism as formerly the “Yellow Peril” and now the “Superminority,” they nevertheless seek to reaffirm their complex internal differences in projects of hybrid and syncretic genealogy. Objectified by state-ordained juridical exclusions (Chinese, Japanese, and Filipinos share this historically unique commonality), they pursue particularistic agendas for economic and cultural autonomy. Given these antinomic forces at work, can Asian American writers collectively pursue a “molecular micropolitics” of marginality? What is at stake if a well-known authority on ethnic affairs like Ronald Takaki (whose recent book affords a point of departure for my metacommentary) tries to articulate the identity-in-difference of this fragmented and dispersed ensemble of ethnoP. (see Grigulevich and Kozlov 17-44). How does a postmodern politics of identity refract the innovative yet tradition-bound performances of the Chinese American Maxine Hong Kingston and the Filipino American Carlos Bulosan? Given the crisis of the postmodern politics of identity, can we legitimately propose an oppositional “emergency” strategy of writing whose historic agency is still on trial or, as it were, on reprieve? My inquiry begins with remarks on Asian American history’s textuality as prelude to its possible aesthetic inscription. In composing Strangers from a Different Shore in a period when the planet is beginning to be homogenized by a new pax EuroAmericana, a “New World Order” spawning (as I write) from the Persian Gulf, Takaki has performed for us the unprecedented task of unifying the rich, protean, intractable diversity of Asian lives in the US without erasing the specificities, the ramifying genealogies, the incommensurable repertoire of idiosyncrasies of each constituent group—a postmodern feat of reconciling incommensurables, to say the least. There are of course many discrete chronicles of each Asian community, mostly written by sympathetic Euro-American scholars before Takaki’s work. But what distinguishes Takaki’s account, aside from his empathy with his subject and documentary trustworthiness, is its claim to represent the truth based on the prima facie experiences of individuals. At once we are confronted with the crucial problem plaguing such claims to veracity or authenticity: Can these subalterns represent themselves (to paraphrase Gayatri Spivak) as self-conscious members of a collectivity for-itself? Or has Takaki mediated the immediacy of naive experience with a theory of representation that privileges the homo economicus as the founding subject of his discourse? No one should underestimate Takaki’s achievement here in challenging the tenability of the received dogma (espoused by Nathan Glazer and other neoconservative pundits) that the European immigrant model of successful assimilation applies to peoples of color in the US (see Takaki, “Reflections”). Europe’s Others, hitherto excluded from the canonical tradition, are beginning to speak and present themselves so as to rectify the mystifying re-presentation of themselves. In this light, Takaki is to be credited above all for giving Asian Americans a synoptic view of their deracinated lives by making them (as protagonists who discover their roles and destinies in the process) perform the drama of their diverse singularities. This is stage-managed within the framework of a chronological history of their ordeals in struggling to survive, adapt, and multiply in a hostile habitat, with their accompanying rage and grief and laughter. By a montage of personal testimony—anecdotes, letters, songs, telegrams, eyewitness reports, confessions, album photographs, quotidian fragments, cliches and banalities of everyday life—juxtaposed with statistics, official documents, reprise of punctual events, Takaki skillfully renders a complex drama of Asians enacting and living their own history. We can perhaps find our own lives already anticipated, pantomimed, rounded off, and judged in one of his varied “talk stories”—a case of life imitating the art of history. Granted the book’s “truth-effects,” I enter a caveat. For all its massive accumulation of raw data and plausible images of numerous protagonists and actions spanning more than a century of wars and revolutions, Takaki’s narrative leaves us wondering whether the collective life-trajectory of Asian Americans imitates the European immigrant success story, spiced with quaint “Oriental” twists—which he clearly implies at the end. If so, it is just one thread of the national fabric, no more tormented nor pacified than any other. If not, then this history is unique in some way that escapes the traditional emplotment of previous annals deriving from the master narrative of hu mankind’s continuous material improvement, self-emancipation, and techno-administrative mastery conceived by the philosophes of the European Enlightenment. Either way, there is no reason for Asian Americans to feel excluded from the grand March of Progress. Our puzzlement, however, is not clarified by the book’s concluding chapter, which exposes the myth of the “model minority” in an eloquent argument, assuring us that Asian Americans did not “let the course of their lives be determined completely by the ‘necessity’ of race and class” (473). In the same breath Takaki warns of a resurgent tide of racially motivated attacks against Asian Americans manifested in the media, in campus harassments, in the 1982 murder of Vincent Chin mistaken for a Japanese by unemployed Detroit autoworkers (and, I might add here, in the January 1989 massacre of Vietnamese and Cambodian schoolchildren in Stockton, California, by a man obsessed with hatred for Southeast Asian refugees). During this same period, in contrast, the judicial victory of the Japanese concentration camp internees’ demand for redress and reparations as well as the growing visibility of Asian American artists furnishes convincing proof that what David Harvey calls the post-Fordist post-Keynesian system (173-78) still allows dreams to come true, that is, allows Asian Americans the opportunity in particular “to help America accept and appreciate its diversity.” Calculating the losses and gains, Takaki prudentially opts for a meliorative closure. In retrospect, the telos of Strangers from a Different Shore can be thematized as the Asian immigrants’ almost miraculous struggle for survival and recognition of their desperately won middle-class status. What is sought is the redemption of individual sacrifices by way of conformity to the utilitarian, competitive ethos of a business society. Reversing the dismaying prospect for Asian Americans forecast in an earlier survey, American Racism (1970) by Roger Daniels and Harry Kitano, Takaki offers a balance sheet for general consumption: Asian Americans are no longer victimized by legislation denying them naturalized citizenship and landownership. They have begun to exercise their political voices and have representatives in both houses of Congress as well as in state legislatures and on city councils. They enjoy much of the protection of civil rights laws that outlaw racial discrimination in employment as well as housing and that provide for affirmative action for racial minorities. They have greater freedom than did the earlier immigrants to embrace their own “diversity”—their own cultures as well as their own distinctive physical characteristics, such as their complexion and the shape of their eyes. (473-74) It now becomes clear that despite its encyclopedic scope and archival competence, Takaki’s somewhat premature synthesis is a learned endeavor to deploy a strategy of containment. His rhetoric activates a mode of comic emplotment where all problems are finally resolved through hard work and individual effort, inspired by past memories of clan solidarity and intuitive faith in a gradually improving future. What is this if not a refurbished version of the liberal ideology of a market-centered, pluralist society where all disparities in values and beliefs—nay, even the sharpest contradictions implicating race, class, and gender—can be harmonized within the prevailing structure of power relations? This is not to say that such attempts to empower disenfranchised nationalities are futile or deceptive. But what needs a more than gestural critique is the extent to which such reforms do not eliminate the rationale for the hierarchical, invidious categorizing of people by race (as well as by gender and class) and their subsequent deprivation. Lacking such self-reflection, unable to problematize his theoretical organon, Takaki has superbly accomplished the articulation of the **hegemonic doctrine of acquisitive/possessive liberalism** as the informing principle of Asian American lives. Whether this is an effect of postmodern tropology or a symptom of “bad faith” investing the logic of elite populism, I am not quite sure. My reservations are shared by other Asian American observers who detect an apologetic agenda in such **liberal historiography.** At best, Takaki’s text operates an ironic, if not duplicitous, strategy: to counter hegemonic Eurocentrism, which erases the Asian American presence, a positivist-empiricist valorization of “lived experience” is carried out within the master narrative of evolutionary, gradualist progress. The American “Dream of Success” is thereby ultimately vindicated. This is not to suggest that historians like Takaki have suddenly been afflicted with amnesia, forgetting that it is the totalizing state practice of this ideology of market liberalism that underlies, for one, the violent colonial domination of peoples of color and the rape of the land of such decolonizing territories as the Philippines (my country of origin) and Puerto Rico in the aftermath of the Spanish-American War. It is the social practice of an expansive political economy which converts humans to exchangeable commodities (African chattel slavery in the South) and commodified labor power, thus requiring for its industrial take-off a huge supply of free labor—hence the need for European immigrants, especially after the Civil War, and the genocidal suppression of the American Indians. It is the expansion of this social formation that recruited Chinese coolies for railroad construction (the “fathers” poignantly described in Kingston’s China Men) and Japanese and Filipino labor (and Mexican braceros later) for agribusiness in Hawaii and California and for the canneries in Alaska. It is this same hegemonic worldview of free monopoly enterprise, also known as the “civilizing mission” of Eurocentric humanism, that forced the opening of the China market in the Opium Wars of the nineteenth century and the numerous military interventions in China and Indochina up to the Vietnam War and the coming of the “boat people.” Of course it is also the power/knowledge episteme of the modernization process in Kenya, South Korea, Mexico, Indonesia, Egypt, Grenada, and all the neocolonial or peripheral dependencies of the world-system named by Immanuel Wallerstein as “historical capitalism” (13-43; see Amin). It is now generally acknowledged that we cannot understand the situation of Asian Americans in the US today or in the past without a thorough comprehension of the global relations of power, the capitalist world-system that “pushed” populations from the colonies and dependencies and “pulled” them to terrain where a supply of cheap labor was needed. These relations of power broke up families, separating husbands from wives and parents from children; at present they motivate the “warm body export” of cheap labor from Thailand, the Philippines, and elsewhere. They legitimate the unregulated market for brides and hospitality girls, the free trade zones, and other postmodern schemes of capital accumulation in Third World countries. The discourse of the liberal free market underpins these power relations, constructing fluid georacial boundaries to guarantee the supply of cheap labor. Race acquires salience in this world-system when, according to John Rex, “the language of racial difference. . . becomes the means whereby men allocate each other to different social and economic positions. . . . The exploitation of clearly marked groups in a variety of different ways is integral to Capitalism.. . . Ethnic groups unite and act together because they have been subjected to distinct and differentiated types of exploitation” (406-07). The colonization and industrialization of the North American continent epitomize the asymmetrical power relations characteristic of this world-system. The sociocultural formation of global apartheid has been long in the making. Studies like Eric Wolf’s Europe and the People Without History (1982) or Richard Bamet and Ronald Muller’s Global Reach (1974), to mention only the elementary texts, show that the migration of peoples around the world, the displacement of refugees, or the forced expulsion and exile of individuals and whole groups (the Palestinian diaspora is the most flagrant) have occurred not by choice or accident but by the complex interaction of political, economic, and social forces from the period of mercantile capitalism to colonialism, from the sixteenth to the nineteenth century, continuing into the imperialism of the twentieth century. This genealogy of domination, the self-reproduction of its mechanisms and the sedimentation of its effects, is what is occluded in Takaki’s narrative (see Nakanishi).

#### Vote negative for communist organizing – that requires collective struggle and the establishment of centralized organization to inform both theory and practice.

Kuhn ‘18

[Gabriel, Austrian-born writer and translator living in Sweden. Among his book publications is “All Power to the Councils! A Documentary History of the German Revolution of 1918-1919”. March 2018. “Don't Mourn, Organize! Is Communism a Pipe Dream—or a Viable Future?” <https://brooklynrail.org/2018/03/field-notes/Dont-Morn-Organize-Is-Communism-a-Pipe-Dreamor-a-Viable-Future>] pat

The forms of organization this requires must go further than the affinity group but stop short of the vanguard party. Affinity groups do not answer the demand for mass organizing that mass societies require. But neither do vanguard parties. They attempt to lead the masses, not organize them, and that’s a big difference. The party model might in general be insufficient for mass organizing today. The networks that movementism gave way to are perhaps more appropriate, but only if they can overcome the assumption that the looser the connections are, the better. This assumption is wrong. Loose connections might suit the needs of an ever more flexible market economy, but not of effective political organizing. To “have contacts” is not enough; you need to do something with them. And you need to stay committed to the projects you initiate. I will try to flesh this out by listing the aspects I consider most important in organizing today.

1. We need to leave sectarianism behind. The left is weak and each additional division weakens it further. In a 2011 article titled “Movement, Cadre, and the Dual Power,” Joel Olson made a simple, yet very important observation: “We believe that the old arguments between communists and anarchists are largely irrelevant today.” This must be our point of departure.

2. We need theory that is adapted to our times. It must overcome the false contradiction between “class struggle” and “cultural struggle.” There is a fruitful debate about a “new class politics” in the German-speaking world. Sebastian Friedrich, one of its main proponents, drew these conclusions in an article published by Counterpunch:

A new class politics does not relegate gender, race, and imperial legacy to issues that are supplementary to class relations. These issues, and the struggles they imply, are an integral part of class relations. In fact, feminist, anti-racist, and anti-colonial struggles are the base on which effective unified class struggles must be launched.… A new class politics must clarify where and how the specific experiences of workers based on gender, race, citizenship, and other factors converge. It must reveal the overlapping interests of workers as members of the class. This makes common struggles possible.

3. We must not rely on the “objective forces” identified by historical materialism. Subjective forces are important for change. It is easy to underestimate how much neoliberalism shapes the lives even of people opposed to it. In the Global North, political activism has become a leisure activity that people engage in or not, depending on their mood, the identity they are trying to create for themselves, or the road of “self-improvement” they have chosen. In almost all cases, it is secondary to professional careers and personal comforts. Under such circumstances, it is difficult to get anything done. There is nothing wrong with being “voluntaristic.” Radical change is dependent on people wanting radical change, no matter how much Marxists still insist on economic realities determining individual consciousness and, therefore, individuals’ capacity for political action. An organization’s efficiency relies on the individual qualities of its members, that is, responsibility, reliability, and accountability.

Making Things Concrete

If we want communism to be more than a pipe dream, we have to be willing to face reality, even if it confuses, challenges, or even frightens us. We cannot ignore struggles that refer to communist ideals, simply because they aren’t the struggles we’d like to see. If our enthusiasm for communism remains limited to lecture halls and conference rooms, it won’t be anything the powerful will lose sleep over.

The struggle that currently receives most attention among communists of all stripes in the Global North is the one in Kurdistan. In Rojava (Syrian Kurdistan), forces affiliated with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, PKK, have established a direct-democratic council system, based on the “democratic confederalism” conceived by the imprisoned PKK leader Abduallah Öcalan. Öcalan describes democratic confederalism as “a non-state political administration or a democracy without a state,” and cites Murray Bookchin’s “libertarian municipalism” as a major influence. There are people who celebrate this as a form of anarchism. But as an observant friend of mine noted, an anarchism that is imposed by a leader is a strange kind of anarchism. Besides, there are reports from the ground that challenge the libertarian narrative. The editors of Lower Class Magazine, an online project dedicated to “low budget underground journalism,” travel regularly to Kurdistan and have the following to say:

The Western left sees Rojava as the realization of a democracy “from below”: communes, councils, a confederation; no hierarchies, no party, a spontaneous mass project. Anarchists and “libertarian” communists wax lyrically about the dawn of a direct-democratic Shangri-La. […] Yes, the change in Rojava comes “from below. It is based on the power of the people, no doubt. Communes and councils are at the heart of decision-making, that is true. But as essential is the following: None of this would be happening if it wasn’t for a vanguard leading the way. The revolution in Rojava proves that Leninist vanguardism is correct, not false.

Another European journalist visiting the region noted that the cadres of the People’s Protection Units, YPG, relate to the councils of Rojava in the same way the Bolshevists related to the councils of the Soviet Union. Furthermore, there are troubling pragmatic alliances, which have included collaboration with the U.S. military. Yet the people behind Rojava Solidarity NYC sum up the situation well:

Rojava, an autonomous region in Northern Syrian, the largest revolutionary territory of the 21st century, has projected anarchist and communist ideas to the forefront of political discourse and into the pragmatic and messy reality of everyday life. … From communal relationships to the councils and self-defense units, we can assess numerous potential routes by which we can create liberated communities at home, while learning from their possibilities and pitfalls.

Rojava won’t be the answer to our problems. No single struggle ever is. But the developments in Rojava challenge us to discuss real-life strategies for radical change. It is easy to focus on shortcomings, but if this is all we ever do, where will it get us?

Councils are essential for communist projects. Their power, which is based on the direct involvement and active participation of the masses, is curtailed as soon as political interest groups, such as parties, assume control over them. This conviction separated historical council communism, represented by figures such as Otto Rühle and Anton Pannekoek, from the Bolsheviks. Pannekoek wrote:

The councils are no government; not even the most central councils bear a governmental character. For they have no means to impose their will upon the masses; they have no organs of power. All social power is vested in the hands of the workers themselves.

Unless we want the transition to communism to entail enormous human suffering (which would be utterly absurd), we need to consider the fact that billions of people will need to be fed, sheltered, nursed, provided with access to clean water, and so forth. To produce according to the needs of the people rather than the needs of profit requires enormous efforts in planning, especially if current living standards are to be upheld. (Living standards don’t equal standards of consumption—the standards of consumption in the Global North cannot and should not be upheld, since they are unsustainable.) Furthermore, we must collectively dispose of industrial and nuclear waste, weapons of mass destruction, and ticking environmental bombs. None of this is possible without a level of centralization, no matter how visceral the reactions are that the word might provoke in some circles.

Only a council system can combine the centralization required by the complexity of modern societies with participative democracy. Centralization requires formal structures. Participative democracy requires these structures to be transparent. They need to be bottom-up rather than top-down, and delegates must be directly responsible to their constituencies. The council system is the only administrative framework to provide that.

Romanticizing particular struggles rarely does any good, no matter how council-based they are—or claim to be. If radicals in the Global North fail to address concerns with respect to struggles in the Global South, it is not respectful but condescending. To escape into the intellectual poverty of cultural relativism doesn’t help. We can only evolve from critical engagement. But real-life struggles are our starting point. It makes little sense to demand struggles for communism if we shy away from engaging with the ones that exist. Arundhati Roy put it simply after spending time with Maoist Naxalites in the forests of central India, an experience she chronicled in the book Walking with the Comrades. She said: “I went in because I wanted to tell the story of who these people are.” This informs revolutionary theory and, in turn, improves revolutionary practice. Most importantly, it is crucial for saving communist struggles from betraying their own principles. Everyone can watch failure unfold. The challenge lies in helping to prevent it.

## Case

### 1NC – u/v

#### Don’t grant access to 1ac paradigm issues – allows for friv theory and is self serving for the 1ar – the 1n and 2n cant suffice if the aff is abusive

#### No inherent warrant for debate being anti asian – means don’t vote on the abuse argument

#### Don’t reject non asian theory – allows for inf abuse and inability to check back

#### Counterinterp: we don’t have to do that lol

#### Doenst solve for hard convos – a) debate is an activity of strategy and method creating – means that we solve back b) the truth testing warrant doesn’t have a warrant ?

#### T before rob – insofar as were not being exclusive we solve back and its impossible to engage in the aff if they werent topical so it’s a prior question and outweighs since we cant debate

### 1NC – Presumption

#### Frame the 1AC through solvency, not impacts – any attempt to filter offense through the RotB or the speech act of the aff is an arbitrary goalpost that only serves to insulate it from criticism and nuanced testing – forcing us to negate the efficacy of personal strategies is at best impossible and at worst violent – the aff can’t change the material structures that produce anti-Asian violence – no warrant for how the aff spills up to impact structures of electoral politics writ large or out of debate means you vote neg on presumption.

### 1NC – Asian Identity

#### The role of scholars is to develop strategies for confronting legal injustices faced by Asian Americans – sacrificing it for theory without praxis turns case and doesn’t solve

SAITO ‘9 (Natsu Taylor, Professor Law at Georgia State University College of Law, “INTERNMENTS, THEN AND NOW: CONSTITUTIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY IN POST-9/11 AMERICA” https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://www.google.com/&httpsredir=1&article=1011&context=dflsc)

The American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee called for the removal of Civil Rights Commissioner Kirsanow following his defense of internment in 2002.210 He was not removed, although apparently he did apologize, insisting that his remarks had been taken out of context.211 In January 2006, while Congress was in recess, President Bush appointed Kirsanow to the National Labor Relations Board.212 Congressman Coble expressed his “regret” that “many Japanese and Arab Americans found my choice of words offensive,” but ignored calls for his resignation as chair of the subcommittee on terrorism.213

CIA Director “Leon Panetta announced at his confirmation hearing that CIA agents that engaged in torture, including waterboarding, in the early phases of the war against terrorism, would not be criminally prosecuted.”214 In fact, attorneys in the Obama administration have continued to rely “on the state secret doctrine and thus seem prepared to confer de facto immunity on the CIA for constitutional wrongs as gross as those entailed in extraordinary rendition.”215 According to Attorney General Eric Holder, “It would be unfair to prosecute dedicated men and women working to protect America for conduct that was sanctioned in advance by the Justice Department.”216

It appears unlikely that those who sanctioned the illegal or unconstitutional programs will be prosecuted. As Jordon Paust observed in 2007, the administration of George W. Bush had “furthered a general policy of impunity by refusing to prosecute any person of any nationality under the War Crimes Act or alternative legislation, the torture statute, genocide legislation, and legislation permitting prosecution of certain civilians employed by or accompanying U.S. military forces abroad.”217 Shortly after Jay Bybee issued his torture memorandum in August 2002, President Bush appointed him to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, and he was confirmed in March 2003.218 John Yoo, who drafted the torture memos, has returned to his law professorship at Boalt Hall.219 The Obama Justice Department has rejected recommendations of ethics investigators concerning violations of professional standards by Bybee and Yoo.220 Although President Obama’s January 22 Executive Order “prohibits reliance on any Department of Justice or other legal advice concerning interrogation that was issued between September 11, 2001 and January 20, 2009,”221 when questioned about possible prosecutions for torture, he has only emphasized the importance of looking forward, not backward.222 As things stand, then, there is no reasonable prospect of legal remedies for any of the wrongs associated with the so-called War on Terror.

I believe we, as lawyers and legal scholars, have responsibilities distinct from those of documentary historians or moral theorists. It is a central tenet of the rule of law that legal rights without remedies are meaningless.223 If the legal system has permitted or facilitated legal wrongs, we have an obligation to ensure that effective remedies are implemented. In other words, it is necessary to address the question of accountability for injustice and, where there are consistent patterns replicating injustices, we must acknowledge that the remedies thus far employed have been inadequate. Otherwise, we are engaging not in legal analysis but alchemy.

The injustices of the Japanese American internment were belatedly acknowledged

#### The aff’s remembering of history through trauma glosses over the transgenerational implications of nationalisms that recapitaulate to neoliberal capitalism. The affirmative aligns themselves with the continued domination of neoliberal capitalism, homophobic, and racist presence within the Asian diaspora.

Chang ‘12

associate professor of English at Santa Clara University (Juliana Chang, Inhuman Citizenship) \*we don’t advocate ableist language\*

The Racial Inhuman

“Underneath, we are the same; we are all human beings.” “There is only one race: the human race.” A curious feature of these statements of [race neutral] color- blind sentiment is the fact that they are articulated so automatically and so ubiquitously—in other words, they are repeated so often that they become mechanical and de-individualized, thereby belying their humanistic con- tent. And the content of these utterances is assumed to be so virtuous in their universalizing identification and sympathy that no further elabora- tion is necessary. Indeed, these axioms are meant to end conversations, not to start or continue them. Let us consider how these declarations of humanist universalism are in fact structured and permeated by undercur- rents of inhumanity. The systematic and impersonal nature of these asser- tions, however heartfelt their intentions, illuminates their instrumental purpose in reinforcing hegemonic ideology and structures. In fact, it is the very sincerity and authenticity of sentimental desire that sutures hege- monic ideology to its subjects. And the content of these seemingly benign avowals enacts an inhuman cruelty by traumatically nullifying the psychic realities of racial subalterns—a cruelty that is masked by hegemony’s claim to the status of common sense and the reasonable. In this section, I explicate the problems of claiming human status for the racial subaltern, for, as I note above, humanist ideology is already permeated by inhuman means and ends. I argue instead that we should recognize the racial inhuman as a powerful trope and force of counter-hegemony. While there is now a burgeoning body of posthumanist scholarship that interrogates our received assumptions about humanism and the humani- ties, less developed has been a sustained and substantial analysis of race together with posthumanist study.18 In the book, I use the framework of critical race studies to query our axiomatic beliefs about the human. Racial violence and violation have historically been rationalized by the exclusion of racial others from the category of the human as that which merits respect and protection. The most obvious strategy for rectifying such injustice, then, would consist of claiming human status for racial sub- jects. Paul Gilroy’s Postcolonial Melancholia is characteristic in his call for a “planetary humanism,” an updated naming of universalism. Observing how colonization produced racial groups as “sub- or infrahuman,” Gilroy advocates for a universal “right to be human.”19 Within the liberal para- digm that Gilroy invokes, the human is in fact conceived of as one who has the right to rights. What Gilroy’s plea highlights, then, is the a priori exclusion of the racial subaltern from this human condition of the rights- bearing subject. This fundamental elision explains why the ostensible pro- tections of civil rights still remain fraught and fragile. How can specific legal rights be negotiated when the very question of the right to have rights remains ideologically suspended? Within Enlightenment modernity, humanity is generally understood as deriving from a rational and ethical struggle for self-determination and freedom. The practice of freedom, in this formulation, consists of over- coming the limitations of one’s immediate existence.20 What presumably distinguishes the human from other animals and beings are the abilities to reason, to transcend the self by sympathizing with others, and to remake the world through symbolic culture. Let us consider the implication of terms used by Gilroy and others such as “sub-human,” “infrahuman,” and “dehumanization.” What would it mean to subtract or extract humanity from the racial other? Subtraction or extraction would result in a lack of humanity and a subsequent alignment with other beings that lack human characteristics: animals, plants, inani- mate objects, machines, and so on. While racial others can be degraded as subhuman and reduced to material embodiment, however, let us remem- ber that they can also be abstracted as superhuman spirits, such as angels or demons—magical divine beings who use their supernatural forces for good or evil.21 Whether sub- or superhuman, however, these figures lack the normative features of the human: higher functions of rationality in the case of the subhuman; an innate sympathy for human frailty in the case of the superhuman. If European humanism was a construct of a liberal modernity that eman- cipated one from the bonds of tradition and traditional authority, then the positing of racial others as primitive meant that they had not yet entered into the category of the civilized human: the self-possessed, self-governing, and rational subject. Indigenous, colonized, and enslaved peoples were his- torically made into reason’s other, bound by instinct, tradition, and super- stition. This framing of temporal underdevelopment or lack led to the “solution” of civilizing such peoples into an ethical and rational humanity. Indeed, this was the purported goal of colonization: to bring the non- Western world into modernity, civilization, and “the family of man.” Precisely because the norms and ideals of the human have been used not only to exclude and exterminate, but also to violently include and incorporate, it is essential that we refuse the gesture of arguing that racial others are just as human as white subjects. We must go beyond the simple diagnosis of racism as dehumanization, because it is far too easy to turn to rehumanization as remedy—a solution that chillingly resonates with the civilizing aims of colonization. The presumable end goal of educating, assimilating, and Christianizing natives or migrants is achieved through deploying military and paramilitary forces of the imperial state to “pacify” and “regulate” such populations. Thus, while postcolonial critics like Gilroy rightly decry the “bloodstained workings” of racist dehumanization, let us observe that the apparent redress of rehumanization—that is, civilizing the other—has its own histories of violence.22 To comprehend the problem of race as a problem of lack means, simply, that “adding” humanity and its attendant rights would fix the problem. Our received notions of humanity, including the implicitly racialized, Euro- centric norms of the human, remain intact in this model. Aspiring to this predetermined ideal means reinforcing such norms and still excluding those who do not or cannot achieve legibility as human. In effect, a few of us become tokenized as human and rendered exceptions to the general mass (who are deemed inhuman precisely because they are a de-individuated mass) of racial others—exceptions that prove the general rule of racial in- humanity. Instead of proving ourselves human and thereby accepting the terms of such humanity, my purpose here is to claim the epistemologies, ethics, and aesthetics of the racial inhuman. What is overlooked by the paradigm of racialization as a lack of human- ity is the way that racial others are produced as an excess of humanity. By inhuman, then, I mean something far more disturbing and ominous than the nonhuman. Slavoj Žižek explains the distinction between the non- human and the inhuman by way of Kant’s philosophy: In his Critique of Pure Reason, Kant introduced a key distinction between negative and indefinite judgement: the positive statement “the soul is mor- tal” can be negated in two ways. We can either deny a predicate (“the soul is not mortal”), or affirm a non-predicate (“the soul is non-mortal”). The dif- ference is exactly the same as the one, known to every reader of the Stephen King, between “he is not dead” and “he is undead.” The indefinite judge- ment opens up a third domain that undermines the distinction between dead and non-dead (alive): the “undead” are neither alive nor dead, they are precisely the monstrous “living dead.” And the same goes for “inhuman”: “he is not human” is not the same as “he is inhuman.” “He is not human” means simply that he is external to humanity, animal or divine, while “he is inhu- man” means something thoroughly different, namely the fact that he is nei- ther human nor inhuman, but marked by a terrifying excess which, although it negates what we understand as humanity, is inherent to being human.23 Unlike the subhuman, the inhuman does not correspond to a lack of human attributes. Nor is the inhuman analogous to the superhuman, for the super- human’s condition is exceptional: she is superhuman precisely because she is elevated above humans. In contrast to these other categories that leave the norms of humanity intact, the inhuman threatens the very foundations of human identity. It is the alien obscenity at the very heart of the human, an innate “monstrosity.”24 It inspires dread and horror not only because we find it strange but also because we find it overly proximate. It terrifies and exhilarates in its threat and promise to deform the human, to devastate our sense of ourselves as rational and benevolent beings. The inhuman is the alien that permeates the human, and the human that finds itself alien. In the chapters that follow, I will attend to the significance of four instan- tiations of the racial inhuman: the living dead, the animal, the antifetish, and the death drive. These four tropes are manifestations of excess: the liv- ing dead as surplus life substance; animal enjoyment that is unbound by law; the antifetish that shatters national romance; the death drive that destroys even as it rebirths. I interpret jouissance as the affect generated by the racial inhuman, an annihilating sensation of terror, trauma, and ecstasy. As I noted, one of the key attributes of the human is its capacity for transcendence. Jouissance, however, is precisely that which blocks transcendence. Embodying substance without sense or meaning, resisting symbolization or dialecticization, jouissance pulls one into a sensation of overembodiment and overembeddedness. The purpose of this study is to sharpen our awareness of how the racial inhuman and its attendant affect of jouissance both disrupt and sustain the prevailing ideologies and fanta- sies of the U.S. nation-state. The fantasy of liberal citizenship, for instance, which is ostensibly grounded in a shared human condition, covers over the monstrous inhumanity of a nation-state that wields the power of “organized death” against its racial and imperial others**.**25 Moreover, as I note in my earlier critique of color-blind universalist discourse, the dream of a shared humanity not only veils, but is also enabled by, a secret kernel of inhumanity. The Uncanny Domestic As scholars of Asian American studies have established, Asian American racialization comprises two major facets. First, Asian Americans are model minorities whose putative success and assimilation is pointed to as evidence of America’s ~~color-blind~~ meritocracy and openness. Second, Asian Americans are construed as perpetual foreigners, seen as alien to Ameri- can culture regardless of nativity or citizenship. Using a psychoanalytic schema, we might view these two facets as different elements of national fantasy. The notion of Asian Americans as the model minority is used to support a certain vision of American exceptionalism: its openness to the world in providing limitless opportunity regardless of race or national ori- gin. The perception of the Asian as alien, however, creates a frisson of jouissance: