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#### Empire has shifted from the administration of death to the production of life – the affs restructuring of global medical intervention is the new logic of biopolitical governance – no longer is imperialism a question of borders and military power, but rather the protection of bodies.

Ahuja ‘16

[Neel, English @ UNC Chapel Hill. 2016. “Bioinsecurities”] pat

One element common to this biopolitics of empire is an anxiety about the dependence of the human body on forces that appear inhuman, even inhumane: medical technologies to extend, optimize, or end life; markets and institutions that unequally distribute resources for sustaining life; environmental processes that support, deprive, or injure bodies. Such concerns were, of course, entirely common to twentieth-century modernist fears of alienation from nature, as well as to liberal, socialist, and fascist states that each proclaimed to defend the life of the people in the major imperial wars. Yet due to the ongoing expansion of government into life through technological, economic, and environmental interventions, a growing number of crises that advertise dreaded risks to life as we know it—climate change, nuclear toxicity, disease pandemics, biological weapons, and financial speculation, to name a few—have recently pressed critical studies of empire to think politics and agency at queer scales of relation, from the grand vantage of planetary geology and climate, through the lively migrations of commodities and animals, all the way down to the microbial, molecular, and quantum worlds of matter in which advanced sciences produce new technologies and knowledge. In an era in which excessive hope is invested in the idea that empire’s so-called free markets will inevitably deliver resources for improving life, discussions of risk and security increasingly provoke concern about how bodies are either threatened or safeguarded in links to other species, to ecology, and to technology. Public fears and hopes are thus invested in questions about how bodies interface beyond the skin of the organism. The living body is not only an ecology reproduced by constituent species (think of the life-sustaining work of gut bacteria or the ingested flesh of animals or plants). It is also an assemblage crosscut by technological, economic, and environmental forces (medical technologies, insurance markets, agricultural systems, toxic pollution) that render the body vulnerable as they reproduce its conditions of possibility.

Yet there remains a sense of tension concerning how social theorists frame the vulnerability of human life between biopolitics and these emerging posthumanist ideas. While biopolitical analysis foregrounds the contested figure of the human, emphasizing that the human body is an effect of power crafted through the social reproduction of nationality, race, sex, and/or class factors conjoined in inhuman fields of power, emerging posthumanist and newmaterialist fields including animal studies, environmental humanities, and object-oriented ontology more often emphasize the agency of the nonhuman and the surprising liveliness of physical matter. As such, despite the avowed critique of the human, they may take for granted the apparent universality of the human lifeworld from which they flee, foreclosing attention to the processes that anthropomorphize the human in order to characterize the human’s sovereign domination of the nonhuman. This move allows some posthumanist critics to project upon an outside, the nonhuman (in the form of environment, animal, machine, or other object), the possibility of resistance to anthropocentrism. Such thinking might be seen as a ruse of transcendence—an assumption that turning attention from the human to the nonhuman could bypass Marxist, feminist, critical race, and postcolonial critiques of imperial systems that proliferate inequality under the guise of universal human freedom.

Despite this liberal, idealist trend among posthumanists (which is more pronounced in the humanities than it is in the social sciences), studies of empire increasingly confront the fact that the apparent exteriority of the subject (the worlds of body, physical matter, and interspecies exchange) has more often formed the center of the politics of empire rather than its excluded outside. It is thus my hope that the collision of biopolitical and posthumanist thought may be salvaged in a practical if unexpected crossing: a more robust accounting of the ways in which politics, including the liberal and neoliberal politics of empire, is embedded in living bodies and planetary environments, which are themselves constituted as objects of knowledge and intervention for imperial science. Such an understanding goes beyond an assertion that life is controlled by human government, which would embrace the strong postEnlightenment division between government and life, human and nonhuman. I instead hope to explore the queer hypothesis that the adaptability, risk, and differentiation central to life increasingly constitute the very matter of politics. This book is about how disease outbreaks, medical technologies, and the relations between humans, animals, bacteria, and viruses galvanized racialized fears and hopes that determined the geopolitical form of US empire during the long twentieth century, following the continent-wide establishment of Euro-American settler networks. Before explaining that argument, however, this brief preface explores how—in addition to established methods of postcolonial study that define empire through histories of conquest, settlement, and the exploitation of labor and resources—the inequalities and violences of imperialism can productively be understood from the vantage of species, the field of life itself.

Research on colonial environmental history and disease control is long established in postcolonial studies, even as today there is growing attention to Global South environmental activism, advanced biotechnologies, and human-animal and human-plant interactions as significant concerns in the planetary routes of European and US empire. Yet my sense of an interspecies politics is still relatively unfamiliar from even the vantage of these studies. Extant studies have long highlighted questions of representation, agency, influence, and domination, explaining the unequal distribution of the privileges accorded for being anthropomorphized, for being made human through colonial ideological and social processes. While maintaining focus on such racialized inequalities fracturing the figure of the human in the worldwide routes of European and US imperialisms, it is the aim of this book to articulate an additional sense of the political as a lively zone of embodied connection and friction. “Interspecies relations form the often unmarked basis upon which scholarly inquiry organizes its objects, political interventions such as ‘human rights’ stake their claims, and capitalist endeavors maneuver resources and marshal profit.” A critique of the interspecies zone of the political—which at its broadest would expand beyond the human-animal and human-microbial relations discussed in this book to include the diversity of living species, matter, energies, and environmental systems that produce everyday life out of biosocial crossings—helps us understand the persistence of empire in a postcolonial age precisely because it conjoins power to forces that retreat into the seemingly natural and ahistorical domains of body and matter. From this vantage, empire appears not only as a process of territorial and economic accumulation across international divisions of labor and sovereignty, but also as a reproductive process managing bodies in unequal planetary conjunctions of life and death. Tracing this second phenomenon requires analysis of biosocial forms of exchange among microbes, plants, animals, and humans, as well as models of power and representation recognizing that bodies are not empty containers of human political subjects, but are lively, transitional assemblages of political matter.

There are risks in attempting to theorize a political process like empire via the material shape it takes in life and matter, anticipated in long-standing liberal and Marxist distinctions between human and natural history. Must such a move necessarily turn away from issues of interest, hegemony, violence, representation, and inequality that often define organized decolonial struggles? I would argue that this need not be so, and that vitalizing colonial discourse studies through an accounting of empire’s living textures may actually give a more grounded account of imperial power as well as the strategies of representation that have persistently masked its material articulations. To this end, I explore empire as a project in the government of species. Broadly, this idea refers to how interspecies relations and the public hopes and fears they generate shape the living form and affective lineaments of settler societies, in the process determining the possibilities and foreclosures of political life. In practice, the government of species has historically optimized and expanded some life forms (human or otherwise) due to biocapital investments in national, racial, class, and sex factors. Operating through interspecies assemblages known as bodies, such investments selectively modify and reproduce life forms and forms of life, extracting “the human” out of the planetary field of interspecies relation. Once securitized, this form is constantly under pressure from the unpredictable and inhuman risks of life in a world of ecological, economic, and political complexity. These forces in turn contribute to the ways publics experience and interpret their futures as more or less livable.

An account of the government of species thus explains that empire can be understood as a project in the management of affective relations—embodied forms of communication and sensation that may occur independently of or in tandem with sentient forms of thought and discourse. These affective relations cross the divisions of life and death, human and animal, media and bodies, and immune and environmental systems. In the process of forming the human out of cacophonous biosocial relations, empire often persists—even after the formal conclusion of colonial occupation or settlement—in part because it invests public hope in the management of bodily vulnerability and orients reproductive futures against horizons of impending risk, a phenomenon I call dread life. In such processes by which bodily vulnerability is transmuted into political urgency, techniques proliferate for managing the relations of populations and the living structures of species (human, animal, viral). As such, empire involves the control of life through accumulation of territory and capital, which may be securitized by activating life’s relational potential. Lauren Berlant describes a “lateral agency” that moves across bodies and populations rather than in the top-down fashion of sovereign power; it may, then, be possible to understand empire’s force of securitization not only through conventional dramas of domination and resistance, but rather through embodied processes of coasting, differentiating, adapting, withering, transition, and movement. These are processes that subtly determine how bodies take form, and to what extent they are able to reproduce themselves in space-time relation. They also more radically stretch the body beyond the organic lifetime and into evolutionary, environmental, and informational domains where life/death distinctions blur.

However, the intimate connection between the governmental imperatives to make live and to make die, which Jasbir Puar names “the bio-necro collaboration,” has long been obscured in social and political theories. It thus remains commonplace for biopolitical analyses to view power as either repressive or productive in essence. In his classic work on the topic, French philosopher and social theorist Michel Foucault argued that by the eighteenth century, a political form had emerged in Europe targeting the human as biological species as the central object of power. Power was no longer simply about the repressive force of the state and its controlling interests wielding the right to kill. Power was increasingly vested in the productive reshaping of the biological life of human organisms by institutions such as clinics, prisons, and asylums and their related forms of scientific knowledge; power meant letting live, albeit in constrained form. Foucault recognized the embedding of biopower across species, calling for a social history that incorporated “the evolution of relations between humanity, the bacillary or viral field, and the interventions of hygiene, medicine, and the different therapeutic techniques.” In the notes to his late lectures, he even speculated that neoliberalism involved a governmentality that can “act on the environment and systematically modify its variables.”

Foucault’s description of the rise of biopower is the inspiration for a number of studies in sociology and anthropology that assess new biopolitical shifts involving advanced biomedical technologies. Given that these biopolitical studies focus largely on the United States, western Europe, China, and India— states that have built biotechnology sectors as engines of unequal neoliberal growth—it is perhaps not surprising that a concomitant line of critique has emerged acknowledging vast and growing world sectors of biological and economic precarity. Building on a number of key postcolonial/feminist studies of the 1990s exploring Foucault’s theory beyond European borders, these necropolitical critiques announce that politics today often emerges as the specter of death. The world’s poor, as well as a growing “precariat” carved from shrinking national bourgeoisies, appear less often as the objects of technological uplift than as the human surplus of the political order of things, populations at risk for displacement, dispossession, captivity, and premature death. The precaritization of sweated labor, the subjection of agrarian populations to the twin scourges of neoliberal structural adjustment and environmental devastation, the proliferation of deterritorialized war and ethnic cleansing, and the growth of predatory industries and rents to recycle capital from surplus populations all reveal that those humans targeted for biopolitical optimization constitute a shrinking population who reproduce through the cannibalistic appropriation of life elsewhere. But necropower is not simply about the distribution of death; it is also about the accumulation of social or economic capital through death and precarity. For example, when suicide passes on social force through the deathly body, or when life insurance capitalizes death, death itself thus gives form to life.

#### TRIPS/compulsory licensing is a neoliberal ploy to both legitimize the WTO as a governing apparatus while covertly authorizing economic retaliation against nations who invoke it.

Ferrer ‘19

[Cory, MFA Candidate, University of Colorado Department of Communication. 2019. “THE RHETORIC OF “BALANCE”: NEOCOLONIALISM AND RESISTANCE IN THE GLOBAL BATTLE FOR GENERIC DRUGS,” www.proquest.com/openview/5cbb5aa35aec157b3cdf8b03d5d269b7/1?pq-origsite=gscholar&cbl=18750&diss=y] Harun + pat

Recall also, that compulsory licensing is only a limited solution to the problem of accessing patented drugs in poorer countries. As the Doha Declaration explains: “We recognize that WTO Members with insufficient or no manufacturing capacities in the pharmaceutical sector could face difficulties in making effective use of compulsory licensing under the TRIPS Agreement” (2). As long as a country doesn’t have the means to produce the drugs, there is no one to whom the government could issue a compulsory license. So long as TRIPS restricts patented medicines from crossing international borders, compulsory licenses fall far short of addressing the need for patented medicines in countries that have little or no manufacturing capacity. In what is possibly the most depressing sentence of the Doha Declaration, the document goes on to offer, not a solution, but an instruction to the TRIPS Council to “find an expeditious solution to this problem and to report to the General Council before the end of 2002” (2). In other words, these negotiations were not able reach a compromise, and so they simply left this for future negotiations.

Also conspicuously absent from the Doha Ministerial declaration is any language addressing the rights of countries who take advantage of these flexibilities and remain free from bilateral pressure for doing so. While one could easily argue that if the US chooses to impose sanctions on a country of their own accord, rather than initiate dispute proceedings through the WTO, then this doesn’t necessarily concern the TRIPS agreement. However, given WTO secretary general Mike Moore’s stated concern with countries “feeling secure” in taking advantage of these flexibilities, and given that the issue of “bilateral pressure” was raised as an obstacle to this security during the TRIPS Council negotiations, the absence of any language addressing this issue appears to be a hard concession to the interests of the US and its allies, allowing them to continue holding the threat of economic sanctions over any nation that takes advantage of the flexibilities granted by this declaration (Moore; “Governments”).

Overall, the Doha declaration makes some significant concessions to the demands of the Global South’s coalition yet stops well short of fully authorizing WTO Members to take full advantage of all public health policies that would put affordable medicines into the hands of their people. The declaration recognizes that it falls short and puts a pin in the issue until the next negotiation, having failed to create a suitable compromise between nations who profit from IP protection and nations who suffer from it. The results of these later negotiations will be discussed in the conclusion to this thesis. Ultimately, the Doha Declaration—and WTO policy in general—are constrained by the demand for a standard of consensus which leaves ultimate veto power in the hands of powerful nations profiting at the others’ expense.

‌Conclusion: What does “Balance” Do?

In the context of the Doha round of negotiations, we see “balance” invoked towards several different ends. The TRIPS agreement invokes “balance” as a form of strategic ambiguity, attempting to please multiple stakeholders by allowing competing interpretations of the same international law to clear the procedural hurdles of consensus. The WTO officers and the EU’s position paper invoked “balance” to build legitimacy for the TRIPS agreement, the deliberative process that produced it, and by extension, the global patent system itself. If the TRIPS agreement strikes a carefully negotiated balance between health and IP protection, then the current balance is presumed sufficient. The paper submitted by the US and its allies invoked “balance” only as a description of strong and effective IP enforcement, a passing nod to balance that ultimately served to build the moral credibility of their strong IP enforcement agenda. For the coalition of the Global South, balance means mutual advantage, but one that must be demonstrated. Their position did not presume the benefit of IP to public health outcomes and argued that when IP protection conflicted with public health outcomes, governments have a standing right to choose public health.

Balance is therefore a deeply contested signifier: both a site of neo-colonial domination, and a site of counter-colonial resistance. However, all these conceptions of balance have one thing in common. They all, in some way, reinforce the legitimacy of the TRIPS agreement and the WTO as a governing institution of the global economy. Though the DCGP openly challenged Western Hegemony of these forums, it did so by drawing on specific provisions of the TRIPS agreement and claiming a position as an authoritative interpreter of international law to which Western nations are (on paper) equally beholden. Instead of challenging the legitimacy of the WTO and TRIPS agreements, the governments of the Global South are claiming that legitimacy for themselves in a counter-colonial push to assert themselves as equal governors and rightsholder of the neo-liberal world order. Though “balance” is typically invoked as a resolution to conflict, it is in fact the very site of that conflict it’s supposed to resolve.

#### Threats of economic collapse shuts down deliberation in favor of immediate response, creating a violent state of exception.

Hanan ‘10

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By framing the proposed legislation in this particular light, Bush offers us a first example of how the neoliberal state of exception is manifested rhetorically in the sphere of policy. By describing the crisis as “extraordinary times” in need of “decisive action,” he is able to side step his administration’s problematic relationship to Wall Street and the present crisis. Since the economy is not operating normally but is instead in a state of disarray and chaos, the downturn must be addressed without normal argumentative debate. In his desire to postpone deliberation by emphasizing the exceptional nature of the crisis, Bush taps into a more general narrative that emerged during the creation and passage of EESA, namely ethical pragmatism. Like moral critique, ethical pragmatism deploys the state of exception enthymematically as a way of justifying EESA legislation. Unlike moral critique, however, ethical pragmatism links the exception to a completely different set of values. By bringing attention to temporary nature of the present situation, ethical pragmatism argues that deliberation and critique are the enemies. Since the Bush Administration is “working with Congress to address the root cause behind much of the instability in our markets,” this narrative contends the worst thing citizens can do right now is challenge the administration.304 The primary difference between these two rhetorical accounts can thus be located in the way they deploy the state of exception as an enthymeme to explain EESA and the government’s reaction to the present crisis. Whereas the moral critique implies that a state of exception has become a permanent practice under Bush, the latter tries to frame the state of exception as temporary action. Hence, insofar as the narrative of ethical pragmatism attempts to exempt itself from the problem by emphasizing authentic deliberation at a future point in time, it relies on a different model of the state of exception that is more justifiable. Turning now to our second policy artifact—that of Secretary Paulson—we see an additional rendering of ethical pragmatism. Delivered on September 23rd 2008 to the Senate Banking Committee, Paulson’s widely publicized address is particularly useful in illustrating how a temporary understanding of state of exception can be used as an enthymeme to circumvent moral critique.305By emphasizing the “urgent response” that the crisis demands, the former Goldman Sach’s CEO centers his argument on how EESA provides “market stability,” Organizing his narrative around a series of binaries, Paulson’s ethical pragmatism is predicated on the opposition between a healthy and sick economy. By arguing that “illiquid mortgage-related assets … are choking off the flow of credit which is so vitally important to our economy,” for example, Paulson renders the financial system a living entity that has been invaded by foreign agents.306 Through a viral process of multiplication, he illustrates how “[t]hese bad loans have created a chain reaction” that now threatens “the very health of our economy.”307In the same way that a virus can weaken a person’s entire immune system, Paulson wants his audience to see the economy as having been infected by a rapidly proliferating disease—one that must be eradicated quickly by experts, and without debate. By explaining the financial crisis through such metaphors, Paulson is able to argue that his legislation is aimed at excising these "troubled assets from the system.”308The measure is “designed for immediate implementation and [to] be sufficiently large to have maximum impact and restore market confidence.”309 Thus, by addressing the “underlying problem”—troubled assets that are dragging down the entire economy—he has devised an expert program to stabilize the financial system. This plan, while putting taxpayers on the line, will cost American families “far less than the alternative—a continuing series of financial institution failures and frozen credit markets unable to fund everyday needs and economic expansion.”310 It is at the end of Paulson’s speech, however, that we realize the primary goal of his narrative: the desire to frame EESA as a temporary state of exception. In spirit of the “bipartisan consensus for an urgent legislative solution,”311 Paulson argues that there is no time to deliberate and contest the parameters of this bill. Since this “troubled asset purchase program on its own is the single most effective thing we can do to … stimulate our economy,” we must trust Paulson’s authority as Treasury Secretary and pass the bill immediately.312 While it is true that “[w]hen we get through this difficult period…our next task must be to address the problems in our financial system through a reform program that fixes our outdated financial regulatory structure,” Paulson contends that “we must get through this period first.”313 Through his appeals to urgency and expedient action, Paulson’s narrative enthymematically invokes a seemingly temporary state of exception. Since the economy is sick and its pathogen is multiplying rapidly, debate and deliberation about whether EESA is the right form of interventionism must be postponed to a later point in time. While “[w]e must [eventually] have that critical debate” now is not the time to question the crisis of neoliberalism.314 As part of Bush’s executive branch we must trust Paulson when he says he has the “best interest of all Americans” in mind and not risk making the situation even worse. Despite residing in a different sphere of policy than Bush and Paulson, the third rhetor—Fed Chair Ben Bernanke—demonstrates how the narrative of ethical pragmatism can emerge in governmental avenues outside the Executive Branch. Delivered to multiple Congressional committees on September 24 and 25, 2008, Bernanke’s testimony represents perhaps the most explicit attempt to grapple with the contradiction between the Federal government's neoliberal history and its looming Keynesian intervention.315“Despite the efforts of the Federal Reserve, the …global financial markets remain under extraordinary stress," declares Bernanke, rationalizing why, in the case of the present downturn, the neoliberal privileging of monetary policy over fiscal policy will no longer suffice.316 Viewing capitalism through a rhetorical lens similar to that of Paulson, Bernanke describes how "stresses in financial markets have been high and have recently intensified significantly."317 As "rising mortgage delinquencies" spiral out of control and intersect other financial venues "the implications for the broader economy could be quite adverse."318 Bernanke thus declares that "[a]ction by the Congress is urgently required to stabilize the situation."319 If action is not taken immediately to avert the economy’s growing crisis, the situation may become even bleaker. Like Bush and Paulson, central to Bernanke's attitude toward EESA is the need for immediate action. While he acknowledges "the shortcomings and weaknesses of our financial markets and regulatory system" now is not the time to debate the policies underscoring the bill.320 The "development of a comprehensive proposal for reform would require careful and extensive analysis that would be difficult to compress into a short legislative timeframe now available."321 Bernanke thus believes that it "is essential to deal with the crisis at hand" and focus later on building a "stronger, more resilient, and better regulated financial system."322 While Bernanke believes the urgency of the situation is enough of a justification for passing EESA, he does have a response for those who may be critical of the bill’s interventionist tendencies: “Government assistance should be given with the greatest of reluctance,” adding that in the present case such attempts have already been exhausted.323Since the Federal Reserve already “attempted to identify private-sector approaches” but none were forthcoming, the government has no other choice but to bail out the financial sector. By rationalizing EESA as the only possible option, then, Bernanke's narrative of ethical pragmatism is meant to close off the possibility of dissent. For those that feel interventionism is a disgrace to free market capitalism, Bernanke has made it clear that "private-sector arrangements" were taken into account. On the other hand, for who those critique the government for "bailing out Wall Street," Bernanke's appeals imply that debate and deliberation will come at a later point in time. Thus through his stifling of opposition from all sides, Bernanke’s narrative of ethical pragmatism invokes the state of exception as the temporary justification for the government’s economic actions. The Exceptionality of Ethical Pragmatism Bush, Paulson and Bernanke all provide accounts that, while told in slightly different ways, use the strategy of ethical pragmatism to try to suspend critique and discussion. Whether emphasizing “extraordinary times,” “urgency,” or “lack of options,” Bush, Paulson, and Bernanke all invoke the state of exception as the enthymematic justification for their actions. The “exceptional” frame underscoring this series of arguments, then, offers an additional way to grasp why the dissenting narrative—moral critique—may have had so little impact on EESA’s legislation. By rendering of EESA as an emergency measure to save the economy, ethical pragmatism was able to defer debate. Moreover, since ethical pragmatism emerged from the very same sphere in which EESA was introduced—that of policy—it was able to supersede dissident narratives about the bill at an institutional level. Since the former, not the latter, narrative defined the parameters of the policy debate; ethical pragmatism had both a material and discursive advantage. Moral critique’s failure can thus be observed simultaneously in two different rhetorical/institutional contexts. In respect to its own rhetorical argument, moral critique’s use of the state of exception as an explanation for EESA’s passage negated its own critique by affirming that this technique of power does indeed exist. At the same time, through the narrative frame of ethical pragmatism, moral critique was deferred from the realm of policy. Since the “exceptionality” of the situation demanded a suspension of deliberation, it became justified to pass the bill without proper economic argument. We are thus left to conclude that the state of exception has both a discursive and extra-discursive reality since the institutional forms and discourses coincide with one another.

#### This culminates in a form of dread life which organizes and deploys disaster biopolitics to justify constant interventionism, health apartheid, and antagonistic subject formation that turns and outweighs the aff.

Debrix ‘18  
(François Debrix, Professor and director of ASPECT, College of Liberal Arts and Human Sciences, Virginia Tech. “End piece: Dealing with disastrous life” in Biopolitical Disaster. Ed. Jennifer L. Lawrence and Sarah Marie Wiebe. 2018 Routledge forthcoming. cVs) rc/pat

Disastrous biopolitics makes possible dread life. I borrow the term “dread life” from Neel Ahuja’s recent study of the racialized dimensions of the governance and management of anxiety, particularly with regards to the fear of infectious diseases (Ahuja 2016). Dread life is a life that has grown accustomed to and has placed its trust in governance discourses that promise that life can be cared for or preserved through a series of social, political, economic, cultural, or technological interventions at the level of collective and individual bodies. Dread life is a life that has become reliant on discourses and representations of crises, looming dangers, impending catastrophes, and ongoing disasters (whether they are visible or not). As Ahuja puts it, dread life emerges as a result of discourses and representations “that (1) posit the environment as an unruly site of perpetual risk, and (2) shore up an imperial optimism in the force of the state that tends to far outstrip its actual ability to control [the crisis]” (Ahuja 2016: 9). Discourses that produce dread life abound because they keep the crisis or the disaster alive, productive, and always active. Through these discourses, the presence of dread life is a constant reminder of the fact that humanity remains under the spell cast by a bad or evil star, that, as fate has it, disasters will always be around. But, just as crucially, dread life also enables the production of an array of configurations, objects, and objectives, and subjectivities that help to make disastrous biopolitics into a set of tangible, material, and generable operations on a day-to-day basis. Thus, dread life breaks down into a series of subsets of disastrous life and living conditions. Depending on how, where, or when the crisis or disaster is mobilized (as many of this volume’s chapters have detailed), dread life can morph into resilient life, or into triaged life, or perhaps into deracinated life, or possibly into toxic life, or sometimes into emergency life, or maybe into a life suspended between disease and death. Any instance whereby dread life is placed in front of “an unruly site of perpetual risk” (as Ahuja puts it) is potentially productive of one of these (and other) subsets of disastrous life/living. Moreover, for any subset of dread life one finds a corresponding modality of governance/governmentality best suited (or so we are told) to manage the crisis or the disaster and, as such, most apt at keeping alive as dread. Thus, for example, resilient life calls for, justifies, and makes effective operations, technologies, and strategies of resilience. Secure life instantiates and authorizes security practices, policies, and politics. Toxic life requires responses in the form of environmentally conscious purifying or cleansing remedies that typically mobilize various layers of scientific expertise. Triaged life often calls for and normalizes clinical and administrative gazes that can sort bodies in order to repurpose them for upcoming disaster challenges (wars, future diseases, weather emergencies, etc.) Dread life is also productive of a range of subjects and subjectivities in charge of determining which types of interventions at the level of populations and bodies are more likely to cope with the disaster of deciding how the governing strategy that has been adopted (resilience, sustainable development, security, etc.) is to be deployed. This is precisely the point where what Ahuja calls “the optimism in the force of the state” (2016:9) is maximized. The state or, better yet, all sorts of agents/agencies in charge of the governance of dread life both depend on and become a function of the production of multiple instances of dread life so that they can serve as the ultimate guarantors of the safety, security, resilience, or sustainability of life itself (even if, more often than not, such a maintenance of dread life implies the culling of other bodies whose lives are not even worthy of being subjected to dread). Thus, as most of this volume’s chapters have revealed, one cannot think life under conditions of disaster without accounting for a series of governing or managing agents/agencies (the state, in some cases, but also various neoliberal assemblages such as corporations, environmental organizations, militaries and other security and enforcement agents, laws, policies and policy statements, extractive technologies, regimes of health, communities of experts, scientific pronouncements, etc.) that come together to make sure that dread life will be maintained as dread life and that disasters will be kept as productive discursive modalities for more dread life (and disasters) to come. This is not necessarily to say that these agents or agencies of governance of dread life are the instigators of dread life or of disastrous biopolitics. Rather, it is to say that these agents/agencies of biopolitical governance are active assemblages that are produced by discourses of disaster maintenance and by the need created in these discourses for life to remain tethered to disaster. Yet, these active assemblages of productive governance of dread life through disaster management display an actancy (through their active/creative performances) that enables discourses of disastrous biopolitics to be reproduced, re-imagined, or redeployed.

#### The alternative is autoaesthetics – liberal biopolitics is a form of resilient living that subverts human potential into endless dangers to be secured – voting negative reintroduces death to the question of life – ask yourself, what would it mean to have a death well lived?

* Alt is uncondo

Evans and Reid ‘14

[Brad Evans, International Relations at the University of Bristol, and Julian Reid, International Relations at University of London. 2014. “Resilient Life”] pat – DM me for the PDF

Even through a brief social detour on fire, however, we can see how the continual framing of life in terms of its biological vulnerability has a more contested history. Indeed, even though the compulsion to view life biologically developed to be one of the defining features of modernity, throughout this period there was nevertheless some belief that the subject was able to secure itself from the problems of the world. This was backed up by the proliferation of various myths about belonging that were central to the creation of political communities. Liberalism, in contrast, operates as if it is ‘limitless’. Its reach, growth and development demand more, and more, and more. However, instead of relating this to a new-found metaphysical awakening that allows us to think that there is more to life than its biological endowment, contemporary liberal biopolitics turns infinite potentiality into a source of limitless endangerment such that all there is to think about is the sheer necessity and survivability of things. In this sense, it is more proper to describe liberal biopolitics as limitless. For rather than taking the open horizon as a space for the infinitely possible, everything is internalized such that it is haunted by whatever remains irreducible to its current sensibility. This inevitably brings us to the vexed question of a death well lived.

We don’t need grand theorizing to make the point that mediations on death have a profound impact upon the way we live. Anybody who has known a person with a terminal illness and becomes anxiously consumed with the prospect of dying will appreciate how the thought and presence of death effectively stops them living. They cannot live because the very uncertainties (physical and intellectual) presented by the mere thought of death are a burden that proves too difficult to carry. Hence, working in an opposite direction to Heidegger’s much debated claim that the ‘absolute impossibility’ of thinking about death constitutes the very possibility of being, the possibility of its occurrence is sufficient to instill what in fact is less a fear of death but more a fear of living. But we cannot simply stop there. As we have suggested, what makes the art of living so dangerously fascinating today is that it requires us to live through the source of our endangerment. Trauma and anxiety as such become our weapons, as vulnerability is amplified and played back to us with increasing frequency to their point of normalization. The political significance of this should not be underestimated.

Our argument is that the political debasement of the subject through strategies of resilience more than puts the very question of death into question by removing it from our critical gaze. In doing so, it represents nothing short of a profound assault on our ability to think metaphysically. This in turn represents a direct attack upon our abilities to transform the world beyond the catastrophic condition in which we are now immersed. After all, how can we even conceive of different worlds if we cannot come to terms with the death and extinction of this one? Resilience as such is what we may term a ‘lethal ecology of reasoning’, for in taking hold and seeking to intervene in all the elements upon which life is said to depend, it puts the living on a permanent life support system that is hard, soft and virtually wired into the most insecure of social fabrics to the evacuation of all possible alternative outcomes. To open, then, a much debated but still yet to be resolved conflict in the history of political and philosophical thought, we maintain that if the biopoliticization of life represents the triumph of techne over poiesis, and if this very biopoliticization today thrives on the technical production of vulnerable subjects which learn to accept that fate, there is a need to resurrect with confidence the idea that what remains irreducible to life can be the starting point for thinking about a more poetic alternative art for living. As Peter Sloterdijk writes on the all too gradual demise of metaphysics:

Ever since the end of the eighteenth century, this has become a twilight zone where it was also possible to see the growth of nihilism, and it was precisely because there that art began to assume an enormous importance, and precisely because art makes it clear that it has a non-nihilistic way of coming to terms with the fact that we ourselves are responsible for the creation of what we think of as the essential. Art defends the truth of life against flat empiricism and deadly positivism, which are no longer capable of an awareness of anything more than the facts and which are therefore incapable of culling the energy to create new inter-relationships of vital or living forces.

Life as a Work of Art

So where does this leave us in our attempts to move beyond the resilient subject? How may we revitalize the very meaning of the political out of the torment of its catastrophic condition? What is further required so that post-biopolitical forms of living may be entertained? How, in other words, may we resurrect with affirmative vigour Nietzsche’s delightful and no less poignant provocation that life itself may become a work of art? We are yet to truly grasp the magnificence of Nietzsche’s work as it may play out in the field of politics. While the stylistic artistry of his particular interventions largely remained tied to the literary field, as witnessed most notably in the figure of Zarathustra, he nevertheless demanded with affirmative vigour rejoicing in the fullness of an experience that embraces the poetic and the aesthetic. Not only does this stake a claim to the creative power of transformation, it also gives over to life the political possibility that its aesthetical qualities may have both an affirmative and resistive potential to challenge dogmatic images of thought. Never has this calling seemed more pressing.

What is at stake here is not simply the ‘aesthetics of existence’ wherein life conforms to some glorious representational standard of beautification. Such constructed imaginaries always grey the magnificent colours of the earth. What is demanded is the formulation of alternative modes of existence that are not afraid to have reasons to believe in this world. As Deleuze succinctly put it, ‘In every modernity and every novelty, you find conformity and creativity; an insipid conformity, but also “a little new music”; something in conformity with the time, but also something untimely – separating the one from the other is the task of those who know how to love, the real destroyers and creators of our day’. Deleuze invariably provides a purposeful nod here to the Nietzchean idea of a poetic subject:

that he himself is really the poet who keeps creating this life... as a poet, he certainly has vis contemplative and the ability to look back upon his work, but at the same time also and above all vis creative, which the active human being lacks... We who think and feel at the same time are those who really continually fashion something that had not been there before: the whole eternally growing world of valuations, colours, accents, perspectives, scales, affirmations, and negations’.

What Nietzsche acknowledges in this passage is that ‘aestheticizing of life entails its artful, stylish disappropriation, a free fall into metaphor and un-self-ness. Autoaesthetics, the artful and chimerical fabrication of the (un)self, means development of strategies of self-mastery, power over one’s art and production, a convergence with self at the locus of the creation (and interpretation) of art’. This was not lost on Foucault, who was also of the opinion that ‘from the idea that the self is not given to us, I think that there is only one practical consequence: we have to create ourselves as a work of art... We should not have to refer the creative activity of somebody to the kind of relation he has to himself, but should relate the kind of relation one has to oneself to a creative activity’.

We may argue that conceiving of life as a work of art stands in direct contrast to the nihilism, indifference and alienation of the catastrophic subject. It resurrects Nietzsche’s claim about the death of God in a way that seeks to find new forms of meaning to life that are necessarily revelatory in nature. And it challenges head on the positivist conceit that a meaningful life can only be progressively reasoned on account of its biopolitical existence. This demands an account of the subject that is more than a historical unfolding of survivability. As Simon Critchley puts it, by drawing upon one of his arch provocateurs, Oscar Wilde, ‘When I think of religion at all, I feel as if I would like to found an order for those who cannot believe: the Confraternity of the Faithless, one might call it, where on an altar, on which no taper burned, a priest, in whose heart peace had no dwelling, might celebrate with unblessed bread and a chalice of empty wine. Everything to be true must become a religion. And agnosticism should have its ritual no less than faith’. This acceptance that there is something to existence that is less explicable to the prevailing logics of secularity, as Todd May explains, requires a more nuanced understanding of philosophical enquiry that moves away from ‘thinking metaphysics’ and all its ways of stupefying and rendering incapable the subject, towards questioning how we might live differently:

We don’t want to reduce it simply to a morally good life, as though a meaningful life were simply an unalienated moral life. Meaningful lives are not so limited and are sometimes more vexed. So we must ask what lends objective worthiness to a life outside the moral realm. Here is where the narrative character of a life comes into play... There are narrative values expressed by human lives that are not reducible to moral values. Nor are they reducible to happiness; they are not simply matters of subjective feeling. Narrative values are not felt, they are lived. And they constitute their own arena of value, one that has not been generally recognized by philosophers who reflect on life’s meaningfulness.

There are a number of qualifications that need to be made here. We cannot be content to see artistic production as something which fosters a negative response to the realities of the world. Creativity must precede any account of the dialectic. Nor must we confuse the art of living with the conforming arts that merely perform a well-rehearsed dance. Life as a work of art is necessarily affirmative in a sense that it appeals to the yet to be revealed. It has no taste for the simulacrum. Neither is it content to accept the need to live dangerously such that we are forced to live with déjà vu all over again. The self is to be actively produced as a non-stable subject that does not seek to emulate some normative standard, but instead forcefully challenges the vulnerable ground which it is said to occupy. So believing in the irreducibility of existence? Certainly. Hostile to all reactive and enslaving forces? Undeniably. Unapologetic in willing the event of its ongoing emergent existence? Steadfast. Openly committed to the affirmative potential of the autonomous subject? Categorically. A believer in a more affective notion of history that is forever in the making? Unreservedly. A student of the eschatological? Earnestly. Appreciative of the transformative political power of fabulation? Truly. A lover of the poetic over the mathematical? Wholeheartedly. Welcoming our coming into the world? Without reservation.

It would be wrong, however, to argue here simply in favour of life as if its very nature exhibited something of the poetic. As we have insisted, never before have we witnessed so many mediations on the value of life. Life, it is now said, constitutes the very meaningfulness of existence as broadly conceived. Without any engagement with the problem of life, there is nothing but a retreat into the abstract deceit of sovereign entrapments. This is now the default setting for global liberal governance on a planetary scale. Whilst critical philosophers once argued that life holds the capacity and the will to resist that which it finds intolerable to its existence, no longer can we have such confidence in the subject as framed in terms of its living qualities alone. Life continually desires that which it should find oppressive. It wilfully gives over to processes of desubjectivization on the promise of better futures to come. Life also shamefully compromises with power to the subjugation of both the self and others. It happily allows itself to be the principal referent object for political strategies which, promising freedom, render life with a difference thoroughly dangerous. Indeed, when power takes life to be its principal object, it often returns with claims to vulnerability that contemporary forms of power find easy to accommodate and turn to their own advantage. Neoliberalism, after all, thrives in situations that are insecure by design. What is at stake here is not simply some mediation on life such that the meaningfulness of life may be thought anew. However tempting this may appear to us, we need to focus more clearly on the affirmative and poetic qualities of existence that are by their very nature ‘irreducible to life’ against those strategies which take life in order to render it deducible – hence deductable as a living entity that demands continuous intervention on account of its endless imperfections.

Needless to say, this art of living that finds political value in those poetic expressions that remain irreducible to life as such stands in marked contrast to the conformist arts which seek to resemble the world. Much of contemporary art, it is fair to say, is what money makes of it. Indeed, if Andy Warhol epitomized what Walter Benjamin aptly termed the work of art in the age of mechanical reproduction, no artist resembles the resilient logic of the times better than Damien Hirst. Beyond his penchant for self-valuation and shameless taking of ideas for self-gratification and self-glorification, Hirst’s work has a well-documented affinity with the medical and the taxidermical. His series of figures in formaldehyde, in particular, can be seen to represent the catastrophic topography of the times. Suspended in perfect animation, while suffocated beneath the weight of a liquid modern embrace, the various animalistic subjects of Hirst’s choosing are devoid of any political agency. Spectacularly simplistic in their mundane and catatonic gaze, their manufactured commitment to a death without the chance of credible decay tells less a tale of philosophical enquiry than the story of a finitude that refuses to accept the notion that finality may be transformative. They are literally ‘set’ in a perpetually fixed catastrophic plot. Nothing original is produced here. Life is merely taken as something to be exhibited without agential content or capacity for transformation. All the while it is condemned to a suspended sentence that is imagined to last for infinity. Hirst’s work thus resembles a Kantian dream and Nietzschean nightmare in the very same move. For here the object is completely immobile such that we become aware of our shared vulnerabilities without asking what we may do differently to challenge them, let alone move beyond the tragedy of their artificial supports.

#### The Role of the Judge is to adopt martial empiricism.

Bousquet et al ‘20

[Antoine Bousquet, University of London, Jairus Grove, University of Hawai‘i at Manoa, and Nisha Shah University of Ottawa. 2020. “Becoming war: Towards a martial empiricism,” <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0967010619895660>] pat

Haunting the formations and deformations of global life, war confronts us as an abyss in the face of which cherished interpretative frameworks perilously buckle and warp. Indeed, Tarak Barkawi and Shane Brighton (2011: 129) accurately identify a ‘conceptual black hole surrounding the notion of war’ that has insistently gnawed at the study of the phenomenon. Locating the source of this lacuna in the absence of an ‘ontology of war’, they propose to ground one in ‘fighting’ (Barkawi and Brighton, 2011: 136). Although we concur on the diagnosis, we take issue with the suggested remedy. War does not obey any neat philosophical division between epistemology and ontology. For us, the resolute elusiveness of any definitive understanding of war is inherent in that very object. Every attempt to conceptually shackle war is undone by the creative advance of its new modes, residences and intensities. This speaks against the value of ontology per se less than it calls for a strange, paradoxical and provisional ontology that is consonant with the confounding mutability of war. Such an ontology, suspended between infinity and totality, being and nothingness, the sheer fecundity and utter catastrophe of war, may not be too uncanny for its object. In fairness, Barkawi and Brighton (2011: 133) gesture towards this in acknowledging ‘war’s recalcitrance as an object of knowledge’ and allowing for war to unmake any truth. Yet they seem unwilling to embrace the full force of their own insight, which Marc von Boemcken (2016: 239) ultimately declares: ‘even the statement that “war is fighting” may well be eventually undone by war. In a very fundamental manner, war escapes human intelligibility.’

This special issue on ‘Becoming War’ grapples with war as obdurate mystery. In its recurring persistence yet constant reinvention, its paradoxical ordering of life for the generation of death, or its stubborn affront to the better world we all purport to want, war never ceases to perplex us. Our world is one shot through by war, manifest in the nation-states we inhabit, the ecologies of technics that bind us to one another, and the very thoughts ricocheting through our communities of sense. And yet we still do not know war.

Rather than endeavour yet again to ‘say something fundamental about what war is’ (Barkawi and Brighton, 2011: 134, emphasis in original), we choose to explore how war becomes. This is not to say that we deny any durability or regularities in the phenomenon of war over time. Simply that, as Alfred Whitehead (1978: 35) puts it, ‘there is a becoming of continuity, but no continuity of becoming’. Accordingly, we seek to trace the lines of becoming that congeal into what comes to count as war, even as it continually frays at the edges and insolently defies habituated frames of reference. We do not, therefore, offer a theory of continuity, a formula for what all lines of becoming war might have in common, but instead sketch a style of investigation that encompasses both the enduring cohesion and the radical dispersion of war. We call this endeavour ‘martial empiricism’ to renounce attempts to devise a definitive theory of war. Instead, we favour an open-ended conceptual arsenal for following the trail of war wherever it leads us, as opposed to camping in the places where we already expect to find it.

Although we do not aim to circumscribe the remit of its investigations, martial empiricism is nonetheless inherently situational, spurred by the impulse to grasp the present martial condition we inhabit in all its calamity and promise. We would be far from the first to point out the growing inadequacy of the conceptual frameworks of war inherited from the Westphalian historical interval. Yet we still collectively flounder in the face of a combined and uneven landscape of armed conflict populated by metastasizing war machines encompassing overseas contingency operations, fullspectrum hybrid theatres, ethno-supremacist militias, crowd-sourced paramilitaries, Incel shooters and narco-state assassins. The game is definitely up when a task force led by the former head of United States Central Command can write that ‘basic categories such as “battlefield,” “combatant” and “hostilities” no longer have clear or stable meaning’ (Abizaid and Brooks, 2014: 35). Confronted with this reality and the persistent bewilderment it induces, we contend that a certain epistemic humility is in order. Rather than professing to know where war begins and ends, martial empiricism starts in the middle, with only the barest tentative intuitions necessary to explore the logistics, operations and embodiments that engender armed conflict as an unremitting condition of global life.

## Case

### u/v

#### don’t grant them access to 1ac paradigm issues – allows friv theory & means the 1n cant check back abuse

### Framing

#### Actor spec – dread life on the K page impact turns all of this – governments take actions to “save lives” as a justification for neoliberalism and genocide – extinction first bad model, 1. Probable impacts ow bc happen rn 2. Taking actions to avoid extisential risks is bad

### Method

### 1NC – Econ

#### Their author votes for us

Tønnesson, 15- Norwegian peace researcher and historian with a PhD from The University of Oslo (Stein Tønnesson, 2015, “Deterrence, interdependence and Sino–US peace,” published in the International Area Studies Review, vol. 18 no. 3)

Etel Solingen (2015) goes further than Khong in a comparison of pre-World War I Germany and today’s China. It is not interdependence per se, she claims, that inhibits war. Interdependence can work both ways. The main question is what kind of socio-economic coalition that dominates domestic politics. Is it a coalition with an active interest in internationalization or one that seeks to protect its nation against foreign influences? Internationalizing strategies emphasize access to global markets, capital, and technology, regional cooperation and domestic macroeconomic stability. This reduces uncertainty, encourages savings, and enhances both foreign and internal investments (Solingen, 2015: 130). Conversely, inward-looking models benefit from enhancing the viability of statist, nationalist, protectionist, and military–industrial complexes. She finds that Germany pre-World War I conforms to the inward-looking model, and that this may explain its preparedness to go to war. The socio-economic coalition dominating Chinese politics today to some extent resembles imperial Germany’s agrarian–industrial–military complex. The main similarities are a ‘combination of rapid socioeconomic change and stagnant political institutions’, and the active use of assertive nationalism as a legitimating device (Solingen, 2015: 138). More importantly, however, China’s Communist Party regime differs from imperial Germany in holding its military under firm civilian control and embracing economic internationalization. China has radically integrated its economy with the global market and become part of an international division of labour, with trans-national production chains. China’s internationalizers ‘share incentives with the West – and much of the rest – to bolster a stable global economy’. Thus the prospects of China going to war are ‘small in 2014, though nontrivial’ (Solingen, 2015: 146).

It should be noted that Solingen has nothing to say about the socio-economic coalitions that hold sway in Washington, DC. She seems, unlike Roach (2014), to assume that the threat to peace comes mainly from China. In this she also differs from Copeland, who finds that it is normally the declining power who initiates war, and Mearsheimer, who claims that China’s attempt to become Asia’s regional hegemon will force the US to contain and weaken it (Mearsheimer, 2001: 402–403; Mearsheimer, 2006: 162).

Conclusions

[their card starts]

Several recent works on China and Sino–US relations have made substantial contributions to the current understanding of how and under what circumstances a combination of nuclear deterrence and economic interdependence may reduce the risk of war between major powers. At least four conclusions can be drawn from the review above: first, those who say that interdependence may both inhibit and drive conflict are right. Interdependence raises the cost of conflict for all sides but asymmetrical or unbalanced dependencies and negative trade expectations may generate tensions leading to trade wars among inter-dependent states that in turn increase the risk of military conflict (Copeland, 2015: 1, 14, 437; Roach, 2014). The risk may increase if one of the interdependent countries is governed by an inward-looking socio-economic coalition (Solingen, 2015); second, the risk of war between China and the US should not just be analysed bilaterally but include their allies and partners. Third party countries could drag China or the US into confrontation; third, in this context it is of some comfort that the three main economic powers in Northeast Asia (China, Japan and South Korea) are all deeply integrated economically through production networks within a global system of trade and finance (Ravenhill, 2014; Yoshimatsu, 2014: 576); and fourth, decisions for war and peace are taken by very few people, who act on the basis of their future expectations. International relations theory must be supplemented by foreign policy analysis in order to assess the value attributed by national decision-makers to economic development and their assessments of risks and opportunities. If leaders on either side of the Atlantic begin to seriously fear or anticipate their own nation’s decline then they may blame this on external dependence, appeal to anti-foreign sentiments, contemplate the use of force to gain respect or credibility, adopt protectionist policies, and ultimately refuse to be deterred by either nuclear arms or prospects of socioeconomic calamities. Such a dangerous shift could happen abruptly, i.e. under the instigation of actions by a third party – or against a third party.

Yet as long as there is both nuclear deterrence and interdependence, the tensions in East Asia are unlikely to escalate to war. As Chan (2013) says, all states in the region are aware that they cannot count on support from either China or the US if they make provocative moves. The greatest risk is not that a territorial dispute leads to war under present circumstances but that changes in the world economy alter those circumstances in ways that render inter-state peace more precarious. If China and the US fail to rebalance their financial and trading relations (Roach, 2014) then a trade war could result, interrupting transnational production networks, provoking social distress, and exacerbating nationalist emotions. This could have unforeseen consequences in the field of security, with nuclear deterrence remaining the only factor to protect the world from Armageddon, and unreliably so. Deterrence could lose its credibility: one of the two great powers might gamble that the other yield in a cyber-war or conventional limited war, or third party countries might engage in conflict with each other, with a view to obliging Washington or Beijing to intervene.

[their card ends]

The best way to enhance global peace is no doubt to multiply the factors protecting it: build a Pacific security community by topping up economic interdependence with political rapprochement and trust, institutionalized cooperation, and shared international norms. Yet even without such accomplishments, the combination of deterrence and economic interdependence may be enough to prevent war among the major powers. Because the leaders of nuclear armed nations are fearful of getting into a situation where peace relies uniquely on nuclear deterrence, and because they know that their adversaries have the same fear, they may accept the risks entailed by depending economically on others. And then there will be neither trade wars nor shooting wars, just disputes and diplomacy.

### 1NC – DeDev!

#### Collapse of industrial society is inevitable---forcing a transition is key to avoid a total collapse that ends civilization

Nafeez M. Ahmed 17, Executive Director of the Institute for Policy Research and Development, *Failing States, Collapsing Systems: BioPhysical Triggers of Political Violence*, 2017, pp. 11-13

Today, human civilization under late capitalism maintains its increasing distance from thermodynamic equilibrium via the throughput of vast quantities of increasingly depleted fossil fuel reserves, along with other finite and increasingly scarce resources such as metal ores, radionucleotides, rare earth elements, phosphate fertilizer, arable land, and fresh water (Nekola et al. 2013). One indicator of the system’s growing complexity today is the measure of material throughput, or economic growth—Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Under capitalist social-property relations, GDP must continuously increase through the maximization of private sector profits, simply for businesses to survive in the competitive marketplace and for the economy to maintain its ability to meet the consumption requirements of a growing population. However, as the complexity of human civilization has advanced, the continual growth in material throughput is correlated with an escalating rate of depletion of energy and raw materials, as well as an acceleration in the dissipation of energy through intensifying greenhouse gas emissions. Robust scientific assessments now demonstrate that the continuation of those biophysical processes of environmental degradation in a business-as-usual scenario will, before the end of the twenty-first century, fundamentally undermine the biophysical basis of human civilization in its current mode of material organization and structural complexity. Further, the uncontrolled energy releases generated by these biophysical processes are manifested in climate change, extreme weather events, and natural disasters (Earth System Disruption); and drives geopolitical competition, social unrest, and violent conflict (Human System Destabilization). These manifestations of dissipative energy release can be seen as distinctive feedback processes resulting from human civilization’s accelerating exploitation of fossil fuel energy sources within the context of the biophysical limits of the environment. In turn, these two strands of systemic feedbacks—Earth System Disruption (ESD) and Human System Destabilization (HSD)—are occurring within a single, overarching human-environment system, and thus are already inherently interconnected, therefore feeding back into each other. This mutual feedback process creates an amplifying global systemic feedback in which: (1) ESD drives HSD, which in turn generates ‘security’ issues perceived through the lens of ‘threat’ and ‘risk’ analysis; (2) this invites traditional securitized human responses that focus on the expansion of existing military, political and economic power to stabilize existing structures of authority and advance prevailing mechanisms of energy extraction and mobilization; (3) the entrenchment and expansion of existing structures undermines human civilization’s capacity to pursue structural modifications to ameliorate, mitigate or prevent ESD, thus intensifying ESD; (4) the feedback process continues as ESD drives further HSD. The trajectory of this amplifying global systemic feedback, carried to its logical conclusion and assuming no intervening shift, is simply the protracted, cascading collapse of human civilization in its current form toward increasingly less complex, and therefore less resource-intensive configurations, corresponding to available resources and constrained within the environmental limits imposed by accelerating climate change (Tainter 1990). Within this amplifying global systemic feedback, one fundamental obstacle to the systemic restructuring required to avert this outcome is knowledge access, distribution, and processing. In much the same way that an integral factor in an organism’s capacity to adapt to changing environmental conditions is its genetic ability to absorb environmental information and process it through genetic modification that can result in new adaptive biological configurations, human civilization must be capable of absorbing and processing accurate information about the human-environment system, and converting this into actionable knowledge, in order to be empowered to enact the key structural modifications capable of effecting a phase-shift to a more stable adaptive configuration in relation to the Earth System. The difference here, of course, is that while evolutionary biological genetic modifi cation is a question of random mutations, human civilization consists of a collection of conscious agents who can make deliberative decisions on the basis of the information available to them, which must be integrated into knowledge that is capable of informing adaptive behaviors. This raises the question of a pivotal system- wide structural defi ciency in the knowledge processing capacity of human civilization. In short, inaccurate, misleading or partial knowledge bears a particularly central role in cognitive failures pertaining to the most powerful prevailing human political, economic and cultural structures, which is inhibiting the adaptive structural transformation urgently required to avert collapse. The most obvious locus of this global systemic information defi cit is, of course, the global media system— or perhaps more accurately, the Global Media-Industrial Complex (GMIC), and related organs of communication and transnational information dissemination. The GMIC, in effect, currently operates as the information-knowledge architecture of human civilization. The implications of this analysis are stark: scientific data demonstrates that the rapid convergence of multiple global crisis in coming years and decades is pushing a vast array of interconnected sub-systems toward a threshold of simultaneous tipping points. From a complex adaptive systems perspective, this feedback threshold signifies a global system that is on the brink, if not in the midst, of a fundamental phase-shift to a new structural configuration. However, the evolutionary context of this process suggests that the nature and outcome of this global civilizational phase-shift will determine the ultimate fate of civilization. Rapidly changing environmental conditions and the escalating breach of biophysical limits are compelling human civilization to either adapt through fundamental

#### Try or die means the transition’s worth it – our evidence does the impact calculus

Alexander 15—Lecturer and research fellow at the University of Melbourne, co-director of the Simplicity Institute, and a PhD [Samuel, *Sufficiency Economy: Enough for Everyone, Forever*, italics in original]

While Tainter’s theory of social complexity has much to commend it, in this chapter I wish to examine and ultimately challenge Tainter’s conclusion that voluntary simplification is not a viable path to sustainability. In fact, I will argue that it is by far our best bet, even if the odds do not provide grounds for much optimism. Part of the disagreement here turns on differing notions of ‘sustainability’. Whereas Tainter seems to use sustainability to mean *sustaining the existing civilisation*, I use sustainability to mean *changing the form of civilisation* through voluntary simplification, insofar as that is required for humanity to operate within the carrying capacity of the planet (Vale and Vale, 2013). Given that Tainter (1988) seems to accept, as we will see, that his own conception of sustainability will eventually lead to collapse, I feel he is wrong to be so dismissive of voluntary simplification as a strategy for potentially avoiding collapse. It is, I argue, our only alternative to collapse, and if that is so, voluntary simplification ought to be given our most rigorous attention and commitment, even if the chances of success do not seem high. I feel Tainter is flippant about our best hope, and given what is at stake, his dismissal of voluntary simplification should be given close critical attention. Furthermore, even if attempting to sustain the existing civilisation through ever-increasing complexity continues to be humanity’s dominant approach to solving societal problems, I maintain the alternative path of voluntary simplification remains the most effective means of building ‘resilience’ (i.e., the ability of an individual or community to withstand societal or ecological shocks). This is significant because it justifies the practice and promotion of voluntary simplification, *irrespective of the likelihood of it ever being broadly accepted*. Directed toward the highly developed regions of the world, I argue that environmental sustainability requires voluntary simplification; but if that strategy is not widely embraced, I maintain we should still embrace the strategy *as far as possible*, in order to build resilience in preparation for forthcoming civilisational deterioration or collapse. The aim is not to achieve some passive socio-ecological stasis, but to move toward a way of life that achieves some form of dynamic equilibrium within ecologically sustainable limits.

While I accept that problem solving generally implies an increase in social complexity, the thesis I present below is that there comes a point when complexity itself becomes a problem, at which point voluntary simplification, not further complexity, is the most appropriate response. Not only does industrial civilisation seem to be at such a point today (Homer-Dixon, 2006; Slaughter, 2010), or well beyond it (Gilding, 2011), I hope to show, albeit in a preliminary way, that voluntary simplification presents a viable and desirable option for responding to today’s converging social, economic, and ecological problems. This goes directly against Tainter’s conception of sustainability, while accepting much of his background theoretical framework.

### covid

#### Can’t make enough vaccines vital components are too scarce

Tepper 4-10 James Tepper, 4/10 [James Tepper, (James M. Tepper is an American neuroscientist currently a Board of Governors Professor of Molecular and Behavioral Neuroscience and Distinguished Professor at Rutgers University and an Elected Fellow of the American Association for the Advancement of Science.)]. "Global Covid vaccine rollout threatened by shortage of vital components." Guardian, 4-1-2021, Accessed 8-8-2021. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/apr/10/global-covid-vaccine-rollout-threatened-by-shortage-of-vital-components // duongie

Vaccine-makers around the world face shortages of vital components including large plastic growbags, according to the head of the firm that is manufacturing a quarter of the UK’s jab supply. Stan Erck, the chief executive of Novavax – which makes the second vaccine to be grown and bottled entirely in Britain – told the Observer that the shortage of 2,000-litre bags in which the vaccine cells were grown was a significant hurdle for global supply. His warning came as bag manufacturers revealed that some pharmaceutical firms were waiting up to 12 months for the sterile single-use disposable plastic containers, which are used to make medicines of all kinds, including the Pfizer, Moderna and Novavax Covid-19 vaccines. But Erck and his British partners said they were confident they had enough suppliers to avoid disruption to the supply of Novavax. The vaccine is waiting for approval from the Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency (MHRA) but the first of 60 million doses ordered by the government are already in production in Teesside. The Fujifilm Diosynth Biotechnologies factory began growing the first cells for the Novavax vaccine in Billingham, County Durham this month and in a few weeks they will fill the bioreactor bag, ready to be transported to GlaxoSmithKline’s plant at Barnard Castle to be put into vials for distribution. “The first hurdle is showing it works and we don’t have that hurdle any more,” Erck said. But he added there were others still to overcome. “There’s the media that the cells have to grow in,” Erck said. “You grow them in these 2,000-litre bags, which are in short supply. Then you pour it out and you have to filter it, and the filters are in short supply. The little things count.” Novavax almost ran out of bags at one of its 20 factories earlier this year, but there had been no delays for the UK operation, according to Martin Meeson, global chief executive of Fujifilm Diosynth. “We started working on our part of the supply chain in summer last year,” he said. “We had to accelerate some of the investment here, but the commitment we made last summer to start manufacturing in February has been fulfilled.” Production of coronavirus vaccines is being ramped up. Production of coronavirus vaccines is being ramped up. Photograph: Christophe Archambault/AP Both Meeson and Erck said the UK’s vaccine taskforce had been helpful in sorting out supply issues so far, but other countries and other medical supplies might be affected. ABEC makes bioreactor bags at two plants in the US and two in Fermoy and Kells in Ireland, and delivered six 4,000-litre bags to the Serum Institute in India last year for its Covid vaccines. Brady Cole, vice-president of equipment solutions at ABEC, said: “We are hearing from our customer base of lead times that are pushing out to nine, 10, even 12 months to get bioreactor bags. We typically run out at 16 weeks to get a custom bioreactor bag out to a customer.” He said ABEC was still managing to fulfil orders at roughly that rate. “The bag manufacturing capacity can’t meet demand right now,” he added. “And on the component side, the tubes and the instruments and so forth that also go into the bag assembly – those lead times are also starting to get stretched as well. But the biggest problem we see is it really is just the ability to get bags in a reasonable amount of time.” ABEC expanded its factories last year and has now started making 6,000-litre bags, which are roughly the size of a minibus. Other firms including MilliporeSigma, part of German company Merck, have also been expanding their manufacturing facilities. American firm Thermo Fisher Scientific expects it will finish doubling its capacity this year. The US government has also blocked exports of bags, filters and other components so it can supply more Pfizer vaccines for Americans. Adar Poonawalla, the chief executive of the Serum Institute of India, said the restrictions were likely to cause serious bottlenecks. Novavax is hoping to avoid delays and “vaccine nationalism” by operating on four continents, with 20 facilities in nine countries. “One year ago, we had exactly zero manufacturing capacity,” Erck said. “We’re self-sufficient. The two main things we need to do are done in the UK. And in the EU we have plants in Spain and the Czech Republic and fill-and-finish in Germany and the Netherlands.” There was no need for vaccines to cross borders to fulfil contracts, he said. The Oxford/AstraZeneca vaccine was hit by a delay to a delivery of 5 million doses from India and a problem with a batch made in Britain, and the company has been dragged into a lengthy row between the UK and the EU over vaccine exports.

#### Covid mutates too fast South Africa and UK variants prove

David **Ho 3/8** [David Ho, (David Da-i Ho is a Taiwanese-American AIDS researcher, physician, and virologist who has made a number of scientific contributions to the understanding and treatment of HIV infection.)]. "New Study of Coronavirus Variants Predicts Virus Evolving to Escape Current Vaccines, Treatments." Columbia University Irving Medical Center, 3-8-2021, Accessed 8-5-2021. https://www.cuimc.columbia.edu/news/new-study-coronavirus-variants-predicts-virus-evolving-escape-current-vaccines-treatments // duongie

A new study of the U.K. and South Africa variants of SARS-CoV-2 predicts that current vaccines and certain monoclonal antibodies may be less effective at neutralizing these variants and that the new variants raise the specter that reinfections could be more likely. The study was published in Nature(link is external and opens in a new window) on March 8, 2021. A preprint of the study was first posted to BioRxiv(link is external and opens in a new window) on January 26, 2021. The study’s predictions are now being borne out with the first reported results of the Novavax vaccine, says the study's lead author David Ho, MD. The company reported(link is external and opens in a new window) on Jan. 28 that the vaccine was nearly 90% effective in the company’s U.K. trial, but only 49.4% effective in its South Africa trial, where most cases of COVID-19 are caused by the B.1.351 variant. "Our study and the new clinical trial data show that the virus is traveling in a direction that is causing it to escape from our current vaccines and therapies that are directed against the viral spike,” says Ho, the director of the Aaron Diamond AIDS Research Center and the Clyde’56 and Helen Wu Professor of Medicine at Columbia University Vagelos College of Physicians and Surgeons. “If the rampant spread of the virus continues and more critical mutations accumulate, then we may be condemned to chasing after the evolving SARS-CoV-2 continually, as we have long done for influenza virus,” Ho says. “Such considerations require that we stop virus transmission as quickly as is feasible, by redoubling our mitigation measures and by expediting vaccine rollout.” After vaccination, the immune system responds and makes antibodies that can neutralize the virus. Ho and his team found that antibodies in blood samples taken from people inoculated with the Moderna or Pfizer vaccine were less effective at neutralizing the two variants, B.1.1.7, which emerged last September in England, and B.1.351, which emerged from South Africa in late 2020. Against the U.K. variant, neutralization dropped by roughly 2-fold, but against the South Africa variant, neutralization dropped by 6.5- to 8.5-fold.

#### The plan only hurts manufacturing moving bottlenecks to less efficient manufacturers

Alex **Knapp, 5/7** [Alex Knapp, (senior editor at Forbes covering healthcare, science, and cutting edge technology.)]. "Patent Waivers Won’t Impact Big Pharma’s Bottom Line—But Could Slow Covid Vaccine Rollouts." Forbes, 5-7-2021, Accessed 8-5-2021. https://www.forbes.com/sites/alexknapp/2021/05/07/patent-waivers-wont-impact-big-pharmas-bottom-line-but-could-slow-covid-vaccine-rollouts/?sh=78866f727862 // duongie

On Wednesday, the Biden Administration stated that it would support a proposal to temporarily waive protection of intellectual property (IP) rights for Covid vaccines during the pandemic, in a bid to boost production and accelerate vaccine distribution throughout the world. Industry trade groups immediately criticized the move, and investors reacted simultaneously—share prices plummeted, though they’ve been slowly recovering Thursday and Friday. Wall Street analysts at Morgan Stanley, Jefferies and Brookline Capital Markets, however, said in reports this week that waiving vaccine IP was unlikely to impact the financials of major vaccine makers, noting that current bottlenecks in vaccine production are related to supply chain, technical knowledge and difficulty in scaling up production. However, they caution that for the same reason, waivers could slow down current production by disrupting the market for raw materials. “Manufacturing supplies, raw materials, vials, stoppers and other key materials are in limited supply for 2021, and certainly for the 2021 calendar year,” wrote analysts from Jeffries, meaning that waivers can’t solve immediate vaccination needs in India and South Africa, where Covid-19 cases are surging. That report also notes that the mRNA vaccines from Pfizer and Moderna have yet to be authorized for use in India, as regulators desired local clinical trial data, which is another hurdle to overcome. Morgan Stanley commented that U.S. support alone doesn’t necessarily mean that a World Trade Organization agreement on the waiver would happen, especially since Germany has expressed opposition. The firm additionally notes that “manufacturing vaccines is a much more complicated process than making chemical drugs, and a patent waiver by itself would not enable other entities to manufacture their own copies of complex vaccines.” Jefferies analysts also remarked that another barrier to increased vaccine production is “ensuring the quality of the product, which is also not trivial.” Contractors for vaccine makers Pfizer, AstraZeneca and Johnson & Johnson have all run into quality-control issues that have led to millions of vaccine doses being discarded. On a company earnings call yesterday, Moderna CEO Stéphane Bancel said he doubted that waiving IP rights would impact his company much, because it would take months or even years for other companies to scale up manufacturing. Meanwhile, the biotech company has recently committed to expanding its own manufacturing capacity and expects to be able to make up to 3 billion doses of vaccine in 2022. Morgan Stanley analysts noted that in October 2020, Moderna “stated it would not enforce its patents during the pandemic, but to our knowledge, no one else has started manufacturing a vaccine that would violate Moderna’s patents.” The team at Brookline Capital markets noted that if a company did begin manufacturing vaccines based on Moderna’s patents, the upside would be an additional licensing revenue stream for the company. On Friday, vaccine manufacturer Novavax, which has reached an agreement with the private-public global health partnership Gavi to provide 1.1 billion vaccine doses to low income countries, stated its opposition to the WTO waiving patents, arguing that it “could further constrain resources by diverting them to entities incapable of manufacturing safe and effective vaccines in the near term.” Jeffries analysts note that a waiver wouldn’t put Novavax at immediate risk, as a key component of the company’s vaccine “is in limited supply and a majority of the raw material has already been locked up” by the company. That said, Morgan Stanley struck a similar point to Novavax about the risk involved in waiving patents. The analysts point out waivers could be counterproductive and actually slow down vaccine manufacturing. “An IP waiver now may exacerbate supply issues,” they write, “if some countries start to try to secure raw materials ahead of being able to produce a vaccine and cause shortages and disruptions in the supply chain.”