## k

#### Empire has shifted from the administration of death to the production of life – the affs restructuring of global medical intervention is the new logic of biopolitical governance – no longer is imperialism a question of borders and military power, but rather the protection of bodies.

Ahuja ‘16

[Neel, English @ UNC Chapel Hill. 2016. “Bioinsecurities”] pat

One element common to this biopolitics of empire is an anxiety about the dependence of the human body on forces that appear inhuman, even inhumane: medical technologies to extend, optimize, or end life; markets and institutions that unequally distribute resources for sustaining life; environmental processes that support, deprive, or injure bodies. Such concerns were, of course, entirely common to twentieth-century modernist fears of alienation from nature, as well as to liberal, socialist, and fascist states that each proclaimed to defend the life of the people in the major imperial wars. Yet due to the ongoing expansion of government into life through technological, economic, and environmental interventions, a growing number of crises that advertise dreaded risks to life as we know it—climate change, nuclear toxicity, disease pandemics, biological weapons, and financial speculation, to name a few—have recently pressed critical studies of empire to think politics and agency at queer scales of relation, from the grand vantage of planetary geology and climate, through the lively migrations of commodities and animals, all the way down to the microbial, molecular, and quantum worlds of matter in which advanced sciences produce new technologies and knowledge. In an era in which excessive hope is invested in the idea that empire’s so-called free markets will inevitably deliver resources for improving life, discussions of risk and security increasingly provoke concern about how bodies are either threatened or safeguarded in links to other species, to ecology, and to technology. Public fears and hopes are thus invested in questions about how bodies interface beyond the skin of the organism. The living body is not only an ecology reproduced by constituent species (think of the life-sustaining work of gut bacteria or the ingested flesh of animals or plants). It is also an assemblage crosscut by technological, economic, and environmental forces (medical technologies, insurance markets, agricultural systems, toxic pollution) that render the body vulnerable as they reproduce its conditions of possibility.

Yet there remains a sense of tension concerning how social theorists frame the vulnerability of human life between biopolitics and these emerging posthumanist ideas. While biopolitical analysis foregrounds the contested figure of the human, emphasizing that the human body is an effect of power crafted through the social reproduction of nationality, race, sex, and/or class factors conjoined in inhuman fields of power, emerging posthumanist and newmaterialist fields including animal studies, environmental humanities, and object-oriented ontology more often emphasize the agency of the nonhuman and the surprising liveliness of physical matter. As such, despite the avowed critique of the human, they may take for granted the apparent universality of the human lifeworld from which they flee, foreclosing attention to the processes that anthropomorphize the human in order to characterize the human’s sovereign domination of the nonhuman. This move allows some posthumanist critics to project upon an outside, the nonhuman (in the form of environment, animal, machine, or other object), the possibility of resistance to anthropocentrism. Such thinking might be seen as a ruse of transcendence—an assumption that turning attention from the human to the nonhuman could bypass Marxist, feminist, critical race, and postcolonial critiques of imperial systems that proliferate inequality under the guise of universal human freedom.

Despite this liberal, idealist trend among posthumanists (which is more pronounced in the humanities than it is in the social sciences), studies of empire increasingly confront the fact that the apparent exteriority of the subject (the worlds of body, physical matter, and interspecies exchange) has more often formed the center of the politics of empire rather than its excluded outside. It is thus my hope that the collision of biopolitical and posthumanist thought may be salvaged in a practical if unexpected crossing: a more robust accounting of the ways in which politics, including the liberal and neoliberal politics of empire, is embedded in living bodies and planetary environments, which are themselves constituted as objects of knowledge and intervention for imperial science. Such an understanding goes beyond an assertion that life is controlled by human government, which would embrace the strong postEnlightenment division between government and life, human and nonhuman. I instead hope to explore the queer hypothesis that the adaptability, risk, and differentiation central to life increasingly constitute the very matter of politics. This book is about how disease outbreaks, medical technologies, and the relations between humans, animals, bacteria, and viruses galvanized racialized fears and hopes that determined the geopolitical form of US empire during the long twentieth century, following the continent-wide establishment of Euro-American settler networks. Before explaining that argument, however, this brief preface explores how—in addition to established methods of postcolonial study that define empire through histories of conquest, settlement, and the exploitation of labor and resources—the inequalities and violences of imperialism can productively be understood from the vantage of species, the field of life itself.

Research on colonial environmental history and disease control is long established in postcolonial studies, even as today there is growing attention to Global South environmental activism, advanced biotechnologies, and human-animal and human-plant interactions as significant concerns in the planetary routes of European and US empire. Yet my sense of an interspecies politics is still relatively unfamiliar from even the vantage of these studies. Extant studies have long highlighted questions of representation, agency, influence, and domination, explaining the unequal distribution of the privileges accorded for being anthropomorphized, for being made human through colonial ideological and social processes. While maintaining focus on such racialized inequalities fracturing the figure of the human in the worldwide routes of European and US imperialisms, it is the aim of this book to articulate an additional sense of the political as a lively zone of embodied connection and friction. “Interspecies relations form the often unmarked basis upon which scholarly inquiry organizes its objects, political interventions such as ‘human rights’ stake their claims, and capitalist endeavors maneuver resources and marshal profit.” A critique of the interspecies zone of the political—which at its broadest would expand beyond the human-animal and human-microbial relations discussed in this book to include the diversity of living species, matter, energies, and environmental systems that produce everyday life out of biosocial crossings—helps us understand the persistence of empire in a postcolonial age precisely because it conjoins power to forces that retreat into the seemingly natural and ahistorical domains of body and matter. From this vantage, empire appears not only as a process of territorial and economic accumulation across international divisions of labor and sovereignty, but also as a reproductive process managing bodies in unequal planetary conjunctions of life and death. Tracing this second phenomenon requires analysis of biosocial forms of exchange among microbes, plants, animals, and humans, as well as models of power and representation recognizing that bodies are not empty containers of human political subjects, but are lively, transitional assemblages of political matter.

There are risks in attempting to theorize a political process like empire via the material shape it takes in life and matter, anticipated in long-standing liberal and Marxist distinctions between human and natural history. Must such a move necessarily turn away from issues of interest, hegemony, violence, representation, and inequality that often define organized decolonial struggles? I would argue that this need not be so, and that vitalizing colonial discourse studies through an accounting of empire’s living textures may actually give a more grounded account of imperial power as well as the strategies of representation that have persistently masked its material articulations. To this end, I explore empire as a project in the government of species. Broadly, this idea refers to how interspecies relations and the public hopes and fears they generate shape the living form and affective lineaments of settler societies, in the process determining the possibilities and foreclosures of political life. In practice, the government of species has historically optimized and expanded some life forms (human or otherwise) due to biocapital investments in national, racial, class, and sex factors. Operating through interspecies assemblages known as bodies, such investments selectively modify and reproduce life forms and forms of life, extracting “the human” out of the planetary field of interspecies relation. Once securitized, this form is constantly under pressure from the unpredictable and inhuman risks of life in a world of ecological, economic, and political complexity. These forces in turn contribute to the ways publics experience and interpret their futures as more or less livable.

An account of the government of species thus explains that empire can be understood as a project in the management of affective relations—embodied forms of communication and sensation that may occur independently of or in tandem with sentient forms of thought and discourse. These affective relations cross the divisions of life and death, human and animal, media and bodies, and immune and environmental systems. In the process of forming the human out of cacophonous biosocial relations, empire often persists—even after the formal conclusion of colonial occupation or settlement—in part because it invests public hope in the management of bodily vulnerability and orients reproductive futures against horizons of impending risk, a phenomenon I call dread life. In such processes by which bodily vulnerability is transmuted into political urgency, techniques proliferate for managing the relations of populations and the living structures of species (human, animal, viral). As such, empire involves the control of life through accumulation of territory and capital, which may be securitized by activating life’s relational potential. Lauren Berlant describes a “lateral agency” that moves across bodies and populations rather than in the top-down fashion of sovereign power; it may, then, be possible to understand empire’s force of securitization not only through conventional dramas of domination and resistance, but rather through embodied processes of coasting, differentiating, adapting, withering, transition, and movement. These are processes that subtly determine how bodies take form, and to what extent they are able to reproduce themselves in space-time relation. They also more radically stretch the body beyond the organic lifetime and into evolutionary, environmental, and informational domains where life/death distinctions blur.

However, the intimate connection between the governmental imperatives to make live and to make die, which Jasbir Puar names “the bio-necro collaboration,” has long been obscured in social and political theories. It thus remains commonplace for biopolitical analyses to view power as either repressive or productive in essence. In his classic work on the topic, French philosopher and social theorist Michel Foucault argued that by the eighteenth century, a political form had emerged in Europe targeting the human as biological species as the central object of power. Power was no longer simply about the repressive force of the state and its controlling interests wielding the right to kill. Power was increasingly vested in the productive reshaping of the biological life of human organisms by institutions such as clinics, prisons, and asylums and their related forms of scientific knowledge; power meant letting live, albeit in constrained form. Foucault recognized the embedding of biopower across species, calling for a social history that incorporated “the evolution of relations between humanity, the bacillary or viral field, and the interventions of hygiene, medicine, and the different therapeutic techniques.” In the notes to his late lectures, he even speculated that neoliberalism involved a governmentality that can “act on the environment and systematically modify its variables.”

Foucault’s description of the rise of biopower is the inspiration for a number of studies in sociology and anthropology that assess new biopolitical shifts involving advanced biomedical technologies. Given that these biopolitical studies focus largely on the United States, western Europe, China, and India— states that have built biotechnology sectors as engines of unequal neoliberal growth—it is perhaps not surprising that a concomitant line of critique has emerged acknowledging vast and growing world sectors of biological and economic precarity. Building on a number of key postcolonial/feminist studies of the 1990s exploring Foucault’s theory beyond European borders, these necropolitical critiques announce that politics today often emerges as the specter of death. The world’s poor, as well as a growing “precariat” carved from shrinking national bourgeoisies, appear less often as the objects of technological uplift than as the human surplus of the political order of things, populations at risk for displacement, dispossession, captivity, and premature death. The precaritization of sweated labor, the subjection of agrarian populations to the twin scourges of neoliberal structural adjustment and environmental devastation, the proliferation of deterritorialized war and ethnic cleansing, and the growth of predatory industries and rents to recycle capital from surplus populations all reveal that those humans targeted for biopolitical optimization constitute a shrinking population who reproduce through the cannibalistic appropriation of life elsewhere. But necropower is not simply about the distribution of death; it is also about the accumulation of social or economic capital through death and precarity. For example, when suicide passes on social force through the deathly body, or when life insurance capitalizes death, death itself thus gives form to life.

#### Threats of economic collapse shuts down deliberation in favor of immediate response, creating a violent state of exception.

Hanan ‘10

Ph.D, Prof of Communication @ Temple (Joshua Stanley, “Managing the Meltdown Rhetorically: Economic Imaginaries and the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008”, dissertation The University of Texas at Austin)

By framing the proposed legislation in this particular light, Bush offers us a first example of how the neoliberal state of exception is manifested rhetorically in the sphere of policy. By describing the crisis as “extraordinary times” in need of “decisive action,” he is able to side step his administration’s problematic relationship to Wall Street and the present crisis. Since the economy is not operating normally but is instead in a state of disarray and chaos, the downturn must be addressed without normal argumentative debate. In his desire to postpone deliberation by emphasizing the exceptional nature of the crisis, Bush taps into a more general narrative that emerged during the creation and passage of EESA, namely ethical pragmatism. Like moral critique, ethical pragmatism deploys the state of exception enthymematically as a way of justifying EESA legislation. Unlike moral critique, however, ethical pragmatism links the exception to a completely different set of values. By bringing attention to temporary nature of the present situation, ethical pragmatism argues that deliberation and critique are the enemies. Since the Bush Administration is “working with Congress to address the root cause behind much of the instability in our markets,” this narrative contends the worst thing citizens can do right now is challenge the administration.304 The primary difference between these two rhetorical accounts can thus be located in the way they deploy the state of exception as an enthymeme to explain EESA and the government’s reaction to the present crisis. Whereas the moral critique implies that a state of exception has become a permanent practice under Bush, the latter tries to frame the state of exception as temporary action. Hence, insofar as the narrative of ethical pragmatism attempts to exempt itself from the problem by emphasizing authentic deliberation at a future point in time, it relies on a different model of the state of exception that is more justifiable. Turning now to our second policy artifact—that of Secretary Paulson—we see an additional rendering of ethical pragmatism. Delivered on September 23rd 2008 to the Senate Banking Committee, Paulson’s widely publicized address is particularly useful in illustrating how a temporary understanding of state of exception can be used as an enthymeme to circumvent moral critique.305By emphasizing the “urgent response” that the crisis demands, the former Goldman Sach’s CEO centers his argument on how EESA provides “market stability,” Organizing his narrative around a series of binaries, Paulson’s ethical pragmatism is predicated on the opposition between a healthy and sick economy. By arguing that “illiquid mortgage-related assets … are choking off the flow of credit which is so vitally important to our economy,” for example, Paulson renders the financial system a living entity that has been invaded by foreign agents.306 Through a viral process of multiplication, he illustrates how “[t]hese bad loans have created a chain reaction” that now threatens “the very health of our economy.”307In the same way that a virus can weaken a person’s entire immune system, Paulson wants his audience to see the economy as having been infected by a rapidly proliferating disease—one that must be eradicated quickly by experts, and without debate. By explaining the financial crisis through such metaphors, Paulson is able to argue that his legislation is aimed at excising these "troubled assets from the system.”308The measure is “designed for immediate implementation and [to] be sufficiently large to have maximum impact and restore market confidence.”309 Thus, by addressing the “underlying problem”—troubled assets that are dragging down the entire economy—he has devised an expert program to stabilize the financial system. This plan, while putting taxpayers on the line, will cost American families “far less than the alternative—a continuing series of financial institution failures and frozen credit markets unable to fund everyday needs and economic expansion.”310 It is at the end of Paulson’s speech, however, that we realize the primary goal of his narrative: the desire to frame EESA as a temporary state of exception. In spirit of the “bipartisan consensus for an urgent legislative solution,”311 Paulson argues that there is no time to deliberate and contest the parameters of this bill. Since this “troubled asset purchase program on its own is the single most effective thing we can do to … stimulate our economy,” we must trust Paulson’s authority as Treasury Secretary and pass the bill immediately.312 While it is true that “[w]hen we get through this difficult period…our next task must be to address the problems in our financial system through a reform program that fixes our outdated financial regulatory structure,” Paulson contends that “we must get through this period first.”313 Through his appeals to urgency and expedient action, Paulson’s narrative enthymematically invokes a seemingly temporary state of exception. Since the economy is sick and its pathogen is multiplying rapidly, debate and deliberation about whether EESA is the right form of interventionism must be postponed to a later point in time. While “[w]e must [eventually] have that critical debate” now is not the time to question the crisis of neoliberalism.314 As part of Bush’s executive branch we must trust Paulson when he says he has the “best interest of all Americans” in mind and not risk making the situation even worse. Despite residing in a different sphere of policy than Bush and Paulson, the third rhetor—Fed Chair Ben Bernanke—demonstrates how the narrative of ethical pragmatism can emerge in governmental avenues outside the Executive Branch. Delivered to multiple Congressional committees on September 24 and 25, 2008, Bernanke’s testimony represents perhaps the most explicit attempt to grapple with the contradiction between the Federal government's neoliberal history and its looming Keynesian intervention.315“Despite the efforts of the Federal Reserve, the …global financial markets remain under extraordinary stress," declares Bernanke, rationalizing why, in the case of the present downturn, the neoliberal privileging of monetary policy over fiscal policy will no longer suffice.316 Viewing capitalism through a rhetorical lens similar to that of Paulson, Bernanke describes how "stresses in financial markets have been high and have recently intensified significantly."317 As "rising mortgage delinquencies" spiral out of control and intersect other financial venues "the implications for the broader economy could be quite adverse."318 Bernanke thus declares that "[a]ction by the Congress is urgently required to stabilize the situation."319 If action is not taken immediately to avert the economy’s growing crisis, the situation may become even bleaker. Like Bush and Paulson, central to Bernanke's attitude toward EESA is the need for immediate action. While he acknowledges "the shortcomings and weaknesses of our financial markets and regulatory system" now is not the time to debate the policies underscoring the bill.320 The "development of a comprehensive proposal for reform would require careful and extensive analysis that would be difficult to compress into a short legislative timeframe now available."321 Bernanke thus believes that it "is essential to deal with the crisis at hand" and focus later on building a "stronger, more resilient, and better regulated financial system."322 While Bernanke believes the urgency of the situation is enough of a justification for passing EESA, he does have a response for those who may be critical of the bill’s interventionist tendencies: “Government assistance should be given with the greatest of reluctance,” adding that in the present case such attempts have already been exhausted.323Since the Federal Reserve already “attempted to identify private-sector approaches” but none were forthcoming, the government has no other choice but to bail out the financial sector. By rationalizing EESA as the only possible option, then, Bernanke's narrative of ethical pragmatism is meant to close off the possibility of dissent. For those that feel interventionism is a disgrace to free market capitalism, Bernanke has made it clear that "private-sector arrangements" were taken into account. On the other hand, for who those critique the government for "bailing out Wall Street," Bernanke's appeals imply that debate and deliberation will come at a later point in time. Thus through his stifling of opposition from all sides, Bernanke’s narrative of ethical pragmatism invokes the state of exception as the temporary justification for the government’s economic actions. The Exceptionality of Ethical Pragmatism Bush, Paulson and Bernanke all provide accounts that, while told in slightly different ways, use the strategy of ethical pragmatism to try to suspend critique and discussion. Whether emphasizing “extraordinary times,” “urgency,” or “lack of options,” Bush, Paulson, and Bernanke all invoke the state of exception as the enthymematic justification for their actions. The “exceptional” frame underscoring this series of arguments, then, offers an additional way to grasp why the dissenting narrative—moral critique—may have had so little impact on EESA’s legislation. By rendering of EESA as an emergency measure to save the economy, ethical pragmatism was able to defer debate. Moreover, since ethical pragmatism emerged from the very same sphere in which EESA was introduced—that of policy—it was able to supersede dissident narratives about the bill at an institutional level. Since the former, not the latter, narrative defined the parameters of the policy debate; ethical pragmatism had both a material and discursive advantage. Moral critique’s failure can thus be observed simultaneously in two different rhetorical/institutional contexts. In respect to its own rhetorical argument, moral critique’s use of the state of exception as an explanation for EESA’s passage negated its own critique by affirming that this technique of power does indeed exist. At the same time, through the narrative frame of ethical pragmatism, moral critique was deferred from the realm of policy. Since the “exceptionality” of the situation demanded a suspension of deliberation, it became justified to pass the bill without proper economic argument. We are thus left to conclude that the state of exception has both a discursive and extra-discursive reality since the institutional forms and

#### The aff’s investment in public health as a response to the threat of disease sanctions a more sinister form of biopolitical racism whereby “unhealthy” populations are subject to ethnic cleansing and state-sanctioned violence.

Elbe ‘5

[Stefan, international relations at the University of Sussex. 2005. “AIDS, Security, Biopolitics,” <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0047117805058532>] pat

Why does it matter that the securitization of HIV/AIDS is biopolitical? It matters because, their humanitarian appeals to ‘life’ and ‘health’ notwithstanding, biopolitical strategies have historically been Janus-faced. They have led to the construction of hospitals and the design of universal healthcare systems, but they have also led to the justification of eugenics and mass death. Some of those advancing the securitization of HIV/AIDS clearly do so in the hope that this will have important humanitarian benefits for persons living with HIV/AIDS around the world by bolstering international AIDS initiatives. Peter W. Singer argues that presenting HIV/AIDS as a security threat ‘strengthens the call for serious action against the menace of AIDS. It is not just a matter of altruism, but simple cold self-interest.’ Many policymakers agree, including the executive director of UNAIDS, who has similarly argued that framing HIV/AIDS as a security issue is not merely an academic exercise but ‘defines how we respond to the epidemic, how much is allocated to combating it, and what sectors of government are involved in the response’. Foucault’s historical analyses, however, point to the need for a greater degree of caution regarding these normative aspirations because biopolitical strategies have in the past also engendered serious dangers that continue to accompany recent efforts to think of security in terms of the health of populations.

One of these dangers is that the biopolitical imperative of optimizing the health of populations effectively constitutes disease – and by extension the diseased – as a social and political problem that needs to be addressed, but without specifying exactly how this problem should be dealt with. Unfortunately the creation of universal healthcare programmes to treat the ill is just as compatible with a biopolitical logic as is the purging of populations of the diseased by more sinister means, such as killing them or letting them gradually die. As counter-intuitive and ironic as it may seem, a biopolitical society based on the enhancement of ‘life’ and ‘health’ can still sanction and justify instances of mass death. The European era of biopower, after all, coincided with 20th-century political projects demanding the deaths of millions. Foucault later came to understand this bizarre confluence only on the basis of a new racism that biopolitical orders can give rise to. ‘Racism’, he contended from a biopolitical perspective, ‘is primarily a way of introducing a break into the domain of life that is under power’s control: the break between what must live and what must die.’ The reason biopolitical orders can still sanction mass death is because they can generate a powerful new form of racism that pits the ‘healthy’ members of the population against the ‘unhealthy’ who are deemed to sap the strength and vitality of the population as a whole. The underlying principle of this new biopolitical racism is thus not the primacy of cultural difference, as with many more traditional forms of racism, but rather the more subtle idea ‘that the death of others makes one biologically stronger insofar as one is a member of a race or a population’. The insistence on maximizing the health of populations can thus be dangerous for those who are deemed to be unhealthy.

The Nazi movement demonstrated the extreme ends to which this darker side of biopolitics can be taken when it carved up the European continent using the dubious criterion of ‘blood’ for deciding which populations could be usefully ‘Germanized’ and thus spared, and which ones would have to perish. It remains one of the most disconcerting testaments to the dangers of thinking security in biological terms, or on the basis of health and sickness. In Nazi Germany, moreover, this new biological racism was also projected internally to Jews who were no longer persecuted solely because of their Judaism, but also because their quasi-biologically defined ‘Jewishness’ was deemed to be undermining the purity and strength of the Aryan race. Enhancing the strength and vitality of the latter, by this logic, required the elimination of the former. In some ways this biopolitical racism is even more pernicious than a culturally defined one because, as Hannah Arendt once pointed out in her memorable phrase, whereas in the past ‘Jews had been able to escape from Judaism into conversion; from Jewishness there was no escape’. A biopolitical society aimed at promoting ‘life’ and ‘health’ still has to make decisions about whose life is worth preserving and whose life will be allowed to perish, and the function of racism in a biopolitical age is to make this very distinction not necessarily according to the principle of cultural difference, but according to the maxim of whose survival will maximize the strength and wellbeing of the population, and whose will undermine it.

By way of extension, the concomitant danger with the securitization of HIV/AIDS as a biopolitical strategy is that while it clearly dramatizes the need to address the problem of disease at the global level, it does so without specifying exactly how this is to be achieved. The securitization of HIV/AIDS may increase attention and resources for charitable and humanitarian global AIDS initiatives, and may lead to more universal access to treatment, but these, alas, are not the only outcomes that would be consistent with a security approach to the pandemic. Indeed, there are at least three more disconcerting ways in which the securitization of HIV/AIDS could – at least hypothetically – follow the path of earlier biopolitical strategies and give rise to a new biopolitical racism between the ‘healthy’ (HIV-negative) and the ‘unhealthy’ (HIV-positive) segments of a population.

#### This culminates in a form of dread life which organizes and deploys disaster biopolitics to justify constant interventionism, health apartheid, and antagonistic subject formation that turns and outweighs the aff.

Debrix ‘18  
(François Debrix, Professor and director of ASPECT, College of Liberal Arts and Human Sciences, Virginia Tech. “End piece: Dealing with disastrous life” in Biopolitical Disaster. Ed. Jennifer L. Lawrence and Sarah Marie Wiebe. 2018 Routledge forthcoming. cVs) rc/pat

Disastrous biopolitics makes possible dread life. I borrow the term “dread life” from Neel Ahuja’s recent study of the racialized dimensions of the governance and management of anxiety, particularly with regards to the fear of infectious diseases (Ahuja 2016). Dread life is a life that has grown accustomed to and has placed its trust in governance discourses that promise that life can be cared for or preserved through a series of social, political, economic, cultural, or technological interventions at the level of collective and individual bodies. Dread life is a life that has become reliant on discourses and representations of crises, looming dangers, impending catastrophes, and ongoing disasters (whether they are visible or not). As Ahuja puts it, dread life emerges as a result of discourses and representations “that (1) posit the environment as an unruly site of perpetual risk, and (2) shore up an imperial optimism in the force of the state that tends to far outstrip its actual ability to control [the crisis]” (Ahuja 2016: 9). Discourses that produce dread life abound because they keep the crisis or the disaster alive, productive, and always active. Through these discourses, the presence of dread life is a constant reminder of the fact that humanity remains under the spell cast by a bad or evil star, that, as fate has it, disasters will always be around. But, just as crucially, dread life also enables the production of an array of configurations, objects, and objectives, and subjectivities that help to make disastrous biopolitics into a set of tangible, material, and generable operations on a day-to-day basis. Thus, dread life breaks down into a series of subsets of disastrous life and living conditions. Depending on how, where, or when the crisis or disaster is mobilized (as many of this volume’s chapters have detailed), dread life can morph into resilient life, or into triaged life, or perhaps into deracinated life, or possibly into toxic life, or sometimes into emergency life, or maybe into a life suspended between disease and death. Any instance whereby dread life is placed in front of “an unruly site of perpetual risk” (as Ahuja puts it) is potentially productive of one of these (and other) subsets of disastrous life/living. Moreover, for any subset of dread life one finds a corresponding modality of governance/governmentality best suited (or so we are told) to manage the crisis or the disaster and, as such, most apt at keeping alive as dread. Thus, for example, resilient life calls for, justifies, and makes effective operations, technologies, and strategies of resilience. Secure life instantiates and authorizes security practices, policies, and politics. Toxic life requires responses in the form of environmentally conscious purifying or cleansing remedies that typically mobilize various layers of scientific expertise. Triaged life often calls for and normalizes clinical and administrative gazes that can sort bodies in order to repurpose them for upcoming disaster challenges (wars, future diseases, weather emergencies, etc.) Dread life is also productive of a range of subjects and subjectivities in charge of determining which types of interventions at the level of populations and bodies are more likely to cope with the disaster of deciding how the governing strategy that has been adopted (resilience, sustainable development, security, etc.) is to be deployed. This is precisely the point where what Ahuja calls “the optimism in the force of the state” (2016:9) is maximized. The state or, better yet, all sorts of agents/agencies in charge of the governance of dread life both depend on and become a function of the production of multiple instances of dread life so that they can serve as the ultimate guarantors of the safety, security, resilience, or sustainability of life itself (even if, more often than not, such a maintenance of dread life implies the culling of other bodies whose lives are not even worthy of being subjected to dread). Thus, as most of this volume’s chapters have revealed, one cannot think life under conditions of disaster without accounting for a series of governing or managing agents/agencies (the state, in some cases, but also various neoliberal assemblages such as corporations, environmental organizations, militaries and other security and enforcement agents, laws, policies and policy statements, extractive technologies, regimes of health, communities of experts, scientific pronouncements, etc.) that come together to make sure that dread life will be maintained as dread life and that disasters will be kept as productive discursive modalities for more dread life (and disasters) to come. This is not necessarily to say that these agents or agencies of governance of dread life are the instigators of dread life or of disastrous biopolitics. Rather, it is to say that these agents/agencies of biopolitical governance are active assemblages that are produced by discourses of disaster maintenance and by the need created in these discourses for life to remain tethered to disaster. Yet, these active assemblages of productive governance of dread life through disaster management display an actancy (through their active/creative performances) that enables discourses of disastrous biopolitics to be reproduced, re-imagined, or redeployed.

#### The alternative is autoaesthetics – liberal biopolitics is a form of resilient living that subverts human potential into endless dangers to be secured – voting negative reintroduces death to the question of life – ask yourself, what would it mean to have a death well lived?

Evans and Reid ‘14

[Brad Evans, International Relations at the University of Bristol, and Julian Reid, International Relations at University of London. 2014. “Resilient Life”] pat – DM me for the PDF

Even through a brief social detour on fire, however, we can see how the continual framing of life in terms of its biological vulnerability has a more contested history. Indeed, even though the compulsion to view life biologically developed to be one of the defining features of modernity, throughout this period there was nevertheless some belief that the subject was able to secure itself from the problems of the world. This was backed up by the proliferation of various myths about belonging that were central to the creation of political communities. Liberalism, in contrast, operates as if it is ‘limitless’. Its reach, growth and development demand more, and more, and more. However, instead of relating this to a new-found metaphysical awakening that allows us to think that there is more to life than its biological endowment, contemporary liberal biopolitics turns infinite potentiality into a source of limitless endangerment such that all there is to think about is the sheer necessity and survivability of things. In this sense, it is more proper to describe liberal biopolitics as limitless. For rather than taking the open horizon as a space for the infinitely possible, everything is internalized such that it is haunted by whatever remains irreducible to its current sensibility. This inevitably brings us to the vexed question of a death well lived.

We don’t need grand theorizing to make the point that mediations on death have a profound impact upon the way we live. Anybody who has known a person with a terminal illness and becomes anxiously consumed with the prospect of dying will appreciate how the thought and presence of death effectively stops them living. They cannot live because the very uncertainties (physical and intellectual) presented by the mere thought of death are a burden that proves too difficult to carry. Hence, working in an opposite direction to Heidegger’s much debated claim that the ‘absolute impossibility’ of thinking about death constitutes the very possibility of being, the possibility of its occurrence is sufficient to instill what in fact is less a fear of death but more a fear of living. But we cannot simply stop there. As we have suggested, what makes the art of living so dangerously fascinating today is that it requires us to live through the source of our endangerment. Trauma and anxiety as such become our weapons, as vulnerability is amplified and played back to us with increasing frequency to their point of normalization. The political significance of this should not be underestimated.

Our argument is that the political debasement of the subject through strategies of resilience more than puts the very question of death into question by removing it from our critical gaze. In doing so, it represents nothing short of a profound assault on our ability to think metaphysically. This in turn represents a direct attack upon our abilities to transform the world beyond the catastrophic condition in which we are now immersed. After all, how can we even conceive of different worlds if we cannot come to terms with the death and extinction of this one? Resilience as such is what we may term a ‘lethal ecology of reasoning’, for in taking hold and seeking to intervene in all the elements upon which life is said to depend, it puts the living on a permanent life support system that is hard, soft and virtually wired into the most insecure of social fabrics to the evacuation of all possible alternative outcomes. To open, then, a much debated but still yet to be resolved conflict in the history of political and philosophical thought, we maintain that if the biopoliticization of life represents the triumph of techne over poiesis, and if this very biopoliticization today thrives on the technical production of vulnerable subjects which learn to accept that fate, there is a need to resurrect with confidence the idea that what remains irreducible to life can be the starting point for thinking about a more poetic alternative art for living. As Peter Sloterdijk writes on the all too gradual demise of metaphysics:

Ever since the end of the eighteenth century, this has become a twilight zone where it was also possible to see the growth of nihilism, and it was precisely because there that art began to assume an enormous importance, and precisely because art makes it clear that it has a non-nihilistic way of coming to terms with the fact that we ourselves are responsible for the creation of what we think of as the essential. Art defends the truth of life against flat empiricism and deadly positivism, which are no longer capable of an awareness of anything more than the facts and which are therefore incapable of culling the energy to create new inter-relationships of vital or living forces.

Life as a Work of Art

So where does this leave us in our attempts to move beyond the resilient subject? How may we revitalize the very meaning of the political out of the torment of its catastrophic condition? What is further required so that post-biopolitical forms of living may be entertained? How, in other words, may we resurrect with affirmative vigour Nietzsche’s delightful and no less poignant provocation that life itself may become a work of art? We are yet to truly grasp the magnificence of Nietzsche’s work as it may play out in the field of politics. While the stylistic artistry of his particular interventions largely remained tied to the literary field, as witnessed most notably in the figure of Zarathustra, he nevertheless demanded with affirmative vigour rejoicing in the fullness of an experience that embraces the poetic and the aesthetic. Not only does this stake a claim to the creative power of transformation, it also gives over to life the political possibility that its aesthetical qualities may have both an affirmative and resistive potential to challenge dogmatic images of thought. Never has this calling seemed more pressing.

What is at stake here is not simply the ‘aesthetics of existence’ wherein life conforms to some glorious representational standard of beautification. Such constructed imaginaries always grey the magnificent colours of the earth. What is demanded is the formulation of alternative modes of existence that are not afraid to have reasons to believe in this world. As Deleuze succinctly put it, ‘In every modernity and every novelty, you find conformity and creativity; an insipid conformity, but also “a little new music”; something in conformity with the time, but also something untimely – separating the one from the other is the task of those who know how to love, the real destroyers and creators of our day’. Deleuze invariably provides a purposeful nod here to the Nietzchean idea of a poetic subject:

that he himself is really the poet who keeps creating this life... as a poet, he certainly has vis contemplative and the ability to look back upon his work, but at the same time also and above all vis creative, which the active human being lacks... We who think and feel at the same time are those who really continually fashion something that had not been there before: the whole eternally growing world of valuations, colours, accents, perspectives, scales, affirmations, and negations’.

What Nietzsche acknowledges in this passage is that ‘aestheticizing of life entails its artful, stylish disappropriation, a free fall into metaphor and un-self-ness. Autoaesthetics, the artful and chimerical fabrication of the (un)self, means development of strategies of self-mastery, power over one’s art and production, a convergence with self at the locus of the creation (and interpretation) of art’. This was not lost on Foucault, who was also of the opinion that ‘from the idea that the self is not given to us, I think that there is only one practical consequence: we have to create ourselves as a work of art... We should not have to refer the creative activity of somebody to the kind of relation he has to himself, but should relate the kind of relation one has to oneself to a creative activity’.

We may argue that conceiving of life as a work of art stands in direct contrast to the nihilism, indifference and alienation of the catastrophic subject. It resurrects Nietzsche’s claim about the death of God in a way that seeks to find new forms of meaning to life that are necessarily revelatory in nature. And it challenges head on the positivist conceit that a meaningful life can only be progressively reasoned on account of its biopolitical existence. This demands an account of the subject that is more than a historical unfolding of survivability. As Simon Critchley puts it, by drawing upon one of his arch provocateurs, Oscar Wilde, ‘When I think of religion at all, I feel as if I would like to found an order for those who cannot believe: the Confraternity of the Faithless, one might call it, where on an altar, on which no taper burned, a priest, in whose heart peace had no dwelling, might celebrate with unblessed bread and a chalice of empty wine. Everything to be true must become a religion. And agnosticism should have its ritual no less than faith’. This acceptance that there is something to existence that is less explicable to the prevailing logics of secularity, as Todd May explains, requires a more nuanced understanding of philosophical enquiry that moves away from ‘thinking metaphysics’ and all its ways of stupefying and rendering incapable the subject, towards questioning how we might live differently:

We don’t want to reduce it simply to a morally good life, as though a meaningful life were simply an unalienated moral life. Meaningful lives are not so limited and are sometimes more vexed. So we must ask what lends objective worthiness to a life outside the moral realm. Here is where the narrative character of a life comes into play... There are narrative values expressed by human lives that are not reducible to moral values. Nor are they reducible to happiness; they are not simply matters of subjective feeling. Narrative values are not felt, they are lived. And they constitute their own arena of value, one that has not been generally recognized by philosophers who reflect on life’s meaningfulness.

There are a number of qualifications that need to be made here. We cannot be content to see artistic production as something which fosters a negative response to the realities of the world. Creativity must precede any account of the dialectic. Nor must we confuse the art of living with the conforming arts that merely perform a well-rehearsed dance. Life as a work of art is necessarily affirmative in a sense that it appeals to the yet to be revealed. It has no taste for the simulacrum. Neither is it content to accept the need to live dangerously such that we are forced to live with déjà vu all over again. The self is to be actively produced as a non-stable subject that does not seek to emulate some normative standard, but instead forcefully challenges the vulnerable ground which it is said to occupy. So believing in the irreducibility of existence? Certainly. Hostile to all reactive and enslaving forces? Undeniably. Unapologetic in willing the event of its ongoing emergent existence? Steadfast. Openly committed to the affirmative potential of the autonomous subject? Categorically. A believer in a more affective notion of history that is forever in the making? Unreservedly. A student of the eschatological? Earnestly. Appreciative of the transformative political power of fabulation? Truly. A lover of the poetic over the mathematical? Wholeheartedly. Welcoming our coming into the world? Without reservation.

#### The Role of the Judge is to give up hope.

#### Hopeful affirmation warps within the biomedical sphere to structure policy toward the governance of difference – voting neg refuses to play into the affirmation of life for the sake of it

Ehlers and Krupar ‘14

[Nadine Ehlers, Women's and Gender Studies at Georgetown University, and Shiloh Krupar, Geographer and Provost's Distinguished Associate Professor at Georgetown University. Fall 2014. “Hope Logics: Biomedicine, Affective Conventions of Cancer, and the Governing of Biocitizenry,” <https://ro.uow.edu.au/lhapapers/1849/>] pat

Hope carries utopian promise; it offers possibilities of a “not yet,” a “to come,” and an imagining of life otherwise. In contemporary critique, hope has often been deployed as the means to effect radical social transformation and the reinvention of contemporary reality. It is seen as a way of reaching beyond the stymied conditions of today by orienting toward the horizon of an alternative tomorrow. Hope is invoked as an incantation, under conditions of uncertainty; it is an insistent affirmation of the ability to effect change. This change can be imagined politically and economically, psychologically and corporeally. Indeed, hope is ubiquitous in contemporary culture, from US President Barack Obama’s political memoir—The Audacity of Hope—to international food drives—the “Convoy of Hope”4—to biomedical understandings of illness and health. As in the above quotation from “Banners of Hope” (an online outreach for children with life-threatening diseases), hope is the panacea for chronic or terminal illness. Hope might be seen to operate as a logic within the biomedical arena, one that structures subjectivities, social realities, and corporeal states. It incites particular behaviors; it induces certain forms of community and belonging; it seduces us to believe in the possible transcendence of bodily limits and/or temporal constraints. As we explore in this essay, hope is the guiding principle of biomedicine’s telos toward the affirmation of life.

This essay argues that hope is conventionalized in particular ways that work in the service of biopolitical imperatives to govern life, and to secure, optimize, and speculate on that life. We orient the investigation toward the regulation of affect within the US biomedical arena to consider how affective conventions—that is, the perceptual, emotional, and corporeal modes of managing and responding to events—of hope perform a governing function. In relation to illness, for example, they condition responses to bodily vulnerability and uncertainty, manage the present for the future, and relentlessly affirm life. We ground these broad claims in an examination of the dominant affective conventions of hope at work in cancer activism and treatment. Documenting the ways in which hope is increasingly militarized, commodified, routinized, and delimited in the neoliberal era, the essay explores how such conventions of hope are actively made and maintained through aspects of cancer-related biomedical encounters—what we call infrastructures of care and bioethics of faith within oncology. The essay concludes by considering alternative hope tactics—“hoping for other things”—in relation to cancer.

## Case

### 1NC – aids

#### Squo solves impacts of HIV/AIDs

Granich et al 17 (*Reuben Granich* International Association of Providers of AIDS Care, Washington DC 20036, USA; *Brian Williams* South African Centre for Epidemiological Modelling and Analysis, Stellenbosch University, South Africa; *Julio Montaner* British Columbia Centre for Excellence in HIV/AIDS, BC, Canada; *José M Zuniga* International Association of Providers of AIDS Care, Washington DC 20036, USA. The Lancet. Vol. 390 Iss. 10092 Art. 22-28 “90-90-90 and ending AIDS: necessary and feasible” July 2017. <https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(17)31872-X>) ME.

More than three decades into the global HIV pandemic, there are still 2·1 million new infections each year and 36·7 million people are living with HIV.1 By mid-2016, 18·2 million people were on antiretroviral treatment—about 50% of people living with HIV.1 Yet in 2015, 15 million people living with HIV were estimated to be unaware of their status and 1·1 million died of AIDS-related complications, despite the fact that US$19 billion was invested in HIV in low-income and middle-income countries.1 Although its history is complex, the HIV pandemic can be characterised by three phases: devastation; discovery and action; and ending AIDS (figure). The initial response was defined by overwhelming devastation of marginalised individuals and their communities, the root causes of which were widespread denial, ignorance, stigma, fear, and neglect. It was a time when affected communities and beleaguered health-care providers struggled in isolation to minister to the sick and dying while governments, experts, and other authorities exercised little if any political will to address a burgeoning health crisis or exacerbated the crisis through their policies.4 Out of this suffering emerged a determined community response that demanded leadership and resources from governments. The discovery and action phase resulted from the growing community, scientific, and political response that unravelled the secrets of HIV. Despite remarkable progress, the accepted wisdom was that ending AIDS was not feasible without a vaccine or cure. Without effective treatment, the focus was on prophylaxis and treatment of opportunistic illnesses, palliative care, ensuring human rights, tackling stigma and discrimination, community support for people with HIV, and prevention methods.5 The development of life-saving, triple drug therapy in 1996 gave hope along with the realisation that most of the people infected with HIV lived in low-income countries and it was morally unacceptable to deny them treatment.6,7 The creation of the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria in 2001 and the US President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) in 2003, the Millennium Development Goals, and the launch of WHO's 3 by 5 initiative, signalled the translation of discovery to action. In the face of considerable scepticism, antiretroviral treatment was delivered at scale and it was subsequently shown that ART leads to a near normal disease-free lifespan and virtually eliminates the risk of HIV transmission.8 By 2006, the old “test and wait” strategy of withholding antiretroviral treatment until people's immune systems were severely compromised no longer made sense.9 These and other developments provided the foundation for the next phase of the HIV pandemic—ending AIDS. = This phase reflects the political shift from a struggle to contain the epidemic to the right to universal HIV treatment as part of a winnable public health battle—a goal embodied in Sustainable Development Goal 3 (table). Ending AIDS means providing treatment for at least 35 million people living with HIV for the rest of their lives or until a cure is developed. Elimination is measured as incidence of less than one case per 1000 population per year.11 HIV eradication (zero global incidence) is not feasible without deploying a cure or vaccine alongside treatment. Other prevention interventions—eg, behavioural change, pre-exposure prophylaxis, condoms, voluntary male circumcision, opioid substitution therapy, and needle and syringe programmes—will be necessary, but not sufficient on their own without universal treatment, to end AIDS in most settings. UNAIDS, PEPFAR, national governments, and many cities have adopted the 90-90-90 target by 2020. This target calls for 90% of people living with HIV diagnosed, 90% of people diagnosed on sustained antiretroviral treatment, and, of those, 90% virally suppressed by 2020.12 The 90-90-90 and the subsequent 95-95-95 by 2030 targets translate into 73% and 86% of people living with HIV being virally suppressed on antiretroviral treatment, respectively.12 In late 2015, after the example of the USA (2012), France (2013), Brazil (2013), and seven other countries, WHO recommended starting antiretroviral treatment irrespective of CD4 cell count.13 As of July, 2017, 51 countries (73% of global HIV burden) have published test and treat guidelines.13 As part of the 90-90-90 efforts, the Fast-Track Cities Initiative is a partnership between the City of Paris, International Association of Providers of AIDS Care (IAPAC), UNAIDS, and the UN Human Settlements Programme, in collaboration with other stakeholders, and includes more than 75 cities focused on achieving the 90-90-90 target and zero stigma through the acceleration of local AIDS responses.14 Reaching the end of AIDS, as defined by low levels of HIV incidence and AIDS-related mortality, has already been achieved in some settings. However, to end AIDS globally will require continued effort and a near doubling of the number of people on treatment. There remains controversy about the feasibility, cost, and epidemiological impact of the 90-90-90 target, with calls for increased prioritisation of other HIV prevention methods15 and other appeals for a 30% increase in annual funding to end AIDS as a public health threat by 2030.16 Using a conservative $300 per person for antiretroviral treatment would result in an $11 billion annual price tag for 36·7 million people living with HIV—far below the current $19 billion annually available resources and the UNAIDS $26·1 billion resource needs estimate.16 Although the true cost is unknown, resources, time, and targets will probably stay fairly fixed and needs projections should explore a more efficient, evidence-based service delivery model that prioritises achieving the 90-90-90 target. Four major innovations will accelerate progress towards 90-90-90 and the end of AIDS. First, reliable, easy-to-use, rapid HIV self-tests that, like pregnancy self-tests a generation ago, will democratise access to HIV testing.17 Second, safer and more effective integrase inhibitors-based antiretroviral treatment, together with same-day offer of treatment and reduction of follow-up clinic visits, will increase efficiency of antiretroviral treatment programmes;18 over time long-acting injectable antiretroviral treatment might be able to further accelerate this trend.19 Third, comprehensive integrated community HIV service delivery models for HIV and other health services will help reach the 90-90-90 target and beyond with the potential added value of destigmatising both HIV and HIV services. Fourth, the information technology revolution, mobile computing, crowd-sourcing, and cloud-based monitoring and evaluation software are already changing the way we do public health by providing near real-time information on programme progress, and more open data and transparency for improved community engagement.

#### No HIV impact---it’s declining and countermeasures check

CDC 17 [Center for Disease Control and Prevention, 2/14/2017, “New HIV Infections Drop 18 Percent in Six Years”, <https://www.hiv.gov/blog/new-hiv-infections-drop-18-percent-in-six-years>] AMarb

Decline signals HIV prevention and treatment efforts in the U.S. are paying off, but not all communities are seeing the same progress. The number of annual HIV infections in the United States fell 18 percent between 2008 and 2014 — from an estimated 45,700 to 37,600 — according to new estimates from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) presented today at the Conference on Retroviruses and Opportunistic Infections (CROI) in Seattle. Progress, however, was not the same among all populations or areas of the country. “The nation’s new high-impact approach to HIV prevention is working. We have the tools, and we are using them to bring us closer to a future free of HIV,” said Jonathan Mermin, M.D., director of CDC’s National Center for HIV/AIDS, Viral Hepatitis, STD, and TB Prevention. “These data reflect the success of collective prevention and treatment efforts at national, state and local levels. We must ensure the interventions that work reach those who need them most.” The most recent analysis of the number of new HIV infections estimated to occur each year in the U.S. provides a sign of progress in HIV prevention. In addition to the national decline, a new CDC analysis also examined trends by transmission route from 2008 to 2014 and found annual HIV infections dropped: 56 percent among people who inject drugs (from 3,900 to 1,700); 36 percent among heterosexuals (from 13,400 to 8,600); 18 percent among young gay and bisexual males ages 13 to 24 (from 9,400 to 7,700); 18 percent among white gay and bisexual males (from 9,000 to 7,400); And substantially in some states and Washington, D.C. — Washington, D.C. (dropping 10 percent each year over the six-year period); Maryland (down about 8 percent annually); Pennsylvania (down about 7 percent annually); Georgia (down about 6 percent annually); New York and North Carolina (both down about 5 percent annually); Illinois (down about 4 percent annually); and Texas (down about 2 percent annually). Furthermore, CDC researchers did not find any increases in annual HIV infections in the 35 states and Washington, D.C., where annual HIV infections could be estimated — they decreased or remained stable in all of those areas. CDC researchers believe the declines in annual HIV infections are due, in large part, to efforts to increase the number of people living with HIV who know their HIV status and are virally suppressed — meaning their HIV infection is under control through effective treatment. This is a top public health priority. Studies have shown that, in addition to improving the health of people living with HIV, early treatment with antiretroviral medications dramatically reduces a person’s risk of transmitting the virus to others. Increases in the use of pre-exposure prophylaxis, or PrEP, may also have played a role in preventing new infections in recent years. CDC issued interim clinical guidelines in 2012 for PrEP, a pill that people who do not have HIV can take daily to reduce their risk of infection from sex by more than 90 percent. The FDA approved PrEP for HIV prevention in 2012. “Maximizing the power of these new prevention tools in conjunction with testing and education efforts, offers the hope of ending the HIV epidemic in this nation,” said Eugene McCray, M.D., director of CDC’s Division of HIV/AIDS Prevention. “Science has shown us the power of HIV treatment medicines in benefitting people with and without HIV.”

#### No chance it causes extinction

Doherty 13 – Chairman of the Department of Immunology at St. Jude’s Children’s Research Hospital, and a Laureate Professor of Microbiology and Immunology at the University of Melbourne; received the Nobel Prize in Physiology [Peter C., 2013, *Pandemics What Everyone Needs to Know*, Chapter 8: HIV/AIDs, pg 139, Oxford University Press] AMarb

Could AIDS blow up in some way to cause an even bigger problem?

New variants of the AIDS virus emerge constantly, and it is now well established that people can be infected from the outset with more than one strain. In addition, there is evidence that super-infection with novel HIV strains can occur in those who are already HIV positive. Despite that, even if a totally new sexually transmitted human retrovirus came onto the scene, there’s no particular reason to think that it would cause more difficulties than the HIV types that are currently circulating. The great majority of the human family remain uninfected. Most are safe because they do not inject drugs, are celibate, or are in stable sexual relationships with trusted partners. For those who will take risks, it seems that downing an anti-retroviral drug prior to sexual activity may provide a good measure of protection. So long as those behavior patterns persist, our species is in no danger of being wiped out by this disease.

### Heg!

#### Alliances create commitment traps and incentivize probing – that causes entanglement and war

O’Hanlon 19

Michael E. O’Hanlon, a senior fellow, and director of research, in Foreign Policy at the Brookings Institution, where he specializes in U.S. defense strategy, the use of military force, and American national security policy, “The Senkaku paradox: Preparing for conflict with the great powers,” Brookings Institute, May 2, 2019, <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2019/05/02/the-senkaku-paradox-preparing-for-conflict-with-the-great-powers/>

However, what about smaller efforts to nibble away at the existing world order that Beijing and Moscow often find objectionable? What if China decided to land forces on one of the eight Senkaku/Diaoyu islands in the East China Sea?∂ These remote rocks are claimed by both Japan and China, uninhabited and effectively worthless except for surrounding fishing waters, but they are covered by the U.S.-Japan security treaty, as President Obama and Secretary Mattis have both publicly reaffirmed in recent years.∂ Or, what if Russia decided to fabricate a “threat” to native Russian speakers in a small town in eastern Estonia or Latvia to create a pretext for “little green men” to swoop in (perhaps bloodlessly) to save the day? Scenarios involving the Philippines or other countries can be imagined, too.∂ Why would Moscow or Beijing consider such actions? China or Russia might like the idea of sowing their hegemonic oats and getting back at neighbors they have not forgiven for past events.∂ But Moscow’s or Beijing’s real purpose might be to weaken American alliance systems, and with them the U.S.-led global order, so as to increase its own power and dominance, especially in regions near its borders.∂ For example, a Russian grab of just one small Baltic town could be expected to throw the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) alliance into existential crisis.∂ Some member nations would likely seek nonmilitary solutions to the threat, whereas others might favor a prompt military response—with the ensuing debate casting into doubt the whole purpose of the alliance. ∂ The state of military technology and expected trends in future innovation compound the problem. Deployment of large U.S.-led military force packages into the lion’s den near China’s coasts or into the Baltic regions of Europe near Russia is becoming a harder proposition to entertain.T∂ The spread of the type of precision technology that the United States once effectively monopolized accounts for much of the reason why. The problem is exacerbated by other new or imminent weapons:∂ miniaturized robotics that function as sensors or even weapons, individually or in swarms;∂ small satellites that could function as clandestine space mines against larger satellites;∂ homing anti-ship missiles and various types of superfast hypersonic missiles in general; and∂ threats to computer systems from both traditional human-generated hacking and artificial intelligence (AI)-generated algorithms.∂ No mid-sized U.S. defense buildup can likely reverse these dynamics.∂ A scenario of the type sketched above would create a huge dilemma for the United States and allies—a situation I call the “Senkaku Paradox.” Mutual-defense treaty commitments under Article V of both the NATO and U.S.-Japan treaties would appear to commit Washington to defend or liberate such allied territory.∂ Yet, that could lead to direct war with a nuclear-armed great power over rather insignificant stakes. A large-scale U.S. and allied response could seem massively disproportionate. But a non-response would be unacceptable and invite further aggression.

#### Data disproves heg impacts

Peace is not because of the U.S. – only logical explanation is states want peace – the fact there is peace without hegemony proves other factors outweigh – empirics only prove our claim

Theoretically if other people wanted war – us couldn’t stop them, thus people just don’t want war

There is peace where the u.s. isn’t which means there is obvi something else at play

Even when hegemony decreased, war still decreased which means that they’re not related

Fettweis 10 – Professor of national security affairs @ U.S. Naval War College (Chris, Georgetown University Press, “Dangerous times?: the international politics of great power peace” Google Books) Jacome

Simply stated, the hegemonic stability theory proposes that international peace is only possible when there is one country strong enough to make and enforce a set of rules. At the height of Pax Romana between 27 BC and 180 AD, for example, Rome was able to bring unprecedented peace and security to the Mediterranean. The Pax Britannica of the nineteenth century brought a level of stability to the high seas. Perhaps the current era is peaceful because the United States has established a de facto Pax Americana where no power is strong enough to challenge its dominance, and because it has established a set of rules that a generally in the interests of all countries to follow. Without a benevolent hegemony, some strategists fear, instability may break out around the globe. Unchecked conflicts could cause humanitarian disaster and, in today’s interconnected world economic turmoil that would ripple throughout global financial markets. If the United States were to abandon its commitments abroad, argued Art, the world would “become a more dangerous place” and, sooner or later, that would “rebound to America’s detriment.” If the massive spending that the United States engages in actually produces stability in the international political and economic systems, then perhaps internationalism is worthwhile. There are good theoretical and empirical reasons, however, the belief that U.S. hegemony is not the primary cause of the current era of stability. First of all, the hegemonic stability argument overstates the role that the United States plays in the system. No country is strong enough to police the world on its own. The only way there can be stability in the community of great powers is if self-policing occurs, ifs states have decided that their interest are served by peace. If no pacific normative shift had occurred among the great powers that was filtering down through the system, then no amount of international constabulary work by the United States could maintain stability. Likewise, if it is true that such a shift has occurred, then most of what the hegemon spends to bring stability would be wasted. The 5 percent of the world’s population that live in the United States simple could not force peace upon an unwilling 95. At the risk of beating the metaphor to death, the United States may be patrolling a neighborhood that has already rid itself of crime. Stability and unipolarity may be simply coincidental. In order for U.S. hegemony to be the reason for global stability, the rest of the world would have to expect reward for good behavior and fear punishment for bad. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has not always proven to be especially eager to engage in humanitarian interventions abroad. Even rather incontrovertible evidence of genocide has not been sufficient to inspire action. Hegemonic stability can only take credit for influence those decisions that would have ended in war without the presence, whether physical or psychological, of the United States. Ethiopia and Eritrea are hardly the only states that could go to war without the slightest threat of U.S. intervention. Since most of the world today is free to fight without U.S. involvement, something else must be at work. Stability exists in many places where no hegemony is present. Second, the limited empirical evidence we have suggests that there is little connection between the relative level of U.S. activism and international stability. During the 1990s the United States cut back on its defense spending fairly substantially, By 1998 the United States was spending $100 billion less on defense in real terms than it had in 1990. To internationalists, defense hawks, and other believers in hegemonic stability this irresponsible "peace dividend" endangered both national and global security "No serious analyst of American military capabilities," argued Kristol and Kagan, "doubts that the defense budget has been cut much too far to meet Americas responsibilities to itself and to world peace."" If the pacific trends were due not to U.S. hegemony but a strengthening norm against interstate war, however, one would not have expected an increase in global instability and violence. The verdict from the past two decades is fairly plain: The world grew more peaceful while the United States cut its forces.

## Terror

#### Risk of nuclear terror is exaggerated

Weiss 15 (Leonard, visiting scholar at Stanford University’s Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC) and a national advisory board member of the Center for Arms control and Non-Proliferation in Washington, DC, "On Fear and Nuclear Terrorism,") //BS

While fear of nuclear weapons is rational, its extension to terrorism has been a vehicle for fear-mongering that is unjustified by available data. Some writers have recognized this lack of data on the subject,2 and their works have started a lively debate, with pushback by proponents of the more conventional alarmist view (see Mowatt-Larssen, 2010). This debate on nuclear terrorism tends to distract from events that raise the risk of nuclear war, the consequences of which would far exceed the results of terrorist attacks. And the historical record shows that the war risk is real. Despite the development and deployment of command-and-control systems in all nations with nuclear weapons (some more sophisticated than others), the Cuban Missile Crisis demonstrated that miscalculation, misinterpretation, and misinformation could lead to a “close call” regarding nuclear war, and that the possibility of a war being launched under conditions of confrontation cannot be dismissed. Accordingly, most analysts believe that reducing the motivation of non-weapon states to acquire nuclear weapons and increasing the motivation of weapon states to reduce and eliminate their nuclear arsenals is a worthwhile ongoing goal. Achieving this goal has been helped by a number of cases in which countries have halted nuclear weapon programs or activities, or dismantled weapons in their possession.3 In these cases, the calculus dictated that security would be enhanced by giving up nuclear weapons, thus reducing the likelihood of becoming a target of another country’s nukes or motivating a rival to acquire such weapons. If the fear of nuclear war has thus had some positive effects, the fear of nuclear terrorism has had mainly negative effects on the lives of millions of people around the world, including in the United States, and even affects negatively the prospects for a more peaceful world. Although there has been much commentary on the interest that Osama bin Laden, when he was alive, reportedly expressed in obtaining nuclear weapons (see Mowatt-Larssen, 2010), and some terrorists no doubt desire to obtain such weapons, evidence of any terrorist group working seriously toward the theft of nuclear weapons or the acquisition of such weapons by other means is virtually nonexistent. This may be due to a combination of reasons. Terrorists understand that it is not hard to terrorize a population without committing mass murder: In 2002, a single sniper in the Washington, DC area, operating within his own automobile and with one accomplice, killed 10 people and changed the behavior of virtually the entire populace of the city over a period of three weeks by instilling fear of being a randomly chosen shooting victim when out shopping. Terrorists who believe the commission of violence helps their cause have access to many explosive materials and conventional weapons to ply their “trade.” If public sympathy is important to their cause, an apparent plan or commission of mass murder is not going to help them, and indeed will make their enemies even more implacable, reducing the prospects of achieving their goals. The acquisition of nuclear weapons by terrorists is not like the acquisition of conventional weapons; it requires significant time, planning, resources, and expertise, with no guarantees that an acquired device would work. It requires putting aside at least some aspects of a group’s more immediate activities and goals for an attempted operation that no terrorist group has previously accomplished. While absence of evidence does not mean evidence of absence (as then-Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld kept reminding us during the search for Saddam’s nonexistent nuclear weapons), it is reasonable to conclude that the fear of nuclear terrorism has swamped realistic consideration of the threat. As Brian Jenkins, a longtime observer of terrorist groups, wrote in 2008:

#### No Retaliation

Erwin and Manguson 09 (Sandra and Stew, National Defense “7 Deadly myths about weapons of terror”)

4 Myth: If the U.S. Were the Victim of a Nuclear Attack, It Would Immediately Retaliate \* Under the nightmare scenario of a nuclear bomb exploding in a U.S. city, the implied assumption is that the nation's leaders would immediately be able to fire back. That would be the case under the Cold War rules of nuclear retaliation, but the situation is far more complicated when nuclear attacks are perpetrated by non-state actors such as terrorist organizations. Unless the weapon is delivered by a missile, immediate retaliation is not realistic,