# Truth and justice B)

#### Our interpretation is that the resolution should exclusively define the division of affirmative and negative ground

#### “Resolved” before a colon reflects a legislative forum.

USAWOCC 04

USAWOCC, functions as Training and Doctrine Command's executive agent for all warrant officer training and education in the U.S. Army, “# 12, Punctuation -- The Colon and Semicolon”, United States Army Warrant Officer Career College, 12 May 2004, accessed: 21 January 2021, https://web.archive.org/web/20051109001422/http://usawocc.army.mil/IMI/wg12.htm, R.S.

The colon introduces the following:

1. A list, but only after "as follows," "the following," or a noun for which the list is an appositive:

Each scout will carry the following: (colon) meals for three days, a survival knife, and his sleeping bag.

The company had four new officers: (colon) Bill Smith, Frank Tucker, Peter Fillmore, and Oliver Lewis.

1. A long quotation (one or more paragraphs):

In The Killer Angels Michael Shaara wrote: (colon)

They may find it a different story from the one they learned in school. There have been many versions of that battle [Gettysburg] and that war [the Civil War].

(The quote continues for two more paragraphs.)

1. A formal quotation or question:

The President declared: (colon) "The only thing we have to fear is fear itself."

The question is: (colon) what can we do about it?

1. A second independent clause which explains the first:

Potter's motive is clear: (colon) he wants the assignment.

1. After the introduction of a business letter:

Dear Sirs: (colon)

Dear Madam: (colon)

1. The details following an announcement

For sale: (colon) large lakeside cabin with dock

1. A formal resolution, **after** the word **"resolved:"**

**Resolved: (colon) That this council petition the mayor.**

1. The words of a speaker in a play:

Macbeth: (colon) She should have died hereafter.

#### Nations are defined territories with governments

**Merriam Webster** [Merriam Webster, 8-22-2021, accessed on 9-6-2021, Merriam-webster, "Definition of NATION", <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/nation>] Adam

Definition of nation

 (Entry 1 of 2)

1a(1): [NATIONALITY sense 5a](https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/nationality)three Slav peoples … forged into a Yugoslavia without really fusing into a Yugoslav nation— Hans Kohn

(2): a politically organized [nationality](https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/nationality)

(3)in the Bible : a non-Jewish nationalitywhy do the nations conspire— Psalms 2:1 (Revised Standard Version)

b: a community of people composed of one or more [nationalities](https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/nationalities) and possessing a more or less defined territory and government Canada is a nation with a written constitution— B. K. Sandwell

c: a territorial division containing a body of people of one or more nationalities and usually characterized by relatively large size and independent statusa nation of vast size with a small population— Mary K. Hammond

2archaic : [GROUP](https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/group), [AGGREGATION](https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/aggregation)

3: a tribe or federation of tribes (as of American Indians)the Seminole Nation in Oklahoma

#### Medicines refer to physical substances.

American Heritage Dictionary of Medicine 18 The American Heritage Dictionary of Medicine 2018 by Houghton Mifflin Harcourt Publishing Company <https://www.yourdictionary.com/medicine> //Elmer

"A **substance**, **especially a drug**, **used to treat** the signs and symptoms of a **disease**, condition, or injury."

#### There are 4 types of IP the aff could reduce.

**Brewer 19** [Trevor Brewer, 5-16-2019, accessed on 8-11-2021, BrewerLong, "What Are The 4 Types of Intellectual Property Rights? BrewerLong", <https://brewerlong.com/information/business-law/four-types-of-intellectual-property/>] Adam

There are four types of intellectual property rights and protections (although multiple types of intellectual property itself). Securing the correct protection for your property is important, which is why consulting with a lawyer is a must. The four categories of intellectual property protections include:

TRADE SECRETS

Trade secrets refer to specific, private information that is important to a business because it gives the business a competitive advantage in its marketplace. If a trade secret is acquired by another company, it could harm the original holder.

Examples of trade secrets include recipes for certain foods and beverages (like Mrs. Fields’ cookies or Sprite), new inventions, software, processes, and even different marketing strategies.

When a person or business holds a trade secret protection, others cannot copy or steal the idea. In order to establish information as a “trade secret,” and to incur the legal protections associated with trade secrets, businesses must actively behave in a manner that demonstrates their desire to protect the information.

[Trade secrets are protected without official registration](https://www.wipo.int/sme/en/ip_business/trade_secrets/protection.htm); however, an owner of a trade secret whose rights are breached–i.e. someone steals their trade secret–may ask a court to ask against that individual and prevent them from using the trade secret.

PATENTS

As defined by the[U.S. Patent and Trademark Office](https://www.uspto.gov/help/patent-help#patents) (USPTO), a patent is a type of limited-duration protection that can be used to protect inventions (or discoveries) that are new, non-obvious, and useful, such a new process, machine, article of manufacture, or composition of matter.

When a property owner holds a patent, others are prevented, under law, from offering for sale, making, or using the product.

COPYRIGHTS

Copyrights and patents are not the same things, although they are often confused. A copyright is a type of intellectual property protection that protects original works of authorship, which might include literary works, music, art, and more. Today, copyrights also protect computer software and architecture.

Copyright protections are automatic; once you create something, it is yours. However, if your rights under copyright protections are infringed and you wish to file a lawsuit, then registration of your copyright will be necessary.

TRADEMARKS

Finally, the fourth type of intellectual property protection is a trademark protection. Remember, patents are used to protect inventions and discoveries and copyrights are used to protect expressions of ideas and creations, like art and writing.

Trademarks, then, refer to phrases, words, or symbols that distinguish the source of a product or services of one party from another. For example, the Nike symbol–which nearly all could easily recognize and identify–is a type of trademark.

While patents and copyrights can expire, trademark rights come from the use of the trademark, and therefore can be held indefinitely. Like a copyright, registration of a trademark is not required, but registering can offer additional advantages.

#### Violation: they defend (insert). Independently, garnering offense from form implies their speech act is an advocacy. CX proves and hold the line – at best, they’re Extra-T which still links to our predictability offense.

#### Vote neg –

#### Predictable limits - post-facto topic adjustment manipulates the balance of prep which is anchored around the resolution. The resolution is the only official and public stasis point for pre-round prep.

#### Two impacts

#### Clash – the resolution as a stasis point is key for thorough examining of both sides of topic – that deconstructs dogma through self-reflection and consideration of multiple viewpoints AND is a prerequisite for third- and fourth-level iteration that develops advocacy skills which turn all their out-of-round impacts.

#### Outweighs:

**A well-defined resolution is critical to allow an iterative process of argument testing and improvement---this does not require particular forms of argument, but does require a common point of disagreement.**

**Poscher 16** – Director at the Institute for Staatswissenschaft and Philosophy of Law at the University of Freiburg (Ralf, “Why We Argue About the Law: An Agonistic Account of Legal Disagreement”, Metaphilosophy of Law, Tomasz Gizbert-Studnicki/Adam Dyrda/Pawel Banas (eds.), Hart Publishing, forthcoming)

Hegel’s dialectical thinking powerfully exploits the idea of negation. It is a central feature of spirit and consciousness that they have the power to negate. The spirit “is this power only by looking the negative in the face and tarrying with it. This […] is the magical power that converts it into being.”102 The tarrying with the negative is part of what Hegel calls the “labour of the negative”103. In a loose reference to this Hegelian notion Gerald Postema points to yet another feature of disagreements as a necessary ingredient of the process of practical reasoning. Only if our reasoning is exposed to contrary arguments can we test its merits. We must go through the “labor of the negative” to have trust in our deliberative processes.104 This also holds where we seem to be in agreement. Agreement without exposure to disagreement can be deceptive in various ways. The first phenomenon Postema draws attention to is the group polarization effect. When a group of like‐minded people deliberates an issue, informational and reputational cascades produce more extreme views in the process of their deliberations.105 The polarization and biases that are well documented for such groups106 can be countered at least in some settings by the inclusion of dissenting voices. In these scenarios, disagreement can be a cure for dysfunctional deliberative polarization and biases.107 A second deliberative dysfunction mitigated by disagreement is superficial agreement, which can even be manipulatively used in the sense of a “presumptuous ‘We’”108. Disagreement can help to police such distortions of deliberative processes by challenging superficial agreements. Disagreements may thus signal that a deliberative process is not contaminated with dysfunctional agreements stemming from polarization or superficiality. Protecting our discourse against such contaminations is valuable even if we do not come to terms. Each of the opposing positions will profit from the catharsis it received “by looking the negative in the face and tarrying with it”. These advantages of disagreement in collective deliberations are mirrored on the individual level. Even if the probability of reaching a consensus with our opponents is very low from the beginning, as might be the case in deeply entrenched conflicts, entering into an exchange of arguments can still serve to test and improve our position. We have to do the “labor of the negative” for ourselves. Even if we cannot come up with a line of argument that coheres well with everybody else’s beliefs, attitudes and dispositions, we can still come up with a line of argument that achieves this goal for our own personal beliefs, attitudes and dispositions. To provide ourselves with the most coherent system of our own beliefs, attitudes and dispositions is – at least in important issues – an aspect of personal integrity – to borrow one of Dworkin’s favorite expressions for a less aspirational idea. In hard cases we must – in some way – lay out the argument for ourselves to figure out what we believe to be the right answer. We might not know what we believe ourselves in questions of abortion, the death penalty, torture, and stem cell research, until we have developed a line of argument against the background of our subjective beliefs, attitudes and dispositions. In these cases it might be rational to discuss the issue with someone unlikely to share some of our more fundamental convictions or who opposes the view towards which we lean. This might even be the most helpful way of corroborating a view, because we know that our adversary is much more motivated to find a potential flaw in our argument than someone with whom we know we are in agreement. It might be more helpful to discuss a liberal position with Scalia than with Breyer if we want to make sure that we have not overlooked some counter‐argument to our case. It would be too narrow an understanding of our practice of legal disagreement and argumentation if we restricted its purpose to persuading an adversary in the case at hand and inferred from this narrow understanding the irrationality of argumentation in hard cases, in which we know beforehand that we will not be able to persuade. Rational argumentation is a much more complex practice in a more complex social framework. Argumentation with an adversary can have purposes beyond persuading him: to test one’s own convictions, to engage our opponent in inferential commitments and to persuade third parties are only some of these; to rally our troops or express our convictions might be others. To make our peace with Kant we could say that “there must be a hope of coming to terms” with someone though not necessarily with our opponent, but maybe only a third party or even just ourselves and not necessarily only on the issue at hand, but maybe through inferential commitments in a different arena. f) The Advantage Over Non‐Argumentative Alternatives It goes without saying that in real world legal disagreements, all of the reasons listed above usually play in concert and will typically hold true to different degrees relative to different participants in the debate: There will be some participants for whom our hope of coming to terms might still be justified and others for whom only some of the other reasons hold and some for whom it is a mixture of all of the reasons in shifting degrees as our disagreements evolve. It is also apparent that, with the exception of the first reason, the rationality of our disagreements is of a secondary nature. The rational does not lie in the discovery of a single right answer to the topic of debate, since in hard cases there are no single right answers. Instead, our disagreements are instrumental to rationales which lie beyond the topic at hand, like the exploration of our communalities or of our inferential commitments. Since these reasons are of this secondary nature, they must stand up to alternative ways of settling irreconcilable disagreements that have other secondary reasons in their favor – like swiftness of decision making or using fewer resources. Why does our legal practice require lengthy arguments and discursive efforts even in appellate or supreme court cases of irreconcilable legal disagreements? The closure has to come by some non‐argumentative mean and courts have always relied on them. For the medieval courts of the Germanic tradition it is bequeathed that judges had to fight it out literally if they disagreed on a question of law – though the king allowed them to pick surrogate fighters.109 It is understandable that the process of civilization has led us to non‐violent non‐ argumentative means to determine the law. But what was wrong with District Judge Currin of Umatilla County in Oregon, who – in his late days – decided inconclusive traffic violations by publicly flipping a coin?110 If we are counting heads at the end of our lengthy argumentative proceedings anyway, why not decide hard cases by gut voting at the outset and spare everybody the cost of developing elaborate arguments on questions, where there is not fact of the matter to be discovered? One reason lies in the mixed nature of our reasons in actual legal disagreements. The different second order reasons can be held apart analytically, but not in real life cases. The hope of coming to terms will often play a role at least for some time relative to some participants in the debate. A second reason is that the objectives listed above could not be achieved by a non‐argumentative procedure. Flipping a coin, throwing dice or taking a gut vote would not help us to explore our communalities or our inferential commitments nor help to scrutinize the positions in play. A third reason is the overall rational aspiration of the law that Dworkin relates to in his integrity account111. In a justificatory sense112 the law aspires to give a coherent account of itself – even if it is not the only right one – required by equal respect under conditions of normative disagreement.113 Combining legal argumentation with the non‐argumentative decision‐ making procedure of counting reasoned opinions serves the coherence aspiration of the law in at least two ways: First, the labor of the negative reduces the chances that constructions of the law that have major flaws or inconsistencies built into the arguments supporting them will prevail. Second, since every position must be a reasoned one within the given framework of the law, it must be one that somehow fits into the overall structure of the law along coherent lines. It thus protects against incoherent “checkerboard” treatments114 of hard cases. It is the combination of reasoned disagreement and the non‐rational decision‐making mechanism of counting reasoned opinions that provides for both in hard cases: a decision and one – of multiple possible – coherent constructions of the law. Pure non‐rational procedures – like flipping a coin – would only provide for the decision part. Pure argumentative procedures – which are not geared towards a decision procedure – would undercut the incentive structure of our agonistic disagreements.115 In the face of unresolvable disagreements endless debates would seem an idle enterprise. That the debates are about winning or losing helps to keep the participants engaged. That the decision depends on counting reasoned opinions guarantees that the engagement focuses on rational argumentation. No plain non‐argumentative procedure would achieve this result. If the judges were to flip a coin at the end of the trial in hard cases, there would be little incentive to engage in an exchange of arguments. It is specifically the count of reasoned opinions which provides for rational scrutiny in our legal disagreements and thus contributes to the rationales discussed above. 2. THE SEMANTICS OF AGONISTIC DISAGREEMENTS The agonistic account does not presuppose a fact of the matter, it is not accompanied by an ontological commitment, and the question of how the fact of the matter could be known to us is not even raised. Thus the agonistic account of legal disagreement is not confronted with the metaphysical or epistemological questions that plague one‐right‐answer theories in particular. However, it must still come up with a semantics that explains in what sense we disagree about the same issue and are not just talking at cross purposes. In a series of articles David Plunkett and Tim Sundell have reconstructed legal disagreements in semantic terms as metalinguistic negotiations on the usage of a term that at the center of a hard case like “cruel and unusual punishment” in a death‐penalty case.116 Even though the different sides in the debate define the term differently, they are not talking past each other, since they are engaged in a metalinguistic negotiation on the use of the same term. The metalinguistic negotiation on the use of the term serves as a semantic anchor for a disagreement on the substantive issues connected with the term because of its functional role in the law. The “cruel and unusual punishment”‐clause thus serves to argue about the permissibility of the death penalty. This account, however only provides a very superficial semantic commonality. But the commonality between the participants of a legal disagreement go deeper than a discussion whether the term “bank” should in future only to be used for financial institutions, which fulfills every criteria for semantic negotiations that Plunkett and Sundell propose. Unlike in mere semantic negotiations, like the on the disambiguation of the term “bank”, there is also some kind of identity of the substantive issues at stake in legal disagreements. A promising route to capture this aspect of legal disagreements might be offered by recent semantic approaches that try to accommodate the externalist challenges of realist semantics,117 which inspire one‐right‐answer theorists like Moore or David Brink. Neo‐ descriptivist and two‐valued semantics provide for the theoretical or interpretive element of realist semantics without having to commit to the ontological positions of traditional externalism. In a sense they offer externalist semantics with no ontological strings attached. The less controversial aspect of the externalist picture of meaning developed in neo‐ descriptivist and two‐valued semantics can be found in the deferential structure that our meaning‐providing intentions often encompass.118 In the case of natural kinds, speakers defer to the expertise of chemists when they employ natural kind terms like gold or water. If a speaker orders someone to buy $ 10,000 worth of gold as a safe investment, he might not know the exact atomic structure of the chemical element 79. In cases of doubt, though, he would insist that he meant to buy only stuff that chemical experts – or the markets for that matter – qualify as gold. The deferential element in the speaker’s intentions provides for the specific externalist element of the semantics. In the case of the law, the meaning‐providing intentions connected to the provisions of the law can be understood to defer in a similar manner to the best overall theory or interpretation of the legal materials. Against the background of such a semantic framework the conceptual unity of a linguistic practice is not ratified by the existence of a single best answer, but by the unity of the interpretive effort that extends to legal materials and legal practices that have sufficient overlap119 – be it only in a historical perspective120. The fulcrum of disagreement that Dworkin sees in the existence of a single right answer121 does not lie in its existence, but in the communality of the effort – if only on the basis of an overlapping common ground of legal materials, accepted practices, experiences and dispositions. As two athletes are engaged in the same contest when they follow the same rules, share the same concept of winning and losing and act in the same context, but follow very different styles of e.g. wrestling, boxing, swimming etc. They are in the same contest, even if there is no single best style in which to wrestle, box or swim. Each, however, is engaged in developing the best style to win against their opponent, just as two lawyers try to develop the best argument to convince a bench of judges.122 Within such a semantic framework even people with radically opposing views about the application of an expression can still share a concept, in that they are engaged in the same process of theorizing over roughly the same legal materials and practices. Semantic frameworks along these lines allow for adamant disagreements without abandoning the idea that people are talking about the same concept. An agonistic account of legal disagreement can build on such a semantic framework, which can explain in what sense lawyers, judges and scholars engaged in agonistic disagreements are not talking past each other. They are engaged in developing the best interpretation of roughly the same legal materials, albeit against the background of diverging beliefs, attitudes and dispositions that lead them to divergent conclusions in hard cases. Despite the divergent conclusions, semantic unity is provided by the largely overlapping legal materials that form the basis for their disagreement. Such a semantic collapses only when we lack a sufficient overlap in the materials. To use an example of Michael Moore’s: If we wanted to debate whether a certain work of art was “just”, we share neither paradigms nor a tradition of applying the concept of justice to art such as to engage in an intelligible controversy.

#### Procedural Fairness – speech times, speaker positions, and wins and losses prove debate is a game structured around competition. Procedural equity is necessary for the sustainability and value of that game otherwise no one will play – any interpretation that upsets it should lose. Independently, its assessment is inevitable because it’s the logical evaluative structure that undergirds their arguments.

#### T outweighs case – in-round engagement is structured by pre-round abuse – anything else nullifies topicality and insulates their arguments from testing, so presume them false.

#### Drop the debater on T – the entire aff is abusive; at worst, our engagement with every part of it was skewed – anything else greenlights 1AR restart.

#### Use competing interps – reasonable limits invite unpredictable intervention and are impossible to determine while prepping – deviating from the topic is a conscious commission, so you should be able to justify it.

#### No RVIs – it’s illogical – you shouldn’t win because the debate was good. It also encourages baiting theory and chills reading topicality which destroys the neg’s ability to check abuse – 1AR theory solves all of their offense.

#### TVA solves their offense – they can say reducing IPPs is good for organizing

#### Switch side debate solves their offense because they can read their aff as a K on the negative

## Case – fun procedural things

#### Presume neg – it’s the affs job to prove a desirable change from the squo. statements are false till proven true that’s why we don’t believe conspiracy theories

#### Reject framing arguments that parameterize content – debate should be an open forum to attack ideas from different directions – anything else brackets out certain modes of knowledge production which their ev would obviously disagree w/.

#### ROB is to vote for the better debater. Only evaluating the consequences of the plan allows us to determine the practical impacts of politics and preserves the predictability that fosters engagement. Rigorous contestation and third and fourth-line testing are key to generate the self-reflexivity that creates ethical subjects.

#### Prefer –

#### 1. Competition- The competitive nature of debate wrecks the interactive nature of debate – the judge must decide between two competing speech acts and the debaters are trying to beat each other – this is the wrong forum for interaction

#### 2. Spillover- How does educational orientations spill over beyond this space? Empirically denied – judges vote on this shit on this time and nothing ever happens.

#### 3. Prescription- certain interactions are prescripted – eg subjectivity– can’t be reformulated so easily

#### 4. Competition takes out the aff – the ballot becomes a securitizing object that prevents engagement

Ritter 13. JD from U Texas Law (Michael J., “Overcoming The Fiction of “Social Change Through Debate”: What’s To Learn from 2pac’s Changes?,” National Journal of Speech and Debate, Vol. 2, Issue 1

The structure of competitive interscholastic debate renders any message communicated in a debate round virtually incapable of creating any social change, either in the debate community or in general society. And to the extent that the fiction of social change through debate can be proven or disproven through empirical studies or surveys, academics instead have analyzed debate with nonapplicable rhetorical theory that fails to account for the unique aspects of competitive interscholastic debate. Rather, the current debate relating to activism and competitive interscholastic debate concerns the following: “What is the best model to promote social change?” But a more fundamental question that must be addressed first is: “Can debate cause social change?” Despite over two decades of opportunity to conduct and publish empirical studies or surveys, academic proponents of the fiction that debate can create social change have chosen not to prove this fundamental assumption, which—as this article argues—is merely a fiction that is harmful in most, if not all, respects. The position that competitive interscholastic debate can create social change is more properly characterize5d as a fiction than an argument. A fiction is an invented or fabricated idea purporting to be factual but is not provable by any human senses or rational thinking capability or is unproven by valid statistical studies. An argument, most basically, consists of a claim and some support for why the claim is true. If the support for the claim is false or its relation to the claim is illogical, then we can deduce that the particular argument does not help in ascertaining whether the claim is true. Interscholastic competitive debate is premised upon the assumption that debate is argumentation. Because fictions are necessarily not true or cannot be proven true by any means of argumentation, the competitive interscholastic debate community should be incredibly critical of those fictions and adopt them only if they promote the activity and its purposes

#### 5. No evidence for the power of the ballot – debate specific – negate on presumption.

Ritter 13 [Michael, JD UTexas Law, B.A. cum laude Trinity University. September 2013. “Overcoming the Fiction of ‘Social Change Through Debate’: What’s to Learn From 2Pac’s Changes?” https://docs.wixstatic.com/ugd/9896ec\_8b2b993ec42440ecaab1b07645385db5.pdf]

Up to this point, this article has shown how each of the essential components of “competitive interscholastic debate” makes it very different from any other kind of debate. But one thing that is persuasive in any kind of debate is some sort of properly conducted study (or even a mere survey) that provides empirical proof or even substantial anecdotal support. To date, none of the many academics who coach or participate in the debate community have published a study or survey to support the social change fiction. (Perhaps they have tried, and discovered they were just wrong.) But until such an empirical study of competitive interscholastic debate is conducted, students, judges, and coaches should not take it for granted.

#### We get new 2NR arguments- you shouldn’t let them get away with aff spin or new applications in unless it was explicit in the 1AC. It’s better- lets us contest the substance of the aff instead of going for cheapshots.

## Case – cap!

#### Stats good – lol trust empirics – j bc monetary incentive doesn’t mean theyre false ie u prob trust the school when they tell u amt of covid cases

#### Badiou’s concept of ethics fails – it’s impossible to make qualitative distinctions between different sorts of evil.

Brown 04 (Nicholas, University of Illinois at Chicago, Or, Alain Badiou and Slavoj Žižek, Waiting for Something to Happen, CR: The New Centennial Review 4.3 (2004) 289-319).

This apparatus is a powerful lens, and there can be no doubt that Badiou is describing something important; perhaps it is even an aspect of evil. But is it really Evil (Mal) itself? Badiou's evil, like his truth, is indifferent to content, a merely formal label. In its formalism, its insistence on fidelity to any Event whatever—on "ethical consistency" itself as a value—Badiou's good is almost an aesthetic rather than an ethical category. (At one point, in an echo of Kant's purposeless purpose, ethical consistency is even described as "disinterested interest.") While there is something undeniably attractive in ethical consistency (and something ugly in its lack), the most important thing for a modern ethics may be to push these sentimental considerations aside. The value of ethical consistency is authorized by Lacan's well-known dictum not to give up on one's desire [ne pas céder sur son désir]. But we should not forget that this maxim derives from the reading of Antigone in Séminaire VII. Yes, Sophocles' Antigone, in her awful ethical consistency, is a captivating figure. Brecht's Galileo, on the other hand, in his opportunism and wavering inconsistency, is a bit distasteful. But Antigone is a reactionary, and Galileo invents physics. Further, Badiou has no way of sorting out different evils beyond his tripartite division. Ethics tells us what Nazism and scientific obscurantism have in common. But an ethics would have to be able to tell them apart. The distinction between, say, the abandonment of a social movement by its leader and the abandonment of a poem by its author cannot be made without some kind of qualitative supplement. Since, as we shall see, Badiou's philosophy is predicated precisely on the subtraction from consideration of all qualitative predicates, this supplement can only be vulgar, non-philosophical. Perhaps the supplement it requires is the language of human rights, which, whatever its faults, can tell the difference between a concentration camp and a creationist textbook.

#### Badiou’s alternative of radical egalitarianism is unworkable and is based on a failed model of communism.

Hallward 03 (Badiou: a subject to truth, Peter Hallward, University of Minnesota Press Minneapolis / London 2003, Professor of Modern European Philosophy, Centre for Research in Modern European Philosophy, Middlesex Univeristy).

Badiou's politics have always been about “collective emancipation, or the problem of the reign of liberty in infinite situations” (DO, 54; cf. TC, 60). His political goals have remained consistent over the years, since “every historical event is communist, to the degree that 'communist' designates the transtemporal subjectivity of emancipation, the egalitarian passion, the Idea of justice, the will to break with the compromises of the service des biens, the deposition of egoism, an intolerance of oppression, the wish to impose a withering away of the state. The absolute preeminence of multiple presentation over representation.” 84 What has changed is communism's mode of existence. In Badiou's earlier work, the practical (if ultimately unattainable) goal was always to effect the actual, historical achievement of stateless community. Today, in order to preserve politics' “intrinsic relation to truth” (DO, 48), Badiou has had to let go of almost any sort of political engagement with the economic and the social. He continues to declare a wholly egalitarian politics, but as reserved for a strictly subjective plane. The unqualified justice of a generic communism, first proposed in Marx's 1844 Manuscripts and conceived in Badiou's own terms as the advent of “pure presentation, ” as the “undivided authority of the infinite, or the advent of the collective as such” (AM, 91), remains the only valid subjective norm for Badiou's political thought. This subjective norm has become ever more distant, however, from the day-to-day business of “objective” politics: the programmatic pursuit of the generic ideal is itself now dismissed as a “Romantic” dream leading to “fraternity terror” (AM, 101).

#### Capitalism is adaptable and sustainable – it reforms with new technologies and innovations in a way that benefits the whole of society. Any alternative is a system of oppression and mitigation of the poor.

Ashworth 10 [Stephen, academic publishing at Oxford, December 18, Oxford, “Towards the Sociology of the Universe, part 2,” http://www.astronist.demon.co.uk/space-age/essays/Sociology2.html, 7/2/11]

#### Under capitalism, social benefit is primarily expressed in monetary terms, and society is stratified economically, with richer classes nearer the top of the social scale and poorer classes nearer the bottom. Under the socialist mode of society, the central function of capital – deciding the allocation of resources – is performed by political ideology. Social benefit is now primarily expressed in terms of ideological capital, being the level of influence, official or unofficial, which an individual enjoys within the institutions, such as in the Soviet Union the Communist Party, which express, teach and propagate that ideology. The rich in such a system are therefore the ideologically rich: those who rise to prominence in the political process and occupy official posts in the Party apparatus; while the poor are those who merely dutifully consume the Party propaganda. The poorest are those who disagree with or actively resist the ruling ideology, and who end up marginalised or criminalised as a result. In view of historical precedents such as the Soviet Union, it is highly unlikely that any realistic socialist society represents an advance over capitalist society in terms of the well-being of the majority of its members (as judged by those members). It is not known whether any third option exists that is compatible with industrialism; however, it is highly plausible that new options will appear in due course, given continued technological development and corresponding social change. Recent history suggests that politically driven attempts at creating a socially just society put all its members, except those at the very top of the Party hierarchy, at a considerable material disadvantage to corresponding members of capitalist societies. One reason for this is that democratic capitalist institutions tend to be flexible and thus capable of responding to changing circumstances, while ideology tends to resist change even in changing circumstances. It must also be clear that any beneficial changes to the modern global liberal democratic market capitalist order can only come about in an incremental fashion, as argued in the social philosophy of Karl Popper (in his book The Open Society and its Enemies). Violent political revolution would, judging by historical precedents, be so destructive that it cannot be contemplated except with extreme horror. Incremental changes in technology, for example the recent introduction of the internet, allow the institutions of democratic capitalism to evolve in ways which are unpredictable but generally beneficial to most groups in society. As civilisation continues to change under the influence of new technologies of computing, medicine and transport, particularly space transport, the democratic capitalist system will naturally also change. Considering the freedoms and privileges enjoyed by the peoples of developed countries compared with their forebears of a few generations ago, it is reasonable to look forward to continued incremental social evolution with optimism concerning the

#### No collapse – capitalism is self-correcting.

Hollender and Breen 10 (Jeffrey Hollender and Bill Breen, 2010, Founder of the American Sustainable Business Council, a progressive alternative to the Chamber of Commerce, Editorial Director of the Fast Company, The Responsibility Revolution: How the Next Generation of Businesses will Win, p. xix

#### The responsibility revolution is about more than cutting carbon, reducing energy use, monitoring factories, or donating to charities. It’s about reimagining companies from within: innovating new ways of working, instilling a new logic of competing, identifying new possibilities for leading, and redefining the very purpose of business. Consequently, we’ve drawn on the best thinking not only from the corporate responsibility arena, but also from the realms of strategy, leadership, and management. Others, to whom we are indebted, have developed some of this book’s core principles. (We will acknowledge them as we present their ideas.) Our intent is to show how an emerging breed of business revolutionaries is turning theory into practice and building organizations that grow revenue by contributing to the greater good. This is a book about change, but it seeks to help companies change on the inside—change their priorities, the way they organize, how they compete, and the way they interact with the world. We fully concede that many companies, perhaps even most companies, won’t willingly alter their behavior. But they will change nonetheless, and it won’t be because they’ve suddenly seen the light. It will be because massive numbers of consumers, a spreading swarm of competitors, values-driven employees, and even that laggard indicator, the federal government, makes them change. Change is under way. The

#### Growth solves itself – markets create more efficient means that solve sustainability

Zey 98 (Michael Zey, executive director of the Expansionary Institute and professor at Montclair State University School of Business, Seizing the Future, 1998, pp. 36-37)

Third, growth itself contains the solutions to the problems it produces. Supporting this principle is the World Bank’s 1992 report “Development and the Environment,” which blatantly states that growth is a powerful antidote to a number of ills plaguing Third World countries, including the pollution that growth supposedly generates. The report thus contends that eliminating poverty should remain the top goal of world policymakers. Although economic growth can initially lead to such problems as pollution and waste, the resulting prosperity also facilitates the developments of technologies that lead to cleaner air and water. In fact, once a nation’s per capita income rises to about $4000 in 1993 dollars, it produces less of some pollutants per capita, mainly due to the fact that it can afford technology like catalytic converters and sewage systems that treat a variety of wastes. According to Norio Yamamoto, research director of the Mitsubishi Research Institute, “We consider any kind of environmental damage to result from mismanagement of the economy.” He claims that the pollution problems of poorer regions such as Eastern Europe can be traced to their economic woes. Hence, he concludes that in order to ensure environmental safety “we need a sound economy on a global basis.” So the answer to pollution, the supposed outgrowth of progress, ought to be more economic growth. The World Bank estimated that every dollar invested in developing countries will grow to $100 in fifty years. As that happens, these countries can take all the necessary steps to invest in pollution-free cars, catalytic converters, and other pollution-free technologies, such as the cleanest of all energy sources, nuclear power.

#### Even if capitalism has caused environmental degradation, now it’s key to solve – the money is moving away from degradation and towards mitigation.

Fitzmaurice 15 [Matthew, CEO of EcoAlpha Asset Management LLC, an asset management firm that invests in companies that provide solutions to global burdened resources with a specific emphasis on water, agriculture and energy efficiency. EcoAlpha focuses on public securities and seeks to generate superior risk-adjusted returns for investors. 03/23/2015. “Only Capitalism Can Save the Planet.” <https://ensia.com/voices/only-capitalism-can-save-the-planet/>] JCH-PF

To say the world has changed a lot in the last century is a huge understatement. Industrial, medical and social progress has resulted in unprecedented growth in the world’s population and economy, and that growth has placed tremendous burdens on the planet’s resources. These burdens create problems — perhaps the most substantive problems we have faced as a species: from water scarcity and pollution to climate change, reliable access to nourishing food, and affordable energy. Here’s the thing, though: where there are problems to be solved, there’s money to be made. And where there’s money to be made, we awaken one of the world’s most powerful forces for change: capitalism. Of course capitalism has played a starring role in distressing the planet’s resources. Historically, the combination of unchecked industry, a readiness to externalize costs and a relentless thirst for growth have plundered and polluted the earth. It’s not a debate, but simple fact that our population size and economies cannot continue on their present trajectories without exhausting the world’s resources. Yet, a rapidly expanding global middle class — increasingly urbanized and hungry for protein — threatens further and accelerating distress. The hopeful news is that businesses, with their almost singular focus on economic self-interest, and governments, motivated by a variety of interests, are beginning to recognize and address in earnest these inevitable problems. Today, the businesses that develop practical and affordable solutions to burdened resource problems will end up being the world’s most profitable companies. No longer can they be considered “sustainability” businesses. They are everyday businesses with a long view, targeting problems that are not going away. That’s smart business. Burdened resources have become a strong economic driver for businesses of all sizes, in all industries everywhere to spend and change — and one that will only grow in scope and intensity over time. The companies that provide effective solutions to burdened resources will provide superior risk-adjusted returns to their investors as business and governments accelerate their solutions spending out of their own economic self-interest. And because the products, technologies and services these companies provide are common solutions to global problems — and are therefore exponentially repeatable — these investments will have amplified positive impact on global resource scarcity issues. Too often people have a narrow view of these solutions, thinking only of solar panels and windmills. But solutions are enormously diverse: They include, among many others, agricultural drones that monitor soil conditions, smart irrigation technology that delivers water only where and when it’s really needed, more efficient distributed energy generation and component suppliers that make cars use less gas. As a whole, the human race has a poor track record when it comes to altruism. Although there are a great many saints among us who spend — and even sacrifice — their lives to help others, most of us are hard pressed to take care of ourselves and our families. We have a much better track record when it comes to investing money in our own self-interest, which has fueled the unprecedented innovation, economic and life-expectancy growth of the past century. In the past, many people who invested in sustainable solutions were motivated principally by conscience, willing to accept reduced returns in order to invest their money in a way that was consistent with their beliefs and convictions — be they religious, social or environmental. Now, however, we face a new reality in which our economic self-interest and the long-term well-being of the planet are coming into alignment. Because we have to face the reality of burdened resources, there’s money in it.

#### Capitalism avoids planetary extinction through Mars colonization.

Spring 16 (Todd, Writer, "A Case for Capitalism, In Regards to Space Travel – The Policy", Policy, 6-3-2016, https://thepolicy.us/a-case-for-capitalism-in-regards-to-space-travel-d77e50f8116e, DOA: 7-28-2017) //Snowball //strikethrough on gendered language

As of now, N.A.S.A. does not plan on sending a ~~manned~~ mission to Mars until the 2030s — assuming, of course, they get the government funding they need to undertake such a massive project. Considering the recent cuts to deep space exploration, down nearly $300 million from 2016, I am not certain what the condition of the program will look like in another two years…much less the gap between now and the 2030s. Where, then — if the government and its agencies will not provide us with the money for exploration — will we turn to slake our thirst for cosmic space travel? SpaceX. Private corporations. Capitalism. Seeing this article in the news, reading day after day the story of budget cuts to N.A.S.A. in regards to deep-space exploration and other related programs, got me thinking about just how important it will be for private companies and corporations to undertake these projects…such as Elon Musk’s SpaceX, and countless others (read the full list here). The problem is that we have gotten it into our heads that Capitalism is the root cause of our economic woes in the United States, perhaps failing to understand that such policies are something like a double-edged sword: they could also be our salvation. This article provides a great list of the pro’s and con’s of Capitalism. I would recommend you take the short passing of time it requires to read it through-and-through before continuing. Now then. I have never been for for fully-unhindered Capitalism. I do not believe that the government should stay out of economic affairs entirely, for as provided in the article many of the con’s relate to improper regulation (monopolization) as opposed to something fundamentally wrong, but I do not believe that any government should be going about shoving their claws into every economic affair either. There must be a healthy balance, especially if Capitalism is to work as it is supposed to work. The same goes for any policy. The government should be there to bolster competition between businesses…not favor one or bail-out the other. The more regulation, the more interference or amendment, the less it works…but this mix of regulation and free market must fall in the “goldilocks zone” if the citizens of said society are to reap its full benefit. If not, like planets about a star, the society shall either burn or freeze. One of those benefits is highlighted by Elon Musk’s SpaceX: the intervention of privately-funded companies to do things that a traditional government agency cannot. Namely, the exploration and eventual colonization of Mars in a reasonable, step-by-step timeframe…unlike the “we will get to it eventually” mindset plaguing the bowels of the United States government. Were not the policies in place to foster the growth of private companies, our best chance at getting people out of Earth-orbit — the Bush-approved, now-cancelled, insanely-expensive Constellation program — would have gone the way of promises and well-wishes. It is my hope that Elon Musk and space entrepreneurs like him are not simply blowing steam, and that one day — perhaps even within my lifetime — I could be on my way to a space hotel on the Moon, flying aboard a space airliner with the name of a private company plastered across the side. Regardless, if we humans are to truly become a multi-planet species we must not hinder economic growth with narrow thoughts. We must not become confused that the “problems down here” and the “problem of getting out there” must be in conflict; they do not need to, and we must not suppose they should. They are two separate issues with two unique sets of problems, and thus this policy of taking resources from one to give to the other will only ensure that neither issue is given that which it needs, or enough to fix what must be solved.

#### Capitalism solves war on a massive scale – it creates lock-in mechanisms that bind countries together and economically dampens conflict – robust studies prove.

Dafoe and Kelsey 14 (Allan & Nina; assistant professor in political science at Yale & research associate in international economics at Berkeley; Journal of Peace Research, “Observing the capitalist peace: Examining market-mediated signaling and other mechanisms,” http://jpr.sagepub.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/content/51/5/619.full)

Countries with liberal political and economic systems rarely use military force against each other. This anomalous peace has been most prominently attributed to the ‘democratic peace’ – the apparent tendency for democratic countries to avoid militarized conflict with each other (Maoz & Russett, 1993; Ray, 1995; Dafoe, Oneal & Russett, 2013).More recently, however, scholars have proposed that the liberal peace could be partly (Russett & Oneal, 2001) or primarily (Gartzke, 2007; but see Dafoe, 2011) attributed to liberal economic factors, such as commercial and financial interdependence. In particular, Erik Gartzke, Quan Li & Charles Boehmer (2001), henceforth referred to as GLB, have demonstrated that measures of capital openness have a substantial and statistically significant association with peaceful dyadic relations. Gartzke (2007) confirms that this association is robust to a large variety of model specifications. To explain this correlation, GLB propose that countries with open capital markets are more able to credibly signal their resolve through the bearing of greater economic costs prior to the outbreak of militarized conflict. This explanation is novel and plausible, and resonates with the rationalist view of asymmetric information as a cause of conflict (Fearon, 1995). Moreover, it implies clear testable predictions on evidential domains different from those examined by GLB. In this article we exploit this opportunity by constructing a confirmatory test of GLB’s theory of market-mediated signaling. We first develop an innovative quantitative case selection technique to identify crucial cases where the mechanism of market-mediated signaling should be most easily observed. Specifically, we employ quantitative data and the statistical models used to support the theory we are probing to create an impartial and transparentmeans of selecting cases in which the theory – as specified by the theory’s creators –makes its most confident predictions.We implement three different case selection rules to select cases that optimize on two criteria: (1) maximizing the inferential leverage of our cases, and (2) minimizing selection bias. We examine these cases for a necessary implication of market-mediated signaling: that key participants drew a connection between conflictual events and adverse market movements. Such an inference is a necessary step in the process by which market-mediated costs can signal resolve. For evidence of this we examine news media, government documents, memoirs, historical works, and other sources. We additionally examine other sources, such as market data, for evidence that economic costs were caused by escalatory events. Based on this analysis, we assess the evidence for GLB’s theory of market mediated costly signaling. Our article then considers a more complex heterogeneous effects version of market-mediated signaling in which unspecified scope conditions are required for the mechanism to operate. Our design has the feature of selecting cases in which scope conditions are most likely to be absent. This allows us to perform an exploratory analysis of these cases, looking for possible scope conditions. We also consider alternative potential mechanisms. Our cases are reviewed in more detail in the online appendix.1 To summarize our results, our confirmatory test finds that while market-mediated signaling may be operative in the most serious disputes, it was largely absent in the less serious disputes that characterize most of the sample of militarized interstate disputes (MIDs). This suggests either that other mechanisms account for the correlation between capital openness and peace, or that the scope conditions for market-mediated signaling are restrictive. Of the signals that we observed, strategic market-mediated signals were relatively more important than automatic market-mediated signals in the most serious conflicts. We identify a number of potential scope conditions, such as that (1) the conflict must be driven by bargaining failure arising from uncertainty and (2) the economic costs need to escalate gradually and need to be substantial, but less than the expected military costs of conflict. Finally, there were a number of other explanations that seemed present in the cases we examined and could account for the capitalist peace: capital openness is associated with greater anticipated economic costs of conflict; capital openness leads third parties to have a greater stake in the conflict and therefore be more willing to intervene;