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#### Capitalism is a system engendering massive violence and inevitable extinction – the foundational task is to find a way out – the Role of the Ballot is to endorse the best organizational tactics.

Badiou ‘18

[Alain, former chair of philosophy at the Ecole Normale Superiure, professor of philosophy at The European Graduate School. Translated by David Broder. 07/30/2018. “The Neolithic, Capitalism, and Communism,” <https://www.versobooks.com/blogs/3948-the-neolithic-capitalism-and-communism>] pat

Today, it has become commonplace to predict the end of the human race such as we know it. There are various reasons for such forecasts. According to a messianic kind of environmentalism, the excessive predations of a beastly humanity will soon bring about the end of life on Earth. Meanwhile, those who instead point to runaway technological advances prophesy, indiscriminately, the automation of all work by robots, grand developments in computing, automatically-generated art, plastic-coated killers, and the dangers of a super-human intelligence.

Suddenly, we see the emergence of threatening categories like transhumanism and the post-human — or, their mirror image, a return to our animal state — depending on whether one prophesies on the basis of technological innovation or laments all the attacks on Mother Nature.

For me, all such prophesies are just so much ideological noise, intended to obscure the real peril that humanity is today exposed to: that is to say, the impasse that globalised capitalism is leading us into. In fact, it is this form of society — and it alone — which permits the destructive exploitation of natural resources, precisely because it connects this exploitation to the boundless quest for private profit. The fact that so many species are endangered, that climate change cannot be controlled, that water is becoming like some rare treasure, is all a by-product of the merciless competition among billionaire predators. There is no other reason for the fact that scientific innovation is subject to the question of what technologies can sell, in an anarchic selection mechanism.

Environmentalist preaching does sometimes use persuasive descriptions of what is going on — despite the exaggerations typical of the prophet. But most of the time this becomes mere propaganda, useful for those states who want to show their friendly face. Just as it is for the multinationals who would have us believe — to the greater benefit of their balance sheets — in the noble, fraternal, natural purity of the commodities they are trafficking.

The fetishism of technology, and the unbroken series of "revolutions" in this domain — of which the "digital revolution" is the most in vogue — has constantly spread the beliefs both that this will take us to the paradise of a world without work — with robots to serve us, and us left to idle — and then, on the other hand, that digital "thought" will crush the human intellect. Today there is not one magazine that does not inform its astonished readers of the imminent "victory" of artificial over natural intelligence. But in most cases neither "nature" nor the "artificial" are properly or clearly defined.

Since the origins of philosophy, the question of the real scope of the word "nature" has been constantly posed. "Nature" could mean the romantic reverie of evening sunsets, the atomic materialism of Lucretius (De natura rerum), the inner being of things, Spinoza’s Totality (Deus sive Natura), the objective underside of all culture, rural and peasant surroundings as counterposed to the suspicious artificiality of the towns ("the earth does not lie," as Marshal Pétain put it), biology as distinct from physics, cosmology as compared to the tiny location that is our planet, the invariance of centuries as compared to the frenzy of innovation, natural sexuality as compared to perversion… I am afraid that today "nature" most of all refers to the calm of the villa and the garden, the charm wild animals have for tourists, and the beach or the mountains where we can spend a nice summer. Who, then, can imagine man responsible for nature, when thus far he has just been a thinking flea on a secondary planet in an average solar system at the edge of one banal galaxy?

Since its origins philosophy has also devoted a great deal of thought to Technology, or the Arts. The Greeks meditated on the dialectic of Techne and Physis — a dialectic within which they situated the human animal. They laid the ground for this animal to be seen as "a reed, the weakest of nature, but … a thinking reed." For Pascal, this meant that humanity was stronger than Nature and closer to God. A long time ago, they saw that the animal capable of mathematics would do great things to the order of materiality.

Are these "robots" which they keep banging on about anything more than calculation in the form of a machine? Digits in motion? We know that they can count quicker than us, but it was we who invented them, precisely in order to fulfil this task. It would be stupid to look at a crane raising a concrete pillar up to some great height, use this to argue that man is incapable of the same feat, and then conclude by saying that some muscular, superhuman giant has emerged… Lightning-quick counting is not the sign of an insuperable "intelligence" either. Technological transhumanism plays the same old tune — an inexhaustible theme of horror and sci-fi movies — of the creator overwhelmed by his own creation. It does so either thrilled about the advent of the superman — something we have been expecting ever since Nietzsche — or fearing him and taking refuge under the skirt of Gaia, Mother Nature.

Let’s put things in a bit more perspective.

For four or five millennia, humanity has been organised by the triad of private property — which concentrates enormous wealth in the hands of very narrow oligarchies; the family, in which fortunes are transmitted via inheritance; and the state, which protects both property and the family by armed force. This triad defined our species’ Neolithic age, and we are still at this point — we could even say, now more than ever. Capitalism is the contemporary form of the Neolithic. Its enslavement of technology in the interests of competition, profit and concentrating capital only raises to their fullest extension the monstrous inequalities, the social absurdities, the murderous wars, and the damaging ideologies that have always accompanied the deployment of new technology under the reign of class hierarchy throughout history.

We should be clear that technological inventions were the preliminary conditions of the arrival of the Neolithic age, and by no means its result. If we consider our species’ fate, we see that sedentary agriculture, the domestication of cattle and horses, pottery, bronze, metallic weapons, writing, nationalities, monumental architecture, and the monotheist religions are inventions at least as important as the airplane or the smartphone. Throughout history, whatever has been human has always, by definition, been artificial. If that had not existed, there would not have been Neolithic humanity — the humanity we know — but a permanent close proximity with animal life; something which did indeed exist, in the form of small nomadic groups, for around 200,000 years.

A fearful and obscurantist primitivism has its roots in the fallacious concept of "primitive communism." Today we can see this cult of the ancient societies in which babies, men, women and the elderly supposedly lived in fraternity, without anything artificial, and indeed lived in common with the mice, the frogs, and the bears. Ultimately, all this is nothing but ridiculous reactionary propaganda. For everything suggests that the societies in question were extremely violent. After all, even their most basic survival needs were constantly under threat.

To speak fearfully of the victory of the artificial over the nature, of robot over man, is today an untenable regression, something truly absurd. It is easy enough to answer such fears, such prophesies. For judged by this standard, even a simple axe, or a domesticated horse, not to mention a papyrus covered in symbols, is an exemplary case of the post- or trans-human. Even an abacus allows quicker calculation than the fingers of the human hand.

Today we need neither a return to primitivism, or fear of the "ravages" the advent of technology might bring. Nor is there any use in morbid fascination for the science-fiction of all-conquering robots. The urgent task we face is the methodical search for a way out of the Neolithic order. This latter has lasted for millennia, valuing only competition and hierarchy and tolerating the poverty of billions of human beings. It must be surpassed at all cost. Except, that is, the cost of the high-tech wars so well known to the Neolithic age, in the lineage of the wars of 1914-1918 and 1939-1945, with their tens of millions of dead. And this time it could be a lot more.

The problem is not technology, or nature. The problem is how to organise societies at a global scale. We need to posit that a non-Neolithic way of organising society is possible. This means no private ownership of that which ought to be held in common, namely the production of all the necessities of human life. It means no inherited power or concentration of wealth. No separate state to protect oligarchies. No hierarchical division of labour. No nations, and no closed and hostile identities. A collective organisation of everything that is in the collective interest.

All this has a name, indeed a fine one: communism. Capitalism is but the final phase of the restrictions that the Neolithic form of society has imposed on human life. It is the final stage of the Neolithic. Humanity, that fine animal, must make one last push to break out of a condition in which 5,000 years of inventions served a handful of people. For almost two centuries — since Marx, anyway — we have known that we have to begin the new age. An age of technologies incredible for all of us, of tasks distributed equally among all of us, of the sharing of everything, and education that affirms the genius of all. May this new communism everywhere and on every question stand up against the morbid survival of capitalism. This capitalism, this seeming "modernity," represents a Neolithic world that has in fact been going on for five millennia. And that means that it is old — far too old.

#### History proves an effective right to strike is impossible in liberal capitalist society – courts will water it down and workers will be replaced – but its justification relies on the same tropes of property protection that will be used to delegitimize worker militancy.

White ‘18

[Ahmed, University of Colorado Law School. 2018. “Its Own Dubious Battle: The Impossible Defense of an Effective Right to Strike,” <https://scholar.law.colorado.edu/articles/1261/>] pat

Like every other aspect of Taft-Hartley, the 1947 amendments to the Wagner Act that directly touched on mass picketing and other forms of strike militancy were strongly supported by the business community, including prominent employers and business associations like the National Association of Manufactures, the American Iron and Steel Institute, and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. Promoted by these groups, witness after witness regaled the Congress with stories of how mass picketing, along with secondary boycotts and other militant tactics, gave unions too much power, eroded the power of owners and their supervisors, and threatened the American way. Time and again, senators and representatives expressed their support for new restrictions on the right to strike as mandates of a common faith, a commitment of the nation itself, to the principles of property and order. “They are a veritable pronouncement of contempt of law and order, private capitalism, and ownership of property, competition, and everything that even smacks of liberty,” said Ohio Representative Frederick Smith, speaking of NLRB positions that seemed to continence an expansive view of the right to strike. “He has been required to employ or reinstate individuals who have assaulted him and his employees and want only to destroy his property,” said New York Representative Ralph Gwinn, in defense of employers supposedly ravaged by such strikes. Under prevailing law, such employers endured “respectable robbery without liability,” Gwinn said.

We in America prize human individual liberty even above the state. We believe that property rights are natural to man. The best protection of those property rights and of that liberty is in the balancing of the rights of our workers and the rights of our businessmen so that the great majority of our citizens will enjoy that private property and that human liberty,

said Representative Charles Kersten of Wisconsin, condemning mass picketing of the sort that had recently featured at the Allis-Chalmers plants in his state. Consider, too, the remarks of Representative John Robsion of Kentucky:

There have been cases in this country where literally thousands of persons have picketed a plant and engaged in violence. In my honest opinion, labor nor management never did help its cause by engaging in lawlessness, violence, and the destruction of the property of others, and under this bill and the law the company cannot mistreat, browbeat and engage in violence and lawlessness against the workers.

Nor was it only conservatives who joined in this, as evidenced by remarks of Utah Senator Elbert Thomas, who had supported the New Deal and the work of the La Follette Committee, on which he had served, and who had joined with Robert La Follette Jr. in 1939 in sponsoring a pro-labor amendment to the Wagner Act. For a worker, he said,

to interpret his right to strike as being an absolute right, entitling him to quit work while the water is turned on in the plant, for leaving in a mine certain equipment in such a way as to result in costly destruction, would obviously be most improper. No person has a right to do such things. No one has a right to act against society. No one has a right to destroy it.

And so it went, the references to the inviolate values of property and order in defense of the legislation much too numerous to exhaustively cite. It is easy to dismiss these contentions, even from moderates like Thomas, as the contrived utterances of people who were singularly committed to advancing their narrow class and political interests. To some extent, they surely were that. But these views were hardly outside the mainstream of American politics, particularly among elites, broad swathes of the middle class, and important elements of the working class. Indeed, they comported very conveniently with commonplace views about the virtues of property and order and resonated with what much of the public believed at the time—this is what made them so resonant. And whether contrived or not, they performed an important function. By invoking the virtues of property and order in this way, these Congressmen and the witnesses before them who favored restricting mass picketing and other forms of coercive protest were conspicuously able to couch this position as something other than a malicious attack on the “legitimate” rights of labor. Instead, theirs was a mission to realign the labor law with fundamental American values, to save it from those who had allowed labor policies and the habits of union to stray beyond this field. In this way they were able to deflect, if not disprove, the all-too-apt contention by the legislation’s opponents, repeated many times in the process, that what Taft-Hartley was really about was elevating property rights over human rights.

Added proof that strike militancy was actually indefensible can be found in the fact that no scholars would justify it, not even mass picketing—at least not beyond the point at which it became coercive, which was of course the very point at which it was employed in an effective way. In the wake of the Memorial Day Massacre, most all the major papers sided with the police, declaring the strikers enemies of public order who brought the violence upon themselves. Initially, this stance was premised on distorted readings of the events of that day that charged the strikers with various acts of provocation. But even when the La Follette Committee publicized a Paramount Pictures newsreel (which the company had suppressed) and unearthed other evidence that proved that most all of the blame for what happened that day rested on the police, most of the papers still adhered to this reading of the events.

This attitude toward mass picketing was a centerpiece of revived interest in the right to strike in the major papers, one that extended from the mid 1930s into the 1940s and exceeded the surge in interest of the late 1910s and early 1920s. In 1941, for instance, the New York Herald Tribune described pending legislative attempts to limit mass picketing as “too thoroughly justified to require argument.” In 1946 the New York Times summoned up the rhetoric used to condemn the sitdown trikes and declared mass picketing a “seizure” that was “by its very nature illegal because it infringes both individual and property rights.” Conservative though he was, newspaperman David Lawrence, founder of U.S. News and World Report, spoke for many when he declared mass picketing an act of “violence” by which unionists were seeking to take the law into their own hands. In fact, Lawrence’s judgement that mass picketing was an affront to civil liberties aligned with that of the American Civil Liberties Union, long a champion of labor rights, which, as the New York Times was keen to note, also condemned the tactic in these terms.

Such views fit with a broader tendency to criticize the right to strike as being too aggressively employed by unionists and too generously construed by the courts and the NLRB. In the decade between the validation of the Wagner and the passage of Taft-Hartley, newspapers gave voice to a criticism of mass picketing and other erstwhile excessive forms of strike behavior, one that typically described the Wagner Act as having gone too far in protecting workers’ prerogatives to protest. A typical example of the content and tenor of these pieces is a 1941 editorial in the Chicago Daily Tribune:

“The right to strike” is now used frequently to mean the right of union leaders to force men who don’t want to strike to do so. It is used to justify the seizure of industries and the blockading of factories by mass picketing to prevent the entrance of workers who are satisfied with their working conditions and the movement of goods in and out of the plants. “The right to strike” in this sense means not only that every strike is right but that every measure which may be adopted to win a strike is right.

In fact, at this crucial moment it was common for elites of all stripes to claim that they supported the right to strike and yet to assert that it was being abused by unionists who insisted on winning every labor dispute and using coercive and disorderly methods to do so. In 1946, Hebert Hoover, who might well have denied just such a thing fifteen years earlier, inveighed that “Nobody denies that there is a ‘right’ to strike”; but that right, he said, had been abused to the detriment of the public interest. Although considerably more liberal than Hoover, Walter Lippmann, the extremely popular political commentator, offered a similar judgement about a railroad strike that same year, concluding “we must henceforth refuse to regard the right to strike as universal and absolute, and as one of the inalienable rights of man.” Also writing in 1946, Henry Ford II, whose father had used a small army of thugs and toughs to enforce the open shop at his plants and bitterly fought unionization until 1941, now purported at once to support the right to strike—and to believe that it should be limited. “There is no longer any question of the right of organized workers to strike, but that right,” he said, “is being misused.”

Like Taft-Hartley’s supporters in Congress, figures like Hoover, Lippmann, and Ford did not trouble themselves to confess that such tactics as they so blithely condemned might actually be necessary to counterbalance the power of employers and give life and meaning to a statute that did not take adequate account of this basic reality, let alone that they were essential in establishing the idea that workers enjoyed any enforceable right to strike. But they did not have to, either; for they honestly did not believe that labor should generally prevail. Liberal or conservative, it did not matter; these were capitalists in a capitalist society, contented, consistent with their values, with a right to strike that went little further than a right to withhold one’s labor. To be sure, these were not the views of ordinary people. But the public’s perspective did not seem to vary all that much from those of elites. Although overall approval of union membership as measured in Gallup surveys slipped noticeably after 1937, it remained quite high—well above fifty percent right through the 1940s. Nevertheless, Gallup surveys taken in June 1937, after the big wave of sit-strikes had waned noticeably, but while mass picketing and overall levels of labor militancy remained high, revealed that fifty-seven percent supported the proposition that the militia should “be called out whenever strike trouble threatens.”

As with the sit-down strikes, too, the status of mass picketing and other forms of strike militancy can also be gauged by the way these tactics were defended. During the hearings on Taft-Hartley, only a few labor leaders stood against the torrent of criticism of these practices by businessmen, conservative unionists, and congressmen and senators, and tried to parry the move to prohibit the strikes. With only a couple of exceptions, most of them consistently qualified their defense of these tactics by downplaying their coercive qualities—again the very thing that made them so effective in the first place—while also describing them as expedients, presumably temporary, that were justified by the unreasonable stances of some employers.

While the political motivations and implications of this campaign against these forms of strike militancy might be as dubious as the attacks on the sit-down strikes, their value in expressing dominant political judgments concerning these tactics is not. Repeatedly, it was taken for granted that workers could not be allowed to excessively coerce their fellow workers, that they should be obliged to adhere to their contractual obligations, that they did not own the streets or the workplace, and that whatever the right to strike was, it was surely, as Brandeis had insisted, not an absolute right. Of course, all of this was controversial for many unionists. But unionists were almost the only ones to really push back against these measures. Even President Harry Truman’s dramatic veto of Taft-Hartley is widely regarded as a political move taken with the expectation that Congress would override the veto anyway. It is also notable that despite dedicating itself to this aim, the labor movement has never come close to repealing the Taft-Hartley Act, or even securing the enactment of favorable amendments to any of its provisions.

And then there is the replacement worker doctrine where, if anything, the change in the law even more clearly reflected the depth and power of liberal norms. For the rule established in Mackay Radio came out of the blue. It was set forth in a case which required no such question to be resolved, in a manner that drew no support from the text of the Wagner Act, and on the basis of legislative history that was ambiguous at best. Worse, as Getman points out, the rule is in direct conflict with the very statutory principle of barring discrimination on the basis of a worker’s assertion of the basic labor rights laid out in § 7 that it was, itself, supposedly derived from.

As an exercise in statutory construction and administration, Mackay Radio makes no sense; but as a defense of property rights it makes all the sense in the world. One way to see this is to consider what would have happened had the Court decided the matter in a fundamentally different way. If employers were barred from replacing economic strikers, it seems likely that strikes would have proliferated to an extraordinary extent, as workers could at least plausibly have expected to be able to strike under a broad array of circumstances and yet be restored to their jobs no matter the outcome. But precisely because such a doctrine would have given workers so much power, Congress would almost certainly have stepped in with its own rule, codifying employers’ right to permanently replace striking workers and bringing this to an end. Ultimately, it is difficult to imagine a much more liberal alternative to the Mackay Radio rule surviving for very long—a point that also draws support from labor’s failure to repeal the rule in Congress in the early 1990s.

A simple exercise in counterfactual speculation bears similar fruit in regard to other, more basic, limitations on the right to strike, including those imposed relative to sit-down strikes, mass picketing, and secondary boycotts. Shrill and self-interested though it was, all the testimony from employers and their allies during the hearings on Taft-Hartley or Landrum-Griffin about the perils posed by these tactics, was fundamentally correct. For were workers able to make unfettered use of sit-down strikes, mass picketing, and general strikes and sympathy walkouts, they could have very much challenged the sovereignty of capitalists in and about the workplace, and with this the bedrock institutions and norms of liberal society. As Jim Pope puts it, Charles Evans Hughes’ opinion in Fansteel established the maxim that “the employer could violate the workers’ statutory rights without sacrificing its property rights, while the workers could not violate the employer’s property rights without sacrificing their statutory rights.” This is unquestionably true. But equally unquestionable is that neither this court nor any other important arbiter of legal rights in this country was ever prepared to endorse the contrary view that property rights might be sufficiently subordinate to labor rights as to justify the kinds of tactics by which workers could routinely defeat powerful employers on the fields of industrial conflict.

Significantly, there is no reason to believe that any of this has changed or is poised to change today. Quite the contrary: In a culture and political system more immersed than ever in the veneration of order and control, mediated by criminal law and police work, by the celebration of property rights, and by a readiness to punish violence, it is all but unthinkable that the courts or the NLRB would deign to give legal sanction to workers to engage in any sustained way in the kinds of tactics that might make going on strike a worthwhile thing to do.

#### Affirming glorious unproductively is useless, and not in a good way, capitalism is a vibe killer and refusing commitment to political projects cements the system.

Hollywood, 10 [Amy, prof at Harvard’s Divinity School, “Sensible Ecstasy: Mysticism, Sexual Difference, and the Demands of History,” 2010, 30-1]//Townes

From Sartre’s perspective, Bataille’s desire to be all is itself a form of totalitarian thinking. According to Sartre, then, Bataille’s methodological confusions are intimately related to his “bad faith” concerning God, salvation, and mysticism, for his desire to stand outside the human condition and history is reflected in his claim to scientific objectivity. “M. Bataille vainly attempts to integrate himself into the machinery that he has set up [montée]: he remains outside, with Durkheim, with Hegel, with God the Father” (NM 166). By claiming scientific objectivity, Sartre argues, Bataille allies himself with the absolute and thereby attempts to escape the very human condition he describes; he wants to escape history, engagement with history, and hence politics. Sartre’s and Bataille’s opposing attitudes toward human projects are crucial here. Sartre insists that to be human is to engage in projects; Bataille argues that inner experience is the opposite of project; thus he generates endlessly recursive negations of his own attempt to provide a method for attaining inner experience. As Jean-François Louette argues, for Sartre a project unifies the course of time and gives it the form of an intention that wants to inscribe itself in the course of things. Sartre, in maintaining against Bataille the notion of project, defends at the same time his ontology of time and the condition for the possibility of politics. This is defined at the same time as putting the self into play without hope of winning everything . . . ; and as a nonecstatic, because not instantaneous, temporality, one which forms 31 “the framework of new enterprises” for “a new humanity who will surpass itself toward new ends.” 8 Louette here cites Sartre’s closing injunction to Bataille. For Sartre, if inner experience does not give rise to new enterprises it is worth nothing more than “the pleasure of drinking a glass of alcohol or of warming oneself in the sun at the beach” (NM 187). Such experiences are, for Sartre, “useless.” Finally, Sartre accuses Bataille of claiming to wish to communicate while writing with a contempt for his audience that blocks communication. Sartre outlines Bataille’s constant queries about how silence and interior experience can be communicated and suggests that Bataille, who was for a brief period a devout Christian, remains a crypto-Christian despite his overt atheism. 9 Bataille writes only for the “apprentice mystic”; but even such “preaching to the converted” causes him distress (NM 151– 52). Ultimately, like the evangelist possessed of a truth that he is required to share, “the communication that he wants to establish is without reciprocity. He is in the heights, we are down below. He delivers us a message: he receives it who can. But that which adds to our trouble, is that the summit from which he speaks to us is at the same time the profound ‘abyss’ of abjection” (NM 152). Once again, we see the interrelation of Sartre’s three critiques, for to stand on the heights bestowing a message on those below is to stand outside the human condition with a truth one must convey to those still trapped within it. The injunction to speak or to write generates endless paradoxes, according to Sartre, for Bataille must move from a singular experience of eternity back into time in order to speak to those still immersed within history. The paradoxes generated by the demand for speech give rise, Sartre suggests, to Bataille’s “hatred of discourse” and to the fragmentation and disdain of his writing.

#### Vote neg to join the party – dual power organizing is the only path to revolutionary change.

Escalante ‘18

[Alyson, philosophy at U of Oregon. 08/24/2018. “Against Electoralism, For Dual Power!” <https://theforgenews.org/2018/08/24/against-electoralism-for-dual-power/>] pat

I am sure that at this point, the opportunists reading this have already begun to type out their typical objection: the world is different than it was in 1917, and the conditions of the United States in no way echo the conditions which enabled the Bolsheviks to achieve revolutionary success.

To this tried and true objection, there is one simple answer: you are entirely correct, and that is why we need to abandon electoralism and working within the bourgeois state.

What were the conditions which allowed the Bolsheviks to successfully revolt? The conditions were that of Dual Power. Alongside the capitalist state, there existed a whole set of institutions and councils which met the needs of the workers. The soviets, a parallel socialist government made up of individual councils, successfully took over many governmental responsibilities in some parts of Petrograd. In the radical Viborg district, the Bolshevik controlled soviets provided government services like mail, alongside programs that could meet the needs of workers. When a far right coup was attempted against the provisional government, it was troops loyal to the Bolshevik factions within the soviet who repelled the coup plotters, proving concretely to the workers of Petrograd that the socialists could not only provide for their needs, but also for their defense.

In short: the Bolsheviks recognized that instead of integrating into the bourgeois state, they could operate outside of it to build dual power. They could establish programs of elected representatives who would serve the workers. They would not bolster the capitalist state in the name of socialism, they would offer an alternative to it.

And so, when the time came for revolt, the masses were already to loyal to the Bolsheviks. The only party who had never compromised, who had denounced the unpopular imperialist wars, who had rejected the provisional government entirely, was the party who successfully gained the support of the workers.

And so, many of us on the more radical fringes of the socialist movement wonder why it is the the DSA and other socialist opportunists seem to think that we can win by bolstering the capitalist state? We wonder, given this powerful historical precedent, why they devote their energy to getting more Ocasios elected; what good does one more left democrat who will abandon the workers do for us?

The answer we receive in return is always the same: we want to win small changes that will make life for the workers easier; we want to protect food stamps and healthcare.

And do this, we reply: what makes you think reformism is the only way to do this. When the bourgeois state in California was happy to let black children go to school unfed, the Black Panthers didn’t rally around democratic candidates, they became militant and fed the children themselves. In the 40s and 50s, socialists in New York saw people going without healthcare and instead of rallying behind democratic candidates, they built the IWO to provide healthcare directly. Both these groups took up our pressing revolutionary task: building dual power.

Imagine if all those hours the DSA poured into electing Ocasio were instead used to feed the people of New York, to provide them with medical care, to ensure their needs were met. Imagine the masses seeing socialism not as a pipe dream we might achieve through electing more imperialists, but as a concrete movement which is currently meeting their needs?

The fact is, we are not nearly ready for revolution. Socialists in the United States have failed to meet the needs of the people, and as long as their only concrete interaction with the masses is handing them a voter registration form, they will continue to fail the people. Our task now is not to elect representatives to advocate for the people; it is much more gruelingly laborious than that. Our task is to serve the people. Our task is to build dual power.

The movement to do this is underway. Members of the DSA refoundation caucus have begun to move the left of the DSA in this direct, socialist groups like Philly Socialists have begun to build dual power through GED programs and tenants unions, many branches of the Party For Socialism and Liberation have begun to feed the people and provide for their concrete needs, and Red Guard collectives in Los Angeles have built serve the people programs and taken on a stance of militant resistance to gentrification. The movement is growing, its time is coming, and dual power is achievable within our life time.

The opportunists are, in a sense, correct. We are not where we were in 1917, but we can begin to move in that direction and dual power can take us there. In order to achieve dual power we have to recognize that Lenin was right: there will be no socialist gains by working within state institutions designed to crush socialism. Furthermore, we must recognize that the strategies of the electoral opportunists trade off with dual power. Electing candidates drains resources, time, and energy away from actually serving the people.

And so, we should commit to undertake the difficult and dangerous task of building dual power. We must reject opportunism, we must name the democratic party as our enemy, we must rally around power directly in the hands of the socialist movement. We do not have a parallel system of soviets in the United States. We can change that. Someday the cry “all power to the soviets” will be heard again. Lets make it happen.

## Case

### u/v

#### Presumption permissibility negate

#### Infinite reasons why something is false before it is true

#### Negating is harder: first and last speech means ethos wins rounds

#### 1ar restart means the 2n doesn’t have the ability to beat back every layer

#### Vote neg on presumption to embrace the incoherence of readings—the fact they packaged Bataille into a debate is only a disservice to Bataille’s thought at the limit

**Noys 2k**

Benjamin Noys. *Georges Bataille: A Critical Introduction*. 2000. https://monoskop.org/images/a/ac/Noys\_Benjamin\_Georges\_Bataille\_A\_Critical\_Introduction\_2000.pdf

This process has also happened to Bataille as well as many other ‘extreme’ or ‘transgressive’ writers and artists. They are put to use to produce a controlled pleasure by being appropriated and then excreted. In this way we can come to terms with the most extreme works and actually exploit the scandal they provoke. However, this appropriation can never completely control the foreign body or make it completely safe for the cultural market place. The foreign body that cannot be dealt with is the one that still remains despite being expelled. Both Bataille and Sade play the foreign body that exists on the limit, that cannot be safely contained within or held outside. As Bataille explains, these gestures try to excrete Sade but Sade offers an economy that wallows in excrement. This will open a thought of the heterogeneous, of ‘unassimilable elements’ (VE, 99; BR, 155), which can neither be rejected nor appropriated. It also means that Bataille cannot be either rejected or appropriated: to reject Bataille is to fail to read him but to become an apologist for Bataille, to celebrate him,11 is also to fail to read him. What Bataille requires is a reading that respects the heterogeneity of his thought, a thought that is of and at the limit. In this book I will explore this reading to argue that any introduction to Bataille has to try and negotiate with his heterogeneity without simply excreting it. What we have seen is that we can only arrive at Bataille through Sade, because it is Sade who poses the problem of the foreign body. For Bataille there are two tendencies in Sade’s writings: firstly, ‘an irruption of excremental forces’ (VE, 92; BR, 148) and secondly, ‘a corresponding limitation’ (VE, 93; BR, 149). These two tendencies are in conflict, with the excremental forces 4 GEORGES BATAILLE challenging the limitations that arise from their eruption. The two tendencies are also reflected in the reception of Sade, which has responded to the eruption of his writings with limitations by either rejecting them or confining them by admiration. Instead Bataille analyses eruption as the essential movement of Sade’s writings and as the destruction of all limitations. In this way he tries to free Sade from the limitations imposed by his readers. The ‘violent excitation’ (VE, 101; BR, 158) of Sade’s work shakes those who reject it and those who try to appropriate it. It threatens to overflow the limitations in which they try to confine Sade. Bataille is also an irruptive force of violent excitation, and this accounts for the excitement of reading him. The irruptive forces which are condensed in Bataille’s works threaten to destroy any reading that imposes a sense on Bataille or tries to place him within limits. To do so is to destroy the thought of freedom that is central to all of Bataille’s work. If we do not read Bataille as a thinker of freedom then we do not read him at all. He has to be read between the gestures of rejection and appropriation for the heterogeneity of his writings and the heterogeneity he exposes at work in all writings to be uncovered. For Bataille ‘the certainty of incoherence in reading, the inevitable crumbling of the soundest constructions, is the deep truth of books’ (ON, 184). Bataille’s objective is to expose all writing to the violent excitation of the heterogeneous and so to force us to confront the impossibility at the heart of thought.

#### Bataille wildly inflates the value of ecstasy and tempting death – in doing so, he ignores the value of living

Johnson 03 DAVID JOHNSON has a DPhil. in English and Related Literature (York University), an MA (Distinction) in Continental Philosophy (Warwick University) and a BA (Hons) in Literature and Philosophy (Middlesex Polytechnic). Time & Society copyright © 2003 available via SAGE database

Life is a serious business of highly charged temporal stakes, involving a being’s struggle to secure for itself the experience of pleasure time/free time rather than pain time/slave time. Since lived time is a living stake, death is not the profound phenomenon that Bataille thinks it is. For one who is racked by drawn-out pain, the pain of death situated at the end of time is an irrelevance. And for one who is caught up in the throes of extended pleasure, the dubious pleasure of death is likewise irrelevant. Death, far from being profound, may simply provide a pragmatic escape from a life of pain and toil, or a simple halt to a life of pleasure and freedom. We can see death as important to time in that it is the end of the great game of time, the great flow. But death is relative in importance to time for the same reason; it is simply the end of the great game of time, a game without which it would be pure abstraction. However, we are not suggesting that death has absolutely no importance for living beings. On the contrary. By countering Bataille’s view of death, which tries to domesticate death through attempting to engage it in ‘intimate’ dialogue, and which tries to make political gain out of death, we can see death as a real, non-negotiable phenomenon. Death can no longer be thought of as an ambiguous but essentially accessible deity, but must instead be seen as that which wipes out real substantial time with no hope of appeal. Death can now be viewed as a certain element in the game of time, as something to be dreaded or desired as the end of time, but which has no fixed moral or political meaning in itself. By affirming the reality of time we are in fact affirming the reality of death, and so we are proposing a more tragic philosophy than the one Bataille proposes – which is ironic, given that Bataille is considered by most postmodernist/ post-structuralist philosophers to be perhaps the cruellest thinker.

#### Bataille’s interpretation of emancipation is inextricably linked to a hegemonically masculine notion of “virility”—can’t separate Bataille from a politics of sexual conformity

**Gekle 16**

Lea Jenny Sophia Gekle (Columbia law student). “The Political Consequences of Bataille’s Critique of Reason.” November 7, 2016. http://blogs.law.columbia.edu/nietzsche1313/lea-gekle-the-political-consequences-of-batailles-critique-of-reason/

In the discussion following the 2/13 Nietzsche session, Prof. R. C. Morris was asked by the participants of the seminar session to expand upon two concepts that she had introduced in the day’s presentation. One could sum these ideas up with two questions: First, how must we understand Bataille’s concept of subversion? And second, one must ask how Bataille’s political emancipatory project is linked to his specific concept of virility. Asking these two questions means to point out a paradox: The use of the concept of virility for an emancipatory project seems more than surprising, it is contradictory. If virility is understood as well as a “male quality,” or like “strength or power” as the Cambridge Dictionary suggests[1], it is difficult to understand how such a concept of virility which is based on the exclusion of everything with isn’t considered to be “virile”, can propose a base for emancipatory politics, meaning, politics which enable the subjects, all human beings to self-determine themselves. I will propose, using Jürgen Habermas highly critical and negative analysis of Nietzsche and post-Nietzschean thoughts, to interrogate certain key concepts of Bataille and to, I hope, problematize and raise questions about the usefulness of Bataille’s concepts for emancipatory politics. In order to understand the historical context of Bataille’s reading of Nietzsche, as well as his use of subversion, — rather than from a Marxist understanding of the revolutionary subject as he develops it in “The Psychological Structure of Fascism”[2], — I will, with a first step, return to the differences in the forms of critique of reason which appeared in the 19th and 20th centuries. This approach, I think, is necessary to understand why Bataille’s reference to Nietzsche’s critique of reason has a political impact, and pushes him to consider subversion as the necessary political practice. According to this, my first part (I) will be a reconstruction of Habermas’ distinction between two kinds of critique of reason. It will lead us to the different interpretations of Nietzschean thought in the 20th century, and I will highlight the concrete political aim underlying Bataille’s Nietzsche reading (II). This will take us to our final part (III) where I will touch on the question of Bataille’s uses for emancipatory politics, and the paradox that exists between the ideal of a liberated society and the concept of virility. Critique of Reason. Classifying Bataille’s critique of reason in a larger historical context Jürgen Habermas, in his large scale study, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity”[3], on the main Western European philosophical debates of the 19th and 20th century, draws clear distinctions between “three perspectives on modernity”[4]. The first two must be understood as a direct answer to Hegel’s conception of modernity and are therefore an intrinsic critique of Hegel. This is the case for the “Left Hegelianism” and “Right-Hegelianism”. Habermas’ calls his third perspective on modernity, simply, “Nietzsche”[5]. It is the latter which becomes for Habermas the “turning point”[6] or, the “entry in into Postmodernity”[7]. But, before getting to the third perspective, Nietzsche, it seems helpful to focus on the commonalities Habermas recognizes in the “Left-Hegelian” perspective and the “Nietzschean perspective”. Above all else, it is the critique of the self-positing reason. He writes in the third lecture “Left Hegelians, Right Hegelians and Nietzsche”: The accusation is aimed against a reason grounded in the principle of subjectivity. And it states that this reason denounces and undermines all unconcealed forms of suppression and exploitation, of degradation and alienation, only to set up in their place the unassailable domination of rationality.[8] Reason itself becomes domination. Both lines of heritage, that of the Left Hegelians and that of Nietzsche, do make of the critique of Enlightenment reason the main purpose for their philosophies. Following the observation of society made by Adorno and Horkheimer — to name two of the most famous philosophers in the tradition of “Left-Hegelianism” and founders of the Critical Theory, the concept of reason which has been introduced by enlightenment philosophy does not stand up to its own promise; to liberate humankind. On the contrary, instead of liberating and making humankind wholly autonomous, it becomes oppression and domination.[9] In the “late capitalis[t]”[10] society of the “culture industry”[11], reason is reduced to “becom[ing] merely an aid to the all-encompassing economic apparatus.”[12] Bataille, on the other hand, is conceived and conceives himself in the tradition of the Nietzschean critique of Reason. This specific tradition of Reason Critique, in difference to the Left-Hegelian tradition, wants, as Habermas writes: [To] remove the dialectical thorn from the critique of reason centered in the subject and shriveled into purposive rationality; and he [Nietzsche] related to reason as a whole the way the Young Hegelians did to its sublimations: Reason is nothing else [in cursive in the original] than power, than the will to power, which it so radiantly conceals.[13] Whereas the Left-Hegelian critique, as well as their heirs (i.e. first generation of Frankfurt School), still believe in the ideals of the Aufklärung, Nietzsche refuses this ideal of the Aufklärung as being already a narrative of a problematic conception of reason. “Reason”, in every way, “is power”[14], as Habermas puts it. A critique of the self-positing reason which navigates only in the pre-determined framework given by reason itself, is incapable of profoundly “changing the perspective” [15] on reason. In other words, if we want to critique present time we must have another framework beyond the limited one of the Enlightenment to make a change in perspective possible. Nietzsche proposes a critique of reason which has recourse to a frame which is not determined by occidental reason.[16] Different uses of Nietzsche While comparing Heidegger’s and Bataille’s different Nietzsche readings, Habermas identifies something which seems to me to be particularly important. Habermas locates the political aim in which Bataille’s Nietzsche reading is embedded.[17] He writes: “In November 1933, when Heidegger was making his campaign speeches for the “Führer”, Bataille published a study of The Psychological Structure of Fascism”[18]. Here, Habermas opposes Heideggers political action with Bataille’s theoretical enterprise which is intrinsically tied to the political aim, for a free, “libertarian socialistic society”[19]. This is why, Habermas tells us, Bataille’s reading of Nietzsche must be understood within the horizon of human emancipation: “[J]ust as Nietzsche did in the Genealogy of Morals, so Bataille studies the demarcating and ever fuller extirpating of everything heterogeneous by which the modern world of purposively rational labor, consumption, and domination is constituted. […] But in Bataille’s account the heterogeneous, extraneous elements appear […] as subversive forces that can only be convulsively released if they are unfettered within a libertarian socialistic society.”[20] In every society, but especially in the society of the developing capitalism, societies produce heterogeneous elements, which are “impossible to assimilate”[21]. Even though, we will see this in the third part of this essay, Bataille’s distinction between a subversion with an emancipatory aim and a fascist subversion is ambivalent, it is certain that it’s only society’s excluded heterogeneous elements which can become subversive. For Bataille, the emancipatory heterogeneous elements have the capacity to subvert the “social slavishness”[22]. Bataille’s Nietzsche reading is driven by the very idea that “subversion continues to pursue the emancipation.”[23]. This is why he writes: Nietzsche dreamed of humanness that, far from fleeing its tragic fate, would love and embrace this fate to the fullest, a humanness that would no longer lie to itself and would raise itself above the social slavishness.[24] Now, once we’ve seen the political motives behind Bataille’s Nietzsche reading, we will have to analyze more precisely what Professor Morris highlighted in her presentation , “Of Bataille, Sur Nietzsche, Über Humanism … and other virilities”: the problematic co-existence of the emancipatory aspirations of Georges Batailles, which are directly linked to the celebration of virility. More than that: Virility becomes, to Bataille, the very concept of a certain self-determination. Political use of Bataille’s subversion Bataille’s paradoxes make him interesting, in his political theories as in his pornography. It has been claimed that his attitude toward Fascism was troublingly equivocal. Hollier, confronting that claim, has argued on the contrary that the equivocal nature of Bataille’s thought saved him from Fascism: ‘A little equivocation gets close to Fascism, a lot of it moves away from it.’’ That is because Fascism, like other political ideologies, abhors the equivocal.[25] If we want to, we could speak about two connected equivocations: The first is, as Suleiman has let us know, Bataille’s often quoted, ambiguous relation with fascism. The second is the ambiguous use of virility as a concept for emancipation. It is Denis Hollier who describes the concept of virility as used by Bataille as « the homeophile fulfilment of human wholeness.”[26]. In order to better understand the equivocation stated by Hollier and Suleiman and to figure out if this latent equivocation is not a manifest paradox, we will have to take a look at Bataille’s already quoted text: The Psychological Structure of Fascism. Bataille’ aim is, in opposition to the Marxist idea of a working class as the revolutionary subject, and, in opposition to the Marxist analysis of fascism present at Bataille’s time, to think anti-fascist resistance not as an opposition between fascism vs communism: “[A]t this moment when a vast convulsion opposes, not so much fascism to communism, but radical imperative forms to the deep subversion which continues to pursue the emancipation of human lives”[27] In order to understand this quote, let’s get back to the ambiguous concept of heterogeneity: For Bataille, there are different kinds of heterogeneity. Some of them can be fascist as well as not fascist. Heterogeneity means above all the systematic exclusion of “bourgeois society”[28]. He writes; The very term heterogeneous indicates that it concerns elements which are impossible to assimilate; this impossibility which has a fundamental impact on social assimilation.[29] The impossibility of society to assimilate the “heterogeneous elements” endows them with specific characteristics, especially “violence, [and] excess”[30]. In addition, they, “provoke affective reaction”.[31] And it is this point which allows one to see, why Mark Mayer writes in his “La virilité dans la psychologie des foules dans l’antifascisme de Bataille”, published in the second Volume of the Cahier Bataille : […] The description by Bataille of crowds and masses, [is] marked [as such] by an apparent obsession for virility and the rejection not only of fascism but also of parliamentarian democracy and communism. It is evident that for Bataille, the crowds with its presumed power to eliminate of the limits of the self in a collective passion of effervescence represented the source of the virilising energy which the modern public of masses needed not only [in order] to escape the alienation and the boredom but also to efficiently resist fascism.[32] Bataille’s is so deeply interested in the fascist movement because he sees an energetic strength acting in fascist masses.[33] But, against this fascist ideal of virility which is linked to the energetic strength Bataille sees in the fascist masses, Bataille presents another sort of virility. A virility which would not be a virility after a fascist ideal but which would have an emancipatory impact. Mayers who also considers this point, writes: “Bataille affirmed that a more positive relation toward the heterogeneous and shapeless energy of the crowds was precisely what needed the left to resist in a virile way to fascism.”[34] Bataille makes it clear, virility in an emancipatory sense is not the same virility as the one in fascism. The first presents the possibility render humanity capable of self-determination and liberty whereas the latter uses the concept of virility which “[u]ltimately only serves to render inner nature’s revolts against instrumental reason adaptable to the imperatives of the latter”[35], as Habermas puts it. Nonetheless Habermas’ questions stays valid: Bataille’s political intentions are of course anti-fascist but his use of “virility” as an emancipatory concept, doesn’t seem able to show concretely “[h]ow the subversively spontaneous expression of these forces [the subversive forces] and the fascist canalizing of them really differ.”[36] Our conclusion must be paradox: Bataille opens with his concept of the heterogeneous and subversion a possibility to think not only of anti-fascist resistance differently than it had been thought in the 1930’s, especially as he analysing more precisely the psychic aspects of fascism. But also, he opens to the possibility to think resistance in a broader political sense in other terms than it had been thought by the Marxist orthodoxy. However, the direct link between “happiness [and] power”[37] and this other form of virility which Bataille seems to have in mind in opposition to a fascist concept of virility still follows the problematic ideal of violence and masculinity.[38] It is at the same time a trap: if virility and the question of affection are both so central to Bataille’s theory of emancipation, it seems impossible to “adjust” his idea of emancipatory subversion to function without it’s reference to virility. If we want to use Bataille for emancipatory or subversive projects today, one must ask: “is it possible to have Bataille’s theory of subversion without the concept of virility? I would like to conclude this short examination with Suleiman’s statement on the subject of virility, which is in my eyes, valid on a political level: […] I fault Bataille finally, for his obsession with virility – the word as much as the concept. As a concept, virility took shifting forms in Bataille’s thought. His continued use of the word, however, locked him into values and into a sexual politics that can only be called conformist, in his time and ours. Rhetorically, virility carries with it too much old baggage. Bataille’s male protagonist may be sexually equivocal, possessing feminine traits and female soul mates; but his rhetoric of virility does not follow them.[39] In our concrete case, this would mean: Even if the distinction between the fascist ideal of virility and the “emancipatory” idea of virility as the “fulfillment of human wholeness,”[40] which Bataille seems to have in mind has become clearer, virility is still too closely linked to its misogynous connotations that it could present a political concept, useful for us to think of human emancipation without excluding everything that is considered “feminine” or simply different from virility.

#### Unions don’t solve inequality – they’re too weak and tons of alt causes

Epstein 20 [Richard A. Epstein Peter and Kirsten Bedford Senior Fellow @ the Hoover Institution. "The Decline Of Unions Is Good News." https://www.hoover.org/research/decline-unions-good-news]

So what then could justify this inefficient provision? One common argument is that unions help reduce the level of income inequality by offering union members a high living wage, as seen in the golden age of the 1950s. But that argument misfires on several fronts. Those high union wages could not survive in the face of foreign competition or new nonunionized firms. The only way a union can provide gains for its members is to extract some fraction of the profits that firms enjoy when they hold monopoly positions.

When tariff barriers are lowered and domestic markets are deregulated, as with the airlines and telecommunications industries, the size of union gains go down. Thus the sharp decline in union membership from 35 percent in both 1945 and 1954 to about 15 percent in 1985 led to no substantial increase in the fraction of wealth earned by the top 10 percent of the economy during that period. However, the income share of the top ten percent rose to about 40 percent over the next 15 years as union membership fell to below 10 percent by 2000.

But don’t be fooled—that 5 percent change in union membership cannot drive widespread inequality for the entire population, which is also affected by a rise in the knowledge economy as well as a general aging of the population. The far more powerful distributive effects are likely to be those from nonunion workers whose job prospects within a given firm have been compromised by higher wages to union workers.

It is even less clear that the proposals of progressives like Sanders, Warren, and Buttigieg to revamp the labor rules would reverse the decline of unions. Not only is the American labor market more competitive, but the work place is no longer dominated by large industrial assembly lines where workers remain in their same position for years. Today, workforces are far more heterogeneous and labor turnover is far higher. It is therefore much more difficult for a union to organize a common front among workers with divergent interests.

Employers, too, have become much more adept at resisting unionization in ways that no set of labor laws can capture. It is no accident that plants are built in states like Tennessee and Mississippi, and that facilities are designed in ways to make it more difficult to picket or shut down. None of these defensive maneuvers would be necessary if, as I have long advocated, firms could post notices announcing that they will not hire union members, as they could do before the passage of the NLRA.

#### Unions are vulnerable to right-wing populism – turns case

Gruenberg 21 [Mark Gruenberg is head of the Washington, D.C., bureau of People's World. He is also the editor of Press Associates Inc. (PAI), a union news service in Washington, D.C. that he has headed since 1999. Previously, he worked as Washington correspondent for the Ottaway News Service, as Port Jervis bureau chief for the Middletown, NY Times Herald Record, and as a researcher and writer for Congressional Quarterly. Mark obtained his BA in public policy from the University of Chicago and worked as the University of Chicago correspondent for the Chicago Daily News. "Worldwide, union leaders grapple with members backing right-wing ‘populists’." https://peoplesworld.org/article/worldwide-union-leaders-grapple-with-members-backing-right-wing-populists/]

WASHINGTON—For years, union leaders on both sides of “The Pond”—also known as the Atlantic Ocean—have faced a problem: Right-wing ideologues’ “populist” rhetoric sways millions of their members to vote against their own interests.

And then once those putative plutocrats achieve public office, they show their true colors, by enacting and enforcing repressive pro-corporate anti-worker laws.

The problem is visible in the U.S., where 40% of union members and their families backed former GOP Oval Office occupant Donald Trump in 2020. But it’s not just Trump.

Over the years, millions supported other right-wing Republicans such as Sens. Mitch McConnell (Ky.), Ted Cruz (Texas), various U.S. representatives, Gov. Greg Abbott (Texas), and former Govs. Bruce Rauner (Ill.) and Scott Walker (Wis.).

All of them, especially Trump and Cruz, spout populist bombast and claim to represent workers—and then enact edicts benefiting the corporate class.

“Trump’s policies favored the rich and the well-connected. But four in ten union voters wanted to give him a second term” last November, said Knut Pankin, moderator of a late-March panel discussion on Right-Wing Populism As An Anti-Worker Agenda. “Why?”

The dilemma exists in other democracies, too. Some unionists heeded anti-immigrant screeds from Germany’s extreme right Alternative for Deutschland, Marine LePen’s French National Rally (formerly the National Front), Norbert Hofer’s Austrian Freedom Party, Hungarian Prime Minister/strongman Viktor Orban of Fidesz, and Poland’s Law and Justice Party, panelists said.

Once those blocs won power in Austria, Poland, and Hungary, or influenced elections in France, mainstream politicians followed their lead, cracking down on workers as well as targeting migrants. The pols feared they would otherwise lose more votes to the right.

The panel, sponsored by Georgetown University’s Kalmanovitz Initiative for Labor and the Working Poor, and the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, a foundation set up to foster U.S.- German relations, tried to figure out why workers vote that way—and how to reorient them.

That’s not to say panelists Vonda McDaniel, president of the Nashville, Tenn., Central Labor Council, Prof. Federico Finchelstein, an expert on East European politics at New York’s New School for Social Research, and Prof. Thomas Greven of the Free University of Berlin reached a conclusion. They offered some reasons for the rightward shift and some solutions.

All those parties, including the GOP, “started as bourgeois, middle-class, shopkeeper-oriented” organizations, but have since pivoted to right-wing populism, Greven explained.

“Cruz at the Conservative Political Action Conference was trying to be the inheritor of the white working class who supported Trump,” he contended. The Texan proclaimed the GOP “the party of steelworkers, construction workers, police officers, firefighters, and waitresses.”

Nationalism, protectionism, and racism

“But one common denominator” is the GOP and the other right-wing parties, plus the workers they appeal to, “have a radicalized response” that “is nationalist, protectionist and nativist…to all facets of globalization,” he said. Those facets include corporate export of workers’ jobs to low-wage nations and resentment of refugees and migrants, often people of color whom white nativists in Europe and the U.S. view as a threat.

“’Us versus them’ is much easier to sell to working-class constituents. Union status doesn’t inoculate people versus right-wing populism,” Greven said. While populists’ pro-worker rhetoric is “a charade,” and progressives’ answer, “tax the rich,” is not enough, he added.

## 2n

#### The 1AR might be persuasive, but they’ve missed the boat on the impact level – capitalism is collapsing now – Badiou says ecological tipping points mean production is terminally unsustainable – two impacts –

#### Extinction – warming causes ocean acidification and biodiversity loss which makes the earth inhospitable – it’s the only irreversible impact which means it should be at the top of your impact calculus – preserving the capacity for human value is intrinsically good.

#### Turns case – collapse causes resource wars, ecological violence, and wealth consolidation which pave the way for neo-fascism and imperial lash-out – that intensifies [aff impact] at every level which means uniqueness flips negative on all their impacts – it’s try-or-die to generate organizing tactics that can generate the speed, scope and scale needed to confront the coming crisis.

### 2NR – Alt – Escalante

#### Vote negative for communist organizing – that’s Escalante ‘18 – the party uses dual power to recruit members by providing services such as food, water, counselling, shelter, employment or education that show the masses the failures of capitalism which creates disinvestment from the system – examples like Feed the People programs or the Red Guard’s militant resistance to gentrification prove it provides an alternative to capitalist reformism [as opposed to the aff’s painting of it as inevitable] to win loyalty from the masses. This isn’t just endless institution building – it works for a formal, public organization of the Communist Party designed to directly challenge capitalism – that’s the only way to create revolutionary change.

#### The rights link – 1NC White says that liberal capitalist societies will never allow an expansive interpretation of the right to strike – they’ve conceded that post-plan, the courts will interpret it in as limited in scope as possible and will allow for replacement workers and police crackdowns which zeroes solvency – but when [aff evidence says a neoliberal thing], it proves that the framework of labor rights they have adopted still relies on capitalist notions of property and good faith market arrangements which means that any truly militant worker agitation will be forcibly quelled – conservative union leadership coupled with increased public scrutiny will be used to make exercise of labor power ineffective at best and actively worse for the labor movement at worse because any truly radical exercise of the right to strike will be framed as too radical by bourgeois media which turns any internal link to movement building.

#### The Role of the Ballot is to endorse the best organizational tactics – this round is a question of whether you think the best way to confront the coming crisis is through a revolutionary vanguard or their strategy of reformism – Badiou says the masses have energy, but lack theories of organization – debate should be an ideological testing ground for ways to guide organizing – it means they don’t get to weigh the plan in a vacuum, but have to justify their entire strategy in the context of it.