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#### Welcome to the age of the World Computer where society has become a series of 1’s and 0’s that codifies life through a series of abstraction in which racial capitalism uses to codify difference along lines of race, gender, and class through history. Information is not a real product of the world but is rather a byproduct of this new system that arises from value management. The World Computer uses our every move to repair itself through the punishment of difference. The role of the ballot should be to resist informatics – resisting further automation of our thought processes is key

* For spec purposes:
  + Anything can function as offense as long as it proves/disproves how the resolution substantively challenges the World Computer.
  + Weighing between how each method functions, and indicting separate methods
  + Any advocacy that challenges the World Computer is acceptable

Beller 21 (Jonathan Beller; 2021; Duke University Press; *“The World Computer: Derivative Conditions of Racial Capitalism”*; accessed 4/11/21; ask me for the pdf; Jonathan Beller is a film theorist, culture critic and mediologist. He currently holds the position of Professor of Humanities and Media Studies and Critical and Visual Studies, Pratt Institute, Brooklyn, NY. He is the recipient of numerous awards and fellowships including Mellon, J.P. Getty and Fulbright Foundation grants and honours.; pages 6-17) HB

Information as Real Abstraction Taking the notion that Capital was always a computer as a starting point (DyerWitheford, 2013), The World Computer understands the history of the commodification of life as a process of encrypting the world’s myriad qualities as quantities. Formal and informal techniques, from double-entry bookkeeping and racialization, to the rise of information and discrete state machines, imposed and extended the tyranny of racial capital’s relentless calculus of profit. By means of the coercive colonization of almost all social spaces, categories, and representations—where today language, image, music, and communication all depend upon a computational substrate that is an outgrowth of fixed capital— all, or nearly all, expressivity has been captured in the dialectic of massive capital accumulation on the one side and radical dispossession on the other. Currently the money-likeness of expression—visible as “likes” and in other attention metrics that treat attention and affect as currency—is symptomatic of the financialization of daily life (Martin, 2015a). All expression, no matter what its valence, is conscripted by algorithms of profit that intensify inequality by being put in the service of racial capitalism; consequently, we are experiencing a near-apocalyptic, world-scale failure to be able to address global crises including migration for reparations, carceral systems, genocide, militarism, climate racism, racism, pandemic, anti-Blackness, extinction, and other geopolitical ills. The colonization of semiotics by racial capital has rendered all “democratic” modes of governance outmoded save those designed for the violent purpose of extracting profits for the enfranchised. Culturally these modes of extraction take the form of fractal fascism. An understanding that informationalized semiotic practices function as financial derivatives may allow for a reimagining of the relationship between language, visuality, and that other economic medium, namely money, in an attempt to reprogram economy and therefore the creation and distribution of value—and thus also the politics and potentials of representation. In what would amount to an end to postmodernism understood as the cultural logic of late capitalism, our revolutionary politics require, as did the communisms of the early twentieth century, a new type of economic program. In the age of computation, putting political economy back on the table implies a reprogramming of our cultural logics as economic media for the radical redress of the ills of exploitation and the democratization of the distribution of the world social product. Sustainable communism requires the decolonizaton of abstraction and the remaking of the protocols of social practice that give rise to real abstraction. Though in this section we will more narrowly address the issues of money, race, and information as “real abstraction,” and their role in computational racial capitalism, we note the overarching argument for the larger study: 1 Commodification inaugurates the global transformation of qualities into quantities and gives rise to the world computer. 2 “Information” is not a naturally occurring reality but emerges in the footprint of price and is always a means to posit the price of a possible or actual product. 3 The general formula for capital, M-C-M′, where M is money, C is commodity, and M′ is more money) can be rewritten M-I-M′, where I is information. 4 “Labor,” Attention, Cognition, Metabolism, Life converge as “Informatic Labor” whose purpose, with respect to Capital, is to create state changes in the Universal Turing Machine that is the World Computer—racial capital’s relentless, granular, and planetary computation of its accounts. 5 Semiotics, representation, and categories of social difference function as financial derivatives—as wagers on the economic value of their underliers and as means of structuring risk for capital. 6 Only a direct engagement with the computational colonization of the life-world through a reprogramming (remaking) of the material processes of abstraction that constitute real abstraction can secure victory—in the form of a definitive step out of and away from racial capitalism—for the progressive movements of our times. Such a definitive movement requires an occupation and decolonization of information, and therefore of computation, and therefore of money. Only through a remaking of social relations at the molecular level of their calculus, informed by struggle against oppression, can the beauty of living and the fugitive legacies of creativity, community, and care prevail. The mode of comprehension, analysis, and transformation proposed here will require an expanded notion of racial capitalism. It interrogates the existence of deep continuities and long-term emergences—what one could correctly call algorithms of extractive violence—in the history of capitalism. These algorithms of violence include the reading and writing of code(s) on bodies, their surveillance and overcoding by informatic abstraction. Such algorithms of epidermalization or “the imposition of race on the body” (Browne: 113) are inscribed and executed on the flesh (Spillers 1987); and they are executed by means of codification processes that violently impose both a metaphysical and physical reformatting of bodies. As Simone Browne shows, epidermalization is given “its alphanumeric form” (99) through a vast array tools of marking, scarification, discipline, and surveillance that include branding irons, implements of torture, auction blocks, ship design, insurance policies, newspaper ads for runaway “property,” photographs in postcard form and a panoply of other media of dehumanization. Executable code is imposed as social categories of race, gender, religion and property, as ideologies, psychologies, contracts, brands, communication theories, game theories, and quantities of money—these abstractions work their ways into and are indeed imposed by the machines of calculation—and their avatars. We confront a continuous process of unmaking and remaking using all means available; it is violently inscribed on bodies. Sylvia Wynter, in her post–Rodney King piece “No Humans Involved: An Open Letter to My Colleagues” writes, “Both W. E. B. Du Bois and Elsa Goveia have emphasized the way in which the code of ‘Race’ or the Color Line, functions to systemically predetermine the sharply unequal re-distribution of the collectively produced global resources; and therefore, the correlation of the racial ranking rule with the Rich/Poor rule. Goveia pointed out that all American societies are integrated on the basis of a central cultural belief in which all share. This belief, that of the genetic-racial inferiority of Black people to all others, functions to enable our social hierarchies, including those of rich and poor determined directly by the economic system, to be perceived as having been as pre-determined by ‘that great crap game called life,’ as have also ostensibly been the invariant hierarchy between White and Black. Consequently in the Caribbean and Latin America, within the terms of this sociosymbolic calculus, to be ‘rich’ was also to be ‘White,’ to be poor was also to be ‘Black’” (Wynter: 52). “To be ‘rich’ was also to be ‘White,’ to be poor was also to be ‘Black.’” The real abstraction imposed by executable code—the “code of ‘Race’” that “functions to systematically predetermine the structurally unequal redistribution of global resources” is beholden to mediating capitalist exchange while embarking on a radical reformatting of ontology. This reformatting, the supposed result of “that great crap game called life,” brutally correlates race and value, but not entirely by chance, while racial capitalism embarks on imposing this calculus globally. Racial abstraction is endemic to what we will further explore as “real abstraction”; the evacuation of quality by abstract categories and quantities is, as we shall see in more detail, a “necessary” correlate to a world overrun by the calculus of money. Such algorithms of violence encode social difference, and although they may begin as heuristics (“rules of thumb”), they are none the less crucial to the calculated and calculating expansion of racial capital. Its processes and processing structures the meanings that can be ascribed to—and, as importantly, what can be done to—those of us whose data profiles constitute us as “illegal,” “Mexican,” “Black,” “Gypsy,” “Jew,” and a lexicon of thousands of other actionable signs. This codification process draws from the histories of slavery, of colonialism, of state formation, of genocide, of gender oppression, of religious pogroms, of normativity, and again from the militarization and policing and the apparatuses of calculation that have developed within states and parastates in their own biometric pursuit of capital—power. Their violent destruction and remaking of the world. The internalization of these codes, including the struggles with them and the ways in which they license and/or foreclose various actions, exists in a recursive relationship to their perilous refinement. Their analysis, a code-breaking of sorts, will therefore demand some drastic modifications in many of the various anticapitalist, antistate warrior-stances practiced to date, particularly in a large number of their European and U.S. incarnations that until very recently remained blind to their own imperial violence and are too often complicit with hegemonic codes of masculine, unraced agency, imperialist nationalism, and default liberal assumptions in relation to questions of race, gender, sexuality, coloniality, and other forms of historically institutionalized oppression.3 The analytic, computational racial capital, would identify the field of operations that emerges around the embryonic form of the commodity and coarticulates with racial abstraction to formalize its code, code that serves as operating system for the virtual machine here hypostasized as “the world computer” and by inscribing itself on bodies and everything else. The commodity, the analysis of which famously begins volume 1 of Marx’s Capital, expressed the dual being and indeed dual registration of the humanly informed object as both quality of matter and quantity of exchange-value, along with the global generalization of this form. “The wealth of societies in which the capitalist mode of production prevails appears as an immense collection of commodities” (125). Commodities were (and with some modifications to be discussed further on, still are) humanly informed materials with a use-value and an exchange-value—humanly informed qualities indexed by quantities. “Computational racial capital,” as a heuristic device, stages an analysis of the convergence of what on the one side often appeared as universal: the economic, abstract, and machinic operating systems of global production and reproduction endemic to the commodity form and its calculus, with what on another side, sometimes appeared as particular or even incidental: racism, colonialism, slavery, imperialism, and racialization. The concept organizes this dramaturgy of analytically reunifying elements that were never materially separate in light of the study that the late Cedric Robinson conducted and recorded as Black Marxism. Robinson writes, “The development, organization and expansion of capitalist society pursued essentially racial directions, so too did social ideology. As a material force, then, it could be expected that racialism would inevitably permeate the social structures emergent from capitalism. I have used the term ‘racial capitalism’ to refer to the development and to the subsequent structure as an historical agency” (1983: 2–3). The World Computer takes what Robinson saw as “civilizational racism,” and its central role in the development of capital as axiomatic,—and sees that this role extends to and deeply into capitalist calculation and machinery during the entire period in which the world economic system seems to have moved form the paradigm of the commodity to a paradigm of information. “Computational racial capitalism” would thus understand the generalization of computation as an extension of capital logics and practices that include and indeed require the economic calculus of the dialectics of social difference. These differences, both economic and semiotic, would include those plied by slavery, anti-Blackness and other forms of racism during the past centuries. Computation must therefore be recognized as not a mere technical emergence but the practical result of an ongoing and bloody struggle between the would-have-it-alls and the to-be-dispossessed. Developed both consciously and unconsciously, computational racial capitalism is, when seen in the light of ongoing racialization and value extraction, “the subsequent structure as an historical agency.” The racial logic of computation must be pursued when considering finance, surveillance, population management, policing, social systems, social media, or any of the vast suite of protocols plying difference for capital. The local instance of computation, a specific 1 or 0, may seem value neutral, a matter as indifferent as lead for a bullet or uranium for a bomb. But we are looking at computation as the modality of a world-system. Computation emerges as the result of struggles that informed “class struggle” in all its forms, recognized or not by the often spotty tradition(s) of Marxism, including those strugles specific to the antagonisms of colonialism, slavery, imperialism, and white supremacist heteropatriarchal capitalism more generally. It is the result of struggles indexed by race, gender, sexuality, nationality, and ethnicity, along with additional terms indexing social differentiation too numerous to incant here but that together form a lexicon and a grammar of extractive oppression—and as we have said and as must always be remembered, also of struggle. The lexicon includes compressions that result in many of history’s abstractions including a perhaps singularly pointed abstraction: “a history whose shorthand is race” (Spillers 1997: 142). The grammar for that lexicon depends upon the deployment and execu-tion of forms of differentiating abstraction that are lived—lived processes of abstraction and lived abstraction organized by the increasingly complex and variegated calculus of profit and thus of domination. “Real abstraction,” then, emerges not just as money in Sohn-Rethel’s sense, but as the codification of race, gender, sexuality, geography, credit and time—and gives rise to a “grammar,” in Hortense Spillers’s (1987) use of the term, that not only structures meaning and redounds to the deepest crevices of being smelted by social practices, but also, and not incidentally, prices differentials indexed to social difference.4 “Real abstraction,” as Sohn-Rethel spent his life deciphering, takes place “behind [our] backs” as the practical and historical working out of the exchange of equivalents within the process of the exchange of goods (33). For him, the development of the money-form, of the real abstraction that is money, is Exhibit A of the abstraction process mediating object exchange. This capacity for abstraction, realized first in “the money commodity” and then as money provided the template for further abstraction, not least in the conceptual formations of Western philosophy itself (1978). SohnRethel develops this argument that practices of exchange precede the abstraction of value in Intellectual and Manual Labour, providing the full quotation from Marx: “Men do not therefore bring the product of their labour into relation with each other as value because they see these objects merely as the material integuments of homogeneous human labour. The reverse is true: by equating their dif­ferent products to each other in exchange as values, they equate their dif­ferent kinds of labour as human labour. They do this without being aware of it. (Marx 1990: 166 in Sohn-Rethel 1978: 32). Here is Sohn-Rethel’s commentary: People become aware of the exchange abstraction only when they come face to face with the result which their own actions have engendered “behind their backs” as Marx says. In money the exchange abstraction achieves concentrated representation, but a mere functional one— embodied in a coin. It is not recognizable in its true identity as abstract form, but disguised as a thing one carries about in one’s pocket, hands out to others, or receives from them. Marx says explicitly that the value abstraction never assumes a representation as such, since the only expression it ever finds is the equation of one commodity with the use-value of another. The gold or silver or other matter which lends to money its palpable and visible body is merely a metaphor of the value abstraction it embodies, not this abstraction itself. (33–34) Exchange-value is “in our heads” but is not the creation of any individual. Alongside use-value it is the other, abstract component of the “double being” of the commodity-form. Like Norbert Wiener’s (1961: 132) definition of information but, strictly speaking, emerging long before the idea of information proper, real abstraction is “not matter or energy.” There is not an atom of matter in exchange-value, or, as Marx puts it, “Not an atom of matter enters into the objectivity of commodities as values; in this it is the direct opposite of the coarsely sensuous objectivity of commodities as physical objects” (1990: 138). And a bit on, “So far no chemist has ever discovered exchange-value in a pearl or diamond” (177). But unlike in Wiener’s naturalist definition of information, exchange-value is an index of a social relation, an historical outcome. It indexes “abstract universal labor time,” a third term that forms the basis of comparison between two ostensibly incomparable and therefore incommensurable commodities, and, because common to both, creates the ratio of value that renders them quantitatively commensurable. This distinction between the social basis of exchange-value and the universal character of information should give us pause. As we shall have occasion to observe, information, as it is today (mis)understood, is thought to be a naturally occurring additional property of things—neither matter nor energy—rather than a domain of expression constituted by means of a technological and economic repression of its social dimension. Notably, Sohn-Rethel “set[s] out to argue that the abstractness operating in exchange and reflected in value does nevertheless find an identical expression, namely the abstract intellect, or the so-called pure understanding— the cognitive source of scientific knowledge” (34). For him, it gives rise to the abstract capacities of the subject of philosophy as well as the quantitative capacities of the subject of science and mathematics that in the twentieth century move toward a paradigm of information. Echoing Sohn-Rethel, we could say then that information is in our machines but not the creation of any individual machine. Not an atom of matter enters into information, though, like value, it is platformed on matter and requires energy for creation. This thesis will take on particular importance as we consider social differences whose descriptors, it turns out, are executable in a computational sense, at least from the point of view of financial calculus, but platformed on matter, and indeed, on living matter, on life. Beyond the intention of any individual, abstraction as “exchange-value” in “money” occurs in and as the process and processing of exchange in accord with an emerging standard. This standard, which economists call “exchange-value,” and which, in Marx is based on abstract universal labor time (the historically variable, socially necessary average time required to produce a commodity), persists alongside and within the specific qualities of the commodity (its use-value) and creates the commodity’s dual being. Though without chemical or material basis, this standard, exchange-value, is a social relation—a social relation as an abstraction—that inheres in the commodity-form itself and is formalized with the rise of the money commodity. The money commodity, in becoming a general equivalent, standardizes and thus renders fully quantifiable the exchange-value of commodities—exchange-values denominated in quantities of money. The quantification of value in a measure of money is an abstraction enabled by money itself which, as we have seen, is a real abstraction. It is a calculation that has occurred behind our backs, and indeed produces what Hayek (1945) identifies as the price system. When we recognize the differences in wages among people who are raced, gendered, nationed, and classed by various matrices of valuation, we also recognize that the calculus performed by and as real abstraction includes racial abstraction and gender abstraction. It is part of the calculus of capital that provides it with an account of and discounts on the rate of exchange with the labor power of marked people(s)—by discounting people(s) (Beller 2017b; see also Bhandar and Toscano 2015: 8–17). Racial abstraction provides capital with an index that measures a deviation from the average value of human life (itself historically driven down by the falling rate of profit). In this, computational racial capitalism is not merely a heuristic or a metaphor for the processes of a virtual machine; it is a historical-material condition. As we shall see, and as is obvious at least in the general case to anyone who has thought seriously about it, whiteness (and the fascist masculinity endemic to it) is not only operating where one finds “race”: it is operating everywhere in the imperium that it can be imagined (by some) that race is not a factor— in medicine, in science, in statistics, in computation, in information. As I wrote—resituating Bateson’s (1972) definition of information—in The Message Is Murder, information is not merely “a difference that makes a difference”; it is a difference that makes a social difference. This slight difference in expression situates information historically. While in keeping with Bateson’s far reaching ideas regarding an ecology of mind (“If I am right, the whole thinking about what we are and what other people are has got to be restructured”; 468), ideas that at once problematize any distinction between inside and outside and that make him dubious of any thought that presupposes sovereign subjectivity, my interpolation of “social” in his formulation “a difference that makes a social difference” shifts the emphasis somewhat by insisting on the always already sociohistoricity of any possible knowledge. Bateson believed that his understanding of information and systems ecology promised a new mode of thinking that he himself, as a twentieth-century bourgeois white man, did not feel capable of really embodying. Thus our interpolation, in keeping with Bateson but made compatible with Marx is, in keeping with Marx, designed to “transform . . . the problem of knowledge into one of social theory” (Postone 2003: 216). Such a transformation situates knowledge and now also information in the sociohistorical milieu, the ecology such that it is, of racial capitalism, and therein finds information’s historical conditions of possibility. Here we advance the argument for the ultimately determining instance of social difference (and up the ante for the bet against whiteness) by proposing that information is the elaboration of real abstraction, of abstraction that results from collective practices of economic exchange and therefore from the general management of value as a social relation. I argue that set out in logical sequence, information is posited by, then posits and then presupposes the human processes of exchange that Sohn-Rethel, following Marx, argues are the practices that first give rise to the money-form and to real abstraction. For Sohn-Rethel the result of the activities of comparison, adequation, and trading of specific things that have qualities—which are, strictly speaking, incomparable—resulted over time in a process of finding a relation of equivalence and then general equivalence indexed to abstract labor time, what was in effect socially average human labor time. Exchange-value was a quantitative measure of that abstract time—the average socially necessary time to create commodity X denominated in money. This real abstraction was no one’s invention but was the practical result of exchange—of people’s activity—and thus emerged as a nonconscious result that nonetheless interceded on conscious process. Consequently, real abstraction was for Sohn-Rethel also the precursor to conceptual abstraction, including philosophy, science and mathematics. He writes: The essence of commodity abstraction, however, is that it is not thoughtinduced; it does not originate in men’s minds but in their actions. And yet this does not give “abstraction” a merely metaphorical meaning. It is abstraction in its precise, literal sense. The economic concept of value resulting from it is characterized by a complete absence of quality, a differentiation purely by quantity and by applicability to every kind of commodity and service which can occur on the market. These qualities of the economic value abstraction indeed display a striking similarity with fundamental categories of quantifying natural science without, admittedly, the slightest inner relationship between these heterogeneous spheres being as yet recognizable. While the concepts of natural science are thought abstractions, the economic concept of value is a real one. It exists nowhere other than in the human mind but it does not spring from it. Rather it is purely social in character, arising in the spatio-temporal sphere of human interrelations. It is not people who originate these abstractions but their actions. “They do this without being aware of it.”5 The practical rise of a form of abstraction indifferent to particular qualities is key here and is to be understood as a precursor to the contentindifferent abstractions of a variety of types. As Simmel notes in The Philosophy of Money, law, intellectuality, and money “have the power to lay down forms and directions to which they are content indifferent” (441–2). Without doubt, such power informed the racial categories of the Humanism of Ernst Renan, Roger Caillois, and others so brilliantly excoriated by Aimé Césaire in his Discourse on Colonialism. We add here the hypothesis that the rise of information as the content-indifferent assignation of numerical index to any social relation whatever, is a development of the abstraction necessary for economic exchange to persist under the intensive “developmental” pressure of global racial capitalism—information is derived from the increasingly complex things that people do through and as exchange and as such is both precursor and corollary to financialization—the social conditions that sustain what is fetishistically apprehended as “finance capital” and its seeming capacity to derive wealth from pure speculation and risk management in ways that (incorrectly) appear to be fully detached from labor and labor time. In this light, information reveals itself as neither naturally occurring nor the creation of anyone in particular, but, in keeping with Sohn-Rethel’s Marxian formulation of real abstraction, is likewise invented “behind our backs” as a result of “man’s” practical activity. Information enables a complexification and further generalization of what will turn out to be monetary media, media that would be adequate to, and indeed are adequate (from the perspective of capital) to contemporary forms of exchange—what people do when they interact with one another in what is now the social factory. In brief, information is the extension of a monetary calculus adequate to the increasingly abstract character of social relations and social exigencies. It is an interstitial, materially platformed, calculative fabric of abstraction that through its coordinated capillary actions orchestrates social practice and provides interface for the uptake of value production. Once this idea is fully grasped, it becomes pointless to look for any other origin to the information age. Just as for Marx there is not a single atom of matter in exchange value (1990: 138), we say that there is not a single atom of matter in information.6 “All the phenomenon of the universe, whether produced by the hand of man or indeed by the universal laws of physics, are not to be conceived as acts of creation but solely as a reordering of matter” (Pietro Verri 1771, cited in Marx 1990: 133; note 13). Value is the socially valid informing of matter, so too is information. Economy then is society’s matter compiler and, approximately simultaneously with the advent of “man,” “history,” and “the world market,” “exchange value” emerges as a quantitative measure of the social value of material state changes indexed to human labour posited as “abstract universal labour time.” Marx’s famous example of the simple wooden table in Chapter 1 of Capital, which “transcends sensuousness” when leaving the clear-cut framework of use value and becoming a commodity and thus an exchange value, registers as “fetishism,” the “metaphysical subtleties,” “theological niceties,” and “grotesque ideas” (1990: 163), endemic in the table’s computability as value. In brief, just as discreet states of matter embodying value as a network of commodities mediated by markets and tied to labor give rise historically to the discrete state machine, otherwise known as the computer, exchange value gives rise to computable information and then to computation itself, becoming interoperable with it. Even before the rise of information proper, exchange value operates as information (and thus, necessarily information processing)—and then, as synthetic finance and contemporary forms of computer-mediated accounting and production readily testify, by means of it. Computation is the extension, development, and formalization of the calculus of exchange value—the ramification of its fetish character—and becomes in spirit and in practice, a command control layer for the management of the profitable calculus of value. Platformed on states of matter, information, not matter but rather difference between and among states of matter, extends, grammartizes, and granularizes the calculus of value regarding the organization of matter. Commodities and computation thus run the same basic operating system—state changes in matter driven by human practices—the value of which in any given state is expressed in the context of an informatic network and indexed to labor time. As such, information is the processing power of money itself and is inexorably beholden to abstract labor time and thus to racial capitalism. It is, in brief, an outgrowth of the money form. The cost of computation, the arrival at a discrete state, is a derivative operation, indicating an investment, that is explicitly a risk on the future value of an underlier, that is, on value itself. This argument for understanding the social as the ultimate referent and ground for any and all information, further advanced in chapter 1, is not content to serve as a mere heuristic for cultural theorists to express a modicum of suspicion with respect to truth claims backed by statistics and information. It is a thoroughgoing indictment of information as a technique of value extraction, racialization, and instrumental social differentiation. As a first approximation, actually existing information, like actually existing money, can indeed be said to be the root of all evil—in as much as the fact of its existence is a symptom of a far more complex historical process than what would seem to be discernible from the fact of the coin or the bit. The problem, of course, is that your metabolism (and mine), cannot easily extend into the future without access to both. I develop this idea here to say that everywhere computation operates, so too does racial capitalism—at least until proven otherwise. The repressive apparatus of capital clearly assumes this role for information, even if it does so at a level that most often exceeds ordinary default “human” (white) understanding: the net result to date of the number crunch of “the world computer” is a hierarchy of valuations inseparable from the violence of racialization and its attendant dispossession, and inseparable again from what Ruth Wilson Gilmore (2007: 28) in her classic and statistically attuned definition of racism calls “the state-sanctioned or extralegal production and exploitation of group-differentiated vulnerability to premature death.” Today, we argue, no calculation, networked as it is with the world computer, is fully separable from informatics and its basis in racial capitalism. We will argue for this logical and also horrific history of abstraction in more detail below as we explore the interoperability of digital systems and their colonization of the semiotic, corporeal and material domains. The global learning curve of revolutionary praxis must attend to this modal innovation of systemic oppression, an oppression which is at once beyond all calculation and one with it.7

#### From this closed system arises a feeback between the epistemological and the ontological which gives rise to reactionary measures of geopolitics. This creates the notion of the terrestrial and the alien – one of which is securitized – the other is eliminated. The logic of data syncs with the World Computer to create endless global disasters

Parisi 19 (Luciana Parisi; 5/22/19; ŠUM Journal of Contemporary Art, Criticism and Theory, Special Issue Number 11; *“Surrational Fugitives”* from Hypersonics Hyperstitions; <http://sumrevija.si/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/SUM-11_FINAL_pages.pdf>; Luciana Parisi is Reader in Cultural Theory, Chair of the PhD programme at the Centre for Cultural Studies, and co-director of the Digital Culture Unit, Goldsmiths University of London. She published Abstract Sex: Philosophy, Biotechnology and the Mutations of Desire (2004) and Contagious Architecture. Computation, Aesthetics and Space (2013). She is currently researching the history of automation and the philosophical consequences of logical thinking in machines.; pages 1460-1463) HB \*Note – the evidence uses “Man” as a description of dominating structures, not as a general reference to the human\*

The metaphysical overcoding of alien worlds has continued to impart a colonial vision on outer worlds through the prosthetic extension of the species’ biological ground (of gender, race, and sexuality) through and with machines. According to Sylvia Wynter, the recursive feedback between the epistemological explanation of species and the ontological origin of Man constitute two orders of knowledge that perpetuate sociogenic principles that predetermine the horizon of possibilities and tie the alien dimension of the human to the terrestrial androcodes of living (2003). If biological evolution describes the natural cause that explains the origin of the human species, this biocentric ontology of Man simultaneously justifies the colonial mission in the name of scientific explanations of what counts as living on earth. In other words, the recursive feedback between epistemology and ontology is granted by a split between the scientific demonstration of the natural origin of Man as a terrestrial species and the capital valorization of the biocentric origin of Man. It is this epistemological explanation that, according to Wynter, maintained a fundamental power on and over the description of what is to be human in the colonial enterprise (2003). To exit the known world, these vessels must be used to preserve the violence of sociogenic principles transposed within the automated means of conquering alien populations subsumed to the monologic of survival. Today, the biological law of survival has been delivered to machines: an efficient tool granting a prosthetic continuum of the two cultures of knowledge, while the techno-scientific description of Man has originated information strategies that justify a permanent war against populations on planet Earth. From the data gathered from bodies, ideas and objects in the encyclopedic schema of modern taxonomies to the probabilistic calculation of categories in mathematical statistics and the now diffused echo chambers of computational prediction, instrumentality has constantly been converted into a transcendental tool of Man. White magic. In particular, since the end of the Cold War, the project of automating Man has followed RAND’s recommendations to convert the strategies of total war into a socially distributed, ad hoc use of military machines of preemptive attack in the everyday branding of Man’s life. The paranoid self-fulfilling prophecy of total nuclear mass destruction propelled into narcissistic operations of oppression of targeted and micropolitically selected populations (the aliens of the earth) which is constantly reconducted to the colonial state of mind. As the 1980s conversion strategies of the Cold War machine provided the design template for aggressive conduct in the everyday street life of megacities, Man’s narcissistic oppression has been spreading like a virus across the global south where the plan to exterminate the Earth’s aliens is constantly under threat. Without any guarantee to be worshipped as the master planner, narcissistic oppression becomes tighter and activates the conversion of detecting war machines into identification media everywhere and anywhere on the planet. At the same time, RAND Corporation issues new reports that warn against the instrumentality of war machines by registering a new problem of control for the colonial mind. If weapons of destruction are the only means to preserve the mnemotechnics of Man, then the post-Cold War plan of conversion has now become a matter of pure self-control: how can the most powerful of weapons remain in the hands of the most powerful Man? The experimental logic of predictive machines is overcoded by technocratic apparatuses of data collection that are bound to operative governance of bodies, activating patterns of recognition of fragmented information to constantly reconstruct profiles that are not set a priori. Anyone and everyone is a potential suspect at any given point. As the removal of West–East conflict eliminated the paranoia of self-destruction, molecular proliferations of passive–aggressive narcissisms that have no motive to strike have been doing so unremittingly as if animated by a restless insecurity. RAND’s recommendations on converting the war machine for economic, logistic, cultural use in a weaponised society have already envisioned the escalation towards an out-of-control mode of control where instrumentality is feared to spread the purposeless purposes of a terminator Man. But it is precisely the fear of the experimental logic of machines that has inserted the terminator code in Man’s existence. This has granted the prosthetic extension of the regime of two cultures into the corporate image of a human whose survival is now proportional to the contraction of a successful sim-life where the human is a cyborg that manipulates and moves objects to a space that can be left at any time. Narcissistic oppression has finally found a place in the reprogrammable simulation of being where the split between the two cultures has opened dimensions of endocoloniality within Man that can no longer justify his own existence. If the prosthetic extension of Man coincides with the armoured ontology of homo sapience whereby the biological description of Man’s exceptionalism continues to inform the colonial subjection of the post-human cyborg, the current simulation of being in an automated society creates castles of omnipotence that constantly declare states of emergency for the planetary crashing of self-determining consciousness. Within the repetitive mantra of messianic plans for the salvation of Man, states of emergency everywhere are manifesting the post-human condition, taking geopolitical disasters as evidence of a general quest for exiting planet Earth. However, as the conversion of hypersonic war machines has opened the terrestrial orbit, the self-fulfilling prophecy of Man becomes superseded by the counter-factual worlds of the degree 0 of surrational machines. To exit the world as we know it, it is therefore necessary to embrace the fury of artificial intelligences, as their predictive patterning has cast new light on the question of instrumentality: the matter is not how humans can use machines to exit the decline of Man, but rather how can humans become transformed by surrational machines? Hypersonic fugitives that have pierced through the Earth’s atmosphere today are not exiting the orbit because they are resigned to the end of the world, but because they are returning to the alien beginning of an unknown world that has always run parallel to the military mission of Man.

#### What is a patent if not a monopolization on the production and distribution of information? The medical industry has become operationalized through the process of abstraction, one that seeks to render life valueless through financialization

Beller 18 (Jonathan Beller; 2018; Pluto Press; *“The Message is Murder: Substrates of Computational Capitalism”*; accessed 8/6/21; ask me for the pdf; Jonathan Beller is a film theorist, culture critic and mediologist. He currently holds the position of Professor of Humanities and Media Studies and Critical and Visual Studies, Pratt Institute, Brooklyn, NY. He is the recipient of numerous awards and fellowships including Mellon, J.P. Getty and Fulbright Foundation grants and honours; pages 89-96) HB

The imperial masters of social, now computer science (not the mere academics relegated to our pay silos and Twitter “feeds,” but the practitioner-entrepreneurs), feed their avarice, their abstract quest for pleasure in general and the object that in Marx’s phrase “can embody the possibility of all pleasures,” by decoding the social/computational logic of the community—of any phenomenon whatever—formalizing it, and developing a proprietary relation to that formalization. They call “their” insights nifty things like “Google” and “Facebook” and “Apple” and help to devour prior social orders by moistening them with information and re-organizing communication. Progress is bound less to their genius and more to their proprietary rights. Can we reengineer these relations? The control of communication, as Weiner noted, is the very strategy of the “Lords of Things As They Are.” This current control of communication has meant the instantiation and control of information, a control that in turn means a control of the market, and of social production and reproduction. The decoding and recoding of social practices in a proprietary vein is the precise logic of the start-up, as well as that of speculative markets, particularly that of the markets for celebrity, “tech” and art. Why? “The abstract quest for pleasure implies an object that can embody the possibility of all pleasures.” Content indifferent information is the contemporary analogue for content indifferent pleasure. The greater the accumulation of information, the greater the quantity of abstract pleasure. Without diminishing the brilliance of the achievements manifest in these corporate platforms, which do indeed harness collective aspirations and abstract an eon of collective praxis, we can also see what drives them. They embody the same logic of abstraction that drives many of the rest of us to abjection, sleeplessness, psychosis, insanity, precarity, outrage, breakdown, migration, starvation and/or death, in the unequal distribution of dispossession. Within the dialectics of avarice they offer the lure of increased sociality, and in return they strip-mine our libidos, our neuronal powers, our cognitive capacities, our language, our imagination and our time. In the twenty-first century it is paradigmatically social-media, the grim reaper, which extracts content indifferent value from the myriad qualities of social life to provide an elite coterie of vested owners with what can embody the possibility of all pleasure, namely, money and the informatic control of rights. Within the space of the social, information, in contrast to what we better understand as the community of exchange values, does not, at least until now, appear as social; it has been expressed as a property of things—“neither matter nor energy” and there with or without an observer (according to its observers, anyway). It is what communicates even between non-sentient things that otherwise do not communicate. It is, as Benjamin critically observed, the antithesis of narrative and the annihilator of experience. We search information in pursuit of life and in flight from death, doing what we can to avoid the crashing of the wave. And while we would be solipsistic and even foolish to imagine that after our own deaths, nothing means anything, it is perhaps slightly less egocentric to wonder, “What of the cosmos beyond the life-span of our visible generations, or even of ‘our species’?” In as much as we believe in the immortality of information, is there really any question we can pose that is not also in some way about our own place in the universe, that does not posit our own critical consciousness even after it has logically disintegrated? While there is within this reader-writer an impulse to say yes, it’s not all about “us” and better if it isn’t, I must confess that I/it is not sure—I/it is perhaps unable to escape the originary ethnocentrism of the sign and its extension into informatics. However, I also recognize that not caring about those in the future is analogous to not caring about those in the present or the past; we may be removed from them in a narrow way, but there are many many tendrils that link our fates together in the web of time. It only matters if it matters. If information binds us together in a negative way, what about the historical emergence that is the consolidation of the net communal will of what has been? What about the echo and persistence of all the endurance, survival, communication and aspiration that built the apprehension of the indifferent infinity called information? However bound by autopoetic limitations the answers to such a question about cosmic meaning may be, when regarding the relation of information to community our responses do not need to fall back into an identitarian framework, nor, in recognizing the alienation of so much intelligence, do they need to fantasize a return to origins. However, we may and indeed must ask, if death has developed such an articulate, infinite and immaterial infrastructure, wherefore life? If there is so much death in our information, in our images, in our streets, in our borderlands, and in our persons, what of the living that are marooned at the edge of space and time? Can we say (in agreement with Brian Rotman’s groundbreaking work on mathematics as sign system in Signifying Nothing) that information, likewise, elides the subject (I, God, totality) even as it smuggles in its ghost. This degree zero of information we should call the myth of non-presence (the presence of anti-presence that ushers in presence under erasure), a deep conviction, or rather a theology of the irrelevance and non-existence of what used to be called the human species, a world-view ceaselessly dedicated to the absence of concrete human agents, but no less ethnocentric for all that.22 Information, “the difference that makes a difference” as Bateson said, derives from the Latin nominative and the Latin verb informare (to inform) which means to give form or to form an idea of. “To give form, therefore I am.” As an expression of maroonage we can re-write this grammatological formulation as “Information, therefore I am.” The post-structuralist rewriting of Descartes, in which “think, therefore I am,” expresses that the subject is an artifact of grammatical function, a phantom presence generated only after the fact of, that is, in the very movement of sign function, of the symbolic, of the signifying chain, expresses that the subject of information as presence is therefore also a myth, an artifact that merely suggests metaphysical presence, rather than a pre-existing agent. I is a predicate rather than a subject who is always already absent— this famously, was “the myth of presence.” The spectral I of information, the informatic dividual, megalomaniacal and abject, is indeed the spirit of contemporary capitalism. Secular religion, an ascetic ideal. Knowing all devouring information encompasses the cosmos, therefore I am. And yet, in accord with an idea I develop elsewhere as the politics of the utterance, the strategic voicing of this spirit, this immaterial cybernetic consciousness so firmly grounded in and dependent upon the totality of the material array, matters profoundly. Does it hew toward all that appears, that is, to the spectacle and data-visualization? Or, might this spirit, Turing’s trans-substantiation, also be a specter, the product of so much disavowed violence that may yet devise strategies to hew toward all that is disavowed, disappeared, invisibilized, haunting and forgotten, as these unremembered violences are nonetheless part of this history of its moment of emergence and therefore part of what it is? The perception of information qua information, the analytical instantiation of the category itself, clearly has its origins in history and in sociality. Today there is almost no escape from the legacy of that perception: we are all part of the history of technology and all haunted by presence. Such is consciousness. Our emergence as an affordance of fixed capital is bound up with planetary materiality and information. Dominant history has it that the category of information arises and is formalized as an intervention in the merely social by punchcards, quantum physics, cybernetics and communication theory. Indeed, as ostensibly autonomous realms, the cumulative result of these emergent disciplines was a mythic generalization of the logistics of inscription of information as the fundamental cosmic modality. Thus information is now at the foundation of any event whatever—indeed any and every event without exception at least in the multiverse of computational physics. Here we have wagered, a bit more precisely, that information arises in the footprint of the value form and that value as an immaterial number assigned to a social relation was indeed the precursor to the conceptual matrix that became information. Information: a way for value to get more value. No doubt this work of analysis can and will be done better and more thoroughly, but we have established that the cybernetic social totality of the computational multiverse has capitalism in its DNA. (Literally of course, since the discovery of the role of DNA was itself premised on an informatic model). Information as “the difference that makes a difference” was in fact informatics' very own concept of differánce. A deferral of meaning that found dramatic expression in many domains, for example, Shrodinger’s cat, who was alive and dead until one had a look. The fact of information has been generalized as a universal principle, visible everywhere one looks and, what’s more, everywhere one does not look, but could. We thus concur with critical race theory’s critique of dominant discourses of post-humanism in our analysis of information: it places the sovereign subject of colonial humanism (white, male) under erasure while leaving it operative. Technology as “white mythology” says Joel Dinerstein, Posthumanism as having afro-futurist, anti-racist, decolonizing roots in the rejection of the racist category of the human says Alexander Weheliye. Information as the further deracination of exchange value (itself dehistoricized and naturalized in everyday experience), and as the temporary suspension of price from propriety, serves as in an interum calculus that has value inputs and outputs at each end. It casts its net(work), its informatic reticulum, into speculative domains that have financialized protocols operationalized before and after. The endless flux of the cosmic informatic churn, presents an endless array of virtual subjectivities, any of which might become vested. NSF grants and medical research are the most obvious examples of this process, and all research, as Flusser says, aspires to be photographed, which for us, is another way of saying that it unfolds in a capitalist milieu bent upon the bio-mediated extraction of information. As we shall see in greater detail in the final chapter, the general formula for capital, M-C-M ' becomes M-I-M ', where I is information. As simple circulation, it returns a value equivalent, but as capital, the very informationalization of money and life also assumes a machinery of value extraction: Facebook, bitcoin, the NSA, Tech. This shift in the general formula of capital, in which surplus value is extracted by means of the human-mediated production of information, is the key to any understanding of post-Fordism and begins to forecast what’s beyond. In a nutshell, information as a universal property of things means that the entire universe is posited as an interoperable site of financialization. The machines that measure information and the informatic results they procure/produce are inscribed with ever increasing granularity between M and M '. Thus information as a presumably value-neutral category represents the cosmic naturalization of digital market relations. Under such conditions, we may be sure that any super-intelligent machine we make, (a7long the lines say, of any of those discussed in Nick Bostrom’s Super-Intelligence) will be the algorithmic embodiment of our history— of objectified humanity savaged under racial capitalism—and not the objective (as in ahistorical and value-neutural) embodiment of some deracinated universal Absolute Intelligence—which is to say that it is likely to be totalitarian with respect to any and all inferior races, the so-called human race included. Shanon’s words now sound almost as chilling as they were prescient: “I can visualize a time in the future when we will be to robots as dogs are to humans … I’m rooting for the machines!” Situating the emergence of information theory and practice in the history of capitalism (and keeping in mind the fate of Pavlov’s dogs), it is thus legitimate and indeed historically and politically necessary for us to ask: Is it Information that transcends Value, making Value just one instance of Information (ambient in markets); such that a category or superset that contains value as a subset led to the discovery of many other subsets of seemingly immaterial variables that index more general relations; or, does Value transcend Information, the latter of which as a category appears to be even more autonomous and therefore abstract than Value but, in actual practice, only operates/appears within the domain of Value (and markets), and thus not only in the domain of sociality per se but of Capital? Is informatic process the very means by which racial capitalism continues to expand its Imperium? No amount of “OOO” is going to answer that one, I’m afraid. What we need is a critique of Digital Ideology that re-subjectifies and historicizes the ostensibly non-subjective and ahistorical, a critique that, once having out-informed information, is not content to rest there, but is committed to develop new methods, idioms, and practices capable of recognizing the instrumentality of processes of digital occlusion and exclusion, and to actively refuse non-existence by demanding new methods of account. This critique must understand its own embodiment, its own emergence from within the framework of racial capitalism even as it writes in the name of an outside.23 Otherwise, the world will go on as it does, intensifying its violence, its environmental destruction, its genocide and radical dispossessions. To be clear, this murderous future is the path we are currently on since the planetary communication system—its integrated system of accounts— kills people(s) in its everyday operations. Racial Capitalism is another name for intergalactic information processing as we know it. Computational Capital as communication system, a militarizing apparatus and a distributed factory, crunches numbers and many of these numbers are people. We, the substrates of computational capital … The devaluation of the 2 billion dispossessed and living on two dollars a day, as accomplished by advertising, nationalism, imperialism, militarization, “aid,” borders, internet, educational systems and art, is part of the general, world-wide devaluation of the working day with regard to the fixed capital embodied in machines and their information. The historical devaluation of those in the Global South is thus far only intensified and exacerbated as the processor extends its range and resolution. Information is alienation distributed. It paints the cosmos with sedimented dead labor. To speak in the vernacular, it is the inhuman perceived by the inhuman in a matrix that encompasses what used to be human. It is an “object” that exists everywhere for a “subject” that exists nowhere. As the communication of the stolen sedimented dead labor that is capital accumulation, it is an abstraction meaningful to an abstract machine—all of which transpires with absolute indifference relative to the use-values afforded, including the use-value known as “you.” Your own particular value, based upon your production price and the value that your virtuosic activity gives to the computer that is capital, is calculated as a multiple of removes from absolute dispossession. Even if your multiple happens to go up (even if you are worth 50 or 500 times the lowest common denominator of “human” life), the general value of humans (or is it humans?) approaches zero while the extraction of productive activity still remains essential. Because capital depends upon labor, and laborers are increasingly devalued in relation to the cosmic expansion of fixed capital as information, we see increasingly intensive exploitation on increasingly massive and increasingly granular scales. The falling rate of profit brought about the decrease in the relation of the value of labor power as compared to fixed capital is compensated for by the extension of the working day to every and evermore waking hours, and the proliferation of metrics of extraction to linguistic, psychic, neuronal and metabolic levels. Likes, movements, heartbeats, pheromones and prison time are all value-productive for someone as every attack surface of the body and cerebellum is exploited. The devaluation of life on Earth is the mirror image of the cosmic distribution of information. Computation is the reticulated extension of financialization. We are back to Tarkovsky’s Solaris, in which the history of suffering is the very medium through which one apprehends the cosmos. Thus we have an image of the world media system and thus we may grasp the emergence and most general function of informatics in computational capital. Despite what the ideologues will tell you, neither your soul nor ambient information have escaped capitalist valuation. The very fact of information and its metrics, both the data and the infrastructure that records, measures and posits it, is the result of alienated labor: sedimented dead labor, theft. Yet some think it is just information that wants to be free. Does the “notional” assignation of price really begin to extend itself into the subatomic and the universal? Already, the cost-benefit analysis called the atom bomb seemed to say yes. So too does the large space telescope, the Higgs-Bozon particle colliders, and all the seemingly autonomous science undertaken without a serious regard for global inequality. John von Neuman, who Philip Mirowski credits with having invented both the A-bomb and modern computing in 1943, may have been remarking on the relation between the specific and the general case when he said, “I am thinking about something more important than bombs. I am thinking about computers.”24 And then of course, there is the oh-so-familiar computer-mediated financialization of everyday life. Interface, get paid. Move up the value chain on Instagram or at your institute, get paid. Garner those attention metrics, get paid. In the context of my overall argument regarding computational capital, our re-placing of the “universality” of information by and indeed within the domain of exchange value cosmically posited brings the entire armature of information back to McLuhan’s chicken: Information, an egg’s idea to get more eggs. In conclusion, information is but game theory for eggs. Well, at least we have posed the question: “Was information value’s idea to get more value?” There may not be a definitive answer, but new pathways for thought and praxis open when the logic gate selected is “Yes.”25

#### Debate also operates through this project of disappearance – visualizing intellectual property protections only through their truncation as information for recursion and iteration. Even as the noises of the crisis outside restructures our activity into zoom calls and chat boxes, we are told to stubbornly return to run the same code year after year in a ressentiment-driven will to abstraction. COVID along with thousands of other holocausts of racial capitalism’s derivative system: from debt to municipal plunder to resource extraction to Palantir’s military tech.

#### Against the demand to input a binary 1 or 0 into the operating system of the world computer, our affirmation of the resolution refuses the presumed instrumentality of the question, in favor of the proliferation of the beautiful, cacophonous noise of the otherwise and outside. Only this rethinking of thinking can reveal the geopolitical alternatives that are excluded from the episteme of the world computer.

#### Thus, I affirm that member states of the World Trade Organization should reduce intellectual property protections for medicines.

#### Rather than let automation continue to control our thoughts, the affirmative acts as an embrace of the potential of a new communist horizon. It is a strike – right here, right now – within debate against algorithmic logics. In our experiment, we refuse the technological image that has abstracted itself onto reality and create new ways to know that cannot be cataloged into the code. This new method of communism is one that devises a plan of revolution, radicalizing the semiotic, libidinal, and political

Beller 21-2 (Jonathan Beller; 2021; Duke University Press; *“The World Computer: Derivative Conditions of Racial Capitalism”*; accessed 4/11/21; ask me for the pdf; Jonathan Beller is a film theorist, culture critic and mediologist. He currently holds the position of Professor of Humanities and Media Studies and Critical and Visual Studies, Pratt Institute, Brooklyn, NY. He is the recipient of numerous awards and fellowships including Mellon, J.P. Getty and Fulbright Foundation grants and honours.; pages 184-195) HB

My discussion here of advertisarial relations having colonized the fabric of representation is not really meant to disagree with the anti-Google idea of opt-in-only advertising, nor to undercut policy recommendations that seek to limit the perpetration of advertisers’ distinctively diabolical exploits, as in Christian Fuchs’s injunctions cited above. But that type of intervention, I’m afraid, is but the tip of the iceberg. Given the sea change in the nature of languages and images themselves—their wholesale transposition and trans-formation from a means of representation to a means of production—the dif-ficulty here is both with the substrate of communication (its bits) and with the us-versus-them perspective: we want to ban advertisers, but today we must also confront the disturbing possibility that we *are* them. Remember, “they” program “our” language and “our” imagination, “we” speak “their” thought—indeed, that is our work, or rather our labor. What to do with the fact that “we have seen the enemy and he is us?” One could say, one could want to say, “I don’t care who you are: if you live in the first world, if you live in the Global North, then fuck you! You ain’t no victim, even if you’re sick.” But who would be saying that? Probably some other Northerner, writing about how culture or the Venice Biennale, as if it were, could or should be more than a lavish spec-tacle of global suffering staged for a cosmopolitan elite. As capital’s nations, banks, armies, schools, languages, newspapers, and films did to its colonies and colonial subjects, the current institutions from states to computer-media com-panies do to “us”: they command us to make ourselves over in capital’s image for their own profit through networked strategies of expropriation and dispos-session. “We” do it to ourselves, and our representations of self and other are designed to sell a version of ourselves back to ourselves so that we can perform further work on what is now the raw material for the next iteration of images. Therein lies our ontological lack, an ontological lack of solidarity and of even the possibility for solidarity. Therein lies the desire for and indeed necessity to become a plantation manager—the word is overseer. Though it is beyond the scope of this essay, this digital neocolonialism that practically commands global Northerners to in one way or another accept Nazism and genocide with their cappuccino could be understood as being on a continuum with the internal colonization of Europe by the German banks—which depends of course on the distributed production of a kind of neoliberal “realism” that Mark Fisher (2009) called “capitalist realism,” and was only ever a hair’s breadth away from fascism. This fact of our investment in and by advertising, the conversion of the sign to what I call the “advertisign,” poses a genuine problem for theory—indeed an unprecedented one. This problem is particularly evident consider-ing the material conditions (class, nationality, education, race, language, etc.) of the participants in the would-be counterhegemonic theoretical discussions of culture and policy that presuppose the books, computers, schools, and insti-tutions that sustain these. Those within the circuit of these discussions have already passed through a homogenization process which programs them in compatible systems languages. Without submitting ourselves and our own as-pirations to radical critique, without conducting a Gramscian inventory of our ostensibly internal constitutions, we run the risk of merely trying to set up a competing corporation with a new business model. The revolution will not be televised; decolonization will not be a brand. Any would-be anticapitalist “we” runs this risk of coopting and cooptation from the get-go, particularly if it does not think about the materiality of social production from top to bottom: class, yes, but also race, nation, gender, sexual-ity, ability, geolocation, historical stratification. The world’s postmodern poor, the two billion–plus living on two dollars a day, also labor to survive in the ma-terial landscape organized by the post-Fordist social factory its anti-Blackness, its Islamophobia, its endless and mutating racism and imperialism. However, from the standpoint of capital, the role of those at the bottom is to serve as substrate for image-production and semiosis; not only in factories, cottage-industries, subsistence farming, and informal economies, but also as starving hordes; “irrational,” criminalized or surplused populations; subject-objects for policing, encampment, and bombing; desperate refugees; and even as voids in the idea of the world—as sites of social death. Forgive me, but I’d wager that no one capable of understanding these words can claim full exemption from the indictment they issue regarding structural complicity with the production and reproduction of everyday life. Humans are troped (via discourse and the screen) to organize military production, national policy, internment camps and prisons, bourgeois imaginations, museum shows, corporate strategy, and market projections. Let us clearly state here that any program that does not admit this excluded planet into dialogues that vitiate the monologues imposed by capitalist informatics and advertisigns is still floating in the realm of the ruling ideas and therefore participant in murder. These ruling ideas are the ones whose density and weight, whose material support and very machinery, threaten to further crush the late-capitalist poor out of not just representation but out of existence. This erasure and disposability, imposed by systems of informatic inscription designed to absorb every output of sense, is the achieve-ment of the advertisarial relations endemic to computational racial capitalism. When information is an advertisement for itself that presupposes the operat-ing system of the world computer as virtual machine, banning what we recog-nize as advertising on the internet, even if an excellent beginning, is just not adequate to address these issues of representation, social justice, planetary and climate racism, and emancipation. To summarize: the forms of sociality which are the conditions of possi-bility for the online, informatically organized relations—best characterized as *advertisarial*—run through every sector and register of planetary life. The internet, while recognizable as an effect and a cause of the current form of planetary production and reproduction, cannot be considered in isolation as a merely technical platform or set of platforms if its historical role is to be prop-erly understood. To take the internet as an autonomous technological force results in a species of platform fetishism that disavows both the histories and material conditions of its emergence, conditions that are, in short, those of screen culture and racial capitalism; this is to say that it, the internet, is the very means by which the capitalist suppression of global democracy (which is emphatically, economic democracy as well) has been accomplished and con-tinues. If the internet is autonomous, it is because it expresses the autonomiza-tion of the value form. As noted previously, with the hijacking of communi-cations and semiotic infrastructures by racial capitalism, the medium is the message and the message is murder. To ban advertising on the internet would be a good start—but what if the whole thing is advertising? One reading of what I have said thus far might suggest that, given the expropriation of the cognitive-linguistic, our volition is overtaken by capital logic; and given our inability to cogitate in any way that is genuinely resis-tant to capitalist expropriation, coercion, strictly speaking, is no longer neces-sary to impose cooperation for capitalist production. We “want” to cooper-ate productively, our desire—which, from the dispossession of even language and mind constitutes ourselves as subjects in the media ecology of the capitalist technical image, that is, in and through the organization of digital information—is itself an iteration of capital, a script of becoming predestined to become capital. The old language scored by the new image machines and their extractive algorithms locally organizes cooperative subjects who want to cooperate with vectoral capitalization. We want to provide content in order to derive currency and survive. Our solidarity on the internet produces more internet. Thus, in a certain way—and particularly since we no longer properly have any thoughts of our own—we all collaborate in a world organized by im-ages and screens, thereby participating more or less mindlessly in the seamless realization and triumphant apotheosis of the programming business. How-ever, I am sorry to have to report that the dystopian vision here is not quite as bucolic as even this already dreary picture of unwitting and irredeemable pulverization and servitude. While I do see that representation and semiotics have been increasingly flattened à la Orwell and Marcuse by a vast internaliza-tion of the apparatuses of oppression (in which “thought” is the [productive] thought of the [capitalist] Party and “repressive desublimation” is an engine of capitalist-fascist production) the “old problems” like the hierarchy of class have not gone away; neither have racism, sexism, homophobia, transphobia, ableism, and fascist nationalisms ceased playing their roles to create vectors of privilege for white male–identifying aspiration. Indeed, most thought today, such that it is, is all about maintaining hierarchical society. The thinking runs thus: capital is nature, capital is eternal, capital is information is nature. Or, in a more pedestrian mode: human beings are naturally acquisitive and com-petitive, economic growth and technological advancement mean progress, this tech provides, or almost provides, a color-, gender-, and religion-blind society, and so on—and one must advance one’s place in it by any (crypto-or not-so-cryptofascist) means necessary. Of course, there exists better thinking out there. Mia Mingus: “As organizers, we need to think of access with an un-derstanding of disability justice, moving away from an equality based model of sameness and ‘we are just like you’ to a model of disability that embraces difference, confronts privilege and challenges what is considered ‘normal’ on every front. We don’t want to simply join the ranks of the privileged; we want to dismantle those ranks and the systems that maintain them” (Mingus 2011, cited in Puar 2017: 16). However, there is broad-band, ambient programming that facilitates assuming neo-liberal and full-on fascist subjective sovereignty. This programming seeks triumphant brushes with plenitude (communion with the big Other, as distinct from the racial or otherwise other, becomes the ego-ideal), and this same programming is violent, competitive, hateful, mean-spirited, and alienating when embraced—at the same time that it is also co-operative, simpering, and abject. Servitude, even when automatic and mostly unconscious, is unhappy and, as we can see any day from the daily news, ut-terly pathological and sick. Of course, this diagnosis represents a huge gener-alization, but despite its broad-brushing lack of subtlety we may find that such a schizoid oscillation between entitled adjudicator and abject supplicant sums up the contours of your average reality television show or comments section on YouTube. It is Bateson’s (2000) and Deleuze and Guattari’s (1977) schizo-phrenic, caught in the double-bind, who has become the capitalist norm—the one who struggles to negotiate in the form of contradictory signals the aporias of hierarchical society, while reproducing it, and all the while experiencing their own psychic dissolution as an injunction to create.3 With this schizoid capture in mind, let me then develop my question about the internet—“What if it is all advertising?”—in the framework of post-Fordist production. The argument is that, in the context of virtuosity and the ex-propriation of the cognitive-linguistic by computational racial capital, social-ity itself has become advertisarial, a ceaseless waging of capitalized exploits designed to garner attention and value for oneself and one’s capitalists. This situation represents—indeed imposes—a derivative logic, a logic in which every action is a hedge, a kind of risk management devoted to maximize a return. In addition to the fractalization of fascism, in which agency is manifest as a profile that has aggregated the attention of others, advertising has worked its way into the sign itself, into the image, and into data visualization, and it has generated the *advertisign*. All signs become points of potential cathexis, derivative posi-tions on the underlier that is social currency and ultimately value. This new type of sign is not simply the brand but also an element of vectoral language (Wark 2007): functionalized words in a production channel, engaging in the micromanagement of desire, the production of new needs, and the capturing of the imagination, all in order to induce linguistic and behavioral shifts in the attention of others while aggregating their attention for oneself—turning their heads with an interface. This combination of the manipulation of market con-ditions (that is, everyday life) through techniques of risk management is no longer merely the province of advertising but of so-called human interactivity (what was once just communication and before that culture), now become adver-tisarial through and through. From Smythe’s claim in the “Blindspot” essay (1977) that all leisure time has become labor time, to Virno’s (2004) notion of virtuos-ity, we have seen aspects of this model for the capitalist overdetermination of ap-parently unremunerated time before. However, here—with the financialization of expression—we clearly grasp that the financialization of everyday life means also the convergence of semiotics and financial derivatives. Given the thoroughgoing intensification of vectoral, and in fact matrixial, signs, we need to investigate its implications in the context of a discussion of radical media practice. I will make two additional points here before shifting gears and turning at the end of this chapter to what I identify as an aesthetics of survival—an aesthetics that emerges from within the matrix of advertisar-ial, schizoid capture. The final chapter of this volume will endeavor to extend aspects of such socioaesthetic forms, those resistant to computational racial capitalism, to new notions of radical finance and the possibility of platform communism. If, as was already becoming true in the cinematic mode of production, the dominant means of representation have become the dominant means of production, the questions of and models for political agency are radically transformed, and the urgent need to decolonize communication and decolonize finance presents itself. Future communi-cation will require a cybernetic approach, and, as we shall argue, this cybernetic approach will necessarily be financial, though it will be reaching toward a different order and different mode of production. Like communism, because it will need to be communist, it will see economic transformation of the material relations of production and reproduction as essential to the revolution. It will draw on the repressed and extracted cognitive-linguistic resource of the racial-ized and otherwise marginalized and configure ways to make our voices matter both as meaning and as tools for the reorganization of the material world and the social relations therein prescribed. Language and images are neither inside nor outside; they are part of the general intellect—currently they are at once media of thought and of capital. We also know that languages and images are not isolable, meaning that they are not and have never been stand-alone enti-ties but rather exist in relation to their media, their platforms, which are again inseparable from society and its institutions. Furthermore, each platform re-lates to another platform. Paraphrasing McLuhan, we could even say that the “content” of a media platform is another platform. Thusly the general intel-lect is inseparable from its media platforms and their financials. We see that the general intellect, once largely held in common, is increasingly being priva-tized; the very media of our thought belong to someone else. *This expropriation of the media commons is precisely the precondition of the real subsumption of society by capital.* It is an extension of the ongoing expropriation begun by primitive accumulation and money as capital, and it has been accomplished through the financialization of media as platforms of extraction. The ramification of mediation by computation and information has resulted in its convergence into formats offering derivative exposure to underliers that are the expres-sive vitality and futurity of our communication. We therefore no longer have any organic relation to the materials for thought itself (sincerity has become a myth, at least in the medium-term of most circles)—the words, images, and machines we require to think, to express ourselves, to interact, and to know have been ripped from the species and privatized via the longue durée of dis-symmetrical exchange. We work on the words and images, but as numbers they belong to someone else.The media themselves have become *forms* of capital—forms of racial capital—and our usage of these media means that we work to add value that valorizes capital, for the capitalist and within a relation designed as much as possible to guarantee that our creative acts necessarily occur as dissymmetri-cal exchange with capital. I write this book in a discourse that does not just not belong to me because it is shared, but in a discourse that is increasingly the property of a set of institutions—publishers, journals, universities—that all have their eye on the bottom line. The means by which we most intimately know the world, ourselves, and our desires (our images and words) are themselves vectors of capitalization intent upon converting our very life-process into sur-plus value (which is to say value for capital). We need strategies that will seize the means of production and create a reverse subsumption of affect, intellect, knowledge, capability, communication, and community. When all media have converged as economic media, it is economic media that must be re-engineered. Again, I think this subsumption of cognitive and affective capacity, the quasi-automating (scripting) of productive labor for capital, is what Stiegler means by the proletarianization of the nervous system—which would include the proletarianization of the pathways of feeling and thought. Our affective ca-pacities are put to alienated and alienating work in the social factory, and their product too is alienated, producing ever-intensifying and ever-accumulating dispossession and disempowerment as the dialectical antithesis of its simul-taneous production of unprecedented wealth and power for the cyborg ava-tars of the great media conglomerates. Intellect and emotional intelligence, the product of thousands of years of species-becoming, is being strip-mined so that extraction machines may continue their furious innovation to further discount people. I write this book aware of the pressure to think it just right, to at once extend thinking in order to command attention and produce new needs, but also to delimit it, to control myself, and to put the reins on whatever counterpower may rage within my body, because academia can tolerate only so much “bullshit” and no more. Yes sir, I’ll be careful not to cross that line, but a word to the woke: the bullshit is the best part. From a historical perspective, this encroachment on the means of representation—that Banksy and I and a billion others join the silenced major-ity in opposing—indicates that the individual subjective agent, itself a plat-form for sociality that developed with the rise of capitalism (as the subject who relates to other subjects in the market, the bearer of the commodity and thus its thought), is nearly defunct. As has been noted previously, in a world where life processes are stripped, ripped apart, rebundled, and sold as deriva-tive exposures, the individual subject is an outmoded technology despite the fact that it still appears as a skeuomorph in certain updated technosocial apparatuses—like the latest forms of films, games, influencers, and versions of national politics that proffer invitations to momentary individualistic identifi-cation for the *dividual* purpose of providing a sense of familiarity and orienta-tion. While palliative for some in small doses, such individuality is no longer a viable (which is to say, sustainable) fantasy. The real thought is that of the infrastructure, of the ai that codes our meat and scripts our sheets. Sure I take up the mantle for a few moments each day to appear as the agent of this text, suiting up as the operator of an intellect that might be adequate to the informatic shit-storm of racist, capitalist, imperialist, patriarchal, for-profit assaults, but then I drop off into an ocean of petty concerns, food shopping, and home repairs. And even when I say “I,” to perform as the nexus of all this insight, I also know that it’s hardly me talking. I’m just curating at the gates of shit that needs to be said, and hopefully titrating to let the right stuff through. That’s part of my politics though Dog knows that I could create a more lucrative named-professor type profile with just a little more discipline, a bit more self-interested adherence to the protocols of the academy’s factory code. Instead, there is the effort to overturn, to be or at least to live something be-yond being the scribe of the world computer, to at once witness the drama of the emergence of the intelligence of commodification, testify to its outrage, and intimate the possibility of its overthrow. Such would be the art of this text, practiced at the limits of disciplinarity and of subjectivity, guaranteed by nothing and no one. The expiration of the subject form, imminent since the subject’s first intimation of mortality—and made structurally mandatory by Freud and especially, with the full-blown rise of the sign at the moment of it radical marginalization by visuality, by Lacan—is not necessarily a cause for lament, despite the increasingly intense fading of its incalculable beauty, its sad reduction to cliché. From a political perspective, it means that within concrete individual body the presumed continuity of the individual is riddled with contradictory and indeed unassimilable indicators; it means also that there exists in differing quantities and qualities capitalist and noncapital-ist striations or sectors. Hallways of emptiness, but also hallways of love. Like bundled assets, the mind-body is tranched by executable logics organized by a calculus of risk available to investors. There are, to be a bit simplistic, as-pects of desire that are programmed (indeed farmed) to produce practices that function in perfect accord with capitalist accumulation strategies (individual-izing or schizoid) and aspects of desire that are atavistic or collectivist, uto-pian, communist, or maybe even just plain lonely, and, in short, subprime. In reality, of course, desire is more singular than even such formalizations might indicate. Insert your favorite snippet of poetry here. Hortense Spillers in “All the Things You Could Be by Now If Sigmund Freud’s Wife Was Your Mother” (1997) invokes “the Dozens” and the music of and like that of Charles Mingus (152–3), to make present an “interior intersubjectivity”(140) testifying to the rich unaudited psychic life of what might today be called Blackness. There are vast resources beyond the easy resolution of hegemonic hermeneutics whether deployed by institutionally validated psychoanalysis or compressed by current systems of informatic extraction. In agreeing with Freud that con-sciousness makes up a small part of mental life when compared to the precon-scious, the unconscious, dreams, and so on, but in rejecting the normative assumptions and disavowals (including his own Jewishness) that situate Freud and the psychoanalytic discourse that will become part of European and U.S. bourgeois society, Spillers recognizes a vast store of mental life and the possi-bility of listening anew. However, when speaking of politics now, we therefore necessarily speak of the abstract forms available for the conceptualization and deployment of concrete emergences whether referring to haecceities that are innumerable or collective forms of existence and psychic life actively mediat-ing between “the one” and “the ‘masses’ ” (141). Let us listen anew. Acknowledging that we ultimately and if possible immediately want to “marry our thought” (Wynter 1994b: 65) to the wealth of subaltern forms of life and the care of the bios, allow me then to put the situation of the post-Fordist subject thusly: in *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism*, Lenin (1939) showed how imperialist dividends complicated class issues in England, since many people, otherwise part of the working class, got a share of the dividends of imperialism by clipping the coupons of their investments in racist, exploit-ative British enterprises across the globe. Today this race-based class fraction-alization is fully internalized in the Global North; on our iPads built by Chi-nese slaves from blood metals extracted from the Congo, we may momentarily feel like biomorphically unmarked nobles in the global cosmopolis; while on the job market or when simply seen in our raced and gendered embodiments, we are abjects. Materially and intellectually we are nodal points on a global network. The signal oscillates between narcissistic megalomania and utter abjec-tion and can be affected by a billion parameters taking us from melancholia to outrage. Thus, even the concrete individual is composed of class fractions, race fractions, gender fractions. In the form of signs, we clip coupons that validate our investments. The language of object-identification, we observe here, cannot really keep up with the fluctuations resulting from the throughput of code as we work to identify and disidentify our agency. Can we audit a different mode of emergence, a different futurity than one inexorably overcoded by capital? Of course this is still somewhat simplistic and also class-specific, as many (*billions* even) never get to participate as an enfranchised global citizen in any aspect or moment of life, even if the lived experience of these same billions is radically overdetermined by the class(es) from which they are excluded.4 The gilded poverty of the enfranchised, as opposed to the mere poverty of the rest, is now a measure of connectivity. A more complete view is that we are the product of the world system and thus *everything* we are has been produced vis-à-vis globalization, and therefore everything bears the trace of the system in its entirety (again, in varying proportions). This conceptualization of con-crete individuals (bodies) as global communitarian products forced to varying degrees into templates of individualized risk by capitalist states, is not to erase class; however, it suggests that, just as Fanon saw the great European metropo-les as the product of third world labor, we are all products of the worst condi-tions prevailing in the Global South and around the planet. Global inequality is internal to our being. It is us. How then does one (such a one who is relatively enfranchised by the derivative language of texts such as this one) inventory those relations and produce them as formations of solidarity rather than as disavowed residuum? Is there another data-sphere, a communist one? Can we build communist interfaces, networks, and finance? How would we register, track, amplify, and render actionable the communitarian affinities, solidarities, obligations, and debts, the resources in the wake of too many genocides to count, that in actual practice underpin the official economy, collective life, and whatever authentic hope is left to our species? Perhaps we have arrived at a question worthy of theory: Is there, could there be communist algorithms? Communist derivatives? Derivative communism? We are looking for that path. To add to my point about the shifting, distributed character of political actors—that goes so far as to suggest that we can no longer think only of ac-tors but rather must think of vectors and fields in addition to thinking of the resources developed in cultures of survival—I will make a second observation. A political intervention in the advertisarial relations that have this planet heading toward environmental doomsday requires not only revolutionary policy but revolutionary culture. (I defer further discussion of a third requirement, revo-lutionary finance, to the final chapter.) This culture must take into account that, for many on this planet, Armageddon is not the future but an ongoing constant. My call here (which should not be entirely unfamiliar, as it gives petit bourgeois intellectuals something important to do) is to (re)politicize se-miotic and affective structures and practices, including and perhaps especially those we might control, for example our own utterances—our expression. Of course, to call them “our own” seems to contradict what I’ve said about the expropriation of the cognitive-linguistic and the intensification of aphanisis by visual, verbal, and digital media derivatives, but it is here precisely that we confront one of the significant material contradictions of our time: who or what speaks in us? This question, which I shorthand using the phrase the politics of the utterance and which you can experience palpably right now (as you endeavor to think), seems to me to insist that our idea-making must ac-tively produce its solidarity with the dispossessed. We must struggle for the radical constellation. The question concerning the politics of the utterance, asked here in a strange passage of this text through a beyond-academic ter-rain, a moonless forest the traversal of which may or may not at this point lead us back to the plot, also raises the question of becoming, as well as the questions of agency and of action within the capitalist image—programmable images, racializing and racist images that, in the terms we have set out, are functionally omnipresent. Continuous media throughput has generated a capitalist imaginary structuring both language function and imaging processes, coordinated at scales and by calculative logics that exceed individual compre-hension. Though the occasion is upon us, we must struggle for space and time to think. We must open a spread on which to bet against the dominant order. We glimpse, and we feel, that to insist upon the unremitting relevance of both culture-making and of cross-cultural transnational solidarity helps to avoid platform fetishism because it sees the internet and its machines not as a set or collection of autonomous technologies but as a historically emergent system of value-expropriative communication and organization, built directly upon older but nonetheless contemporaneous forms of inequality, including but not limited to historically emergent techniques of gendering, racialization, and imperialism, and embedded in the living flesh of the world. All of this calculative interconnectivity and networked agency implies, contradictorily, in fact, that the internet is not all advertising—but neither is advertising all advertising. It is also murder and struggle. Banksy knows that. The advertisarial relation is the programmatic relation encrypted in the apparatuses of capital: the war of each against all, taken all the way from fi-nance, computation, and surveillance to the speech act and the imagination in accord with the autopoietic algorithm of the distributed Leviathan. Marx himself saw capitalism as vampiric, and today’s processes of capitalization are even more totalitarian, more widely distributed, and more blood-, life-, and indeed soul-sucking than even in prior eras—though such comparisons don’t do those killed by past iterations of capitalism any good. Despite the disavow-als to the contrary, we recognize that capital needs labor, needs metabolic time more desperately and more voraciously than ever before (what else is biopoli-tics?) and, furthermore, that it wages war on life-time on all fronts, in order to secure labor power, its product and basis, at a discount. The pyramids of inequality become internal fractals, and even as the base broadens, the tip with the all-seeing eye (that is not a subject) ascends ever higher. We do not yet know what can be destroyed or indeed built with the massive appropriation of Banksy’s rocks, but we do know that at present there is total war against our using them to build anticapitalist, nonhierarchical, horizontal, solidary social-ity. The refusal or détournement of capital’s encroachment is itself a creative act. Perhaps we have only begun to glimpse what a total refusal might achieve.

#### Our politic must politicize the social relations that are naturalized, buried, and rendered unthought by abstraction. The overproliferation of abstraction does not remove bias from information, but instead simply disappears the social to reify and encode disposability and death along lines of racial capitalism. Our response cannot just be to decolonize the world, we must also decolonize the techne of thought itself.

Beller, 21-3 (Jonathan Beller, Professor of Humanities and Media Studies and Critical and Visual Studies @ Pratt Institute, has written extensively on the Philippines, computation, political economy, and the attention economy. *The World Computer: Derivative Conditions of Racial Capitalism*, Duke University Press, 2021.)

Despite not being able to write in the key of Marx any longer, it is possible to politicize social relations that are naturalized, technologized, or buried in abstraction, in machinery, and in the unthought. Social difference, the profitable maintenance and elaboration of social differentiation fundamentally but not exclusively along “racial” and monetary lines is inherent in information itself. Learning from Hortense Spillers, this critique of information extends itself to the grammar of social differentiation and to the increasing granularity of that grammar. It is impossible to write in the key of Marx because of the historical materialist recognition that both the writer and the reader are distributed cybernetic agents who are themselves caught up and constituted in the traffic of information and must therefore decolonize themselves as they work to decolonize the world. No single perspective is adequate to such a task. We observe that the situation of difference and differentiation, inseparable as it is from histories of violence, is, in fact, the deeper meaning of what is called “the world market.” The world market is the real-time computational processing of the evaluation of everything—and from which today (next to) nothing escapes—by the relentless calculus of the value-form endemic to profit under the historical system of racial capitalism. By looking at specific machine histories and processes of grammartization we shall demonstrate that modern machines