#### Our world is dictated by the hyperreal. Society is engrained in the meaningless binary in which we have lost any meaning of truth. This breeds the conditions of semiocapitalism and a paralysis of our psychic process. Swarts no date

Swarts, Frederick. The Metaphysic of the Code . //fd

"Leibniz, that mathematical spirit, saw in the mystic elegance of **the binary system** that counts only the zero and the one, the very image of creation. The unity of the supreme Being, **operating by binary function in nothingness**, would have sufficed to bring out of it all the beings." - McLuhan The great simulacra constructed by man pass from a universe of natural laws to a universe of force and tensions of force, today to a universe of structures and binary oppositions. After the metaphysic of being and appearance, after that of energy and determination, comes that of indeterminacy and the code. Cybernetic control, generation from model, differential modulation, feed-back, question/answer, etc.: such is the new *operational* configuration (industrial simulacra are only *operational*). Digitality is its metaphysical principle (the God of Leibniz), and DNA its prophet. It is in effect in the genetic code that **the "genesis of simulacra**" today finds its most accomplished form. **At the limit of** an always more extensive **abolition of references and finalities**, of the loss of resemblance and designation, we find **the digital program- sign**, whose value is purely tactical, at the intersection of the other signals (corpuscles of information/test) and whose structure **is that of a macro-molecular code of command and control**. At this level the question of signs, of **their rational destination**, their **real or imaginary**, their repression, their deviation, the illusion they create or that which they conceal, or their parallel meanings - **all of that is erased**. We have already seen signs of the first order, complex signs and rich in illusion, change, with the machines, into crude signs, dull, industrial, repetitive, echoless, operational and efficacious. What a mutation, even more radical still, with signals of the code, illegible, with no gloss possible, buried like programmatic matrices light-years away in the depths of the "biological" body - black boxes where all the commandments, all the answers ferment! End of the theatre of representation, the space of signs, their conflict, their silence; only the black box of the code, the molecular emitter of signals from which we have been irradiated, crossed by answers/questions like signifying radiations, tested continuously by our own program inscribed in the cells. Jail cells, electronic cells, party cells, microbiological cells: always the search for the smallest indivisible element, whose organic synthesis would be made according to the givens of the code. But **the code itself is but a genetic cell**, a generator where myriads of intersections produce all the questions and possible solutions, so that choices (by whom?) can be made. No finality involved with these "questions" (informational and signifying impulsions) but the answer, genetically unchangeable or inflected by minute and aleatory differences. Space is no longer even linear or one- dimensional: *cellular* space, indefinite generation of the same signals, like the tics of a prisoner gone crazy with solitude and repetition. Such is **the genetic code**: an erased record, unchangeable, of which we are no more than cells- for-reading. All aura of sign, of significance itself is resolved in this determination; all **is resolved in the inscription and decodage.** Such is the third-order simulacrum, our own. Such is the "mystic elegance of the binary system, of the zero and the one", from which all being proceeds. Such is the status of the sign that is also the end of signification: DNA or operational simulation. All of this is perfectly well summed up by Sebeok ("Genetics and Semiotics", in Versus): Numerous observations confirm the hypothesis that the internal organic world descends in a straight line from the primordial forms of life. The most remarkable fact is the omnipresence of the DNA molecule. The genetic material of all organisms known on earth is in great measure made up of the nucleonic acids DNA and RNA that contain in their information structure, transmitted by reproduction from one generation to another and furthermore gifted with the capacity of self-reproduction and imitation. Briefly, the genetic code is universal, or almost. Its deciphering was an immense discovery, in the sense that it showed that "the two languages of the great polymers, the language of nucleonic acid and that of protein, are tightly correlated" (Crick, 1966; Clarck/Narcker, 1968). The Soviet mathematician Liapounov demonstrated in 1963 that all living systems transmit by prescribed canals with precision a small quantity of energy or of matter containing a great volume of information, which is responsible for the ulterior control of a great quantity of energy and matter. In this perspective numerous phenomena, biological as well as cultural (stockage, feed-back, canalization of messages and others) can be seen as aspects of the treatment of information. In the last analysis information appears in great part as the repetition of information, or even as another sort of information, a sort of control that seems to be a universal property of terrestrial life, independent of form or substance. Five years ago I drew attention to the convergence of genetics and linguistics - autonomous disciplines, but parallel in the larger field of communication science (of which animal semiotics also is a part). The terminology of genetics is full of expressions taken from linguistics and communication theory (Jacobson, 1968), which also underlined either the major resemblances or the important differences of structure and of function between genetic and verbal codes. . . It is obvious today that the genetic code must be considered the most fundamental of all the semiotic networks, and therefore a prototype of all the other systems of signaling that animals use, man included. From this point of view, molecules which are systems of quanta and behave like stable vehicles of physical information, systems of animal semiotics and cultural systems, including language, constitute a continuous chain of stages, with always more complex energy levels, in the framework of a universal unique evolution. It is therefore possible to describe either language or living systems from a unified cybernetic point-of-view. For the present, this is only a useful analogy or a prediction. A reciprocal rapprochement between animal communication and linguistics can lead to a complete knowledge of the dynamics of semiotics, and such a knowledge can be revealed, in the last analysis, to be nothing less than the very definition of life. And so the current strategic model is designed that everywhere is replacing the great ideological model which constituted political economy in its time. You will find it under the rigorous sign of "science" in the Chance and Necessity of Jacques Monod. The end of dialectical evolution, it is the discontinuous indeterminism of the genetic code that now controls life - the teleological principle. Finality no longer belongs to the term; there is no longer a term, nor a determination. Finality is there beforehand, inscribed in the code. We see that nothing has changed - simply the order of ends yields to the play of molecules, and the order of signifieds to the play of infinitesimal signifiers, reduced to their aleatory commutation. All the transcendant finalities reduced to a dashboard full of instruments. There is still, however, recourse to a nature, to an inscription in "biological" nature - in actuality, a nature distorted by fantasy like she always was, metaphysical sanctuary no longer of origin and substance, but this time of the code; the code must have an "objective" basis. What could be better for that purpose than the molecule and genetics? Monod is the strict theologian of this molecular transcendance, Edgar Morin the rapt disciple (A.D.N.\* + Adonai!). But for one as well as the other, the fantasy of the code, which is equivalent to the reality of power, is merged with molecular idealism. (\*D.N.A.) Thus we find once more in history that delirious illusion of uniting the world under the aegis of a single principle - that of a homogenous substance with the Jesuits of the Counter Reformation; that of the genetic code with the technocrats of biological science (but also linguistics as well), with Leibniz and his binary divinity as precursor. For the program here aimed at has nothing genetic about it, it is a social and historical program. That which is hypostatized in biochemistry is the ideal of a social order ruled by a sort of genetic code of macromolecular calculation, of P.P.B.S. (Planned Programming Budgeting System), irradiating the social body with its operational circuits. The technical cybernetic finds its "natural philosophy" here, as Monod says. The fascination of the biological, of the biomedical dates from the very beginnings of science. It was at work in Spencerian organicism (sociobiology) on the level of second- and third-order structures (Jacob's classification in The Logic of Life, it is active today in modern biochemistry, on the level of structures of the fourth-order). Coded similarities and dissimilarities: that is certainly the image of cyberniticized social exchange. You only have to add "stereospecific complex" in order to re-inject intracellular communication; that Morin will come to transfigure into molecular Eros.

#### The impact is collective paranoia –we are living in a system of hyper reality, an obscene proliferation of meaning caused by the lack of a reference point for the real events attempting to be described. The system demands that information be found and circulated to replace the actual meaning that has been lost.

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#### It is in this always operative tendency of rendered appearances to yield meaning (even if their meaning is to be information-worthy), not in the image or event itself, that we situate the conditions of possibility and reproducibility for the ever-thickening representational fog and for the violence/virulence of images, or better yet, of appearances. To make war or, as the case may be, the terror event mean something—even in some of the most immediate reactions often designed to evoke injustice or, indeed, incomprehension—is the generative point of violence, the source of representation as a virulent/virtual code and mode of signification. Baudrillard writes, “Everywhere one seeks to produce meaning, to make the world signify, to render it visible.” He adds, “We are not, however, in danger of lacking meaning; […] we are gorged with meaning and it is killing us” (Baudrillard, 1988: 63). Indeed, the Western world—increasingly, the global—has found itself with a proliferation of meanings and significations in the late 20th and early 21st centuries. It is as if the so-called crisis of nihilism (thought to be characteristic of much critique and philosophical suspicion throughout the 20th century) later on produced something of the opposite order. The mass violence of the 20th century inaugurated not a complete void of despair or meaninglessness, but instead a flood of meaning, if not an overproduction of it. Baudrillard refers to this frantic explosion of meaning/signification as “a panic-stricken production of the real and the referential, above and parallel to the panic of material production […]” (Baudrillard, 1983: 7). Here, Baudrillard describes a mode of production of a different kind, not motivated by class interests or exploitation of value, but by an automated, perhaps viral, abreaction to the empty core or disenchantment of things and the world: that is to say, the degree to which things seem to lack a singular center of gravity or have lost a justifiable reference to the real world, and yet each thing that “matters” is also an attempt to get at reality as a question of accumulation (of meaning), circulation (of signs), and filling up of all interstitial spaces of communication and value. The end result is an over-abundance of signs and images of reality, something that culminates in what Baudrillard calls hyperreality—things appear more real than reality itself. The story that needs to be told is thus not about the undoubtedly deplorable “truth” or fact of explosive and warlike violence, but about a violence of another sort. In the radical digital transparency of the global scene, we (members of the *demos*) often have full or direct exposure to explosivity, as we saw above with the image of terror. But what still needs to be thought and problematized is *implosivity*or what may be called *implosive violence*. Implosive violence is a violence for which we do not, and perhaps will never, have much of a language (Rancière, 2007: 123). Although, not having a language for it or, rather, as we saw above, seeking to find a language to talk about it and, perhaps, to make sense of it is still sought after. This is, perhaps, what digital pictures of war/terror violence seek to capture or want to force through. Implosive violence, often digitally rendered these days, is in close contact with media technologies and representational devices and techniques because it seeks representation and meaning. This is why implosive violence insists on calling in wars (against terror, for example) and on mobilizing war machines (against terrorist others, against vague enemy figures), but wars and war machines that no longer have—to the extent that they ever had—a clearly identifiable object and subject, or a clear mission/purpose. As such, this implosive violence and its wars (the new Western/global way of war, perhaps) must remain uncertain, unclear, foggy, inwardly driven, representational, and indeed virulent. They must remain uncertain and confused even as they are digitally operative and desperately capture events/images to give the impression that meanings/significations can and will be found. Yet, as we saw above, it is not meanings exactly that must be found, but information and the endless guarantee of its immediate circulation. As information occupies the empty place of meaning, certainty, or truth, images must be instantaneously turned into appearances that search for meanings that will never be discovered because, instead, a proliferation of information-worthy facts and beliefs will take over (perhaps this is what US fake pundit and comedian Stephen Colbert famously referred to as “truthiness”). Or, as Baudrillard puts it, “free from its former enemies, humanity now has to create enemies from within, which in fact produces a wide variety of inhuman metastases” (Baudrillard, 2003). Thus, this implosive violence is destined to be a global violence since it "is the product of a system that tracks down any form of negativity and singularity, including of course death as the ultimate form of singularity. […] It is a violence that, in a sense, puts an end to violence itself and strives to establish a world where anything related to the natural must disappear […] *Better than a global violence, we should call it a global virulence.* This form of violence is indeed viral. It moves by contagion, produces by chain reaction, and little by little it destroys our immune systems and our capacities to resist" (2003; our italics). In a way, this global virulence is all-out and everyday war itself. It is also the Global War on Terror, a war whose virulence and ever present (virtual, potential) violence mediatizes and hyper-realizes everyday life for a lot of human bodies in the West and beyond (is that not also something that the Boston Marathon bombing smart phone representations struggled to tell us?). For Baudrillard, this is how we should apprehend the mythos of globalization (since globalization is all about virulence). To suggest, as many still do, that there is any sort of remaining hegemony in the production of cultural and political meanings (as, for example, Horkheimer and Adorno once told us; see Horkheimer and Adorno, 2002) is anachronistic. But it is also a convenient claim to make. As we mentioned above, such a posture implies that hope can be around the corner, that things can be changed, that the *demos*can be rescued and liberated, that it can trust the immediacy offered by today’s digitalized media, and that such an immediacy is the guarantee that not all meanings are lost (again, it is about proving meaning by way of information, the real by way of appearances). Viral, virtual, and virulent media representations have assumed the empty throne abandoned by the modern sovereign/core of power in the implosive West/global. The implosive immediacy of proliferating videos, images, memes, articles, utterances, leaks, wikis, blogs, clips, blips, flips, or flops reigns supreme and sovereign. And it is this proliferating sovereignty of digitalized mediation/representation that ensures the circulation of war’s violence/virulence too (it is, in this way, war’s platform and generator). As Baudrillard intimates, this representational, mediatized, and informational virality or virulence is simply the historical logic of the West/modernity brought to its fatal and perhaps absurd end, a tautology of Western modernity and globality inwardly and mediatically hyper-realized (truth, being, and language all operating as one and the same, indifferently, in a circulatory movement of immediately available appearances). It is the eternal recurrence of the same, or perhaps the eternal recurrence of the always already replayed. Of course, we (digital modern subjects) could ignore all this. We could go on to celebrate representational, real-time digital technologies and their visual/viral/virulent practices in the belief that, somehow, they will continue to give us the truth of war, the truth of violence, the truth of senseless terror/horror. Perhaps, they may even give us a new hope/meaning about the *demos*, about “our” ontological positioning in, through, and with digital media. And maybe the ethical impulse is indeed to ignore or, at least, selectively use this Baudrillardian critique of war’s and representation’s violence and virulence. But another posture, one we advocate, is to take another look at the violence of representation itself, at the virulence of the West and the global, and at modernity’s own implosive history—which, of course, is the history of representation, too—to which today’s digitalized technologies and media owe their significance and, at times, urgency.

**Their framework is violent— the will to subjective futurity reduces the inner experience of otherness to instrumental value and death is displaced in the present tense onto marginalized others.**

**Winnubst 06.** Shannon Winnubst, professor of Women’s and gender studies at Ohio State University, Queering Freedom, pg. 183

For Bataille, the **servility to utility** is **displayed** particularly in **the temporality** of such a world—**the temporality of anticipation**. Returning again to the role of the tool, he writes, In efficacious activity man becomes **the equivalent of a tool**, which produces; he is like the thing **the tool is**, being itself a product. The implication of these facts is quite clear: the tool’s meaning is given by the future, in what the tool will produce, in the future utilization of the product: like the tool, he who serves—who works—has the value of that which will be later, not of that which is. (1988–91, 2:218) The **reduction of our lives to the order of utility** forces us to **project ourselves endlessly** into the **future**. Bataille writes of this as our anguished state, caused by this anticipation “that must be called **anticipation of oneself**. For he must apprehend himself in the future, through the anticipated results of his action” (1988–91, 2:218). This is why **advanced capitalism** and **phallicized whiteness** must **ground themselves in a denial of death**: death **precludes** the **arrival of this future**. It **cuts us off from ourselves**, **severing us** from the **future self** that is always our real and true self. Resisting the existential turn, however, Bataille refuses to read this denial of death as an ontological condition of humanity. For Bataille, this is a **historical** and **economic denial**, one in which only a culture **grounded in the anticipation** of the **future** must **participate**. He frames it primarily as **a problem of the intellect**. In the reduction of the world to the order of utility, we have **reduced our lives** and **experiences** to **the order of instrumental reason**. This order necessarily operates in a sequential temporality, facing forward toward the time when the results will be achieved, the questions solved, the theorems proved—and also when political domination will be ended and ethical an- guish quieted. As Bataille credits Hegel for seeing, “knowledge is never given to us except by unfolding in time” (1988–91, 2:202). It never appears to us except, finally, “as the result of a calculated effort, an operation useful to some end” (1988–91, 2:202)—and its utility, as we have seen, only drives it forward toward some future utility, endlessly. There are always **new and future objects** of thought to conquer and domesticate. Within this order of reason, death presents the cessation of the very practice of knowledge itself. **Severing us** from the **future objects of thought** and **from our future selves**, “death **prevents man** from attaining himself” (1988–91, 2:218). As Bataille explains, “the fear of death appears linked from the start to the projection of oneself into a future time, which [is] an effect of the positing of oneself as a thing” (1988–91, 2:218). The **fear of death derives from the subordination** to the **order** of **utility** and its dominant form of the intellect, **instrumental reason.** While death is unarguably a part of the human condition, for Bataille the **fear of death** is a **historically habituated response**, one **that grounds cultures of advanced capitalism** and **phallicized whiteness**. In those frames of late modernity, death introduces **an ontological scarcity** into **the very human condition**: it **represents finitude**, the **ultimate limit**. We must **distance ourselves from such threats**, and we do so most often by **projecting** them **onto sexualized, racialized**, and **classed bodies**. But for Bataille, **servility** to the **order of knowledge** is as **unnecessary** as **servility to the order of utility**. To **die humanly**, he argues, is to accept “**the subordination of the thing**” (1988– 91, 2:219), which places us in the schema that separates our present self from the future, desired, anticipated self: “to die humanly is to have of the future being, of the one who matters most in our eyes, the senseless idea that he is not” (1988–91, 2:219). But if we are not trapped in the endless anticipation of our future self as the index of meaning in our lives, we may not be anguished by this cessation: “If we live sovereignly, the **representation of death is impossible**, for the **present is not subject** to the **demands of the future**” (1988–91, 2:219). **To live sovereignly** is **not to escape death**, which is ontologically **impossible**. But it is to **refuse the fear**, and **subsequent attempts at disavowal**, of death as the **ontological condition** that **defines humanity**. Rather than trying to transgress this ultimate limit and prohibition, the sovereign [person] man “**cannot die fleeing**. He [it] **cannot let the threat** of **death** deliver him over to **the horror of a desperate yet impossible flight**” (1988–91, 2:219). Living in a temporal mode in which “anticipation would **dissolve into NOTHING**” (1988–91, 2: 208), the sovereign man **[person] “lives and dies like an animal”** (1988–91, 2:219). He lives and dies without the anxiety invoked by the forever unknown and forever encroaching anticipation of the future. As Bataille encourages us elsewhere, “Think of **the voracity** of **animals**, as **against the composure of a cook**” (1988–91, 2:83).

#### Liberation is liquidated and their revolution is terminally non-unique. There is no longer a risk of political change as all movements have already happened – The only revolutions left are simulated copies of the originals that fail to actualize change.

**Baudrillard, 93** (Jean, The Transparency of Evil: Essays on Extreme Phenomena, 1993)

If I were asked to characterize the present state of affairs, I would describe it as 'after the orgy' . The orgy in question was the moment when modernity exploded upon us, the moment of liberation in every sphere . Political liberation, sexual liberation, liberation of the forces of production, liberation of the forces of destruction, women's liberation, children's liberation, liberation of unconscious drives, liberation of art. The assumption of all models of representation, as of all models of anti-representation. This was a total orgy an orgy of the real, the rational, the sexual, of criticism as of anti-criticism, of development as of the crisis of development. We have pursued every avenue in the production and effective overproduction of objects, signs, messages, ideologies and satisfactions . Now everything has been liberated, the chips are down, and we find ourselves faced collectively with the big question: WHAT DO WE DO NOW THE ORGY IS OVER? Now all we can do is simulate the orgy, simulate liberation. We may pretend to carry on in the same direction, accelerating, but in reality we are accelerating in a void, because all the goals of liberation are already behind us, and because what haunts and obsesses us is being thus ahead of all the results - the very availability of all the signs, all the forms, all the desires that we had been pursuing. But what can we do? This is the state of simulation, a state in which we are obliged to replay all scenarios precisely because they have all taken place already, whether actually or potentially. The state of utopia realized, of all utopias realized, wherein paradoxically we must continue to live as though they had not been. But since they have, and since we can no longer, therefore, nourish the hope of realizing them, we can only 'hyper-realize' them through interminable simulation. We live amid the interminable reproduction of ideals, phantasies, images and dreams which are now behind us, yet which we must continue to reproduce in a sort of inescapable indifference. The fact is that the revolution has well and truly happened, but not in the way we expected. Everywhere what has been liberated has been liberated so that it can enter a state of pure circulation, so that it can go into orbit. With the benefit of a little hindsight, we may say that the unavoidable goal of all liberation is to foster and provision circulatory networks. The fate of the things liberated is an incessant commutation, and these things are thus subject to increasing indeterminacy, to the principle of uncertainty. Nothing (not even God) now disappears by coming to an end, by dying. Instead, things disappear through proliferation or contamination, by becoming saturated or transparent, because of extenuation or extermination, or as a result of the epidemic of simulation, as a result of their transfer into the secondary existence of simulation. Rather than a mortal mode of disappearance, then, a fractal mode of dispersal. Nothing is truly reflected any more - whether in a mirror or in the abyssal realm (which is merely the endless reduplication of consciousness). The logic of viral dispersal in networks is no longer a logic of value; neither, therefore, is it a logic of equivalence. There is no longer any such thing as a revolution" of values - merely a circumvention or involution of values . A centripetal compulsion coexists with a decentredness of all systems, an internal metastasis or fevered endogenic virulence which creates a tendency for systems to explode beyond their own limits, to override their own logic - not in the sense of creating sheer redundancy, but in the sense of an increase in power, a fantastic potentialization whereby their own very existence is put at risk.

#### The alternative is complete negation – a refusal to feed the system that destroys our psyche. The political has lost the will for positive action and now all that is left in the power of the masses is negation. Baudrillard 93

(Baudrillard, Jean), The Transparency of Evil: Essays on Extreme Phenomena, 1993)//faizaan

In Simmel's words, 'Negation is the simplest thing imaginable. That is why the broad masses, whose component elements cannot achieve agreement as to goals, come together here.' **It is useless to expect a positive opinion or a critical will from the masses**, for they have none: **all they have is** an undifferentiated power, **the power to reject**. **Their strength flows solely from what they are able to expel, to negate** - and that is, first and foremost, any project that goes beyond them, any class or understanding that transcends them. There is something here of a philosophy of cunning born of the most brutal experience - the experience of animals, or of peasants: 'They won't put that over on us again, we won't fall for their calls to sacrifice, or listen to their pie in the sky.' **Profound disgust for the political order** - though one that may well coexist with specific political opinions . Disgust for the pretension and transcendence of power, **for the inevitability and abomination of the political sphere. Where once there were political passions, we now find only the violence peculiar to a fundamental disgust with everything political**. Power itself is founded largely on disgust. The whole of advertising, the whole of political discourse, is a public insult to the intelligence, to reason - but an insult in which we collaborate, abjectly subscribing to a silent interaction. The day of hidden persuasion is over: those who govern us now resort unapologetically to arm-twisting pure and simple. The prototype here was a banker got up like a vampire, saying, 'I am after you for your money' . A decade has already gone by since this kind of obscenity was introduced, with the government's blessing, into our social mores. At the time we thought the ad feeble because of its aggressive vulgarity . In point of fact it was a prophetic commercial, full of intimations of the future shape of social relationships, because it operated, precisely, in terms of disgust, avidity and rape. The same goes for pornographic and food advertising, which are also powered by shamelessness and lust, by a strategic logic of violation and anxiety.

#### The role of the ballot is to vote for the debater that best disrupts the simulacrum. Role playing contributes to inauthenticity and dead attachment to images of suffering, Antonio 95

Nietzsche's Antisociology: Subjectified Culture and the End of History Author(s): Robert J. Antonio Source: American Journal of Sociology , Jul., 1995, Vol. 101, No. 1 (Jul., 1995), pp. 1-43 Published by: The University of Chicago Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.com/stable/2782505 //WHS-AK

The "problem of the actor," Nietzsche said, "troubled me for the longest time."'12 He considered "**roles" as "external," "surface," or "foreground" phenomena** and viewed close personal identification with them as symptomatic of estrangement. While modern theorists saw dif- ferentiated roles and professions as a matrix of autonomy and reflexivity, Nietzsche held that **persons** (especially male professionals**) in specialized occupations** **overidentify with their positions and engage in gross fabrica- tions** to obtain advancement. They look hesitantly to the opinion of oth- ers, asking themselves, "How ought I feel about this?" **They are so** thoroughly **absorbed in simulating** effective **role players** that they have trouble being anything but actors-"The role **has actually become the character**." This highly subjectified social self or simulator **suffers devas- tating inauthenticity**. The powerful authority given the social greatly amplifies Socratic culture's already self-indulgent "inwardness." Integ- rity, decisiveness, spontaneity, and **pleasure are undone by paralyzing overconcern about** possible **causes, meanings, and consequences of acts** and unending internal dialogue about what others might think, expect, say, or do (Nietzsche 1983, pp. 83-86; 1986, pp. 39-40; 1974, pp. 302-4, 316-17). Nervous rotation of socially appropriate "masks" reduces persons to hypostatized "shadows," "abstracts," or simulacra. **One adopts "many roles," playing them** "badly and **superficially**" in the fashion of a stiff "puppet play." Nietzsche asked, "**Are you genuine? Or only an actor**? A representative or that which is represented? . . . [Or] no more than an imitation of an actor?" Simulation is so pervasive that it is hard to tell the copy from the genuine article; social selves "prefer the copies to the originals" (Nietzsche 1983, pp. 84-86; 1986, p. 136; 1974, pp. 232- 33, 259; 1969b, pp. 268, 300, 302; 1968a, pp. 26-27). Their inwardness and aleatory **scripts foreclose genuine attachment to others**. This type of **actor cannot plan for the long term** or participate in enduring net- works of interdependence; such a person is neither willing nor able to be a "stone" in the societal "edifice" (Nietzsche 1974, pp. 302-4; 1986a, pp. 93-94). Superficiality rules in the arid subjectivized landscape. Neitzsche (1974, p. 259) stated, "One thinks with a watch in one's hand, even as one eats one's midday meal while reading the latest news of the stock market; one lives as if one always 'might miss out on something. ''Rather do anything than nothing': this principle, too, is merely a string to throttle all culture. . . . **Living in** a constant **chase after gain compels people to expend** their **spirit to the point of exhaustion** in continual pretense and overreaching and anticipating others." Pervasive leveling, improvising, and faking foster an inflated sense of ability and an oblivious attitude about the fortuitous circumstances that contribute to role attainment (e.g., class or ethnicity). The most medio- cre people believe they can fill any position, even cultural leadership. Nietzsche respected the self-mastery of genuine ascetic priests, like Socra- tes, and praised their ability to redirect ressentiment creatively and to render the "sick" harmless. But he deeply feared the new simulated versions. Lacking the "born physician's" capacities, these impostors am- plify the worst inclinations of the herd; they are "violent, envious, ex- ploitative, scheming, fawning, cringing, arrogant, all according to cir- cumstances. " **Social selves are fodder for the** "great man of the **masses**." Nietzsche held that "the less one knows how to command, the more ur- gently one covets someone who commands, who commands severely- a god, prince, class, physician, father confessor, dogma, or party conscience. **The** deadly **combination of desperate conforming and overreaching** and untrammeled ressentiment **paves the way for a new type of tyrant.**