# **1NC Setcol**

#### **Settler colonialism was not just another event in history but a structuring of a “logic of elimination” re-entrenched everyday by Western structures of law and government – the affirmative’s actions deepens the settler state and its biopolitical control of life.**

Morgensen 11 (Scott Lauria Morgensen, assistant professor of gender studies at Queen’s University, “The Biopolitics of Settler Colonialism: Right Here, Right Now, *Settler Colonial Studies*, 2011)

Settler colonialism is exemplary of the processes of biopower theorised by Giorgio Agamben and Michel Foucault. However, settler colonialism remains naturalised within theories of biopower and theories of its relation to coloniality. White supremacist settler colonisation produces specific modes of biopolitics that sustain not only in settler states but also in regimes of global governance that inherit, extend, and naturalise their power. I extend Patrick Wolfe’s theory that a ‘logic of elimination’ constitutes settler colonialism in the genocide and amalgamation of Indigenous peoples, by indicating that this also indigenises and naturalises white settler nations as projections of the West. Agamben’s work illuminates how Indigenous peoples are eliminated in a state of exception to Western law, which by functioning to erase consanguinity – as the patriarch in Roman law eliminates the defiant son – explains Indigenous peoples’ seemingly contradictory incorporation within and excision from the body of white settler nations. This biopolitical process specific to settler colonialism also structures the manner in which white settler societies demonstrably universalize Western law, both within their bounds and in global arenas. My call to denaturalise settler colonialism in social theory is but a first step towards broader study of how the biopolitics of settler colonialism structure current modes of biopower and require concerted critique at the intersections of Indigenous and settler colonial studies. If, following Patrick Wolfe, settler colonialism produces settler societies by pursuing the elimination of Indigenous peoples via amalgamation and replacement, then it is exemplary of biopower. Adapting Giorgio Agamben, we find that Europeans establish Western law and a new People on settled land by practicing an exception to the law that permits eliminating Indigenous peoples while defining settlers as those who replace.1 Settler colonialism performs biopower in deeply historical and fully contemporary ways. As scholars increasingly theorise biopower as definitive of our times, with many insisting that this quality of biopower is colonial, we must confront our inheritance of settler colonialism as a primary condition of biopower in the contemporary world. The work of Michael Foucault and Agamben and of their interlocutors must be resituated within a new genealogy of settler colonialism that can shift interpretations of biopower today. For more than five hundred years, Western law functioned as biopower in relation to ongoing practices of European settler colonialism. Settler colonialism has conditioned not only Indigenous peoples and their lands and the settler societies that occupy them, but all political, economic and cultural processes that those societies touch. Settler colonialism directly informs past and present processes of European colonisation, global capitalism, liberal modernity and international governance. If settler colonialism is not theorised in accounts of these formations, then its power remains naturalised in the world that we engage and in the theoretical apparatuses with which we attempt to explain it. Settler colonialism can be denaturalised by theorising its constitution as biopower, as well as how it in turn conditions all modern modes of colonialism and biopower. My argument critically shifts recent theories of the coloniality of biopower by centreing settler colonialism in analysis. Wolfe has observed in histories of the Americas that a settler colonial ‘logic of elimination’ located Indigenous Americans relationally, yet distinctly from Africans in the transatlantic slave trade or colonised indentured labour, thereby illuminating (as Mark Rifkin notes) the ‘peculiar’ status of Indigenous peoples within the biopolitics of settler colonialism.2 Western law is troubled once European subjects are redefined as settlers in relation to the Indigenous peoples, histories, and lands incorporated by white settler nations. I argue that this tension is engaged productively by Agamben’s tracing of the state of exception to homo sacer, and notably its derivation in Roman law from a thesis of consanguinity. I adapt this quality to illuminate why and how Western law incorporates Indigenous peoples into the settler nation by simultaneously pursuing their elimination. I further argue that these deeply historical processes ultimately enact biopower as a persistent activity of settler states that were never decolonised and of the global regimes that extend and naturalise their power. By the twentieth century – amid a formal demise of colonial empires, putative decolonisation of the global South, and global capitalist recolonisation – the universalisation of Western law as liberal governance was ensured by the actions of settler states. A genealogy of the biopolitics of settler colonialism will explain that the colonial era never ended because settler colonialism remains the naturalised activity projecting Western law and its exception along global scales today. Theories of the biopolitical state, regimes of global governance, and the war on terror will be insufficient unless they critically theorise settler colonialism as a historical and present condition and method of all such power. THEORISING SETTLER COLONIAL BIOPOWER Foucault and Agamben theorised biopower as a present activity that inherits and transforms the deeply historical conditions of Western law. Foucault incited this theory by examining the modern proliferation of procedures to produce the life of the nation in relation to deadly regulation of its others, a process that he argued displaces the power of the sovereign ‘to take life or let live’ with a governmentality that enacts ‘the power to “make” live or “let” die’.3 Judith Butler emphasises that, for Foucault, governmentality in the modern state or in global regimes acts as an ‘extra-legal sphere’ – ‘an art of managing things and persons, concerned with tactics, not laws’ – that then ‘depends upon “the question of sovereignty” no longer predominating over the field of power’.4 Hence, governmentality acts in the name of the very sovereignty that it exceeds, producing ‘a lawless sovereignty as part of its own operation of power’.5 Agamben adapts Foucault’s account of modern biopower as governmentality when he claims that its extra-legal appearance is a recent adaptation of qualities intrinsic to Western law; as he says, ‘it can even be argued that the production of a biopolitical body is the original activity of sovereign power’.6 Citing the Roman legal origins of Western law, Agamben links sovereignty to a power to designate subjects of the law as homo sacer, the sacred man who may be killed without being sacrificed or made subject to homicide. The placement of homo sacer in a zone of ‘bare life’ establishes Western law precisely by placing it in abeyance in this case. The sacred man enters a ‘state of exception’ to the law that simultaneously reinforces its rule. Agamben notably defines the exception by reference to the camp as ‘in a decisive way the political space itself of modernity’, which by forming a permanent ‘space for (bare) life’ creates a ‘materialization of the state of exception’ as ‘the rule’.7 Agamben thus reinterprets the biopolitics of the modern state as an effect of Western law’s constitution by the state of exception. In this reading, the function of governmentality to ‘make life’ is compatible with the state of exception remaining intrinsic to law, as consigning certain subjects to a state of bare life (‘let die’) reestablishes a power to produce and defend life among those who remain. Yet significant tensions appear in the work of Foucault and Agamben – and, hence, also in Agamben’s revision of Foucault – in that neither scholar directly theorises colonialism as a context for biopower. Scholars of colonialism respond by arguing that colonialism is intrinsic to processes of biopower in the past and present. Reading Foucault’s account of the modern biopolitical state in relation to colonial situations, Ann Laura Stoler definitively demonstrated that its racial, sexual and national power arise at colonial sites or relationally among colonies and metropoles, not as projections from a European source.8 Following Stoler, modern biopower is the product and process of a colonial world. Achille Mbembe extended such reinterpretations of Foucault in conversation with Agamben by reading the colony as exception, which defines Western law amid the globalisation of European capital and empire.9 Sherene Razack and Sunera Thobani engage all such theories to explain that in contemporary modes of biopower, the colonial returns or never left; and, notably, both centre settler colonialism as a condition of the power they examine.10 Mark Rifkin signally engages Agamben’s theses with settler colonialism by arguing that the ‘geopolitics’ of conquest place Indigenous peoples in a state of exception that simultaneously troubles the territorial and national integrity of settlers as representatives of Western law.11 Together, these scholars respond to colonialism’s elision in theories of biopower by demonstrating that it conditions biopower and critical theory – an intervention deepened by Rifkin’s and my work centreing settler colonialism for study. Addressing these critiques requires adjusting the very advance of Agamben’s argument that biopower is intrinsic to Western law. Michael Dillon identifies a lingering ahistoricity in Agamben’s ‘ontologization’ of Western law that he argues would benefit from a return to Foucault’s genealogical method, which for Katia Genel will result in ‘revisiting and complicating Agamben’s formulations and more complexly applying them’.12 Theorising biopower from within a genealogy of settler colonialism will trace how deeply historical procedures in Western law confronted the specificities of the era of European settlement and shifted in response. In such a genealogy Agamben remains crucial, given that scholars of settler colonialism may trace biopower to situations that existed prior to the eighteenth and nineteenth century era that Foucault linked to the rise of the modern biopolitical state. Already in the sixteenth century and across the Americas, settler colonialism grew to condition colonialism and biopower in settler and other societies worldwide. The continuity of settler colonialism at these sites up to the present then demonstrates that this periodisation meaningfully explains biopower today. Patrick Wolfe’s theorisation of settler colonialism already incites a genealogy of its biopolitical form. Arguing that ‘settler colonizers come to stay: invasion is a structure, not an event’, Wolfe explains that assertions of sovereignty by settlers ground Western law in ‘a logic of elimination’.13 Noting that scholars after Raphael Lemkin tend to correlate genocide with extermination, Wolfe argues that settler colonialism performs genocide alongside a variety of practices that converge on a purposed elimination of Indigenous peoples.14 While the erasure and replacement of Indigenous peoples may transpire through deadly violence, Wolfe emphasises that elimination may follow efforts not to destroy but to produce life, as in methods to amalgamate Indigenous peoples, cultures and lands into the body of the settler nation. As Wolfe and Katherine Ellinghaus explain, this amalgamation precisely narrows or erases the possibility of distinctive Indigenous nationalities challenging the prerogative of the settler nation that means to replace them on, now, ‘its own’ lands.15

#### The aff is an act of settler futurity that attempts to extend the settler colonial state into the future with the assumption that linear progress can eventually be achieved via reform – the fact that indigenous people are the smallest population group forced to live on a land that was taken from them proves that they reinvest in settler colonial violence– means they cant weigh the case if we prove their starting point is flawed.

Tuck and Gaztambide-Fernandez 13 [EVE TUCK and RUBÉN A. GAZTAMBIDE-FERNÁNDEZ. "Curriculum, Replacement, and Settler Futurity" Rochester29.1 (2013): 72-89.]

Settler Futurity. The settler colonial curricular project of replacement is invested in settler futurity, or what Andrew Baldwin calls the “permanent virtuality” of the settler on stolen land (2012, p. 173). When we locate the present of settler colonialism as only the production of the past, we overlook how settler colonialism is configured in relation to a different temporal horizon: the future. To say that something is invested in something else’s futurity is not the same as saying it is invested in something’s future, though the replacement project is invested in both settler future and futurity. Futurity refers to the ways in which, “the future is rendered knowable through specific practices (i.e. calculation, imagination, and performance) and, in turn, intervenes upon the present through three anticipatory logics (i.e. pre-caution, pre-emption and preparedness)” (p. 173). Considering the significance of futurity for researching whiteness and geography, Baldwin (2012) wonders whether a past-oriented approach reproduces the (false), Teleological assumption that white racism can be modernized away. Such an assumption privileges an ontology of linear causality in which the past is thought to act on the present and the present is said to be an effect of whatever came before [...] According to this kind of temporality, the future is the terrain upon or through which white racism will get resolved. It cleaves the future from the present and, thus, gives the future discrete ontological form. (p. 174) Thus, in this historical analysis of the settler colonial curricular project of replacement, we seek to emphasize the ways in which replacement is entirely concerned with settler futurity, which always indivisibly means the continued and complete eradication of the original inhabitants of contested land. Anything that seeks to recuperate and not interrupt settler colonialism, to reform the settlement and incorporate Indigenous peoples into the multicultural settler colonial nation state is fettered to settler futurity. To be clear, our commitments are to what might be called an Indigenous futurity, which does not foreclose the inhabitation of Indigenous land by nonIndigenous peoples, but does foreclose settler colonialism and settler epistemologies. That is to say that Indigenous futurity does not require the erasure of now-settlers in the ways that settler futurity requires of Indigenous peoples.

#### Setcol is the root cause of all capitalistic violence. The whole reason why capitalist institutions feed off workers is bc settlers put those systems there in the first place on stolen land, if we allow indigenous ppl to have power that dissolves the state and these institutions as well it solves the root cause of all of their harms

#### Their framing of anti-subordination offers token recognition and empathy to alleviate settler anxiety and consolidate their social capital. Sentiments that attempt to eliminate forms of violence will always be corrupted because they fail to acknowledge which groups were the root cause of this violence.

Slater 16

(Lisa Slater, PhD (Sydney University), MA (Sydney University), Questioning Care, Chapter 7 in The Pedagogies of Cultural Studies, edited by Andrew Hickey, Routledge, 2016, JKS)

What worlds do you care for? Donna Haraway (2008) challenges her readers to become curious about the world-making effects of their caring practices. In this chapter I will examine the world-making effects of settler Australians’ care for Indigenous peoples, and more broadly reflect upon pedagogies of care and the production of the contemporary caring subject. Haraway (1988) has long argued for situated knowledges. As much as we live in an interconnected, entangled world, peoples (or as Haraway might prefer, the more-than-human) also live different histories. To care is to make claims on life and the future (and in so doing draw upon particular pasts). In Australia, the art of caring for others or instituting good health and well- being continues to be modeled on settler liberal concepts of what is a good life and a healthy subject-citizen. In contrast, many Indigenous people have called upon settler Australia to recognize and take seriously alternative life worlds and thus to imagine different futures. To do so, we need to ask, what are the world-making effects of our caring stories? Cultural studies prides itself on a commitment to social justice, and I would argue that such an undertaking requires a radical innovation of how we understand and prac- tice care. My intention is to not simply critique modes of caring for others but rather to run a bit of interference on care: to reflect upon what worlds are we caring for, so we might consider what worlds flourish and what worlds are diminished. To generate new political practices and anticolonial styles of care, we need to draw upon alternative genealogies of care. As cultural studies academics, we care, and teach our students, about social justice. Lately, I’ve been speculating about what our students care for. Or perhaps more accurately, I am curious about knowledge politics, which is much more than revealing the politics or working to produce more accurate facts but rather understanding that the “[w]ays of studying and representing things have world-making effects” (Puig de la Bellacasa 2011: 86). The stories we tell about care—knowledge construction and circulation—have material consequences. When I say our students, I mean students of Australian universities, not just my students at the University of Wollongong. Where are we directing their affective force? Over the last few years when teaching undergraduate students, I have been surprised by their self-assured (if not even self-righteous) sense of what social issues are important and deserving of care. But more so, even if they are improvising as knowing, empathetic subjects, they are highly attuned to, and keen to learn, what issues should animate their sympathy and what is the correct response. They know that their care should be directed toward such issues as marriage equality, the environment, poverty, and homelessness, and if I tell them about sweat- shops or the escalating imprisonment rates of Aboriginal people, they will care about that, too. They know not to care is to out oneself as ignorant, or worse a brute or redneck. To care about particular issues is the mark of the civil or the civilized. We might ask, are we in an age of watered-down ethics (Puig de la Bellacasa 2010)? We cultivate awareness and we care about a long list of fashionable issues. Puig de la Bellacasa argues that concern for ethics has become a form of hegemonic thinking. She writes: That we live in the age of ethics is perceivable in an inflationist use of the word: from corporate ethics to everyday ethical living—garbage recycling, fair trade—from international relations to the life sciences, every human practice seems today to cultivate awareness of its ethical component. In most instances interest in the ethical translates in a local or global search for rules, recommendations or resolutions regarding a specific field or profession. (2010: 153) She refers to this as biopolitical morality: forms of power aimed at controlling people’s existence at every level of experience and subjectivity (2010: 155). In an era when the primary role of higher education is to produce work- ers for the knowledge economy, and to secure individual prosperity and social mobility, coupled with the frustration that many academics feel about the lack of student engagement in sociopolitical issues, demonstrations of some form of care and interest seem better than nothing. My concern is that despite our training and commitment to critique, as cultural studies scholars we might be, however inadvertently, conceding to biopolitical morality. However, for many students, Indigenous issues can be some of the trickiest to negotiate. In general students are aware of the socioeconomic disparity between Indigenous and mainstream Australia, and left leaning politicized students are quick to blame past generations and the government. But most sense it’s a mine field, and are wary. My colleagues who teach Indigenous stud- ies (and from my own previous experience) tell me students largely want to learn about ‘dot paintings’ and an ancient culture but do not want to discuss contemporary issues, such as the ongoing impact of colonial and neocolonial practices, because they are considered too political and confronting (terms settler Australians readily apply). Over the years, I have noted the resistances of settler Australian students, which coexist with a particular enthusiasm for so-called ‘traditional’ Aboriginal culture. This cultural dynamic is found in broader Australia, and it is one for which I have developed an intellectual fascination. Of course, not everyone cares about Indigenous people. In Australia, this is only too clear. However, I would argue, concern for Indigenous well-being has become a moral barometer of our time. Thus, settler sensitivity, anxiety, around how to engage with Indigenous issues makes it a productive site for investigating the knowledge politics of care. It would be fair to say, I’ve been doing a lot of thinking about care, worrying at care. In particular my interest is, what I am calling in a crude sociological category, “good white people”: progressive settler Australians who want to engage with Indigenous peoples, cultures, and social issues. In short, care. They, or we, are deeply concerned about the so-called “Indigenous problem”; socioeconomic inequality, poor health, education, and housing, and racism, growing incarceration and suicide rates, the closing of remote communities, the ‘loss’ of culture, and the list could go on. There is a lot to worry about. Overwhelmed, the good white person asks, what can we do? Too often the effect is that ‘we’, settler Australians, imagine that we know what the problem is and, like the government, we must find the solutions (Cowlishaw 2013: 245). What is the cultural relationship? Tony Birch argues pity is the “emotion that drives the relationship between conservative and liberal-minded Australians alike in their dealings with Aboriginal people” (Birch 2014: 41). Largely, I agree. However, I think pity is an expression of good old-fashioned settler anxiety; variously understood as a sense of ille- gitimacy or guilt due to Australia’s colonial past and ongoing white privilege (Gelder and Jacobs 1998). Nonetheless, Aboriginal people are objects for mainstream Australia to worry about but not to take seriously. Good white people care about Indigenous people and culture. We are anxious to get ‘it’ right; our sense of self and belonging depends upon it. But more so, anxiety is an historical subjectivity—a social practice, an activity through which the subject is constituted. Foucault claimed that the study of the genealogy of the modern Western subject needed to be twofold. It is not enough to take into account technologies of domination,1 we also need to consider the active practices of self-constitution, which Foucault calls technologies or care of the self: techniques which permit individuals to effect, by their own means, a certain number of operations on their own bodies, on their own souls, on their own thoughts, on their own conduct, and this in a manner so as to transform themselves, modify themselves, and to attain a certain state of perfection, of happiness, of purity, of supernatural power, and so on. (2005: 214) In a simple sense, care of the self is the work we do to know ourselves, to constitute ourselves as subjects in relation to what one understands as the truth (Foucault 1997: 271). In such a truth, Indigenous people are vulnerable and care is performed through acts of benevolence that welcome Indigenous people into an already determined future. I am arguing that a contemporary practice of self-seeking—care of the self—is the activity of knowing who I am in relation to Indigenous issues and intercultural relations, which offers self-certainty. Of course, these activities do not produce an authentic self, but a certain kind of subjectivity that does particular work in the world, reproducing colonial relations of authority and vulnerability. These are, as Foucault argues: not something invented by the individual himself. They are models that he finds in his culture and are proposed, suggested, imposed upon him by his culture, his society, and his social group. (1997: 291).

#### The labor movement is built on the exploitation of indigenous populations. The aff’s “right to strike” only seeks to benefit the settler labor movement. Settler labor movements fight for higher wages and living standards while simultaneously exploiting indigenous labor and excluding indigenous workers from the labor market. The collective dispossession of the indigenous population ties the settler community together through settler quietism. The aff’s foundational assumptions are complicit in the destructive of Native life and governance.

Englert 20 [Englert, S. Institute for Area Studies, Leiden University, Leiden, The Netherlands (2020), Settlers, Workers, and the Logic of Accumulation by Dispossession. Antipode, 52: 1647-1666. <https://doi.org/10.1111/anti.12659>] AX

Dispossession – deprive of land

In order to reflect on the particular nature of accumulation by dispossession within a settler colonial context, another issue should be raised: that of the internal social relations within settler colonial societies. Indeed, the most striking aspect of settler colonial societies is the development of a colonial polity in which settlers live, produce, and reproduce themselves socially. They do so on the back of the dispossession of indigenous populations through which they acquire land, resources, and, depending on the context, labour. This—perhaps obvious—characteristic leads to the development of internal class relations and conflicts, alongside confrontations between settlers and indigenous peoples. The history of settler colonialism underscores the conspicuous absence of involvement by settler working classes (as opposed to individuals or limited networks) in mass, sustained challenges against the process of settlement and indigenous dispossession.3 In fact, more often than not, settler labour movements fought for the intensification of settler expansion and racial segregation (see “An Alternative Reading: Settler Colonies and the Exploitation of the Native” above), through colour bars, boycott campaigns and demands for expulsion. In the process, bitter confrontations emerged between settler labour and capital, when the latter [and] attempted to increase its profit margins through the exploitation of indigenous labour—for example in the context of the white labour movements in Australia and South Africa.4 Yet these conflicts can be resolved, especially while the settler colony continues to expand, by intensifying the dispossession of indigenous populations in order to improve the material conditions of settler workers (see “Case Studies” below). Here, the question of accumulation by dispossession returns to the fore. If settler workers are exploited as workers within the settler colony, they remain settlers. As such they participate in the processes of accumulation by dispossession through the occupation of lands, the elimination or exploitation of indigenous peoples, and the extraction of expropriated resources. For example, at a very basic level, their houses, workplaces, and basic infrastructure such as roads, railways, etc., are all premised on the capture and control of indigenous land. Settler workers are both exploited by settler bosses and their co-conspirators in the dispossession of indigenous peoples. As such, class struggle within a settler society has a dual character: it is waged over the distribution of wealth extracted from their labour as well as over the colonial booty. In the case of Zionism in Palestine, the current associated with the publication Matzpen (“Compass”) developed a class analysis of Israeli society. They came to the conclusion that because the Israeli economy was heavily subsidised from the outside (first primarily by Britain, then by the US) and that this subsidy was not simply going into private hands but was used by the Labour Zionist bureaucracy to organise the development of the Israeli economy and infrastructure, class antagonisms were diverted within its society. Hangebi et al. ([2012](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/anti.12659#anti12659-bib-0014):83) wrote: The Jewish worker in Israel does not receive his share in cash, but he gets it in terms of new and relatively inexpensive housing, which could not have been constructed by raising capital locally; he gets it in industrial employment, which could not have been started or kept going without external subsidies; and he gets it in terms of a general standard of living, which does not correspond to the output of that society … In this way the struggle between the Israeli working class and its employers, both bureaucrats and capitalists, is fought not only over the surplus value produced by the worker but also over the share each group receives from this external source of subsidies. If this analysis was essentially correct, it underplayed, however, the consequences of an important aspect of Israeli wealth creation (which Matzpen otherwise recognised): the Israeli state, its infrastructure, and its economy were made possible by colonial expansion, land confiscation, the expulsion of Palestinians and the expropriation of their wealth and property. Affordable housing, for example, an issue discussed further below, was not only possible because of the subsidies the Israeli state received from abroad. It was possible because the land on which new houses were built, as well as existing Palestinian houses, had been confiscated by the Israeli army, Palestinians had been expelled in their hundreds of thousands, and the spoils were re-distributed amongst settlers. It was—and remains—the collective dispossession of the indigenous population by the Israeli population as a whole, which ties the settler community together, despite internal class, ethnic, and political divisions. The settler class struggle is fought over the distribution of wealth extracted from settler labour power as well as over the share each group receives from the process of accumulation by dispossession. This dual class and colonial relationship helps explain the relative absence of settler workers’ resistance against settler colonial expansion or alliances with Indigenous peoples.[5](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/anti.12659#anti12659-note-1005_77) This tendency can be understood as “settler quietism”: even if working-class settlers are exploited by their ruling classes, overthrowing the settler state would mean overthrowing a system in which they share, however unequally, in the distribution of the colonial loot. Participating in the process of dispossession and fighting for a greater share of the pie leads to more important and immediate material gains. It also follows, as many anti-colonial thinkers and activists, not least among them Fanon ([2001](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/anti.12659#anti12659-bib-0011)) in the Wretched of the Earth, have argued that indigenous people face the settler population as a whole in their struggle for de-colonisation. This is not to say that individual settlers or specific settler organisations cannot or have not supported struggles for decolonisation. It is however to point out that this is not the case for the majority of the settler working class, while it continues to depend on the continued dispossession of the natives for the quality of its living standards. Whether the settler colony is organised on the basis of an eliminatory or an exploitative model, what remains constant is that the entirety of the settler polity will participate in the process of accumulation by dispossession, and that the different settler classes will struggle both against the natives to impose and maintain this dispossession, as well as amongst themselves in order to determine the nature of its internal distribution. More than that, the specific structural forms of settler rule over the indigenous population is best understood as the outcome of struggle, both between settler classes and between settlers and indigenous populations. This paper now turns to two brief case studies demonstrating this process in the context of Zionism in Palestine. The specificity of Zionism in the history of settler colonialism, its lack of a colonial metropolis, had real consequences for the Zionists in Palestine. Firstly, it could not impose—at first—its control over the land through military force. Secondly it could not organise the transfer of populations to the colony in the same way a state could. In the words of Shafir ([1996](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/anti.12659#anti12659-bib-0041):155): “Zionism, then, was a colonisation movement which simultaneously had to secure land for its settlers and settlers for its land”. The dual need for land and labour was at the heart of many political developments in the Yishuv. If the question of land was resolved first through acquisition from largely absentee land owners and then (and most extensively) through military violence, the question of immigration came close several times to bringing the whole colonial project to its knees, as the European Jewish population tended to reject Zionism as a political response to the poverty and discrimination they faced. Two distinct political responses emerged within the early settler population. On the one hand, the Jewish farmers and their sponsors hoped to develop a cash crop producing agricultural sector focused on export to Europe and the exploitation of cheap Palestinian workers. This vision was based, as demonstrated by Shafir ([1996](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/anti.12659#anti12659-bib-0041)), on the model of other European projects—especially the French settler colonies of North Africa. On the other hand, the nascent Labour Zionist movement demanded better wages and working conditions for Jewish workers in Palestine, which they argued would be the only way to attract and retain new settlers. This, they claimed, necessitated full separation between the Jewish and Palestinian sectors, removing thereby the “unfair competition” of the cheaper indigenous labour force. This led to the development of a series of new Labour Zionist institutions to organise this “Conquest of Hebrew Labour”, by organising strikes, pickets, and boycotts of Jewish owned businesses that employed Palestinian workers or sold products made by them. The Kibbutzim, the Histadrut,[6](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/anti.12659#anti12659-note-1006_81) and the early Zionist militias were all born out of the process of organising this campaign (Lockman [1996](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/anti.12659#anti12659-bib-0024)). For example, the Histadrut’s constitution, passed at its founding congress, made clear that it was a Zionist body committed to the project of settlement through the development of an exclusively Jewish society. It stated that the Histadrut’s goal was to: … unite all the workers and labourers in the country who live by their own labour without exploiting the labour of others, in order to arrange for all settlement, economic and also cultural affairs of all the workers in the country, so as to build a society of Jewish labour in Eretz Yisra’el. (quoted in Lockman 1996:68) The similarity between the logic of this statement and that of the white South African strikers mentioned above is remarkable. This struggle—waged against Palestinian workers and Jewish farmers—led to a partial victory for the Labour Zionist movement (Lockman [2012](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/anti.12659#anti12659-bib-0025)). Key industries, such as construction and agriculture, were taken over by Labour Zionist institutions such as Solal Boneh and the Kibbutzim. At the same time, Jewish representation in colonial institutions was increased through collaboration with the British Mandate authorities especially in the context of crushing the Arab Revolt of 1936-1939. The Labour Zionists took over the Yishuv’s political leadership and created a dominant Jewish sector, without however being able to establish a fully segregated one. It did set in motion the logic of separation as well as laying the infrastructure for a Jewish state, which would be made a reality by its militias’ military violence and mass expulsion of Palestinians during the Nakba. This case study shows that the Labour Zionist movement developed on the basis of opposing Jewish farmers as well as Palestinian workers, a political focus that also shaped its key institutions. The campaign for Hebrew Labour also demonstrates that the “elimination of the native” in the settler colonial context is not a given, as in the Wolfe-an framework, but the outcome of a specific set of struggles that pit both the indigenous population against the settlers, as well as different settler classes against one another.

#### Thus, the only alternative is decolonization.

Tuck and Yang 12

(Eve Tuck, Unangax, State University of New York at New Paltz K. Wayne Yang University of California, San Diego, Decolonization is not a metaphor, Decolonization: Indigeneity, Education & Society Vol. 1, No. 1, 2012, pp. 1-40, //recut FD WHS)

An ethic of incommensurability, which guides moves that unsettle innocence, stands in contrast to aims of reconciliation, which motivate settler moves to innocence. Reconciliation is about rescuing settler normalcy, about rescuing a settler future. Reconciliation is concerned with questions of what will decolonization look like? What will happen after abolition? What will be the consequences of decolonization for the settler? Incommensurability acknowledges that these questions need not, and perhaps cannot, be answered in order for decolonization to exist as a framework. We want to say, first, that decolonization is not obliged to answer those questions - decolonization is not accountable to settlers, or settler futurity. Decolonization is accountable to Indigenous sovereignty and futurity. Still, we acknowledge the questions of those wary participants in Occupy Oakland and other settlers who want to know what decolonization will require of them. The answers are not fully in view and can’t be as long as decolonization remains punctuated by metaphor. The answers will not emerge from friendly understanding, and indeed require a dangerous understanding of uncommonality that un-coalesces coalition politics - moves that may feel very unfriendly. But we will find out the answers as we get there, “in the exact measure that we can discern the movements which give [decolonization] historical form and content” (Fanon, 1963, p. 36). To fully enact an ethic of incommensurability means relinquishing settler futurity, abandoning the hope that settlers may one day be commensurable to Native peoples. It means removing the asterisks, periods, commas, apostrophes, the whereas’s, buts, and conditional clauses that punctuate decolonization and underwrite settler innocence. The Native futures, the lives to be lived once the settler nation is gone - these are the unwritten possibilities made possible by an ethic of incommensurability when you take away the punctuation he says of lines lifted from the documents about military-occupied land its acreage and location you take away its finality opening the possibility of other futures -Craig Santos Perez, Chamoru scholar and poet (as quoted by Voeltz, 2012) Decolonization offers a different perspective to human and civil rights based approaches to justice, an unsettling one, rather than a complementary one. Decolonization is not an “and”. It is an elsewhere.

#### The role of the ballot is to vote for who best centers indigenous scholarship and resistance - Any ethical commitment requires that the aff place themselves in the center of Native scholarship and demands.

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Arlo Kempf says that ‘where anticolonialism is a tool used to invoke resistance for the colonized, it is a tool used to invoke accountability for the colonizer’.42 Relational accountability should be a cornerstone of settler colonial studies. I believe settler colonial studies and scholars should ethically and overtly place themselves in relationship to the centuries of Indigenous oral, and later academic scholarship that conceptualizes and resists settler colonialism without necessarily using the term: SCT may be revelatory to many settler scholars, but Indigenous people have been speaking for a long time about colonial continuities based on their lived experiences. Some SCTs have sought to connect with these discussions and to foreground Indigenous resistance, survival and agency. Others, however, seem to use SCT as a pathway to explain the colonial encounter without engaging with Indigenous people and experiences – either on the grounds that this structural analysis already conceptually explains Indigenous experience, or because Indigenous resistance is rendered invisible.43 Ethical settler colonial theory (SCT) would recognize the foundational role Indigenous scholarship has in critiques of settler colonialism. It would acknowledge the limitations of settler scholars in articulating settler colonialism without dialogue with Indigenous peoples, and take as its norm making this dialogue evident. In my view, it is critical that we not view settler colonial studies as a new or unique field being established, which would enact a discovery narrative and contribute to Indigenous erasure, but rather take a longer and broader view. Indigenous oral and academic scholars are indeed the originators of this work. This space is not empty. Of course, powerful forces of socialization and discipline impact scholars in the academy. There is much pressure to claim unique space, to establish a name for ourselves, and to make academic discoveries. I am suggesting that settler colonial studies and anti-colonial scholars resist these hegemonic pressures and maintain a higher anti-colonial ethic. As has been argued, ‘the theory itself places ethical demands on us as settlers, including the demand that we actively refuse its potential to re-empower our own academic voices and to marginalize Indigenous resistance’.44 As settler scholars, we can reposition our work relationally and contextually with humi- lity and accountability. We can centre Indigenous resistance, knowledges, and scholarship in our work, and contextualize our work in Indigenous sovereignty. We can view oral Indigenous scholarship as legitimate scholarly sources. We can acknowledge explicitly and often the Indigenous traditions of resistance and scholarship that have taught us and pro- vided the foundations for our work. If our work has no foundation of Indigenous scholarship and mentorship, I believe our contributions to settler colonial studies are even more deeply problematic.