# 1NC

## K

#### Our world is dictated by the hyperreal. Society is engrained in the meaningless binary in which we have lost any meaning of truth. This breeds the conditions of semiocapitalism and a paralysis of our psychic process. Swarts no date

Swarts, Frederick. The Metaphysic of the Code . //fd

"Leibniz, that mathematical spirit, saw in the mystic elegance of **the binary system** that counts only the zero and the one, the very image of creation. The unity of the supreme Being, **operating by binary function in nothingness**, would have sufficed to bring out of it all the beings." - McLuhan The great simulacra constructed by man pass from a universe of natural laws to a universe of force and tensions of force, today to a universe of structures and binary oppositions. After the metaphysic of being and appearance, after that of energy and determination, comes that of indeterminacy and the code. Cybernetic control, generation from model, differential modulation, feed-back, question/answer, etc.: such is the new *operational* configuration (industrial simulacra are only *operational*). Digitality is its metaphysical principle (the God of Leibniz), and DNA its prophet. It is in effect in the genetic code that **the "genesis of simulacra**" today finds its most accomplished form. **At the limit of** an always more extensive **abolition of references and finalities**, of the loss of resemblance and designation, we find **the digital program- sign**, whose value is purely tactical, at the intersection of the other signals (corpuscles of information/test) and whose structure **is that of a macro-molecular code of command and control**. At this level the question of signs, of **their rational destination**, their **real or imaginary**, their repression, their deviation, the illusion they create or that which they conceal, or their parallel meanings - **all of that is erased**. We have already seen signs of the first order, complex signs and rich in illusion, change, with the machines, into crude signs, dull, industrial, repetitive, echoless, operational and efficacious. What a mutation, even more radical still, with signals of the code, illegible, with no gloss possible, buried like programmatic matrices light-years away in the depths of the "biological" body - black boxes where all the commandments, all the answers ferment! End of the theatre of representation, the space of signs, their conflict, their silence; only the black box of the code, the molecular emitter of signals from which we have been irradiated, crossed by answers/questions like signifying radiations, tested continuously by our own program inscribed in the cells. Jail cells, electronic cells, party cells, microbiological cells: always the search for the smallest indivisible element, whose organic synthesis would be made according to the givens of the code. But **the code itself is but a genetic cell**, a generator where myriads of intersections produce all the questions and possible solutions, so that choices (by whom?) can be made. No finality involved with these "questions" (informational and signifying impulsions) but the answer, genetically unchangeable or inflected by minute and aleatory differences. Space is no longer even linear or one- dimensional: *cellular* space, indefinite generation of the same signals, like the tics of a prisoner gone crazy with solitude and repetition. Such is **the genetic code**: an erased record, unchangeable, of which we are no more than cells- for-reading. All aura of sign, of significance itself is resolved in this determination; all **is resolved in the inscription and decodage.** Such is the third-order simulacrum, our own. Such is the "mystic elegance of the binary system, of the zero and the one", from which all being proceeds. Such is the status of the sign that is also the end of signification: DNA or operational simulation. All of this is perfectly well summed up by Sebeok ("Genetics and Semiotics", in Versus): Numerous observations confirm the hypothesis that the internal organic world descends in a straight line from the primordial forms of life. The most remarkable fact is the omnipresence of the DNA molecule. The genetic material of all organisms known on earth is in great measure made up of the nucleonic acids DNA and RNA that contain in their information structure, transmitted by reproduction from one generation to another and furthermore gifted with the capacity of self-reproduction and imitation. Briefly, the genetic code is universal, or almost. Its deciphering was an immense discovery, in the sense that it showed that "the two languages of the great polymers, the language of nucleonic acid and that of protein, are tightly correlated" (Crick, 1966; Clarck/Narcker, 1968). The Soviet mathematician Liapounov demonstrated in 1963 that all living systems transmit by prescribed canals with precision a small quantity of energy or of matter containing a great volume of information, which is responsible for the ulterior control of a great quantity of energy and matter. In this perspective numerous phenomena, biological as well as cultural (stockage, feed-back, canalization of messages and others) can be seen as aspects of the treatment of information. In the last analysis information appears in great part as the repetition of information, or even as another sort of information, a sort of control that seems to be a universal property of terrestrial life, independent of form or substance. Five years ago I drew attention to the convergence of genetics and linguistics - autonomous disciplines, but parallel in the larger field of communication science (of which animal semiotics also is a part). The terminology of genetics is full of expressions taken from linguistics and communication theory (Jacobson, 1968), which also underlined either the major resemblances or the important differences of structure and of function between genetic and verbal codes. . . It is obvious today that the genetic code must be considered the most fundamental of all the semiotic networks, and therefore a prototype of all the other systems of signaling that animals use, man included. From this point of view, molecules which are systems of quanta and behave like stable vehicles of physical information, systems of animal semiotics and cultural systems, including language, constitute a continuous chain of stages, with always more complex energy levels, in the framework of a universal unique evolution. It is therefore possible to describe either language or living systems from a unified cybernetic point-of-view. For the present, this is only a useful analogy or a prediction. A reciprocal rapprochement between animal communication and linguistics can lead to a complete knowledge of the dynamics of semiotics, and such a knowledge can be revealed, in the last analysis, to be nothing less than the very definition of life. And so the current strategic model is designed that everywhere is replacing the great ideological model which constituted political economy in its time. You will find it under the rigorous sign of "science" in the Chance and Necessity of Jacques Monod. The end of dialectical evolution, it is the discontinuous indeterminism of the genetic code that now controls life - the teleological principle. Finality no longer belongs to the term; there is no longer a term, nor a determination. Finality is there beforehand, inscribed in the code. We see that nothing has changed - simply the order of ends yields to the play of molecules, and the order of signifieds to the play of infinitesimal signifiers, reduced to their aleatory commutation. All the transcendant finalities reduced to a dashboard full of instruments. There is still, however, recourse to a nature, to an inscription in "biological" nature - in actuality, a nature distorted by fantasy like she always was, metaphysical sanctuary no longer of origin and substance, but this time of the code; the code must have an "objective" basis. What could be better for that purpose than the molecule and genetics? Monod is the strict theologian of this molecular transcendance, Edgar Morin the rapt disciple (A.D.N.\* + Adonai!). But for one as well as the other, the fantasy of the code, which is equivalent to the reality of power, is merged with molecular idealism. (\*D.N.A.) Thus we find once more in history that delirious illusion of uniting the world under the aegis of a single principle - that of a homogenous substance with the Jesuits of the Counter Reformation; that of the genetic code with the technocrats of biological science (but also linguistics as well), with Leibniz and his binary divinity as precursor. For the program here aimed at has nothing genetic about it, it is a social and historical program. That which is hypostatized in biochemistry is the ideal of a social order ruled by a sort of genetic code of macromolecular calculation, of P.P.B.S. (Planned Programming Budgeting System), irradiating the social body with its operational circuits. The technical cybernetic finds its "natural philosophy" here, as Monod says. The fascination of the biological, of the biomedical dates from the very beginnings of science. It was at work in Spencerian organicism (sociobiology) on the level of second- and third-order structures (Jacob's classification in The Logic of Life, it is active today in modern biochemistry, on the level of structures of the fourth-order). Coded similarities and dissimilarities: that is certainly the image of cyberniticized social exchange. You only have to add "stereospecific complex" in order to re-inject intracellular communication; that Morin will come to transfigure into molecular Eros.

#### The 1AC desire to command, control, and cooperate over the unique processes of space represent an attempt to make the cosmos into a geopolitical chess game to control the fluctuation of meaning.

Havercroft and Duvall 9 (Jonathan Havercroft and Raymond Duvall; 2009; *“Critical astropolitics The geopolitics of space control and the transformation of state sovereignty”*; accessed 12/13/21; <https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/files/7892-havercroft-and-duvallcritical-astropoliticspdf>; Jonathan Havercroft is an Associate Professor in the Department of Politics and International Relations at the University of Southampton. He teaches in the areas of political theory and international relations. He is the editor of the journal Global Constitutionalism; Raymond Duvall is a Professor of Political Science at the University of Minnesota; pages 44-50) HB // retagged faizaan

Astropolitics: realist and liberal strands Realism and astropolitik Everett Dolman3 draws on the writings of Mackinder and Mahan as inspiration for his development of a theory, which he titles Astropolitik. By the term, astropolitik, Dolman means “the application of the prominent and refined realist vision of state competition into outer space policy, particularly the development and evolution of a legal and political regime for humanity’s entry into the cosmos” (Dolman 2002a: 1). While Mahan focused on the structure of the ocean to develop his theories, and Mackinder focused on the topography of land, Dolman turns his attention toward the cartography of outer space. Whereas, at first glance, space may appear to be a “featureless void,” Dolman argues that it “is in fact a rich vista of gravitational mountains and valleys, oceans and rivers of resources and energy alternately dispersed and concentrated, broadly strewn danger zones of deadly radiation, and precisely placed peculiarities of astrodynamics” (Dolman 2002a: 61). In a manner similar to Mahan’s focus on natural sea lanes and “choke points” and Mackinder’s emphasis of geographic regions, Dolman emphasizes orbits, regions of space, and launch points as geopolitically vital assets over which states can be expected competitively and strategically to struggle for control. Orbital paths are important because stable orbits require virtually no fuel expenditure for satellites, whereas unstable orbits make it impossible for satellites to remain in space for a long time. Furthermore, different types of orbits pass over different parts of the earth at different frequencies. As such, the mission of a spacecraft determines in large part which orbit is most useful for it. There are essentially four types of orbits: low-altitude (between 150 km and 800 km above the Earth’s surface); medium-altitude (ranging from 800 km–35,000 km); high-altitude (above 35,000 km); and highly elliptical (with a perigee of 250 km and an apogee of 700,000 km) (Dolman 2002a: 65–7). In addition to pointing to the division of space into orbital planes, Dolman also identifies four key regions of space: 1 Terra, which includes the Earth and its atmosphere up until “just below the lowest altitude capable of supporting unpowered orbit” (Dolman 2002: 69); 2 Earth Space, which covers the region from the lowest possible orbit through to geo-stationary orbit; 3 Lunar Space, which extends from geo-stationary orbit to the Moon’s orbit; and 4 Solar Space, which “consists of everything in the solar system . . . beyond the orbit of the moon” (Dolman 2002a: 70). For Dolman, Earth Space is the astropolitical equivalent of Mackinder’s Outer Crescent, because controlling it will permit a state to limit strategic opportunities of potential rivals and at the same time allow the projection of force for indirect control (i.e. without occupation) of extensive territory of vital strategic importance, in this case (unlike Mackinder’s) potentially the entire Earth. “Control of Earth Space not only guarantees long-term control of the outer reaches of space, it provides a near-term advantage on the terrestrial battlefield” (Dolman 1999: 93). On the basis of these principles, Dolman develops an “Astropolitik policy for the United States” (Dolman 1999: 156), which calls on the U.S. government to control Earth Space. In the current historical–political juncture, no state controls this region. However, rather than leave it as a neutral zone or global commons, Dolman calls for the U.S. to seize control of this geo-strategically vital asset. According to Dolman’s reasoning, the neutrality of Earth Space is as much a threat to U.S. security as the neutrality of Melos was to Athenian hegemony. To leave space a neutral sanctuary could be interpreted as a sign of weakness that potential rivals might exploit. As such, it is better for the U.S. to occupy Earth Space now. Dolman’s astropolitik policy has three steps. The first involves the U.S. withdrawing from the current space regime on the grounds that its prohibitions on commercial and military exploitation of outer space prevent the full exploitation of space resources. In place of the global commons approach that informs that regime, Dolman calls for the establishment of “a principle of free-market sovereignty in space” (Dolman 2002a: 157), whereby states could establish territorial claims over areas they wish to exploit for commercial purposes. This space rush should be coupled with “propaganda touting the prospects of a new golden age of space exploration” (Dolman 2002a: 157). Step two calls for the U.S. to seize control of low-Earth orbit, where “space-based laser or kinetic energy weapons could prevent any other state from deploying assets there, and could most effectively engage and destroy terrestrial enemy ASAT facilities” (Dolman 2002a: 157). Other states would be permitted “to enter space freely for the purpose of engaging in commerce” (Dolman 2002a: 157). The final step would be the establishment of “a national space coordination agency ... to define, separate and coordinate the efforts of commercial, civilian and military space projects” (Dolman 2002a: 157). Within Dolman’s theory of astropolitik is a will-to-space-based-hegemony fuelled by a series of assumptions, of which we would point to three as especially important. First, it rests on a strong preference for competition over collaboration in both the economic and military spheres. Dolman, like a good realist, is suspicious of the possibilities for sustained political and economic cooperation, and assumes instead that competition for power is the law of international political–economic life. He believes, though, that through a fully implemented astropolitical policy “states will employ competition productively, harnessing natural incentives for self-interested gain to a mutually beneficial future, a competition based on the fair and legal commercial exploitation of space” (Dolman 2002a: 4). Thus, underpinning his preference for competition is both a liberal assumption that competitive markets are efficient at producing mutual gain through innovative technologies, and the realist assumption that inter-state competition for power is inescapable in world politics. As we will note more fully below, this conjunction of liberal and realist assumptions is a hallmark of the logic of empire as distinct from the logic of a system of sovereign states. The second and most explicit of Dolman’s key assumptions is the belief that the U.S. should pursue control of orbital space because its hegemony would be largely benign. The presumed benevolence of the U.S. rests, for Dolman, on its responsiveness to its people. If any one state should dominate space it ought to be one with a constitutive political principle that government should be responsible and responsive to its people, tolerant and accepting of their views, and willing to extend legal and political equality to all. In other words, the United States should seize control of outer space and become the shepherd (or perhaps watchdog) for all who would venture there, for if any one state must do so, it is the most likely to establish a benign hegemony. (Dolman 2002a: 157) However, even if the U.S. government is popularly responsive in its foreign policy – a debatable proposition – the implication of Dolman’s astropolitik is that the U.S. would exercise benign control over orbital space, and, from that position, potentially all territory on Earth and hence all people, by being responsible to its 300 million citizens. As such, this benign hegemony would in effect be an apartheid regime where 95 percent of the world would be excluded from participating in the decision-making of the hegemonic power that controls conditions of their existence. This, too, is a hallmark of empire, not of a competitive system of sovereign states. Third, Dolman’s astropolitik treats space as a resource to be mastered and exploited by humans, a Terra Nulius, or empty territory, to be colonized and reinterpreted for the interests of the colonizer. This way of looking at space is similar to the totalizing gaze of earlier geopolitical theorists who viewed the whole world as an object to be dominated and controlled by European powers, who understood themselves to be beneficently, or, at worst, benignly, civilizing in their control of territories and populations (Ó Tuathail 1996: 24–35). This assumption, like the first two, thus also implicates a hallmark of the logic of empire, namely what Ó Tuathail (1996) calls the ‘geopolitical gaze’ (about which we have more to say below), which works comfortably in tandem with a self-understanding of benign hegemony. When these three assumptions are examined in conjunction, Dolman’s astropolitik reveals itself to be a blueprint for a U.S. empire that uses the capacities of space-based weapons to exercise hegemony over the Earth and to grant access to the economic resources of space only to U.S. (capitalist) interests and their allies. This version of astropolitics, which is precisely the strategic vision underlying the policy pronouncements of the National Security Space Management and Organization Commission (Commission 2001) – and subsequently President George W. Bush – with which we began this chapter, is a kind of spatial, or geopolitical, power within the context of U.S. imperial relations of planetary scope. Its ostensive realist foundations are muted, except as a rather extreme form of offensive realism, because the vision is not one of great power competition and strategic balancing, but rather one of imperial control through hegemony. As such, it brings into question the constitution of sovereignty, since empire and sovereignty are fundamentally opposed constitutive principles of the structure of the international system – the subjects of empire are not sovereign. Thus, if astropolitics is to be in the form of Dolman’s astropolitik (and current U.S. policy aspirations), the future of sovereignty is in question, despite his efforts to position the theory as an expression of the realist assumption of great power competition. In later sections of this chapter, we attempt to show what this bringing sovereignty into question is likely to mean, conceptually and in practice. Before turning to that principal concern, however, we consider an alternative geopolitical theory of astropolitics. Liberal-republican astropolitics Over the past twenty-five years, in a series of articles and recently a major book, Daniel Deudney has attempted to rework the tenets of geopolitics and apply them to the contemporary challenges raised by new weapons technologies – particularly nuclear and space weapons (Deudney 1983, 1985, 1995, 2000, 2002, 2007).4 While Deudney finds geopolitical theory of the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century theoretically unsophisticated and reductionist, he believes that geopolitical attention to material conditions, spatiality, change, and political processes could form the basis of a theoretically sophisticated contextual–materialist security theory of world politics. Deudney starts from a premise about space weaponization similar to the core of Dolman’s astropolitik, namely that if any state were able to achieve military control of space, it would hold potential mastery over the entire Earth. One preliminary conclusion, however, seems sound: effective control of space by one state would lead to planet-wide hegemony. Because space is at once so proximate and the planet’s high ground, one country able to control space and prevent the passage of other countries’ vehicles through it could effectively rule the planet. Even more than a monopoly of air or sea power, a monopoly of effective space power would be irresistible. (Deudney 1983: 17) Rather than developing the implications of this as a strategic opportunity for any one state (e.g. the U.S.), however, Deudney sees it as a collective problem to be kept in check through collaboration; his project is to avoid space-based hegemony through cooperation among states. In a series of articles on global security written in the 1980s – while Cold War tensions between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. continued to frame much theoretical discussion in international relations – Deudney saw the space age as a double-edged sword in superpower relations. On the one side, space weaponization posed a risk that the superpowers would extend their conflict extra-terrestrially and devise new, deadlier technologies that would enhance the risk of exterminating all of humanity; on the other, according to Deudney, the space age had found productive opportunities for the superpowers to deal with their rivalries in stabilizing collaboration. He notes that the Sputnik mission, while in the popular understanding only an escalation of the Cold War, initially was the result of an internationally organized research program – the International Geophysical Year (Deudney 1985; though see Dolman 2002a: 106–107 for an alternate interpretation of these events as Cold War competition). Another example was President Eisenhower’s proposed “Atoms for Peace” project, which involved the great powers sharing nuclear technology with developing nations for energy purposes. Most famous was the collaboration between the Soviet Union and the U.S. during the 1970s on the rendezvous between an Apollo capsule and the Soyuz space station. Similar multinational collaborations continue to this day, with the most notable example being the International Space Station. In addition to promoting collaboration, according to Deudney, the space age has also enhanced the ability of space powers to monitor each other – through spy satellites – thereby increasing the likelihood that they abide by arms control treaties. Deudney believes that these types of collaboration and increased surveillance could be strengthened and deepened so that great powers could be persuaded over time to “forge missiles into spaceships” (Deudney 1985: 271). In the 1980s this led Deudney to develop a set of specific proposals for a peaceful space policy, including collaboration between space powers on manned missions to the Moon, asteroids, and Mars. The development of an International Satellite Monitoring Agency would make “space-based surveillance technology accessible to an international community” for monitoring ceasefires, crises, compliance with international arms control treaties, and the Earth’s environment (Deudney 1985: 291). These proposals are aimed at promoting collaboration on projects of great scientific and military significance for the individual states. Deudney’s expectation is that such cooperation would mitigate security dilemmas and promote greater ties between states that would co-bind their security without sacrificing their sovereignty. While Deudney has not been explicit about how his astropolitics of collaboration would alter world order, in his more theoretical writings he has elaborated the logic of a liberal-republican international system. In a 2002 article on geopolitics and international theory, he developed what he called a‘historical security materialist’ theory of geopolitics: “[I]n which changing forces of destruction (constituted by geography and technology) condition the viability of different modes of protection (understood as clusters of security practices) and their attendant ‘superstructures’ of political authority structures (anarchical, hierarchical, and federal-republican)” (Deudney 2002: 80). In that work, he identified four different eras in which distinct modes of destruction were predominant: Pre-modern; Early Modern; Global Industrial; and Planetary-Nuclear, as well as two modes of protection: real-statism, which is based on an internal monopoly of violence and external anarchy; and federal-republicanism, which is based on an internal division of powers and an external symmetrical binding of actors through institutions that reduces their autonomy in relation to one another. According to Deudney, in the Planetary-Nuclear age the federal-republican mode of protection is more viable because states “are able to more fully and systematically restrain violence” than under the power balancing practices of real-statist modes of protection (Deudney 2002: 97; see also Deudney 2007: 244–277 for an elaboration of this argument). Although Deudney has not extended his “historical security materialist” approach into explicitly theorizing space weapons, per se (dealt with only tangentially and implicitly in the last two chapters of his recent book), his proposals during the Cold War to foster institutional collaboration between space powers as a way of promoting peace can safely be understood as a form of the mutually binding practices that he associates with the federalrepublican mode of protection. In addition, one of the general conclusions that Deudney reaches about “historical security materialism” is that the more a security context is rich in the potential for violence, the better suited a federal-republican mode of protection is to avoid systemic breakdown. Therefore, it seems reasonable to conclude that within Deudney’s work is a nascent theory of how a federal-republican international system could limit conflict between space powers by binding them together in collaborative uses of space for exploratory and security uses. In this sense, Deudney can be read as the liberal-republican astropolitical counterpart to Everett Dolman.5 While Deudney’s astropolitical theorizations hold out the promise of a terrestrial pacification through space exploration it is interesting to note a significant aporia in his theory – empire as a possible mode of protection. While real-statist modes of protection have an internal hierarchical authority structure, they are based on assumptions of external-anarchy, which is to say a system of sovereign states. Conversely, the federal-republican model is based on a symmetrical binding of units, in a way that no single unit can come to dominate others and accordingly in which they preserve their sovereignty (Deudney 2000, 2002, 2007). In a third mode, to which Deudney gives only scant attention, the case of empire, the hegemony of a single unit is such that other units are bound to it in an asymmetrical pattern that locates sovereignty only in the hegemon, or imperial center. Successful empires, including the Roman, British, and American, permit local autonomy in areas that are not of the imperial power’s direct concern while demanding absolute obedience in areas that are of vital concern to it, particularly when it comes to issues of security.6 Deudney’s implicit astropolitical theory thus ignores structurally asymmetric relations – in effect he ignores power. It is as if in wanting to have the world avoid the possibility of a planetary hegemony at the heart of the premise with which he and Dolman began their respective analyses, he white-washes it by failing to acknowledge the profound asymmetries of aspirations and technological–financial–military capacities among states for control of orbital space. In the next two sections we respond to Deudney’s call for “historical security materialism” by focusing on the premise that he skirts but that Dolman emphasizes, that military control of space means (at least the possibility of) mastery of the Earth. Specifically we examine how a new mode of destruction – space weapons – is the ideal basis for the third mode of protection – empire – through its potential for substantial asymmetry. We argue that the power asymmetries of space weapons have very significant constitutive effects on sovereignty and international systemic anarchy, and underlie the constitution of a new, historically unprecedented, form of empire. Before turning to that central thesis, however, we will first sketch the general contours of a critical astropolitics, which builds on the foundational premise of Dolman and Deudney, but modifies their theories in light of the significant insights of critical theory, particularly with respect to constitutive power. We ask: what consequences of astropolitics can a critical approach illuminate that may be concealed by an astropolitics informed by either liberal-republican or realist assumptions? How can insights offered by the revival of geopolitics in the writings of Deudney and Dolman – particularly the call for a new security materialist mode of analysis – be used to supplement and refine critical international relations theory?

#### Information creates new systems of reality that feel far more intimate than reality itself – a tool used by the elite to hide the failures of meaning. A loss of information would lead to total disarray.

Baudrillard 2 [Jean; Simulacra and Simulation; Sociologist/Philosopher, cool dude; 1981; University of Michigan Press; LCA-BP][[1]](#footnote-1) \*edited for lang

The third hypothesis is the most interesting but flies in the face of every commonly held opinion. Everywhere socialization is measured by the exposure to media messages. Whoever is underexposed to the media is desocialized or virtually asocial. Everywhere information is thought to produce an accelerated circulation of meaning, a plus value of meaning homologous to the economic one that results from the accelerated rotation of capital. Information is thought to create communication, and even if the waste is enormous, a general consensus would have it that nevertheless, as a whole, there be an excess of meaning, which is redistributed in all the interstices of the social - just as consensus would have it that material production, despite its dysfunctions and irrationalities, opens onto an excess of wealth and social purpose. We are all complicitous in this myth. It is the alpha and omega of our modernity, without which the credibility of our social organization would collapse. Well, the fact is that it is collapsing, and for this very reason: because where we think that information produces meaning, the opposite occurs. Information devours its own content. It devours communication and the social. And for two reasons. 1. Rather than creating communication, it exhausts itself in the act of staging communication. Rather than producing meaning, it exhausts itself in the staging of meaning. A gigantic process of simulation that is very familiar. The nondirective interview, speech, listeners who call in, participation at every level, blackmail through speech: "You are concerned, you are the event, etc." More and more information is invaded by this kind of phantom content, this homeopathic grafting, this awakening dream of communication. A circular arrangement through which one stages the desire of the audience, the antitheater of communication, which, as one knows, is never anything but the recycling in the negative of the traditional institution, the integrated circuit of the negative. Immense energies are deployed to hold this simulacrum at bay, to avoid the brutal desimulation that would confront us in the face of the obvious reality of a radical loss of meaning. It is useless to ask if it is the loss of communication that produces this escalation in the simulacrum, or whether it is the simulacrum that is there first for dissuasive ends, to short-circuit in advance any possibility of communication (precession of the model that calls an end to the real). Useless to ask which is the first term, there is none, it is a circular process - that of simulation, that of the hyperreal. The hyperreality of communication and of meaning. More real than the real, that is how the real is abolished. Thus not only communication but the social functions in a closed circuit, as a lure - to which the force of myth is attached. Belief, faith in information attach themselves to this tautological proof that the system gives of itself by doubling the signs of an unlocatable reality. But one can believe that this belief is as ambiguous as that which was attached to myths in ancient societies. One both believes and doesn't. One does not ask oneself, "I know very well, but still." A sort of inverse simulation in the masses, in each one of us, corresponds to this simulation of meaning and of communication in which this system encloses us. To this tautology of the system the masses respond with ambivalence, to deterrence they respond with disaffection, or with an always enigmatic belief. Myth exists, but one must guard against thinking that people believe in it: this is the trap of critical thinking that can only be exercised if it presupposes the naivete and ~~stupidity~~ of the masses 2. Behind this exacerbated mise-en-scène of communication, the mass media, the pressure of information pursues an irresistible destructuration of the social. Thus information dissolves meaning and dissolves the social, in a sort of nebulous state dedicated not to a surplus of innovation, but, on the contrary, to total entropy.\*1 Thus the media are producers not of socialization, but of exactly the opposite, of the implosion of the social in the masses. And this is only the macroscopic extension of the implosion of meaning at the microscopic level of the sign. This implosion should be analyzed according to McLuhan's formula, the medium is the message, the consequences of which have yet to be exhausted. That means that all contents of meaning are absorbed in the only dominant form of the medium. Only the medium can make an event - whatever the contents, whether they are conformist or subversive. A serious problem for all counterinformation, pirate radios, antimedia, etc. But there is something even more serious, which McLuhan himself did not see. Because beyond this neutralization of all content, one could still expect to manipulate the medium in its form and to transform the real by using the impact of the medium as form. If all the content is wiped out, there is perhaps still a subversive, revolutionary use value of the medium as such.

#### Images of catastrophe are exported of suffering and justify structures of violence, they attach a false investment towards different causes just for the ballot creating an inauthentic attachment driving hyperreal desires.

**Baudrillard ‘94** Jean, “The Illusion of the End” p. 66-71. // djb

We have long denounced the capitalistic, economic exploitation of the poverty of the 'other half of the world' [['autre monde]. **We must today denounce the moral and sentimental exploitation of that poverty - charity cannibalism being worse than oppressive violence.** The extraction and humanitarian reprocessing of a destitution which has become the equivalent of oil deposits and gold mines. The extortion of the spectacle of poverty and, at the same time, of our charitable condescension: a worldwide appreciated surplus of fine sentiments and bad conscience. We should, in fact, see this not as the extraction of raw materials, but as a waste-reprocessing enterprise. Their destitution and our bad conscience are, in effect, all part of the waste-products of history- the main thing is to recycle them to produce a new energy source. We have here an escalation in the psychological balance of terror. World capitalist oppression is now merely the vehicle and alibi for this other, much more ferocious, form of moral predation. One might almost say, contrary to the Marxist analysis, that material exploitation is only there to extract that **spiritual raw material that is the misery of peoples, which serves as psychological nourishment for the rich countries and media nourishment for our daily lives.** The 'Fourth World' (we are no longer dealing with a 'developing' Third World) is once again beleaguered, this time as a catastrophe-bearing stratum. The West is whitewashed in the reprocessing of the rest of the world as waste and residue. And the white world repents and seeks absolution - it, too, the waste-product of its own history. The South is a natural producer of raw materials, the latest of which is catastrophe. The North, for its part, specializes in the reprocessing of raw materials and hence also in the reprocessing of catastrophe. Bloodsucking protection, humanitarian interference, Medecins sans frontieres, international solidarity, etc. The last phase of colonialism: the New Sentimental Order is merely the latest form of the New World Order. **Other people's destitution becomes our adventure playground.** Thus, the humanitarian offensive aimed at the Kurds - a show of repentance on the part of the Western powers after allowing Saddam Hussein to crush them - is in reality merely the second phase of the war, a phase in which charitable intervention finishes off the work of extermination. We are the consumers of the ever delightful spectacle of poverty and catastrophe, **and of the moving spectacle of our own efforts to alleviate it (which, in fact, merely function to secure the conditions of reproduction of the catastrophe market);** there, at least, in the order of moral profits, the Marxist analysis is wholly applicable: we see to it that extreme poverty is reproduced as a symbolic deposit, as a fuel essential to the moral and sentimental equilibrium of the West. In our defence, it might be said that this extreme poverty was largely of our own making and it is therefore normal that we should profit by it. There can be no finer proof that the distress of the rest of the world is at the root of Western power and that the spectacle of that distress is its crowning glory than the inauguration, on the roof of the Arche de la Defense, with a sumptuous buffet laid on by the Fondation des Droits de l'homme, of an exhibition of the finest photos of world poverty. Should we be surprised that spaces are set aside in the Arche d' Alliance. for universal suffering hallowed by caviar and champagne? Just as the economic crisis of the West will not be complete so long as it can still exploit the resources of the rest of the world, so the symbolic crisis will be complete only when it is no longer able to feed on the other half's human and natural catastrophes (Eastern Europe, the Gulf, the Kurds, Bangladesh, etc.). We need this drug, which serves us as an aphrodisiac and hallucinogen. And the poor countries are the best suppliers - as, indeed, they are of other drugs. We provide them, through our media, with the means to exploit this paradoxical resource, just as we give them the means to exhaust their natural resources with our technologies. Our whole culture lives off this catastrophic cannibalism, relayed in cynical mode by the news media, and carried forward in moral mode by our humanitarian aid, which is a way of encouraging it and ensuring its continuity, just as economic aid is a strategy for perpetuating under-development. Up to now, the financial sacrifice has been compensated a hundredfold by the moral gain. **But when the catastrophe market itself reaches crisis point, in accordance with the implacable logic of the market**, when distress becomes scarce or the marginal returns on it fall from overexploitation, **when we run out of disasters from elsewhere or when they can no longer be traded like coffee or other commodities, the West will be forced to produce its own catastrophe for itself, in order to meet its need for spectacle and that voracious appetite for symbols which characterizes it even more than its voracious appetite for food.** It will reach the point where it devours itself. When we have finished sucking out the destiny of others, we shall have to invent one for ourselves. The Great Crash, the symbolic crash, will come in the end from us Westerners, but only when we are no longer able to feed on the hallucinogenic misery which comes to us from the other half of the world. Yet they do not seem keen to give up their monopoly. The Middle East, Bangladesh, black Africa and Latin America are really going flat out in the distress and catastrophe stakes, and thus in providing symbolic nourishment for the rich world. They might be said to be overdoing it: heaping earthquakes, floods, famines and ecological disasters one upon another, and finding the means to massacre each other most of the time. The 'disaster show' goes on without any let-up and our sacrificial debt to them far exceeds their economic debt. The misery with which they generously overwhelm us is something we shall never be able to repay. The sacrifices we offer in return are laughable (a tornado or two, a few tiny holocausts on the roads, the odd financial sacrifice) and, moreover, by some infernal logic, these work out as much greater gains for us, whereas our kindnesses have merely added to the natural catastrophes another one immeasurably worse: the demographic catastrophe, a veritable epidemic which we deplore each day in pictures. In short, there is such distortion between North and South, to the symbolic advantage of the South (a hundred thousand Iraqi dead against casualties numbered in tens on our side: in every case we are the losers), that one day everything will break down. One day, the West will break down if we are not soon washed clean of this shame, if an international congress of the poor countries does not very quickly decide to share out this symbolic privilege of misery and catastrophe. It is of course normal, since we refuse to allow the spread of nuclear weapons, that they should refuse to allow the spread of the catastrophe weapon. But it is not right that they should exert that monopoly indefinitely. In any case, the under-developed are only so by comparison with the Western system and its presumed success. In the light of its assumed failure, they are not under-developed at all. They are only so in terms of a dominant evolutionism which has always been the worst of colonial ideologies. The argument here is that there is a line of objective progress and everyone is supposed to pass through its various stages (we find the same eyewash with regard to the evolution of species and in that evolutionism which unilaterally sanctions the superiority of the human race). In the light of current upheavals, which put an end to any idea of history as a linear process, there are no longer either developed or under-developed peoples. Thus, to encourage hope of evolution - albeit by revolution - among the poor and to doom them, in keeping with the objective illusion of progress, to technological salvation is a criminal absurdity. In actual fact, it is their good fortune to be able to escape from evolution just at the point when we no longer know where it is leading. In any case, a majority of these peoples, including those of Eastern Europe, do not seem keen to enter this evolutionist modernity, and their weight in the balance is certainly no small factor in the West's repudiation of its own history, of its own utopias and its own modernity. It might be said that the routes of violence, historical or otherwise, are being turned around and that the viruses now pass from South to North, there being every chance that, five hundred years after America was conquered, 1992 and the end of the century will mark the comeback of the defeated and the sudden reversal of that modernity. The sense of pride is no longer on the side of wealth but of poverty, of those who - fortunately for them - have nothing to repent, and may indeed glory in being privileged in terms of catastrophes. Admittedly, this is a privilege they could hardly renounce, even if they wished to, but natural disasters merely reinforce the sense of guilt felt towards them by the wealthy – by those whom God visibly scorns since he no longer even strikes them down. One day it will be the Whites themselves who will give up their whiteness. It is a good bet that repentance will reach its highest pitch with the five-hundredth anniversary of the conquest of the Americas. We are going to have to lift the curse of the defeated - but symbolically victorious - peoples, which is insinuating itself five hundred years later, by way of repentance, into the heart of the white race. No solution has been found to the dramatic situation of the under-developed, and none will be found since their drama has now been overtaken by that of the overdeveloped, of the rich nations. The psychodrama of congestion, saturation, super abundance, neurosis and the breaking of blood vessels which haunts us - the drama of the excess of means over ends – calls more urgently for attention than that of penury, lack and poverty. That is where the most imminent danger of catastrophe resides, in the societies which have run out of emptiness. **Artificial catastrophes, like the beneficial aspects of civilization, progress much more quickly than natural ones**. The underdeveloped are still at the primary stage of the natural, unforeseeable catastrophe. We are already at the second stage, that of the manufactured catastrophe - imminent and foreseeable - and we shall soon be at that of the pre-programmed catastrophe, the catastrophe of the third kind, deliberate and experimental. **And, paradoxically, it is our pursuit of the means for averting natural catastrophe - the unpredictable form of destiny - which will take us there**. Because it is unable to escape it, humanity will pretend to be the author of its destiny. **Because it cannot accept being confronted with an end which is uncertain or governed by fate, it will prefer to stage its own death as a species.**

#### Hegemony is a paranoid fantasy – the 1AC’s painting China as an obstacle to primacy only externalizes the lack to convince us that the problem lies in Otherness – that creates a feedback loop of insecurity and racialized logics.

Solomon ‘15

Ty Solomon, Lecturer in International Relations, University of Glasglow, “The Politics of Subjectivity in American Foreign Policy Discourses,” University of Michigan Press, Jan 2015, KB rc/pat

Rather than acknowledging the possibility that the ambiguity of subjectivity cannot be overcome, the prospect of American global domination offers a fantasy that channels the desire for subjectivity in a direction that promises a lack of absolutely nothing for “America.” Yet both this image of American global domination and the discursive attempts to pin down what the nation is missing are fantasy objects—partial manifestations of object a that indeed never existed but are posited to have existed and whose presumed absence sparks the desire for the recovery of the enjoyment that they seem to promise.9 While articulating that what America lacks constitutes the potential source of global chaos, other aspects of the discourse soften the impact of this potential source of global disintegration. Whereas Krauthammer emphasized unipolarity for unipolarity’s sake, without giving too much gravity to potential threats or others, Kristol and Kagan’s text is replete with other potential obstacles to enjoyment. Kristol and Kagan offer up a variety of “rogue states” and other entities that join with national weakness to become threats on the horizon. China and Iran, for example, appear frequently as states that likely will not accede to the international rules that the US lays down or adopt American values. “Whether or not the United States continues to grant most-favored-nation status to China is less important” for Kristol and Kagan (1996: 23) “than whether it has an overall strategy for containing, influencing, and ultimately seeking to change the regime in Beijing.” America should develop a missile defense system capable of “shielding, say, Los Angeles from nuclear intimidation by the Chinese during the next crisis in the Taiwan Strait” (25). The greater defense capabilities the US builds up, the “less chance there is that countries like China or Iran will entertain ambitions of upsetting the present world order”—a world order defined by American principles (26). Spreading American influence abroad “means not just supporting U.S. friends and gently pressuring other nations but actively pursuing policies—in Iran, Cuba, or China, for instance—ultimately intended to bring about a change of regime” (28). And more broadly, Kristol and Kagan fear that given America’s indifference toward foreign affairs, it “may no longer have the wherewithal to defend against threats to America’s vital interests in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East, much less to extend America’s current global preeminence well into the future” (24). In one sense, figures such as China and Iran constitute Others against which American “identity” is defined. We are benevolent, while they are aggressive. We spread our universal values to the benefit of all, while they spread fear and threaten peaceful nations. We construct world order, they wantonly seek to undermine it. This illustrates what many IR identity theorists have pointed out—that identity depends on an Other for its definition. Weldes (1999: 220), for example, argues that “identity and difference are mutually constitutive: there is always a politics of identity through which identity and difference are defined in tandem.” In this view, it is perhaps not terribly surprising that Kristol and Kagan’s discourse aided in enhancing neoconservative traction during the later 1990s. Their discourse produces a series of Others against which “American” identity is defined, and consequently these “foreign policy problems allow for the articulation and rearticulation of relations of identity/difference as a means of both constituting and securing state identity” (220). However, the present analysis demonstrates that this process of Othering is itself made possible and sustained by the movements of lack, desire, and enjoyment—the key factors that are mostly neglected in IR identity frameworks. Beyond the mere construction of “us” and “them,” in a more fundamental sense the incompleteness of the collective subject of Kristol and Kagan’s discourse is projected onto the figures of these states. The key notion here is, again, that the subject is a subject of lack. Subjects are always already decentered and disjointed. The movements of lack and anticipated wholeness—and how the subject is produced as dealing with these ambiguities—are the condition of possibility of Self-Other relations. Lack is dealt with through the fantasy implied in their discourse. In Kristol and Kagan’s discourse, the entire world under America’s protective and benevolent wing would be peaceful and largely free of antagonism, tension, and conflict if not for nonconforming states such as China, Iraq, and Iran. Yet rather than Others whose objective presence is deemed threatening, the figures of China, Iran, and others patch up the contingent fantasy of American global supremacy. The fantasy of American security, which is the fantasy of global conformity to American “universal” values, is, like all fantasies, an impossible project. Fantasy offers a way to deal with this contingency through a discourse that attempts to cover over the incompleteness of subject formation and the perpetual unfulfillment of desire for enjoyment. On one hand, Kristol and Kagan offer a neoconservative vision of American global control, while on the other hand, we have the ontological impossibility of such a social totality. What accounts for this discursive discrepancy? The sole answer offered by the discourse is “rogue states” such as Iran, Iraq, and North Korea. Yet, according to the dynamics of desire analyzed here, world order is not prevented by rogue states, but from the impossibility of “fully” constructing such an entity. In other words, the spark of desire stems from the incompleteness of the subject itself, which in turn gives rise to fantasy and Othering: The point is not that “we” are nothing but the drive to annihilate the antagonistic force that prevents us from achieving our full identity. Rather, the antagonistic force is held responsible for the blockage of our full identity, and this permits the externalization of our constitutive lack as subjects to the negating Other, which thus becomes the positive embodiment of our selfblockage. As a result our political actions will tend to be guided by the illusion that the annihilation of the antagonistic force will permit us to become the fully constituted “we” that we have always sought to be. (Torfing 1999: 128–29) This balancing act within fantasy drives much of the identification appeal of Kristol and Kagan’s discourse. While they argue that American internal “weakness,” “mood,” “indifference,” and the like must be confronted with appropriate programs of increased militarization and more nationalistic spectacles (signified by “our” need to more fully adhere to “honor,” “exceptionalism,” “national greatness,” and so on), the coherence of the discourse rests on a fantasy in which a localizable set of Others—“rogue states”—constitute the sole obstacles on which the inescapable contingency and incompleteness of American global domination can be projected. It is not the possibility that America’s values may not in fact be universal, nor is it the possibility that the rest of the world may not welcome with open arms American “benevolent hegemony.” It is not that “we,” the subject, are incapable of fully embracing our enjoyment because of the impossibility of its full experience. It is, as the fantasy rationalizes, a relatively small group of Others that impedes American total global hegemony. They pose an obstacle to our wholeness. If not for these Others, the US and the world would reclaim the mythical wholeness of enjoyment. The fantasy in fact presupposes that the subject was unified before the missing object was lost. Again, Kristol and Kagan remember the days when Reagan summoned the full potential of American spiritual and military might, stared down the Soviet Union, and won the Cold War for the side of freedom. They recall even further in the past, when Theodore Roosevelt inspired Americans to embrace their global responsibilities. Together, both of these leaders “celebrated American exceptionalism” (1996: 32). Thus, the fantasy blames others while simultaneously offering the promise of enjoyment as something missing for which to strive. This double movement within fantasy (an Other to blame and a missing yet promised “sublime object,” both of which are negotiations with lack and incompleteness) is key to tracing the discursive efficacy here. As Yannis Stavrakakis (1999: 82) points out, this “fantasmatic element is crucial for the desirability of all [such] discourses, in other words for the hegemonic appeal.” America is missing something that it had during both Roosevelt’s and Reagan’s times (partially symbolized by terms such as moral clarity, American principles, honor, national greatness, and so on). The fantasy itself retroactively constructs what it says was lost, a unity that never was. The subject’s loss drives the desire for reclaiming that which is perceived to have been lost (the indefinable object a), and Kristol and Kagan offer a neoconservative fantasy that explains what the subject must do to once again reach wholeness. Through fantasy, we can further draw out some of the key contrasts between Kristol and Kagan’s discourse and Krauthammer’s. As is evident, fantasies are typically constituted through a double movement. On one hand, for an identity to exist, there must be difference. Fantasies usually offer up an Other on which the incompleteness of the subject may be projected. On the other hand, fantasies offer a promise to come—a promise that “we” will recover some “sublime object” that is felt to have been lost (though it never existed). The constitutive dynamics of the first dimension (the frustrations of lack and wholeness that produce a focus a focus on Otherness) and this second dimension (the enticement of a promised enjoyment) are often overlooked in IR identity accounts. In other words, “the stake of social-ideological fantasy is to construct a vision of society which does exist, a society which is not split by an antagonistic division” that will lure subjects to identify with it (Žižek 1989: 126). Krauthammer’s discourse on unipolarity arguably concerned one aspect of fantasy without evoking the other. The unipolarity discourse relied to some extent on its construction of Others for the projection of the collective subject’s lack. Yet the promise it offered actually seemed close to fulfillment—a “unipolar moment” with America on top. The promise of enjoyment fades rather than sparks desire, and this discourse’s relative troubles with resonance may be traced to this aspect. It offered an Other but lacked an appealing promise of enjoyment to come. In contrast, the fantasy implied in Kristol and Kagan’s discourse evokes both dimensions of fantasy. It offers a series of Others that are constructed as threatening but that function as the sites on which the incompleteness of the discourse’s subject is projected. In conjunction, it also offers the promised recovery of a core part of “us” that is felt to be missing. This discourse keeps the indefinable object a at a proper distance to draw subjects to its promise yet not too close so as to kill desire. Placing the fantasies of these two discourses side by side, therefore, we can see more clearly how fundamental both aspects of fantasy’s double movement are to the differing efficacy of these discourses. Hegemonic Logic These elements of fantasy underpinned the neoconservative attempts at discursive hegemony in the late 1990s. Logics of equivalence and difference function here in much the same way as they have in other neoconservative discourses. Boundaries of the collective subject and its Others are constructed through strings of signifiers that attempt to pin down or represent the subject within discourse, and Others are constructed through strings of differences. The Others against which the subject is defined are constructed through different predications that attempt to express who and what they are and what they share against the US. American forces “deter Chinese aggression against democratic Taiwan” in East Asia, help deter a “possible invasion” of South Korea by the North, and help deter “possible aggression by Saddam Hussein or the fundamentalist regime in Iran” in the Persian Gulf (Kristol and Kagan 1996: 20–21). Both “rogue states” such as North Korea and “nuclear intimidation” by the Chinese pose threats to the US mainland (25). China and Iran “entertain ambitions of upsetting the present world order” (26). For Kristol and Kagan, all of these examples illustrate how John Quincy Adams’s warning that the US “ought not go ‘abroad in search of monsters to destroy’” is now outdated (31). “But why not?,” the authors ask, questioning Adams (31). “The alternative is to leave monsters on the loose, ravaging and pillaging to their hearts’ content, as Americans stand by and watch” (31). “Aggression,” “invasion,” “fundamentalist,” “rogue,” “intimidation,” “upsetting,” even “monsters”—these various names and signifiers constitute not just a series of Others (mainly China, Iran, and Iraq) in Kristol and Kagan’s discourse, but all seem to express a common underlying similarity. “Fundamentalists” and “rogues” are almost by definition here “aggressive” and “monsters,” enjoying a combination of “ravaging,” “pillaging,” “aggression,” and “upsetting.” As they are produced in the discourse, the similarities they share may seem to be some “essence” common to such outlaw states. Yet their unfixed definition is passed along this string of signifiers. When one’s definition is interrogated, one must rely on the other signifiers in the chain to fill in the definition. Their meanings, then, both differ and are deferred: they differ to the extent that they are deployable as different signifiers so that one can speak of them as different, yet each of their individual meanings is deferred to the others in the chain. Similarly, logics of equivalence are at work in the construction of the “American” subject. “Moral clarity,” “American exceptionalism,” “moral confidence,” “American principles,” “American influence,” “patriotic mission,” “spirit,” “remoralization,” “honor,” “national greatness,” “heroic,” “elevated patriotism,” “responsibility,” and “moral and political leadership” all attempt to tie together what “America” and the “United States” mean. While each of these signifiers seems to point to a different quality or characteristic of the subject, they also seem to express a certain underlying similarity. Like the construction of difference in the chains constituting America’s Others, the signifiers constructing “America” seem to share a quality that cannot be expressed by any of them individually. Their meanings thus differ and are deferred; each of the signifiers differs from the others in one sense, yet their meanings within the text are deferred to other signifiers in the chain constructing the subject “America.” Their meanings are blurred to the extent that even though they are viewed as expressing a fundamental “Americanness,” nothing fundamental underlies any of the signifiers or the chain as a whole. The meaning of one is deferred to another without touching an underlying essence of the subject, simply because there is no such essence. The meanings circle around that which underlies the chain, which is simply a place of lack—a void (Laclau 1996: 57). Thus, logics of equivalence and difference are at work in the chains constructing both the American subject and America’s threatening Others. Desire itself brings together these chains of identification. Desire for full representation, for a signifier that will represent the split subject in a way that its divisions and ambiguities will be healed, moves from object to object. Without lack there is no desire, and without desire there is no subjectivity. Within Kristol and Kagan’s discourse, the desire for subjectivity is constructed along the series of equivalences that construct both “America” and the Other(s). The desire for a signifier that will fully represent the subject and that will heal its divisions and erase its ambiguity shifts along the series of signifiers that attempt to represent it. “Moral clarity,” “American exceptionalism,” “moral confidence,” “national greatness,” and so on offer the promise of wholeness as laid out in the fantasy, yet all fail in their promise to heal the subject’s split. Thus, desire is constantly frustrated and constantly shifts to avoid this frustration, just as desire is frustrated in its inevitable encounter with the signifiers of the Other(s). The two chains are mutually constitutive of each other, and desire is frustrated in the lack of representation in “our” chain and by the Other(s) that are perceived to block our representation (yet actually function as the signifying patches that allow the subject some coherence). The complete subject that they imply is nothing other than the retroactive construction of itself that did not exist before it was presumed by the fantasy. The equivalences attempt to touch this “America” that is/was without division, yet the fantasy implicit in these signifiers merely covers over a lack. Implicit in these plays of equivalence and difference is the filling and emptying of “universal” and “particular” meanings. The plays of universals and particulars are not just the politics of difference and similarity but are blended with the plays of presence and absence of desire and enjoyment in the discourse. Kristol and Kagan’s discourse is stuffed with universals whose meanings they attempt to fill with particular neoconservative understandings. Most obviously, “America” and the “United States” are nodal points that Kristol and Kagan attempt to give meaning and fantasy. “America” is not by nature an isolationist nation, they argue. Instead, America’s true role is that of the “benevolent” global hegemon (1996: 20). Here, the nation is an ambiguous site of inscription on which Kristol and Kagan write their own understanding of “America.” The United States is a country that, properly understood, actively and aggressively promotes its ideals as those that should define global order. Wrongly understood, it is a country that merely sits on the sidelines to play exemplar for others to follow. Such a policy “of sitting atop a hill and leading by example becomes in practice a policy of cowardice and dishonor,” Kristol and Kagan write scornfully (31). Other universals function in the same manner. “Moral clarity,” “American exceptionalism,” and “moral confidence” can have a range of plausible meanings. “Moral clarity” is deployed to represent what “America,” properly understood, should be. “American exceptionalism” can and has had a range of plausible meanings, yet for them it means the active promotion of “exceptionalism” to a world that does not have it yet needs it. Global order itself depends on it. “Moral confidence” in itself has no intrinsic content outside of the particular meanings attributed to it through hegemonic contestation, and the authors fill it in here as that particularly “American” quality that the subject must recapture and utilize if it is to fully become itself again. The other prominent signifiers, embedded in the neoconservative fantasy offered, function in the same manner. “Moral confidence,” “American princi- ples,” “American influence,” “patriotic mission,” “spirit,” “remoralization,” “honor,” “national greatness,” “heroic,” “elevated patriotism,” “responsibility,” and “moral and political leadership” are all intrinsically ambiguous “universal” signifiers whose contingent meanings are filled in by the particular neoconservative fantasy offered. These universals, then, are not merely filled in by the particular meanings that Kristol and Kagan construct but are intimately and inextricably bound to the plays of desire and enjoyment that are channeled through the discourse of the text. The particular meanings of these universal notions are bound up with fantasies that promise the construction of a subject that implies an erasure of its ambiguities. These fantasies are tied to images of Others that block our enjoyment. If not for these Others (the subject believes) desire would be satisfied, enjoyment would be achieved, and the subject would no longer feel the frustration of its incompleteness. Yet the removal of these Others would still reveal the subject’s ambiguity and lack, simply because lack is constitutive of subjectivity. The creation of political boundaries and frontiers, then, is inextricably tied with the politics of desire and enjoyment.

#### Images of catastrophe are exported of suffering and justify structures of violence, they attach a false investment towards different causes just for the ballot creating an inauthentic attachment driving hyperreal desires.

**Baudrillard ‘94** Jean, “The Illusion of the End” p. 66-71. // djb

We have long denounced the capitalistic, economic exploitation of the poverty of the 'other half of the world' [['autre monde]. **We must today denounce the moral and sentimental exploitation of that poverty - charity cannibalism being worse than oppressive violence.** The extraction and humanitarian reprocessing of a destitution which has become the equivalent of oil deposits and gold mines. The extortion of the spectacle of poverty and, at the same time, of our charitable condescension: a worldwide appreciated surplus of fine sentiments and bad conscience. We should, in fact, see this not as the extraction of raw materials, but as a waste-reprocessing enterprise. Their destitution and our bad conscience are, in effect, all part of the waste-products of history- the main thing is to recycle them to produce a new energy source. We have here an escalation in the psychological balance of terror. World capitalist oppression is now merely the vehicle and alibi for this other, much more ferocious, form of moral predation. One might almost say, contrary to the Marxist analysis, that material exploitation is only there to extract that **spiritual raw material that is the misery of peoples, which serves as psychological nourishment for the rich countries and media nourishment for our daily lives.** The 'Fourth World' (we are no longer dealing with a 'developing' Third World) is once again beleaguered, this time as a catastrophe-bearing stratum. The West is whitewashed in the reprocessing of the rest of the world as waste and residue. And the white world repents and seeks absolution - it, too, the waste-product of its own history. The South is a natural producer of raw materials, the latest of which is catastrophe. The North, for its part, specializes in the reprocessing of raw materials and hence also in the reprocessing of catastrophe. Bloodsucking protection, humanitarian interference, Medecins sans frontieres, international solidarity, etc. The last phase of colonialism: the New Sentimental Order is merely the latest form of the New World Order. **Other people's destitution becomes our adventure playground.** Thus, the humanitarian offensive aimed at the Kurds - a show of repentance on the part of the Western powers after allowing Saddam Hussein to crush them - is in reality merely the second phase of the war, a phase in which charitable intervention finishes off the work of extermination. We are the consumers of the ever delightful spectacle of poverty and catastrophe, **and of the moving spectacle of our own efforts to alleviate it (which, in fact, merely function to secure the conditions of reproduction of the catastrophe market);** there, at least, in the order of moral profits, the Marxist analysis is wholly applicable: we see to it that extreme poverty is reproduced as a symbolic deposit, as a fuel essential to the moral and sentimental equilibrium of the West. In our defence, it might be said that this extreme poverty was largely of our own making and it is therefore normal that we should profit by it. There can be no finer proof that the distress of the rest of the world is at the root of Western power and that the spectacle of that distress is its crowning glory than the inauguration, on the roof of the Arche de la Defense, with a sumptuous buffet laid on by the Fondation des Droits de l'homme, of an exhibition of the finest photos of world poverty. Should we be surprised that spaces are set aside in the Arche d' Alliance. for universal suffering hallowed by caviar and champagne? Just as the economic crisis of the West will not be complete so long as it can still exploit the resources of the rest of the world, so the symbolic crisis will be complete only when it is no longer able to feed on the other half's human and natural catastrophes (Eastern Europe, the Gulf, the Kurds, Bangladesh, etc.). We need this drug, which serves us as an aphrodisiac and hallucinogen. And the poor countries are the best suppliers - as, indeed, they are of other drugs. We provide them, through our media, with the means to exploit this paradoxical resource, just as we give them the means to exhaust their natural resources with our technologies. Our whole culture lives off this catastrophic cannibalism, relayed in cynical mode by the news media, and carried forward in moral mode by our humanitarian aid, which is a way of encouraging it and ensuring its continuity, just as economic aid is a strategy for perpetuating under-development. Up to now, the financial sacrifice has been compensated a hundredfold by the moral gain. **But when the catastrophe market itself reaches crisis point, in accordance with the implacable logic of the market**, when distress becomes scarce or the marginal returns on it fall from overexploitation, **when we run out of disasters from elsewhere or when they can no longer be traded like coffee or other commodities, the West will be forced to produce its own catastrophe for itself, in order to meet its need for spectacle and that voracious appetite for symbols which characterizes it even more than its voracious appetite for food.** It will reach the point where it devours itself. When we have finished sucking out the destiny of others, we shall have to invent one for ourselves. The Great Crash, the symbolic crash, will come in the end from us Westerners, but only when we are no longer able to feed on the hallucinogenic misery which comes to us from the other half of the world. Yet they do not seem keen to give up their monopoly. The Middle East, Bangladesh, black Africa and Latin America are really going flat out in the distress and catastrophe stakes, and thus in providing symbolic nourishment for the rich world. They might be said to be overdoing it: heaping earthquakes, floods, famines and ecological disasters one upon another, and finding the means to massacre each other most of the time. The 'disaster show' goes on without any let-up and our sacrificial debt to them far exceeds their economic debt. The misery with which they generously overwhelm us is something we shall never be able to repay. The sacrifices we offer in return are laughable (a tornado or two, a few tiny holocausts on the roads, the odd financial sacrifice) and, moreover, by some infernal logic, these work out as much greater gains for us, whereas our kindnesses have merely added to the natural catastrophes another one immeasurably worse: the demographic catastrophe, a veritable epidemic which we deplore each day in pictures. In short, there is such distortion between North and South, to the symbolic advantage of the South (a hundred thousand Iraqi dead against casualties numbered in tens on our side: in every case we are the losers), that one day everything will break down. One day, the West will break down if we are not soon washed clean of this shame, if an international congress of the poor countries does not very quickly decide to share out this symbolic privilege of misery and catastrophe. It is of course normal, since we refuse to allow the spread of nuclear weapons, that they should refuse to allow the spread of the catastrophe weapon. But it is not right that they should exert that monopoly indefinitely. In any case, the under-developed are only so by comparison with the Western system and its presumed success. In the light of its assumed failure, they are not under-developed at all. They are only so in terms of a dominant evolutionism which has always been the worst of colonial ideologies. The argument here is that there is a line of objective progress and everyone is supposed to pass through its various stages (we find the same eyewash with regard to the evolution of species and in that evolutionism which unilaterally sanctions the superiority of the human race). In the light of current upheavals, which put an end to any idea of history as a linear process, there are no longer either developed or under-developed peoples. Thus, to encourage hope of evolution - albeit by revolution - among the poor and to doom them, in keeping with the objective illusion of progress, to technological salvation is a criminal absurdity. In actual fact, it is their good fortune to be able to escape from evolution just at the point when we no longer know where it is leading. In any case, a majority of these peoples, including those of Eastern Europe, do not seem keen to enter this evolutionist modernity, and their weight in the balance is certainly no small factor in the West's repudiation of its own history, of its own utopias and its own modernity. It might be said that the routes of violence, historical or otherwise, are being turned around and that the viruses now pass from South to North, there being every chance that, five hundred years after America was conquered, 1992 and the end of the century will mark the comeback of the defeated and the sudden reversal of that modernity. The sense of pride is no longer on the side of wealth but of poverty, of those who - fortunately for them - have nothing to repent, and may indeed glory in being privileged in terms of catastrophes. Admittedly, this is a privilege they could hardly renounce, even if they wished to, but natural disasters merely reinforce the sense of guilt felt towards them by the wealthy – by those whom God visibly scorns since he no longer even strikes them down. One day it will be the Whites themselves who will give up their whiteness. It is a good bet that repentance will reach its highest pitch with the five-hundredth anniversary of the conquest of the Americas. We are going to have to lift the curse of the defeated - but symbolically victorious - peoples, which is insinuating itself five hundred years later, by way of repentance, into the heart of the white race. No solution has been found to the dramatic situation of the under-developed, and none will be found since their drama has now been overtaken by that of the overdeveloped, of the rich nations. The psychodrama of congestion, saturation, super abundance, neurosis and the breaking of blood vessels which haunts us - the drama of the excess of means over ends – calls more urgently for attention than that of penury, lack and poverty. That is where the most imminent danger of catastrophe resides, in the societies which have run out of emptiness. **Artificial catastrophes, like the beneficial aspects of civilization, progress much more quickly than natural ones**. The underdeveloped are still at the primary stage of the natural, unforeseeable catastrophe. We are already at the second stage, that of the manufactured catastrophe - imminent and foreseeable - and we shall soon be at that of the pre-programmed catastrophe, the catastrophe of the third kind, deliberate and experimental. **And, paradoxically, it is our pursuit of the means for averting natural catastrophe - the unpredictable form of destiny - which will take us there**. Because it is unable to escape it, humanity will pretend to be the author of its destiny. **Because it cannot accept being confronted with an end which is uncertain or governed by fate, it will prefer to stage its own death as a species.**

#### The alternative is complete negation – a refusal to feed the system that destroys our psyche. The political has lost the will for positive action and now all that is left in the power of the masses is negation. Baudrillard 93

(Baudrillard, Jean), The Transparency of Evil: Essays on Extreme Phenomena, 1993)//faizaan

In Simmel's words, 'Negation is the simplest thing imaginable. That is why the broad masses, whose component elements cannot achieve agreement as to goals, come together here.' **It is useless to expect a positive opinion or a critical will from the masses**, for they have none: **all they have is** an undifferentiated power, **the power to reject**. **Their strength flows solely from what they are able to expel, to negate** - and that is, first and foremost, any project that goes beyond them, any class or understanding that transcends them. There is something here of a philosophy of cunning born of the most brutal experience - the experience of animals, or of peasants: 'They won't put that over on us again, we won't fall for their calls to sacrifice, or listen to their pie in the sky.' **Profound disgust for the political order** - though one that may well coexist with specific political opinions . Disgust for the pretension and transcendence of power, **for the inevitability and abomination of the political sphere. Where once there were political passions, we now find only the violence peculiar to a fundamental disgust with everything political**. Power itself is founded largely on disgust. The whole of advertising, the whole of political discourse, is a public insult to the intelligence, to reason - but an insult in which we collaborate, abjectly subscribing to a silent interaction. The day of hidden persuasion is over: those who govern us now resort unapologetically to arm-twisting pure and simple. The prototype here was a banker got up like a vampire, saying, 'I am after you for your money' . A decade has already gone by since this kind of obscenity was introduced, with the government's blessing, into our social mores. At the time we thought the ad feeble because of its aggressive vulgarity . In point of fact it was a prophetic commercial, full of intimations of the future shape of social relationships, because it operated, precisely, in terms of disgust, avidity and rape. The same goes for pornographic and food advertising, which are also powered by shamelessness and lust, by a strategic logic of violation and anxiety.

#### The role of the ballot is to vote for the debater that best disrupts the simulacrum. Role playing contributes to inauthenticity and dead attachment to images of suffering, Antonio 95

Nietzsche's Antisociology: Subjectified Culture and the End of History Author(s): Robert J. Antonio Source: American Journal of Sociology , Jul., 1995, Vol. 101, No. 1 (Jul., 1995), pp. 1-43 Published by: The University of Chicago Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.com/stable/2782505 //WHS-AK

The "problem of the actor," Nietzsche said, "troubled me for the longest time."'12 He considered "**roles" as "external," "surface," or "foreground" phenomena** and viewed close personal identification with them as symptomatic of estrangement. While modern theorists saw dif- ferentiated roles and professions as a matrix of autonomy and reflexivity, Nietzsche held that **persons** (especially male professionals**) in specialized occupations** **overidentify with their positions and engage in gross fabrica- tions** to obtain advancement. They look hesitantly to the opinion of oth- ers, asking themselves, "How ought I feel about this?" **They are so** thoroughly **absorbed in simulating** effective **role players** that they have trouble being anything but actors-"The role **has actually become the character**." This highly subjectified social self or simulator **suffers devas- tating inauthenticity**. The powerful authority given the social greatly amplifies Socratic culture's already self-indulgent "inwardness." Integ- rity, decisiveness, spontaneity, and **pleasure are undone by paralyzing overconcern about** possible **causes, meanings, and consequences of acts** and unending internal dialogue about what others might think, expect, say, or do (Nietzsche 1983, pp. 83-86; 1986, pp. 39-40; 1974, pp. 302-4, 316-17). Nervous rotation of socially appropriate "masks" reduces persons to hypostatized "shadows," "abstracts," or simulacra. **One adopts "many roles," playing them** "badly and **superficially**" in the fashion of a stiff "puppet play." Nietzsche asked, "**Are you genuine? Or only an actor**? A representative or that which is represented? . . . [Or] no more than an imitation of an actor?" Simulation is so pervasive that it is hard to tell the copy from the genuine article; social selves "prefer the copies to the originals" (Nietzsche 1983, pp. 84-86; 1986, p. 136; 1974, pp. 232- 33, 259; 1969b, pp. 268, 300, 302; 1968a, pp. 26-27). Their inwardness and aleatory **scripts foreclose genuine attachment to others**. This type of **actor cannot plan for the long term** or participate in enduring net- works of interdependence; such a person is neither willing nor able to be a "stone" in the societal "edifice" (Nietzsche 1974, pp. 302-4; 1986a, pp. 93-94). Superficiality rules in the arid subjectivized landscape. Neitzsche (1974, p. 259) stated, "One thinks with a watch in one's hand, even as one eats one's midday meal while reading the latest news of the stock market; one lives as if one always 'might miss out on something. ''Rather do anything than nothing': this principle, too, is merely a string to throttle all culture. . . . **Living in** a constant **chase after gain compels people to expend** their **spirit to the point of exhaustion** in continual pretense and overreaching and anticipating others." Pervasive leveling, improvising, and faking foster an inflated sense of ability and an oblivious attitude about the fortuitous circumstances that contribute to role attainment (e.g., class or ethnicity). The most medio- cre people believe they can fill any position, even cultural leadership. Nietzsche respected the self-mastery of genuine ascetic priests, like Socra- tes, and praised their ability to redirect ressentiment creatively and to render the "sick" harmless. But he deeply feared the new simulated versions. Lacking the "born physician's" capacities, these impostors am- plify the worst inclinations of the herd; they are "violent, envious, ex- ploitative, scheming, fawning, cringing, arrogant, all according to cir- cumstances. " **Social selves are fodder for the** "great man of the **masses**." Nietzsche held that "the less one knows how to command, the more ur- gently one covets someone who commands, who commands severely- a god, prince, class, physician, father confessor, dogma, or party conscience. **The** deadly **combination of desperate conforming and overreaching** and untrammeled ressentiment **paves the way for a new type of tyrant.**

## On Case

#### Outer Space Laws are unclear – private corporations are still capable of escaping due to loopholes in the plan, proves the plan doesn’t solve and just circumvents.

Green and Stark 17 [Christopher and Eda, “Outer Space Treaty and Beyond: Do Existing Space Laws Put an Astronomical Barrier to Private IP Rights in Space?”, JDSUPRA. 8 September 2020 https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/outer-space-treaty-beyond-do-existing-44028/] //DebateDrills LC

Our limited body of space law provides little guidance. The first international treaty, the “Outer Space Treaty,” was signed by the U.S., Russia, and the U.K. in 1967, quickly followed by the Rescue Agreement. Over the next two decades, three other treaties—the Liability Convention, the Registration Convention, and the Moon Agreement—were also signed by these nations, with most countries following in their footsteps.[3] But after that rapid succession of international treaties, there have since been few others. These five documents form the basis of the international space law we have today, but none address the issue of [intellectual property rights in space](https://www.fr.com/fish-litigation/ip-rights-outer-space/). Rather, upon inspection, it appears that the stated purpose of these treaties may be antithetical to intellectual property protection. The “Outer Space Treaty” espouses communal themes in characterizing space as the “province of all mankind,” the “common heritage of mankind” and to the “benefit of all countries.”[4] Unsurprisingly, Article II of the Outer Space Treaty prohibits any appropriation of areas in space, keeping in line with its principle of communal property.[5] On the other hand, patents are fundamentally territorial and grant monopoly rights for a period of time. Applied to space, it is unclear just what is open for patent protections. For example, can private companies patent orbital patterns of satellites? Currently, companies may patent the technology or design of satellites that stay in a particular orbit, even if not the orbital pattern itself.[6] The practical implications of this are significant, especially with the advent of satellite constellations. If particular satellite technologies, and, indirectly, their orbital patterns, are patentable, then a significant portion of space may be occupied by one satellite constellation, i.e. one company alone.[7] Does this private apportionment of space run counter to our notions of sharing space? Some argue that the Outer Space Treaty only bans sovereign appropriation and does not limit private entities from exerting claims. Others counter that private property rights flow from sovereign property claims, so the former is meaningless without the latter.[8] So the question remains, can the stated goals of sharing outer space be reconciled with the proprietary nature of patents? Our current corpus of space treaties comes from a period of history when space exploration was undertaken primarily by governments rather than private actors. The cooperative goals were likely a reaction to the time, as the world was coming out of a charged space race. The silence of these space treaties on intellectual property rights presents an opportunity for modern-day agreements to provide patent protections for private companies. Without robust international agreement on patents for space, we may even see less international cooperation as companies refuse to divulge their discoveries.[9] Now, as more and more private companies enter space exploration and carry the torch of innovation, it is more important than ever to strike a balance between sharing our “common heritage” and providing patent protections that incentivize invention.[10]

#### No debris cascades, but even a worst case is confined to low LEO with no impact

Daniel Von Fange 17, Web Application Engineer, Founder and Owner of LeanCoder, Full Stack, Polyglot Web Developer, “Kessler Syndrome is Over Hyped”, 5/21/2017, http://braino.org/essays/kessler\_syndrome\_is\_over\_hyped/

Kessler Syndrome is overhyped. A chorus of online commenters great any news of upcoming low earth orbit satellites with worry that humanity will to lose access to space. I now think they are wrong. What is Kessler Syndrome? Here’s the popular view on Kessler Syndrome. Every once in a while, a piece of junk in space hits a satellite. This single impact destroys the satellite, and breaks off several thousand additional pieces. These new pieces now fly around space looking for other satellites to hit, and so exponentially multiply themselves over time, like a nuclear reaction, until a sphere of man-made debris surrounds the earth, and humanity no longer has access to space nor the benefits of satellites. It is a dark picture. Is Kessler Syndrome likely to happen? I had to stop everything and spend an afternoon doing back-of-the-napkin math to know how big the threat is. To estimate, we need to know where the stuff in space is, how much mass is there, and how long it would take to deorbit. The orbital area around earth can be broken down into four regions. Low LEO - Up to about 400km. Things that orbit here burn up in the earth’s atmosphere quickly - between a few months to two years. The space station operates at the high end of this range. It loses about a kilometer of altitude a month and if not pushed higher every few months, would soon burn up. For all practical purposes, Low LEO doesn’t matter for Kessler Syndrome. If Low LEO was ever full of space junk, we’d just wait a year and a half, and the problem would be over. High LEO - 400km to 2000km. This where most heavy satellites and most space junk orbits. The air is thin enough here that satellites only go down slowly, and they have a much farther distance to fall. It can take 50 years for stuff here to get down. This is where Kessler Syndrome could be an issue. Mid Orbit - GPS satellites and other navigation satellites travel here in lonely, long lives. The volume of space is so huge, and the number of satellites so few, that we don’t need to worry about Kessler here. GEO - If you put a satellite far enough out from earth, the speed that the satellite travels around the earth will match the speed of the surface of the earth rotating under it. From the ground, the satellite will appear to hang motionless. Usually the geostationary orbit is used by big weather satellites and big TV broadcasting satellites. (This apparent motionlessness is why satellite TV dishes can be mounted pointing in a fixed direction. You can find approximate south just by looking around at the dishes in your northern hemisphere neighborhood.) For Kessler purposes, GEO orbit is roughly a ring 384,400 km around. However, all the satellites here are moving the same direction at the same speed - debris doesn’t get free velocity from the speed of the satellites. Also, it’s quite expensive to get a satellite here, and so there aren’t many, only about one satellite per 1000km of the ring. Kessler is not a problem here. How bad could Kessler Syndrome in High LEO be? Let’s imagine a worst case scenario. An evil alien intelligence chops up everything in High LEO, turning it into 1cm cubes of death orbiting at 1000km, spread as evenly across the surface of this sphere as orbital mechanics would allow. Is humanity cut off from space? I’m guessing the world has launched about 10,000 tons of satellites total. For guessing purposes, I’ll assume 2,500 tons of satellites and junk currently in High LEO. If satellites are made of aluminum, with a density of 2.70 g/cm3, then that’s 839,985,870 1cm cubes. A sphere for an orbit of 1,000km has a surface area of 682,752,000 square KM. So there would be one cube of junk per .81 square KM. If a rocket traveled through that, its odds of hitting that cube are tiny - less than 1 in 10,000. So even in the worst case, we don’t lose access to space. Now though you can travel through the debris, you couldn’t keep a satellite alive for long in this orbit of death. Kessler Syndrome at its worst just prevents us from putting satellites in certain orbits. In real life, there’s a lot of factors that make Kessler syndrome even less of a problem than our worst case though experiment. Debris would be spread over a volume of space, not a single orbital surface, making collisions orders of magnitudes less likely. Most impact debris will have a slower orbital velocity than either of its original pieces - this makes it deorbit much sooner. Any collision will create large and small objects. Small objects are much more affected by atmospheric drag and deorbit faster, even in a few months from high LEO. Larger objects can be tracked by earth based radar and avoided. The planned big new constellations are not in High LEO, but in Low LEO for faster communications with the earth. They aren’t an issue for Kessler. Most importantly, all new satellite launches since the 1990’s are required to include a plan to get rid of the satellite at the end of its useful life (usually by deorbiting) So the realistic worst case is that insurance premiums on satellites go up a bit. Given the current trend toward much smaller, cheaper micro satellites, this wouldn’t even have a huge effect. I’m removing Kessler Syndrome from my list of things to worry about.

1. [Jean; Simulacra and Simulation; French Sociologist/Philosopher; 1981; University of Michigan Press; LCA-BP] [↑](#footnote-ref-1)