## **Indigenous Objectivity AC**

Settler colonialism is the governing thought of modernity that posits notions of control and desire into the Western man implanting the seed opportunity born out of genocide. Paperson ‘17

[La Paperson, aka K. Wayne Yang, UC San Diego. 2017. “A Third University is Possible”. <https://manifold.umn.edu/read/a-third-university-is-possible/section/ba50806d-ff18-4100-9998-784aecb42ae4>] //recut faizaan

Land is the prime concern of settler colonialism, contexts in which the colonizer comes to a “new” place not only to seize and exploit but to stay, making that “new” place his permanent home. Settler colonialism thus complicates the center–periphery model that was classically used to describe colonialism, wherein an imperial center, the “metropole,” dominates distant colonies, the “periphery.” Typically, one thinks of European colonization of Africa, India, the Caribbean, the Pacific Islands, in terms of external colonialism, also called exploitation colonialism, where land and human beings are recast as natural resources for primitive accumulation: coltan, petroleum, diamonds, water, salt, seeds, genetic material, chattel. Theories named as “settler colonial studies” had a resurgence beginning around 2006. However, the analysis of settler colonialism is actually not new, only often ignored within Western critiques of empire. The critical literatures of the colonized have long **positioned the violence of settlement as a prime feature in colonial life** as well as in global arrangements of power. We can see this in Franz Fanon’s foundational critiques of colonialism. Whereas Fanon’s work is often generalized for its diagnoses of anti/colonial violence and the racialized psychoses of colonization upon colonized and colonizer, Fanon is also talking about settlement as the particular feature of French colonization in Algeria. For Fanon, the violence of French colonization in Algeria arises from settlement as a spatial immediacy of empire: the geospatial collapse of metropole and colony into the same time and place. On the “selfsame land” are spatialized white immunity and racialized violation, non-Native desires for freedom, Black life, and Indigenous relations. Settler colonialism is too often thought of as “what happened” to Indigenous people. This kind of thinking confines the experiences of Indigenous people, their critiques of settler colonialism, their decolonial imaginations, to an unwarranted historicizing parochialism, as if settler colonialism were a past event that “happened to” Native peoples and not generalizable to non-Natives. Actually, settler colonialism is something that “happened for” settlers. Indeed, it is happening for them/us right now. Wa Thiong’o’s question of how instead of why directs us to think of land tenancy laws, debt, and the privatization of land as settler colonial technologies that enable the “eventful” history of plunder and disappearance. Property law is a settler colonial technology. The weapons that enforce it, the knowledge institutions that legitimize it, the financial institutions that operationalize it, are also technologies. Like all technologies, they evolve and spread. Recasting land as property means severing Indigenous peoples from land. This separation, what Hortense Spillers describes as “the loss of Indigenous name/land” for Africans-turned-chattel, recasts Black Indigenous people as black bodies for biopolitical disposal: who will be moved where, who will be murdered how, who will be machinery for what, and who will be made property for whom. In the alienation of land from life, alienable rights are produced: the right to own (property), the right to law (protection through legitimated violence), the right to govern (supremacist sovereignty), the right to have rights (humanity). In a word, what is produced is whiteness. Moreover, it is not just human beings who are refigured in the schism. Land and nonhumans become alienable properties, a move that first alienates land from its own sovereign life. Thus we can speak of the various technologies required to create and maintain these separations, these alienations: Black from Indigenous, human from nonhuman, land from life. “How?” is a question you ask if you are concerned with the mechanisms, not just the motives, of colonization. Instead of settler colonialism as an ideology, or as a history, you might consider settler colonialism as a set of technologies—a frame that could help you to forecast colonial next operations and to plot decolonial directions. The Settler–Native–Slave Triad Does Not Describe Identities One of the main interventions of settler colonial studies has been to insist that the patterning of social relations is shaped by colonialism’s thirst for land and thus is shaped to fit modes of empire. Because colonialism is a perverted affair, our relationships are also warped into complicitous arrangements of violation, trespass, and collusion with its mechanisms. For Fanon, the psychosis of colonialism arises from the patterning of violence into the binary relationship between the immune humanity of the white settler and the impugned humanity of the native. For Fanon, the supremacist “right” to create settler space that is immune from violence, and the “right” to abuse the body of the Native to maintain white immunity, this is the spatial and fleshy immediacy of settler colonialism. Furthermore, the “humanity” of the settler is constructed upon his agency over the land and nature. As Maldonado-Torres explains, “I think, therefore I am” is actually an articulation of “I conquer, therefore I am,” a sense of identity posited upon the harnessing of nature and its “natural” people. This creates a host of post+colonial problems that have come to define modernity. Because the humanity of the settler is predicated on his ability to “write the world,” to make history upon and over the natural world, the colonized is instructed to make her [their] claim to humanity by similarly acting on the world or, more precisely, acting in his. Indeed, for Fanon, it is the perverse ontology of settler becomings—becoming landowner or becoming property, becoming killable or becoming a killer—and the mutual implication of tortured and torturer that mark the psychosis of colonialism. This problem of modernity and colonial psychosis is echoed in Jack Forbes’s writings: “Columbus was a wétiko. He was mentally ill or insane, the carrier of a terribly contagious psychological disease, the wétiko psychosis. . . . The wétiko psychosis, and the problems it creates, have inspired many resistance movements and efforts at reform or revolution. Unfortunately, most of these efforts have failed because they have never diagnosed the wétiko.” Under Western modernity, becoming “free” means becoming a colonizer, and because of this, “the central contradiction of modernity is freedom.” Critiques of settler colonialism, therefore, do not offer just another “type” of colonialism to add to the literature but a mode of analysis that has repercussions for any diagnosis of coloniality and for understanding the modern conditions of freedom. By modern conditions of freedom, I mean that Western freedom is a product of colonial modernity, and I mean that such freedom comes with conditions, with strings attached, most manifest as terms of unfreedom for nonhumans. As Cindi Mayweather says, “your freedom’s in a bind.”

#### **The media is the modern orchestrater of genocide and the identity of the settler, ingraining destructive ideologies of settler dominance amongst the masses. Tucker 19**

Tucker, Ericka. “Perpetuating Colonization Through the Gaze of US Media”, 2019, University of Washington https://digital.lib.washington.edu/researchworks/bitstream/handle/1773/43978/Tucker\_washington\_0250O\_20171.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y, 3-6-2022, // faizaan

The roles, ideological functions, and influence of mass media have been studied extensively. According to Hall, the “mass media ‘provide the guiding myths which shape our perception of the world and serve as important instruments as social control.’”31 In his analysis of news media in particular, Hall not only addresses the power of media but also critiques the relationship between media and what he calls the “gatekeepers” - government officials, politicians, corporate spokespeople, “experts” - in keeping those who exist outside of this relationship on the margins and misrepresented.32 Kellner argues that “media culture” plays a large part in the creation of identity, helping people understand not only who they are but their place in the world.33 The world is highly mediated, in which people and events become synonymous with their representations, regardless of whether they are factual or accurate; the news thrives on immediacy and, increasingly, eschews context which results in distorted representations and upholds the 30 Ibid., 6. 31 Helen Davis, Understanding Stuart Hall (London: Sage, 2004), 41. 32 Ibid., 43. 33 Douglas Kellner, Media Culture: Cultural Studies, Identity and Politics Between the Modern and the Postmodern, (London: Routledge, 1995). 16 page16image1843891536 dominant political and social landscape. However, Hall’s theory of the politics of representation posits that media representation is more complex than a simple cause-and-effect relationship between media and consumers. Power strives to solidify meaning to support its agenda, and audiences receive meaning, but meaning cannot be fixed; individuals constantly remake or “decode” meaning as it is received, and therefore meaning is constantly changing regardless of the author’s intent (encoding).34 Encoding and decoding are discursive practices in a constant state of motion and flux, in a “dialectic of cultural struggle”35 which occurs at the point where “different, opposed traditions meet, intersect.”36 Thus, the consumption of media is not a passive act; consumers make meaning out of various texts by, in part, pulling from previous interactions with media. By reinforcing already widely-held stereotypes, “the press has given these images the weight of factuality.”37 Thus, the news media wields a particular power over public opinion and public policy, by defining and constructing social problems in ways that reinforce unequal power structures. Hall argues that “the media’s main sphere of operations is the production and transformation of ideologies.”38 Ideologies are not created and followed in a vacuum, but rather are made up of a complex set of meanings which determine social formations and conditions, or how people make sense of the world and their place in it.39 Ideologies also influence individual identities.

#### The media is still a site of social exclusion of indigenous voices and silences decolonial pedagogies. UTS 21

UTS "Indigenous voices still missing in media stories", 07-01-2021, University of Technology Sydney, https://www.uts.edu.au/news/social-justice-sustainability/indigenous-voices-still-missing-media-stories, 3-6-2022, //faizaan

Since the British invasion of Gadigal land at Sydney Cove in 1788, race relations in Australia have been underscored by what [Wiradjuri writer Jack Gibson](https://indigenousx.com.au/media-and-white-blinkers.) describes as the “supremeness of whiteness”. Narratives of [Indigenous inferiority and deficiency](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/1329878X1314900117), combined with paternalistic policies, have produced a cultural climate where non-Indigenous voices have often dominated debate on matters of concern and importance to Indigenous communities. However, in recent years, Indigenous [journalists](https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/aug/03/nothing-about-us-without-us-thats-why-we-need-indigenous-owned-media) and storytellers have sought to change this. [The Uluru Statement From the Heart](https://apo.org.au/node/91606) calls for a process of truth-telling. And as the Black Lives Matter movement has grown, some media organisations are recognising the need to deal with their histories of racist representations. In 2020, for example, the Stuff Group in New Zealand [apologised](https://www.stuff.co.nz/pou-tiaki/our-truth/123533668/our-truth-t-mtou-pono-stuff-introduces-new-treaty-of-waitangi-based-charter-following-historic-apology) for its racist and exclusionary depictions of Māori over decades. [Our new research](https://alltogethernow.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/When-inclusion-means-exclusion-report-2021.pdf), published as a joint report from All Together Now, University of Technology Sydney, Deakin University and Cultural and Indigenous Research Australia, examines the ways in which the mainstream media use language, voices, and other features (such as sources and points of view) to represent and frame Indigenous communities and issues. Our research revealed the media is increasingly depicting Indigenous people and communities in “inclusive” ways. In a survey of 288 opinion pieces about Indigenous communities across mainstream newspapers and television networks in Australia, we found that 151 had inclusive depictions of Indigenous people. Articles were considered inclusive if their language defied racial stereotypes, condemned racism, or gave a voice to Indigenous people. However, when we delved more deeply into a smaller sample of these inclusive pieces using discourse analysis, we found that inclusive commentary can still deny agency to Indigenous people through marginalising Indigenous voices. Exploring surface level inclusion Focusing on 20 opinion articles published between 2019 and 2020 in five leading newspapers - The Sydney Morning Herald, The Australian, The Daily Telegraph, Herald Sun and The Courier Mail - we found that Indigenous voices, points of view and sources were routinely under-represented, while relevant historical and cultural context was regularly overlooked. This obscures the actions and views of Indigenous people in the political debates that matter to their communities. Our research found what we called surface level inclusion: inclusion of Indigenous people through the absence of negative stereotypes, but excluding Indigenous authors, perspectives, historical and cultural contexts, and voices

#### Thus the advocacy: In a democracy, a free press ought to prioritize indigenous objectivity over settler advocacy.

* We will give you access to any post fiat dissads and impacts
* Our RoB won’t weigh into most impacts, you will probably need to read your own

#### **Objectivity as a mode of knowledge production is the only way to frame the political, our method is a form of recognizing how knowledge should be constructed only from the perspective of indigenous groups. Ludwig 15**

Ludwig David, " The objectivity of local knowledge. Lessons from ethnobiology", 09-13-2015, No Publication, https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s11229-016-1210-1.pdf, 3-8-2022, //WHS AC + faizaan

Doubts about the objectivity of local knowledge usually do not focus on epistemic agents but on the practices they engage in. For example, the dismissal of First Nation elders and hunters in the Dall Sheep case did presumably not stem from the suspicion that they were less sincere than Western biologists about finding the causes of the population decline. Instead, RRSSC members suspected that even the most sincere and impartial Kluane would fail to gain reliable knowledge because their epistemic practices are “too subjective”. Following Douglas’ (2004) useful taxonomy of different notions of objectivity, it seems that the objectivity of processes of knowledge production (Douglas’ objectivity1) is at stake and not the objectivity of individuals (objectivity2) or groups (objectivity3) who engage in these processes. As Douglas points out, the objectivity of processes of knowledge production has been traditionally associated with gaining “a grasp of the real objects in the world” (2004, p. 456). And indeed, this seems to reflect worries that are commonly articulated against local knowledge. For example, the charge against Kluane in the Dall Sheep case was that their accounts simply failed to grasp what was really going on. Kluane (both as individuals and as a group) may have been sincere in wanting to identify the real causes of the population decline but their epistemic practices led them astray. Moving from slogans like “grasp of the real objects in the world” to metaphysically less demanding formulations, Douglas suggests to distinguish between two senses of the objectivity of processes. On the one hand, there is convergent objectivity that reflects the convergence of results from different areas of inquiry. As Douglas points out, convergent objectivity is not only for scientists: “In everyday life, when an object continues to appear from a variety of vantage points and using a variety of techniques (e.g., both sight and sound), the possibility of illusion seems remote. As any birdwatcher will tell you, a convergence of evidence from various sources (e.g., bird coloration and song) assists greatly in the objective identification of the species under observation” (2004, p. 458). On the other hand, there is manipulable objectivity that reflects reliable ways of intervening in the world. Again, Douglas argues that manipulable objectivity is not limited to the sciences: “When we can use objects around us, we trust our accounts of their existence and properties as reliable. If I can reach out and drink from the glass of water, and it quenches my thirst, and I can fill it back up again, repeating the whole process reliably, I have good reason to trust the reliability of relevant beliefs about the glass” (2004, p. 457). Both senses of objectivity specify virtues and not only the absence of vices in the sense of Hacking. It is therefore attractive to frame debates about the objectivity of Indigenous and other local knowledges in terms of the question whether they exhibit the virtues of convergent and manipulable objectivity. And indeed, issues of convergence have played an outstandingly important role in early ethnobiology. To illustrate this historical connection, consider Diamond’s 1966 article “Zoological Classification System of a Primitive People” that investigated correlations between vertebrate categories (ámana aké) of the Fore of the New Guinea Highlands and taxa in biological systematics. Diamond did not only find convergence but immediately tied it to the objectivity of the categories employed: “The nearly one-to-one correspondence between Fore ámana aké and species as recognized by European taxonomists reflects the objective reality of the gaps separating sympatric species” (1966, p. 1102)

#### Indigenous objectivity deems indigenous knowledge production as a universal truth to claim their deserved sovereignty. It’s not a form of advocacy, but rather ingrains the truth of this land– that settlers operate on stolen land and the only ethical form of legislation must be towards indigenous groups. Nairn et al 17

Nairn Raymond, McCreanor Tim, Barnes Angela, “Mass media representations of indigenous peoples", 12-2017, Massey University https://trc.org.nz/sites/trc.org.nz/files/Mass-media-representations-indigenous-peoples%20.pdf, 3-6-2022, //faizaan

In that spirit we own our focus on the roles of discourse and the settler‐generated discursive resources that enable and sustain self‐serving settler representations of indigenous peoples (Fforde, et al., 2013) has shaped this review. It is an orientation growing out of more than two decades, work during which members of Kupu Taea have been charting the 'race talk' of New Zealand settlers about Māori (Kupu Taea, 2014; Moewaka Barnes, et al., 2012; Nairn & McCreanor, 1991). Consequently, when we review studies that explore the contribution of media production practices to the representations of indigenous peoples we have chosen to foreground those that display the synergies between production and discourse practices (Fairclough, 1993) that contribute to the symbolic annihilation of indigenous peoples (Gerbner, 1972; Klein & Shiffman, 2009; Tuchman, 1978a). Such research addressing the credibility (or authority) of those representations raises questions about the role ‘ideology’ plays in shaping media representations and people's understanding of the mass mediated world together with the contributions media make to sustaining and naturalising the hegemonic ideology. Elizabeth Furniss (2001) is clear about such naturalising: “...urban and rural presses alike are adept at manipulating news frames as a strategy of political containment: rural presses deflect criticism of local Aboriginal/non‐Aboriginal conflicts into rural‐urban dichotomies, while urban presses deflect challenges to state authority by evoking noble savage imagery and reducing Aboriginal claims to localized conflicts.” (pp.28‐9) One take‐home message from research on media representations of indigenous peoples is that there are considerable benefits for settler‐media and settler societies, most ensuing from the naturalised ordinariness of settler values, practices, and institutions. As discussed previously, we have chosen to use the phrase ‘colonising‐state’ to talk in general ways about the nations that were created from settler colonies initiated in the 18th and 19th centuries because we, and the reviewed research, are drawing attention to the identified commonalities in the mass media representations of indigenous peoples. Although the phrase forgrounds those commonalities, we don’t intend to imply there are not significant differences between the histories of these states or their relationships with indigenous peoples. Nor are we suggesting that there are no persons, organisations or state agencies that are, or could be, enabling of indigenous identities or supportive of indigenous peoples’ goals. Given the sustained effort colonists and settlers invest in constructing and sustaining their own naturalised normality, it is imperative that researchers who seek to expose the constructed nature of those representations and the consequences of uncritically accepting the world is like that, do not, unintentionally or otherwise, appear to concur with maintenance of that naturalised normality. That imperative raises issues about how media or a medium are named as one label may afford readers specific interpretative possibilities that another might close off. John Budarick and Debra King (2008) utilised a comparison 11 | Page between mass and indigenous accounts to throw the former’s representations into high relief (see also Nairn et al., 2012) characterised the mass medium as “[a] major daily newspaper” that they contrasted against “[a newspaper serving an] informed Indigenous audience” (p.359) that challenged the dominant ideology by throwing it into sharp relief. In our work we initially used ‘mainstream’ for the dominant media though we now recognise that, as ‘mainstream’ is usually glossed as: ideas, attitudes, or activities that are shared by most people and regarded as normal or conventional, the term appears to affirm or legitimate both the media and practices we wish to render problematic. Consequently, our preferred labels for the media we study are: settler‐media, dominant, English‐language, or mass. The last was chosen for the Introduction because it is in common use, emphasises the broad reach of the media, and hints at suffocating effects created by its wide reach. Similarly, as we seek to problematize the dominant society we have concerns about how it is named and, again, have employed a range of labels: colonial, settler, racist, Pākehā (the dominant, white settler group in New Zealand), dominant, and media‐saturated. Further, we recognise that, in many contexts, the term ‘settler’ does not do justice to the colonising imperative. In light of evidence that other settler‐societies harness mass media to their colonial projects one objective of this review is comparison of the ways in which mass media go about that task in other societies. We anticipated the comparison would reveal commonalities in both the representations of indigenous peoples and their deployment. Funding to collect and review the relevant international research was obtained in late 2014 and, in early February 2015 the search for relevant research publications began (Appendix 1 lists keywords employed and theoretical dimensions we sought to include). The monograph is organised in four Parts: 1 – the research sample; 2 – analysing mass media representations; 3 ‐ representations of Indigenous persons and peoples; 4 – discussion.

**Indigenous objectivity invokes the repressive force that strips the state of its power to fascilitate decolonial actions. Sturm 17**

Sturm, Circe. Associate Professor Dept of Anthropology at UT Austin — Ph.D., University of California, Davis, "Reflections on the Anthropology of Sovereignty and Settler Colonialism: Lessons from Native North America." Cultural Anthropology 32, no. 3 (2017): 340–348. https://doi.org/10.14506/ca32.3.03

Jessica Cattelino’s (2008)book High Stakes: Florida Seminole Gaming and Sovereignty provides an excellent case for understanding how these competing assertions of sovereignty play out on the ground. She offers two important interventions. The first moves us beyond classical debates about sovereignty that view it as either autonomous and inherent (a by-product of peoplehood or kingly authority, for instance) or derivative and dependent (as something that stems from external political recognition by other sovereigns).4 Instead, she explores interdependent forms of sovereignty that are negotiated, partial, insecure, and demand diplomacy on all sides.5 In her second major contribution, Cattelino explores how the circulation of capital is a sovereign force in and of itself, one that provides a key to how sovereignty functions in these more interdependent forms. She provides a neo-Simmelian analysis of the ways in which Florida Seminoles exploit the fungibility of casino money, meaning its ability to be exchanged with other forms of symbolic and material capital, in ways that help shore up their own political authority and well-being as a community.6 **The upshot of this body of work in Native North America is that the state power generated by colonialism, in any of its forms, remains highly insecure and not a privileged site of sovereign authority. In fact, state sovereignty as a repressive force generates various forms of resistance to that sovereignty, including a whole slew of countersovereignties that exceed its more legal, formal, authorized, recognized, and official versions** (see Cramer 2005; Klopotek 2011; Povinelli 2002; Miller 2003). Anthropologists working around the world have expended a great deal of energy analyzing different cases in which state sovereignty is challenged, though often these examples focus on extralegal, criminal, and violent forms of resistance (Hansen and Stepputat 2006, 304–6). Indigenous studies adds to this discussion an attention to the everyday forms of sovereignty generated in response to settler state authority. Elizabeth Povinelli’s (2006) work on self-sovereignty offers an important example, one in which she explores how intimacy is linked to modern notions of freedom and social order, becoming yet another space for everyday expressions of lived sovereignty—a point also taken up in the work of Mark Rifkin (2011, 2012) and Scott Morgensen (2011b). Yet the most pathbreaking research to come along in recent years that explores extra-state forms of sovereignty is that of Audra Simpson (2014) in her book Mohawk Interruptus: Life across the Borders of Settler States. Simpson takes on the concept of resistance and offers instead the idea of refusal. **Theories of resistance tend to focus attention on how aspects of domination get reproduced by those doing the resisting, meaning that in countering oppression, the terms of debate and terrain of conflict are already predetermined**—thus the idea that counterhegemony retains a kernel of hegemony, heterodoxy that of orthodoxy, violence begets more violence, and so on. Simpson’s theory of **refusal offers something else entirely**: **refusal is neither derivative nor reproductive, but rather an outright rejection of the externally imposed logics of settler-state sovereignty**. In other words, the logic of elimination is met with the logic of indigenous continuity, and border crossings that demand settler-state passports are met with tribally generated documents that insist on Mohawk nationhood. **Refusal is affective, material, historical, ideal, and even pleasurable—an act possibly more ontological than anything else of indigenous people insisting on their own unique way of being.** Simpson’s work has much to offer anthropologists working in other contexts, particularly those who want to rethink theories of power. As I have been arguing throughout this essay, such insights stem in part from a critical engagement with twined critiques of sovereignty and settler colonialism. These two analytical frameworks offer anthropology important correctives for thinking about indigenous people and their experiences. A case in point is the recent controversy surrounding the Massachusetts senator Elizabeth Warren’s claims to Cherokee and Lenape ancestry, and how it reveals a particularly strong tendency in the United States and Canada to minoritize indigeneity and take what should be debates about sovereignty, citizenship, political authority, and territorial jurisdiction, among other issues, and turn instead to questions of racial and cultural authenticity, or even genetic descent (Franke-Ruta 2012; Krieg 2016).7 The controversy involves, on the one hand, Senator Warren, born and raised in Oklahoma, who has claimed an indigenous identity for several decades, based almost exclusively on family stories of descent from a Cherokee great-grandmother. On the other hand are members of the Republican Party, who have accused Warren of both fanciful invention and racial opportunism, and then took the opportunity to ridicule her during public debates with Hollywood war whoops, tomahawk chops, and derogatory taunts. Lost in the controversy is any attention to American Indian identity as a political status, one that rests on tribal sovereignty and the fundamental premise that tribes have the sovereign right to determine their own citizenry. Lost, too, is attention to the way in which racism and white supremacy undergird settler colonialism and are both being manifested not only in the racist behavior of Warren’s Republican opponents but also in her narratives of indigenous decent, for these, too, are often linked to a settler desire to incorporate and domesticate indigeneity (Sturm 2011).

**The 1AC is the initial spark that sets the state on fire. Brick by brick we must remove rights from the state in order to remove any form of its authoritative capacity and give the land back to indigenous peoples. Belfi 21**

Belfi, E. & Sandiford, N. (2021). Decolonization Series Part 1: Exploring Decolonization. In S. Brandauer and E. Hartman (Eds.). Interdependence: Global Solidarity and Local Actions. The Community-based Global Learning Collaborative. Retrieved from: <http://globalsolidaritylocalaction.sites.haverford.edu/what-is-decolonization-why-is-it-important/> //faizaan

We cannot only dedicate ourselves to thinking about decolonizing, we must act to decolonize. Additionally, efforts to indigenize (appropriating Indigenous approaches to life or even falsely claiming Indigenous identity) do not contribute to decolonization, but further colonize Indigenous knowledge and identity. Decolonization calls for decentering the narrative by which settlers romanticize Indigenous beliefs and surface culture (indigenization). It calls instead for deconstructing settler-imposed systems that continue to oppress Black, Brown, and Indigenous people. Moves of settler innocence domesticate decolonization’s demands of undoing colonialism, eliminating its gendered and racialized hierarchies, and establishing Indigenous sovereignty. The danger of the decolonization metaphor (such as ‘decolonize your mind’) is that it prevents us from actually decolonizing. “It recenters whiteness, it resettles theory, it extends innocence to the settler, it entertains a settler future” rather than recentering Indigenous futures and sovereignty (Tuck and Yang 2012, 3, 35). A settler future is one where settlers can continue to benefit from colonialism and perhaps be minimally aware of their settler privileges. A settler future does not encourage acting against colonization, through, for example, giving back Indigenous ancestral lands. Focusing instead on securing an Indigenous future necessitates substantive decolonial actions — actions we must explore and learn to implement. Framing who decolonization work is about and for is an integral step in moving forward with effective decolonial action.

#### There is no neutrality in the fight against the state. Thus, the role of the ballot is to vote for who best centers themselves in Native scholarship and demands.

Carlson 16

[Elizabeth Carlson, PhD, is an Aamitigoozhi, Wemistigosi, and Wasicu (settler Canadian and American), whose Swedish, Saami, German, Scots-Irish, and English ancestors have settled on lands of the Anishinaabe and Omaha Nations which were unethically obtained by the US government. Elizabeth lives on Treaty 1 territory, the traditional lands of the Anishinaabe, Nehiyawak, Dakota, Nakota, and Red River Metis peoples currently occupied by the city of Winnipeg, the province of Manitoba, (2016): Anti-colonial methodologies and practices for settler colonial studies, Settler Colonial Studies, DOI: 10.1080/2201473X.2016.1241213, //recut FD WHS

Arlo Kempf says that ‘where anticolonialism is a tool used to invoke resistance for the colonized, it is a tool used to invoke accountability for the colonizer’.42 Relational accountability should be a cornerstone of settler colonial studies. I believe settler colonial studies and scholars should ethically and overtly place themselves in relationship to the centuries of Indigenous oral, and later academic scholarship that conceptualizes and resists settler colonialism without necessarily using the term: SCT may be revelatory to many settler scholars, but Indigenous people have been speaking for a long time about colonial continuities based on their lived experiences. Some SCTs have sought to connect with these discussions and to foreground Indigenous resistance, survival and agency. Others, however, seem to use SCT as a pathway to explain the colonial encounter without engaging with Indigenous people and experiences – either on the grounds that this structural analysis already conceptually explains Indigenous experience, or because Indigenous resistance is rendered invisible.43 Ethical settler colonial theory (SCT) would recognize the foundational role Indigenous scholarship has in critiques of settler colonialism. It would acknowledge the limitations of settler scholars in articulating settler colonialism without dialogue with Indigenous peoples, and take as its norm making this dialogue evident. In my view, it is critical that we not view settler colonial studies as a new or unique field being established, which would enact a discovery narrative and contribute to Indigenous erasure, but rather take a longer and broader view. Indigenous oral and academic scholars are indeed the originators of this work. This space is not empty. Of course, powerful forces of socialization and discipline impact scholars in the academy. There is much pressure to claim unique space, to establish a name for ourselves, and to make academic discoveries. I am suggesting that settler colonial studies and anti-colonial scholars resist these hegemonic pressures and maintain a higher anti-colonial ethic. As has been argued, ‘the theory itself places ethical demands on us as settlers, including the demand that we actively refuse its potential to re-empower our own academic voices and to marginalize Indigenous resistance’.44 As settler scholars, we can reposition our work relationally and contextually with humi- lity and accountability. We can centre Indigenous resistance, knowledges, and scholarship in our work, and contextualize our work in Indigenous sovereignty. We can view oral Indigenous scholarship as legitimate scholarly sources. We can acknowledge explicitly and often the Indigenous traditions of resistance and scholarship that have taught us and pro- vided the foundations for our work. If our work has no foundation of Indigenous scholarship and mentorship, I believe our contributions to settler colonial studies are even more deeply problematic.

**ROB outweighs T/theory**

**A) Jurisdiction- the ROB speaks specifically to this round and how the ballot should be signed, while theory is about norm-setting which is out of the judge’s jurisdiction bc that is out of round**

**B) Offense- the ROB constrains what is and isn’t offensive so theory must be contextualized to the framing or else it’s not offensive so you can’t vote on it**

**C) Debating for fairness is arbitrary – people still will read the same arguments and do the same practices regardless so it doesn’t do anything, but there is still a strength of link of you learning something at the end of the round**

**D) Theory speaks to a fair and educational space but my ROB evidence says that those spaces can’t exist prior to the aff because they’re grounded in accumulation**

**E) K education outweighs – LD is uniquely key for kritikal education**

#### There is no room for settler futurity – any assumption that change can be enacted via reform within the state just concedes to the state’s unethical legislative capacity in the first place and denies indigenous sovereignty. **Tuck and Gaztambide-Fernandez 13**

[EVE TUCK and RUBÉN A. GAZTAMBIDE-FERNÁNDEZ. "Curriculum, Replacement, and Settler Futurity" Rochester29.1 (2013): 72-89.] // faizaan

Settler Futurity. The settler colonial curricular project of replacement is invested in settler futurity, or what Andrew Baldwin calls the “permanent virtuality” of the settler on stolen land (2012, p. 173). When we locate the present of settler colonialism as only the production of the past, we overlook how settler colonialism is configured in relation to a different temporal horizon: the future. To say that something is invested in something else’s futurity is not the same as saying it is invested in something’s future, though the replacement project is invested in both settler future and futurity. Futurity refers to the ways in which, “the future is rendered knowable through specific practices (i.e. calculation, imagination, and performance) and, in turn, intervenes upon the present through three anticipatory logics (i.e. pre-caution, pre-emption and preparedness)” (p. 173). Considering the significance of futurity for researching whiteness and geography, Baldwin (2012) wonders whether a past-oriented approach reproduces the (false), Teleological assumption that white racism can be modernized away. Such an assumption privileges an ontology of linear causality in which the past is thought to act on the present and the present is said to be an effect of whatever came before [...] According to this kind of temporality, the future is the terrain upon or through which white racism will get resolved. It cleaves the future from the present and, thus, gives the future discrete ontological form. (p. 174) Thus, in this historical analysis of the settler colonial curricular project of replacement, we seek to emphasize the ways in which replacement is entirely concerned with settler futurity, which always indivisibly means the continued and complete eradication of the original inhabitants of contested land. Anything that seeks to recuperate and not interrupt settler colonialism, to reform the settlement and incorporate Indigenous peoples into the multicultural settler colonial nation state is fettered to settler futurity. To be clear, our commitments are to what might be called an Indigenous futurity, which does not foreclose the inhabitation of Indigenous land by nonIndigenous peoples, but does foreclose settler colonialism and settler epistemologies. That is to say that Indigenous futurity does not require the erasure of now-settlers in the ways that settler futurity requires of Indigenous peoples.

#### Settler colonialism is the root cause of violence. It uniquely perpetuates a heteropatriarchal society through fostering conceptions of the native as less than human.

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In this section, I describe U.S. **settler colonialism** as a race-gender project. By that I mean that it **transplanted certain racialized and gendered conceptions and regimes from the metropole but also transformed them in the context of and experiences in the New World**. What emerged out of the settler colonial project was a racialized and gendered national identity that normalized male whiteness. Since settlers initially were exogenous others seeking to claim rights to land and sovereignty over those who already occupied the land, they needed to develop conceptions of indigenous peoples as lesser beings, unworthy of consideration. They harnessed race and gender to construct a hierarchy of humankind. Conceiving of indigenous peoples as less than fully human justified dispossessing them and rendered them expendable and/or invisible. Land occupied or used seasonally by indigenes was conceived of as terra nullius (empty land or land belonging to no one) and therefore available for taking by white settlers. Simultaneously, settlers conceived of themselves as more advanced and evolved, bringers of progress and enlightenment to the wilderness. Masculine whiteness thus became central to settler identity, a status closely tied to ownership of property and political sovereignty. The latter in turn articulated with heteropatriarchy, which rendered white manhood supreme with respect to control over property and self-rule. This entailed settler wives being denied an independent legal identity; instead, her identity was merged into that of her husband, and her property and labor were under his control. Further, it was presumed that “heteropatriarchal nuclear-domestic arrangements, in which the [white] father is both protector and leader should serve as the model for social arrangements of the state and its institutions” (Arvin, Tuck, and Morrill 2013:13).

#### Utilitarian framing should be rejected, it normalizes white pleasure and abstracts from indigenous violence. Extinction is a settler narrative that obscures the foundations of settler violence and precludes politics of decolonization.

Dalley 16 Hamish Dalley (2016): The deaths of settler colonialism: extinction as a metaphor of decolonization in contemporary settler literature, Settler Colonial Studies, DOI: 10.1080/2201473X.2016.1238160 SJBE

Settlers love to contemplate the possibility of their own extinction; to read many contemporary literary representations of settler colonialism is to find settlers strangely satisfied in dreaming of ends that never come. This tendency is widely prevalent in English-language representations of settler colonialism produced since the 1980s: the possibility of an ending – the likelihood that the settler race will one day die out – is a common theme in literary and pop culture considerations of colonialism’s future. Yet it has barely been remarked how surprising it is that this theme is so present. For settlers, of all people, to obsessively ruminate on their own finitude is counterintuitive, for few modern social formations have been more resistant to change than settler colonialism. With a few exceptions (French Algeria being the largest), the settler societies established in the last 300 years in the Americas, Australasia, and Southern Africa have all retained the basic features that define them as settler states – namely, the structural privileging of settlers at the expense of indigenous peoples, and the normalization of whiteness as the marker of political agency and rights – and they have done so notwithstanding the sustained resistance that has been mounted whenever such an order has been built. Settlers think all the time that they might one day end, even though (perhaps because) that ending seems unlikely ever to happen. The significance of this paradox for settler-colonial literature is the subject of this article. Considering the problem of futurity offers a useful foil to traditional analyses of settlercolonial narrative, which typically examine settlers’ attitudes towards history in order to highlight a constitutive anxiety about the past – about origins. Settler colonialism, the argument goes, has a problem with historical narration that arises from a contradiction in its founding mythology. In Stephen Turner’s formulation, the settler subject is by definition one who comes from elsewhere but who strives to make this place home. The settlement narrative must explain how this gap – which is at once geographical, historical, and existential – has been bridged, and the settler transformed from outsider into indigene. Yet the transformation must remain constitutively incomplete, because the desire to be at home necessarily invokes the spectre of the native, whose existence (which cannot be disavowed completely because it is needed to define the settler’s difference, superiority, and hence claim to the land) inscribes the settler’s foreignness, thus reinstating the gap between settler and colony that the narrative was meant to efface.1 Settler-colonial narrative is thus shaped around its need to erase and evoke the native, to make the indigene both invisible and present in a contradictory pattern that prevents settlers from ever moving on from the moment of colonization.2 As evidence of this constitutive contradiction, critics have identified in settler-colonial discourse symptoms of psychic distress such as disavowal, inversion, and repression.3 Indeed, the frozen temporality of settler-colonial narrative, fixated on the moment of the frontier, recalls nothing so much as Freud’s description of the ‘repetition compulsion’ attending trauma.4 As Lorenzo Veracini puts it, because: ‘settler society’ can thus be seen as a fantasy where a perception of a constant struggle is juxtaposed against an ideal of ‘peace’ that can never be reached, settler projects embrace and reject violence at the same time. The settler colonial situation is thus a circumstance where the tension between contradictory impulses produces long-lasting psychic conflicts and a number of associated psychopathologies.5 Current scholarship has thus focused primarily on settler-colonial narrative’s view of the past, asking how such a contradictory and troubled relationship to history might affect present-day ideological formations. Critics have rarely considered what such narratological tensions might produce when the settler gaze is turned to the future. Few social formations are more stubbornly resistant to change than settlement, suggesting that a future beyond settler colonialism might be simply unthinkable. Veracini, indeed, suggests that settler-colonial narrative can never contemplate an ending: that settler decolonization is inconceivable because settlers lack the metaphorical tools to imagine their own demise.6 This article outlines why I partly disagree with that view. I argue that the narratological paradox that defines settler-colonial narrative does make the future a problematic object of contemplation. But that does not make settler decolonization unthinkable per se; as I will show, settlers do often try to imagine their demise – but they do so in a way that reasserts the paradoxes of their founding ideology, with the result that the radical potentiality of decolonization is undone even as it is invoked. I argue that, notwithstanding Veracini’s analysis, there is a metaphor via which the end of settler colonialism unspools – the quasi-biological concept of extinction, which, when deployed as a narrative trope, offers settlers a chance to consider and disavow their demise, just as they consider and then disavow the violence of their origins. This article traces the importance of the trope of extinction for contemporary settler-colonial literature, with a focus on South Africa, Canada, and Australia. It explores variations in how the death of settler colonialism is conceptualized, drawing a distinction between historio-civilizational narratives of the rise and fall of empires, and a species-oriented notion of extinction that draws force from public anxiety about climate change – an invocation that adds another level of ambivalence by drawing on ‘rational’ fears for the future (because climate change may well render the planet uninhabitable to humans) in order to narrativize a form of social death that, strictly speaking, belongs to a different order of knowledge altogether. As such, my analysis is intended to draw the attention of settlercolonial studies toward futurity and the ambivalence of settler paranoia, while highlighting a potential point of cross-fertilization between settler-colonial and eco-critical approaches to contemporary literature. That ‘extinction’ should be a key word in the settler-colonial lexicon is no surprise. In Patrick Wolfe’s phrase,7 settler colonialism is predicated on a ‘logic of elimination’ that tends towards the extermination – by one means or another – of indigenous peoples.8 This logic is apparent in archetypal settler narratives like James Fenimore Cooper’s The Last of the Mohicans (1826), a historical novel whose very title blends the melancholia and triumph that demarcate settlers’ affective responses to the supposed inevitability of indigenous extinction. Concepts like ‘stadial development’ – by which societies progress through stages, progressively eliminating earlier social forms – and ‘fatal impact’ – which names the biological inevitability of strong peoples supplanting weak – all contribute to the notion that settler colonialism is a kind of ‘ecological process’ 9 that necessitates the extinction of inferior races. What is surprising, though, is how often the trope of extinction also appears with reference to settlers themselves; it makes sense for settlers to narrate how their presence entails others’ destruction, but it is less clear why their attempts to imagine futures should presume extinction to be their own logical end as well. The idea appears repeatedly in English-language literary treatments of settler colonialism. Consider, for instance, the following rumination on the future of South African settler society, from Olive Schreiner’s 1883 Story of an African Farm: It was one of them, one of those wild old Bushmen, that painted those pictures there. He did not know why he painted but he wanted to make something, so he made these. […] Now the Boers have shot them all, so that we never see a yellow face peeping out among the stones. […] And the wild bucks have gone, and those days, and we are here. But we will be gone soon, and only the stones will lie on, looking at everything like they look now.10 In this example, the narrating settler character, Waldo, recognizes prior indigenous inhabitation but his knowledge comes freighted with an expected sense of biological superiority, made apparent by his description of the ‘Bushman’s’ ‘yellow face’, and lack of mental self-awareness. What is not clear is why Waldo’s contemplation of colonial genocide should turn immediately to the assumption that a similar fate awaits his people as well. A similar presumption of racial vulnerability permeates other late nineteenthcentury novels from the imperial metropole, such as Dracula and War of the Worlds, which are plotted around the prospect of invasions that would see the extinction of British imperialism, and, in the process, the human species. Such anxieties draw energy from a pattern of settler defensiveness that can be observed across numerous settler-colonial contexts. Marilyn Lake’s and Henry Reynold’s account of the emergence of transnational ‘whiteness’ highlights the paradoxical fact that while white male settlers have been arguably the most privileged class in history, they have routinely perceived themselves to be ‘under siege’, threatened with destruction to the extent that their very identity of ‘whiteness was born in the apprehension of imminent loss’. 11 The fear of looming annihilation serves a powerful ideological function in settler communities, working to foster racial solidarity, suppress dissent, and legitimate violence against indigenous populations who, by any objective measure, are far more at risk of extermination than the settlers who fear them. Ann Curthoys and Dirk Moses have traced this pattern in Australia and Israel-Palestine, respectively.12 This scholarship suggests that narratives of settler extinction are acts of ideological mystification, obscuring the brutal inequalities of the frontier behind a mask of white vulnerability – an argument with which I sympathize. However, this article shows how there is more to settler-colonial extinction narratives than bad faith.