## T – whole res

Interpretation: The aff must defend the whole res and not a subset of the resolution.

V: they only defend mega constellations

Prefer:

#### Standards

#### 1] Limits—there are thousands of new affs

#### a] negs only have the innovation DA as a generic—no links to every aff that means crazy aff prep skew b] only big schools can compete since small teams cannot prep for every single small unpredictable aff

#### 2] Precision—anything other interp lets affs do away with random words in the res a] that means no solid neg ground b] The judge doesn’t have the jurisdiction to vote on affs that don’t affirm

#### Vote neg because fairness is constitutive of the game of debate, drop the debater bc their arg is their advocacy, competing interps because reasonability is arbitrary, no rvis – they’re illogical and chill theory by creating a disincentive.

### CP – communication

(0:24)

#### Counterplan: Space fairing superpowers should communicate with each other to promote transparency, about space debris and satellite locations.

**Lauder**, John, 26-9-20**20** "How to Avoid a Space Arms Race," No Publication, https://www.rand.org/blog/2020/10/how-to-avoid-a-space-arms-race.html

There has been some success. The 1967 multilateral [Outer Space Treaty](https://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/spacelaw/treaties/introouterspacetreaty.html) prohibited the stationing of weapons of mass destruction in orbit. The 2010 U.S.-Russian [New START](https://www.state.gov/new-start/) nuclear arms control agreement prohibited either country from interfering with the other side's [“National Technical Means”](https://fas.org/blogs/secrecy/2019/11/ntm-obe/) for monitoring compliance, which is understood to include satellite reconnaissance systems as well as other intelligence collection methods But negotiating legally binding limits on weapons or activities that threaten use of space by all nations has so far proven elusive, for several reasons. In the first place, defining what constitutes a space weapon can be daunting. Terrestrial-based missile defense interceptors can and have been adapted to also destroy satellites. Lasers, electronic jamming, directed energy weapons, and offensive cyber tools designed for a wide range of other national security missions can also threaten satellites. It is highly unlikely that the United States or others would agree to ban capabilities that they believe are essential to protect their military operations on land, at sea, in the air, or in space. In the future, the problem of defining an anti-satellite weapon (ASAT) is likely to get even more complicated. Several space-faring countries are planning to develop a capability to service and refuel satellites on orbit to extend their service lives. However, any system that can maneuver close enough to another satellite for this purpose can pose an ASAT threat. In July [Russia](https://www.theverge.com/2020/7/23/21335506/russia-anti-satellite-weapon-test-kosmos-2543) used a close approach to conduct a non-destructive test against one of its satellites. Even if an agreement could be reached on the definition of an ASAT system, verifying compliance with arms control limits would prove challenging. Some 70 countries and multinational organizations own or operate satellites. The U.S. Space Force tracks over 26,000 thousand objects in space, including satellites and debris. This number is likely to grow rapidly. SpaceX, for example, plans to launch thousands of small [Starlink](https://www.starlink.com/" \t "_blank) satellites to provide global internet service. Sorting out potential threats in a more crowded space environment may become increasingly difficult. Parties to any arms control accord must have confidence that others are not cheating. Onsite inspection, a common feature in arms control pacts, is largely infeasible in space. It is unclear whether proven arms control monitoring tools, such as information exchanges, are feasible or useful for a space agreement. The history of U.S.-Soviet arms control during the Cold War might suggest a way forward. Before the two superpowers concluded major agreements, they negotiated a series of measures to enhance transparency and build mutual confidence, such as notifying each other of impending ballistic missile launches. They also adopted measures to avoid incidents at sea. Efforts to promote transparency and confidence in the space domain are underway. Under both Republican and Democratic administrations, the United States has collaborated with other nations and the commercial space sector on developing several non-legally-binding [“norms of behavior”](https://spacenews.com/study-raises-new-concerns-about-lack-of-governing-norms-in-space/) for operations in space, including best practices to avoid collisions and mitigate space debris.

### CP – PAROS

(0:20)

#### Counterplan: States ought to abide by the Prevention of an Arms Race Treaty in Space (PAROS)

NTI 21, “Proposed Prevention of an Arms Race in Space (PAROS) Treaty.” PROPOSED PREVENTION OF AN ARMS RACE IN SPACE (PAROS) TREATY, 5 Apr. 2021, www.nti.org/learn/treaties-and-regimes/proposed-prevention-arms-race-space-paros-treaty/. In 1985 the CD established an ad hoc committee to identify and examine issues relevant to PAROS such as the legal protection of satellites, nuclear power systems in space, and various confidence-building measures. The United States resolutely opposed giving the committee a negotiating mandate, preferring bilateral talks with the Soviet Union. The committee convened each year through 1994. No further committee meeting occurred due to objections made by the United States. In 1990 the United States stated that it “has not identified any practical outer space arms control measures that can be dealt within a multilateral environment.” With its large missile defense program and technical advantages in potential space weaponry, the United States has consistently refused to negotiate PAROS in the CD. Under the draft treaty submitted to the CD by Russia in 2008, State Parties would commit to refrain from placing objects carrying any type of weapon into orbit, installing weapons on celestial bodies, and threatening to use force against objects in outer space. State Parties would also agree to practice agreed confidence-building measures. A PAROS treaty would complement and reaffirm the importance of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, which aims to preserve space for peaceful uses by prohibiting the use of space weapons, the development of space-weapon technology, and technology related to “missile defense.” The treaty would prevent any nation from gaining a military advantage in outer space.

### CP – Debris Pickup

(0:54)

#### Counterplan text: The United Nations office for outer space affairs ought to adopt a system of market share liability in regard to the creation of debris in outer space by private entities in accordance with Munoz-Patchen 18

#### The Counterplan incentivizes proportional debris clean up while deterring future debris creation

**Munoz-Patchen 18** [Chelsea Munoz-Patchen, Chelsea Muñoz-Patchen is an associate in the Houston office of Latham & Watkins. While attending University of Chicago Law School, Ms. Muñoz-Patchen was an articles editor for The Chicago Journal of International Law. Her research on regulating space debris was published in 2018. Ms. Muñoz-Patchen served as a research assistant for Professors Daniel Abebe and Jonathan Masur, focusing on intellectual property and constitutional law in the US and Ethiopia. Prior to law school, Ms. Muñoz-Patchen earned her BA and BS in Geography from Arizona State University. As a graduate student, she studied political ecology and people’s relationship to urban nature, and taught Introduction to Physical Geography labs. 7-1-2018, Semanticscholar, "Regulating the Space Commons: Treating Space Debris as Abandoned Property in Violation of the Outer Space Treaty | Semantic Scholar", <https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/Regulating-the-Space-Commons%3A-Treating-Space-Debris-Munoz-Patchen/607eff0141f48332a69ae8c5a3301d871057a4fa> accessed 12/21/21] Adam

Market-share liability has been suggested as a way to deal with the difficulty of identifying the individual ownership of objects and it could be put to use in the obligation to clean up debris.154 Market-share liability would allow for the apportionment of responsibility based on the respective contribution to the risk, and would not require the identification of individual pieces of space debris.155 Market-share liability has already been successfully applied where multiple parties contribute to a dangerous situation, but where it is virtually impossible to tie a particular party to the harm caused.156 Market-share liability was created in 1980 in the case Sindell v. Abbott Labororatories. 157 In Sindell, the Supreme Court of California devised the concept in response to a case in which pharmaceuticals that were marketed to pregnant women caused cancer in their children at least a decade later.158 Since the latent period was so long, the women naturally could not remember the specific pill manufacturer out of two hundred such manufacturers.159 The court found that each defendant’s market share could be determined fairly accurately, and therefore used market share as a basis for the apportionment of liability.160 While market-share liability has not been broadly adopted, this is likely because cases with fungible products and a serious causation problem are rare.161 Academics have taken this idea and sought to apply it to space debris, which has similar fungibility and causation issues, but their applications have been limited to a tort-like context.162 One author suggested that whenever a collision occurs due to an unidentifiable piece of debris and a functional space object, liability and compensation should be apportioned “among spacefaring nations equal to the percentages of the total debris population for which the particular nation is responsible.” 163 This mechanism frees the victim from having to prove causation by a specific nation, when that would be virtually impossible.164 There will be difficulties calculating the percentage with precision in such a system, but there is fairly accurate information from the U.N. including registry, sampling, mathematical models, and other records of known collisions and the resultant debris.165 Without strong buy-in, it may be challenging to get this rarely used domestic tort theory to apply in international space law, especially with the potential for disputes over the proper apportionment of market share.166 The states primarily responsible for existing debris are the U.S., Russia, and China – powerful countries unlikely to be pleased with this newfound expense. That said, though these nations would be paying the highest cost, this would be proportional to their respective contributions to the problem. Indeed, these nations may welcome this remedy, because their space activity is threatened by the proliferation of space debris and they likely value continuing their extensive and advanced use of space. This solution solves the free rider problem and would compensate any nation or company that cleans up space such that any nation (like the U.S., Russia, or China) fearing the collapse of its space program and unwilling to bear all the cleanup costs itself would see this as an attractive solution. It is even possible that liable states like the U.S. and Russia will be eager to aid in debris identification, so as to add to other states’ liability.167 This regulatory remedy would resolve the current tragedy of the commons. By assigning responsibility for the cost of cleanup, nations or companies would be incentivized to begin cleanup operations, because they would know that others will not freeride on their costly efforts. Instead, they will have guaranteed compensation from those responsible. Obtaining the funds is crucial, particularly since the high cost of deploying existing technology to destroy space debris has been a hindrance thus far.168 Using market-share liability is also a useful way to compensate victims of debris collisions and to incentivize spacefaring nations to avoid creating new debris in the future.169 However, this does not do enough to remedy the persistent existence of space debris, which is threatening the very continuation of space activity. The Outer Space Treaty creates an obligation on states to carry out space activities “for the ‘benefit and interests of all countries,’ and that outer space shall never be subject to national appropriation.” 170 To uphold their obligations under this treaty, nations should not be creating debris, because it interferes with the ability of others to conduct their space activities, or perhaps keeps them from space altogether. Due to this legal violation, and the negative externality created by property abandonment, states should be required to pay for the disposal of debris in proportion to the amount they create. While the creation of debris may be unavoidable, there are existing practices that can greatly minimize the proliferation of debris, and any debris that is nonetheless created can be dealt with through market-share liability payments. This collection of market-share disposal payments would not simply be a tax on operations or tort compensation for harmful acts. Instead, once liability is apportioned, (and this could be done on an ongoing or periodic basis to reflect new developments), nations or companies undertaking actions to clean up space would be compensated for their costs by the nations responsible according to their percentage of responsibility. The U.N. Office for Outer Space Affairs (UNOOSA) could allocate the percentage of liability, drawing on its role in promoting international cooperation and the peaceful use of outer space, as well as preparing reports and studies.171 If any disputes were to arise from nonpayment, familiar procedures could be employed—perhaps by drawing from other notable space treaties that provide “established procedures for the peaceful settlement of disputes, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.” 172 In many of the space treaties and conventions, including the Liability Convention, disputes and claims can be brought to the SecretaryGeneral of the U.N.173 These bodies could be utilized here to assure fairness in allocating liability and handling routine compensation disputes. This new regulatory regime can thus be grounded in the existing space treaty regime and administered by existing authorities. It would resolve the incentive problems that exist in the international commons of space through regulation that allocates the cost of debris cleanup to those who have created and continue to create it. The regime can also adapt as the outer space marketplace and the actors who comprise it shift over time, and as the registry of space objects, incidents, and tracking capabilities improves. This regulatory regime also ultimately would allocate cleanup funds to parties who would like to continue to operate in space, removing the disincentive to carry the cost in the face of potential freeriding.

### CP – Miscalc Hotline

(0:20)

#### Counterplan text: States should establish a hotline to reduce miscalculation in space operations

Erwin 21

Sandra Erwin, [Senior staff writer; Writes about military space programs, policy, technology and the industry that supports this sector; She has covered the military, the Pentagon, Congress and the defense industry for nearly two decades as editor of NDIA’s National Defense Magazine and Pentagon correspondent for Real Clear Defense], 3 November 2021, “One way to help prevent wars in space? Military hotlines with Russia and China”, [https://spacenews.com/one-way-to-help-prevent-wars-in-space-military-hotlines-with-russia-and-china //](https://spacenews.com/one-way-to-help-prevent-wars-in-space-military-hotlines-with-russia-and-china%20//) AK

WASHINGTON — Hotlines between heads of states have long been established to reduce the risk that an accident or miscalculation might trigger a nuclear war. During recent U.S. military operations in the airspace above Syria, a hotline was set up with Russia to ensure safety of flight. With space now considered a domain of war, hotlines between U.S. and foreign rivals might be worth contemplating, said Lt. Gen. B. Chance Saltzman, U.S. Space Force deputy chief of space operations for operations, cyber and nuclear. Before joining the Space Force, Saltzman led air campaigns at U.S. Air Forces Central Command in the Middle East. “We had a hotline to the Russians because we were very concerned that a miscommunication with aircraft flying in close proximity in Syria would lead to a problem,” he said Nov. 3 during a conference call with U.S. and European reporters. “I don’t see any reason why a similar approach couldn’t work for the space domain,” Saltzman said. Saltzman is in Europe this week visiting allies. He said many of the conversations were about the “strategic competition” that is unfolding in the space domain between the U.S., China and Russia and the “lessons learned from history about miscommunication,” he said. During the air campaign over Syria, “the hotline that we used was to make as many of our operations as transparent as possible and attempt to avoid those miscommunications.” The risk of a mischaracterizing what any country is doing in space is even greater than in the air because objects in orbit are “hard to see,” he said. A civilian satellite conducting surveillance, for example, could be mistaken for a hostile counterspace weapon. “In space we literally can’t use our visual reference points. We have to rely on radar. We have to rely on telescopes, and that creates a level of uncertainty.” If there was a hotline, “at least we would have a discussion before we draw the wrong conclusions. And we currently don’t have that capability. But I think the idea merits a full scale discussion.” Saltzman on Nov. 3 gave a keynote speech at the Global Milsatcom 2021 conference in London. He said one of the themes was the desire for greater cooperation on space security. “Establishing responsible norms and behaviors is really a global concern. No one nation can establish those independently, and there’s so much shared capacity that we could leverage.” He said the United States remains “the most capable spacefaring nation in terms of the capabilities that we have on orbit.” But China poses a major challenge. “They can see that if they can take some of those capabilities from us, they can shift the tables in terms of of that strategic advantage,” Saltzman added. “And the most significant challenge isn’t any one system. It’s really the pace at which they’re developing all their systems. It’s such a broad array of counterspace capabilities that they’re pursuing and high end technologies, that what’s most concerning is just the speed at which they are going from ‘good idea’ to full scale capability that’s being demonstrated on orbit.” For the United States, “our challenge is going to be matching that pace, making sure that we’re paying attention, keeping good situational awareness of their developments.”

### Adv CP – Nukes

(0:25)

#### CP Text: States ought to eliminate nuclear arsenals.

#### It results in a zero-treaty—solves prolif, rearm, and process concerns.

Koplow 14

[David, Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center “What Would Zero Look Like Look Like? A Treaty for the Abolition of Nuclear Treaty for the Abolition of Nuclear Weapons” 45 Geo. J. Int'l L. 683-781 (2014) // ishan]

Negotiators and drafters of the instruments designed to pursue nuclear disarmament will be compelled to confront a daunting array of challenges. Several of these choice-points are identified in multiple footnotes attached to the Zero Agreement and Zero Treaty in the subsequent sections of this article, but a few are so important and complex that further textual elaboration is required. This section will first describe the eleven characteristics necessary for an adequate elimination regime and will then continue by illuminating the critical problems of: (a) the definition of "zero"; (b) verification and enforcement of compliance; (c) timing and the negotiating process; and (d) collateral measures. A. Key Characteristics for a Valid Elimination Process Just as important as clarifying what the documents will attempt to incorporate is the articulation of what they will not undertake to do. In particular, the enterprise is decidedly not about "unilateral" or "immediate" disarmament, despite the (sometimes deliberate) mischaracter izations that too often proliferate.' 3 " Instead, the following provides a list of eleven key characteristics that a valid nuclear weapons elimination process must possess; it comprises the metrics against which the feasibility and acceptability of a new treaty package would have to be judged and is reflected in the preambles of the draft documents in Parts IV and V. 1. Global. A zero-agreement regime would ultimately have to be universal, covering (with varying degrees of intensity based upon the potential non-compliance risk they present) all countries and all physical environments in the world. Obviously, the states possessing nuclear weapons, as well as the states with advanced civil nuclear industries (and therefore the latent capacity to produce nuclear weapons relatively quickly), would have to be early participants. In addition, almost any country (as well as the high seas, outer space, and other locations outside the jurisdiction of any state) could potentially serve as a site for clandestine evasions of the treaty. Therefore, all would have to be subject, within some reasonable time period, to inclusion in the verification and enforcement regime. The various states need not participate immediately or in an equal or identical fashion, but proponents of abolition have repeatedly stressed that getting to zero will have to be a fully multilateral "joint enterprise." 3 5

No permutations – it severs out of their affirmative, and the CP competes through Net Benefits

### DA – Innovation

(0:55)

#### Space Commercialization drives Tech Innovation in the Status Quo – it provides a unique impetus.

Hampson 17 Joshua Hampson 1-25-2017 “The Future of Space Commercialization” <https://republicans-science.house.gov/sites/republicans.science.house.gov/files/documents/TheFutureofSpaceCommercializationFinal.pdf> (Security Studies Fellow at the Niskanen Center)//Elmer

The size of the space economy is far larger than many may think. In 2015 alone, the global market amounted to $323 billion. Commercial infrastructure and systems accounted for 76 percent of that 9 total, with satellite television the largest subsection at $95 billion. The global space launch market’s 10 11 share of that total came in at $6 billion dollars. It can be hard to disaggregate how space benefits 12 particular national economies, but in 2009 (the last available report), the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) estimated that commercial space transportation and enabled industries generated $208.3 billion in economic activity in the United States alone. Space is not just about 13 satellite television and global transportation; while not commercial, GPS satellites also underpin personal navigation, such as smartphone GPS use, and timing data used for Internet coordination.14 Without that data, there could be problems for a range of Internet and cloud-based services.15 There is also room for growth. The FAA has noted that while the commercial launch sector has not grown dramatically in the last decade, there are indications that there is latent demand. This 16 demand may catalyze an increase in launches and growth of the wider space economy in the next decade. The Satellite Industry Association’s 2015 report highlighted that their section of the space economy outgrew both the American and global economies. The FAA anticipates that growth to 17 continue, with expectations that small payload launch will be a particular industry driver.18 In the future, emerging space industries may contribute even more the American economy. Space tourism and resource recovery—e.g., mining on planets, moons , and asteroids—in particular may become large parts of that industry. Of course, their viability rests on a range of factors, including costs, future regulation, international problems, and assumptions about technological development. However, there is increasing optimism in these areas of economic production. But the space economy is not just about what happens in orbit, or how that alters life on the ground. The growth of this economy can also contribute to new innovations across all walks of life. Technological Innovation Innovation is generally hard to predict; some new technologies seem to come out of nowhere and others only take off when paired with a new application. It is difficult to predict the future, but it is reasonable to expect that a growing space economy would open opportunities for technological and organizational innovation. In terms of technology, the difficult environment of outer space helps incentivize progress along the margins. Because each object launched into orbit costs a significant amount of money—at the moment between $27,000 and $43,000 per pound, though that will likely drop in the future —each 19 reduction in payload size saves money or means more can be launched. At the same time, the ability to fit more capability into a smaller satellite opens outer space to actors that previously were priced out of the market. This is one of the reasons why small, affordable satellites are increasingly pursued by companies or organizations that cannot afford to launch larger traditional satellites. These small 20 satellites also provide non-traditional launchers, such as engineering students or prototypers, the opportunity to learn about satellite production and test new technologies before working on a full-sized satellite. That expansion of developers, experimenters, and testers cannot but help increase innovation opportunities. Technological developments from outer space have been applied to terrestrial life since the earliest days of space exploration. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) maintains a website that lists technologies that have spun off from such research projects. Lightweight 21 nanotubes, useful in protecting astronauts during space exploration, are now being tested for applications in emergency response gear and electrical insulation. The need for certainty about the resiliency of materials used in space led to the development of an analytics tool useful across a range of industries. Temper foam, the material used in memory-foam pillows, was developed for NASA for seat covers. As more companies pursue their own space goals, more innovations will likely come from the commercial sector. Outer space is not just a catalyst for technological development. Satellite constellations and their unique line-of-sight vantage point can provide new perspectives to old industries. Deploying satellites into low-Earth orbit, as Facebook wants to do, can connect large, previously-unreached swathes of 22 humanity to the Internet. Remote sensing technology could change how whole industries operate, such as crop monitoring, herd management, crisis response, and land evaluation, among others. 23 While satellites cannot provide all essential information for some of these industries, they can fill in some useful gaps and work as part of a wider system of tools. Space infrastructure, in helping to change how people connect and perceive Earth, could help spark innovations on the ground as well. These innovations, changes to global networks, and new opportunities could lead to wider economic growth.

#### Strong Innovation solves Extinction.

Matthews 18 Dylan Matthews 10-26-2018 “How to help people millions of years from now” <https://www.vox.com/future-perfect/2018/10/26/18023366/far-future-effective-altruism-existential-risk-doing-good> (Co-founder of Vox, citing Nick Beckstead @ Rutgers University)//Re-cut by Elmer

If you care about improving human lives, you should overwhelmingly care about those quadrillions of lives rather than the comparatively small number of people alive today. The 7.6 billion people now living, after all, amount to less than 0.003 percent of the population that will live in the future. It’s reasonable to suggest that those quadrillions of future people have, accordingly, hundreds of thousands of times more moral weight than those of us living here today do. That’s the basic argument behind Nick Beckstead’s 2013 Rutgers philosophy dissertation, “On the overwhelming importance of shaping the far future.” It’s a glorious mindfuck of a thesis, not least because Beckstead shows very convincingly that this is a conclusion any plausible moral view would reach. It’s not just something that weird utilitarians have to deal with. And Beckstead, to his considerable credit, walks the walk on this. He works at the Open Philanthropy Project on grants relating to the far future and runs a charitable fund for donors who want to prioritize the far future. And arguments from him and others have turned “long-termism” into a very vibrant, important strand of the effective altruism community. But what does prioritizing the far future even mean? The most literal thing it could mean is preventing human extinction, to ensure that the species persists as long as possible. For the long-term-focused effective altruists I know, that typically means identifying concrete threats to humanity’s continued existence — like unfriendly artificial intelligence, or a pandemic, or global warming/out of control geoengineering — and engaging in activities to prevent that specific eventuality. But in a set of slides he made in 2013, Beckstead makes a compelling case that while that’s certainly part of what caring about the far future entails, approaches that address specific threats to humanity (which he calls “targeted” approaches to the far future) have to complement “broad” approaches, where instead of trying to predict what’s going to kill us all, you just generally try to keep civilization running as best it can, so that it is, as a whole, well-equipped to deal with potential extinction events in the future, not just in 2030 or 2040 but in 3500 or 95000 or even 37 million. In other words, caring about the far future doesn’t mean just paying attention to low-probability risks of total annihilation; it also means acting on pressing needs now. For example: We’re going to be better prepared to prevent extinction from AI or a supervirus or global warming if society as a whole makes a lot of scientific progress. And a significant bottleneck there is that the vast majority of humanity doesn’t get high-enough-quality education to engage in scientific research, if they want to, which reduces the **odds that we have enough trained scientists to come up with the breakthroughs** we need as a civilization to survive and thrive. So maybe one of the best things we can do for the far future is to improve school systems — here and now — to harness the group economist Raj Chetty calls “lost Einsteins” (potential innovators who are thwarted by poverty and inequality in rich countries) and, more importantly, the hundreds of millions of kids in developing countries dealing with even worse education systems than those in depressed communities in the rich world. What if living ethically for the far future means living ethically now? Beckstead mentions some other broad, or very broad, ideas (these are all his descriptions): Help make computers faster so that people everywhere can work more efficiently Change intellectual property law so that technological innovation can happen more quickly Advocate for open borders so that people from poorly governed countries can move to better-governed countries and be more productive Meta-research: improve incentives and norms in academic work to better advance human knowledge Improve education Advocate for political party X to make future people have values more like political party X ”If you look at these areas (economic growth and technological progress, access to information, individual capability, social coordination, motives) a lot of everyday good works contribute,” Beckstead writes. “An implication of this is that a lot of everyday good works are good from a broad perspective, even though hardly anyone thinks explicitly in terms of far future standards.” Look at those examples again: It’s just a list of what normal altruistically motivated people, not effective altruism folks, generally do. Charities in the US love talking about the lost opportunities for innovation that poverty creates. Lots of smart people who want to make a difference become scientists, or try to work as teachers or on improving education policy, and lord knows there are plenty of people who become political party operatives out of a conviction that the moral consequences of the party’s platform are good. All of which is to say: Maybe effective altruists aren’t that special, or at least maybe we don’t have access to that many specific and weird conclusions about how best to help the world. If the far future is what matters, and generally trying to make the world work better is among the best ways to help the far future, then effective altruism just becomes plain ol’ do-goodery.

## Case

#### 1] Private entities are crucial to innovation in space technology and reducing debris – empirics prove.

**INN '20,** Innovation News Network, "Innovation in space: the private sector’s role in the 2020 space race", 6-11-2020, accessed 7-11-2021, <https://www.innovationnewsnetwork.com/innovation-in->space-the-private-sectors-role-in-the-2020-space-race/5490/ DHS//JL SpaceX has paved the way for a new wave of commercial space technologies. However, **private actors have been influencing the space industry for many years.** In May 2003, Scaled Composites first launched SpaceShipOne, an experimental and reusable space plane that uses a hybrid rocket to achieve speeds of up to speeds of up to 900 m/s. SpaceShipOne completed the first crewed private spaceflight in 2004, which was then retired that year. In 2013, The Spaceship Company announced the first powered flight of SpaceShipTwo, another suborbital spaceplane designed for space tourism. Unfortunately, in October 2014, the first SpaceShipTwo VSS Enterprise crashed in the Mojave Desert. Further investigation suggested that the craft’s descent device deployed too early, killing the pilot, Michael Alsbury. Virgin Galactic plans to operate a fleet of five improved SpaceShipTwo spaceplanes in a private passenger-carrying service and has been taking bookings for some time, with a suborbital flight carrying an updated ticket price of $250,000. **SpaceX is responsible for some of the most innovative space technologies** produced in the last decade. SpaceX has created the most powerful rocket ever developed, Falcon Heavy, which can lift more than twice the payload of the next closest operational vehicle, the Delta IV Heavy. Although the nature is of the commercial space sector is competitive, many private companies share common goals. How can commercialisation reduce overcrowding in space? Almost 60 years of space activities and more than 5,450 launches have resulted in approximately 23,000 objects remaining in orbit. Around 24% of the catalogued objects are satellites. This catastrophic waste of technology can have a negative effect of future launches and it has been theorised that sending objects into Earth’s orbit could become impossible due the risk of collision. This debris must be removed from orbit if the space industry is to continue to grow. Many **private companies have taken on the burden of removing debris from Earth’s orbit.** Aviosonic Space Tech has pioneered the first Debris Collision Alert System (DeCAS) for the monitoring of space vehicles and satellites as they re-enter Earth’s atmosphere. Avisonic’s patented space debris management system, DeCAS, addresses the vital issue of protecting people and institutions across the globe through a precise, efficient, and cost-effective system which will make the world a safer place. Although the removal of space debris is an important step in sustainable space travel, many businesses are developing nanosatellites to reduce the volume of technology in orbit. Another benefit of developing nanosatellites is that they can do almost everything a conventional satellite does at a fraction of the cost, making this technology more popular in the commercial sector.

**2] There is a 0.1% chance of a collision.**

**Salter 16** [(Alexander William, Economics Professor at Texas Tech) “SPACE DEBRIS: A LAW AND ECONOMICS ANALYSIS OF THE ORBITAL COMMONS” 19 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 221 \*numbers replaced with English words] TDI

The probability of a collision is currently low. Bradley and Wein estimate that the maximum probability in LEO of a collision over the lifetime of a spacecraft remains below one in one thousand, conditional on continued compliance with NASA’s deorbiting guidelines.3 However, the possibility of a future “snowballing” effect, whereby debris collides with other objects, further congesting orbit space, remains a significant concern.4 Levin and Carroll estimate the average immediate destruction of wealth created by a collision to be approximately $30 million, with an additional $200 million in damages to all currently existing space assets from the debris created by the initial collision.5 The expected value of destroyed wealth because of collisions, currently small because of the low probability of a collision, can quickly become significant if future collisions result in runaway debris growth.

#### 1] Interdependence checks space war.

**Hall 15** [Luke Penn-Hall 15, Analyst at The Cipher Brief, M.A. from the Johns Hopkins School for Advanced International Studies, B.A. in International Relations and Religious Studies from Claremont McKenna College, “5 Reasons “Space War” Isn’t As Scary As It Sounds”, The Cipher Brief, 8/18/2015, <https://www.thecipherbrief.com/article/5-reasons-%E2%80%9Cspace-war%E2%80%9D-isn%E2%80%99t-scary-it-sounds>] recut Adam

* If you are also reading the Pavur evidence then unhighlight the debris stuff

The U.S. depends heavily on military and commercial satellites. If a less satellite-dependent opponent launched an anti-satellite (ASAT) attack, it would have far greater impact on the U.S. than the attacker. However, it’s not as simple as that – for the following reasons:

1. An ASAT attack would likely be part of a larger, terrestrial attack. An attack on space assets would be no different than an attack on territory or other assets on earth. This means that no space war would stay limited to space. An ASAT campaign would be part of a larger conventional military conflict that would play out on earth.

2. Every country with ASAT capabilities also needs satellites. While the United States is the most dependent on military satellites, most other countries need satellites to participate in the global economy. All countries that have the technical ability to play in this space – the U.S., Russia, China and India - also have a vested interest in preventing the militarization of space and protecting their own satellites. If any of those countries were to attack U.S. satellites, it would likely hurt them far more than it would hurt the United States.

3. Destruction of satellites could create a damaging chain reaction. Scientists warn that the violent destruction of satellites could result in an effect called an ablation cascade. High-velocity debris from a destroyed satellite could crash into other satellites and create more high-velocity debris. If an ablation cascade were to occur, it could render certain orbital levels completely unusable for centuries.

4. Any country that threatened access to space would threaten the global economy. Even if a full-blown ablation cascade didn’t occur, an ASAT campaign would cause debris, making operating in space more hazardous. The global economy relies on satellites and any disruption of operations would be met with worldwide disapproval and severe economic ramifications.

5. International Prohibits the Use of ASAT Weapons. Several international treaties expressly prohibit signatory nations from attacking other countries’ space assets. It is generally accepted that space should be treated as a global common area, rather than a military domain.

While it remains necessary for military planners to create contingency plans for a, space war it is a highly unlikely scenario. All involved parties are incentivized against attacking. However, if a space war did occur, it would be part of a larger conflict on Earth. Those concerned about the potential for war in space should be more concerned about the potential for war, period.

#### 2] Deterrence solves risk of war.

**Evanoff 19** [Kyle Evanoff, Kyle is a research associate in international economics and U.S. foreign policy at the Council on Foreign Relations “Big Bangs, Red Herrings, and the Dilemmas of Space Security”, Council on Foreign Relations, 6/27/2019, <https://www.cfr.org/blog/big-bangs-red-herrings-and-dilemmas-space-security> accessed 12/11/21] Adam

More important, U.S. policymakers should avoid making decisions on the basis of a possible, though highly improbable, space Pearl Harbor. They should recognize that latent counterspace capabilities—as exemplified in 2008’s Operation Burnt Frost, which saw the United States repurpose a ballistic missile interceptor to destroy a satellite—are more than sufficient to deter adversaries from launching a major surprise attack in almost all scenarios, especially in light of the aforementioned deep interdependence in the space domain. Adding to the deterrence effect are uncertain offensive cyber capabilities. The United States continues to launch incursions into geopolitical competitors’ critical systems, such as the Russian power grid, and has demonstrated a willingness to employ cyberattacks in the wake of offline incidents, as it did after Iran shot down a U.S. drone last week. Unlike in the nuclear arena, where anything short of the prospect of nuclear retaliation holds limited dissuasive power, space deterrence can stem from military capabilities in various domains. For this reason, an attack on a U.S. satellite could elicit any number of responses. The potential for cross-domain retaliation, combined with the high strategic value of space assets, means that any adversary risks extreme escalation in launching a major assault on American space architectures. Again, well-conceived diplomatic efforts are useful in averting such scenarios altogether.

#### 3] Space weapon deployment doesn’t cause an arms race or increase chance of war

Lopez 12 [LAURA DELGADO LO´ PEZ, Institute for Global Environmental Strategies, Arlington, Virginia. Astropolitics. "Predicting an Arms Race in Space: Problematic Assumptions for Space Arms Control." https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14777622.2012.647391]

The previous discussion demonstrates that although a globalized space arms race could follow U.S. deployment of space weapons, it is also plausible and more likely that it may not happen at all. As Mueller states: ‘‘In the end, most of the inevitability arguments are weak.’’62 The assumptions discussed here break the argument into a series of debatable maxims that other scholars have also considered. Hays, for instance, counters the inevitability argument by pointing out that previous ASAT tests did not have this purported destabilizing effect, to which we can add that even after the Chinese ASAT test, neither Russia nor the United States, who would be both capable and more politically likely to launch space weapons, moved forward in that direction.63 Although some may draw attention to the recent wake-up calls in order to underline a sense of urgency, one should also recall that when it seemed truly inevitable before, it did not happen either. In his detailed account of military space developments from 1945 to 1984, Paul Stares described how superpowers’ assessment of the value of space weapons shifted, with a ‘‘hiatus in testing’’ reflecting the attractiveness of satellites as military targets.64 In this changed landscape, Stares also assumed the inevitability argument, claiming that ‘‘the chances of space remaining a ‘sanctuary’ [absence of weapons] into the 21st century appear today to be remote.’’65 Perhaps the conditions are more conducive now, but the important point to be reiterated is that the outcome is not inevitable, and that any such prediction must be undertaken with caution. One of the most prominent theorists to propose an alternate picture and pair it with an aggressive pro-space weapons stance is Everett Dolman. In his Astropolitik theory, Dolman summarizes the steps that the United States must take to assume control of space, particularly through withdrawal from the current space regime.66 This move, he argues, would benefit not only the United States, but also the rest of the world, since having a democracy controlling space is a catalyst for peace.67 Elsewhere, he writes: ‘‘Only a liberal world hegemon would be able to practice the restraint necessary to maintain its preponderant balance of hegemonic power without resorting to an attempt at empire.’’68 Accordingly, he believes that this strategy would be ‘‘perceived correctly as an attempt at continuing U.S. hegemony,’’69 but that other countries, correctly assessing U.S. leadership in space, would not seek to deploy their own systems. Having the ability to prevent the stationing of foreign weapons systems in space, he writes, ‘‘makes the possibility of large-scale space war and a military space race less likely, not more.’’70 In fact, he says, ‘‘to suggest that the inevitable result is a space arms competition is the worst kind of mirror-imaging.’’71 Dolman argues that the weaponization of space by the United States would ‘‘decrease the likelihood of an arms race by shifting spending away from conventional weapons systems,’’ which would reduce U.S. capabilities in territorial occupation and would thus be perceived as less threatening to other countries.72

#### 4] No space war, and no impact if it does happen

Handberg 17 Roger Handberg 17, Professor in the School of Politics, Security, and International Affairs at the University of Central Florida, 2017, “Is space war imminent? Exploring the possibility,” Comparative Strategy, Vol. 36, No. 5, p. 413-425

The assumption made is that space war will be successfully waged in both the heavens and on the Earth itself. This assumption, however, is grounded on several hypotheticals occurring. First, that total devastating strategic surprise can be achieved—the side attacked becomes so damaged and devastated that further resistance is impossible to sustain regardless of national will, since nuclear weapons overhang the entire enterprise. The analogy usually invoked for American audiences is a “Pearl Harbor” type attack. This scenario is premised on equivalent American incompetence and lack of readiness as exhibited in December 1941. One must note that Pearl Harbor ended as a strategic failure for Japan—it led to defeat because the attack mobilized U.S. power without hesitation, given the intense political divisions over whether to enter the worldwide conflicts already raging. The attack was a military failure because Navy carriers were not destroyed along with battleship row along with critical fuel facilities. Similar analogies invoke September 11, 2001 as the prototype for such attacks more recently, but the same caveats apply. Total surprise assumes that all relevant opponent systems and civilian assets are disabled and left vulnerable to follow on attacks. In fact, collapse of U.S. defenses leaves U.S. cities as hostages to the rulers of the heavens, or vice versa if the U.S. moves first. Space war is extremely destabilizing, as will be discussed, since survivability of one's strategic assets becomes problematic. Second, surprise requires that sufficient offensive space assets be placed in orbit without triggering a response by other states—the scale of such technology deployment is in itself possibly self-defeating given high costs and a likely lack of launch capacity. In addition, much launch capacity is now international rather than national, so maintaining secrecy becomes even more difficult. Space as an operational environment suffers from excessive transparency, meaning any launches can be monitored and tracked by others with strong evidence as to what is being deployed. One must remember that the original satellite launches in the 1950s were accurately tracked by a British grade-school class as a science project. In addition, at least since the early 1960s, remote sensing has increased exponentially the global capability to detect buildup of military assets of differing types, whether in space or on the ground. Commercial remote-sensing capabilities further enhance the capacity to detect militarily relevant actions. For example, commercial imagery is accessed by private parties to monitor the North Korean missile and nuclear weapons programs, in effect expanding the capacity of the world to look in on various states' interior regions, scanning for relevant information, including weapons buildup and launch capabilities. Even construction of physical facilities for production of space assets or for other weaponry can be monitored, making surprise more difficult but not impossible, as demonstrated in earlier monitoring of North Korea and, in 1998, the nuclear tests by both Pakistan and India. That means if the ASAT weapons come from ground locations, there is a high probability that they can be detected but no guarantee exists that detection will in fact occur. The uncertainty will impact calculations of attack success. Third, the most obvious initial attack of space-based assets will most likely come from cyber attacks, given that such actions do not necessarily require the scale of resources necessary for other modalities such as kinetic weapons, or even lasers or other energy-type weapons. One will have to position the weapons plus the infrastructure to permit rapid recycling of the weapons for the next attack. Firing off interceptors will likely be a one-off, meaning extremely precise targeting will be required if the attack is to be successful. Note that none of these systems require that individuals be placed in Earth orbit, despite the imagery describing such operations in fictional universes. Deployment requires a large lift capacity for initial deployment plus replenishment of destroyed or inoperative space assets, since a space conflict assumes that assets will be lost either kinetically or be compromised by cyber or energy beams. In any case, the combatants must be able to recover their capabilities lost during the conflict; failure to do would mean defeat or at least stalemate, negating the reason for the attack. That raises a major question when one considers the problem or expectation that space war can be successfully conducted or defended. Operationally Responsive Space (ORS) remains a critical weak point for all potential space-war participants. Loss of space assets occurs routinely during operations, but actual combat losses can be exponential depending on the weaponry used, and replacing those losses becomes the race to the next level after the initial exchange or combat. Unfortunately, ORS remains a major weakness of the United States and likely other states; deploying replacement satellites remains a multiyear process, while launch capabilities are scheduled long in advance. The rise of multiple private-launch competitors may partially alleviate some of the delay but that remains problematic given that the military payloads may be competing with commercial vendors also trying to replace losses. The tradeoff is that. in principle, private-launch vendors may be able to do so more cheaply, but their capacity may be saturated by demand from the civil and commercial sectors, leaving few “uncommitted” launch options for military purposes. Normally this is not an issue, but the available launch options may be third party rather than national-flag carriers, which raises severe security concerns. Fourth, several other assumptions become essential to make the strategy work, including that such an attack does not render Earth orbit so debris-saturated that further military space operations become impossible to sustain. Also, damage to civilian space assets remains, such that their continuation is possible if undamaged replacements can be quickly reintroduced to restart economically critical operations. Globalization has been fostered through satellite technologies. Their disruption can be devastating for all parties, regardless of who is the winner or the loser. What may occur is the graveyard of the modern economic system. No potential space participants would be immune to the damage, regardless of whether or not they were participants in the actual conflict. Fifth, there must be no difficulty in separating potential targets from the enemy, allied states, and nonbelligerent states. This creates a situation in which the spread of space technologies globally complicates actions, expanding the range of participants beyond the combatants, much like earlier wars at sea, where there were the combatants' ships, along with those of nonbelligerents, including neutrals whom the combatants struggled to draw into the conflict on their side, or at least to render their services unavailable to the other side. The earliest discussion of space conflict was premised on Cold War analogies, meaning two major combatants, either U.S.–Russia, or U.S–-China, or even a three-way war. Presently, analyses focus on a bilateral conflict with the U.S. opposed to China and Russia. Whether that would occur is obviously unknown, despite political rhetoric about a Eurasia coalition of likeminded states. What it does is multiply the number of potential targets and complicates reactions to neutrals' actions to protect their interests or assets. The distinction between combatants and neutrals or third parties will be possibly blurred beyond separation. The byproduct of a kinetic space conflict is massive amounts of space debris, destroying or damaging most space assets regardless of their state sponsor or nationality. Initial attacks may be focused and precise, but the result is still the same. The debris generated by armed conflict will endure beyond the immediate clash. The obvious alternative is a strictly electronic attack on space assets' operating systems, leaving the satellites in orbit, although without the ability to move them or control possible erratic changes in orbit due to collisions with other space debris. Other forms space war will take Reality is more complicated—kinetic action produces debris, the ultimate deterrent to actual space war. Therefore, space war could likely track several distinct phases. The first is cyber attacks, which disable or destroy the working systems of the spacecraft or the ground-support network—in effect, a series of stealth attacks. Civilian satellites are extremely soft targets—defense requires a capacity to detect and analyze any attack on the spacecraft, not available presently for most commercial spacecraft due to cost considerations. Otherwise, one could use nuclear weapons to create electromagnetic pulses (EMP) which can fry unprotected electronics both in space and on the ground, depending on where the weapons are detonated. Interestingly, space war scenarios have some territorial war aspects in that any attacks on space assets will devastate both military and civilian targets without distinction between the war participants and civilians. Similar to unrestricted submarine warfare, all targets in the relevant area will become casualties or otherwise impacted in their operations. Second, attacks that are conducted against the ground down links and/or communications systems, leaving the spacecraft without guidance or instructions, and also no information is returned to the commanders even if the satellites survive the initial onslaught. These can involve kinetic attacks against specific locations or insertion of special operations forces to render the facility inoperative. For example, antennas can be disabled or destroyed, disrupting operations until new facilities are brought online. Other alternatives could include kinetic weapons launched from space, “rods from God.”20 Air strike packages could include electronic warfare elements capable of scrambling or disrupting operations of such facilities even prior to physical strikes against the targets. Spacecraft not destroyed or disabled in the initial two stages of the attack can be directly attacked by “dazzling” their receivers, with laser impulses destroying the receivers for which there are few replacements without replacing the spacecraft physically. Third, rapid replacement of inoperative satellites, regardless of the reasons, does not occur, which translates into a race for the third, possibly end, phase of the war, replenishment. Inability to replace losses may mean that none of the combatants are able to dominate in the end, meaning conventional conflict may be the outcome, although issues of global reach may confine conflicts to relatively small areas. In previous conventional conflicts, large-scale forces were moved, albeit slowly, across the globe to the conflict, i.e., Desert Shield morphing into Desert Storm after a nearly six-month buildup.

lbl