## 1NC-Off

#### Interpretation: the affrimative must defend a policy action

#### ‘Resolved’ preceding a colon indicates a legislative forum.

Blanche Ellsworth 81, English professor at SFSU and M.A. in English from UC Berkeley, 1/1/1981, *English Simplified*, 4th Edition, cc

A colon is also used to separate 3. THE SALUTATION OF A BUSINESS LETTER FROM THE BODY, Dear Sir Dear Ms. Weiner NOTE: In an informal letter, a comma follows the salutation: Dear Mary, Dear Uncle Jack 4. PARTS OF TITLES, REFERENCES, AND NUMERALS. TITLE: Principles of Mathematics: An Introduction REFERENCE: Luke 3:4—13 NUMERALS: 8:15 PM 5. PLACE OF PUBLICATION FROM PUBLISHER Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill 6. THE WORD RESOLVED FROM THE STATEMENT OF THE RESOLUTION. Resolved: That this committee go on record as favoring new legislation.

#### Justice implies a desirable departure from the status quo – that means the aff must rectify an injust social interaction

IHS n.d. [(Institute for Humane Studies at George Mason University, non-profit organization that engages with students and professors) “What is Justice?”] JL

One of the most influential accounts of the origin and nature of justice comes from Plato’s Republic. According to Plato’s account, we can think of the principles of justice as mutually agreed to principles for the coordination and structure of social interaction that would benefit all who are subject to them. What those principles are will depend on the society. In addition, there’s a second theory of justice that Plato offers that’s more general. According to this second theory, justice is “each getting what is rightfully theirs and no one getting what is rightfully another’s.” In other words, questions of justice always ask, “Who has a right to what?”

#### Justice is a policy question

Merriam Webster ND [(Mesrriam Webster) “Justice” https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/justice] BC

Essential Meaning of justice

1: the process or result of using laws to fairly judge and punish crimes and criminals

1: characterized by injustice : UNFAIR

#### Policy education – the only way to regulate private sector activity is through government policy – that kills real world education and skews topic lit which is in the context of implementation

#### Vote negative to preserve limits and equitable division of ground – the resolution is the most predictable stasis point for debates, anything outside of that ruins prep and clash by allowing the affirmative to pick any grounds for debate. That greenlights a race away from the core topic controversies that allow for robust contestation, which favors the aff by making neg ground inapplicable, susceptible to the perm, and concessionary. Two additional impacts:

#### Accessibility – Cutting negs to every possible aff wrecks small schools, which has a disparate impact on under-resourced and minority debaters. Counter-interpretations are arbitrary, unpredictable, and don’t solve the world of neg prep because there’s no grounding in the resolution

#### Link turns their education offense – getting to the third and fourth level of tactical engagement is only possible with refined and well-researched positions connected to the resolutional mechanism. Repeated debates over core issues incentivize innovative argument production and improved advocacy based on feedback and nuanced responses from opponents.

#### Prefer our impact: they’ve skewed the game which necessarily comes first because it makes evaluating the aff impossible. The role of individual debate rounds on broader subject formation is white noise – *can you remember what happened in doubles of the Loyola tournament your junior year?* – individual rounds don’t affect our subjectivity, so fairness is the only impact your ballot can resolve. You should presume all their truth claims false because they have not been properly tested

#### Fairness is an impact – [1] probability – your ballot can’t solve their impacts but it can solve mine – debate can’t alter subjectivity, but can rectify skews in this round [2] internal link turns every impact – a limited topic promotes in-depth research and engagement which is necessary to access all of their education [3] comes before substance – deciding any other argument in this debate cannot be disentangled from our inability to prepare for it – any argument you think they’re winning is a link, not a reason to vote for them, since it’s just as likely that they’re winning it because we weren’t able to effectively prepare to defeat it. This means they don’t get to weigh the aff and proves you should be epistemically suspect of their truth claims.

#### TVA States should declare that public guardianship obligations created by the non-ownership doctrine necessitate a reduction in private actor appropriation of Outer Space.

#### Nonownership solves better has a sound legal basis and effectively advances rights for the sky and the land through policy action cornum 15 is wrong its possible

Adler 07, Dean College of Law at Utah (Robert, RESTORING COLORADO RIVER ECOSYSTEMS: A Troubled Sense of Immensity, pg. 199-200)

The public trust doctrine, however, retains the anthropocentric focus of property law in which “trust assets” are held by the government for the common benefit of human users. Perhaps the bigger problem is that the ecological values inherent in aquatic ecosystems are not amenable to either private or public ownership. The concept of “nonownership” has an equally long legal history, but has not received the same scholarly or judicial attention outside the arena of wildlife law. Some scholars read the original Roman law to mean that some common resources cannot be owned *at all*. Private individuals cannot “own” wildlife even if wild animals reside on their land. Individuals may own domesticated animals reduced to human control and wild animals reduced to physical possession through hunting or capture. No one can “own” a species, however, or even a population of wild animals. A rancher might own domesticated horses but not the wild mustangs grazing on her land. The U.S. Supreme Court clung for many years to the notion that states owned wildlife in trust for their people, but gradually abandoned this concept. In Missouri v. Holland, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes questioned the idea that state "ownership" of birds that migrate across state lines could impair federal regulatory power: "To put the claim of the State upon title is to lean upon a slender reed. Wild birds are not in the possession of anyone; and possession is the beginning of ownership. The whole foundation of the State's rights is the presence within their jurisdiction of birds that yesterday had not arrived, tomorrow may be in another State and in a week a thousand miles away." In later cases the Supreme Court referred to the ownership concept as a "legal fiction" or "fantasy," and ultimately ruled that state authority to regulate wildlife is grounded in sovereign authority to protect common resources and the common welfare. It is not based on ownership. The nonownership principle conforms to a growing realization that nonhuman components of the natural world are not merely resources for human use and consumption, but have intrinsic value. Just as the law evolved in the 19th century to reject the idea that people could own slaves, law in the 20th century changed to conform with society's growing ethical rejection of human dominion over all other living species. At least since the early 1970s, some scholars began to propose legal rights for nonhuman species. The idea that wildlife cannot be owned also makes sense in light of the realization that species provide ecosystem services beyond those measured in the market economy. So what does this have to do with restoration of the Colorado River? No one claims ownership of razorback suckers or Yuma clapper rails. But private property rights at the water's edge limit the government's ability to restore the natural relationship between land and water. If inundation of private property constitutes an unconstitutional taking of property, modified dam flows that even periodically inundate riparian habitats or backwaters might be prohibited. Or, it might

#### That disspells spatial nullius, it stops approaiation noone can own or mine space but we can safleuderstand it as more than just rocks to be mined, AND it’s a polcy action

#### SSD solves the aff – you can contest the partaking in spatial nullius from the other side criquing public ventures like the United States, literallt with these cards you’ve read

#### Reject the team—T is question of models of debate and the damage to our strategy was already done norming is what u weigh

#### Competing interps—they have to proactively to justify their model and reasonability links to our offense

#### No rvis or impact turns—it’s their burden to prove their topical. Beating back T doesn’t prove their advocacy is good

#### 

#### They can’t get offense: we don’t exclude them, only persuade you that our methodology is best. Every debate requires a winner and loser, so voting negative doesn’t reject them from debate, it just says they should make a better argument next time.

#### Semiotic capitalism is predicated on informational overload that leaves no room for the human aspects of our behavior ending in mass psychological trauma. The affs turn to political activism and policy cause depression and misery.When the sign has become all encompassing the only standard and role of the ballot left is to vote for whoever best resists semiocapitalism

**Bifo, 9** [Franco Berardi, Italian communist theorist and activist in the autonomist tradition, whose work mainly focuses on the role of the media and information technology within post-industrial capitalism   Precarious Rhapsody, by Franco Bifo Berardi et al., AK Press, 2009. P. 40-42 Lindale PP]

The acceleration of information exchange has produced and is producing an effect of a pathological type on the individual human mind and even more on the collective mind. **Individuals are not in a position to consciously process the immense and always growing mass of information that enters their computers, their cell phones, their television screens, their electronic diaries and their heads. However, it seems indispensable to follow, recognize, evaluate, process all this information if you want to be efficient, competitive, victorious.** The practice of multitasking, the opening of a window of hypertextual attention, the passage from one context to another for the complex evaluation of processes, tends to deform the sequential modality of mental processing. According to Christian Marazzi, who has concerned himself in various books with the relations between economics, language and affectivity, **the latest generation of economic operators is** affected by a real and proper form of dyslexia, incapable of reading a page from the beginning to the end according to sequential procedures, **incapable of maintaining concentrated attention on the same object for a long time**. And dyslexia spreads to cognitive and social behaviors, leading to rendering the pursuit of linear strategies nearly impossible. **Some**, like Davenport and Beck , **speak of an attention economy**. But when a cognitive faculty enters into and becomes part of economic discourse this means that it has become a scarce resource. **The necessary time for paying attention to the fluxes of information to which we are exposed and which must be evaluated in order to be able to make decisions is lacking. The consequence is in front of our eyes: political and economic decisions no longer respond to a long term strategic rationality and simply follow immediate interests. On the other hand, we are always less available for giving our attention to others gratuitously. We no longer have the attention time for love, tenderness, nature, pleasure and compassion. Our attention is ever more besieged and therefore we assign it only to our careers, to competition and to economic decisions. And in any case our temporality cannot follow the insane speed of the hypercomplex digital machine.** Human beings tend to become the ruthless executors of decisions taken without attention. The universe of transmitters, or cyberspace, now proceeds at a superhuman velocity and becomes untranslatable for the universe of receivers, or cybertime, that cannot go faster than what is allowed by the physical material from which our brain is made, the slowness of our body, the need for caresses and affection. Thus opens a pathological gap and mental illness spreads as testified by the statistics and above all our everyday experience. And just as pathology spreads, so too do drugs. The flourishing industry of psychopharmaceuticals beats records every year, the number of packets of Ritalin, Prozac, Zoloft and other psychotropics sold in the pharmacies continually increases, while dissociation, suffering, desperation, terror, the desire not to exist, to not have to fight continuously, to disappear grows alongside the will to kill and to kill oneself. **When, towards the end of the 1970s, an acceleration of the productive and communicative rhythms in occidental metropolitan centers was imposed, a gigantic epidemic of drug addiction made its appearance. The world was leaving its human epoch to enter the era of machinic posthuman acceleration: many sensitive organisms of the human variety began to snort cocaine, a substance that permits the acceleration of the existential rhythm leading to transforming oneself into a machine. Many other sensitive organisms of the human kind injected heroin in their veins, a substance that deactivates the relation with the speed of the surrounding atmosphere.** The epidemic of powders during the 1970s and the 1980s produced an existential and cultural devastation with which we still haven’t come to terms with. Then illegal drugs were replaced by those legal substances which the pharmaceutical industry in a white coat made available for its victims and this was the epoch of anti-depressants, of euphorics and of mood regulators. **Today psychopathy reveals itself ever more clearly as a social epidemic and, more precisely, a socio-communicational one. If you want to survive you have to be competitive and if you want to be competitive you must be connected, receive and process continuously an immense and growing mass of data. This provokes a constant attentive stress, a reduction of the time available for affectivity. These two tendencies, inseparably linked, provoke an effect of devastation on the individual psyche: depression, panic, anxiety, the sense of solitude and existential misery. But these individual symptoms cannot be indefinitely isolated, as psychopathology has done up until now and as economic power wishes to do.**

#### The aff’s  ‘activism’ is the scream of an exploited worker that will only fuel semiocapitalism more. By protesting, the aff refuels the machine and becomes infinitely frustrated in their futility. Your activism gets ruined and seized by semiocapitalism creating a cyclical process of depression.

**the affs protests to shift dominant wester world views is causing  overhaul of cyclical depression and violence meanign they feed settler colonialism**

**Genosko and Thoburn, 11** [Gary and Nicholas, “Preface: The Transversal Communism of Franco Berardi.” After the Future, by Franco Bifo Berardi et al., AK Press, 2011.]

There is, then, no return to Lenin or Mao. Alongside Hardt and Negri, perhaps the most prominent and influential of efforts to re-found a communism adequate to the current conjuncture is to be found in the work of Alain Badiou. In his later work, Badiou has turned away from the vanguard model of the party – he took his time, but got there in the end. Yet this is because **we have entered a new “sequence”, beyond that which was characterized** (and, for Badiou, properly expressed) **in the Leninist party form and the Maoist Cultural Revolution** (Badiou 2008). **Bifo’s difference is that**, whether correctly characterized by a series of sequences or not**, communism proper never went by the way of Lenin or Mao** (the “Mao-Dadaism” of Radio Alice was something quite other). As shorthand for this critique, we would signal the affirmation and intensification – not refusal – of work in the Soviet and Chinese regimes. But **the problem that Bifo isolates in these pages is the subjective political model inherent to such orthodox communism, the “militant”, and its not so distant cousin, the “activist”.** **Activism**, Bifo argues, **is the narcissistic response of the subject to the infinite and invasive power of capital, a response that can only leave the activist frustrated, humiliated, and depressed. Bifo** here **locates this** modern political configuration **with Lenin**, and makes a most heretical statement: “I am convinced that the 20th century would have been a better century had Lenin not existed”. **He diagnoses** this condition in these pages **through a reading of Lenin’s bouts of depression**, but we would highlight that elsewhere **Bifo also identifies the problem in Félix Guattari**, a most surprising move, given the sophistication of Guattari’s schizoanalytic critique of authoritarian political subjectivation. **Bifo developed his friendship with Guattari while in exile from Italy in the 1980s, a period that Guattari characterized as his “winter years”, the coincidence of personal depression and neoliberal reaction. Under these conditions, a certain political activism appeared central to Guattari, but not so to Bifo:** “I remember that **in the 1980s Félix often scolded me because I was no longer involved in some kind of political militancy. ... For me, militant will and ideological action had become impotent**” (Berardi 2008: 13). **For Bifo, at times of reaction, of the evacuation of political creativity from the social field,  activism becomes a desperate attempt to ward off depression. But it is doomed to fail, and, worse, to convert political innovation and sociality into its opposite, to “replace desire with duty”:** Félix knew this, I am sure, but he never said this much, not even to himself, and this is why he went to all these meetings with people who didn’t appeal to him, talking about things that distracted him... And here again is the root of depression, in this impotence of political will that we haven’t had the courage to admit. (Berardi 2008: 13) **One can discern two aspects to Bifo’s analysis of depression. It is a product of the “panic” induced by the sensory overload of digital capitalism, a condition of withdrawal, a disinvestment of energy from the competitive and narcissistic structures of the enterprise. And it is also a result of the loss of political composition and antagonism**: “**depression is born out of the dispersion of the community’s immediacy. Autonomous and desiring politics was a proliferating community. When the proliferating power is lost, the social becomes the place of depression**” (Berardi 2008: 13). **In both manifestations, depression is a real historical experience, something that must be actively faced and engaged with – we cannot merely ward it off with appeals to militant voluntarism.** We need to assess its contours, conditions, products, to find an analytics of depression, and an adequate politics. And that is the goal of this book, a first step toward a politics after the future, and after the redundant subjective forms of which it was made.

#### the 3rd link is

**the Infosphere**

#### Resistance to power becomes useless in the face of the infosphere – Capital will use their movement as a hammer to crush others. Their methodology flares the freedom of capital and kills liberation strategies.

#### Baron et al, 19 [Ilan Zvi Baron, Associate Professor in the School of Government and International Affairs at Durham University, with Jonathan Havercroft, Associate Professor in International Political Theory at the University of Southampton, Isaac Kamola, assistant professor of political science at Trinity College, Jonneke Koomen, Associate Professor of Politics, Sociology and Women’s and Gender Studies at Willamette University, Alex Prichard, senior lecturer in International Relations at the University of Exeter, and Justin Murphy, independent scholar, “Liberal Pacification and the Phenomenology of Violence,” 2019, International Studies Quarterly, 63, 199–212]//Townes \*ableist language modifications denoted by brackets

**Phenomenology**, as we are using it, **is not about lived experience**. It is the **philosophical tradition** of **revealing** different types of beings and **things that contain meaning in our world**, **the structures** and/or contexts **in which they exist,** and **how these structures and contexts are meaningful**. Understood in this way, **violence is one of these structures and/or contexts**. A phenomenological perspective does not approach violence from a particular normative position, although it does not preclude normative critique. A phenomenological approach does not treat violence as a discrete thing that one agent does to another, although it does not preclude such acts being described as violent. Instead, a phenomenological perspective adds to our intellectual and methodological toolbox by **identifying violence as a condition** or context **in which people function**. Phenomenology allows us to identify violence **occurring in ways and in places** that **we** otherwise **would not** be able to **recognize**. It does not change the meaning of violence (as harm, for example). Instead, it treats violence ontologically, enabling us to reveal more accurately the extent to which violence exists in the world. From a phenomenological perspective, violence is often inconspicuous. **Violence can function as a naturalized or internalized regime of compulsion or domination.** **Pacification** reveals both the **pervasiveness of violence** and **forms of violence** that may **otherwise remain inconspicuous**. The erasing of tradition and the enforcement of particular legal codes at the expense of indigenous cultural norms is one example of an inconspicuous form of violence that involves conspicuous and inconspicous consequences (Cocks 2014). In understanding violence phenomenologically, as a structure of revealing across multiple worlds, we are better able to reveal the extent to which violence shapes our world and how we are then shaped by violence. Pacavere The Romans understood violence as a necessary condition for pax. **The liberal imagination blinds itself to [obfuscates] the ways that pacification functions as violence in our world order**. International relations scholarship’s strict distinction between peace and violence reinforces this obfuscation. Yet, **the violence of (and in) pacification is central to the contemporary world**. A phenomenological approach shows that moments of violent rupture are not aberrations of the world order. **Violent outbreaks are breakdowns of pacification**. It follows that multiple structures of the world order function as **the violence of pacification**, of pacavere.12 These structures include **liberal capitalism**, **colonialism** and the **postcolonial aftermath**, and **war**. Each functions as a key site of pacification. Anarchist thought reveals the pacification in liberal capitalism. Postcolonial thought reveals the pacification of colonial projects. Both anarchist and postcolonial thought demonstrate how war is a breakdown of pacification, revealing the hidden violent structures of our worldhood. Anarchist critiques of capitalism, unlike Marxist and liberal interpretations, take seriously the decisive role of state violence in structuring society and markets. Anarchists view the state as an institution that sustains elite appropriations of political and economic power (Proudhon [1861] 1998; Sorel 1999; Prichard 2015). Those at the bottom of the social hierarchy bear the costs of this enforced order. **The state diffuses violence** (**pacification**) throughout the entire society—often **in ways that go unrecognized** by its subjects (Sorel 1999, 65). The naturalization of violence **consolidates** arbitrary **regimes of domination** in society. While specific, countable incidents of violence may decline, the social order is largely **premised on the threat of violence for contravening social norms** making specific, **countable incidents of violence relatively rare** (Kinna and Prichard, forthcoming). **Anarchist thinkers view rising inequality in the context of declining riots, insurgencies, and assassinations** (see Figure 1) **as evidence of pacification**. Inci**dents of proletarian violence, anticolonial violence, riots, and protests are all examples of resistance to the “regimes of domination” that shape contemporary society, regimes easily identifiable by those subject to them** (Gordon 2007, 33). Drawing on these accounts, we interpret declining rates of riots as a sign of increased pacification, rather than evidence that the system is becoming less violent. Conversely, eruptions of antistate and anticapitalist direct violence are signs of a breakdown in pacification. Much like Heidegger’s example of broken equipment (1962, 102–3, 412–13), which draws our attention to the background structures of our world, brief instances of direct violence reveal violently structured social relations. Although the liberal imagination obscures the centrality of violence, violence has always been central to the liberal world order—to the liberal worldhood—particularly during the colonial and imperial projects of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (Bell 2007a, 2007b). Colonial violence was diffused throughout the entire society, often in ways that went unrecognized by the colonized themselves. **The violence of pacification structured the very existence of the colonized subject**. This **violence** transformed the **colonized subjects** into a different “**species**” (Fanon 1963, 35– 40, 43). Colonial pacification was more than direct and indirect violence; it was sufficiently diffuse to **remake the psyche** of the colonized, **affecting** their **mental health and emotions** (Fanon 1963, 35–106). Fanon (1963, 31) **described it as “atmospheric violence,” a “violence rippling under the skin.”** Unable to lash out against the colonizer, the colonized lived **everyday within a world ordered by violence**. In this world, the colonized could not respond to the colonizers for fear of directly violent reprisals and would turn to symbolic activities such as a dance circle to expose the violence experienced on a daily basis (Fanon 1963, 57). For the colonized, rituals such as the dance were a means of expressing existential frustrations with and resistance to the violence of colonial pacification through reenactments of direct violence. Ultimately, anticolonial struggles exposed the violence of colonialism by directing that violence back on its authors. Practices of colonial rule were central to developing liberal norms of sovereignty, as well as to the domination and control of recalcitrant populations whether within Europe, such as the English domination of the Welsh, Irish, and Scots, or outside of Europe by settler colonialists against indigenous populations (Deloria Jr 1974; Anghie 2005; Miller 2006; Havercroft 2008; Shaw 2008; Barkawi and Stanski 2012; Coulthard 2014; Simpson 2014; Lightfoot 2016; Rueda-Saiz 2017). **This civilizing imagination functioned phenomenologically. It produced insiders as civilized and peaceful and outsiders as violent, external threats to civilization. In doing so, this imagination successfully obscured how the structures of liberalism produced colonial violence**.13 FOOTNOTE 13 Arguments about the foundational role of colonialism, primitive accumulation, and white supremacy in structuring the modern international system are particularly useful in thinking about phenomenological violence (Jones 2006; Anievas, Manchanda, and Shilliam 2015; Du Bois 1915; Shaw 2008; Coulthard 2014; Deloria 1974; Lowe 2015; Hartman 1997). The legacy of these practices pervades contemporary liberal peace-building (Richmond 2014; Sabaratnam 2015; Bouka 2013; Autesserre 2009) and liberal global governance (Koomen 2014a, 2014b, 2013), while trade liberalization can facilitate mass violence (Kamola 2007; Smith 2016). Césaire argues that colonialism produced a “boomerang effect” within European societies; Nazism was the return of violence previously “applied only to non-European peoples” (Césaire 2000, 36). At independence, international law became a mechanism for **reinforcing this** international **order** upon the previously colonized world (Grovogui 1996). The idea of **war** as an external practice of states, not tied to their **internal workings** and located according **to** specific normative **projections of Western identity**, followed from this colonial mentality. This mentality **legitimized** the **exporting** of **violence to create a Western imperial pax** and was so widespread that it shaped the **development of modern warfare** (Ellis 1986; Proudhon [1861] 1998). The **colonial wars reproduced** and **reinforced ideologies of Western superiority, evidenced in part by the West’s superior military technology**. A consequence of this racist hubris was the inability to foresee the destructive tendencies of Western warfare when unleashed against themselves (Ellis 1986). The discipline of international relations, founded in response to the unexpectedly destructive character of the First World War, reproduced this understanding of war.14 This understanding disguises the possibility of increasing violence within the liberal world by presuming a historical narrative of progress and being shocked by its aberration. **War, however, is not the absence of peace or an aberration of liberal progress, but is instead a phenomenological breaking of the liberal worldhood**.15 Once a liberal order of democracy, free markets, and international institutions are spread throughout the world, liberal ideology imagines peace as the end state. Yet, states often deploy war under liberal guises.16 Wars under the aegis of humanitarian values and regime change are examples of the multifaceted character of liberal pacification. Liberal regimes emphasize the violence of those that they are invading, while minimizing the violence involved in these military undertakings and the violence necessary to sustain the liberal societies themselves. What Pierre-Joseph Proudhon called “the moral phenomenology of war” (Prichard 2015, 112–34; Proudhon [1861] 1998) becomes an integral part of the everyday workings of society that shape innumerable aspects of our daily language. **The upshot is that**, within liberal ideology, **the violence committed by liberal states is justified, whereas the violence committed by illiberal states is not**. **Postcolonial** and **anarchist scholarship focuses** on the **incorporation** of **violence** in the **production of liberal spaces** (Barkawi and Laffey 1999). These same concerns can be directed onto the liberal order itself. Seen from the perspective of marginalized and oppressed populations, the structures of liberal pacification take on a distinctly violent aspect. The liberal world is not less violent. Rather, **the liberal world involves a sophisticated phenomenological process of legitimating certain types of violence in order to render other types of violence invisible.** Liberal Pacification What does it mean to apply this third type of violence to our understanding of international relations? Pacification reveals liberalism as a violent process as opposed to a system that is emblematic of the absence of direct violence. There are parallels between the Pax Britannia, Pax Americana, and the ancient peace of the Pax Romana (Neocleous 2010, 13). **However, our account emphasizes the crucial role of pacification as a distinct kind of violence in maintaining these pacific orders**. Our theory offers the novel insight that incorporating pacification into the analysis of the liberal peace reveals crucial aspects **of this peace that conventional and critical accounts neglect**. A focus on pacification provides three critical insights. First, it recovers the crucial role of pacification in the historical founding of the liberal order. Second, by distinguishing between three kinds of violence (Figure 2), we account for the empirical observations of the liberal peace as leading to a decline in direct violence and an increase in violence overall as part of the pacification of the Pax Americana. Conversely, the liberal version of the Pax Americana cannot account for key anomalies. Third, our approach draws attention to the violent ordering of social relations. This dimension of violence is neglected even in Marxist, postcolonial, neo-Gramscian, and post-structuralist critiques of the liberal peace, which primarily focus on the role of direct and indirect violence in maintaining the Pax Americana. Contemporary liberal international relations theory emphasizes the nonviolent role of the liberal triad (democracy, free markets, and institutions) in causing the liberal peace. Yet, a quick review of the history of liberalism in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries shows that key figures in liberalism, from John Stuart Mill, to Joseph Galliéni, to American foreign policy elites, understood pacification as a necessary step in establishing and maintaining the liberal order Mill, one of the philosophical founders of liberalism, conceptualized and deployed liberalism as a domination strategy. **Mill argued that it is appropriate to impose despotism or slavery on “savages” who incline to “fighting and rapine,” but the government should use force as little as possible: What they require is not a government of force, but one of guidance**. Being, however, in too low a state to yield to the guidance of any but those to whom they look up as the possessors of force, the sort of government fittest for them is one [that] possesses force, but seldom uses it. (Mill 1998, 232–33) In terms of our conceptual distinction, Mill argued that liberalism as pacification was a more effective instrument of violence than the direct modes of violence that governments usually deploy. The history of European colonialism is replete with this line of reasoning. “[L]iberal improvement” was a regular plank of colonial strategy by France and Britain in the nineteenth century (Owens 2015, 154). Consider one example from the French colonial tradition. Galliéni, a military commander and administrator, consciously deployed liberalism as a domination strategy in the pacification of Tonkin during the 1890s. Galliéni’s strategy involved slowly spreading military outposts and deploying civil administrators to create markets, schools, and amenities. The rationale was that locals would gain a personal interest in the continuation of French control and would help to quell Chinese brigandage. “Piracy,” said Galliéni, “is the result of an economic condition. It can be fought by prosperity” (quoted in Owens 2015, 157). Galliéni devised a “theory of pacification” in which “the correct combination of force and politics can socialize, pacify, and domesticate a population into regulating itself” (quoted in Owens 2015, 157). What Mill proposed in theory, Galliéni enacted in practice; pacification—**the violent reordering of social relations in a colony—was a more effective means of maintaining liberal rule than the deployment of direct violence**. While less explicit, the relationship between liberalism and imperialism remained present in the twentieth-century development of the Pax Americana. During this era, US policy makers sought to construct a zone of peace distinct from the zones of war associated with authoritarian regimes. The US State Department first recognized the concept of “hegemonic pacification” in the Euro-Atlantic conference diplomacy of the 1920s (Cohrs 2008, 619). The United States’ “strategic restraint” in the aftermath of World War Two was motivated by this concept of liberal, hegemonic pacification (Ikenberry 2009; Ikenberry 2011, 173). US defense officials Stimson, Patterson, McCloy, and Assistant Secretary Howard C. Peterson agreed that it was a matter of the security interests of the United States to maintain “open markets, unhindered access to raw materials, and the rehabilitation of much—if not all—of Eurasia along liberal capitalist lines” (Leffler 1984, 349–56; Barkawi and Laffey 1999). Liberalism as a domination and pacifying strategy continued throughout (and long after) the Cold War (Laffey 2003; Stokes 2003), as evident in one of the founding documents of the post–World War Two liberal order, NSC-68 (Ikenberry 2011, 168). While the enforcement of a Pax Americana eventually yielded a decline in direct violence, it produced an increase in other types of violence. **The first insight of our theory is that pacification has always been part of the liberal project and that the violence in the liberal project never went away**. **The second insight is that by reinterpreting the liberal peace as liberal pacification we are able to grant the empirical findings of liberal peace theorists while maintaining that the Pax Americana represents an intensification of violence overall**. In the language of positivist social science, **our theory is observationally equivalent to that of liberal peace theory**. We expect that the quantity of direct violence inversely associates with the degree of pacification in a society. Therefore, our interpretation challenges research that identifies liberal institutions as the cause of declining violence. Liberal institutions, as apparatuses of liberal pacification, ensure that direct violence is increasingly rare while leaving the structures of violence and domination in place. The observational equivalence on particular dependent variables (in our case, all forms of direct violence) produces a theoretical change requiring the generation of novel observable implications (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994, 30). Furthermore, increased suffering in liberal societies provides evidence contradicting the main claims of liberal peace theories, while remaining consistent with liberal pacification. At its core, liberalism is a project that tries to maximize the utility of its subjects (in other words, minimize suffering while maximizing happiness). As such, a state of liberal peace should lead to a **decrease in markers of suffering**. **However**, there is **more slavery** in the world today than ever before, with conservative estimates of between **12.3 and 27 million people** in debt bondage, chattel, or contract slavery (Gordon 2012).17 Moreover, there is ample evidence of rising **psychological disorders** in **liberal societies**. A preponderance of evidence from the United States suggests that **depression**, **anxiety**, alienation, **opioid dependency**, **stress**, other related **psychological disorders, increased** social **isolation**, **and** the **decline of community** have increased throughout the twentieth century (Twenge, Zhang, and Im 2004, 320; Adler, Boyce, Chesney, et al. 1994; Twenge 2000; Twenge, Konrath, Foster, et al. 2008; Twenge, Gentile, DeWall, et al. 2010; Cohen and Janicki-Deverts 2012; American Society of Addiction Medicine 2016). Changes to human life associated with modernity have caused psychological **stress** to **increase** (Jackson 2014). **Mortality rates** have increased for some white, non-Hispanics aged 45–54 in the United States between 1999 and 2013 (Case and Deaton 2015). Modern technological advances from television to the Internet may contribute to increasing separation and alienation of the social human animal into individualized bodies connected by increasingly weak and empty bonds (Putnam 2000; Gray 2011; Turkle 2011). At minimum, new information communication technology such as Facebook can increase the stress and anxiety of its users (Lee-Won, Herzog, and Park 2015). **The violent structuring of liberalism enables increases in social alienation, anxiety, stress, and human bondage through repression, economic control, and social isolation**. **These are not isolated instances of suffering**. They are **fundamental structural features of our liberal world**. If liberalism is a process of pacification rather than simply peace, then this rise in individual suffering in liberal spaces may be evidence of a similar process that Fanon equated with the psychic life of the colonist. **Just as Fanon’s colonial subjects, unable to lash out at the settler through direct violence, internalized their suffering, modern liberal subjects, unable to resist liberal pacification, internalize their suffering** (1982, chap. 6; cf. Sorel 1999, 118). Liberal peace should bring about a rise in happiness; that it has instead led to rising suffering is evidence of liberal pacification. Third, in addition to offering an alternative interpretation of the liberal peace, our theory of liberal pacification supplements key insights from critical approaches to peace. Tarak Barkawi and Mark Laffey’s work on imperial processes and liberal spaces makes a similar point to ours, that the celebrated zone of liberal peace rests on practices of violence (Barkawi and Laffey 1999, 2002; cf. Neocleous et al. 2013). Their account, however, focuses on practices of direct violence, such as humanitarian interventions against authoritarian regimes or corporations hiring local militias to make work sites in the global south safe for economic extraction (Barkawi and Laffey 1999, 422). Our point is that these moments of direct violence lead to pacification wherein social relations have been so violently reordered as to make direct violence no longer necessary. **Once direct violence has established liberal space, pacification functions as a structure of violence that sustains the space**. Direct violence only manifests itself when pacification weakens. Pacification, however, does not merely operate through manipulating the conscience of its subjects. While Marxist and Gramscian concepts of ideology and hegemony are consistent with our theory of pacification (Peceny 1997, 418), they do not address how the constructed political order sustains itself through a violent reordering of social relations. A Gramscian-inspired critique of the democratic peace can yield a bird’s-eye view of the ways in which liberal peace theory is itself deployed as an ideological tool (Ish-Shalom 2006, 569–75). However, Gramscianinspired approaches do not account for the ways that everyday practices of violence (for example, surveillance technologies, implied threats from weapons, security barriers, etc.) sustain liberal pacification. While ideational factors are important in pacification, these factors rest upon practices and structures that are of an ontological-existential character. To review, our reinterpretation of the liberal peace as liberal pacification offers three novel insights. **First**, liberal scholars and others associate the **development** of the **liberal order** with **peace** and a **decline** in violence by **ignoring** how **pacification** is part of the **liberal project**. **Second**, the empirically observed decline in violence equated with the liberal peace is not **necessarily** a sign of **human progress** but could be a **sign** of **intensified repression** or **increases** in other forms of **suffering** across the **liberal world order**. Third, our concept of pacification reveals violence that is neither direct nor indirect but is phenomenologically structured into the world order. Understanding liberalism as pacification **produces a paradigm shift**. Liberal pacification is violent in the sense that it coerces a specific type of liberal docility, while also preventing types of resistance that might be understood as violent, including riots, insurrections, civil wars, and interstate wars. Pacification reveals the ongoing violence at the heart of a political project that imagines itself to be against violence. Conclusion Our account of pacification recovers a crucial aspect of pax, one originally etched into Roman monuments. The heading of the Res Gestae (the funeral monument to Emperor Augustus) reads, “[t]his is how he [Augustus] made the world subject to the power of the people of Rome” (Beard 2016, 364). This monument does not celebrate peace as the absence of violence; it celebrates pacification. Pax takes the form of a process that violently reorders the world so that imperial subjects are rendered incapable of using violence to resist Roman rule. The absence of overt acts of violence depends upon the maximization of

#### The only ethical action left is to refuse the terms as given and embrace radical passivity.

**Bifo, 11** [Franco Berardi, Italian communist theorist and activist in the autonomist tradition, whose work mainly focuses on the role of the media and information technology within post-industrial capitalism   “Chapter 4 Exhastion and Subjectivity.” After the Future, by Franco Bifo Berardi et al., AK Press, 2011. P. 107-108]

Advertising and stimulated hyper-expression (“just do it”), have submitted the energies of the social psyche to permanent mobilization. **Exhaustion follows, and exhaustion is the only way of escape: Nothing, not even the system, can avoid the symbolic obligation, and it is in this trap that the only chance of a catastrophe for capital remains. The system turns on itself, as a scorpion does when encircled by the challenge of death.** For it is summoned to answer, if it is not to lose face, to what can only be death. **The system must itself commit suicide in response to the multiplied challenge of death and suicide.** So hostages are taken. On the symbolic or sacrificial plane, from which every moral consideration of the innocence of the victims is ruled out the hostage is the substitute, the alter-ego of the terrorist, the hostage’s death for the terrorist. Hostage and terrorist may thereafter become confused in the same sacrificial act. (Baudrillard 1993a: 37) **In these impressive pages Baudrillard outlines the end of the modern dialectics of revolution against power, of the labor movement against capitalist domination, and predicts the advent of a new form of action which will be marked by the sacrificial gift of death (and self-annihilation). After the destruction of the World Trade Center in the most important terrorist act ever, Baudrillard wrote a short text titled The Spirit of Terrorism where he goes back to his own predictions and recognizes the emergence of a catastrophic age. When the code becomes the enemy the only strategy can be catastrophic: all the counterphobic ravings about exorcizing evil: it is because it is there, everywhere, like an obscure object of desire.** Without this deep-seated complicity, the event would not have had the resonance it has, and in their symbolic strategy the terrorists doubtless know that they can count on this unavowable complicity. (Baudrillard 2003: 6) This goes much further than hatred for the dominant global power by the disinherited and the exploited, those who fell on the wrong side of global order. This malignant desire is in the very heart of those who share this order’s benefits. An allergy to all definitive order, to all definitive power is happily universal, and the two towers of the World Trade Center embodied perfectly, in their very double-ness (literally twin-ness), this definitive order: No need, then, for a death drive or a destructive instinct, or even for perverse, unintended effects. Very logically – inexorably – the increase in the power heightens the will to destroy it. And it was party to its own destruction. When the two towers collapsed, you had the impression that they were responding to the suicide of the suicide-planes with their own suicides. **It has been said that “Even God cannot declare war on Himself.” Well, He can. The West, in position of God** (divine omnipotence and absolute moral legitimacy), **has become suicidal, and declared war on itself**. (Baudrillard 2003: 6-7) **In Baudrillard’s** catastrophic **vision I see a** new way of thinking subjectivity: **a reversal of the energetic subjectivation that animates the revolutionary theories of the 20th century, and the opening of an implosive theory of subversion, based on depression and exhaustion. In the activist view exhaustion is seen as the inability of the social body to escape the vicious destiny that capitalism has prepared: deactivation of the social energies that once upon a time animated democracy and political struggle. But exhaustion could also become the beginning of a slow movement towards a “wu wei” civilization, based on the withdrawal, and frugal expectations of life and consumption.** **Radicalism could abandon** the mode of **activism, and adopt** the mode of **passivity. A radical passivity would definitely threaten the ethos of relentless productivity that neoliberal politics has imposed. The mother of all the bubbles, the work bubble, would finally deflate. We have been working too much during the last three or four centuries, and outrageously too much during the last thirty years. The current depression could be the beginning of a massive abandonment of competition, consumerist drive, and of dependence on work.** Actually, if we think of the geopolitical struggle of the first decade – the struggle between Western domination and jihadist Islam – we recognize that **the most powerful weapon has been suicide.** 9/11 is the most impressive act of this suicidal war, but thousands of people have killed themselves in order to destroy American military hegemony. And they won, forcing the western world into the bunker of paranoid security, and defeating the hyper-technological armies of the West both in Iraq, and in Afghanistan. The suicidal implosion has not been confined to the Islamists. Suicide has became a form of political action everywhere. Against neoliberal politics, Indian farmers have killed themselves. Against exploitation hundreds of workers and employees have killed themselves in the French factories of Peugeot, and in the offices of France Telecom. In Italy, when the 2009 recession destroyed one million jobs, many workers, haunted by the fear of unemployment, climbed on the roofs of the factories, threatening to kill themselves**. Is it possible to divert this implosive trend from the direction of death, murder, and suicide, towards a new kind of autonomy, social creativity and of life?** I think that **it is possible only if we start from exhaustion, if we emphasize the creative side of withdrawal.** The exchange between life and money could be deserted, and **exhaustion could give way to a huge wave of withdrawal from the sphere of economic exchange. A new refrain could emerge in that moment, and wipe out the law of economic growth. The self-organization of the general intellect could abandon the law of accumulation and growth, and start a new concatenation, where collective intelligence is only subjected to the common good.** The global recession started officially in September 2008 and lasted officially until the summer of 2009. Since the summer of 2009 the official truth in the media, in political statements, in economic talk was: recovery. The stock exchange began to rise again and the banks started again paying huge bonuses to their managers and so on. Meanwhile, unemployment was exploding everywhere, salaries were falling, welfare was curtailed, 90 million more are expected to join the army of poverty in the next year. Is this recovery? Our conditional reflex (influenced by the Keynesian knowledge that recovery is the recovery of the “real economy”) answered: no, this is not recovery, capitalism cannot recover only by financial means. But we should reframe our vision. Finance is no longer a mere tool of capitalist growth. The financialization of capitalism has made finance the very ground of accumulation, as Christian Marazzi (2010) has explained in recent works such as The Violence of Financial Capitalism. In the sphere of semiocapitalism, financial signs are not only signifiers pointing to some referents. The distinction between sign and referent is over. The sign is the thing, the product, the process. The “real” economy and financial expectations are no longer distinct spheres. In the past, when riches were created in the sphere of industrial production, when finance was only a tool for the mobilization of capital to invest in the field of material production, recovery could not be limited to the financial sphere. It took also employment and demand. **Industrial**

## Case

#### Vote neg on presumption – the 1AC doesn’t propose a method to resolve the impacts they’ve isolated:

#### They don’t solve subjectivities – their discursive rupture doesn’t get rid of violent binaries which means they don’t get to utopias

#### The Ballot cannot solve any of their offense – it does not do anything but make Sean more likely to get a bid BUT the Ballot can remedy a violation of Education and Clash in this round – frame solvency through the Ballot

#### 2. Framing Issue – there is no reason why any of their offense about, zines, handing out preventative materials, etc. is intrinsic to debate – BUT there is a risk that by introducing that within debate creates a perverse incentive for violence to continue – so the moment of radicality can happen.

### Advantage

#### Mitchell 20 isnt solved

#### Space exploration isnt equivalent to the death cause by western exploration

Drake 18 [(NADIA DRAKE, science journalist and contributing writer at National Geographic.), “We need to change the way we talk about space exploration”, National Geographic, https://www.nationalgeographic.com/science/article/we-need-to-change-way-we-talk-about-space-exploration-mars, NOVEMBER 9, 2018] SS

When discussing space exploration, people often invoke stories about the exploration of our own planet, like the European conquest and colonization of the Americas, or the march westward in the 1800s, when newly minted Americans believed it was their duty and destiny to expand across the continent.

But increasingly, government agencies, journalists, and the space community at large are recognizing that these narratives are born from racist, sexist ideologies that historically led to the subjugation and erasure of women and indigenous cultures, creating barriers that are still pervasive today.

To ensure that humanity’s future off-world is less harmful and open to all, many of the people involved are revising the problematic ways in which space exploration is framed. Numerous conversations are taking place about the importance of using inclusive language, with scholars focusing on decolonizing humanity’s next journeys into space, as well as science in general.

“Language matters, and it’s so important to be inclusive,” NASA astronaut Leland Melvin said recently during a talk at the University of Virginia.

Lucianne Walkowicz, an astronomer featured in National Geographic’s docudrama series Mars, spent the last year studying the ethics of Mars exploration as the Chair of Astrobiology at the U.S. Library of Congress. We recently spoke with Walkowicz to examine the problems associated with old-fashioned verbiage and to discuss some solutions. What follows is a record of that conversation, edited for length and clarity.

Why is it so crucial to consider the words we use when describing space exploration?

The language we use automatically frames how we envision the things we talk about. So, with space exploration, we have to consider how we are using that language, and what it carries from the history of exploration on Earth. Even if words like “colonization” have a different context off-world, on somewhere like Mars, it’s still not OK to use those narratives, because it erases the history of colonization here on our own planet. There’s this dual effect where it both frames our future and, in some sense, edits the past.

What are some of the problematic narratives the term “colonization” brings up?

One narrative that comes up a lot draws on the history of Europeans coming to the Americas.

I’ve seen people talk about the arrival of the first European settlers as this romantic, heroic story of people making it in a harsh environment. But of course, there were already people here, in the Americas, when those historical events happened.

Furthermore, a lot of the Europeans’ ability to live throughout the Americas came at the cost of genocide for indigenous people. I think it’s not intuitive, particularly when we talk to white Americans, for example, to think of the history of Columbus’s journey as a story of genocide. But it’s important to realize that’s what it is.

A lot of those historical narratives are also bound up in the history of slavery, for example, so when we talk about how colonies in Virginia grew from being a few settlers to becoming tens of thousands of people, it’s also important to realize that roughly half of those people came against their own will, and many died along the way.