### Off

#### Interpretation, Affoirmatives must have delineated plan texts

Violation they do not

Standards:

Shiftinesss, lets the aff squirm out of links and disads and perm I anyway as we have no idea what they do maybe untilthe 1ar, causes late breaking which causes a 2nr research and decks fairness

#### Fairness – debate is a competitive activity that requires fairness for objective evaluation. Outweighs because it’s the only intrinsic part of debate – all other rules can be debated over but rely on some conception of fairness to be justified.

#### Drop the debater – a] deter future abuse and b] set better norms for debate.

#### Competing interps – [a] reasonability is arbitrary and encourages judge intervention since there’s no clear norm, [b] it creates a race to the top where we create the best possible norms for debate.

#### No RVIs – a] illogical, you don’t win for proving that you meet the burden of being fair, logic outweighs since it’s a prerequisite for evaluating any other argument, b] RVIs incentivize baiting theory and prepping it out which leads to maximally abusive practices

## K

## 3

#### Using “meglomaniac” to denote a form of obsession isn’t a medical condition, it’s an ableist term and a slur – drop them for violent language – use wild instead.

**Autistichoya 6/10**, 6-10-2020, "Ableism/Language," No Publication, https://www.autistichoya.com/p/ableist-words-and-terms-to-avoid.html

Generally ableist terms/phrases (some are slurs, some not) I've listed some alternatives for each phrase, but a longer list of alternatives that can be used for many terms is at the bottom of this page. Blind to \_\_\_\_ / turn a blind eye to \_\_\_\_ / blinded by ignorance/bigotry/etc. / double-blind review Refers to Blind, low-vision, or sight-limited people. Often used as a metaphor. Consider instead: willfully ignorant, deliberately ignoring, turning their back on, overcome by prejudice, doubly anonymous, had every reason to know, feigned ignorance Bonkers Can refer to people with mental or psychiatric disabilities, if the implication from use is that a person is "like a crazy person." Consider instead: wild, confusing, unpredictable, impulsive, reckless, fearless, lives on the edge, thrill-seeker, risk-taker, out of control Bound to a wheelchair (wheelchair bound) Refers to people with physical or mobility disabilities. Considered ableist because many wheelchair-users experience wheelchairs, and other mobility aids, as liberating, since they enable freedom of movement, rather than confining or restrictive. Consider instead: uses a wheelchair, wheelchair-user, in a wheelchair, began using a wheelchair, needs or requires a wheelchair, is a full-time wheelchair-user Burn victim Refers to people who have survived burns and have visible scars from burns. Not considered offensive by all. Consider instead: burn survivor, significant scarring from burns Confined to a wheelchair Refers to people with physical or mobility disabilities. Considered ableist because many wheelchair-users experience wheelchairs, and other mobility aids, as liberating, since they enable freedom of movement, rather than confining or restrictive. Consider instead: uses a wheelchair, wheelchair-user, in a wheelchair, began using a wheelchair, needs or requires a wheelchair, is a full-time wheelchair-user Crazy Refers to people with mental or psychiatric disabilities. Consider instead: wild, confusing, unpredictable, impulsive, reckless, fearless, lives on the edge, thrill-seeker, risk-taker, out of control Cripple/Crippled (by \_\_\_\_) Refers to people with physical or mobility disabilities. Often used as a metaphor. Consider instead: Frozen by, stopped by, completely stuck, totally halted all operations (if using metaphors); physically disabled person, person with a mobility impairment, paralyzed person (if referring to a disabled person) Cuckoo Refers to people with mental or psychiatric disabilities, when not used to describe the bird. Consider instead: wild, confusing, unpredictable, impulsive, reckless, fearless, lives on the edge, thrill-seeker, risk-taker, out of control Daft Refers to people with mental or psychiatric disabilities. Consider instead: dense, ignorant, lacks understanding, impulsive, risk-taker, uninformed, silly, foolish Deaf-Mute Refers to Deaf or hard of hearing people. Consider instead: Deaf person, nonspeaking Deaf person, signing Deaf person, hard of hearing person, DeafBlind person, ASL user, ASL speaker, signer Deaf to \_\_\_\_ / turn a deaf ear to \_\_\_\_ / etc. Refers to Deaf or hard of hearing people. Often used as a metaphor. Consider instead: willfully ignorant, deliberately ignoring, turning their back on, had every reason to know, feigned ignorance Deformed / deformity Refers to people born with absent limbs, disfigurements, or other atypical appearances, or who later have amputations, burn scars, or other changes to their physical appearance that are stigmatized in society. Note that many people do not mind use of the words deformed or deformity, and others find the word disfigurement offensive. Consider instead: describing the specific condition or appearance Deranged Refers to people with mental or psychiatric disabilities. Consider instead: wild, confusing, unpredictable, impulsive, reckless, fearless, lives on the edge, thrill-seeker, risk-taker, out of control, scary Derp (also herp-derp, der, durr, duh, doy, and variations) Sounds meant to mock vocalizations that people with intellectual disabilities are stereotyped as making. Some originated, per Oxford English Dictionary, with a 1943 Bugs Bunny cartoon. (h/t Josh Klopfenstein for this information on "duh") Consider instead: obviously, of course, uh yeah, ummm, ummm uhhh, um yeah, hell yeah, fuck yeah Diffability Can refer to any person with a disability, and is usually a euphemistic phrase to avoid saying "disability" or "disabled." Consider instead: disabled person or person with a disability (referring to individuals); disability/ability statuses (referring to an identity/social category) Differently abled or different abilities Can refer to any person with a disability, and is usually a euphemistic phrase to avoid saying "disability" or "disabled." Consider instead: disabled person or person with a disability (referring to individuals); disability/ability statuses (referring to an identity/social category) Dumb Refers to d/Deaf or hard of hearing people, people with speech-related disabilities, or people with linguistic or communication disorders or disabilities. Consider instead: dense, ignorant, lacks understanding, impulsive, risk-taker, uninformed, silly, foolish (to replace metaphor); nonspeaking, nonverbal, person with a speech impairment, person with a cognitive disability, Deaf person, hard of hearing person (to refer to a Deaf or disabled person) Handicap(ped) Refers to people with physical or mobility disabilities, and is usually a euphemistic phrase to avoid saying "disability" or "disabled." Consider instead: Disabled person, physically disabled person, wheelchair-user, person with a disability (to refer to a person); accessible parking, placard parking, disabled-only parking (to refer to designated parking spaces) Handicapable Usually refers to people with physical or mobility disabilities, but can also mean any person with a disability. Consider instead: Disabled person, physically disabled person, wheelchair-user, person with a disability Harelip Refers to people with cleft-lip palate or similar facial deformities/cosmetic disabilities. Consider instead: cleft lip, cleft palate, cleft lip and palate Hermaphrodite Refers to people with intersex conditions, whether or not they were coercively assigned to a particular sex/gender, and whether or not they currently identify with a binary gender. Consider instead: intersex person or person with intersex condition (if you are referencing a person's genitals or chromosomes); gender non-conforming, gender variant, or genderfluid person (if you are referencing a person's divergence from expectations of gender norms/expression) Idiot(ic) Refers to people with intellectual disabilities. Consider instead: Uninformed, reckless, impulsive, ignorant, risk-taking, risky and dangerous, dipshit Imbecile Refers to people with intellectual disabilities. Consider instead: Uninformed, reckless, impulsive, ignorant, risk-taking, risky and dangerous, dipshit Insane or Insanity Refers to people with mental or psychiatric disabilities. Often used as a metaphor. Consider instead: wild, confusing, unpredictable, impulsive, reckless, fearless, lives on the edge, thrill-seeker, risk-taker, out of control Lame Refers to people with physical or mobility disabilities. Often used as a metaphor. Consider instead: Boring, uninteresting, monotonous, lacks excitement, uncool, out of fashion (if using metaphors); physically disabled person, person with a mobility impairment, paralyzed person (if referring to a disabled person) Loony / Loony Bin Refers to people with mental or psychiatric disabilities. Consider instead: wild, confusing, unpredictable, impulsive, reckless, fearless, lives on the edge, thrill-seeker, risk-taker, out of control Lunatic Refers to people with mental or psychiatric disabilities. Consider instead: wild, confusing, unpredictable, impulsive, reckless, fearless, lives on the edge, thrill-seeker, risk-taker, out of control, scary Madhouse / Mad / Madman Refers to an institution housing people with mental or psychiatric disabilities. Consider instead: wild, confusing, unpredictable, impulsive, reckless, fearless, lives on the edge, thrill-seeker, risk-taker, out of control, scary Maniac Refers to people with mental or psychiatric disabilities. Consider instead: wild, confusing, unpredictable, impulsive, reckless, fearless, lives on the edge, thrill-seeker, risk-taker, out of control, extremely energetic

#### Reps first – is a necessary starting point of deconstruction of biases.

**Sani ‘13** [Shehu Sani – Nigerian senator, an author, playwright and a human rights activist. He is President of the Civil Rights Congress of Nigeria - (CRCN). and the Chairman of Hand-in-Hand, Africa. He was a leading figure in the struggle for the restoration of democracy in Nigeria] “Hatred for Black People” November 2013.] MT – Recut

The important point here is that language plays a role in the state's definition and policing of "the epistemological limits of what society can be." Language is not simply a cultural epiphenomenon of more fundamental economic processes. It functions as a "measure of population" setting both the outer limits of society—that is, the question of who legitimately belongs to the national community—and its inner limits or demarcations. The reality is that language is a strong force in society that segregates groups according to specific cultures, sexes, races, classes, etc. The underlying issue that allows language to build up such barriers is the subconscious fight to possess the English language. Language segregates members of society, either forcing them out or accepting them into the larger, accepted group. Languages force people out of the majority, while at the same time segregating them into smaller and smaller groups within their minority. People at each level of society associate and

#### Iit and any adjective of it is a slur

Parker marie **molloy13**

[**https://thoughtcatalog.com/parker-marie-molloy/2013/10/15-crazy-examples-of-insanely-ableist-language/#:~:text=Ableist%20language%20is%20any%20word,an%20individual%20with%20a%20disability.&text=Examples%20of%20ableist%20language%20include,psycho%2C%E2%80%9D%20%E2%80%9Cspaz.%E2%80%9D**](https://thoughtcatalog.com/parker-marie-molloy/2013/10/15-crazy-examples-of-insanely-ableist-language/#:~:text=Ableist%20language%20is%20any%20word,an%20individual%20with%20a%20disability.&text=Examples%20of%20ableist%20language%20include,psycho%2C%E2%80%9D%20%E2%80%9Cspaz.%E2%80%9D) **shes a writer for thought catalog and fights for abelism/ sc**

“Sticks and stones may break my bones, but words can never hurt me.”

The older I get, the more I realize how wrong that childhood axiom really is. Words have power. Throughout history, the right words, spoken by the right person, have been used for good and for evil. They’ve given hope to the hopeless, and they’ve been used to convince entire nations to do unspeakably nefarious things. Words convey our most powerful emotions: love, hate, anger, joy.

We need to talk about words, specifically, ableist words. One all-too-common practice of headline writing and casual speaking is flippantly using ableist vocabulary, which may cause some people real emotional harm. I’d like to see a shift away from this type of language, which I’ll get to in a moment. Obviously, you’re the only one who can determine what words you want to use in conversation or in writing, so I’ll preemptively say, no, I am not advocating censorship (beat you to it, comments section), but rather, just some thought into future word choice.

Ableist language is any word or phrase that intentionally or inadvertently targets an individual with a disability.For the most part, these words are filler, nothing more. Examples of ableist language include “crazy,” “insane,” “lame,” “dumb,” “retarded,” “blind,” “deaf,” “idiot,” “imbecile,” “invalid (noun),” “maniac,” “nuts,” “psycho,” “spaz.”

Each of these words, when used flippantly, can be extremely insulting to individuals who find themselves with physical (“lame,” “invalid,” “dumb”) or mental (“crazy,” “retarded,” “psycho”) disabilities. A full explanation of why these words are so problematic, along with alternatives that can be used can be found over at [Autistic Hoya](http://www.autistichoya.com/p/ableist-words-and-terms-to-avoid.html).

I was reading through the latest issue of Cosmopolitan (don’t judge me). On the cover in big, bold letters were the words “Crazy Hot Sex: Be the Best He’s Ever Had” (Can’t say that particular story would be of much use to me, anyway, but I digress). A friend of mine pointed out that use of the term “crazy,” was ableist. She was absolutely right. We’ve become so desensitized to this type of language that we don’t even notice it when it’s right in front of us.

Just looking through recent posts here on Thought Catalog, you can see just how pervasive this language really is. Below are 15 examples of articles (by some amazing authors) that use ableist language in the headline. I understand why these terms are used: they draw in readers through mild hyperbole.

### K

#### The 1AC is animated by the spectacle of its own power – the aff is the latest instantiation of America’s “errand in the wilderness” which suppresses interrogation of imperial violence through establishing a transcendental ethos of American Exceptionalism.

Spanos and Spanos ‘19

[William V Spanos, Literature at Binghamton, Rob Glass’ favorite, RIP to a real one, and Adam Spanos, University of Chicago. 2019. “American Spectacle and the Vietnam War Sublime,” published in “Neocolonial Fictions of the Global Cold War.” (eds. Steven Belletto and Joseph Keith)] pat

The United States has instrumentalized the spectacle as part of a twofold ideological strategy directed inwardly, toward the national community, and outwardly, toward its threatening enemy. The dominant exceptionalist culture’s representation of the wilderness of the world outside its borders functions as a means of gaining power over its alleged enemy. It has characterized this appalling wilderness as the evidence of its Other’s civilizational inferiority. It has even managed to solicit the attachment of some sectors of these foreign populations to the American-legislated nomos of the earth and drawn them into subservience to this nation’s Higher Cause.

For a domestic audience, this extraterritorial menace has been figured as a threat to the security of the covenantal people. But the invocation of this threat acts as a prompt to the citizenry to recommit its youthful energies and reconstitute its unity in the face of the recidivism—the backsliding and the splintering of the sovereign Logos—intrinsic to the “civilizing” process. This is the national ritual that the dominant culture perennially stages as spectacle, especially at times of national crisis and, above all, when the people’s dedication to the errand shows signs of flagging.

This tactic, of converting what seemed hauntingly unmasterable about the world into an admonitory rhetoric that would incite aggressive reaction, had its origin at the time when the Puritans first encountered the vastness and indefiniteness of the terrain to which they had come as well as the inassimilable alterity of the people already there. These settlers had an un-easy experience of being unhomed; they found themselves face to face with the utter contingency—even arbitrariness—of their new situation. But the American Puritans did not understand the anxiety born of this deracination as an ontological imperative to rethink their Logos. On the contrary, as Sacvan Bercovitch has shown, they harnessed this anxiety to the tasks of reorienting themselves and establishing the transcendental significance of their place in the world:

The American Puritan jeremiad was the ritual of a culture on an errand—which is to say, a culture based on a faith in process. Substituting teleology for hierarchy, it discarded the Old World ideal of stasis for a New World vision of the future. Its function was to create a climate of anxiety that helped release the restless “progressivist” energies required for the success of the venture. . . . It made anxiety its end as well as its means. Crisis was the social norm it sought to inculcate. . . . The future, though divinely assured, was never quite there, and New England’s Jeremiahs set out to provide the sense of insecurity that would ensure the outcome.

In his capacity as Jeremiah, this spokesperson of God’s chosen people represented the New World wilderness in such a way as to foreground both the promise inherent in his capacity to domesticate this terrain and the danger that constantly lurked. Furthermore, he separated those who attended to him from the temporality of being by reducing them to spectators of the alarming and captivating truth-image that he called forth. In his sermons, prose, and poetry, and despite a professed commitment to the “plain style,” he ritualized and staged the sublime, spatialized its unnameability into awesome spectacle.

The basic problematic of the US spectacle—a central component of national identity from the Puritans through the contemporary moment—is the attempt to capture the encounter with being in its dynamic, errant, and totally unjustifiable givenness and to convert the wonder it evokes into awe. American spectacle supplies an illusory grounding for the nation’s existence, suggesting that the appearance and subsequent presence of the United States are divinely ordained; citizens access this meaning to the extent that they consent to the meaningfulness of the spectacle offered to them. This spectacle resembles the sublime experience of the absence of any such transcendental guarantee insofar as it forces the spectator to confront that which is beyond the pale of merely empirical knowledge. But whereas the sublimity of the nothingness of being calls forth questions—albeit ones that are finally un-answerable—the spectacle of US power functions to suppress the faculty of interrogation. It therefore involves a twofold displacement: in place of the nothing the spectacle offers the illusory presence of American power; instead of an inquisitive relation to what remains unknown the spectacle encourages acquiescence and silent marveling. The jeremiad constitutes a relay between the two points and functions to ensure that the spectacle doesn’t degenerate into the sublime.

Dejustification of Violence: Vietnam as Event

The decisive event heralding the implosion of the American spectacle occurred at the conclusion of the Vietnam War, a turning point that has widely been identified with the breakdown of the country’s social order. Historians of the war have recognized this fact without identifying its proper ontological rationale. According to Marilyn Young, “the war opened up for debate not only the principles that had governed American foreign policy since the end of World War II, but the larger structure of the nation and its political procedures.” Furthermore, “racism and poverty were being explained as endemic, the social system seen as inherently unfair to minority groups; natural resources were described as depleted and limited, and the Cold War as at least as much an American as a Soviet creation. . . . [F]undamental moral values connected to family, sex, and work that had only rarely been challenged in the past were held up to public scrutiny, even scorn.” Likewise, Christian Appy argues that the war forced Americans to reassess their national identity, in the process of which their belief in American exceptionalism was “shattered.” However one specifies the inception of this event—the student protests and teach-ins, the mounting resistance to the draft, the radicalization of the civil rights movement, the imposition of a tax increase to pay for the war, the public reaction to the Tet offensive, the revelation of the My Lai massacre, the publication of the Pentagon Papers, or otherwise—it is undeniable that a general symbolic crisis had taken place, one that rendered increasingly large domains of American life unjustifiable in the eyes of its members. But this event, most often referred to as the “Vietnam quagmire,” involved more than the collapse of previously hegemonic social structures. More fundamentally, it brought into question the political ontology on which the United States had predicated its very existence.

Prior to this event, the US state had relied on visual technologies in order to foster public consent for the war. The fact that this was the first “post-modern war” and the first to be widely televised did not alter the fact that the state and national elites had long worked to solicit public acquiescence by way of imagery, even if the tools used to produce these images were primarily rhetorical and their manifestation largely confined to the collective imaginary. By the closing stages of the conflict, however, many American citizens (and others across the globe) came to recognize the emptiness of these images, their lack of historical referentiality. The end of the Vietnam War, then, did not only entail the withdrawal of consent for an imperial army’s occupation of a foreign territory. It also and more significantly involved a disclosure of the nothingness—the absence of ground—that had always haunted US pretensions to universalism. This culminating moment forced an encounter with the primal scene of the nation’s founding, a site at which this nothingness had been obscured by the spectacular imagistics of US ideology. When the spectacle’s history-destroying function became manifest to viewers of the war at home, a rupture in the ordinary sequence of time took place that suddenly brought the life-destroying violence of American power into stark relief. The Vietnam War then became the untimely occasion for a rethinking of the very meaning of “America,” an event that continues to ramify into the present.

Since the Puritans had announced their intention to redeem world his-tory through the establishment of a polity with a universal mission, the temporality of US national life was determined by its adventist rhetoric and view of history. In announcing to the world the “good news” that the United States would have brought to all mankind, in the confident mode of the future anterior, its deputies took what had been a secularized version of the providential view of history (as given, for example, by Hegel) and retheologized it. The philosophers of US history married the progressive view of history to a messianic sense of their nation’s capacity to bring the flux of time to an end. The demise of this paradigm, however, was marked not by the anticipated triumph of liberal capitalism over its antagonists but by the defeat of American forces in Vietnam.

Because US identity was so intimately bound up with this temporality—one that was simultaneously amnesiac, optimistic, and expectant—the recognition of the impending failure of US forces to overcome its putatively Communist opponent could not easily be metabolized. On one hand, the disclosure of the gap between the principles used to justify the war and the military’s actual conduct in Vietnam served to undermine domestic support for the war, which suddenly become comparable to other great atrocities in recent memory, including the genocide of Jews during World War II. On the other hand, the very historical context in which the Vietnam War was understood to inhere, as an event distinct from what came before because part of the nation’s linear movement toward a better future, no longer sufficed to orient Americans within historical time. The comfort provided by the idea that they were safely lodged on a determinate trajectory dissipated when the forecasted end of the war failed to materialize. Subsequently both the nation’s identity and the dominant understanding of how that identity would realize itself in historical time entered a period of crisis.

It was not simply the US government’s justification of the war, the cold calculations of military planners, or the execution of the war by soldiers that came to seem morally wrong and indifferent to human life. Nor was it the case that the war came to be understood as an exception to the basic principles undergirding US foreign policy, a ghastly aberration within an otherwise benevolent history of interactions with other peoples. Instead, this event reconfigured the national imaginary in a totalizing way. The nonlocalized nature of the critiques of the United States, the extension of these challenges to almost all components of American life, intensified the perception that a kind of generalized anarchy had been unleashed that threatened to undermine the nation’s existence. But the energies unleashed in this moment were not merely critical, and it is for this reason that the familiar historiographical trope of the war that comes home does not completely capture the dynamic of the event. For a new spirit of inquiry emerged simultaneously alongside the impulse to challenge existing practices of domination, one that worked to disclose truths that had previously been unthinkable.

The Vietnam War came to be perceived as a part of an iterative temporal sequence rather than a unique occurrence. Suddenly an entire catalog of state violence became relevant to the effort to make sense of this war; those who immersed themselves in the event worked to retrieve these historical referents from the antiquarian status to which traditional historians and cultural critics had consigned them. Among these, the removal and genocide of Native Americans was among the most significant. Throughout the war, it was common for American soldiers to refer to the undefended zones outside of their fortifications as “Indian country,” which it was their job to clear and make ready for civilized, capitalist life. Although the pervasiveness of this metaphor initially served to conceal the violence at stake in both projects, finally the revelations about the sheer extent of the displacements in Vietnam—and the casualness with which Vietnamese civilians were killed—turned the metaphor into a metonymy. The distance between Indian removal and the devastation of Vietnamese communities collapsed as the war came to seem like merely one instance of a broader imperial project. Other events, too, flashed into view: Hernán Cortés’s conquest of the Aztec Empire using spectacular and demoralizing displays of force; Manifest Destiny, the westward expansion that brooked no obstacle—ecological or human—set on the path of the settlers’ unerring mission; and the mass enslavement and subordination of peoples of African descent, which had its parallel in the disproportionate conscription of young black men to fight, as Martin Luther King Jr. said, “to guarantee liberties in Southeast Asia which they had not found in Southwest Georgia and East Harlem.” In some quarters these projects had long been the object of anguish and critique; as a consequence of the Vietnam War the dejustificatory violence they entailed for existing US narratives became ineluctable.

The late Vietnam War was not the only such modern event in which a catastrophe had delegitimated regnant worldviews and discharged a wave of attempts to secure more livable forms of life. Nor was this the only such moment in American history. The domestication and instrumentalization of the sublime in the service of the US “empire of liberty” was synecdochically epitomized by the two writers who have been identified (contradictorily) as “quintessentially American novelists,” Herman Melville and Mark Twain, the one deliberately, the other inadvertently, in such novels as Moby-Dick (1851), where the sublime whiteness of the whale is staged as spectacle in behalf of imperial aggrandizement, and A Connecticut Yankee in King Arthur’s Court (1889), whose narrative signature is the staging of illusion for effect.38But whereas these writers discerned the nothingness that the preponderant national narrative had tried to obscure symptomatically in their texts—with differing degrees of lucidity—they remained essentially solitary voices in the wilderness: prophetic figures without followings. In the Vietnam War, by contrast, a mass movement emerged that was characterized by the perception that the spectacle had already effectively foundered. And while those attentive to this disclosure did not constitute a majority of the US population, they were especially importunate and expansive in their thinking. These protesters identified the spectacular logics of domination as they had manifested at sites all along the continuum of being: the glorification of the patriarch and such mediatic analogues as the cowboy, the lone ranger, and the crime boss; the hypostatization of the rugged individual over collective modes of being; the transfiguration of the labor relation into the commodity; the manipulation and devastation of ecosystems; the intense cultural visibility of white people and the penumbra cast around all others; and, of course, the pyrotechnics of US militarism. The Vietnam War disclosed the totalizing control that the culture of the US spectacle asserted not only over national existence but over all of these registers of being in the same instant that it unshackled the interrogative energies that had previously been labelled “divisive,” “obscene,” or “nihilistic.”

This same event had an incredible effect on the composition and mission of the American university. Prior to and during the war, the spectacle of US military might had served as a substitute for—if not a direct incentive to—a research agenda. Not only did this spectacle paralyze the public and encourage complacency about matters of citizenship, but it also offered the illusion of a complete set of answers to the problems of national existence. But when the compensatory function of the spectacle became recognizable, the questions it had been meant to allay suddenly took on renewed importance. Out of this new spirit of interrogation a number of intellectual projects emerged, among them ethnic studies, black studies, lesbian and gay studies, women’s studies, postcolonial studies, and—only much later—a new Americanist studies. In dialogue with new or reconfigured interpretive methods like semiology, deconstruction, reader-response criticism, Foucauldian genealogy, psychoanalysis, and Marxism, these inquiries formalized insights that had been intuited in the broader culture.

These formations, like many of the new social movements that emerged concomitantly, have all too often been misunderstood as simple purveyors of “identity politics,” so it is worth briefly recalling their originary impulse. The US war effort marked the culmination of a long history that had al-ready reduced large sectors of its population to mere “standing reserve,” an underemployed, systematically marginalized, unrecognized, and uprooted population whose only function was to respond docilely to the national calling (whether in the draft or another capacity). All of the constituent parts of this nameless coalition had been subjected to the spectacular authority of the country and denied a voice within the limited circle of US democracy. As speaking beings who were, however, not afforded the right to speak the nation’s political language—who were not allowed to utter its shibboleth of redemption or to participate in its empire of liberty—they were thrown back upon themselves as unhomed subjects. It was out of this condition of debarment from what was euphemized as the “national conversation” that the aforementioned intellectual and social movements invented new forms of speech capable of identifying the aporias in the nation’s discourses on freedom, inclusivity, and justice. Not efforts to constitute as identities what had been deconstituted by the nation’s white metaphorics, these “whatever singularities” devoted themselves to uncovering what had been obfuscated, even nullified, by the United States’ beneficent self-representation and its meliorative philosophy of history. In the process they produced universal logics of their own that offered the possibility of more livable lives: ones in which sex will have been desublimated, freedom reconceptualized in more substantive terms, collective autonomy respected without exception. The Vietnam War did not cause the emergence of these intellectual movements but it catalyzed the oppositional forces that ultimately came to understand the Vietnam War in its longer and more encompassing history.

Ungrounding National Being

The decomposition of the spectacular facade of US imperialism at the end of the Vietnam War was undoubtedly a transformative event, but it was not beyond the reach of the powers of restoration. Although it opened up new possibilities for thinking US social relations and incited the formation of new collectivities and cultural and intellectual initiatives in its wake, the partisans of this event did not abolish the spectacle once and for all. Afterward, state agents turned to the same technology in order to carry out the Gulf War and the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as the more amorphous “war on terror” that continues across the globe. The “shock and awe” tactics employed in Baghdad in 2003, for example, suggested to Iraqis that the United States was so inordinately powerful that resistance was futile. But they also messaged to a domestic audience that the state’s will was “incontrovertible” and not to be questioned. Yet already in the first Gulf War, the United States was employing techniques which conveyed the impression that the war was not so much a life-and-death encounter or an invasion with real human consequences but a media event. When George H. W. Bush declared that through the conduct of this war the United States had finally “kicked the Vietnam syndrome,” he meant that the nation had finally overcome its anxious encounter with the emptiness of its own claims to legitimacy. The spectacle of the war covered over the nothingness that the sublime end of the previous war had precipitated.

#### Recent US history has vacillated between the sublime and the spectacle, between the perception of the horrible nihilistic violence that undergirds US expansion and a stupefaction before the supreme glory and redemptive ends of this same power. Despite momentary fulgurations of resistance to US imperialism and its affiliated projects, most notably in Seattle in 1999, the run-up to the invasion of Iraq in 2003, the global Occupy protests of 2011, and the Movement for Black Lives, today the spectacle prevails. Donald Trump’s presidency, although founded in part on the claim that the neoconservative wing of the Republican Party has betrayed American interests, is in fact deeply committed both to the imperial conception of US identity and to governance through pacification by means of the spectacle. His invocations of American “greatness” in fact function to conjure a spectacular image, one designed to short-circuit inquiries into the unsavory histories of US injustices and to construct a community united around his jeremiad that acts to exclude numerous others. It is no coincidence in this regard that Trump has drawn the key phrase of his campaign from Ronald Reagan, whose central objective in his first campaign and afterward was to make Americans forget the violence they had perpetrated in Vietnam. And yet this historical parallel remains largely obscured in public discourse at present, as do the many others that link Trump to his forebears in the office. For it is in the nature of the spectacle to short-circuit history, to conceal the decisions, the agents, and the actions that led to the expropriation and subordination of human lives, and to proffer instead the illusion of a timeless truth that should be accepted as a matter of course. In this renewal of the spectacular culture of the United States, new victims are being made and old ones restored to their former roles

#### Their ‘nationalization’ of space is the same American world-making strategy that expanded the carceral state under the premise of beating the Soviet menace in the cosmos, expancing carciality and cohering imperialism after vietnam

Loyd ‘15. Jenna M. 2015. "Whitey on the Moon: Space, Race, and the Crisis of Black Mobility." In Montegary, Liz and Melissa White, eds. Mobile Desires: The Politics and Erotics of Mobility Justice. Palgrave Pivot, 41-52.//NAE

But Watts is a country which lies, psychologically, uncounted miles further than most whites seem at present willing to travel. (Pynchon, 1966) From the days of chattel slavery until today, the concept of travel has been inseparably linked in the minds of our people with the concept of freedom. (Robeson, 1988, original emphasis) In the 1960 presidential election, candidate John F. Kennedy invoked moon exploration to displace the salience of religious division by focusing on unifying issues, including the spread of Communism that was ‘fester[ing] only 90 miles from the coast of Florida’ and crises in family farms, hunger, and unaffordable medical care that ‘know no religious barrier.’ The real problem was ‘an America with too many slums, with too few schools, and too late to the moon and outer space.’ This listing of ‘real issues which should decide this campaign’ suggested urgent, yet equally solvable, concerns. The space race ratified a national challenge, suggesting that returning the gaze from this ‘new frontier’ to domestic problems was the next step for technoscientific progress. When Dr Martin Luther King spoke of the moon in 1967, he was a world away from Kennedy’s Cold War hopefulness (Jordan, 2003). He delivered his final speech, ‘Where Do We Go From Here?: Chaos or Community?’, to the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) on the ten-year anniversary of the organization’s formation following the Montgomery bus boycott. Despite the gains of the civil rights move- ment, King concluded, ‘the Negro still lives in the basement of the Great Society.’ He went on to question the consonance between scientific and social progress that had seemed so central to Kennedy’s understanding of the nation: Today our exploration of space is engaging not only our enthusiasm but our patriotism.... No such fervor or exhilaration attends the war on poverty.... Without denying the value of scientific endeavor, there is a striking absurdity in committing billions to reach the moon where no people live, while only a fraction of that amount is appropriated to service the densely populated slums. If these strange views persist, in a few years we can be assured that when we set a man on the moon, with an adequate telescope he will be able to see the slums on earth with their intensified congestion, decay and turbulence. King concluded his remarks by asking: ‘On what scale of values is this a program of progress?’ (King, as cited in Gilroy, 1991 [1987], pp. 345–346). Spectacular Cold War images of space travel drew on and renovated a constellation of meanings associated with mobility that inform US national identity, including celebratory narratives of continental exploration, limitless possibility, and freedom. Kennedy did not see any conflict between mastering space travel and meeting domestic needs – each a concrete signification of American capitalist providence in the Cold War period. King’s speech marks both of these registers. His imagined telescopic view of the earth traverses an expansive scale of human possi- bility, but under Pax Americana, King finds that ‘common humanity’ is an ideological vision papering over the reality of grave economic and racial divisions. Even before a man (much less The Man) was on the moon, liberal and radical social critics alike were deploying a rhetorical device I call lunar criticism – ‘If we can put a man on the moon, we can do X, Y, or Z’ – to question US national priorities and narratives of progress. Liberal iterations of lunar criticism suggested that the gap between promise and practice could be bridged as part of fulfilling the national creed. Radical social critics argued that what appeared to be an incidental gap was in fact a racialized conflict. Reaching the moon began to look less like a virtuous American project than a white American project that furthered Black economic exploitation and abandonment. The space race as a spectacle of freedom and (white) upward mobility must be held in tension with the deepening ‘urban crisis’ (Beauregard, 2003). As both a powerful discourse and material geography, the urban crisis was constituted through Cold War investments in suburban housing, freeways, and defense industry construction, relative disinvestment in central cities, and through militarized, counter-insurgency responses to the urban unrest of the 1960s (Loyd, 2014). Yet, the interrelations between these spaces have been obscured through enduring spectacular productions of capitalist suburban hyper-mobility and ‘ghetto’ immobilization and backwardness (Siddiqi, 2010). As novelist Thomas Pynchon dissected, ‘Watts’ was another country to white Americans, represent- ing a psychological distance that white Americans were disinclined to travel. This chapter situates radical iterations of lunar criticism within the context of urban crisis and on the cusp of what Jodi Melamed, following Howard Winant, calls the post-World War II ‘racial break’ after which ‘state-recognized US antiracisms replaced white supremacy as the chief ideological mode for making the inequalities that global capitalism generated appear necessary, natural, or fair’ (Melamed, 2011, p. xvi). By contrast, race-radical antiracisms ‘have made visible the continued racialized historical development of capitalism and have persistently foregrounded antiracist visions incompatible with liberal political solutions to destructively uneven global social-material relations’ (p. xvii). In the spectacular treatment of urban uprisings, the space called the ‘ghetto’ ideologically and tactically cohered the problems of urban crisis, which were actually metropolitan (urban-suburban) in form and imperial in process. To develop this argument, I analyze the work of Gil Scott-Heron whose poetry, songs, and writing exemplify the race-radical tradition. His poem ‘Whitey on the Moon’ delivers a radical antiracist critique of the US space program that ties otherworldly investments to ongoing histories of Black forced im/mobility and immiseration. To that end, this essay responds to the call within the new mobilities scholar- ship to examine the ‘role of past mobilities in the present constitution of modern notions of security, identity and citizenship’ (Cresswell, 2012, p. 646). I begin by situating mobilities within post-war militarized spectacle and racial politics. I then move to an analysis of how race-radical lunar criticism grappled with the dialectics of urban crisis, which included the simultaneous deployment of rhetorics of mobility and new means of social control and state power. I conclude by exploring how Scott-Heron’s race-radical vision offers insights into contemporary mobilizations for mobility justice. Cold War spectacles of (upward) mobility What sort of national spectacle was the moon when King spoke? Spectacle tends to be understood as an ideological mask or distortion of reality, but Shiloh Krupar usefully conceptualizes spectacle as ‘a tactical ontology – meaning a truth-telling, world-making strategy’ (2013, p. 10). Indeed, in Blank Spots on the Map (2009), Trevor Paglen shows how NASA was the visible institutional face of an expansive and largely secret Cold War military geography. Krupar and Paglen show how US militarization has developed through institutional apparatuses and personnel that create a world of plausible appearances. Visuality and material landscapes are interconnected such that hypervisibility (that is, the space race) is a technological apparatus simultaneously creating unseen spaces of waste and sacrifice. Thus, spectacle is a tool of reification and division that works by disconnecting spaces and categories – delineating human from nature, valued from abjected – that are actually produced together. Caren Kaplan’s work on the visual logic of modern war-making connects such spectacles to the mobility of states and imperial citizens. Air power is an iteration of the cosmic view, a ‘unifying gaze of an omniscient viewer of the globe from a distance’ (Kaplan, 2006, p. 401). Kaplan ties this viewpoint – which claims universality, neutrality, and freedom ‘from bounded embeddedness on earth’ – to Euro-American colonization (Kaplan, 2006, p. 402; also see Cosgrove, 1994). Modern military ‘air power is seamlessly linked to the cosmic view through its requirements for a unified, universal map of the globe that places the home nation at the center on the ground and proposes an extension of this home to the space above it, limitlessly’ (Kaplan, 2006, p. 402). The upshot, according to Kaplan, is that the mobility of air power simultaneously produces an imagination of fixed sovereign territories. Indeed, for Kaplan, modern war is paradoxical in that it ‘requires the movements of large armies and instigates the mass displacement of refugees, yet it also polices borders and limits freedom of movement’ (p. 396). I take these theories of spectacle to suggest that the Cold War space race produced a modern, white, upwardly mobile subject that obscured the simultaneous co-production of an immobilized, unfree population confined to a knowable, tactical domestic space. That is, the militarization of the ‘cosmic view’ facilitates not only abstract targets of foreign war, but also targets of domestic state and state-sanctioned violence and confinement. The militarized logic of the ‘home front’ both coercively compels a patriotic citizen subject and obscures the racial, gender, class, and other social divides within the nation that belie the state’s claim to national unity (Lutz 2002; Young 2003; Loyd 2011). As the United States faced vulnerability to charges of racism during the Cold War, a cultural project of racial liberalism enabling mobility of the US empire would simultaneously entail efforts to confine Black mobility and dissident thought. For example, Rachel Buff (2008) shows how the US government deployed the terror of deportation as a means of disrupting political organizing. In the immediate post-World War II era, both W. E. B. Du Bois and Paul Robeson were barred from foreign travel for their views on peace, nuclear abolition, and decolonization (Kinchy, 2009; Robeson, 1988). The experience, no doubt, contributed to the observation that the Robeson epigraph makes on the race-radical desire for free mobility. Race-radical lunar criticism The United States would not make its lunar touch down until 1969 (after Kennedy’s and King’s assassinations), but King found a moon landing a more plausible future than a Second Reconstruction. And it was more plausible. By the time of his speech, long, hot summers of urban uprisings punctured the image of freedom and opportunity that the United States projected around the world. Moreover, the War on Poverty, while less than three years old, was virtually dead letter. The 1966 midterm elections ushered in legislators who claimed a mandate to terminate the War on Poverty and urban social investments. The ‘great rat debate’ of 1967 captured the level of political polarization as Congress quibbled over a miserly sum of ‘no more than $16.5 million to combat rodent infestations in ghetto neighborhoods.’ A year later, the Los Angeles Times observed, ‘[r]ats are still coexisting with the poor as comfortably as ever’ (Abramson, 1968). It is within this context that Gil Scott-Heron’s ‘Whitey on the Moon’ makes landing in 1970 on his first album, Small Talk at 125th and Lennox. The poem’s narrative arc is wryly humorous and brief, delivered in less than two minutes, with a simple drum accompaniment common in street poetry. Scott-Heron tells the story of sister Nell, who has been attacked by a rat even as Neil Armstrong lands on the moon: A rat done bit my sister Nell with Whitey on the moon. Her face and arms began to swell and Whitey’s on the moon. I can’t pay no doctor bills, but Whitey’s on the moon. Ten years from now I’ll be payin’ still while Whitey’s on the moon. Debts for Nell’s medical treatment, which would not have been incurred were there basic tenant rights and public health investments, will extend into the foreseeable future as costs for rent, food, and taxes will continue to rise to pay for the voyage. The final line of the song offers a sardonic resolution to the outlandish situation. When the next doctor bills arrive, he will forward them ‘air mail special to Whitey on the moon.’ Marvin Gaye’s 1971 song ‘Inner City Blues (Make Me Wanna Holler)’ likewise links high taxes and inflation to an imperial project that results in the devastation of Black lives: ‘Markets, moon shots, spend it on the have-nots/Money, we make it, ‘fore we see it, you take it.’ Scott-Heron and Gaye flip racist narratives of the welfare queen as responsible for poverty, naming instead state neglect and the theft of Black wealth. Their songs reclaim the value being appropriated to a desirable national project that denies it rests on Black expropriation and death. In this reading, the moon counters temporalities and spatialities of racial liberalism that rendered white supremacy as historical and anachronistic by insisting that American white supremacy is part of the modern geopolitical order. Visual artist Faith Ringgold also depicted this reality in her 1969 paint- ing of an American flag entitled ‘Flag for the Moon: Die Nigger.’ The word ‘die’ reads across the block of stars in the flag’s upper left corner. The stripes of the flag are formed by elongated black letters aligned from the bottom to the top edge of the flag, spelling out the word ‘nigger’ between the customary 13 red stripes. The painting’s message is three-fold: the use of black paint in place of white draws attention to the negative space between the lines to illustrate the tense interrelation between the invis- ibility of white supremacy and Black people to the history of the United States. Ringgold indicts the act of placing the flag on the moon as sending a spectacular message underscoring the abandonment of Black needs. Yet, the painting’s reference to H. Rap Brown’s Die, Nigger, Die! suggests the immediate tension between structural racism and the possibility for liberatory Black politics and identity (Patton, 1998, p. 198). ‘Whitey on the Moon’ is often cited as an expression of afrofuturism, which Mark Dery defines as a genre of Black social thought concern- ing ‘culture, technology, and things to come’ (Dery, as cited in Nelson, 2002, p. 9). For Kodwo Eshun, afrofuturism provides a ‘resource for speculation’ that traces the ‘potentiality of space and distance within the high-pressure zone of perpetual racial hostility’ (Eshun, 2003, p. 299). He explains that afrofuturism ‘uses extraterrestriality as a hyper- bolic trope to explore the historical terms, the everyday implications of forcibly imposed dislocation, and the constitution of Black Atlantic subjectivities: from slave to negro to coloured...to black to African to African American’ (pp. 298–299). In an afrofuturist reading, radical lunar criticism uses the vast physi- cal distance of the earth to the moon to imagine alternative futures to the gaping racial divides in earthly living conditions and well-being. As Stevphen Shukaitis suggests, ‘the imaginal machine based around space imagery is made possible by its literal impossibility. In the sense that this possibility cannot be contained or limited, it becomes an assemblage for the grounding of a political reality that is not contained but opens up to other possible futures that are not foreclosed through their pre-given definition’ (2009, p.107). Given the coloniality of the cosmic view and the simultaneous construction of Black ‘placelessness and constraint’ (McKittrick, 2011, p. 948), I suggest that Scott-Heron’s lunar criticism is not so much concerned with the otherworldly as a space for imagining the earthly impossible, but for assembling earthly sites of decolonization and liberation. Scott-Heron’s race-radical critique explores what Katherine McKittrick calls ‘spaces of encounter that hold in them useful anticolonial practices and narratives’ (2011, p. 950). He offers a theory of militarized spectacle in which juxtaposition, or division, falls way to connection, to shared production. He shows how a landscape of rat-infested housing produces the man on the moon – through taxes and a vanishing horizon of medical debt – and names the spectacle obscuring this process ‘Whitey.’ In contrast to liberal iterations of lunar criticism, which suggested that solving poverty was possible within the terms of American capitalism, Scott-Heron linked American capitalism to the production of poverty, militarism, environmental devastation, and human abandonment. These themes found in ‘Whitey on the Moon’ are consistent across his work, and include persistent criticism of spectacular popular culture and consumerism, war and state violence (‘No Knock,’ ‘King Alfred’s Plan,’ ‘Did You Hear What They Said?,’ ‘H20 Gate Blues,’ ‘B Movie’), concern for children’s well being (‘Speed Kills,’ ‘Who Will Save the Children?’), the threat of nuclear destruction and climate change (‘We Almost Lost Detroit,’ ‘South Carolina (Barnwell),’ ‘Spacesong’), drugs and habituation to other people’s suffering (‘Billy Green Is Dead,’ ‘Angel Dust,’ ‘Home is Where the Hatred Is’), and structural unemployment (‘Who Will Pay Reparations on My Soul?’). Scott-Heron’s poems link histories of forced mobility to the development of blues consciousness and revolution, exemplifying what Clyde Woods (2000) calls a ‘blues epistemology.’ Indeed, Scott-Heron described himself as a ‘bluesologist’ (Ward, 2011), pursuing the science of the blues, offering a diagnostic that the ‘I ain’t got no money blues, I ain’t got no job blues, I ain’t got no woman blues’ are the same things (Mugge, 1982). For Woods, the blues ‘has been used repeatedly by multiple genera- tions of working-class African Americans to organize communities of consciousness....It was used to confront the daily efforts of plantation powers to erase African American leadership and the memory of social progress. ... The blues and its extensions are actively engaged in providing intellectually brutal confrontations with the “truths” of working-class African American life. It draws on African American musical practices, folklore, and spirituality to re-organize and give a new voice to working- class communities facing severe fragmentation’ (2005, p. 1008). The economic and racial forces of displacement and fragmentation were not distant from Scott-Heron. He was born in Chicago and spent much of his childhood living with his grandmother in the small town of Jackson, Tennessee. He saw the African American section of Jackson demolished to build the new highway between Memphis and Nashville before moving at the age of 13 with his mother to New York City (Scott- Heron, 2012). They first lived with his uncle in the Bronx and later in the Robert Fulton Houses in Chelsea. From there, he rode the subway for over an hour to Fieldston, a private high school in the Bronx. After his first year of college at Lincoln University in Oxford, Pennsylvania, which he chose to attend because Black writers and leaders such as Langston Hughes, Kwame Nkrumah, and Thurgood Marshall studied there, he took a leave of absence to complete his first novel, The Vulture. The book was published in 1970, the same year as his first album (and book of poetry), Small Talk at 125th and Lennox, which also debuted the well-known poem ‘The Revolution Will Not Be Televised.’ Scott-Heron’s blues offered an anticolonial vision of race-radical revo- lutionary consciousness, evident on the album From South Africa to South Carolina (1975), which ties together nuclear colonialism in South Carolina with apartheid in South Africa. Claudrena Harold (2011) observes that, ‘Scott-Heron’s descriptions of “down home” routinely moved beyond the geographical borders of the former Confederacy and into the transna- tional terrain commonly referred to as the Global South.’ ‘Delta Man,’ for example, traces the development of revolutionary consciousness along the sites of the plantation and Great Migration, from the Mississippi Delta during slavery, to Nebraska following the Civil War, and then to the inner city. The bridge between each of these places – ‘revolution outta be where I’m comin’ from’ – shuttles possibility between sites of forced mobility. The history lessons found in ‘Spacesong’ and ‘Who’ll Pay Reparations on My Soul?’, moreover, speak of white settler dispossession of Native inhabitants. Such an expansive internationalist, decolonial desire tempers the feeling of despair otherwise dominant in ‘Winter in America.’ The song was written in 1975 at a moment when the possibility of the Black freedom and peace movements had been betrayed, leaving ‘nobody fight- ing ‘cause nobody knows what to save.’ Within an internationalist blues epistemology, however, the hopeful suggestion is that spring can still be found in movements outside of the United States (Peddie, 2011, 122). Mobilizing urban crisis The militarization of the urban crisis was accompanied by an ideological project to enclose the racialized ‘Black ghetto’ as a place separate from modern white suburbia, reifying it as a space of dangerousness that may be subject legitimately to exceptional rules and abandoned. The great rat debate contributed to this ideological crystallization. Southern Democrats and Republican opponents of the bill used innuendo (‘rats of the two-legged variety’ and ‘rats of the four-legged variety’) to tie the bill to race and rioting in Newark (Strickland, 1969, p. 342). Another congressman mockingly referred to it as the ‘civil “rats” bill’ (McLaughlin, 2011, p. 542). ‘Whitey on the Moon,’ by turn, revealed the truth that state abandonment is not just an afterthought, but a productive absence directly abetted by state violence. In drawing together the exploration of the moon with the extraction of value from and suppression of Black freedom movements, race-radical lunar criticism rejected the bifurcated militarized spectacle of limitless space and anachronistic ghetto confinement. Indeed, Scott-Heron offers a documentary trace of the new ‘great confinement’ that was then in the making (de Giorgi, 2006). In ‘No Knock,’ Scott-Heron invites listeners to take an incredulous interpretation of new legislation that enabled the police to enter a dwelling without notice: Long rap about “No Knock” being legislated for the people you’ve always hated in this hell hole that you/we call home. “No Knock,” the Man will say to keep this man from beating his wife. “No Knock,” the Man will say to protect people from themselves. His poem ‘King Alfred’s Plan’ discusses a Nixon plan for preventive detention that would create a caged future in the absence of Black political unity. ‘Locked in cages, pens, hemmed in shoulder to shoulder arms outstretched for just a crust of bread...Let us unite out of love and not hate / Let us unite on our own and not because of barbed wire death.’ As race-radical lunar criticism illustrates, the material and ideological struggle over urban crisis constituted a space for grappling with intersecting structures of white racial rule and empire, namely whether and how they could be democratically reconstructed. This offers a cultural trace of the shift from military Keynesianism to post-Keynesian militarism that Ruth Wilson Gilmore (1998) names as the conjuncture for the sharp expansion of the carceral state. In contrast to the ‘symbiotic’ progression from ‘ghetto’ to prison confinement offered by Wacquant (2001), race-radical lunar criticism illustrates both the tremendous contests over shifting forms of unfreedom and their situatedness within a broader crisis of imperialism that anticolonial and ‘domestic’ freedom struggles provoked. The uneven geography that the warfare-welfare state produced was the grounds of struggle over the costs and harms of militarization. Investments in defense were widespread but concentrated in New South and New West sites in the so-called Sunbelt, what Markusen and colleagues (1991) dubbed the Gunbelt. This unevenness was not only regional, but also shaped patterns of development at the metropolitan scale (Loyd, 2014). This social and spatial struggle was deeply racialized and gendered. For this reason, it is misleading to interpret the space race as a form of militarization that uniformly trumps basic needs, as liberal versions of spending priorities suggest. Conflicts over who would pay for the costs of empire and militarization were mediated through strug- gles over racism that took a spectacular form, splitting inner city from suburb in ways that obscured the intersections among race, class, and gender. The Black welfare mother was enlisted as the spectacular figure of national disorder, even though most welfare recipients were white and most Great Society spending supported middle class suburban homes. Scott-Heron’s retort to this scapegoating restored the racial economic context within which Black families and communities struggled for freedom. Cross-class welfare rights and peace movements questioned military Keynesianism, meaning that they increasingly rejected the wages of empire and believed that a democratic reconstruction of US society was possible only by ending its wars. Conclusion: race-radical lunar criticism for the prison home front As a sublime symbol of progress, exploration, and national purpose, the moon represented a material symbol of upward mobility and possibility for the nation. The Cold War space race as spectacle cohered an ideological understanding of upward mobility and progress. This spectacle, moreover, was not simply a mode of visuality, but also built material spaces of the economically buoyant Sunbelt-Gunbelt and fostered confinement of Black central city spaces and dislocation of residents from industries being developed elsewhere. Urban crisis, then, was fundamentally a crisis over Black ‘upward’ mobility in terms of movement through space (that is, the Great Migration and moving beyond confines of racial ghettos) and claims to political power and presence in public spaces. Race-radical lunar criticism defied the Cold War spectacle that would split the world in two, the nation into Black and white, American or failed American, by illustrating the relationships between the ghetto and suburb, the ghetto and empire. Critical interpretations of the relationship between racialized poverty and wealth, as offered through Black lunar criticism, did not disappear, but were submerged within a discourse that naturalized Black confinement in ghetto and prison spaces while obscuring the consolidation of political and economic forces responsible for a new, multiscalar regime of mobility and immobility. The political and cultural contest over this lived and ideological space of urban crisis underscores the uncertain future of the prison resolution. With mass incarceration in question from the left and right, race-radical lunar criticism offers some guidance for understanding how the present crisis may be resolved in favor of mobility justice. Scott-Heron’s song ‘Alien (Hold Onto Your Dreams)’ criticizes divide and conquer tactics, and ties the trajectories of transnational Latino/a migrants to African American histories of forced mobility. Moreover, Scott-Heron’s dialectical blues understanding of the politics of space suggests that dismantling the United States’ unprecedented carceral state will hinge not so much on comparing rates of spending on confinement versus welfare but on analyzing their interconnection and on developing political unity and (even) love. The peaceful promise of outer space – displacing the Man from the moon – remains tied to liberatory, decolonial projects on earth.

#### The aff’s managerial concerns over space debris is techno-nationalism – liberal governance over space as a “commons” is the exclusive domain of space-faring nations

Stroikos ‘16

[Dimitrios, University of York. 2016. “China, India in Space and the Orbit of International Society: Power, Status, and Order on the High Frontier.”] Pat

Moreover, it is necessary to briefly say something about how techno-nationalism as a primary institution interacts with some of the other institutions of international space society. First, in many ways, techno-nationalism is complimentary to sovereign statehood because sovereignty in space is largely embedded in cosmopolitan and solidarist conceptions. This is partly why highly visible space projects define spacefaring hierarchies. Second, and consequently, techno-nationalism is also closely linked to great power status and great power management in the sense that different space capabilities also confer different levels of status and responsibilities in the management of international order in space. Likewise, in relation to diplomacy, highly visible techno-nationalist space feats can also offer a seat at the table of diplomatic initiatives and negotiations. Seen in this light, ‘high-visibility’ projects, such as space programmes are part of ‘recognition games’, which states play in order to acquire the status of a great power (Suzuki, 2008). As Cunningham (2009: 74) notes, ‘to be a superpower, one must be a “spacefaring” nation’. The Space Market Arguably, the economic factor has been one of the most neglected issues in the English School literature. Discussing some of the shortcomings of Bull’s work, Miller (1990: 74) pointed out in 1990, ‘a basic criticism of Bull’s account of international society’ is ‘that it does not include a strong economic component’ dealing with rules regarding trade, navigation, and investment and the common interests that permeate the sphere of economic activities. Since then, some important work has been done to bring together the economic sector and the English School, especially in the context of globalisation (Buzan, 2004; Buzan, 2005; Hurrell, 2007: 194-215). However, the question of how to consider the economic sector within the English School remains rather underdeveloped. According to Buzan, one response is to treat capitalism as a master institution, but he prefers the use of the market as a more neutral term, which has the additional merit of encompassing other practices, such as trade (Buzan, 2004: 193-4, Buzan, 2014a: 136). Consequently, given the growing globalisation and commercialisation of space activities (OECD, 2014: 9-10), there are good reasons for considering the space market as an emerging primary institution of international space society. Significantly, in some ways, since the advent of the Space Age, the space market has followed a parallel trajectory to the market as a distinctive institution at the global level. In particular, although the market was a key primary institution of the Western global international society during much of the Cold War, it has emerged as a sort of a global institution in the post-Cold War era (Buzan, 2014a: 138). Likewise, the space market was initially confined to American-led space activities, beginning as a US government initiative with the Communications Satellite Act in 1962, which led to the creation of the International Telecommunications Satellite Consortium (Intelsat) in 1964 (Moltz, 2014: 94). However, during the early Cold War, commercial activities were largely limited to the field of satellite communications and even commercial transatlantic cooperation in space was determined to a large extent by political and strategic factors and technology transfer considerations (Krige, 2013b). Equally, the idea of the commercialisation of space remained contested not the least because of the opposition of the Soviet Union and communist China to the market in general. This began to change only in the 1980s, when a number of space players emerged, including Europe and Japan, that challenged the US leadership in the fields of satellite manufacturing, launching capability, and other commercial space services. It was also during this period that the Soviet Union and China became less reluctant to get involved with commercial space activities (Krige, 2013a: 16-7). But it was after the end of the Cold War that the globalisation and commercialisation of space activities gradually led to the emergence of a global space market, which points to its inclusion as a primary institution of the international space society. According to a recent report by the Space Foundation (2015: 2), the global space economy grew up by 9 percent in 2014, totalling $330 billion, with commercial space activities accounting for the 76 percent of the global space economy and direct-to-home television services accounting for more than three-quarters of the commercial space sector. Even in the launch field, which has been traditionally reserved to the state largely due to national security and cost considerations, US small private companies have emerged like Space Exploration Technologies Corporation, known as SpaceX, and XCOR Aerospace. As Newlove-Eriksson and Eriksson (2013) argue, the globalisation of space activities has been underpinned by the growing importance of private authority and transnational Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) and the blurred distinction between the military and civilian uses of space. Therefore, it makes sense to think of the space market as an institution of international space society. Yet, a number of points are worth noting here as they help to highlight the possibilities and limits of this move. First, despite all the attention paid to the privatisation of space travel promoted by space entrepreneurs of the likes of Elon Musk (SpaceX), Jeff Bezos (Blue Origin), and Richard Branson (Virgin Galactic), the privatisation of space should not be overstated. Not only does the degree of privatisation vary across space services and products (Moltz, 2014: 102-12), but governments also remain central actors in the space industry as key sources of initial investment and as customers for several space products and services (Brennan and Vecchi, 2011: 18, OECD, 2014: 17). Second, while it is clear that the argument over whether to have the market or not ended with the collapse of the Soviet Union, the tension between economic nationalism and economic liberalism is far from over, as there are not many states fully open to the forces of the global economy and many states support a form of capitalism that is embedded in economic nationalism. This points to the contested nature of the market as a primary institution in the sense that for many states the challenge of how to relate to the global market and make it more effective remains (Buzan, 2014a: 138). As far as international space society is concerned, it is necessary to note that the contested nature of the space market as an institution is reflected in the continuing dialectics between techno-nationalism and techno-globalism. It is commonplace among scholars to argue that Japan and China are two key examples of states that privilege a techno-nationalist approach to technology and innovation, including space technology. But even the United States has not been immune to techno-nationalist impulses. As Weiss (2014) shows, the enduring lead in high technology that the United States still enjoys is largely explained by the creation of not a liberal, but a hybrid political economy, whereby the national security state is interwoven with the commercial sector. NASA, of course, has been a key institution of the national security state since the beginning of the Space Age. But this has also been manifested in its recent efforts to catalyse the development of a commercial space industry through inviting competitive innovation (Weiss, 2014: 119-20, 27-8). This leads to the third point to make about how to understand the relationship between techno-nationalism and the space market. Because of the enduring influence of the former, it is tempting to see techno-nationalism as containing the space market (at least for the time being). Clearly, at one level, the space market can be understood as complementary to techno-nationalism in the ever-globalising international space society. Yet, at another level, the space market as a solidarist institution is staged as opposed to techno-nationalism. This tension is compounded by the fact that, in many ways, techno-nationalism occupies the crucial place of national sovereignty and territoriality in the sector of space considering that sovereignty in international space society is largely understood in cosmopolitan terms. Fourth, in discussing the market as a primary institution, Beeson and Breslin (2014) suggest that it makes more sense to treat the ‘developmental state’ and ‘regional production structures’ as primary institutions in East Asia rather than focusing on the market. This is an important consideration that serves to highlight how the global political economy is underpinned by significant regional derivations. Following from this, although it is apparent that the space market is a key feature of the social structure of international space society, it is possible to say that there are significant regional derivations. Perhaps the best expression of this is the Chinese and Indian variants of postcolonial techno-nationalism that still shape how the two rising Asian space powers relate to the space market. In light of the above, for now, it seems that there is some sort of hierarchy between techno-nationalism and the space market with the former subsuming the latter, especially with regards to space programmes in a postcolonial context. Certainly, the integration of China and India into the global space economy has accelerated over the last decades, but, as we shall see, techno-nationalism is still prominent in the ways in which the two Asian space powers approach space technology. Moreover, the space market remains contested as an emerging institution due to the ambiguity embedded in space law regarding space activities carried on by private actors. This process is further complicated by the inherent dual-use nature of space technology and the blurring of the distinction between the private and public realms (Newlove-Eriksson and Eriksson 2013). Environmental Stewardship There is now a burgeoning literature that deals with the relationship between international society and global environmentalism and assesses the extent to which environmental stewardship can be seen as a nascent institution of international society. Recent efforts to find ways to mitigate space debris as well as to create a normative framework for the sustainability of space are illustrative of how environmental stewardship is gradually becoming an institution in space. For example, in 2007, COPUOS adopted the ‘Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines’, which were wrought by the international Inter-Agency Debris Coordination Committee (IADC), consisting of experts from thirteen space agencies (United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs, 2010). Moreover, as discussed earlier, in 2010, COPUOS formed the Working Group on the Long-term Sustainability of Outer Space Activities. Notably, the European Union proposal for a Code of Conduct for Outer Space also includes provisions on space debris control and mitigation (Council of the European Union, 2008: 9; Dickow, 2009: 159). Thus, there are grounds for considering environmental stewardship as an emerging institution of international space society. Indeed, the growing number of governments, private firms, and non-state actors that emphasise the importance of the sustainable utilisation of space suggests that space sustainability has emerged as a key norm. However, what should be noted is that these developments reflect a more pragmatic approach to maintain the space environment sustainable for the effective use of space rather than an expression of cosmopolitan values. Consequently, in the subsequent chapters, rather than examining in detail the engagement of China and India with environmental stewardship as a nascent institution in space, the focus will be on the emerging norm of space sustainability as a key great power responsibility in managing international space order and the implications of this development for China and India as aspiring great powers. Concluding Remarks Although it is clear that there are a number of ways of understanding the international politics of space, it may be worth going beyond standard theoretical approaches to understand how order is maintained in space. Drawing on key English School concepts, this chapter suggests that it is possible to conceptualise space not merely as a system, but also as an international society with a distinct social structure. This exercise of concept development is important both analytically and hermeneutically, given the notion of an exclusive club of space-faring countries. The chapter developed this argument further by highlighting how the nature of outer space as a distinctive sectoral interstate society is manifested in the ways in which its primary institutions are differentiated from such institutions at the global level (space war, space law, cosmopolitan sovereignty, space diplomacy, balance of power, great power management, techno-nationalism, space market, and environmental stewardship) in a historical and comparative context. In doing so, the chapter helps to highlight the constitutive impact of these institutions on the norms that shape the behaviour of the space-faring states.

#### Imperialism turns and outweighs every other impact – it’s a threat multiplier, the root cause of all war and violence, and responsible for ongoing extinction that outweighs on scope, probability, and cyclical harms.

**Eckhardt 90** - (William Eckhardt; Lentz Peace Research Laboratory of St. Louis; “Civilizations, Empires, and Wars”; https://www.jstor.org/stable/423772?seq=1#page\_scan\_tab\_contents; February, 1990; **HS**)

Modern Western Civilization used war as well as peace to gain the whole world as a domain to benefit itself at the expense of others: **The expansion of the culture and institutions of modern civilization from its centers in Europe was made possible by imperialistic war**… It is true missionaries and traders had their share in the work of expanding world civilization, but always with the support, immediate or in the background, of armies and navies (pp. 251-252). The importance of dominance as a primary motive in civilized war in general was also emphasized for modern war in particular: '**[Dominance] is probably the most important single element in the causation of major modern wars'** (p. 85). European empires were thrown up all over the world in this processof benefiting some at the expense of others, which was characterized by armed violence contributing to structural violence**: 'World-empire is built by conquest and maintained by force… Empires are primarily organizations of violence' (pp. 965, 969). 'The struggle for empire has greatly increased the disparity between states with respect to the political control of resources, since there can never be enough imperial territory to provide for all'** (p. 1190). This **'disparity between states', not to mention the disparity within states, both of which take the form of racial differences in life expectancies, has killed 15-20 times as many people in the 20th century as have wars and revolutions (**Eckhardt & Kohler, 1980; Eckhardt, 1983c). When this structural violence of 'disparity between states' created by civilization is taken into account, then the violent nature of civilization becomes much more apparent. Wright concluded that 'Probably at least 10 per cent of deaths in modern civilization can be attributed directly or indirectly to war… The trend of war has been toward greater cost, both absolutely and relative to population… The proportion of the population dying as a direct consequence of battle has tended to increase' (pp. 246, 247).So far asstructural violence has constituted about one-third of all deaths in the 20th century (Eckhardt & Kohler, 1980; Eckhardt, 1983c), and so far as **structural violence was a function of armed violence, past and present, then Wright's estimate was very conservative indeed.** Assuming that war is some function of civilization, then civilization is responsible for one-third of 20th century deaths. **This is surely self-destruction carried to a high level of efficiency.** The structural situation has been improving throughout the 20th century, however, so that structural violence caused 'only' 20% of all deaths in 1980 (Eckhardt, 1983c). There is obviously room for more improvement. To be sure, armed violence in the form of revolution has been directed toward the reduction of structural violence, even as armed violence in the form of imperialism has been directed toward its maintenance. **But imperial violence came first, in the sense of creating structural violence, before revolutionary violence emerged to reduce it. It is in this sense that structural violence was basically, fundamentally, and primarily a function of armed violence in its imperial form. The atomic age has ushered in the possibility, and some would say the probability, of killing not only some of us for the benefit of others, nor even of killing all of us to no one's benefit, but of putting an end to life itself!** This is surely carrying self-destruction to some infinite power beyond all human comprehension. It's too much, or superfluous, as the Existentialists might say. Why we should care is a mystery. But, if we do, then the need for civilized peoples to respond to the ethical challenge is very urgent indeed. Life itself may depend upon our choice.

#### The aff attempts to transcend the nothingness at the core of America’s ethos – voting negative adopts a position of indifference towards the spectacle which intensifies the proliferation of said nothingness.

Spanos and Spanos ‘19

[William V Spanos, Literature at Binghamton, Rob Glass’ favorite, RIP to a real one, and Adam Spanos, University of Chicago. 2019. “American Spectacle and the Vietnam War Sublime,” published in “Neocolonial Fictions of the Global Cold War.” (eds. Steven Belletto and Joseph Keith)] pat – language [modified]

The Vietnam War teaches us, however, that the spectacle contains within it the germ of a more radical reckoning with the truth. Both the spectacle and the sublime constitute responses to the absence of any determining ground for being; but whereas the spectacle constructs an image meant to dissimulate this nothingness, the sublime disposition confronts it with what might be called an engaged reverence. Such a perspective understands that presence and absence belong together and that one cannot be extirpated without extreme damage to the other. The sublime task is not to calculate how one might most effectively transcend the nothing, but rather to reconstitute perception in such a way as to intensify one’s attunement to the nothing and proliferate the sites at which one is capable of discovering its insistence.

In conclusion, then, let us revisit two locations at which this nothingness can be detected within the terms of US political ontology. First, the ambivalent universalism at stake in American exceptionalism—which describes the United States as a country both distinct from others and capable of transforming them in its image—entails a necessary violence against the “unexceptional.” These figures, including the Vietnamese during the war, comprise a category of beings whose existence is deemed contingent or altogether denied. Such a construal of the other then allows for their annihilation, the literalization of their representational nonbeing. By virtue, however, of their spectral status or unrecognizability to the exceptionalist outlook, they can act with a license denied to those who are more visible—as the National Liberation Front (NLF) did in Vietnam. Furthermore, this position of internal exclusion, of subjection to the universal norm without belonging to the community of subjects who are understood to be its addressers, constitutes a privileged epistemological position. It allows for the understanding and critique of a universalist discourse such as that of American exceptionalism insofar as it can testify to the violence to which the latter remains [ignorant] ~~blind~~. Both the NLF and the various US social movements to which we earlier alluded undertook this critique in differing ways.

The nothingness of national being manifests also in the recognition that the foundation and subsequent rise to global predominance of the United States was not predestined (no more than that of any other nation, or indeed of the nation-form itself). In both its mere existence and in the position that it has historically achieved, the United States is the consequence of accident. Like Heidegger’s being, it is “thrown.” The implication of this observation is not simply that the United States, however monolithic its appearance, is a historical object and so capable of being changed. That is true enough. The point is rather that, insofar as its existence has no transcendentally determining principle, the actions to which it commits itself are not preordained. This means that the deeds carried out in its name cannot possibly impute to the nation the spectacular glory and ultimate justification for its existence that its apologists so desperately desire. Nothing done in the name of the United States can supply that foundation. The United States, like every other nation, is condemned to search perpetually and in vain for the meaning that will give its presence in the world a permanent justification. The task for its citizenry today is to learn indifference to the lures of a spectacle that would prescribe meaning at the expense of an interested polity.

### 4 1NC—OFF

#### Interpretation: Evaluate the affirmative as an object of research over just their plan text. To clarify, they need to weigh the totality of their aff, including their assumptions and ideologies, not just the causal consequences. It is not sufficient to prove their plan is good in the abstract.

#### 1] Debate is a site of scholarship production, not policymaking 101. Even if individual ballots do not change our subjectivities, iterative investments in research models influence our political orientations. Rejecting paradigms premised on imperialism in pedagogical spaces can act as a starting point for a counter discursive vision of politics.

#### 2] George Bush DA—justifications and representations influence our political advocacy. Even though George Bush and Spanos both hate Donald Trump, the reasons why matter as much. Winning a link argument means that their political advocacy looks more like a Hemanth Sanjeev trust fund rather than anti-imperial ist movements.

#### 3] Education—they arbitrarily restrict debate’s locus of contestation to an 8 second plan text. Forcing them to defend the entirety of their aff incentivizes better scholarship and is more real-world. Arbitrarily severing parts of the aff decks negative preparation.

#### 4] it’s the only exportable thing, the judges ballot doesn’t affect the wto or medicine but your rhethoric affects debate

#### 4] Slight unfairness valuable—when imperialist American Ethos modes of thinking in the academy are challenged through slight violations, it creates a cognitive dissonance that can produce new forms of scholarship.