## 1NC – Off

#### Our interpretation is that the resolution should determine the division of affirmative and negative ground.

#### To clarify, we don’t think doing something outside of the topic is bad, just that defending it as a point of offense is.

The aff asked for interps to meet we didn’t know what they defended, trough cx we can see they have more offense then hypothetical implemntation

#### The resolution is a normative question.

**Ericson 03**

Jon M. Ericson, Dean Emeritus of the College of Liberal Arts – California Polytechnic U., et al., “The Debater’s Guide, Third Edition”, p. 4, 2003, accessed: 28 January 2020, R.S.

The Proposition of Policy: Urging Future Action In policy propositions, each topic contains certain key elements, although they have slightly different functions from comparable elements of value-oriented propositions. 1. An agent doing the acting ---“The United States” in “The United States should adopt a policy of free trade.” Like the object of evaluation in a proposition of value, the agent is the subject of the sentence. 2. The verb should—the first part of a verb phrase that urges action. 3. An action verb to follow should in the should-verb combination. For example, should adopt here means to put a program or policy into action though governmental means. 4. A specification of directions or a limitation of the action desired. The phrase free trade, for example, gives direction and limits to the topic, which would, for example, eliminate consideration of increasing tariffs, discussing diplomatic recognition, or discussing interstate commerce. Propositions of policy deal with future action. Nothing has yet occurred. The entire debate is about whether something ought to occur. What they agree to do, then, when they accept the affirmative side in such a debate is to offer sufficient and compelling reasons for an audience to perform the future action that they propose.

#### “Resolved” before a colon reflects a legislative forum.

**AOS 05**

Army Officer School, “# 12, Punctuation – The Colon and Semicolon”, 12 May 2005, accessed: 28 January 2020, <http://usawocc.army.mil/IMI/wg12.htm>, R.S.

The colon introduces the following: a. A list, but only after "as follows," "the following," or a noun for which the list is an appositive: Each scout will carry the following: (colon) meals for three days, a survival knife, and his sleeping bag. The company had four new officers: (colon) Bill Smith, Frank Tucker, Peter Fillmore, and Oliver Lewis. b. A long quotation (one or more paragraphs): In The Killer Angels Michael Shaara wrote: (colon) They may find it a different story from the one they learned in school. There have been many versions of that battle [Gettysburg] and that war [the Civil War]. (The quote continues for two more paragraphs.) c. A formal quotation or question: The President declared: (colon) "The only thing we have to fear is fear itself." The question is: (colon) what can we do about it? d. A second independent clause which explains the first: Potter's motive is clear: (colon) he wants the assignment. e. After the introduction of a business letter: Dear Sirs: (colon) Dear Madam: (colon) f. The details following an announcement For sale: (colon) large lakeside cabin with dock g. A formal resolution, after the word "resolved:" Resolved: (colon) That this council petition the mayor.

#### Most qualified, comprehensive, non-partisan, and recent evidence says LAWs are weapon delivery platforms that independently analyze their environment and initiate fire.

Wyatt, PhD, 6/8

Austin Wyatt, (PhD, Australian Catholic University) is a research associate in the Values in Defence and Security Technology group at The University of New South Wales at the Australian Defence Force Academy. His research concerns autonomous weapons with a particular emphasis on their disruptive effects in Southeast Asia, “So Just What Is a Killer Robot?: Detailing the Ongoing Debate around Defining Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems”, Washington Headquarters Services: Employees That Make A Difference, 08 June 2020, accessed: 19 November 2020, <https://www.whs.mil/News/News-Display/Article/2210967/so-just-what-is-a-killer-robot-detailing-the-ongoing-debate-around-defining-let/>, R.S.

The **most common definition of LAWSs originated in a 2012 US Department of Defense (DOD) directive on autonomous weapon systems**.6 This directive outlined the DOD’s view on developing an autonomous capability for weapon systems and the required level of human involvement. This document defines a weapon as fully autonomous if, when activated, it “can select and engage targets without further intervention by a human operator.”7 Interestingly, DOD Directive 3000.09 lists a requirement for sufficient training for human operators, which indicates a recognition that human operators would have to retain some level of oversight over any use of force decisions. The concern of how to balance the need to achieve effectiveness in a battlespace characterized by an operational tempo potentially beyond the capacity of human reaction time while also maintaining sufficiently effective human oversight to guard against unintended engagements is apparent in this directive.8 Finally, DOD Directive 3000.09 also contained a built-in process for obtaining waivers for development, deployment, or even the transfer of LAWSs in situations that potentially contravene the policy.9 Despite being due to expire at the end of 2017, DOD Directive 3000.09 was still in effect at the time of writing and features prominently in the developing discourse on LAWSs. As the most commonly cited state definition for autonomous weapon systems, the DOD Directive 3000.09 definition has been used as the starting point for the definitions used by multiple other actors, including nongovernmental organizations such as the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots.10 While this definition has found traction amongst scholars, it has largely been received critically. For example, Heather Roff criticized the DOD definition because the terms select and engage are open to interpretation.11 Notwithstanding scholarly critique, the DOD definition is arguably the natural starting point for developing a working definition of AWSs.

Despite its flaws, the DOD definition does represent a more realistic, if nonspecific, view of autonomy in weapon systems than the definitions adopted by some other states. In 2011, for example, the UK Ministry of Defence definition referred to autonomous systems having the capability to understand “higher level intent and direction” and that individual actions “may not be” predictable.12 This definition seems to indicate that a platform or military system must possess artificial intelligence with a level of self-awareness that bleeds into the field of general artificial intelligence (AI). It is highly unlikely that any state actor would countenance the development of weapons that they could not predict, even if it were technologically possible to create LAWSs with the capacity to interpret higher-level intent. The concept of this level of full autonomy has been justifiably dismissed as a distraction in the literature,13 as an approach driven by this definition simply does not account for the weapon systems that are actually in development.

On 14 April 2018, China became the first permanent member of the Security Council to publicly endorse a ban on the use of LAWSs.14 This surprise announcement was initially seized on as a victory by the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots and covered extensively in the media, but closer analysis identifies this announcement as an important example of how states can utilize definitional factors to gain influence over the development of LAWSs.

The Chinese definition of LAWSs is based around five characteristics, which serve to exclude other forms of increasingly autonomous military technologies from the discourse. The first characteristic is that a device must carry a “sufficient payload” and be intended to employ lethal force.15 While this would obviously cover LAWSs that are designed to directly participate in combat, it would exclude those that carried a less-than-lethal munitions package (such as the remote-operated “Skunkcopter” unmanned aerial vehicle [UAV]), or are designed for an antivehicle/munitions primary function. The second characteristic is an unusually high autonomy barrier, stating that a LAWS would have an “absence of human intervention and control” for the “entire process of executing a task.”16 China’s statement was vague about what it considers a “task”; this document could refer to a single use of force decision, the acquisition of a target, or an entire deployed mission. Thirdly, and closely linked, the device should have no method of termination once activated to be considered a LAWS.17 This statement would discount weapon systems that operate autonomously but can be overridden by a human overseer, such as the Phalanx Close-in Weapons System. It is also highly unlikely that a state would deploy a weapon they had no way of deactivating or assuming control over, especially given the comparatively nascent state of AI technology.

The fourth characteristic is that the device must have an indiscriminate effect, that the device would “execute the task of killing and maiming regardless of conditions, scenarios and targets.”18 This characteristic is an interesting inclusion because international humanitarian law already forbids the use of weapon and weapon platforms that are incapable of being operated in a discriminate manner. The inclusion of this characteristic is complemented by the latter statement in the same announcement that a fully autonomous weapon system would be incapable of satisfying the legal requirement of discriminate use of force. The question of whether a fully autonomous platform could abide international law in the use of discriminate force is central to the debate surrounding LAWSs and has been at the forefront of publicly visible developments in the space. As an example, the Super aEgis II is capable of distinguishing between uniforms and offers clear warnings before engaging to reduce the chances of using lethal force against civilians. Finally, the Chinese definition includes the characteristic that LAWSs could evolve and learn through interaction with the environment they are deployed into in such a way that they “expand its functions and capabilities in a way exceeding human expectations.”19 This final characteristic leans closer to the UK’s definition of fully autonomous weapons and is effectively arguing that the presence of an actively evolving artificial intelligence is necessary for a weapon system to be considered a LAWS. The concept that LAWSs are being developed with high level AI has been widely criticized by scholars and defense personnel but is a common point raised by concerned nongovernmental organizations (NGO) and smaller states. While it is possible, it is beyond the realm of current technology and whether states would even be interested in a learning autonomous weapon has been criticized as unrealistic.

There are many reasons that the Chinese definition of lethal autonomous weapons is particularly important. Aside from their obvious influence as a permanent member of the security council, autonomous military technology is emerging as a key force multiplier, a factor that is of obvious importance in the context of the Sino-American rivalry and Chinese military modernization. Furthermore, China has a proven track record of using and then ignoring international law as a tactic for advancing its interests, for example, consider China’s reaction to being ruled against by the UN permanent court of arbitration in its case against the Philippines over territorial disputes in 2016.20 Finally, China has already emerged as a major exporter of UAVs (armed and unarmed) to both state and nonstate actors.21 Indeed, the 2017 decision to reduce export restrictions on US companies was partially motivated by a desire to counterbalance the market dominance achieved by China in the UAV export market. While China’s decision to support a ban on the development and use of AWSs seems to be a victory for those opposed to LAWSs, the actual content of their announcement reveals the importance of definitional agreement.

The Chinese announcement clearly excludes large aspects of the developing autonomous military market; however, it has proven quite common in the definitional debate for state and scholarly actors to put forward definitions that have additions that limit the scope of their application. The inclusion of “lethal” in LAWSs excludes weapon platforms that are designed to utilize less-than-lethal ammunition or guide other munitions while the requirement of “higher level” autonomy excludes the plethora of human supervised weapon systems that are already deployed or in development. As encountered by the UN-sponsored Group of Governmental Experts on LAWSs, this disagreement on a common definition hampers efforts to develop either a ban or effective regulatory controls.22

Part of the problem is that, while most commonly cited definitions are broadly similar in their top-level language, when one attempts to apply these definitions or questions their underlying assumptions discrepancies emerge. Given the regulatory and discursive power of definitions in this debate,23 there is a clear political and strategic incentive for states to adopt distinct discursive frames for understanding autonomy in this sense. This understanding implies that, among states as a minimum, definition discrepancies are likely to remain,24 at least while the debate remains focused on the question of a ban.

The complex definitional debate surrounding the term lethal autonomous weapon system is one of the key reasons that international efforts to implement a preemptive ban have stalled. Seven states are publicly believed to be developing lethal autonomous weapon systems: the US, South Korea, China, Russia, India, the United Kingdom, and Israel, though none has admitted to possessing a functioning fully AWS.25 Only 19 countries publicly support an outright developmental ban; however, this support is based on divergent conceptual understandings of “fully autonomous weapons.” The clear majority of the 63 other states that have publicly stated a position support the continuation of governmental discussions.26 This support shows that, while the majority of states do not support a preemptive ban, they are concerned and willing to continue high-level discussions toward generating a normative and legal framework to control the impact of LAWSs. Outside the land of government press releases, the 2017 intergovernmental meeting of experts was cancelled, ostensibly due to a lack of funds. The “discussion” advocated by the majority of states in 2019 has therefore been largely organized by NGOs, scholarly communities and regional interstate bodies.

Identifying Commonalities in the Focus of Nonstate Definitions of LAWS

Despite emerging as the principle vehicle for pushing forward discussion on the challenges presented by the emergence of increasingly autonomous weapon systems, there remains definitional disagreement among civil society and scholars, nor has there been any concrete steps taken toward developing an universally agreed set of functional standards for determining whether a given weapon system would fall under the proposed ban.

The majority of actively participating NGOs, including the International Committee for Robot Arms Control, Article 36, Human Rights Watch, and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), subscribe to functionally similar definitions. This is unsurprising given that these organizations are members of the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots (CSKR), which has been the leading advocate in this space since 2012. Another member of the CSKR—Reaching Critical Will (a Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom program)—defines fully autonomous weapon systems as follows:

“Killer robots are fully autonomous weapon systems. These are weapons that operate without meaningful human control, meaning that the weapon itself can take decisions about where and how it is used; what or whom it is used against; and the effects of use.”27

There are three elements from this definition that can be commonly identified in the published literature and discussion papers produced by NGOs on this issue.

Lethality

The first element is that this definition explicitly states that fully autonomous weapons are Killer Robots. As part of the campaign’s name, this is obviously, a central element of the CSKR’s perspective. The term killer robot is a dysphemism that has been consistently used to focus the discourse on the capability of lethal aspect of LAWSs, particularly in media appearances and published materials, as well as in the central questions of the public surveys commissioned by CSKR over the past three years. While a legitimate and important concern, the lethal use of AWSs is the most controversial potential use of the underlying technologies and arguably distracts from the rapid progress that states are making on systems that are not designed primarily for the use of lethal force. Ajey Lele has argued that focusing on lethality makes it impossible to come to a “foolproof” definition because sometimes the lethality of an autonomous system will depend on the purpose of its deployment.28 Heather Harrison Dinniss also argued that the purpose of deployment, target justification, and user intention were more important than the weapon’s inherent nature.29

While Lele referred specifically to cyberwarfare, other problematic autonomous systems could include AI-enabled battlefield decision-making aides, cyber warfare agents, and “support” unmanned ground vehicles whose stated purpose is for battlefield resupply, none of which would necessarily be covered by a ban that followed this definition, yet could be used in a manner that leads to death and injury.

“Full” Autonomy and Critical Functions

Secondly, it is problematic to focus on whether a hypothetical system having full autonomy. While distinguishing fully autonomous systems from platforms that clearly operate under human supervision or within functional constraints has clear utility (at least from a policymaking perspective), autonomy is not a binary characteristic that can be easily identified, separated and measured. Jenks argues that it is more effective to consider autonomy as the “capability of the larger system enabled by the integration of human and machine abilities” and that autonomy (even in weapon systems) is inherently bounded by the interaction between human and machine.30 Alternatively, Horowitz has argued that AI (the most important underlying technology for autonomous systems) is better conceptualized as a disruptive enabling technology rather than a distinct weapon system, maintaining that AI is conceptually closer to the combustion engine than the aircraft carrier.31

It is therefore important to focus on the extent to which a system has control over its critical functions independent of human intervention or supervision, which is reflected in the Reaching Critical Will definition. The critical functions of a weapon system are the processes used to select, acquire, track and attack targets.32 These processes are considered critical because they become the core of the kill chain once human supervision is removed.33 The kill chain is a commonly used term within the US military and in the relevant academic literature. The level of control over these functions is central to the ICRC definition of autonomous weapon systems.34 Similarly for Anderson, it is the capacity of autonomous weapons to “undertake” the process of identification, rather than merely to respond to a particular stimulus that is their primary characteristic.35 By focusing on the critical functions of the weapon system, advocates of a ban took a step toward the functional benchmarks that would be required for effective international regulation of LAWSs.

Meaningful Human Control

The final commonly seen element that can be extracted from the Reaching Critical Will definition is the importance placed on retaining a Meaningful Human Control standard. The concept of Meaningful Human Control arose as a response to the perceived “accountability gap” with autonomous weapon systems and has been a major talking point at each meeting of experts.36 The Campaign to Stop Killer Robots, and affiliated groups, have enthusiastically embraced Meaningful Human Control as a vital standard that, employed alongside a ban on fully autonomous weapons, would arguably prevent the transfer of the decision to use lethal force to those robotic systems that are not prohibited. However, despite this prominence, there remains no universal agreement on the limits of its meaning or how to ensure that it is maintained. For example, Christof Heyns has written that autonomous law enforcement weapons would still be under meaningful human control if a human authorised that specific target and instance of force, even if the weapons did not engage immediately.37 The literature has begun to push back against this lack of definitional clarity, as well as the murkiness surrounding definitions of autonomy in the military context.38 As a prominent example, R. Crootof has challenged the blind acceptance of Meaningful Human Control.39 Instead, her work explores how the concept of Meaningful Human Control would interact with inconsistent domestic state laws as well as international humanitarian law.40

Furthermore, tragic historical examples with semiautonomous weapon systems, including the downing of Iran Air Flight 655, demonstrated that Meaningful Human Control must be paired with robust verification procedures and organizational modifications, including comprehensive operator and commander training. Without these measures, there is a danger that human supervisors would operate on the basis of overly enthusiastic interpretations of the platform’s capability, even where “meaningful human control” is theoretically maintained.41

So, What is an Autonomous Weapon System?

Attempting to present an authoritative single definition of LAWSs in the midst of the ongoing international debate would be a hubristic goal for this article. As with terrorism, the broad strokes of a definition have been admirably outlined by others and are generally agreed, the continued international debate centers on the specifics and is sustained by discursive differences that are primarily political in nature. However, by drawing on the positions explained above, and a selection of definitions developed by prominent scholars, **it is possible to synthesize a working definition** that would be sufficient to facilitate discussion separate from the politicized CCW process.

At its most simplistic an AWS could be thought of as a computer that is analyzing data inputted from multiple conventional sensors to inform its actions without direct human involvement. While insufficiently detailed, this kind of definition is **useful for scholars whose analysis is focused on the ethical, moral, strategic, or legal issues raised by LAWSs.** For example, Maya Brehm adopted a basic definition of AWSs as “a weapon system with sensors, algorithms and effectors,” with the explicit acknowledgement that this approach sidestepped the ongoing debate while providing a sufficient descriptive picture for the reader. However, for regulation to be effective, it would require a more operationalizable and detailed approach.

At the core of this approach should be a consideration of the level of independent control that a system exercises over its critical functions.42 Setting aside those weapon systems that are either inert (requiring human operation) or automated (**such as landmines**),43 this approach would help identify whether a system is operationally semiautonomous, supervised by a human operator, or exercises operationally full autonomy over its critical functions. Interestingly, existing definitions have placed emphasis on different critical functions in their approach to autonomous weapon systems. For example, Crootof emphasized the weapon’s ability to process information to make targeting decisions,44 while Horowitz emphasized the ability to select a target that was not preselected by an operator.45

Furthermore, given the goal is to create a definition suitable for the development of technical standards among states that are currently pursuing AWSs, as well as potential future importers, it is better to focus the definition on autonomy at the platform level, rather than disposable munitions or systems where autonomous agents completely replace humans in the planning of military action.46

Based on these features, consider the following as an early example of such a working definition for LAWSs:

“A fully autonomous Lethal Autonomous Weapon System (LAWS) is a weapon delivery platform that is able to independently analyze its environment and make an active decision whether to fire without **human supervision** or **guidance**.”47

#### 6 affs. (France banned them recently)

Rohrlich 19

Justin Rohrlich, staff reporter based in NYC. Past bylines include VICE News, The Daily Beast, Foreign Policy, NKNews.org, and others. He won an Emmy in 2008, “Report: Kill the idea of “killer robots” before they kill us”, QUARTZ, 8 May 2019, accessed: 19 November 2020, <https://qz.com/1614684/killer-robots-must-be-stopped-pax-tells-the-world/#:~:text=Seven%20countries%20are%20known%20to,making%20the%20decision%20to%20fire>., R.S.

Lethal autonomous weapons, or “killer robots,” as they are described by Pax, the anti-war NGO behind the report, are designed to select and engage targets without proximate human control. Their advent has been called the “third revolution in warfare” by AI experts—a successor to the invention of gunpowder and the creation of nuclear bombs.

**Seven countries** are known to be developing lethal autonomous weapons: the **US**, **China**, **Russia**, the **UK**, **France**, **Israel**, and **So**uth **Ko**rea. Right now, US military policy mandates some level of human interaction when actually making the decision to fire. The other countries maintain they support a ban on fully autonomous lethal weapons. China, however, supports a ban on their use but not on their development.

#### Violation – They don’t, Even if they defend the topic, methodological or performative offense presumes they also implicitly defend their speech act. “I meets” are a reason to reduce this debate to a level of content. Also, they only defend their demand to ban lethal autonomous weapons, not the ban itself, so LAWs good is no longer offense.

#### Limits – the topic is the only public stasis point for all aff and neg prep – counter-interps don’t solve. Abandoning the semantics of the topic creates infinite potential affs, incentivizes avoiding topical controversy, and lets them loosely thread the same aff to every topic for four years – that leaves them miles ahead against the limited number of generics against their affs since specificity deflates the size of link and they can invest most of their time drilling against those arguments. Also lets them run away from controversy by creating post-facto adjustments in the topic for their interests.

#### Fairness matters – Debate is a competitive game – our resource investment and ballot demand prove we all value winning. Skewing the neg out moots access to that value. That outweighs – a) mag – scholarships could be on the line so err against hacking, b) probability – outweighs ballot key warrants since the ballot can only resolve W/L, c) other forums solve – no reason debate is key, but there is a reason it’s key to our offense.

#### Unfairness link turns impact turns:

#### 1 – Skewing substance means T is our best bet – if T is bad then vote neg since they positioned us to go for it.

#### 2 – Inclusivity – The huge case-list most heavily skews debaters with the least resources and allows big schools to exploit that – exclusionary scholarship turns their offense.

#### T outweighs the case and ballot key warrants – they’re ahead on their aff so letting them weigh it is unfair and rigorous testing is a prior question to truth value of their args, so presume them false.

#### The TVA is to read a CCW – even if it’s not perfect, it should solve most of their offense – disads to the TVA are reasons there’s ground on both sides.

#### Mathur concludes arms control agreements need to center the needs of the global south – the TVA does that. Their author concludes that arms control is inevitable and necessary – only we do that because we engage liberal institutions, which are malleable.

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Conclusion Scholarly efforts that are underway to confront the ‘dynamic of denial’ by recollecting the role of the Global South in shaping the agenda of arms control and disarmament via Bandung and the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) must be encouraged. Similarly it will be interesting to see how efforts towards reconstituting the problem of disarmament as a global humanitarian problem can help resist the ‘dynamic of difference’ between the West and the rest. Chris Smith observes how ‘the development of conscious and active single-issue campaigns is much less easy than it has been in the West’ but that the struggle for basic rights and development has set the stage for the ‘development of an alternative paradigm’ to address problems of peace and disarmament (Smith, pp. 906- 907). This alternative paradigm of ‘disarmament as humanitarian action’ is based on human rights and health based approaches to weapons control that give some credit to Global South’s contribution towards arms control and disarmament.

#### Global south supports the TVA.

Bode 19 [Ingvild Bode, Principal Investigator of an ERC research project on autonomous weapons systems and international norms (AUTONORMS), “Norm‐making and the Global South: Attempts to Regulate Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems,” 2019, *Global Policy*, Vol. 10, Issue 3, pp. 359-364, <https://doi.org/10.1111/1758-5899.12684>, EA]

Taken together, these observations speak of a growing Global South participation at the UN‐CCW and are, in particular, linked to supporters of a comprehensive ban on LAWS. I illustrate this further through providing a cursory trajectory of some Global South statements. When the discussions started, Global South countries typically perceived LAWS as a ‘science fiction issue that does not affect them directly’ (interview 1, 25.04.2017). A notable exception was Pakistan which was quick to latch on to the topic and became the first Global South state to deliver statements, not least due to the history of targeted killing via drone strikes on Pakistani territory. Early notable contributions by Global South countries therefore turned around core NAM issues: political independence and the protection of territorial integrity and sovereignty (e.g. Mission of India, 2014). Initially, likewise, there were considerable cynicism and scepticism among the Global South disarmament community about whether debates on LAWS could be helpful at all as powerful countries are still perceived to do whatever they want in terms of weapons systems (interview 2, 26.04.2017).

But Global South representatives quickly began to raise a distinct normative agenda, highlighting the ‘negative consequences’ of LAWS (Mission of Mexico, 2014) and voicing questions as to whether machines will ever be able to distinguish between civilians and combatants and therefore be able to adhere to key principles of international humanitarian law (Mission of Brazil, 2014). More fundamentally, countries such as Ecuador have consistently condemned the delegation of kill decisions to machines as ‘inacceptable and inadmissible’ (Mission of Ecuador, 2014, 2015, 2016). As the debate on LAWS progressed, Global South statements have become more forceful and coordinated: in November 2017, the NAM delivered a first joint statement urging states parties to move towards a negotiation mandate and a preventive ban on LAWS on the basis of ‘mounting expressions of concerns about how these weapons change warfare’ (Non‐Aligned Movement 2017, p. 2), including their destabilising potential in terms of lowering use of force thresholds. NAM delivered further joint statements of a similar character in April and August 2018. Similarly, in April 2018, the African Group (2018, pp. 1–2) delivered a strongly worded joint statement supporting a ban on LAWS: ‘The African Group finds it inhumane, abhorrent, repugnant, and against public conscience for humans to give up control to machines, allowing machines to decide who lives or dies, how many lives and whose life is acceptable as collateral damage when force is used’. Over the duration of debates, many statements and comments by individual Global South states parties increasingly speak of a concerted effort towards defining and understanding meaningful human control, a concept originally introduced by the NGO Article 36 (Roff and Moyes, 2016), according to clear legal principles and making this the foundation of novel international legislation (e.g. Mission of Brazil, 2019; Mission of Costa Rica, 2018).

We can therefore identify two norm‐making strategies pursued by the Global South in making these increasingly forceful statements. First, Global South states parties use the institutional platform provided by the UN‐CCW to position their calls towards new normative guidance on LAWS at the international level. Second, Global South states parties have worked closely with civil society representatives, such as the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots, whose contributions they also mention favourable in numerous statements. In doing this, they use institutional platforms and build coalitions between states and civil society similar to those associated with other disarmament issues such as landmines and cluster munitions. But, in the case of LAWS, it is countries of the Global South rather than Western states such as Norway or Canada that are taking the lead.

#### T is a voter which should be evaluated using competing interps – Granting a 1AR restart skews the neg out since we don’t have a 3NR to answer the brand new 2AR. Reasonability is arbitrary and invites unpredictable judge intervention – chills T since it’s never a safe flow and there's only limited deviations from the rez so you should have to justify them, also means no RVIs since it’s not ir-reciprocal and you can beat it without offense. RVIs are also illogical since T is a win condition, not offense. Logic outweighs since every arg concedes its authority.

**the first is Informational overload**

#### Semiotic capitalism is predicated on informational overload that leaves no room for the human aspects of our behavior ending in mass psychological trauma. The affs turn to political activism and policy cause depression and misery.When the sign has become all encompassing the only standard and role of the ballot left is to vote for whoever best resists semiocapitalism

**Bifo, 9** [Franco Berardi, Italian communist theorist and activist in the autonomist tradition, whose work mainly focuses on the role of the media and information technology within post-industrial capitalism   Precarious Rhapsody, by Franco Bifo Berardi et al., AK Press, 2009. P. 40-42 Lindale PP]

The acceleration of information exchange has produced and is producing an effect of a pathological type on the individual human mind and even more on the collective mind. **Individuals are not in a position to consciously process the immense and always growing mass of information that enters their computers, their cell phones, their television screens, their electronic diaries and their heads. However, it seems indispensable to follow, recognize, evaluate, process all this information if you want to be efficient, competitive, victorious.** The practice of multitasking, the opening of a window of hypertextual attention, the passage from one context to another for the complex evaluation of processes, tends to deform the sequential modality of mental processing. According to Christian Marazzi, who has concerned himself in various books with the relations between economics, language and affectivity, **the latest generation of economic operators is** affected by a real and proper form of dyslexia, incapable of reading a page from the beginning to the end according to sequential procedures, **incapable of maintaining concentrated attention on the same object for a long time**. And dyslexia spreads to cognitive and social behaviors, leading to rendering the pursuit of linear strategies nearly impossible. **Some**, like Davenport and Beck , **speak of an attention economy**. But when a cognitive faculty enters into and becomes part of economic discourse this means that it has become a scarce resource. **The necessary time for paying attention to the fluxes of information to which we are exposed and which must be evaluated in order to be able to make decisions is lacking. The consequence is in front of our eyes: political and economic decisions no longer respond to a long term strategic rationality and simply follow immediate interests. On the other hand, we are always less available for giving our attention to others gratuitously. We no longer have the attention time for love, tenderness, nature, pleasure and compassion. Our attention is ever more besieged and therefore we assign it only to our careers, to competition and to economic decisions. And in any case our temporality cannot follow the insane speed of the hypercomplex digital machine.** Human beings tend to become the ruthless executors of decisions taken without attention. The universe of transmitters, or cyberspace, now proceeds at a superhuman velocity and becomes untranslatable for the universe of receivers, or cybertime, that cannot go faster than what is allowed by the physical material from which our brain is made, the slowness of our body, the need for caresses and affection. Thus opens a pathological gap and mental illness spreads as testified by the statistics and above all our everyday experience. And just as pathology spreads, so too do drugs. The flourishing industry of psychopharmaceuticals beats records every year, the number of packets of Ritalin, Prozac, Zoloft and other psychotropics sold in the pharmacies continually increases, while dissociation, suffering, desperation, terror, the desire not to exist, to not have to fight continuously, to disappear grows alongside the will to kill and to kill oneself. **When, towards the end of the 1970s, an acceleration of the productive and communicative rhythms in occidental metropolitan centers was imposed, a gigantic epidemic of drug addiction made its appearance. The world was leaving its human epoch to enter the era of machinic posthuman acceleration: many sensitive organisms of the human variety began to snort cocaine, a substance that permits the acceleration of the existential rhythm leading to transforming oneself into a machine. Many other sensitive organisms of the human kind injected heroin in their veins, a substance that deactivates the relation with the speed of the surrounding atmosphere.** The epidemic of powders during the 1970s and the 1980s produced an existential and cultural devastation with which we still haven’t come to terms with. Then illegal drugs were replaced by those legal substances which the pharmaceutical industry in a white coat made available for its victims and this was the epoch of anti-depressants, of euphorics and of mood regulators. **Today psychopathy reveals itself ever more clearly as a social epidemic and, more precisely, a socio-communicational one. If you want to survive you have to be competitive and if you want to be competitive you must be connected, receive and process continuously an immense and growing mass of data. This provokes a constant attentive stress, a reduction of the time available for affectivity. These two tendencies, inseparably linked, provoke an effect of devastation on the individual psyche: depression, panic, anxiety, the sense of solitude and existential misery. But these individual symptoms cannot be indefinitely isolated, as psychopathology has done up until now and as economic power wishes to do.**

#### The aff’s  ‘activism’ is the scream of an exploited worker that will only fuel semiocapitalism more. By protesting, the aff refuels the machine and becomes infinitely frustrated in their futility. Your activism gets ruined and seized by semiocapitalism creating a cyclical process of depression.

**the affs protests of () is causing  overhaul of cyclical depression and violence**

**Genosko and Thoburn, 11** [Gary and Nicholas, “Preface: The Transversal Communism of Franco Berardi.” After the Future, by Franco Bifo Berardi et al., AK Press, 2011.]

There is, then, no return to Lenin or Mao. Alongside Hardt and Negri, perhaps the most prominent and influential of efforts to re-found a communism adequate to the current conjuncture is to be found in the work of Alain Badiou. In his later work, Badiou has turned away from the vanguard model of the party – he took his time, but got there in the end. Yet this is because **we have entered a new “sequence”, beyond that which was characterized** (and, for Badiou, properly expressed) **in the Leninist party form and the Maoist Cultural Revolution** (Badiou 2008). **Bifo’s difference is that**, whether correctly characterized by a series of sequences or not**, communism proper never went by the way of Lenin or Mao** (the “Mao-Dadaism” of Radio Alice was something quite other). As shorthand for this critique, we would signal the affirmation and intensification – not refusal – of work in the Soviet and Chinese regimes. But **the problem that Bifo isolates in these pages is the subjective political model inherent to such orthodox communism, the “militant”, and its not so distant cousin, the “activist”.** **Activism**, Bifo argues, **is the narcissistic response of the subject to the infinite and invasive power of capital, a response that can only leave the activist frustrated, humiliated, and depressed. Bifo** here **locates this** modern political configuration **with Lenin**, and makes a most heretical statement: “I am convinced that the 20th century would have been a better century had Lenin not existed”. **He diagnoses** this condition in these pages **through a reading of Lenin’s bouts of depression**, but we would highlight that elsewhere **Bifo also identifies the problem in Félix Guattari**, a most surprising move, given the sophistication of Guattari’s schizoanalytic critique of authoritarian political subjectivation. **Bifo developed his friendship with Guattari while in exile from Italy in the 1980s, a period that Guattari characterized as his “winter years”, the coincidence of personal depression and neoliberal reaction. Under these conditions, a certain political activism appeared central to Guattari, but not so to Bifo:** “I remember that **in the 1980s Félix often scolded me because I was no longer involved in some kind of political militancy. ... For me, militant will and ideological action had become impotent**” (Berardi 2008: 13). **For Bifo, at times of reaction, of the evacuation of political creativity from the social field,  activism becomes a desperate attempt to ward off depression. But it is doomed to fail, and, worse, to convert political innovation and sociality into its opposite, to “replace desire with duty”:** Félix knew this, I am sure, but he never said this much, not even to himself, and this is why he went to all these meetings with people who didn’t appeal to him, talking about things that distracted him... And here again is the root of depression, in this impotence of political will that we haven’t had the courage to admit. (Berardi 2008: 13) **One can discern two aspects to Bifo’s analysis of depression. It is a product of the “panic” induced by the sensory overload of digital capitalism, a condition of withdrawal, a disinvestment of energy from the competitive and narcissistic structures of the enterprise. And it is also a result of the loss of political composition and antagonism**: “**depression is born out of the dispersion of the community’s immediacy. Autonomous and desiring politics was a proliferating community. When the proliferating power is lost, the social becomes the place of depression**” (Berardi 2008: 13). **In both manifestations, depression is a real historical experience, something that must be actively faced and engaged with – we cannot merely ward it off with appeals to militant voluntarism.** We need to assess its contours, conditions, products, to find an analytics of depression, and an adequate politics. And that is the goal of this book, a first step toward a politics after the future, and after the redundant subjective forms of which it was made.

#### the 3rd link is

**the Infosphere**

#### Resistance to power becomes useless in the face of the infosphere – Capital will use their movement as a hammer to crush others. Their methodology flares the freedom of capital and kills liberation strategies.

#### Baron et al, 19 [Ilan Zvi Baron, Associate Professor in the School of Government and International Affairs at Durham University, with Jonathan Havercroft, Associate Professor in International Political Theory at the University of Southampton, Isaac Kamola, assistant professor of political science at Trinity College, Jonneke Koomen, Associate Professor of Politics, Sociology and Women’s and Gender Studies at Willamette University, Alex Prichard, senior lecturer in International Relations at the University of Exeter, and Justin Murphy, independent scholar, “Liberal Pacification and the Phenomenology of Violence,” 2019, International Studies Quarterly, 63, 199–212]//Townes \*ableist language modifications denoted by brackets

**Phenomenology**, as we are using it, **is not about lived experience**. It is the **philosophical tradition** of **revealing** different types of beings and **things that contain meaning in our world**, **the structures** and/or contexts **in which they exist,** and **how these structures and contexts are meaningful**. Understood in this way, **violence is one of these structures and/or contexts**. A phenomenological perspective does not approach violence from a particular normative position, although it does not preclude normative critique. A phenomenological approach does not treat violence as a discrete thing that one agent does to another, although it does not preclude such acts being described as violent. Instead, a phenomenological perspective adds to our intellectual and methodological toolbox by **identifying violence as a condition** or context **in which people function**. Phenomenology allows us to identify violence **occurring in ways and in places** that **we** otherwise **would not** be able to **recognize**. It does not change the meaning of violence (as harm, for example). Instead, it treats violence ontologically, enabling us to reveal more accurately the extent to which violence exists in the world. From a phenomenological perspective, violence is often inconspicuous. **Violence can function as a naturalized or internalized regime of compulsion or domination.** **Pacification** reveals both the **pervasiveness of violence** and **forms of violence** that may **otherwise remain inconspicuous**. The erasing of tradition and the enforcement of particular legal codes at the expense of indigenous cultural norms is one example of an inconspicuous form of violence that involves conspicuous and inconspicous consequences (Cocks 2014). In understanding violence phenomenologically, as a structure of revealing across multiple worlds, we are better able to reveal the extent to which violence shapes our world and how we are then shaped by violence. Pacavere The Romans understood violence as a necessary condition for pax. **The liberal imagination blinds itself to [obfuscates] the ways that pacification functions as violence in our world order**. International relations scholarship’s strict distinction between peace and violence reinforces this obfuscation. Yet, **the violence of (and in) pacification is central to the contemporary world**. A phenomenological approach shows that moments of violent rupture are not aberrations of the world order. **Violent outbreaks are breakdowns of pacification**. It follows that multiple structures of the world order function as **the violence of pacification**, of pacavere.12 These structures include **liberal capitalism**, **colonialism** and the **postcolonial aftermath**, and **war**. Each functions as a key site of pacification. Anarchist thought reveals the pacification in liberal capitalism. Postcolonial thought reveals the pacification of colonial projects. Both anarchist and postcolonial thought demonstrate how war is a breakdown of pacification, revealing the hidden violent structures of our worldhood. Anarchist critiques of capitalism, unlike Marxist and liberal interpretations, take seriously the decisive role of state violence in structuring society and markets. Anarchists view the state as an institution that sustains elite appropriations of political and economic power (Proudhon [1861] 1998; Sorel 1999; Prichard 2015). Those at the bottom of the social hierarchy bear the costs of this enforced order. **The state diffuses violence** (**pacification**) throughout the entire society—often **in ways that go unrecognized** by its subjects (Sorel 1999, 65). The naturalization of violence **consolidates** arbitrary **regimes of domination** in society. While specific, countable incidents of violence may decline, the social order is largely **premised on the threat of violence for contravening social norms** making specific, **countable incidents of violence relatively rare** (Kinna and Prichard, forthcoming). **Anarchist thinkers view rising inequality in the context of declining riots, insurgencies, and assassinations** (see Figure 1) **as evidence of pacification**. Inci**dents of proletarian violence, anticolonial violence, riots, and protests are all examples of resistance to the “regimes of domination” that shape contemporary society, regimes easily identifiable by those subject to them** (Gordon 2007, 33). Drawing on these accounts, we interpret declining rates of riots as a sign of increased pacification, rather than evidence that the system is becoming less violent. Conversely, eruptions of antistate and anticapitalist direct violence are signs of a breakdown in pacification. Much like Heidegger’s example of broken equipment (1962, 102–3, 412–13), which draws our attention to the background structures of our world, brief instances of direct violence reveal violently structured social relations. Although the liberal imagination obscures the centrality of violence, violence has always been central to the liberal world order—to the liberal worldhood—particularly during the colonial and imperial projects of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (Bell 2007a, 2007b). Colonial violence was diffused throughout the entire society, often in ways that went unrecognized by the colonized themselves. **The violence of pacification structured the very existence of the colonized subject**. This **violence** transformed the **colonized subjects** into a different “**species**” (Fanon 1963, 35– 40, 43). Colonial pacification was more than direct and indirect violence; it was sufficiently diffuse to **remake the psyche** of the colonized, **affecting** their **mental health and emotions** (Fanon 1963, 35–106). Fanon (1963, 31) **described it as “atmospheric violence,” a “violence rippling under the skin.”** Unable to lash out against the colonizer, the colonized lived **everyday within a world ordered by violence**. In this world, the colonized could not respond to the colonizers for fear of directly violent reprisals and would turn to symbolic activities such as a dance circle to expose the violence experienced on a daily basis (Fanon 1963, 57). For the colonized, rituals such as the dance were a means of expressing existential frustrations with and resistance to the violence of colonial pacification through reenactments of direct violence. Ultimately, anticolonial struggles exposed the violence of colonialism by directing that violence back on its authors. Practices of colonial rule were central to developing liberal norms of sovereignty, as well as to the domination and control of recalcitrant populations whether within Europe, such as the English domination of the Welsh, Irish, and Scots, or outside of Europe by settler colonialists against indigenous populations (Deloria Jr 1974; Anghie 2005; Miller 2006; Havercroft 2008; Shaw 2008; Barkawi and Stanski 2012; Coulthard 2014; Simpson 2014; Lightfoot 2016; Rueda-Saiz 2017). **This civilizing imagination functioned phenomenologically. It produced insiders as civilized and peaceful and outsiders as violent, external threats to civilization. In doing so, this imagination successfully obscured how the structures of liberalism produced colonial violence**.13 FOOTNOTE 13 Arguments about the foundational role of colonialism, primitive accumulation, and white supremacy in structuring the modern international system are particularly useful in thinking about phenomenological violence (Jones 2006; Anievas, Manchanda, and Shilliam 2015; Du Bois 1915; Shaw 2008; Coulthard 2014; Deloria 1974; Lowe 2015; Hartman 1997). The legacy of these practices pervades contemporary liberal peace-building (Richmond 2014; Sabaratnam 2015; Bouka 2013; Autesserre 2009) and liberal global governance (Koomen 2014a, 2014b, 2013), while trade liberalization can facilitate mass violence (Kamola 2007; Smith 2016). Césaire argues that colonialism produced a “boomerang effect” within European societies; Nazism was the return of violence previously “applied only to non-European peoples” (Césaire 2000, 36). At independence, international law became a mechanism for **reinforcing this** international **order** upon the previously colonized world (Grovogui 1996). The idea of **war** as an external practice of states, not tied to their **internal workings** and located according **to** specific normative **projections of Western identity**, followed from this colonial mentality. This mentality **legitimized** the **exporting** of **violence to create a Western imperial pax** and was so widespread that it shaped the **development of modern warfare** (Ellis 1986; Proudhon [1861] 1998). The **colonial wars reproduced** and **reinforced ideologies of Western superiority, evidenced in part by the West’s superior military technology**. A consequence of this racist hubris was the inability to foresee the destructive tendencies of Western warfare when unleashed against themselves (Ellis 1986). The discipline of international relations, founded in response to the unexpectedly destructive character of the First World War, reproduced this understanding of war.14 This understanding disguises the possibility of increasing violence within the liberal world by presuming a historical narrative of progress and being shocked by its aberration. **War, however, is not the absence of peace or an aberration of liberal progress, but is instead a phenomenological breaking of the liberal worldhood**.15 Once a liberal order of democracy, free markets, and international institutions are spread throughout the world, liberal ideology imagines peace as the end state. Yet, states often deploy war under liberal guises.16 Wars under the aegis of humanitarian values and regime change are examples of the multifaceted character of liberal pacification. Liberal regimes emphasize the violence of those that they are invading, while minimizing the violence involved in these military undertakings and the violence necessary to sustain the liberal societies themselves. What Pierre-Joseph Proudhon called “the moral phenomenology of war” (Prichard 2015, 112–34; Proudhon [1861] 1998) becomes an integral part of the everyday workings of society that shape innumerable aspects of our daily language. **The upshot is that**, within liberal ideology, **the violence committed by liberal states is justified, whereas the violence committed by illiberal states is not**. **Postcolonial** and **anarchist scholarship focuses** on the **incorporation** of **violence** in the **production of liberal spaces** (Barkawi and Laffey 1999). These same concerns can be directed onto the liberal order itself. Seen from the perspective of marginalized and oppressed populations, the structures of liberal pacification take on a distinctly violent aspect. The liberal world is not less violent. Rather, **the liberal world involves a sophisticated phenomenological process of legitimating certain types of violence in order to render other types of violence invisible.** Liberal Pacification What does it mean to apply this third type of violence to our understanding of international relations? Pacification reveals liberalism as a violent process as opposed to a system that is emblematic of the absence of direct violence. There are parallels between the Pax Britannia, Pax Americana, and the ancient peace of the Pax Romana (Neocleous 2010, 13). **However, our account emphasizes the crucial role of pacification as a distinct kind of violence in maintaining these pacific orders**. Our theory offers the novel insight that incorporating pacification into the analysis of the liberal peace reveals crucial aspects **of this peace that conventional and critical accounts neglect**. A focus on pacification provides three critical insights. First, it recovers the crucial role of pacification in the historical founding of the liberal order. Second, by distinguishing between three kinds of violence (Figure 2), we account for the empirical observations of the liberal peace as leading to a decline in direct violence and an increase in violence overall as part of the pacification of the Pax Americana. Conversely, the liberal version of the Pax Americana cannot account for key anomalies. Third, our approach draws attention to the violent ordering of social relations. This dimension of violence is neglected even in Marxist, postcolonial, neo-Gramscian, and post-structuralist critiques of the liberal peace, which primarily focus on the role of direct and indirect violence in maintaining the Pax Americana. Contemporary liberal international relations theory emphasizes the nonviolent role of the liberal triad (democracy, free markets, and institutions) in causing the liberal peace. Yet, a quick review of the history of liberalism in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries shows that key figures in liberalism, from John Stuart Mill, to Joseph Galliéni, to American foreign policy elites, understood pacification as a necessary step in establishing and maintaining the liberal order Mill, one of the philosophical founders of liberalism, conceptualized and deployed liberalism as a domination strategy. **Mill argued that it is appropriate to impose despotism or slavery on “savages” who incline to “fighting and rapine,” but the government should use force as little as possible: What they require is not a government of force, but one of guidance**. Being, however, in too low a state to yield to the guidance of any but those to whom they look up as the possessors of force, the sort of government fittest for them is one [that] possesses force, but seldom uses it. (Mill 1998, 232–33) In terms of our conceptual distinction, Mill argued that liberalism as pacification was a more effective instrument of violence than the direct modes of violence that governments usually deploy. The history of European colonialism is replete with this line of reasoning. “[L]iberal improvement” was a regular plank of colonial strategy by France and Britain in the nineteenth century (Owens 2015, 154). Consider one example from the French colonial tradition. Galliéni, a military commander and administrator, consciously deployed liberalism as a domination strategy in the pacification of Tonkin during the 1890s. Galliéni’s strategy involved slowly spreading military outposts and deploying civil administrators to create markets, schools, and amenities. The rationale was that locals would gain a personal interest in the continuation of French control and would help to quell Chinese brigandage. “Piracy,” said Galliéni, “is the result of an economic condition. It can be fought by prosperity” (quoted in Owens 2015, 157). Galliéni devised a “theory of pacification” in which “the correct combination of force and politics can socialize, pacify, and domesticate a population into regulating itself” (quoted in Owens 2015, 157). What Mill proposed in theory, Galliéni enacted in practice; pacification—**the violent reordering of social relations in a colony—was a more effective means of maintaining liberal rule than the deployment of direct violence**. While less explicit, the relationship between liberalism and imperialism remained present in the twentieth-century development of the Pax Americana. During this era, US policy makers sought to construct a zone of peace distinct from the zones of war associated with authoritarian regimes. The US State Department first recognized the concept of “hegemonic pacification” in the Euro-Atlantic conference diplomacy of the 1920s (Cohrs 2008, 619). The United States’ “strategic restraint” in the aftermath of World War Two was motivated by this concept of liberal, hegemonic pacification (Ikenberry 2009; Ikenberry 2011, 173). US defense officials Stimson, Patterson, McCloy, and Assistant Secretary Howard C. Peterson agreed that it was a matter of the security interests of the United States to maintain “open markets, unhindered access to raw materials, and the rehabilitation of much—if not all—of Eurasia along liberal capitalist lines” (Leffler 1984, 349–56; Barkawi and Laffey 1999). Liberalism as a domination and pacifying strategy continued throughout (and long after) the Cold War (Laffey 2003; Stokes 2003), as evident in one of the founding documents of the post–World War Two liberal order, NSC-68 (Ikenberry 2011, 168). While the enforcement of a Pax Americana eventually yielded a decline in direct violence, it produced an increase in other types of violence. **The first insight of our theory is that pacification has always been part of the liberal project and that the violence in the liberal project never went away**. **The second insight is that by reinterpreting the liberal peace as liberal pacification we are able to grant the empirical findings of liberal peace theorists while maintaining that the Pax Americana represents an intensification of violence overall**. In the language of positivist social science, **our theory is observationally equivalent to that of liberal peace theory**. We expect that the quantity of direct violence inversely associates with the degree of pacification in a society. Therefore, our interpretation challenges research that identifies liberal institutions as the cause of declining violence. Liberal institutions, as apparatuses of liberal pacification, ensure that direct violence is increasingly rare while leaving the structures of violence and domination in place. The observational equivalence on particular dependent variables (in our case, all forms of direct violence) produces a theoretical change requiring the generation of novel observable implications (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994, 30). Furthermore, increased suffering in liberal societies provides evidence contradicting the main claims of liberal peace theories, while remaining consistent with liberal pacification. At its core, liberalism is a project that tries to maximize the utility of its subjects (in other words, minimize suffering while maximizing happiness). As such, a state of liberal peace should lead to a **decrease in markers of suffering**. **However**, there is **more slavery** in the world today than ever before, with conservative estimates of between **12.3 and 27 million people** in debt bondage, chattel, or contract slavery (Gordon 2012).17 Moreover, there is ample evidence of rising **psychological disorders** in **liberal societies**. A preponderance of evidence from the United States suggests that **depression**, **anxiety**, alienation, **opioid dependency**, **stress**, other related **psychological disorders, increased** social **isolation**, **and** the **decline of community** have increased throughout the twentieth century (Twenge, Zhang, and Im 2004, 320; Adler, Boyce, Chesney, et al. 1994; Twenge 2000; Twenge, Konrath, Foster, et al. 2008; Twenge, Gentile, DeWall, et al. 2010; Cohen and Janicki-Deverts 2012; American Society of Addiction Medicine 2016). Changes to human life associated with modernity have caused psychological **stress** to **increase** (Jackson 2014). **Mortality rates** have increased for some white, non-Hispanics aged 45–54 in the United States between 1999 and 2013 (Case and Deaton 2015). Modern technological advances from television to the Internet may contribute to increasing separation and alienation of the social human animal into individualized bodies connected by increasingly weak and empty bonds (Putnam 2000; Gray 2011; Turkle 2011). At minimum, new information communication technology such as Facebook can increase the stress and anxiety of its users (Lee-Won, Herzog, and Park 2015). **The violent structuring of liberalism enables increases in social alienation, anxiety, stress, and human bondage through repression, economic control, and social isolation**. **These are not isolated instances of suffering**. They are **fundamental structural features of our liberal world**. If liberalism is a process of pacification rather than simply peace, then this rise in individual suffering in liberal spaces may be evidence of a similar process that Fanon equated with the psychic life of the colonist. **Just as Fanon’s colonial subjects, unable to lash out at the settler through direct violence, internalized their suffering, modern liberal subjects, unable to resist liberal pacification, internalize their suffering** (1982, chap. 6; cf. Sorel 1999, 118). Liberal peace should bring about a rise in happiness; that it has instead led to rising suffering is evidence of liberal pacification. Third, in addition to offering an alternative interpretation of the liberal peace, our theory of liberal pacification supplements key insights from critical approaches to peace. Tarak Barkawi and Mark Laffey’s work on imperial processes and liberal spaces makes a similar point to ours, that the celebrated zone of liberal peace rests on practices of violence (Barkawi and Laffey 1999, 2002; cf. Neocleous et al. 2013). Their account, however, focuses on practices of direct violence, such as humanitarian interventions against authoritarian regimes or corporations hiring local militias to make work sites in the global south safe for economic extraction (Barkawi and Laffey 1999, 422). Our point is that these moments of direct violence lead to pacification wherein social relations have been so violently reordered as to make direct violence no longer necessary. **Once direct violence has established liberal space, pacification functions as a structure of violence that sustains the space**. Direct violence only manifests itself when pacification weakens. Pacification, however, does not merely operate through manipulating the conscience of its subjects. While Marxist and Gramscian concepts of ideology and hegemony are consistent with our theory of pacification (Peceny 1997, 418), they do not address how the constructed political order sustains itself through a violent reordering of social relations. A Gramscian-inspired critique of the democratic peace can yield a bird’s-eye view of the ways in which liberal peace theory is itself deployed as an ideological tool (Ish-Shalom 2006, 569–75). However, Gramscianinspired approaches do not account for the ways that everyday practices of violence (for example, surveillance technologies, implied threats from weapons, security barriers, etc.) sustain liberal pacification. While ideational factors are important in pacification, these factors rest upon practices and structures that are of an ontological-existential character. To review, our reinterpretation of the liberal peace as liberal pacification offers three novel insights. **First**, liberal scholars and others associate the **development** of the **liberal order** with **peace** and a **decline** in violence by **ignoring** how **pacification** is part of the **liberal project**. **Second**, the empirically observed decline in violence equated with the liberal peace is not **necessarily** a sign of **human progress** but could be a **sign** of **intensified repression** or **increases** in other forms of **suffering** across the **liberal world order**. Third, our concept of pacification reveals violence that is neither direct nor indirect but is phenomenologically structured into the world order. Understanding liberalism as pacification **produces a paradigm shift**. Liberal pacification is violent in the sense that it coerces a specific type of liberal docility, while also preventing types of resistance that might be understood as violent, including riots, insurrections, civil wars, and interstate wars. Pacification reveals the ongoing violence at the heart of a political project that imagines itself to be against violence. Conclusion Our account of pacification recovers a crucial aspect of pax, one originally etched into Roman monuments. The heading of the Res Gestae (the funeral monument to Emperor Augustus) reads, “[t]his is how he [Augustus] made the world subject to the power of the people of Rome” (Beard 2016, 364). This monument does not celebrate peace as the absence of violence; it celebrates pacification. Pax takes the form of a process that violently reorders the world so that imperial subjects are rendered incapable of using violence to resist Roman rule. The absence of overt acts of violence depends upon the maximization of

#### The only ethical action left is to refuse the terms as given and embrace radical passivity.

**Bifo, 11** [Franco Berardi, Italian communist theorist and activist in the autonomist tradition, whose work mainly focuses on the role of the media and information technology within post-industrial capitalism   “Chapter 4 Exhastion and Subjectivity.” After the Future, by Franco Bifo Berardi et al., AK Press, 2011. P. 107-108]

Advertising and stimulated hyper-expression (“just do it”), have submitted the energies of the social psyche to permanent mobilization. **Exhaustion follows, and exhaustion is the only way of escape: Nothing, not even the system, can avoid the symbolic obligation, and it is in this trap that the only chance of a catastrophe for capital remains. The system turns on itself, as a scorpion does when encircled by the challenge of death.** For it is summoned to answer, if it is not to lose face, to what can only be death. **The system must itself commit suicide in response to the multiplied challenge of death and suicide.** So hostages are taken. On the symbolic or sacrificial plane, from which every moral consideration of the innocence of the victims is ruled out the hostage is the substitute, the alter-ego of the terrorist, the hostage’s death for the terrorist. Hostage and terrorist may thereafter become confused in the same sacrificial act. (Baudrillard 1993a: 37) **In these impressive pages Baudrillard outlines the end of the modern dialectics of revolution against power, of the labor movement against capitalist domination, and predicts the advent of a new form of action which will be marked by the sacrificial gift of death (and self-annihilation). After the destruction of the World Trade Center in the most important terrorist act ever, Baudrillard wrote a short text titled The Spirit of Terrorism where he goes back to his own predictions and recognizes the emergence of a catastrophic age. When the code becomes the enemy the only strategy can be catastrophic: all the counterphobic ravings about exorcizing evil: it is because it is there, everywhere, like an obscure object of desire.** Without this deep-seated complicity, the event would not have had the resonance it has, and in their symbolic strategy the terrorists doubtless know that they can count on this unavowable complicity. (Baudrillard 2003: 6) This goes much further than hatred for the dominant global power by the disinherited and the exploited, those who fell on the wrong side of global order. This malignant desire is in the very heart of those who share this order’s benefits. An allergy to all definitive order, to all definitive power is happily universal, and the two towers of the World Trade Center embodied perfectly, in their very double-ness (literally twin-ness), this definitive order: No need, then, for a death drive or a destructive instinct, or even for perverse, unintended effects. Very logically – inexorably – the increase in the power heightens the will to destroy it. And it was party to its own destruction. When the two towers collapsed, you had the impression that they were responding to the suicide of the suicide-planes with their own suicides. **It has been said that “Even God cannot declare war on Himself.” Well, He can. The West, in position of God** (divine omnipotence and absolute moral legitimacy), **has become suicidal, and declared war on itself**. (Baudrillard 2003: 6-7) **In Baudrillard’s** catastrophic **vision I see a** new way of thinking subjectivity: **a reversal of the energetic subjectivation that animates the revolutionary theories of the 20th century, and the opening of an implosive theory of subversion, based on depression and exhaustion. In the activist view exhaustion is seen as the inability of the social body to escape the vicious destiny that capitalism has prepared: deactivation of the social energies that once upon a time animated democracy and political struggle. But exhaustion could also become the beginning of a slow movement towards a “wu wei” civilization, based on the withdrawal, and frugal expectations of life and consumption.** **Radicalism could abandon** the mode of **activism, and adopt** the mode of **passivity. A radical passivity would definitely threaten the ethos of relentless productivity that neoliberal politics has imposed. The mother of all the bubbles, the work bubble, would finally deflate. We have been working too much during the last three or four centuries, and outrageously too much during the last thirty years. The current depression could be the beginning of a massive abandonment of competition, consumerist drive, and of dependence on work.** Actually, if we think of the geopolitical struggle of the first decade – the struggle between Western domination and jihadist Islam – we recognize that **the most powerful weapon has been suicide.** 9/11 is the most impressive act of this suicidal war, but thousands of people have killed themselves in order to destroy American military hegemony. And they won, forcing the western world into the bunker of paranoid security, and defeating the hyper-technological armies of the West both in Iraq, and in Afghanistan. The suicidal implosion has not been confined to the Islamists. Suicide has became a form of political action everywhere. Against neoliberal politics, Indian farmers have killed themselves. Against exploitation hundreds of workers and employees have killed themselves in the French factories of Peugeot, and in the offices of France Telecom. In Italy, when the 2009 recession destroyed one million jobs, many workers, haunted by the fear of unemployment, climbed on the roofs of the factories, threatening to kill themselves**. Is it possible to divert this implosive trend from the direction of death, murder, and suicide, towards a new kind of autonomy, social creativity and of life?** I think that **it is possible only if we start from exhaustion, if we emphasize the creative side of withdrawal.** The exchange between life and money could be deserted, and **exhaustion could give way to a huge wave of withdrawal from the sphere of economic exchange. A new refrain could emerge in that moment, and wipe out the law of economic growth. The self-organization of the general intellect could abandon the law of accumulation and growth, and start a new concatenation, where collective intelligence is only subjected to the common good.** The global recession started officially in September 2008 and lasted officially until the summer of 2009. Since the summer of 2009 the official truth in the media, in political statements, in economic talk was: recovery. The stock exchange began to rise again and the banks started again paying huge bonuses to their managers and so on. Meanwhile, unemployment was exploding everywhere, salaries were falling, welfare was curtailed, 90 million more are expected to join the army of poverty in the next year. Is this recovery? Our conditional reflex (influenced by the Keynesian knowledge that recovery is the recovery of the “real economy”) answered: no, this is not recovery, capitalism cannot recover only by financial means. But we should reframe our vision. Finance is no longer a mere tool of capitalist growth. The financialization of capitalism has made finance the very ground of accumulation, as Christian Marazzi (2010) has explained in recent works such as The Violence of Financial Capitalism. In the sphere of semiocapitalism, financial signs are not only signifiers pointing to some referents. The distinction between sign and referent is over. The sign is the thing, the product, the process. The “real” economy and financial expectations are no longer distinct spheres. In the past, when riches were created in the sphere of industrial production, when finance was only a tool for the mobilization of capital to invest in the field of material production, recovery could not be limited to the financial sphere. It took also employment and demand. **Industrial**

## CASE

### ROB

#### Don’t prefer their ROB on pont 1 no reason its th cause of millatraism when we pprove capital molding us down into prductive machines is the root cause of milatraism that’s baron 19, anything that has emotions is affected

#### On poitn 2 Considering queerness can never devolve in just an epistemological question, we need to addres themindset that is shaping the world whichh is semiocaptialism prefer our ROB to resist

#### Top level all of your ev is about drones controlled by humans, even after your plan millitaries will still kill queers and think its “Fuckin Cool”

### 1NC – Presumption

#### 1 – Frame the 1AC through solvency, not impacts – any attempt to filter offense through the RotB or the speech act of the aff is an arbitrary goalpost that only serves to insulate it from criticism and nuanced testing – forcing us to negate the efficacy of personal strategies is at best impossible and at worst violent – the aff can’t change the material structures that produce violence against brown women – no warrant for how the aff spills up to impact structures of statist and white politics writ large or out of debate means you vote neg on presumption. Voting for their performance may feel affectively appealing but you should ask yourself what a W on tabroom does – frame T as a PIC out of their offense.

#### 2 – Spreading through every single card in the 1AC kills its affective value.

#### 3 – If we win the topic isn’t bad or that non-t affs push us to framework, you shouldn’t vote us down because they think it’s white, no warrant btw.

#### On part 2 Homonationalism provides a simplistic account of relationship between tolerance and violence---specific analysis of material structures and institutions is necessary to solve

**Ritchie 14** [Jason, Assistant Professor of Anthropology at Florida International University, “Pinkwashing, Homonationalism, and Israel–Palestine: The Conceits of Queer Theory and the Politics of the Ordinary,” Antipode, 3 Jun 2014]

My argument is not, of course, that racism does not exist in many contemporary contexts—including Israel–Palestine—nor I am arguing that “tolerance” of homosexuals has not, in many of those contexts, been marshaled to provide cover for the imposition of violence against racialized others (eg the Israeli occupation). My argument, instead, is that the popularity of the concept of homonationalism owes much to its oversimplifications. Power, in this framework, is reducible to racism, and racism is understood in a universalizing manner that allows the critic to avoid the messy work of “[locating] the meanings of race and racism … within particular fields of discourse [and articulating their meanings] to the social relations” in concrete socio-historical contexts (Solomos and Back 1995:415).¶ I have utilized the metaphor of the checkpoint to demonstrate what I believe to be a more empirically convincing and politically engaged account of the everyday violence queer Palestinians face. Focusing on the checkpoint requires one to locate the racist violence of the Israeli state in a specific time and place, structured by identifiable social and political processes and inhabited by actual human beings who embody multiple subject positions that differently inflect the ways in which they encounter those processes and one another. Such a strategy will do little to challenge the monopolization of queer spaces in North American and European cities by racist neocons like Michael Lucas, nor will it provide a convenient mechanism for radical activists—or theoretically sophisticated academics—to validate their queer credentials. But if queers who live in other places have some value beyond serving as grist for North American and European queers