### 1

#### Interpretation: Topical affirmatives must specify which medicines they defend.

#### Violation: They don’t

#### Standards:

#### Ground - Not specifying destroys neg ground because they can shift and clarify which medicines they defend in the 1AR to no link DAs and perm CPs

#### Topic education – vague terms like medicine prevent us from having in-depth discussion about the topic

#### Topicality is a voter for fairness and education – drop the debater

#### Drop the debater – The round is irreparably skewed

#### Competing interpretations – Reasonability invites arbitrary judge interventions who draw inconsistent lines at what is reasonable

#### No RVIs – A] Logic – You shouldn’t win for being fair – logic outweighs because it’s key to all arguments B] Baiting – debaters read abusive positions and get good at winning the RVI – prevents abuse checks and crowds out substance

#### 1NC theory outweighs – we were only abusive because they were

## Plan Flaw

#### The member states of the WTO is colloquially known as the World Toilet Organization

#### Their plan says WTO not World Trade organization that this really cool song talks about

WTO No DATE

<https://www.worldtoilet.org/> They help disadvantged youth and empower many

World Toilet Organization was founded on 19 November 2001 and the inaugural World Toilet Summit was held on the same day, the first global summit of its kind. We recognised the need for an international day to draw global attention to the sanitation crisis – and so we established World Toilet Day on 19 November. World Toilet Day has continued to garner support over the years, with NGOs, the private sector, civil society organisations and the international community joined in to mark the global day.

A world body on toilets — are you kidding me? Your toilet is more important than you think.  
Let’s take a look at some quick facts about the sanitation crisis.

#### [CHILDREN](https://www.worldtoilet.org/)

Some 297 000 children – more than 800 every day – under five who die annually from diarrhoeal diseases due to poor sanitation, poor hygiene, or unsafe drinking water. These deaths are preventable.([WHO 2019](https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/drinking-water)). [EDUCATION/GIRLS](https://www.worldtoilet.org/) Almost half of the schools in the world do not have handwashing facilities with soap and water available to students. Clean and safe toilets help keep more girls in school and increase attendance rates. Far too many girls miss out on education just because of the lack of a clean and safe toilet. ([WHO/UNICEF 2020](https://www.unwater.org/app/uploads/2020/06/JMP-2020-COVID-global-hygiene-snapshot.pdf))[OPEN DEFECATION](https://www.worldtoilet.org/) Over half of the global population or 4.2 billion people lack safe sanitation. Globally, at least 2 billion people use a drinking water source contaminated with faeces. ([WHO/UNICEF 2019](https://washdata.org/))[INVESTMENT](https://www.worldtoilet.org/)For every $1 invested in basic sanitation, the return is $2.5. And in the case of basic sanitation in rural areas, every $1 returns on average more than $5 in saved medical costs and increased productivity. (Hutton et al. 2015)A clean and safe toilet ensures health, dignity and well-being — yet 40% of the world’s population does not have access to toilets. World Toilet Organization is a global non-profit committed to improving toilet and sanitation conditions worldwide. We believe in empowering individuals through education, training and building local marketplace opportunities to advocate for clean and safe sanitation facilities in their communities.The silence surrounding the sanitation crisis is beginning to break as evidenced by the Sustainable Development Goal’s inclusion of sanitation on its global development agenda. Sustainable Development Goal #6 calls for universal access to adequate and equitable sanitation and the end of open defecation by 2030.World Toilet Organization is one of the few organizations whose sole focus is on toilets  
and sanitation. Breaking the silence on the sanitation crisis is at the heart of what we do.  
And here’s how we do it.

#### Their plan makes no sense why would the World Toilet organization have peoples vaccine rights they don’t so you don’t do anything as praxis and its nontopical

#### Voter for fairness and education- disincentivize research into the nuances of policy interactions between congress and the executive which decreases civic engagement- bad plan writing kills fairness and creates model of debate where affirmatives add extra planks to plans to spike offense and monopolize preround prep

Extend voters here

## Counterplan

#### CP: The people ought to take control of medicine and its intellectual proerty rights away from the member states of the World Intellectual Property Organization

#### We gain performative offense and solve their case I am glad for My sister to be gay and advocate for her through this plan . I am glad she is gay and Devoting this to her through an anti-imperialst organization that doesn’t hunt and otherize brown people like us

#### WIPO has more norm-producing authority than the WTO and is more involved with implementation and perception around TRIPS so it would be more meaningful to take from here

Okediji 14, Ruth, Jeremiah Smith. Jr, Professor of Law at Harvard Law School and Co-Director of the Berkman Klein Center, Balancing Health and Wealth: The Battle Over Intellectual Property and Access to Medicines in Latin America”, <https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199676743.001.0001/acprof-9780199676743>, Accessed 9/2/21 VD

WIPO’s technical assistance activities, directed primarily at developing and least developed countries, have profoundly shaped domestic understanding of the appropriate implementation of patent norms in those jurisdictions (Flynn, et al. 2013; Pager 2012; Yu 2012; Sell 2011; Deere 2008),16 including the perception of how much wiggle room is afforded under TRIPS standards to address barriers to access to medicines. From producing model patent laws,17 to training programs for IP offices and officials (New 2012; New 2001), and other forms of “technical assistance” projects,18 WIPO designs, deploys, and oversees a pervasive network of activities that directly and indirectly infuse domestic laws of developing and least developed countries with strong normative predispositions, consistent with the interests of maximalist patent standards and, typically, minimalist public interest limitations (Kostecki 2006). So while overtly intervening with the administration of the TRIPS Agreement may be implausible for WIPO, it is WIPO, not the WTO, that has been most powerful in influencing, establishing, and nurturing the domestic normative context in which TRIPS norms are implemented. The core obligations of the TRIPS Agreement build upon the substantive norms of the classic WIPO treaties, namely the Paris Convention and the Berne Convention.19 Both of these instruments have an enduring legacy in defining the expectations of countries about the scope of international protection available, the rights granted to foreigners, and the economic impact of global IP protection (Okediji 2013). WIPO has long been at the forefront of expanding the reach of these treaties globally, and in developing a narrative about the role of IP in economic development. Given how significantly WIPO has been involved in defining the domestic landscape of IP laws in many developing and least-developed countries, there is no question that the difficulty in persuading local officials of the degree and right to exercise national discretion in TRIPS implementation strategies is likely strongly linked to the precedential effect of WIPO’s activities in those countries since their independence (Okediji 2008; Okediji 2003).

### 2 – K

#### The 1AC is animated by the spectacle of its own power – the aff is the latest instantiation of America’s “errand in the wilderness” which suppresses interrogation of imperial violence through establishing a transcendental ethos of American Exceptionalism. Their “deal” with the World trade organization Is the link the 1ac is in kahoots with imperialists, it doesn’t take power sway but includes the US in a ontological sotry where they will call u the other

Spanos and Spanos ‘19

[William V Spanos, Literature at Binghamton, Rob Glass’ favorite, RIP to a real one, and Adam Spanos, University of Chicago. 2019. “American Spectacle and the Vietnam War Sublime,” published in “Neocolonial Fictions of the Global Cold War.” (eds. Steven Belletto and Joseph Keith)] pat

The United States has instrumentalized the spectacle as part of a twofold ideological strategy directed inwardly, toward the national community, and outwardly, toward its threatening enemy. The dominant exceptionalist culture’s representation of the wilderness of the world outside its borders functions as a means of gaining power over its alleged enemy. It has characterized this appalling wilderness as the evidence of its Other’s civilizational inferiority. It has even managed to solicit the attachment of some sectors of these foreign populations to the American-legislated nomos of the earth and drawn them into subservience to this nation’s Higher Cause.

For a domestic audience, this extraterritorial menace has been figured as a threat to the security of the covenantal people. But the invocation of this threat acts as a prompt to the citizenry to recommit its youthful energies and reconstitute its unity in the face of the recidivism—the backsliding and the splintering of the sovereign Logos—intrinsic to the “civilizing” process. This is the national ritual that the dominant culture perennially stages as spectacle, especially at times of national crisis and, above all, when the people’s dedication to the errand shows signs of flagging.

This tactic, of converting what seemed hauntingly unmasterable about the world into an admonitory rhetoric that would incite aggressive reaction, had its origin at the time when the Puritans first encountered the vastness and indefiniteness of the terrain to which they had come as well as the inassimilable alterity of the people already there. These settlers had an un-easy experience of being unhomed; they found themselves face to face with the utter contingency—even arbitrariness—of their new situation. But the American Puritans did not understand the anxiety born of this deracination as an ontological imperative to rethink their Logos. On the contrary, as Sacvan Bercovitch has shown, they harnessed this anxiety to the tasks of reorienting themselves and establishing the transcendental significance of their place in the world:

The American Puritan jeremiad was the ritual of a culture on an errand—which is to say, a culture based on a faith in process. Substituting teleology for hierarchy, it discarded the Old World ideal of stasis for a New World vision of the future. Its function was to create a climate of anxiety that helped release the restless “progressivist” energies required for the success of the venture. . . . It made anxiety its end as well as its means. Crisis was the social norm it sought to inculcate. . . . The future, though divinely assured, was never quite there, and New England’s Jeremiahs set out to provide the sense of insecurity that would ensure the outcome.

In his capacity as Jeremiah, this spokesperson of God’s chosen people represented the New World wilderness in such a way as to foreground both the promise inherent in his capacity to domesticate this terrain and the danger that constantly lurked. Furthermore, he separated those who attended to him from the temporality of being by reducing them to spectators of the alarming and captivating truth-image that he called forth. In his sermons, prose, and poetry, and despite a professed commitment to the “plain style,” he ritualized and staged the sublime, spatialized its unnameability into awesome spectacle.

The basic problematic of the US spectacle—a central component of national identity from the Puritans through the contemporary moment—is the attempt to capture the encounter with being in its dynamic, errant, and totally unjustifiable givenness and to convert the wonder it evokes into awe. American spectacle supplies an illusory grounding for the nation’s existence, suggesting that the appearance and subsequent presence of the United States are divinely ordained; citizens access this meaning to the extent that they consent to the meaningfulness of the spectacle offered to them. This spectacle resembles the sublime experience of the absence of any such transcendental guarantee insofar as it forces the spectator to confront that which is beyond the pale of merely empirical knowledge. But whereas the sublimity of the nothingness of being calls forth questions—albeit ones that are finally un-answerable—the spectacle of US power functions to suppress the faculty of interrogation. It therefore involves a twofold displacement: in place of the nothing the spectacle offers the illusory presence of American power; instead of an inquisitive relation to what remains unknown the spectacle encourages acquiescence and silent marveling. The jeremiad constitutes a relay between the two points and functions to ensure that the spectacle doesn’t degenerate into the sublime.

Dejustification of Violence: Vietnam as Event

The decisive event heralding the implosion of the American spectacle occurred at the conclusion of the Vietnam War, a turning point that has widely been identified with the breakdown of the country’s social order. Historians of the war have recognized this fact without identifying its proper ontological rationale. According to Marilyn Young, “the war opened up for debate not only the principles that had governed American foreign policy since the end of World War II, but the larger structure of the nation and its political procedures.” Furthermore, “racism and poverty were being explained as endemic, the social system seen as inherently unfair to minority groups; natural resources were described as depleted and limited, and the Cold War as at least as much an American as a Soviet creation. . . . [F]undamental moral values connected to family, sex, and work that had only rarely been challenged in the past were held up to public scrutiny, even scorn.” Likewise, Christian Appy argues that the war forced Americans to reassess their national identity, in the process of which their belief in American exceptionalism was “shattered.” However one specifies the inception of this event—the student protests and teach-ins, the mounting resistance to the draft, the radicalization of the civil rights movement, the imposition of a tax increase to pay for the war, the public reaction to the Tet offensive, the revelation of the My Lai massacre, the publication of the Pentagon Papers, or otherwise—it is undeniable that a general symbolic crisis had taken place, one that rendered increasingly large domains of American life unjustifiable in the eyes of its members. But this event, most often referred to as the “Vietnam quagmire,” involved more than the collapse of previously hegemonic social structures. More fundamentally, it brought into question the political ontology on which the United States had predicated its very existence.

Prior to this event, the US state had relied on visual technologies in order to foster public consent for the war. The fact that this was the first “post-modern war” and the first to be widely televised did not alter the fact that the state and national elites had long worked to solicit public acquiescence by way of imagery, even if the tools used to produce these images were primarily rhetorical and their manifestation largely confined to the collective imaginary. By the closing stages of the conflict, however, many American citizens (and others across the globe) came to recognize the emptiness of these images, their lack of historical referentiality. The end of the Vietnam War, then, did not only entail the withdrawal of consent for an imperial army’s occupation of a foreign territory. It also and more significantly involved a disclosure of the nothingness—the absence of ground—that had always haunted US pretensions to universalism. This culminating moment forced an encounter with the primal scene of the nation’s founding, a site at which this nothingness had been obscured by the spectacular imagistics of US ideology. When the spectacle’s history-destroying function became manifest to viewers of the war at home, a rupture in the ordinary sequence of time took place that suddenly brought the life-destroying violence of American power into stark relief. The Vietnam War then became the untimely occasion for a rethinking of the very meaning of “America,” an event that continues to ramify into the present.

Since the Puritans had announced their intention to redeem world his-tory through the establishment of a polity with a universal mission, the temporality of US national life was determined by its adventist rhetoric and view of history. In announcing to the world the “good news” that the United States would have brought to all mankind, in the confident mode of the future anterior, its deputies took what had been a secularized version of the providential view of history (as given, for example, by Hegel) and retheologized it. The philosophers of US history married the progressive view of history to a messianic sense of their nation’s capacity to bring the flux of time to an end. The demise of this paradigm, however, was marked not by the anticipated triumph of liberal capitalism over its antagonists but by the defeat of American forces in Vietnam.

Because US identity was so intimately bound up with this temporality—one that was simultaneously amnesiac, optimistic, and expectant—the recognition of the impending failure of US forces to overcome its putatively Communist opponent could not easily be metabolized. On one hand, the disclosure of the gap between the principles used to justify the war and the military’s actual conduct in Vietnam served to undermine domestic support for the war, which suddenly become comparable to other great atrocities in recent memory, including the genocide of Jews during World War II. On the other hand, the very historical context in which the Vietnam War was understood to inhere, as an event distinct from what came before because part of the nation’s linear movement toward a better future, no longer sufficed to orient Americans within historical time. The comfort provided by the idea that they were safely lodged on a determinate trajectory dissipated when the forecasted end of the war failed to materialize. Subsequently both the nation’s identity and the dominant understanding of how that identity would realize itself in historical time entered a period of crisis.

It was not simply the US government’s justification of the war, the cold calculations of military planners, or the execution of the war by soldiers that came to seem morally wrong and indifferent to human life. Nor was it the case that the war came to be understood as an exception to the basic principles undergirding US foreign policy, a ghastly aberration within an otherwise benevolent history of interactions with other peoples. Instead, this event reconfigured the national imaginary in a totalizing way. The nonlocalized nature of the critiques of the United States, the extension of these challenges to almost all components of American life, intensified the perception that a kind of generalized anarchy had been unleashed that threatened to undermine the nation’s existence. But the energies unleashed in this moment were not merely critical, and it is for this reason that the familiar historiographical trope of the war that comes home does not completely capture the dynamic of the event. For a new spirit of inquiry emerged simultaneously alongside the impulse to challenge existing practices of domination, one that worked to disclose truths that had previously been unthinkable.

The Vietnam War came to be perceived as a part of an iterative temporal sequence rather than a unique occurrence. Suddenly an entire catalog of state violence became relevant to the effort to make sense of this war; those who immersed themselves in the event worked to retrieve these historical referents from the antiquarian status to which traditional historians and cultural critics had consigned them. Among these, the removal and genocide of Native Americans was among the most significant. Throughout the war, it was common for American soldiers to refer to the undefended zones outside of their fortifications as “Indian country,” which it was their job to clear and make ready for civilized, capitalist life. Although the pervasiveness of this metaphor initially served to conceal the violence at stake in both projects, finally the revelations about the sheer extent of the displacements in Vietnam—and the casualness with which Vietnamese civilians were killed—turned the metaphor into a metonymy. The distance between Indian removal and the devastation of Vietnamese communities collapsed as the war came to seem like merely one instance of a broader imperial project. Other events, too, flashed into view: Hernán Cortés’s conquest of the Aztec Empire using spectacular and demoralizing displays of force; Manifest Destiny, the westward expansion that brooked no obstacle—ecological or human—set on the path of the settlers’ unerring mission; and the mass enslavement and subordination of peoples of African descent, which had its parallel in the disproportionate conscription of young black men to fight, as Martin Luther King Jr. said, “to guarantee liberties in Southeast Asia which they had not found in Southwest Georgia and East Harlem.” In some quarters these projects had long been the object of anguish and critique; as a consequence of the Vietnam War the dejustificatory violence they entailed for existing US narratives became ineluctable.

The late Vietnam War was not the only such modern event in which a catastrophe had delegitimated regnant worldviews and discharged a wave of attempts to secure more livable forms of life. Nor was this the only such moment in American history. The domestication and instrumentalization of the sublime in the service of the US “empire of liberty” was synecdochically epitomized by the two writers who have been identified (contradictorily) as “quintessentially American novelists,” Herman Melville and Mark Twain, the one deliberately, the other inadvertently, in such novels as Moby-Dick (1851), where the sublime whiteness of the whale is staged as spectacle in behalf of imperial aggrandizement, and A Connecticut Yankee in King Arthur’s Court (1889), whose narrative signature is the staging of illusion for effect.38But whereas these writers discerned the nothingness that the preponderant national narrative had tried to obscure symptomatically in their texts—with differing degrees of lucidity—they remained essentially solitary voices in the wilderness: prophetic figures without followings. In the Vietnam War, by contrast, a mass movement emerged that was characterized by the perception that the spectacle had already effectively foundered. And while those attentive to this disclosure did not constitute a majority of the US population, they were especially importunate and expansive in their thinking. These protesters identified the spectacular logics of domination as they had manifested at sites all along the continuum of being: the glorification of the patriarch and such mediatic analogues as the cowboy, the lone ranger, and the crime boss; the hypostatization of the rugged individual over collective modes of being; the transfiguration of the labor relation into the commodity; the manipulation and devastation of ecosystems; the intense cultural visibility of white people and the penumbra cast around all others; and, of course, the pyrotechnics of US militarism. The Vietnam War disclosed the totalizing control that the culture of the US spectacle asserted not only over national existence but over all of these registers of being in the same instant that it unshackled the interrogative energies that had previously been labelled “divisive,” “obscene,” or “nihilistic.”

This same event had an incredible effect on the composition and mission of the American university. Prior to and during the war, the spectacle of US military might had served as a substitute for—if not a direct incentive to—a research agenda. Not only did this spectacle paralyze the public and encourage complacency about matters of citizenship, but it also offered the illusion of a complete set of answers to the problems of national existence. But when the compensatory function of the spectacle became recognizable, the questions it had been meant to allay suddenly took on renewed importance. Out of this new spirit of interrogation a number of intellectual projects emerged, among them ethnic studies, black studies, lesbian and gay studies, women’s studies, postcolonial studies, and—only much later—a new Americanist studies. In dialogue with new or reconfigured interpretive methods like semiology, deconstruction, reader-response criticism, Foucauldian genealogy, psychoanalysis, and Marxism, these inquiries formalized insights that had been intuited in the broader culture.

These formations, like many of the new social movements that emerged concomitantly, have all too often been misunderstood as simple purveyors of “identity politics,” so it is worth briefly recalling their originary impulse. The US war effort marked the culmination of a long history that had al-ready reduced large sectors of its population to mere “standing reserve,” an underemployed, systematically marginalized, unrecognized, and uprooted population whose only function was to respond docilely to the national calling (whether in the draft or another capacity). All of the constituent parts of this nameless coalition had been subjected to the spectacular authority of the country and denied a voice within the limited circle of US democracy. As speaking beings who were, however, not afforded the right to speak the nation’s political language—who were not allowed to utter its shibboleth of redemption or to participate in its empire of liberty—they were thrown back upon themselves as unhomed subjects. It was out of this condition of debarment from what was euphemized as the “national conversation” that the aforementioned intellectual and social movements invented new forms of speech capable of identifying the aporias in the nation’s discourses on freedom, inclusivity, and justice. Not efforts to constitute as identities what had been deconstituted by the nation’s white metaphorics, these “whatever singularities” devoted themselves to uncovering what had been obfuscated, even nullified, by the United States’ beneficent self-representation and its meliorative philosophy of history. In the process they produced universal logics of their own that offered the possibility of more livable lives: ones in which sex will have been desublimated, freedom reconceptualized in more substantive terms, collective autonomy respected without exception. The Vietnam War did not cause the emergence of these intellectual movements but it catalyzed the oppositional forces that ultimately came to understand the Vietnam War in its longer and more encompassing history.

Ungrounding National Being

The decomposition of the spectacular facade of US imperialism at the end of the Vietnam War was undoubtedly a transformative event, but it was not beyond the reach of the powers of restoration. Although it opened up new possibilities for thinking US social relations and incited the formation of new collectivities and cultural and intellectual initiatives in its wake, the partisans of this event did not abolish the spectacle once and for all. Afterward, state agents turned to the same technology in order to carry out the Gulf War and the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as the more amorphous “war on terror” that continues across the globe. The “shock and awe” tactics employed in Baghdad in 2003, for example, suggested to Iraqis that the United States was so inordinately powerful that resistance was futile. But they also messaged to a domestic audience that the state’s will was “incontrovertible” and not to be questioned. Yet already in the first Gulf War, the United States was employing techniques which conveyed the impression that the war was not so much a life-and-death encounter or an invasion with real human consequences but a media event. When George H. W. Bush declared that through the conduct of this war the United States had finally “kicked the Vietnam syndrome,” he meant that the nation had finally overcome its anxious encounter with the emptiness of its own claims to legitimacy. The spectacle of the war covered over the nothingness that the sublime end of the previous war had precipitated.

#### Recent US history has vacillated between the sublime and the spectacle, between the perception of the horrible nihilistic violence that undergirds US expansion and a stupefaction before the supreme glory and redemptive ends of this same power. Despite momentary fulgurations of resistance to US imperialism and its affiliated projects, most notably in Seattle in 1999, the run-up to the invasion of Iraq in 2003, the global Occupy protests of 2011, and the Movement for Black Lives, today the spectacle prevails. Donald Trump’s presidency, although founded in part on the claim that the neoconservative wing of the Republican Party has betrayed American interests, is in fact deeply committed both to the imperial conception of US identity and to governance through pacification by means of the spectacle. His invocations of American “greatness” in fact function to conjure a spectacular image, one designed to short-circuit inquiries into the unsavory histories of US injustices and to construct a community united around his jeremiad that acts to exclude numerous others. It is no coincidence in this regard that Trump has drawn the key phrase of his campaign from Ronald Reagan, whose central objective in his first campaign and afterward was to make Americans forget the violence they had perpetrated in Vietnam. And yet this historical parallel remains largely obscured in public discourse at present, as do the many others that link Trump to his forebears in the office. For it is in the nature of the spectacle to short-circuit history, to conceal the decisions, the agents, and the actions that led to the expropriation and subordination of human lives, and to proffer instead the illusion of a timeless truth that should be accepted as a matter of course. In this renewal of the spectacular culture of the United States, new victims are being made and old ones restored to their former roles

#### WTO are the modern imperialist tools of the US

Banerjee 9 (Subhabrata Bobby, Director of Research at the School of Business, University of Western Sydney, HISTORIES OF OPPRESSION AND VOICES OF RESISTANCE: TOWARDS A THEORY OF THE TRANSLOCAL, REARTIKULACIJA #9, 2009, <http://www.reartikulacija.org/?p=612/)> SVVV [] brackets are for exclusionist language

Old patterns of imperialism can be seen in the dominance of neoliberal policies in today’s global political economy. Transnational corporations often wield power over [developing] countries through their enticements of foreign investment and their threats to withhold or relocate their investments. In return for foreign investments and jobs, corporations are able to extract from impoverished and often corrupt [developing] governments tax concessions, energy and water subsidies, minimal environmental legislation, minerals and natural resources, a compliant labor force and the creation of Special Economic Zones (SEZ) which are essentially states of exception where the law is suspended in order for the business of economic extraction to continue. Thus, rather than marking the death of the nation-state as some theorists of globalization like to argue, the global economy is premised precisely on a system of nation-states. Neoliberal globalization can be seen as a marker for the final hegemonic triumph of the state mode of production. The nation-state then is a fundamental building block of globalization, in the working of transnational corporations, in the setting-up of a global financial system, in the institution of policies that determine the mobility of labor, and in the creation of the multi-state institutions such as the UN, IMF, World Bank, NAFTA and WTO. The unprecedented scale of government intervention in response to the global financial crisis in Europe, North America, Asia and Australia has been such that neoconservative circles have invoked the specter of socialism and the fears of the emergence of a state-run economy. Whether the financial crisis is indeed a reflection of the crisis in capitalism that could result in long-term re-engagement of the state in economic production or whether it will be business as usual remains to be seen, especially now that Germany, France and the United States appear to be coming out of recession. Imperial formations in the contemporary political economy are more “efficient” in the sense that formal colonies no longer need to be governed. Imperialism has learned to manage things better by using the elites of the former colonies to do the governing, and the structural power of supranational institutions like the World Trade Organization, World Bank and International Monetary Fund and markets to do much of the imperial work. I will describe three modes of management that enable accumulation by dispossession: management by extraction, management by exclusion and management by expulsion. Management by extraction arises from the ‘endowment curse’ and is an all too familiar discourse for millions of people in the Third World living and dying because of the oil curse and the minerals curse. Extraction of oil and minerals in many parts of the world is almost always accompanied by violence, environmental destruction, dispossession and death (Banerjee, 2008). Transnational oil companies, governments, private security forces are all key actors in these zones of violence and the communities most affected by this violence are forced to give up their sovereignty, autonomy, and tradition in exchange for modernity and economic development which continue to elude them. Shell in Nigeria, Chevron in Ecuador, Rio Tinto in Papua, Barrick in Peru and Argentina, Newmont Mining in Peru, Vedanta Resources in India and the Zapatista uprising in Chiapas, Mexico are but a few of the more well publicized cases of the endowment curse. The market, state and international economic and financial institutions are inextricably involved in management by extraction. The Chiapas region of Mexico for example, produces 54% of Mexico’s hydroelectric energy, 21% of its oil, and 47% of its natural gas also contains the country’s most impoverished people where 36% of the population do not have running water and 35% do not have electricity. There are 7 hotel beds for every 1000 tourists and 0.3 hospital beds for every 1000 locals. In one of the country’s richest regions in terms of natural resources and a source of wealth for the rest of the country, 71.6% of the indigenous population in the region suffers from malnutrition and 14,500 people die every year from treatable diseases (Banerjee, 2008). Transnational corporations extract wealth from Chiapas by mining their land, felling their forests, and selling a tourist experience at the expense of local communities who have the misfortune of ‘inhabiting’ the region. In 1994 thousands of Chiapians rose up against the Mexican government in an armed insurrection and temporarily took over the regional capital of San Cristobal. The Mexican government responded with military action and after a series of violent conflicts offered a ‘conditional pardon’ to the rebels. The market was not particularly sympathetic to the plight of the Zapatistas either. In a memo titled ‘Mexico – Political Update’ , the Chase Manhattan Bank, a major financer of the Mexican government concluded that the ‘government will need to eliminate the Zapatistas to demonstrate their effective control of the national territory and security policy’. Thus, international finance and infrastructure is a key requirement for ‘development’ to occur in ‘underdeveloped’ areas, of which governments must demonstrate ‘effective control and security’, which means certain communities need to be ‘eliminated’. Management by exclusion arises from the ‘democracy curse’ and is another practice that is commonly used to govern the political economy. During the negotiations leading up to the Kyoto protocol one of the tasks allocated to a policy group was to develop a global forest policy to offset greenhouse gas emissions. Conscious of the fallout from the protests that accompanied the 1999 World Trade Organization meetings at Seattle and similar protests at the World Economic Forum at Davos, Genoa and Melbourne, the organizers were careful to be seen to be inclusive and invited green groups, unions, community organizations, apart from corporations, policy makers and scientists. However, in their quest to come up with a global forest policy they omitted to invite a key stakeholder group: representatives of millions of people who actually live in the forest, mainly Indigenous tribes. The forest dwelling tribes held their own climate change summit and proclaimed their own resolution at the International Indigenous Forum on Climate Change: ‘The measures to mitigate climate change currently being negotiated are based on a worldview of territory that reduces forests, lands, seas and sacred sites to only their carbon absorption capacity. This world-view and its practices adversely affect the lives of Indigenous Peoples and violate our fundamental rights and liberties, particularly, our right to recuperate, maintain, control and administer our territories which are consecrated and established in instruments of the United Nations’ (IIFC, 2000). For indigenous people who inhabit the region, forests are not just carbon sinks - forests are their food, livelihood, source of medicine, housing, culture, society, polity and economy. Global trade and environmental policies are often made without taking into account the violence and dispossession of Indigenous communities that result from these policies. It becomes meaningless to debate issues of forest rights when there are no forests left. Dispossession of local communities also highlights both the failure of the market and state where ‘citizens’ of democratic states do not have the right to determine their future.

#### Western Medicine has been used empircally to coercively homogenize and a US method to imperialise the other when u say the people nome of ur evidence is in reference to the otherized comunities of the US

Schuelke 2017 (Lisa K, Degree of Doctor of Philosophy from University of Nebraska, “Nursing Reservations: White Field Nurses, Scientific Medicine, and Settler Colonialism, 1924-1955”, http://search.proquest.com/openview/94a4cf9872bc680ed10dc84e1157abcf/1?pq-origsite=gscholar&cbl=18750&diss=y)

Field nurses, primarily white women, encountered diverse cultures when they arrived on reservations in the American West between 1924 and 1955. Diseases were rampant, and many Native Americans had little knowledge of so-called modern medicine, frequently relying upon a combination of natural and spiritual remedies associated with various Indigenous traditions. White field nurses witnessed first hand the devastating impact numerous illnesses had on Native Americans, and there is no doubt that the majority of the women in this study genuinely sought to relieve suffering associated with illnesses. Still, most field nurses intended to replace Indigenous curing with what they regarded as the superiority of white scientific medicine, thus assimilating Native Americans, a prominent feature of the broader settler colonial project. Enriching Native American health went hand in hand with biomedical assimilation. While field nurses worked to meet the need for better healthcare, they concluded that Indigenous models were inferior to Western medicine. At the same time, many Native Americans valued traditional healing, and were slow to adopt scientific medicine. Divergent cultural perspectives toward healthcare created tension between the two groups, fostering negotiations and resistance on both sides. White nurses in this study sometimes attempted to restrain Indigenous curing while Native Americans equally drew lines designed to restrict the invasion of white medicine.

#### Imperialism turns and outweighs every other impact – it’s a threat multiplier, the root cause of all war and violence, and responsible for ongoing extinction that outweighs on scope, probability, and cyclical harms.

**Eckhardt 90** - (William Eckhardt; Lentz Peace Research Laboratory of St. Louis; “Civilizations, Empires, and Wars”; https://www.jstor.org/stable/423772?seq=1#page\_scan\_tab\_contents; February, 1990; **HS**)

Modern Western Civilization used war as well as peace to gain the whole world as a domain to benefit itself at the expense of others: **The expansion of the culture and institutions of modern civilization from its centers in Europe was made possible by imperialistic war**… It is true missionaries and traders had their share in the work of expanding world civilization, but always with the support, immediate or in the background, of armies and navies (pp. 251-252). The importance of dominance as a primary motive in civilized war in general was also emphasized for modern war in particular: '**[Dominance] is probably the most important single element in the causation of major modern wars'** (p. 85). European empires were thrown up all over the world in this processof benefiting some at the expense of others, which was characterized by armed violence contributing to structural violence**: 'World-empire is built by conquest and maintained by force… Empires are primarily organizations of violence' (pp. 965, 969). 'The struggle for empire has greatly increased the disparity between states with respect to the political control of resources, since there can never be enough imperial territory to provide for all'** (p. 1190). This **'disparity between states', not to mention the disparity within states, both of which take the form of racial differences in life expectancies, has killed 15-20 times as many people in the 20th century as have wars and revolutions (**Eckhardt & Kohler, 1980; Eckhardt, 1983c). When this structural violence of 'disparity between states' created by civilization is taken into account, then the violent nature of civilization becomes much more apparent. Wright concluded that 'Probably at least 10 per cent of deaths in modern civilization can be attributed directly or indirectly to war… The trend of war has been toward greater cost, both absolutely and relative to population… The proportion of the population dying as a direct consequence of battle has tended to increase' (pp. 246, 247).So far asstructural violence has constituted about one-third of all deaths in the 20th century (Eckhardt & Kohler, 1980; Eckhardt, 1983c), and so far as **structural violence was a function of armed violence, past and present, then Wright's estimate was very conservative indeed.** Assuming that war is some function of civilization, then civilization is responsible for one-third of 20th century deaths. **This is surely self-destruction carried to a high level of efficiency.** The structural situation has been improving throughout the 20th century, however, so that structural violence caused 'only' 20% of all deaths in 1980 (Eckhardt, 1983c). There is obviously room for more improvement. To be sure, armed violence in the form of revolution has been directed toward the reduction of structural violence, even as armed violence in the form of imperialism has been directed toward its maintenance. **But imperial violence came first, in the sense of creating structural violence, before revolutionary violence emerged to reduce it. It is in this sense that structural violence was basically, fundamentally, and primarily a function of armed violence in its imperial form. The atomic age has ushered in the possibility, and some would say the probability, of killing not only some of us for the benefit of others, nor even of killing all of us to no one's benefit, but of putting an end to life itself!** This is surely carrying self-destruction to some infinite power beyond all human comprehension. It's too much, or superfluous, as the Existentialists might say. Why we should care is a mystery. But, if we do, then the need for civilized peoples to respond to the ethical challenge is very urgent indeed. Life itself may depend upon our choice.

#### The aff attempts to transcend the nothingness at the core of America’s ethos – voting negative adopts a position of indifference towards the spectacle which intensifies the proliferation of said nothingness. Thusthe coutnter roll of the ballot Vote for the best straegey of Counter imperialist and body centric praxis)

Spanos and Spanos ‘19

[William V Spanos, Literature at Binghamton, Rob Glass’ favorite, RIP to a real one, and Adam Spanos, University of Chicago. 2019. “American Spectacle and the Vietnam War Sublime,” published in “Neocolonial Fictions of the Global Cold War.” (eds. Steven Belletto and Joseph Keith)] pat – language [modified]

The Vietnam War teaches us, however, that the spectacle contains within it the germ of a more radical reckoning with the truth. Both the spectacle and the sublime constitute responses to the absence of any determining ground for being; but whereas the spectacle constructs an image meant to dissimulate this nothingness, the sublime disposition confronts it with what might be called an engaged reverence. Such a perspective understands that presence and absence belong together and that one cannot be extirpated without extreme damage to the other. The sublime task is not to calculate how one might most effectively transcend the nothing, but rather to reconstitute perception in such a way as to intensify one’s attunement to the nothing and proliferate the sites at which one is capable of discovering its insistence.

In conclusion, then, let us revisit two locations at which this nothingness can be detected within the terms of US political ontology. First, the ambivalent universalism at stake in American exceptionalism—which describes the United States as a country both distinct from others and capable of transforming them in its image—entails a necessary violence against the “unexceptional.” These figures, including the Vietnamese during the war, comprise a category of beings whose existence is deemed contingent or altogether denied. Such a construal of the other then allows for their annihilation, the literalization of their representational nonbeing. By virtue, however, of their spectral status or unrecognizability to the exceptionalist outlook, they can act with a license denied to those who are more visible—as the National Liberation Front (NLF) did in Vietnam. Furthermore, this position of internal exclusion, of subjection to the universal norm without belonging to the community of subjects who are understood to be its addressers, constitutes a privileged epistemological position. It allows for the understanding and critique of a universalist discourse such as that of American exceptionalism insofar as it can testify to the violence to which the latter remains [ignorant] ~~blind~~. Both the NLF and the various US social movements to which we earlier alluded undertook this critique in differing ways.

The nothingness of national being manifests also in the recognition that the foundation and subsequent rise to global predominance of the United States was not predestined (no more than that of any other nation, or indeed of the nation-form itself). In both its mere existence and in the position that it has historically achieved, the United States is the consequence of accident. Like Heidegger’s being, it is “thrown.” The implication of this observation is not simply that the United States, however monolithic its appearance, is a historical object and so capable of being changed. That is true enough. The point is rather that, insofar as its existence has no transcendentally determining principle, the actions to which it commits itself are not preordained. This means that the deeds carried out in its name cannot possibly impute to the nation the spectacular glory and ultimate justification for its existence that its apologists so desperately desire. Nothing done in the name of the United States can supply that foundation. The United States, like every other nation, is condemned to search perpetually and in vain for the meaning that will give its presence in the world a permanent justification. The task for its citizenry today is to learn indifference to the lures of a spectacle that would prescribe meaning at the expense of an interested polity.

### 1NC—OFF

#### Interpretation: Evaluate the affirmative as an object of research over just their plan text. To clarify, they need to weigh the totality of their aff, including their assumptions and ideologies, not just the causal consequences. It is not sufficient to prove their plan is good in the abstract.Also means you evalute the CP right next to their aff on a representational level on how well it does what the aff does, their reps also supercede how they fufill their ROB

#### 1] Debate is a site of scholarship production, not policymaking 101. Even if individual ballots do not change our subjectivities, iterative investments in research models influence our political orientations. Rejecting paradigms premised on imperialism in pedagogical spaces can act as a starting point for a counter discursive vision of politics.

#### 2] George Bush DA—justifications and representations influence our political advocacy. Even though George Bush and Spanos both hate Donald Trump, the reasons why matter as much. Winning a link argument means that their political advocacy looks more like a Hemanth Sanjeev trust fund rather than anti-imperial ist movements.

#### 3] Education—they arbitrarily restrict debate’s locus of contestation to an 8 second plan text. Forcing them to defend the entirety of their aff incentivizes better scholarship and is more real-world. Arbitrarily severing parts of the aff decks negative preparation.

#### 4] Slight unfairness valuable—when imperialist American Ethos modes of thinking in the academy are challenged through slight violations, it creates a cognitive dissonance that can produce new forms of scholarship.

#### 5] No fairness offense for them—even if they can’t weigh causal consequences, they can weigh the representations, justifications, and research models against the K. An example is to say liberalism good. This should be predictable because they have to research those things anyways before constructing the aff.

## Case

### 1AC—Theory

#### Err negative on 1AR theory

#### Answers to the counterinterp will be new in the 2AR which means intervention is inevitable—that outweighs—every argument including theory accedes to the judge making a fair evaluation.

#### The aff has a 7-6 time skew and 2-1 speech advantage

#### At best, its DTA and reasonability with the brightline of putting sufficient defense because generating offense is impossible if they can line by line our standards for 3 minutes

#### They need to contextualize each individual theory shell as DTA or DTD—it’s the best middle road—obviously there’s a distinction between Condo Word PICs and font size theory—this solves infinite abuse while preventing overpunishing.

#### Pluralism flows negative since there are multiple ways to have pluralism in the alternative, for example the indigenous movement to seperate their territory from the US and understand its exceptionalism was not the same thing as Irans understanding of US imperialism which shows that pluralism is nonunique

#### And total rejection of how the aff naturalizes violence as biologically innate to retroactively whitewash and naturalize Western imperialism. Is necessary to sustain indifference which makes the permutation IMPOSSIBLE

### Queer Theory

#### A.) Individualism-

#### Queer theory focuses too much on the individual – in practice it otherizes and ensures their aff is turned into conservative politics

Neascu ‘5 Dana Neacsu. The Wrongful Rejection of Big Theory (Marxism) by Feminism and Queer Theory: A Brief Debate. 2005 Capital University Law Review.

Current cultural politics discuss two forms of postmodernism: one of "reaction" and one of "resistance." n50 The reactionary form "would seem to be [an example] of pure commodification and involves 'an instrumental pastiche of pop- or pseudo-historical forms.'" n51 Conversely, the resistant form is "concerned with a critical deconstruction of tradition . . . with a critique of origins, not a return to them." n52 Feminist and queer theories belong to the latter form of postmodern theories. n53 By rejecting the Marxist theoretical framework, however, the theories may end up focusing too much on the individual, thus sharing the conservative's reactionary social policies that individuals (unlike corporations) do not deserve government subsidies. n54 Marxism promotes the values of ensuring a decent lifestyle for all, which underlines both its compatibility with the social and economic rights discourse and its potential role in helping feminist and queer theories reconnect with the "others" that are not part of their culturally identified groups. Through the discourse of human rights in its broader usage, which goes beyond our provincial limitation to civil and political rights, n55 the "others" may be more able to empathize with the [\*132] specific demands made on behalf of women and those in the queer community.

#### B.) Commodification-

#### Focus on sexuality creates a fetishized and commodified version of queerness that re-entrenches capitalism

McNamara, 2k (Liam, academic and philosopher of queer theory, “The Political Economy of Sex” “Profit and Pleasure: Sexual Identities in Late Capitalism,” Culture Machine, Reviews, Rosemary Hennessey, http://www.culturemachine.net/index.php/cm/rt/printerFriendly/229/210)--CRG

This leads Hennessey to question forms of queer visibility in commodity culture. She uses drag as an example, which for Judith Butler is a ludic form of sexuality which through theatricality and parody exposes discursive forms of sexuality that shape identity. However, Hennessey points out 'even the option of drag as a flexible sexual identity depends on the availability not only of certain discourses of sexuality, aesthetics, style, and glamour but also of a global circuit of commodity production, exchange, and consumption specific to industrialized economies' (P&P, 120). Drag is not enabling for everybody, and since this sexual identity is severed from general historical processes, Hennessey feels Butler has merely fetishized an emergent postmodern sexuality. However, it is worth pointing out that Hennessey is not suggesting Butler is wrong in celebrating drag, but that she has overlooked how productive forces underpin such developments, and how discourses of sexual liberation may merely be a source of 'relative deprivation' for the less affluent. Hennessey's theoretical stance is interesting, because she is explicitly trying to link theories of commodification with sexuality, and has resisted an uncritical celebration of the new postmodern sexualities. Similarly, Hennessey displays scepticism for Foucaultian technologies of the self, since not everybody has the money or consumer finesse to indulge in this process. In fact, the discourse of heteronormativity that is subverted in film and fashion can be linked to a less gendered professional workplace that has emerged through an aestheticization of everyday life, as opposed to a more general form of liberation desired by Hennessey. The new postmodern sexualities can be a means of disguising relations of production through a spurious egalitarianism; such a process occludes the issue of class. A good example of this is the contemporary exploitation of the 'pink pound', since middle-class homosexuals tend to have a high disposable income. In order to illustrate this point, and to oppose a historical approach to cultural materialism, Hennessey examines the film The Crying Game. The way she has addressed this point is by attempting to show how both sexual and political themes have featured in representations of the empire -- Hennessey contends that cinema has a mythic function because the political subtext of the film is repressed. The Crying Game is one of these postmodern myths that suggests sexual identity is a masquerade, but undercuts this radical suggestion by turning the film into a simple 'unveiling of a secret'; the putative radical stance of the film emerges through the heterosexual imaginary, that is, heterosexual forms of meaning making. Through a Lacanian reading of desire Hennessey suggests that a fascination for transvestism is due to its exposure of the illusory status of the phallus (i.e. sexual difference emerges through the cultural matrix of language). The Crying Game suggests that womanhood may not be determined biologically, but is predicated on the presence/absence of the phallus. However, because the film disapproves of and punishes the phallic woman and valorizes the man who is in essence a woman (more woman than the phallic woman), the film remains loyal to the heterosexual imaginary and gendered sex roles. Hennessey deepens the analysis by linking this sexual ambivalence to the aestheticization of everyday life -- in a commodified lifeworld the phallus may circulate more freely. This also uncovers a political subtext, where postcolonial anxieties about lost phallic power are displaced onto a sexual ambivalence encoded by the heterosexual imaginary. In turn, the issue of race is repressed. Overall, Hennessey's reading of this film points out how the issue of class and race has receded in the face of the twin hegemonies of postmodern sexuality and postcolonial discourse, and The Crying Game offers an essentialist and conservative view of the 'real woman'. In the final two chapters, Hennessey turns to the subject of desire and revolutionary love. Critical analysis of sexuality in political economy has been subsumed by an overly cultural approach, shifting the area of thought from class to desire. An example provided is the work of Gayle Rubin, who switched focus from commodity production to the role kinship relations play in the formation of sexuality. Hennessey points out how kinship relations are in fact mediated by political economy, and cannot be examined in isolation. In the work of Dorothy Allison we see a move from Marxist positions to a 'sex-radical' stance, that tends to equate lust with desire. It is in a similar vein that Hennessey criticizes the work of Teresa de Lauretis and Elizabeth Grosz, where desire is valorized as a revolutionary force that makes connections, which unfortunately seems to share many of the aims of late capitalism. This conception of queer desire is ultimately complicit with contemporary consumerist objectives. Hennessey's work has interesting parallels with the work of Baudrillard, by uncovering a mirror of production beneath ostensibly radical feminist theory. Also, these new desiring bodies have emerged outside the historical generation of the needs of the majority of women, and so have little connection with genuine everyday experience. This can be seen in American welfare reform, where the sexuality of the poor is targeted by ideologies of 'personal responsibility'. Hennessey has exposed an implicit hierarchy of discrimination within bourgeois ideologies of sexual liberation; the poor are seen as being promiscuous and a welfare state burden, while the rich are merely 'experimenting' or enjoying themselves. When applied to deprived groups, promiscuity may be recognized as an imputed characteristic employed for the social legitimation of bourgeois sexual mores.

#### C.) Recentering sexuality-

#### The aff’s discussion of heteronormativity re-entrenches sexuality norms which hold up the structure of capitalism

McNamara, 2k (Liam, academic and philosopher of queer theory, “The Political Economy of Sex” “Profit and Pleasure: Sexual Identities in Late Capitalism,” Culture Machine, Reviews, Rosemary Hennessey, http://www.culturemachine.net/index.php/cm/rt/printerFriendly/229/210)--CRG

In Chapter Three, Hennessey attacks the current reigning ideology of neoliberalism, which involves an increasing drive for profits, globalization, and a general cultural turn in theory, leading to the assimilation of critical theory by the academy. This has lead to the abandonment of Marxism and its substitution by cultural materialism. Hennessey tries to turn the argument back to theories of exploitation, ultimately rejecting overdetermination in favour of commodity fetishism. She explicitly links heteronormativity to the emergence of the commodity form, since it is the division of labour that has allowed the formation of new sexual subjectivities in the consumer society. This liberation of productive forces has enabled the emergence of new desiring subjects that escape the heterosexual norm, but this development is underpinned by a new patriarchal hierarchy ushering in a renascent form of heteronormativity. Hennessey points out how in the nineteenth century sexology and psychoanalytic discourses allowed for new divergent sexual identities that were swiftly reterritorialized under the 'perversions'. Heteronormative paradigms have gone on to manage desire by restricting queer desire to the perversions. Basically Hennessey is trying to historicize Cixous' ideas of a 'patriarchal binary logic' and the persistence of gendered active/passive roles of sexuality.6 Hennessey links sexual liberation to economic imperatives and the division of labour in addition to the conventional cultural explanations, and suggests that desire has been managed and moved away from procreative norms due to the demands of the new productive forces found in mass consumption. Hennessey's stance shows a critical understanding of sexual liberation, by the introduction of the theory of class. Hennessey points out: 'capitalism does not require heteronormative families or even a gendered division of labour. What it does require is an unequal division of labour' (P&P, 105). Some gay men have adopted the ideology of the family, but this ideology is generally compulsory for the disadvantaged. At bottom, what is needed is commodity exchange and surplus value for the few not many. Capitalism still relies on heterosexuality for the poor, and the new non-normative forms of sexuality are generally reserved for the affluent consumer subjectivities. These emergent 'postmodern sexualities' are compatible with the new liquescent forms of the commodity, possessing a fluidity that has an affinity with the new consumer ethos.

#### D.) “Queering” performances-

#### Queering performances reinscribe the bourgeois fetishized identity. This forecloses the possibility of social transformation.

Hennessy 95

Rosemary Hennessy 1995 “Queer Visibility in Commodity Culture” Cultural Critique, 29, 31-76

To sum up, my reading of Butler's work suggests several points about the materiality of sexuality that are politically important to queer theory and politics. First of all, if the materiality of social life is taken to be an ensemble of economic, political, and ideological production, we can still acknowledge that the coherent sex-gender identities heterosexuality secures may be fabrications always in need of repair, but their fragility can be seen not as the property of some restlessness in language itself but as the effect of social struggle. Second, the meanings that are taken to be "real" are so because they help secure a certain social order, an order that is naturalized as the way things are or should be and that "illegitimate" meanings to some degree threaten. Because it is the social order-the distribution of wealth, resources, and power-that is at stake in the struggle over meanings, a politics that contests the prevailing constructions of sexual identity and that aims to disrupt the regimes they support will need to address more than discourse. Third, the naturalized version of sexual identity that currently dominates in the United States as well as the oppositional versions that contest it are conditioned by more than just their local contexts of reception. Any specific situation is made possible and affected by dimensions of social life that exceed it. A social practice like drag, then, needs to be analyzed at several levels: in terms of the conjunctural situation (whether you are looking at what drag means when walking a ball in Harlem or turning a trick in the Village, performing in a Hasty Pudding revue at Harvard or hoping to pass in Pocatello); in terms of its place in the social formation (whether this local scene occurs in an urban or rural area, in the United States, Germany, Nicaragua, or India, at the turn of the 20th or of the 21st century); and in terms of the global relations that this situation is tied to-how even the option of drag as a flexible sexual identity depends on the availability not only of certain discourses of sexuality, aesthetics, style, and glamour, but also of a circuit of commodity production, exchange, and consumption specific to industrialized economies. Recognizing that signs are sites of social struggle, then, ultimately leads us to inquire into the social conditions that enable and perhaps even foster the slipping and sliding of signification. Is the subversiveness of a selfconsciously performative identity like drag at risk if we inquire into certain of the other social relations-the relations of labor, for instance- that help enable it? What is the consequence of a theory that does not allow this kind of question? I want to suggest that one consequence is the risk of promoting an up-dated, postmodern, reinscription of the bourgeois subject's fetishized identity. Alienation of any aspect of human life from the network of social relations that make it possible constitutes the very basis of fetishization. By limiting her conception of the social to the discursive, Butler unhinges identity from the other material relations that shape it. Her performative identity recasts bourgeois humanist individuality as a more fluid and indeterminate series of subversive bodily acts, but this postmodern subject is severed from the collective historical processes and struggles through which identities are produced and circulate. Moreover, in confining her analysis of the inflection of sexuality by racial, national, or class difference to specific historical contexts, she forecloses the possibility of marshalling collectivities for social transformation across differences in historical positioning.