## 3

#### Interpretation: Debaters must disclose all constructive positions excluding personal narratives or personally sensitive information on open source with underlining and highlighting on the 2020-21 NDCA LD wiki after the round in which they read them.

#### Violation – screenshots in the doc prove they don’t

#### They must disclose their card those are not part of the personal narrative

Theirs:

Mine:

#### Negate:

#### 1] Debate resource inequities—you’ll say people will steal cards, but that’s good—it’s the only way to truly level the playing field for students such as novices in under-privileged programs – it equals the playing field

Overing 18 – Bob Overing, LD Scholar (“Holiday Disclosure Post #6 – 10 Things Edition” JANUARY 12, 2018. http://www.premierdebate.com/disclosure-post-6/)

**Open source improves on usual disclosure practices** in the obvious way – **you can read their evidence for better prep**aration – and in a number of smaller ways too. **It solves the analytics problem** I discussed above, **so round-altering uncarded arguments are available** (though this doesn’t really apply to Harvard-Westlake), **and it gives access to evidence from paywalled articles**. **Every season I coach debaters who lack access to major databases; for schools without robust online library offerings or teams without college coaches, this matters a lot**.

#### 2] Evidence ethics – open source is the only way to verify pre-round that cards aren’t miscut or highlighted or bracketed unethically. That’s a voter – maintaining ethical ev practices is key to being good academics and we should be able to verify you didn’t cheat.

#### Norming o/ws any other benefit key to creating safe realms of debate

#### Drop the debater. Drop the arg is severance since you jump ship from your advocacy which perpetuates abuse since it allows you to restart the round.

#### Competing interps: 1. Reasonability causes a race to the bottom where we read increasingly unfair practices that minimally fit the brightline 2. Collapses- you use offense-defense to determine reasonability being good which concedes the authority of competing interps

#### No RVIs: 1. Illogical- being topical doesn’t mean you should win, it’s just a burden. 2. Chilling effect- debaters will be scared to read theory for fear of losing to a prepped out counter interp, proliferating abuse

### 2

#### Interpretation: Topical affirmatives must specify which medicines they defend.

#### Violation: They don’t

#### Standards:

#### Ground - Not specifying destroys neg ground because they can shift and clarify which medicines they defend in the 1AR to no link DAs and perm CPs

#### Topic education – vague terms like medicine prevent us from having in-depth discussion about the topic

#### Topicality is a voter for fairness and education – drop the debater, don’t weigh case against T its indicting your ability to read the aff in the first llace dso the argumetns are onaccesible , pschological violence doesn’t ou/w you can do this aff while specfying specfic medicines that cause chinese racism

#### Extent paradimgmissues here

### 1NC Text

#### Text:

#### 1. The World Trade Organization ought to be abolished.

#### 2. The following 164 countries listed in the speech doc ought to independently and without influence from international government states should eliminate IPPs to breakdown Chinese roboticism and

#### invoke Asian rage, which allows for better norms

#### robots.

Afghanistan

Albania

Angola

Antigua and Barbuda

Argentina

Armenia

Australia

Austria

Bahrain, Kingdom of

Bangladesh

Barbados

Belgium

Belize

Benin

Bolivia, Plurinational State of

Botswana

Brazil

Brunei Darussalam

Bulgaria

Burkina Faso

Burundi

Cabo Verde

Cambodia

Cameroon

Canada

Central African Republic

Chad

Chile

China

Colombia

Congo

Costa Rica

Côte d’Ivoire

Croatia

Cuba

Cyprus

Czech Republic

Democratic Republic of the Congo

Denmark

Djibouti

Dominica

Dominican Republic

Ecuador

Egypt

El Salvador

Estonia

Eswatini

European Union (formerly EC)

Fiji

Finland

France

Gabon

Gambia

Georgia

Germany

Ghana

Greece

Grenada

Guatemala

Guinea

Guinea-Bissau

Guyana

Haiti

Honduras

Hong Kong, China

Hungary

Iceland

India

Indonesia

Ireland

Israel

Italy

Jamaica

Japan

Jordan

Kazakhstan

Kenya

Korea, Republic of

Kuwait, the State of

Kyrgyz Republic

Lao People’s Democratic Republic

Latvia

Lesotho

Liberia

Liechtenstein

Lithuania

Luxembourg

Macao, China

Madagascar

Malawi

Malaysia

Maldives

Mali

Malta

Mauritania

Mauritius

Mexico

Moldova, Republic of

Mongolia

Montenegro

Morocco

Mozambique

Myanmar

Namibia

Nepal

Netherlands

New Zealand

Nicaragua

Niger

Nigeria

North Macedonia

Norway

Oman

Pakistan

Panama

Papua New Guinea

Paraguay

Peru

Philippines

Poland

Portugal

Qatar

Romania

Russian Federation

Rwanda

Saint Kitts and Nevis

Saint Lucia

Saint Vincent and the Grenadines

Samoa

Saudi Arabia, Kingdom of

Senegal

Seychelles

Sierra Leone

Singapore

Slovak Republic

Slovenia

Solomon Islands

South Africa

Spain

Sri Lanka

Suriname

Sweden

Switzerland

Chinese Taipei

Tajikistan

Tanzania

Thailand

Aruba

Tonga

Trinidad and Tobago

Tunisia

Turkey

Uganda

Ukraine

United Arab Emirates

United Kingdom

United States

Uruguay

Vanuatu

Venezuela, Bolivarian Republic of

Viet Nam

Yemen

Zambia

Zimbabwe

Hawley, senator, JD Yale, 20

(Josh, 5-5, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/05/opinion/hawley-abolish-wto-china.html)

The coronavirus emergency is not only a public health crisis. With [30 million Americans unemployed](https://www.cnbc.com/2020/04/30/us-weekly-jobless-claims.html), it is also an economic crisis. And it has exposed a hard truth about the modern global economy: it weakens American workers and has empowered China’s rise. That must change. The global economic system as we know it is a relic; it requires reform, top to bottom. We should begin with one of its leading institutions, the World Trade Organization. We should abolish it.

### 1NC Colonialism

#### The WTO as an institution is unethical and perpetuates colonialism

Godrej 20

(Dinyar, Co-editor @ New Internationalist, 4-20, https://newint.org/features/2020/02/10/brief-history-impoverishment)

For countries that were undergoing economic ravishment by structural adjustment, the 1990s brought new torments in the form of the World Trade Organization (WTO), a club dominated by rich nations. In the name of creating a ‘level playing field’, the WTO required poorer countries to sign up to an all-or-nothing, binding set of rules, which removed protections for domestic industries and allowed foreign capital unhindered access. This was strongly prejudicial to the interests of local industries, which were not in a position to withstand foreign competition. Influence within the WTO is weighted by the size of a nation’s economy – thus even if all poorer nations joined forces to demand policy changes they would still not have a chance against wealthy nations. This trade injustice has drawn widespread protests and pressure for the WTO to reform. Meanwhile, wealthy nations are increasingly going down the route of bilateral Free Trade Agreements (FTAs). Usually negotiated in secret, the interests of their corporations are paramount in FTAs and include the ability to sue states for eye-watering sums (should they, for example, want to terminate a contract or nationalize an industry) with no provision for states to do the same. Such instruments are working to create a utopia for transnational corporations, creating a business-friendly climate, which translates as the demolition of labour protection, tax cuts for the wealthiest and a supine regulatory environment. Tax havens operated by the richest countries are home to huge sums of illicit wealth draining out of some of the poorest. Today, due to how the global economy has been engineered, for every dollar of aid sent to poorer countries, they lose 10 times as much in outflows – and that’s before one counts their losses through unfair trade rules and underpaid labour. Foreign investors take nearly $500 billion a year in profits from the Global South, and trade-power imbalances cost poorer nations $700 billion a year in lost export revenue. 7 CONCENTRATION In the 21st century wealth increasingly flows through corporate hands towards a small super-elite. In a trend that began in the 1990s, the lion’s share of equity value is being realized through squeezing workers: the classification ‘working poor’ so familiar in the Global South is now increasingly also being used in the wealthy North, where neoliberal capitalism is leading inevitably to wage erosion and work precarity, coupled with the withdrawal of state support. Inequality is rising dramatically. In 2018 the richest 26 people owned wealth equivalent to the poorest half of the world’s population. And their wealth was increasing at the rate of $2.5 billion a day. Meanwhile 3.4 billion people – nearly half the world – were living on less than $5.50 a day.

### 1NC Heg Bad

#### Eliminating the WTO ends U.S. global hegemony

Bello, PhD, 2000

(Walden, Sociology @ Stanford, https://users.ox.ac.uk/~magd1352/ecologist/Should%20WTO%20be%20abolished.pdf)

The idea that the world needs the World Trade Organisation (WTO) is one of the biggest lies of our time. The WTO came about, in 1995, mainly because it was in the interest of the US and its corporations. The European Union, Japan and especially the developing countries were mostly ambivalent about the idea; it was the US which drove it on. Why? Because though the US, back in 1948, blocked the formation of an International Trade Organisation (ITO), believing that, at that time, the interests of its corporations would not be served by such a global body, it had changed its mind by the 1990s. Now it wanted an international trade body. Why? Because its global economic dominance was threatened. The flexible GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) system, which preceded the WTO, had allowed the emergence of Europe and East Asia as competing industrial centres that threatened US dominance even in many high-tech industries. Under GATT’s system of global agricultural trade, Europe had emerged as a formidable agricultural power even as Third World governments concerned with preserving their agriculture and rural societies limited the penetration of their markets by US agricultural products. In other words, before the WTO, global trade was growing by leaps and bounds, but countries were using trade policy to industrialise and adapt to the growth of trade so that their economies would be enhanced by global trade and not be marginalised by it. That was a problem, from the US point of view. And that was why the US needed the WTO. The essence of the WTO is seen in three of its central agreements: the Agreement on Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs), the Agreement on Agriculture (AOA), and the Agreement on Trade Related Investment Measures (TRIMs). The purpose of TRIPs is not to promote free trade but to enhance monopoly power. One cannot quarrel with the fact that innovators should have preferential access to the benefits that flow from their innovation for a period of time. TRIPs, however, goes beyond this to institutionalise a monopoly for high-tech corporate innovators, most of them from the North. Among other things, TRIPs provides a generalised minimum patent protection of 20 years; institutes draconian border regulations against products judged to be violating intellectual property rights; and – contrary to the judicial principle of presuming innocence until proven guilty – places the burden of proof on the presumed violator of process patents. What TRIPs does is reinforce the monopolistic or oligopolistic position of US high tech firms such as Microsoft and Intel. It makes industrialisation by imitation or industrialisation via loose conditions of technology transfer – a strategy employed by the US, Germany, Japan, and South Korea during the early phases of their industrialisation – all but impossible. It enables the technological leader, in this case the US, to greatly influence the pace of technological and industrial development in the rest of the world.

**the first is Informational overload**

**Semiotic capitalism is predicated on informational overload that leaves no room for the human aspects of our behavior ending in mass psychological trauma. The affs turn to political activism and policy cause depression and misery.When the sign has become all encompassing the only standard and role of the ballot left is to vote for whoever best resists semiocapitalism**

**Bifo, 9** [Franco Berardi, Italian communist theorist and activist in the autonomist tradition, whose work mainly focuses on the role of the media and information technology within post-industrial capitalism   Precarious Rhapsody, by Franco Bifo Berardi et al., AK Press, 2009. P. 40-42 Lindale PP]

The acceleration of information exchange has produced and is producing an effect of a pathological type on the individual human mind and even more on the collective mind. **Individuals are not in a position to consciously process the immense and always growing mass of information that enters their computers, their cell phones, their television screens, their electronic diaries and their heads. However, it seems indispensable to follow, recognize, evaluate, process all this information if you want to be efficient, competitive, victorious.** The practice of multitasking, the opening of a window of hypertextual attention, the passage from one context to another for the complex evaluation of processes, tends to deform the sequential modality of mental processing. According to Christian Marazzi, who has concerned himself in various books with the relations between economics, language and affectivity, **the latest generation of economic operators is** affected by a real and proper form of dyslexia, incapable of reading a page from the beginning to the end according to sequential procedures, **incapable of maintaining concentrated attention on the same object for a long time**. And dyslexia spreads to cognitive and social behaviors, leading to rendering the pursuit of linear strategies nearly impossible. **Some**, like Davenport and Beck , **speak of an attention economy**. But when a cognitive faculty enters into and becomes part of economic discourse this means that it has become a scarce resource. **The necessary time for paying attention to the fluxes of information to which we are exposed and which must be evaluated in order to be able to make decisions is lacking. The consequence is in front of our eyes: political and economic decisions no longer respond to a long term strategic rationality and simply follow immediate interests. On the other hand, we are always less available for giving our attention to others gratuitously. We no longer have the attention time for love, tenderness, nature, pleasure and compassion. Our attention is ever more besieged and therefore we assign it only to our careers, to competition and to economic decisions. And in any case our temporality cannot follow the insane speed of the hypercomplex digital machine.** Human beings tend to become the ruthless executors of decisions taken without attention. The universe of transmitters, or cyberspace, now proceeds at a superhuman velocity and becomes untranslatable for the universe of receivers, or cybertime, that cannot go faster than what is allowed by the physical material from which our brain is made, the slowness of our body, the need for caresses and affection. Thus opens a pathological gap and mental illness spreads as testified by the statistics and above all our everyday experience. And just as pathology spreads, so too do drugs. The flourishing industry of psychopharmaceuticals beats records every year, the number of packets of Ritalin, Prozac, Zoloft and other psychotropics sold in the pharmacies continually increases, while dissociation, suffering, desperation, terror, the desire not to exist, to not have to fight continuously, to disappear grows alongside the will to kill and to kill oneself. **When, towards the end of the 1970s, an acceleration of the productive and communicative rhythms in occidental metropolitan centers was imposed, a gigantic epidemic of drug addiction made its appearance. The world was leaving its human epoch to enter the era of machinic posthuman acceleration: many sensitive organisms of the human variety began to snort cocaine, a substance that permits the acceleration of the existential rhythm leading to transforming oneself into a machine. Many other sensitive organisms of the human kind injected heroin in their veins, a substance that deactivates the relation with the speed of the surrounding atmosphere.** The epidemic of powders during the 1970s and the 1980s produced an existential and cultural devastation with which we still haven’t come to terms with. Then illegal drugs were replaced by those legal substances which the pharmaceutical industry in a white coat made available for its victims and this was the epoch of anti-depressants, of euphorics and of mood regulators. **Today psychopathy reveals itself ever more clearly as a social epidemic and, more precisely, a socio-communicational one. If you want to survive you have to be competitive and if you want to be competitive you must be connected, receive and process continuously an immense and growing mass of data. This provokes a constant attentive stress, a reduction of the time available for affectivity. These two tendencies, inseparably linked, provoke an effect of devastation on the individual psyche: depression, panic, anxiety, the sense of solitude and existential misery. But these individual symptoms cannot be indefinitely isolated, as psychopathology has done up until now and as economic power wishes to do.**

**The aff’s  ‘activism’ is the scream of an exploited worker that will only fuel semiocapitalism more. By protesting, the aff refuels the machine and becomes infinitely frustrated in their futility. Your activism gets ruined and seized by semiocapitalism creating a cyclical process of depression.**

**the affs protests of () is causing  overhaul of cyclical depression and violence**

**Genosko and Thoburn, 11** [Gary and Nicholas, “Preface: The Transversal Communism of Franco Berardi.” After the Future, by Franco Bifo Berardi et al., AK Press, 2011.]

There is, then, no return to Lenin or Mao. Alongside Hardt and Negri, perhaps the most prominent and influential of efforts to re-found a communism adequate to the current conjuncture is to be found in the work of Alain Badiou. In his later work, Badiou has turned away from the vanguard model of the party – he took his time, but got there in the end. Yet this is because **we have entered a new “sequence”, beyond that which was characterized** (and, for Badiou, properly expressed) **in the Leninist party form and the Maoist Cultural Revolution** (Badiou 2008). **Bifo’s difference is that**, whether correctly characterized by a series of sequences or not**, communism proper never went by the way of Lenin or Mao** (the “Mao-Dadaism” of Radio Alice was something quite other). As shorthand for this critique, we would signal the affirmation and intensification – not refusal – of work in the Soviet and Chinese regimes. But **the problem that Bifo isolates in these pages is the subjective political model inherent to such orthodox communism, the “militant”, and its not so distant cousin, the “activist”.** **Activism**, Bifo argues, **is the narcissistic response of the subject to the infinite and invasive power of capital, a response that can only leave the activist frustrated, humiliated, and depressed. Bifo** here **locates this** modern political configuration **with Lenin**, and makes a most heretical statement: “I am convinced that the 20th century would have been a better century had Lenin not existed”. **He diagnoses** this condition in these pages **through a reading of Lenin’s bouts of depression**, but we would highlight that elsewhere **Bifo also identifies the problem in Félix Guattari**, a most surprising move, given the sophistication of Guattari’s schizoanalytic critique of authoritarian political subjectivation. **Bifo developed his friendship with Guattari while in exile from Italy in the 1980s, a period that Guattari characterized as his “winter years”, the coincidence of personal depression and neoliberal reaction. Under these conditions, a certain political activism appeared central to Guattari, but not so to Bifo:** “I remember that **in the 1980s Félix often scolded me because I was no longer involved in some kind of political militancy. ... For me, militant will and ideological action had become impotent**” (Berardi 2008: 13). **For Bifo, at times of reaction, of the evacuation of political creativity from the social field,  activism becomes a desperate attempt to ward off depression. But it is doomed to fail, and, worse, to convert political innovation and sociality into its opposite, to “replace desire with duty”:** Félix knew this, I am sure, but he never said this much, not even to himself, and this is why he went to all these meetings with people who didn’t appeal to him, talking about things that distracted him... And here again is the root of depression, in this impotence of political will that we haven’t had the courage to admit. (Berardi 2008: 13) **One can discern two aspects to Bifo’s analysis of depression. It is a product of the “panic” induced by the sensory overload of digital capitalism, a condition of withdrawal, a disinvestment of energy from the competitive and narcissistic structures of the enterprise. And it is also a result of the loss of political composition and antagonism**: “**depression is born out of the dispersion of the community’s immediacy. Autonomous and desiring politics was a proliferating community. When the proliferating power is lost, the social becomes the place of depression**” (Berardi 2008: 13). **In both manifestations, depression is a real historical experience, something that must be actively faced and engaged with – we cannot merely ward it off with appeals to militant voluntarism.** We need to assess its contours, conditions, products, to find an analytics of depression, and an adequate politics. And that is the goal of this book, a first step toward a politics after the future, and after the redundant subjective forms of which it was made.

**the 3rd link is**

**the Infosphere**

**Resistance to power becomes useless in the face of the infosphere – Capital will use their movement as a hammer to crush others. Their methodology flares the freedom of capital and kills liberation strategies.**

**Baron et al, 19 [Ilan Zvi Baron, Associate Professor in the School of Government and International Affairs at Durham University, with Jonathan Havercroft, Associate Professor in International Political Theory at the University of Southampton, Isaac Kamola, assistant professor of political science at Trinity College, Jonneke Koomen, Associate Professor of Politics, Sociology and Women’s and Gender Studies at Willamette University, Alex Prichard, senior lecturer in International Relations at the University of Exeter, and Justin Murphy, independent scholar, “Liberal Pacification and the Phenomenology of Violence,” 2019, International Studies Quarterly, 63, 199–212]//Townes \*ableist language modifications denoted by brackets**

**Phenomenology**, as we are using it, **is not about lived experience**. It is the **philosophical tradition** of **revealing** different types of beings and **things that contain meaning in our world**, **the structures** and/or contexts **in which they exist,** and **how these structures and contexts are meaningful**. Understood in this way, **violence is one of these structures and/or contexts**. A phenomenological perspective does not approach violence from a particular normative position, although it does not preclude normative critique. A phenomenological approach does not treat violence as a discrete thing that one agent does to another, although it does not preclude such acts being described as violent. Instead, a phenomenological perspective adds to our intellectual and methodological toolbox by **identifying violence as a condition** or context **in which people function**. Phenomenology allows us to identify violence **occurring in ways and in places** that **we** otherwise **would not** be able to **recognize**. It does not change the meaning of violence (as harm, for example). Instead, it treats violence ontologically, enabling us to reveal more accurately the extent to which violence exists in the world. From a phenomenological perspective, violence is often inconspicuous. **Violence can function as a naturalized or internalized regime of compulsion or domination.** **Pacification** reveals both the **pervasiveness of violence** and **forms of violence** that may **otherwise remain inconspicuous**. The erasing of tradition and the enforcement of particular legal codes at the expense of indigenous cultural norms is one example of an inconspicuous form of violence that involves conspicuous and inconspicous consequences (Cocks 2014). In understanding violence phenomenologically, as a structure of revealing across multiple worlds, we are better able to reveal the extent to which violence shapes our world and how we are then shaped by violence. Pacavere The Romans understood violence as a necessary condition for pax. **The liberal imagination blinds itself to [obfuscates] the ways that pacification functions as violence in our world order**. International relations scholarship’s strict distinction between peace and violence reinforces this obfuscation. Yet, **the violence of (and in) pacification is central to the contemporary world**. A phenomenological approach shows that moments of violent rupture are not aberrations of the world order. **Violent outbreaks are breakdowns of pacification**. It follows that multiple structures of the world order function as **the violence of pacification**, of pacavere.12 These structures include **liberal capitalism**, **colonialism** and the **postcolonial aftermath**, and **war**. Each functions as a key site of pacification. Anarchist thought reveals the pacification in liberal capitalism. Postcolonial thought reveals the pacification of colonial projects. Both anarchist and postcolonial thought demonstrate how war is a breakdown of pacification, revealing the hidden violent structures of our worldhood. Anarchist critiques of capitalism, unlike Marxist and liberal interpretations, take seriously the decisive role of state violence in structuring society and markets. Anarchists view the state as an institution that sustains elite appropriations of political and economic power (Proudhon [1861] 1998; Sorel 1999; Prichard 2015). Those at the bottom of the social hierarchy bear the costs of this enforced order. **The state diffuses violence** (**pacification**) throughout the entire society—often **in ways that go unrecognized** by its subjects (Sorel 1999, 65). The naturalization of violence **consolidates** arbitrary **regimes of domination** in society. While specific, countable incidents of violence may decline, the social order is largely **premised on the threat of violence for contravening social norms** making specific, **countable incidents of violence relatively rare** (Kinna and Prichard, forthcoming). **Anarchist thinkers view rising inequality in the context of declining riots, insurgencies, and assassinations** (see Figure 1) **as evidence of pacification**. Inci**dents of proletarian violence, anticolonial violence, riots, and protests are all examples of resistance to the “regimes of domination” that shape contemporary society, regimes easily identifiable by those subject to them** (Gordon 2007, 33). Drawing on these accounts, we interpret declining rates of riots as a sign of increased pacification, rather than evidence that the system is becoming less violent. Conversely, eruptions of antistate and anticapitalist direct violence are signs of a breakdown in pacification. Much like Heidegger’s example of broken equipment (1962, 102–3, 412–13), which draws our attention to the background structures of our world, brief instances of direct violence reveal violently structured social relations. Although the liberal imagination obscures the centrality of violence, violence has always been central to the liberal world order—to the liberal worldhood—particularly during the colonial and imperial projects of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (Bell 2007a, 2007b). Colonial violence was diffused throughout the entire society, often in ways that went unrecognized by the colonized themselves. **The violence of pacification structured the very existence of the colonized subject**. This **violence** transformed the **colonized subjects** into a different “**species**” (Fanon 1963, 35– 40, 43). Colonial pacification was more than direct and indirect violence; it was sufficiently diffuse to **remake the psyche** of the colonized, **affecting** their **mental health and emotions** (Fanon 1963, 35–106). Fanon (1963, 31) **described it as “atmospheric violence,” a “violence rippling under the skin.”** Unable to lash out against the colonizer, the colonized lived **everyday within a world ordered by violence**. In this world, the colonized could not respond to the colonizers for fear of directly violent reprisals and would turn to symbolic activities such as a dance circle to expose the violence experienced on a daily basis (Fanon 1963, 57). For the colonized, rituals such as the dance were a means of expressing existential frustrations with and resistance to the violence of colonial pacification through reenactments of direct violence. Ultimately, anticolonial struggles exposed the violence of colonialism by directing that violence back on its authors. Practices of colonial rule were central to developing liberal norms of sovereignty, as well as to the domination and control of recalcitrant populations whether within Europe, such as the English domination of the Welsh, Irish, and Scots, or outside of Europe by settler colonialists against indigenous populations (Deloria Jr 1974; Anghie 2005; Miller 2006; Havercroft 2008; Shaw 2008; Barkawi and Stanski 2012; Coulthard 2014; Simpson 2014; Lightfoot 2016; Rueda-Saiz 2017). **This civilizing imagination functioned phenomenologically. It produced insiders as civilized and peaceful and outsiders as violent, external threats to civilization. In doing so, this imagination successfully obscured how the structures of liberalism produced colonial violence**.13 FOOTNOTE 13 Arguments about the foundational role of colonialism, primitive accumulation, and white supremacy in structuring the modern international system are particularly useful in thinking about phenomenological violence (Jones 2006; Anievas, Manchanda, and Shilliam 2015; Du Bois 1915; Shaw 2008; Coulthard 2014; Deloria 1974; Lowe 2015; Hartman 1997). The legacy of these practices pervades contemporary liberal peace-building (Richmond 2014; Sabaratnam 2015; Bouka 2013; Autesserre 2009) and liberal global governance (Koomen 2014a, 2014b, 2013), while trade liberalization can facilitate mass violence (Kamola 2007; Smith 2016). Césaire argues that colonialism produced a “boomerang effect” within European societies; Nazism was the return of violence previously “applied only to non-European peoples” (Césaire 2000, 36). At independence, international law became a mechanism for **reinforcing this** international **order** upon the previously colonized world (Grovogui 1996). The idea of **war** as an external practice of states, not tied to their **internal workings** and located according **to** specific normative **projections of Western identity**, followed from this colonial mentality. This mentality **legitimized** the **exporting** of **violence to create a Western imperial pax** and was so widespread that it shaped the **development of modern warfare** (Ellis 1986; Proudhon [1861] 1998). The **colonial wars reproduced** and **reinforced ideologies of Western superiority, evidenced in part by the West’s superior military technology**. A consequence of this racist hubris was the inability to foresee the destructive tendencies of Western warfare when unleashed against themselves (Ellis 1986). The discipline of international relations, founded in response to the unexpectedly destructive character of the First World War, reproduced this understanding of war.14 This understanding disguises the possibility of increasing violence within the liberal world by presuming a historical narrative of progress and being shocked by its aberration. **War, however, is not the absence of peace or an aberration of liberal progress, but is instead a phenomenological breaking of the liberal worldhood**.15 Once a liberal order of democracy, free markets, and international institutions are spread throughout the world, liberal ideology imagines peace as the end state. Yet, states often deploy war under liberal guises.16 Wars under the aegis of humanitarian values and regime change are examples of the multifaceted character of liberal pacification. Liberal regimes emphasize the violence of those that they are invading, while minimizing the violence involved in these military undertakings and the violence necessary to sustain the liberal societies themselves. What Pierre-Joseph Proudhon called “the moral phenomenology of war” (Prichard 2015, 112–34; Proudhon [1861] 1998) becomes an integral part of the everyday workings of society that shape innumerable aspects of our daily language. **The upshot is that**, within liberal ideology, **the violence committed by liberal states is justified, whereas the violence committed by illiberal states is not**. **Postcolonial** and **anarchist scholarship focuses** on the **incorporation** of **violence** in the **production of liberal spaces** (Barkawi and Laffey 1999). These same concerns can be directed onto the liberal order itself. Seen from the perspective of marginalized and oppressed populations, the structures of liberal pacification take on a distinctly violent aspect. The liberal world is not less violent. Rather, **the liberal world involves a sophisticated phenomenological process of legitimating certain types of violence in order to render other types of violence invisible.** Liberal Pacification What does it mean to apply this third type of violence to our understanding of international relations? Pacification reveals liberalism as a violent process as opposed to a system that is emblematic of the absence of direct violence. There are parallels between the Pax Britannia, Pax Americana, and the ancient peace of the Pax Romana (Neocleous 2010, 13). **However, our account emphasizes the crucial role of pacification as a distinct kind of violence in maintaining these pacific orders**. Our theory offers the novel insight that incorporating pacification into the analysis of the liberal peace reveals crucial aspects **of this peace that conventional and critical accounts neglect**. A focus on pacification provides three critical insights. First, it recovers the crucial role of pacification in the historical founding of the liberal order. Second, by distinguishing between three kinds of violence (Figure 2), we account for the empirical observations of the liberal peace as leading to a decline in direct violence and an increase in violence overall as part of the pacification of the Pax Americana. Conversely, the liberal version of the Pax Americana cannot account for key anomalies. Third, our approach draws attention to the violent ordering of social relations. This dimension of violence is neglected even in Marxist, postcolonial, neo-Gramscian, and post-structuralist critiques of the liberal peace, which primarily focus on the role of direct and indirect violence in maintaining the Pax Americana. Contemporary liberal international relations theory emphasizes the nonviolent role of the liberal triad (democracy, free markets, and institutions) in causing the liberal peace. Yet, a quick review of the history of liberalism in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries shows that key figures in liberalism, from John Stuart Mill, to Joseph Galliéni, to American foreign policy elites, understood pacification as a necessary step in establishing and maintaining the liberal order Mill, one of the philosophical founders of liberalism, conceptualized and deployed liberalism as a domination strategy. **Mill argued that it is appropriate to impose despotism or slavery on “savages” who incline to “fighting and rapine,” but the government should use force as little as possible: What they require is not a government of force, but one of guidance**. Being, however, in too low a state to yield to the guidance of any but those to whom they look up as the possessors of force, the sort of government fittest for them is one [that] possesses force, but seldom uses it. (Mill 1998, 232–33) In terms of our conceptual distinction, Mill argued that liberalism as pacification was a more effective instrument of violence than the direct modes of violence that governments usually deploy. The history of European colonialism is replete with this line of reasoning. “[L]iberal improvement” was a regular plank of colonial strategy by France and Britain in the nineteenth century (Owens 2015, 154). Consider one example from the French colonial tradition. Galliéni, a military commander and administrator, consciously deployed liberalism as a domination strategy in the pacification of Tonkin during the 1890s. Galliéni’s strategy involved slowly spreading military outposts and deploying civil administrators to create markets, schools, and amenities. The rationale was that locals would gain a personal interest in the continuation of French control and would help to quell Chinese brigandage. “Piracy,” said Galliéni, “is the result of an economic condition. It can be fought by prosperity” (quoted in Owens 2015, 157). Galliéni devised a “theory of pacification” in which “the correct combination of force and politics can socialize, pacify, and domesticate a population into regulating itself” (quoted in Owens 2015, 157). What Mill proposed in theory, Galliéni enacted in practice; pacification—**the violent reordering of social relations in a colony—was a more effective means of maintaining liberal rule than the deployment of direct violence**. While less explicit, the relationship between liberalism and imperialism remained present in the twentieth-century development of the Pax Americana. During this era, US policy makers sought to construct a zone of peace distinct from the zones of war associated with authoritarian regimes. The US State Department first recognized the concept of “hegemonic pacification” in the Euro-Atlantic conference diplomacy of the 1920s (Cohrs 2008, 619). The United States’ “strategic restraint” in the aftermath of World War Two was motivated by this concept of liberal, hegemonic pacification (Ikenberry 2009; Ikenberry 2011, 173). US defense officials Stimson, Patterson, McCloy, and Assistant Secretary Howard C. Peterson agreed that it was a matter of the security interests of the United States to maintain “open markets, unhindered access to raw materials, and the rehabilitation of much—if not all—of Eurasia along liberal capitalist lines” (Leffler 1984, 349–56; Barkawi and Laffey 1999). Liberalism as a domination and pacifying strategy continued throughout (and long after) the Cold War (Laffey 2003; Stokes 2003), as evident in one of the founding documents of the post–World War Two liberal order, NSC-68 (Ikenberry 2011, 168). While the enforcement of a Pax Americana eventually yielded a decline in direct violence, it produced an increase in other types of violence. **The first insight of our theory is that pacification has always been part of the liberal project and that the violence in the liberal project never went away**. **The second insight is that by reinterpreting the liberal peace as liberal pacification we are able to grant the empirical findings of liberal peace theorists while maintaining that the Pax Americana represents an intensification of violence overall**. In the language of positivist social science, **our theory is observationally equivalent to that of liberal peace theory**. We expect that the quantity of direct violence inversely associates with the degree of pacification in a society. Therefore, our interpretation challenges research that identifies liberal institutions as the cause of declining violence. Liberal institutions, as apparatuses of liberal pacification, ensure that direct violence is increasingly rare while leaving the structures of violence and domination in place. The observational equivalence on particular dependent variables (in our case, all forms of direct violence) produces a theoretical change requiring the generation of novel observable implications (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994, 30). Furthermore, increased suffering in liberal societies provides evidence contradicting the main claims of liberal peace theories, while remaining consistent with liberal pacification. At its core, liberalism is a project that tries to maximize the utility of its subjects (in other words, minimize suffering while maximizing happiness). As such, a state of liberal peace should lead to a **decrease in markers of suffering**. **However**, there is **more slavery** in the world today than ever before, with conservative estimates of between **12.3 and 27 million people** in debt bondage, chattel, or contract slavery (Gordon 2012).17 Moreover, there is ample evidence of rising **psychological disorders** in **liberal societies**. A preponderance of evidence from the United States suggests that **depression**, **anxiety**, alienation, **opioid dependency**, **stress**, other related **psychological disorders, increased** social **isolation**, **and** the **decline of community** have increased throughout the twentieth century (Twenge, Zhang, and Im 2004, 320; Adler, Boyce, Chesney, et al. 1994; Twenge 2000; Twenge, Konrath, Foster, et al. 2008; Twenge, Gentile, DeWall, et al. 2010; Cohen and Janicki-Deverts 2012; American Society of Addiction Medicine 2016). Changes to human life associated with modernity have caused psychological **stress** to **increase** (Jackson 2014). **Mortality rates** have increased for some white, non-Hispanics aged 45–54 in the United States between 1999 and 2013 (Case and Deaton 2015). Modern technological advances from television to the Internet may contribute to increasing separation and alienation of the social human animal into individualized bodies connected by increasingly weak and empty bonds (Putnam 2000; Gray 2011; Turkle 2011). At minimum, new information communication technology such as Facebook can increase the stress and anxiety of its users (Lee-Won, Herzog, and Park 2015). **The violent structuring of liberalism enables increases in social alienation, anxiety, stress, and human bondage through repression, economic control, and social isolation**. **These are not isolated instances of suffering**. They are **fundamental structural features of our liberal world**. If liberalism is a process of pacification rather than simply peace, then this rise in individual suffering in liberal spaces may be evidence of a similar process that Fanon equated with the psychic life of the colonist. **Just as Fanon’s colonial subjects, unable to lash out at the settler through direct violence, internalized their suffering, modern liberal subjects, unable to resist liberal pacification, internalize their suffering** (1982, chap. 6; cf. Sorel 1999, 118). Liberal peace should bring about a rise in happiness; that it has instead led to rising suffering is evidence of liberal pacification. Third, in addition to offering an alternative interpretation of the liberal peace, our theory of liberal pacification supplements key insights from critical approaches to peace. Tarak Barkawi and Mark Laffey’s work on imperial processes and liberal spaces makes a similar point to ours, that the celebrated zone of liberal peace rests on practices of violence (Barkawi and Laffey 1999, 2002; cf. Neocleous et al. 2013). Their account, however, focuses on practices of direct violence, such as humanitarian interventions against authoritarian regimes or corporations hiring local militias to make work sites in the global south safe for economic extraction (Barkawi and Laffey 1999, 422). Our point is that these moments of direct violence lead to pacification wherein social relations have been so violently reordered as to make direct violence no longer necessary. **Once direct violence has established liberal space, pacification functions as a structure of violence that sustains the space**. Direct violence only manifests itself when pacification weakens. Pacification, however, does not merely operate through manipulating the conscience of its subjects. While Marxist and Gramscian concepts of ideology and hegemony are consistent with our theory of pacification (Peceny 1997, 418), they do not address how the constructed political order sustains itself through a violent reordering of social relations. A Gramscian-inspired critique of the democratic peace can yield a bird’s-eye view of the ways in which liberal peace theory is itself deployed as an ideological tool (Ish-Shalom 2006, 569–75). However, Gramscianinspired approaches do not account for the ways that everyday practices of violence (for example, surveillance technologies, implied threats from weapons, security barriers, etc.) sustain liberal pacification. While ideational factors are important in pacification, these factors rest upon practices and structures that are of an ontological-existential character. To review, our reinterpretation of the liberal peace as liberal pacification offers three novel insights. **First**, liberal scholars and others associate the **development** of the **liberal order** with **peace** and a **decline** in violence by **ignoring** how **pacification** is part of the **liberal project**. **Second**, the empirically observed decline in violence equated with the liberal peace is not **necessarily** a sign of **human progress** but could be a **sign** of **intensified repression** or **increases** in other forms of **suffering** across the **liberal world order**. Third, our concept of pacification reveals violence that is neither direct nor indirect but is phenomenologically structured into the world order. Understanding liberalism as pacification **produces a paradigm shift**. Liberal pacification is violent in the sense that it coerces a specific type of liberal docility, while also preventing types of resistance that might be understood as violent, including riots, insurrections, civil wars, and interstate wars. Pacification reveals the ongoing violence at the heart of a political project that imagines itself to be against violence. Conclusion Our account of pacification recovers a crucial aspect of pax, one originally etched into Roman monuments. The heading of the Res Gestae (the funeral monument to Emperor Augustus) reads, “[t]his is how he [Augustus] made the world subject to the power of the people of Rome” (Beard 2016, 364). This monument does not celebrate peace as the absence of violence; it celebrates pacification. Pax takes the form of a process that violently reorders the world so that imperial subjects are rendered incapable of using violence to resist Roman rule. The absence of overt acts of violence depends upon the maximization of pacification. **The practice of pacification includes threats, coercion, intimidation, and surveillance to restructure and sustain social and political relations**. When this type of violence operates effectively, it appears as the absence of violence; pacification’s violence resides in the structuring of the prevailing order. While such an outcome may appear peaceful, it entails, at best, a negative peace that operates through a violent and coercive reordering of society. Liberal peace advocates measure direct violence and equate the decline in that kind of violence with peace. However, our claim is that the spread of liberal institutions does not necessarily decrease violence but transforms it. Our phenomenological analysis captures empirical trends in human domination and suffering that liberal peace theories fail to account for, including increased inequality, slavery, anxiety, addiction, and anomie. Our analysis also highlights how a decline in direct violence may actually coincide with the transformation of violence in ways that are concealed, monopolized, and structured into the fabric of modern liberal society. **If our theory is correct, we will find increases in markers of suffering as society liberalizes**. While we cannot say whether these indicators are unique to pacified liberal societies, it is significant that they are rarely, if ever, discussed in terms of violence and the liberal peace. **Liberal pacification is observationally equivalent to liberal peace**. This is **not a semantic argument.** Liberal peace advocates claim that processes that promote individual freedom and autonomy (that is, democracy, free markets, and global institutions) cause peace. **While the restructuring of the global order—pacification—reduces direct violence, it also restructures social relations in ways that are violent**. Declines in directly observable violence render other forms of violence invisible as violence; in fact, insidious, coercive, and violent systems of **military deterrence and** compellence, **nuclear terror**, surveillance, and intimidation **constitute the worldhood of the liberal order.**

**The only ethical action left is to refuse the terms as given and embrace radical passivity.**

**Bifo, 11** [Franco Berardi, Italian communist theorist and activist in the autonomist tradition, whose work mainly focuses on the role of the media and information technology within post-industrial capitalism   “Chapter 4 Exhastion and Subjectivity.” After the Future, by Franco Bifo Berardi et al., AK Press, 2011. P. 107-108]

Advertising and stimulated hyper-expression (“just do it”), have submitted the energies of the social psyche to permanent mobilization. **Exhaustion follows, and exhaustion is the only way of escape: Nothing, not even the system, can avoid the symbolic obligation, and it is in this trap that the only chance of a catastrophe for capital remains. The system turns on itself, as a scorpion does when encircled by the challenge of death.** For it is summoned to answer, if it is not to lose face, to what can only be death. **The system must itself commit suicide in response to the multiplied challenge of death and suicide.** So hostages are taken. On the symbolic or sacrificial plane, from which every moral consideration of the innocence of the victims is ruled out the hostage is the substitute, the alter-ego of the terrorist, the hostage’s death for the terrorist. Hostage and terrorist may thereafter become confused in the same sacrificial act. (Baudrillard 1993a: 37) **In these impressive pages Baudrillard outlines the end of the modern dialectics of revolution against power, of the labor movement against capitalist domination, and predicts the advent of a new form of action which will be marked by the sacrificial gift of death (and self-annihilation). After the destruction of the World Trade Center in the most important terrorist act ever, Baudrillard wrote a short text titled The Spirit of Terrorism where he goes back to his own predictions and recognizes the emergence of a catastrophic age. When the code becomes the enemy the only strategy can be catastrophic: all the counterphobic ravings about exorcizing evil: it is because it is there, everywhere, like an obscure object of desire.** Without this deep-seated complicity, the event would not have had the resonance it has, and in their symbolic strategy the terrorists doubtless know that they can count on this unavowable complicity. (Baudrillard 2003: 6) This goes much further than hatred for the dominant global power by the disinherited and the exploited, those who fell on the wrong side of global order. This malignant desire is in the very heart of those who share this order’s benefits. An allergy to all definitive order, to all definitive power is happily universal, and the two towers of the World Trade Center embodied perfectly, in their very double-ness (literally twin-ness), this definitive order: No need, then, for a death drive or a destructive instinct, or even for perverse, unintended effects. Very logically – inexorably – the increase in the power heightens the will to destroy it. And it was party to its own destruction. When the two towers collapsed, you had the impression that they were responding to the suicide of the suicide-planes with their own suicides. **It has been said that “Even God cannot declare war on Himself.” Well, He can. The West, in position of God** (divine omnipotence and absolute moral legitimacy), **has become suicidal, and declared war on itself**. (Baudrillard 2003: 6-7) **In Baudrillard’s** catastrophic **vision I see a** new way of thinking subjectivity: **a reversal of the energetic subjectivation that animates the revolutionary theories of the 20th century, and the opening of an implosive theory of subversion, based on depression and exhaustion. In the activist view exhaustion is seen as the inability of the social body to escape the vicious destiny that capitalism has prepared: deactivation of the social energies that once upon a time animated democracy and political struggle. But exhaustion could also become the beginning of a slow movement towards a “wu wei” civilization, based on the withdrawal, and frugal expectations of life and consumption.** **Radicalism could abandon** the mode of **activism, and adopt** the mode of **passivity. A radical passivity would definitely threaten the ethos of relentless productivity that neoliberal politics has imposed. The mother of all the bubbles, the work bubble, would finally deflate. We have been working too much during the last three or four centuries, and outrageously too much during the last thirty years. The current depression could be the beginning of a massive abandonment of competition, consumerist drive, and of dependence on work.** Actually, if we think of the geopolitical struggle of the first decade – the struggle between Western domination and jihadist Islam – we recognize that **the most powerful weapon has been suicide.** 9/11 is the most impressive act of this suicidal war, but thousands of people have killed themselves in order to destroy American military hegemony. And they won, forcing the western world into the bunker of paranoid security, and defeating the hyper-technological armies of the West both in Iraq, and in Afghanistan. The suicidal implosion has not been confined to the Islamists. Suicide has became a form of political action everywhere. Against neoliberal politics, Indian farmers have killed themselves. Against exploitation hundreds of workers and employees have killed themselves in the French factories of Peugeot, and in the offices of France Telecom. In Italy, when the 2009 recession destroyed one million jobs, many workers, haunted by the fear of unemployment, climbed on the roofs of the factories, threatening to kill themselves**. Is it possible to divert this implosive trend from the direction of death, murder, and suicide, towards a new kind of autonomy, social creativity and of life?** I think that **it is possible only if we start from exhaustion, if we emphasize the creative side of withdrawal.** The exchange between life and money could be deserted, and **exhaustion could give way to a huge wave of withdrawal from the sphere of economic exchange. A new refrain could emerge in that moment, and wipe out the law of economic growth. The self-organization of the general intellect could abandon the law of accumulation and growth, and start a new concatenation, where collective intelligence is only subjected to the common good.** The global recession started officially in September 2008 and lasted officially until the summer of 2009. Since the summer of 2009 the official truth in the media, in political statements, in economic talk was: recovery. The stock exchange began to rise again and the banks started again paying huge bonuses to their managers and so on. Meanwhile, unemployment was exploding everywhere, salaries were falling, welfare was curtailed, 90 million more are expected to join the army of poverty in the next year. Is this recovery? Our conditional reflex (influenced by the Keynesian knowledge that recovery is the recovery of the “real economy”) answered: no, this is not recovery, capitalism cannot recover only by financial means. But we should reframe our vision. Finance is no longer a mere tool of capitalist growth. The financialization of capitalism has made finance the very ground of accumulation, as Christian Marazzi (2010) has explained in recent works such as The Violence of Financial Capitalism. In the sphere of semiocapitalism, financial signs are not only signifiers pointing to some referents. The distinction between sign and referent is over. The sign is the thing, the product, the process. The “real” economy and financial expectations are no longer distinct spheres. In the past, when riches were created in the sphere of industrial production, when finance was only a tool for the mobilization of capital to invest in the field of material production, recovery could not be limited to the financial sphere. It took also employment and demand. **Industrial capitalism could not grow if society did not grow. Nowadays we must accept the idea that financial capitalism can recover and thrive without social recovery. Social life has become residual, redundant, irrelevant. The financial cycle is bleeding the social environment dry: sucking energies, resources, and the future. And giving nothing back. Recovery of the financial process of valorization of capital is totally separated from the cycle of material production and social demand. Financial capitalism has obtained autonomy from social life. Let’s consider the political side of the same problem: once upon a time when society was suffering the blows of recession, workers reacted with strikes, struggle and political organization, and forced state intervention in order to increase demand.** Industrial growth needed mass consumption and social stability. **What is impressive in the ongoing crisis, on the contrary, is the widespread passivity of the workers, their inability to unionize.** The political trend in Europe is the meltdown of leftist parties and the labor movement. In the US, Obama is daily attacked by racist and populist mobs, but no progressive social movement is emerging. 1.2 million people have had their mortgages foreclosed upon and lost their houses following the sub-prime swindle, but no organized reaction has surfaced. **People suffer and cry alone. In the old time of industrial capitalism, the working class could fight against a target that was precisely identified:** the boss, the entrepreneur who was the owner of material things like the factory, and of the product of his laborers. **Nowadays the boss** has vanished. He **is fragmented into billions of financial segments, and disseminated into millions of financial agents scattered all around the world**. The **workers** themselves are part of recombinant financial capital. They are expecting future revenues from their pension fund investments. They own stock options in the enterprise exploiting their labor. They **are hooked up, like a fly in a spider web, and if they move, they get strangled, but if they don’t move, the spider will suck their life from them. Society may rot, fall apart, agonize. It is not going to affect the political and economic stability of capitalism.** What is called economic recovery is a new round of social devastation. So the recession is over, capitalism is recovering. Nonetheless, unemployment is rising and misery is spreading. This means that financial capitalism is autonomous from society. **Capitalism doesn’t need workers: it just needs cellular fractals of labor, underpaid, precarious, de-personalised. Fragments of impersonal nervous energy, recombined by the network. The crisis is going to push forward technological change, and the substitution of human labor with machines**. The employment rate is not going to rise in the future, and productivity will increase. A shrinking number of workers will be forced to produce more and more, and to work overtime. **The real bubble is the work bubble**. We have been working too much; we are still working too much. The human race does not need more goods, it needs a redistribution of existing goods, an intelligent application of technology and a worldwide cut in the lifetime dedicated to labor. **Social energies have to be freed from labor dependence, and returned to the field of social affection, education, and therapy. We should take seriously the concept of autonomy.** In the present condition autonomy means exodus from the domain of economic law: Out-onomy, **abandonment of the field of economic exchange, self-organization of knowledge and of production in a sphere of social life which is no longer dependent on economic culture and expectations – barter, free exchange of time and of competence, food self reliance, occupation of territories in the cities, organization of self-defense.**

## Case

### UV

#### Reject 1AR theory- A] 7-6 time skew means it’s endlessly aff biased B] I don’t have a 3nr which allows for endless extrapolation C] 1AR theory is skewed to the aff because they have a 2ar judge psychology warrant.

#### Reasonability on 1AR shells –it checks 2AR sandbagging by preventing really abusive 1NCs while still giving the 2N a chance.

#### DTA on 1AR shells - They can blow up a blippy 20 second shell to 3 min of the 2AR while I have to split my time and can’t preempt 2AR spin which necessitates judge intervention

The YU evidence does not at all say chinese culture is erased by IP its literally just says The US iterpretation of IP isnt that of CHINA , there is no erasure

The second evidence literally jus says counterfeit drugs have been deadly and killed people , obviously they would deny Chinese coutnerfeit medcine you highlighted in your card

#### The aff has no proof remocing IP will change chinese lives at all the

Turn Semiocap is what ecapsulates the lense of capitlism that frames how people look at china Solving Semiocap is a prequsite to Allow for better norms

You subjegated as a prductionn line due to capitlism that drives you to endless competition it turns