### 1

#### Interpretation: AFF’s breaking new must disclose the advocacy text and advantage areas when pairings are released. Violation in the doc.

#### Even if your reading the same aff it was disclosed at a different tournament for all I know your reading a new aff or a undislocsed k aff,

#### The standard is clash – new aff’s make negating impossible b/c we don’t know what the debate is going to be about which neutralizes pre round prep and forces the neg to beat an aff they had 5 months to prep and frontline with 4 minutes of prep. This makes negating impossible b/c they’ll have prepped all the generics we can read.

#### Whole res doesn’t solve – advantage area is just as important as the plan text b/c how counterplans solve the case, specific case responses, answers to framing all require an idea of what the AFF is going to be about. The neg is entitled to 15 minutes of research against an AFF they had infinite prep to get ready to make sure we don’t lose on purely surprise factor.

#### Vote on substantive engagement:  otherwise we’re speaking without debating and there’s nothing to separate us from dueling oratory.   It also creates the most valuable long-term skills since we need to learn how to defend our beliefs in any context, like politics.

Drop the debate for abuse no rvis you don’t win for being fair

CI otherwise it’s a race to the bottom we cant predict a brightline

### 1NC Text

#### Text:

#### 1. The World Trade Organization ought to be abolished.

#### 2. The following 164 countries listed in the speech doc ought to independently and without influence from international government [opponent’s plan]

Afghanistan

Albania

Angola

Antigua and Barbuda

Argentina

Armenia

Australia

Austria

Bahrain, Kingdom of

Bangladesh

Barbados

Belgium

Belize

Benin

Bolivia, Plurinational State of

Botswana

Brazil

Brunei Darussalam

Bulgaria

Burkina Faso

Burundi

Cabo Verde

Cambodia

Cameroon

Canada

Central African Republic

Chad

Chile

China

Colombia

Congo

Costa Rica

Côte d’Ivoire

Croatia

Cuba

Cyprus

Czech Republic

Democratic Republic of the Congo

Denmark

Djibouti

Dominica

Dominican Republic

Ecuador

Egypt

El Salvador

Estonia

Eswatini

European Union (formerly EC)

Fiji

Finland

France

Gabon

Gambia

Georgia

Germany

Ghana

Greece

Grenada

Guatemala

Guinea

Guinea-Bissau

Guyana

Haiti

Honduras

Hong Kong, China

Hungary

Iceland

India

Indonesia

Ireland

Israel

Italy

Jamaica

Japan

Jordan

Kazakhstan

Kenya

Korea, Republic of

Kuwait, the State of

Kyrgyz Republic

Lao People’s Democratic Republic

Latvia

Lesotho

Liberia

Liechtenstein

Lithuania

Luxembourg

Macao, China

Madagascar

Malawi

Malaysia

Maldives

Mali

Malta

Mauritania

Mauritius

Mexico

Moldova, Republic of

Mongolia

Montenegro

Morocco

Mozambique

Myanmar

Namibia

Nepal

Netherlands

New Zealand

Nicaragua

Niger

Nigeria

North Macedonia

Norway

Oman

Pakistan

Panama

Papua New Guinea

Paraguay

Peru

Philippines

Poland

Portugal

Qatar

Romania

Russian Federation

Rwanda

Saint Kitts and Nevis

Saint Lucia

Saint Vincent and the Grenadines

Samoa

Saudi Arabia, Kingdom of

Senegal

Seychelles

Sierra Leone

Singapore

Slovak Republic

Slovenia

Solomon Islands

South Africa

Spain

Sri Lanka

Suriname

Sweden

Switzerland

Chinese Taipei

Tajikistan

Tanzania

Thailand

Aruba

Tonga

Trinidad and Tobago

Tunisia

Turkey

Uganda

Ukraine

United Arab Emirates

United Kingdom

United States

Uruguay

Vanuatu

Venezuela, Bolivarian Republic of

Viet Nam

Yemen

Zambia

Zimbabwe

Hawley, senator, JD Yale, 20

(Josh, 5-5, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/05/opinion/hawley-abolish-wto-china.html)

The coronavirus emergency is not only a public health crisis. With [30 million Americans unemployed](https://www.cnbc.com/2020/04/30/us-weekly-jobless-claims.html), it is also an economic crisis. And it has exposed a hard truth about the modern global economy: it weakens American workers and has empowered China’s rise. That must change. The global economic system as we know it is a relic; it requires reform, top to bottom. We should begin with one of its leading institutions, the World Trade Organization. We should abolish it.

### 1NC Colonialism

#### The WTO as an institution is unethical and perpetuates colonialism

Godrej 20

(Dinyar, Co-editor @ New Internationalist, 4-20, https://newint.org/features/2020/02/10/brief-history-impoverishment)

For countries that were undergoing economic ravishment by structural adjustment, the 1990s brought new torments in the form of the World Trade Organization (WTO), a club dominated by rich nations. In the name of creating a ‘level playing field’, the WTO required poorer countries to sign up to an all-or-nothing, binding set of rules, which removed protections for domestic industries and allowed foreign capital unhindered access. This was strongly prejudicial to the interests of local industries, which were not in a position to withstand foreign competition. Influence within the WTO is weighted by the size of a nation’s economy – thus even if all poorer nations joined forces to demand policy changes they would still not have a chance against wealthy nations. This trade injustice has drawn widespread protests and pressure for the WTO to reform. Meanwhile, wealthy nations are increasingly going down the route of bilateral Free Trade Agreements (FTAs). Usually negotiated in secret, the interests of their corporations are paramount in FTAs and include the ability to sue states for eye-watering sums (should they, for example, want to terminate a contract or nationalize an industry) with no provision for states to do the same. Such instruments are working to create a utopia for transnational corporations, creating a business-friendly climate, which translates as the demolition of labour protection, tax cuts for the wealthiest and a supine regulatory environment. Tax havens operated by the richest countries are home to huge sums of illicit wealth draining out of some of the poorest. Today, due to how the global economy has been engineered, for every dollar of aid sent to poorer countries, they lose 10 times as much in outflows – and that’s before one counts their losses through unfair trade rules and underpaid labour. Foreign investors take nearly $500 billion a year in profits from the Global South, and trade-power imbalances cost poorer nations $700 billion a year in lost export revenue. 7 CONCENTRATION In the 21st century wealth increasingly flows through corporate hands towards a small super-elite. In a trend that began in the 1990s, the lion’s share of equity value is being realized through squeezing workers: the classification ‘working poor’ so familiar in the Global South is now increasingly also being used in the wealthy North, where neoliberal capitalism is leading inevitably to wage erosion and work precarity, coupled with the withdrawal of state support. Inequality is rising dramatically. In 2018 the richest 26 people owned wealth equivalent to the poorest half of the world’s population. And their wealth was increasing at the rate of $2.5 billion a day. Meanwhile 3.4 billion people – nearly half the world – were living on less than $5.50 a day.

### 1NC Heg Bad

#### Eliminating the WTO ends U.S. global hegemony

Bello, PhD, 2000

(Walden, Sociology @ Stanford, https://users.ox.ac.uk/~magd1352/ecologist/Should%20WTO%20be%20abolished.pdf)

The idea that the world needs the World Trade Organisation (WTO) is one of the biggest lies of our time. The WTO came about, in 1995, mainly because it was in the interest of the US and its corporations. The European Union, Japan and especially the developing countries were mostly ambivalent about the idea; it was the US which drove it on. Why? Because though the US, back in 1948, blocked the formation of an International Trade Organisation (ITO), believing that, at that time, the interests of its corporations would not be served by such a global body, it had changed its mind by the 1990s. Now it wanted an international trade body. Why? Because its global economic dominance was threatened. The flexible GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) system, which preceded the WTO, had allowed the emergence of Europe and East Asia as competing industrial centres that threatened US dominance even in many high-tech industries. Under GATT’s system of global agricultural trade, Europe had emerged as a formidable agricultural power even as Third World governments concerned with preserving their agriculture and rural societies limited the penetration of their markets by US agricultural products. In other words, before the WTO, global trade was growing by leaps and bounds, but countries were using trade policy to industrialise and adapt to the growth of trade so that their economies would be enhanced by global trade and not be marginalised by it. That was a problem, from the US point of view. And that was why the US needed the WTO. The essence of the WTO is seen in three of its central agreements: the Agreement on Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs), the Agreement on Agriculture (AOA), and the Agreement on Trade Related Investment Measures (TRIMs). The purpose of TRIPs is not to promote free trade but to enhance monopoly power. One cannot quarrel with the fact that innovators should have preferential access to the benefits that flow from their innovation for a period of time. TRIPs, however, goes beyond this to institutionalise a monopoly for high-tech corporate innovators, most of them from the North. Among other things, TRIPs provides a generalised minimum patent protection of 20 years; institutes draconian border regulations against products judged to be violating intellectual property rights; and – contrary to the judicial principle of presuming innocence until proven guilty – places the burden of proof on the presumed violator of process patents. What TRIPs does is reinforce the monopolistic or oligopolistic position of US high tech firms such as Microsoft and Intel. It makes industrialisation by imitation or industrialisation via loose conditions of technology transfer – a strategy employed by the US, Germany, Japan, and South Korea during the early phases of their industrialisation – all but impossible. It enables the technological leader, in this case the US, to greatly influence the pace of technological and industrial development in the rest of the world.

#### Primacy causes endless war, terror, authoritarianism, prolif, and Russia-China aggression.

Ashford, PhD, 19

(Emma, PoliSci@UVA, Fellow@CATO, Power and Pragmatism: Reforming American Foreign Policy for the 21st Century, in New Voices in Grand Strategy, 4, CNAS)

Humility is a virtue. Yet in the last quarter century, American policymakers have been far more likely to embrace the notion of America as the “indispensable nation,” responsible for protecting allies, promoting democracy and human rights, tamping down conflicts, and generally managing global affairs. Compare this ideal to the U.S. track record – endless Middle Eastern wars, the rise of ISIS, global democratic backsliding, a revanchist Russia, resurgent China, and a world reeling from the election of President Donald Trump – and this label seems instead the height of hubris. Many of the failures of U.S. foreign policy speak for themselves. As the daily drumbeat of bad news attests, interventions in Iraq and Libya were not victories for human rights or democracy, but rather massively destabilizing for the Middle East as a whole. Afghanistan – despite initial military successes – has become a quagmire, highlighting the futility of nation- building. Other failures of America’s grand strategy are less visible, but no less damaging. NATO expansion into Eastern Europe helped to reignite hostility between Russia and the West. Worse, it has diluted the alliance’s defensive capacity and its democratic character. And even as the war on terror fades from public view, it remains as open-ended as ever: Today, the United States is at war in seven countries and engaged in “combating terrorism’ in more than 80.1 To put it bluntly: America’s strategy since the end of the Cold War – whether it is called primacy or liberal internationalism – may not be a total failure, but it has not been successful either. Many have tried to place blame for these poor outcomes.2 But recrimination is less important than understanding why America’s strategy has failed so badly and avoiding these mistakes in future. Much of the explanation is the natural outcome of changing constraints. Iraq and Libya should not be viewed as regrettable anomalies, but rather the logical outcome of unipolarity and America’s liberal internationalist inclination to solve every global problem. It’s also a reliance on flawed assumptions – that what is good for America is always good for the world, for example. Support for dangerous sovereignty-undermining norms adds to the problem; just look at the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), which has proved not to protect populations or stabilize fragile states, but to provoke chaos, encourage nuclear proliferation, and undermine the international institutions. Perhaps, if nothing else had changed, a form of watered-down liberal internationalism that foreswore interventionism and drew back from the war on terror might have been possible.3 But international politics are undergoing a period of profound transformation, from unipolarity to regional or even global multipolarity. Primacy – and the consistent drumbeat of calls in Washington to do more, always and everywhere – is neither sustainable nor prudent. Nor can we fall back on warmed-over Cold War–era strategies better suited to an era of bipolar superpower competition.

### K

#### The 1AC is animated by the spectacle of its own power – the aff is the latest instantiation of America’s “errand in the wilderness” which suppresses interrogation of imperial violence through establishing a transcendental ethos of American Exceptionalism.

Spanos and Spanos ‘19

[William V Spanos, Literature at Binghamton, Rob Glass’ favorite, RIP to a real one, and Adam Spanos, University of Chicago. 2019. “American Spectacle and the Vietnam War Sublime,” published in “Neocolonial Fictions of the Global Cold War.” (eds. Steven Belletto and Joseph Keith)] pat

The United States has instrumentalized the spectacle as part of a twofold ideological strategy directed inwardly, toward the national community, and outwardly, toward its threatening enemy. The dominant exceptionalist culture’s representation of the wilderness of the world outside its borders functions as a means of gaining power over its alleged enemy. It has characterized this appalling wilderness as the evidence of its Other’s civilizational inferiority. It has even managed to solicit the attachment of some sectors of these foreign populations to the American-legislated nomos of the earth and drawn them into subservience to this nation’s Higher Cause.

For a domestic audience, this extraterritorial menace has been figured as a threat to the security of the covenantal people. But the invocation of this threat acts as a prompt to the citizenry to recommit its youthful energies and reconstitute its unity in the face of the recidivism—the backsliding and the splintering of the sovereign Logos—intrinsic to the “civilizing” process. This is the national ritual that the dominant culture perennially stages as spectacle, especially at times of national crisis and, above all, when the people’s dedication to the errand shows signs of flagging.

This tactic, of converting what seemed hauntingly unmasterable about the world into an admonitory rhetoric that would incite aggressive reaction, had its origin at the time when the Puritans first encountered the vastness and indefiniteness of the terrain to which they had come as well as the inassimilable alterity of the people already there. These settlers had an un-easy experience of being unhomed; they found themselves face to face with the utter contingency—even arbitrariness—of their new situation. But the American Puritans did not understand the anxiety born of this deracination as an ontological imperative to rethink their Logos. On the contrary, as Sacvan Bercovitch has shown, they harnessed this anxiety to the tasks of reorienting themselves and establishing the transcendental significance of their place in the world:

The American Puritan jeremiad was the ritual of a culture on an errand—which is to say, a culture based on a faith in process. Substituting teleology for hierarchy, it discarded the Old World ideal of stasis for a New World vision of the future. Its function was to create a climate of anxiety that helped release the restless “progressivist” energies required for the success of the venture. . . . It made anxiety its end as well as its means. Crisis was the social norm it sought to inculcate. . . . The future, though divinely assured, was never quite there, and New England’s Jeremiahs set out to provide the sense of insecurity that would ensure the outcome.

In his capacity as Jeremiah, this spokesperson of God’s chosen people represented the New World wilderness in such a way as to foreground both the promise inherent in his capacity to domesticate this terrain and the danger that constantly lurked. Furthermore, he separated those who attended to him from the temporality of being by reducing them to spectators of the alarming and captivating truth-image that he called forth. In his sermons, prose, and poetry, and despite a professed commitment to the “plain style,” he ritualized and staged the sublime, spatialized its unnameability into awesome spectacle.

The basic problematic of the US spectacle—a central component of national identity from the Puritans through the contemporary moment—is the attempt to capture the encounter with being in its dynamic, errant, and totally unjustifiable givenness and to convert the wonder it evokes into awe. American spectacle supplies an illusory grounding for the nation’s existence, suggesting that the appearance and subsequent presence of the United States are divinely ordained; citizens access this meaning to the extent that they consent to the meaningfulness of the spectacle offered to them. This spectacle resembles the sublime experience of the absence of any such transcendental guarantee insofar as it forces the spectator to confront that which is beyond the pale of merely empirical knowledge. But whereas the sublimity of the nothingness of being calls forth questions—albeit ones that are finally un-answerable—the spectacle of US power functions to suppress the faculty of interrogation. It therefore involves a twofold displacement: in place of the nothing the spectacle offers the illusory presence of American power; instead of an inquisitive relation to what remains unknown the spectacle encourages acquiescence and silent marveling. The jeremiad constitutes a relay between the two points and functions to ensure that the spectacle doesn’t degenerate into the sublime.

Dejustification of Violence: Vietnam as Event

The decisive event heralding the implosion of the American spectacle occurred at the conclusion of the Vietnam War, a turning point that has widely been identified with the breakdown of the country’s social order. Historians of the war have recognized this fact without identifying its proper ontological rationale. According to Marilyn Young, “the war opened up for debate not only the principles that had governed American foreign policy since the end of World War II, but the larger structure of the nation and its political procedures.” Furthermore, “racism and poverty were being explained as endemic, the social system seen as inherently unfair to minority groups; natural resources were described as depleted and limited, and the Cold War as at least as much an American as a Soviet creation. . . . [F]undamental moral values connected to family, sex, and work that had only rarely been challenged in the past were held up to public scrutiny, even scorn.” Likewise, Christian Appy argues that the war forced Americans to reassess their national identity, in the process of which their belief in American exceptionalism was “shattered.” However one specifies the inception of this event—the student protests and teach-ins, the mounting resistance to the draft, the radicalization of the civil rights movement, the imposition of a tax increase to pay for the war, the public reaction to the Tet offensive, the revelation of the My Lai massacre, the publication of the Pentagon Papers, or otherwise—it is undeniable that a general symbolic crisis had taken place, one that rendered increasingly large domains of American life unjustifiable in the eyes of its members. But this event, most often referred to as the “Vietnam quagmire,” involved more than the collapse of previously hegemonic social structures. More fundamentally, it brought into question the political ontology on which the United States had predicated its very existence.

Prior to this event, the US state had relied on visual technologies in order to foster public consent for the war. The fact that this was the first “post-modern war” and the first to be widely televised did not alter the fact that the state and national elites had long worked to solicit public acquiescence by way of imagery, even if the tools used to produce these images were primarily rhetorical and their manifestation largely confined to the collective imaginary. By the closing stages of the conflict, however, many American citizens (and others across the globe) came to recognize the emptiness of these images, their lack of historical referentiality. The end of the Vietnam War, then, did not only entail the withdrawal of consent for an imperial army’s occupation of a foreign territory. It also and more significantly involved a disclosure of the nothingness—the absence of ground—that had always haunted US pretensions to universalism. This culminating moment forced an encounter with the primal scene of the nation’s founding, a site at which this nothingness had been obscured by the spectacular imagistics of US ideology. When the spectacle’s history-destroying function became manifest to viewers of the war at home, a rupture in the ordinary sequence of time took place that suddenly brought the life-destroying violence of American power into stark relief. The Vietnam War then became the untimely occasion for a rethinking of the very meaning of “America,” an event that continues to ramify into the present.

Since the Puritans had announced their intention to redeem world his-tory through the establishment of a polity with a universal mission, the temporality of US national life was determined by its adventist rhetoric and view of history. In announcing to the world the “good news” that the United States would have brought to all mankind, in the confident mode of the future anterior, its deputies took what had been a secularized version of the providential view of history (as given, for example, by Hegel) and retheologized it. The philosophers of US history married the progressive view of history to a messianic sense of their nation’s capacity to bring the flux of time to an end. The demise of this paradigm, however, was marked not by the anticipated triumph of liberal capitalism over its antagonists but by the defeat of American forces in Vietnam.

Because US identity was so intimately bound up with this temporality—one that was simultaneously amnesiac, optimistic, and expectant—the recognition of the impending failure of US forces to overcome its putatively Communist opponent could not easily be metabolized. On one hand, the disclosure of the gap between the principles used to justify the war and the military’s actual conduct in Vietnam served to undermine domestic support for the war, which suddenly become comparable to other great atrocities in recent memory, including the genocide of Jews during World War II. On the other hand, the very historical context in which the Vietnam War was understood to inhere, as an event distinct from what came before because part of the nation’s linear movement toward a better future, no longer sufficed to orient Americans within historical time. The comfort provided by the idea that they were safely lodged on a determinate trajectory dissipated when the forecasted end of the war failed to materialize. Subsequently both the nation’s identity and the dominant understanding of how that identity would realize itself in historical time entered a period of crisis.

It was not simply the US government’s justification of the war, the cold calculations of military planners, or the execution of the war by soldiers that came to seem morally wrong and indifferent to human life. Nor was it the case that the war came to be understood as an exception to the basic principles undergirding US foreign policy, a ghastly aberration within an otherwise benevolent history of interactions with other peoples. Instead, this event reconfigured the national imaginary in a totalizing way. The nonlocalized nature of the critiques of the United States, the extension of these challenges to almost all components of American life, intensified the perception that a kind of generalized anarchy had been unleashed that threatened to undermine the nation’s existence. But the energies unleashed in this moment were not merely critical, and it is for this reason that the familiar historiographical trope of the war that comes home does not completely capture the dynamic of the event. For a new spirit of inquiry emerged simultaneously alongside the impulse to challenge existing practices of domination, one that worked to disclose truths that had previously been unthinkable.

The Vietnam War came to be perceived as a part of an iterative temporal sequence rather than a unique occurrence. Suddenly an entire catalog of state violence became relevant to the effort to make sense of this war; those who immersed themselves in the event worked to retrieve these historical referents from the antiquarian status to which traditional historians and cultural critics had consigned them. Among these, the removal and genocide of Native Americans was among the most significant. Throughout the war, it was common for American soldiers to refer to the undefended zones outside of their fortifications as “Indian country,” which it was their job to clear and make ready for civilized, capitalist life. Although the pervasiveness of this metaphor initially served to conceal the violence at stake in both projects, finally the revelations about the sheer extent of the displacements in Vietnam—and the casualness with which Vietnamese civilians were killed—turned the metaphor into a metonymy. The distance between Indian removal and the devastation of Vietnamese communities collapsed as the war came to seem like merely one instance of a broader imperial project. Other events, too, flashed into view: Hernán Cortés’s conquest of the Aztec Empire using spectacular and demoralizing displays of force; Manifest Destiny, the westward expansion that brooked no obstacle—ecological or human—set on the path of the settlers’ unerring mission; and the mass enslavement and subordination of peoples of African descent, which had its parallel in the disproportionate conscription of young black men to fight, as Martin Luther King Jr. said, “to guarantee liberties in Southeast Asia which they had not found in Southwest Georgia and East Harlem.” In some quarters these projects had long been the object of anguish and critique; as a consequence of the Vietnam War the dejustificatory violence they entailed for existing US narratives became ineluctable.

The late Vietnam War was not the only such modern event in which a catastrophe had delegitimated regnant worldviews and discharged a wave of attempts to secure more livable forms of life. Nor was this the only such moment in American history. The domestication and instrumentalization of the sublime in the service of the US “empire of liberty” was synecdochically epitomized by the two writers who have been identified (contradictorily) as “quintessentially American novelists,” Herman Melville and Mark Twain, the one deliberately, the other inadvertently, in such novels as Moby-Dick (1851), where the sublime whiteness of the whale is staged as spectacle in behalf of imperial aggrandizement, and A Connecticut Yankee in King Arthur’s Court (1889), whose narrative signature is the staging of illusion for effect.38But whereas these writers discerned the nothingness that the preponderant national narrative had tried to obscure symptomatically in their texts—with differing degrees of lucidity—they remained essentially solitary voices in the wilderness: prophetic figures without followings. In the Vietnam War, by contrast, a mass movement emerged that was characterized by the perception that the spectacle had already effectively foundered. And while those attentive to this disclosure did not constitute a majority of the US population, they were especially importunate and expansive in their thinking. These protesters identified the spectacular logics of domination as they had manifested at sites all along the continuum of being: the glorification of the patriarch and such mediatic analogues as the cowboy, the lone ranger, and the crime boss; the hypostatization of the rugged individual over collective modes of being; the transfiguration of the labor relation into the commodity; the manipulation and devastation of ecosystems; the intense cultural visibility of white people and the penumbra cast around all others; and, of course, the pyrotechnics of US militarism. The Vietnam War disclosed the totalizing control that the culture of the US spectacle asserted not only over national existence but over all of these registers of being in the same instant that it unshackled the interrogative energies that had previously been labelled “divisive,” “obscene,” or “nihilistic.”

This same event had an incredible effect on the composition and mission of the American university. Prior to and during the war, the spectacle of US military might had served as a substitute for—if not a direct incentive to—a research agenda. Not only did this spectacle paralyze the public and encourage complacency about matters of citizenship, but it also offered the illusion of a complete set of answers to the problems of national existence. But when the compensatory function of the spectacle became recognizable, the questions it had been meant to allay suddenly took on renewed importance. Out of this new spirit of interrogation a number of intellectual projects emerged, among them ethnic studies, black studies, lesbian and gay studies, women’s studies, postcolonial studies, and—only much later—a new Americanist studies. In dialogue with new or reconfigured interpretive methods like semiology, deconstruction, reader-response criticism, Foucauldian genealogy, psychoanalysis, and Marxism, these inquiries formalized insights that had been intuited in the broader culture.

These formations, like many of the new social movements that emerged concomitantly, have all too often been misunderstood as simple purveyors of “identity politics,” so it is worth briefly recalling their originary impulse. The US war effort marked the culmination of a long history that had al-ready reduced large sectors of its population to mere “standing reserve,” an underemployed, systematically marginalized, unrecognized, and uprooted population whose only function was to respond docilely to the national calling (whether in the draft or another capacity). All of the constituent parts of this nameless coalition had been subjected to the spectacular authority of the country and denied a voice within the limited circle of US democracy. As speaking beings who were, however, not afforded the right to speak the nation’s political language—who were not allowed to utter its shibboleth of redemption or to participate in its empire of liberty—they were thrown back upon themselves as unhomed subjects. It was out of this condition of debarment from what was euphemized as the “national conversation” that the aforementioned intellectual and social movements invented new forms of speech capable of identifying the aporias in the nation’s discourses on freedom, inclusivity, and justice. Not efforts to constitute as identities what had been deconstituted by the nation’s white metaphorics, these “whatever singularities” devoted themselves to uncovering what had been obfuscated, even nullified, by the United States’ beneficent self-representation and its meliorative philosophy of history. In the process they produced universal logics of their own that offered the possibility of more livable lives: ones in which sex will have been desublimated, freedom reconceptualized in more substantive terms, collective autonomy respected without exception. The Vietnam War did not cause the emergence of these intellectual movements but it catalyzed the oppositional forces that ultimately came to understand the Vietnam War in its longer and more encompassing history.

Ungrounding National Being

The decomposition of the spectacular facade of US imperialism at the end of the Vietnam War was undoubtedly a transformative event, but it was not beyond the reach of the powers of restoration. Although it opened up new possibilities for thinking US social relations and incited the formation of new collectivities and cultural and intellectual initiatives in its wake, the partisans of this event did not abolish the spectacle once and for all. Afterward, state agents turned to the same technology in order to carry out the Gulf War and the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as the more amorphous “war on terror” that continues across the globe. The “shock and awe” tactics employed in Baghdad in 2003, for example, suggested to Iraqis that the United States was so inordinately powerful that resistance was futile. But they also messaged to a domestic audience that the state’s will was “incontrovertible” and not to be questioned. Yet already in the first Gulf War, the United States was employing techniques which conveyed the impression that the war was not so much a life-and-death encounter or an invasion with real human consequences but a media event. When George H. W. Bush declared that through the conduct of this war the United States had finally “kicked the Vietnam syndrome,” he meant that the nation had finally overcome its anxious encounter with the emptiness of its own claims to legitimacy. The spectacle of the war covered over the nothingness that the sublime end of the previous war had precipitated.

#### Recent US history has vacillated between the sublime and the spectacle, between the perception of the horrible nihilistic violence that undergirds US expansion and a stupefaction before the supreme glory and redemptive ends of this same power. Despite momentary fulgurations of resistance to US imperialism and its affiliated projects, most notably in Seattle in 1999, the run-up to the invasion of Iraq in 2003, the global Occupy protests of 2011, and the Movement for Black Lives, today the spectacle prevails. Donald Trump’s presidency, although founded in part on the claim that the neoconservative wing of the Republican Party has betrayed American interests, is in fact deeply committed both to the imperial conception of US identity and to governance through pacification by means of the spectacle. His invocations of American “greatness” in fact function to conjure a spectacular image, one designed to short-circuit inquiries into the unsavory histories of US injustices and to construct a community united around his jeremiad that acts to exclude numerous others. It is no coincidence in this regard that Trump has drawn the key phrase of his campaign from Ronald Reagan, whose central objective in his first campaign and afterward was to make Americans forget the violence they had perpetrated in Vietnam. And yet this historical parallel remains largely obscured in public discourse at present, as do the many others that link Trump to his forebears in the office. For it is in the nature of the spectacle to short-circuit history, to conceal the decisions, the agents, and the actions that led to the expropriation and subordination of human lives, and to proffer instead the illusion of a timeless truth that should be accepted as a matter of course. In this renewal of the spectacular culture of the United States, new victims are being made and old ones restored to their former roles

#### WTO are the modern imperialist tools of the US, u cannot say you support anti-imperailist policies and then say “ the WTO is critical to solve climate change”

Banerjee 9 (Subhabrata Bobby, Director of Research at the School of Business, University of Western Sydney, HISTORIES OF OPPRESSION AND VOICES OF RESISTANCE: TOWARDS A THEORY OF THE TRANSLOCAL, REARTIKULACIJA #9, 2009, <http://www.reartikulacija.org/?p=612/)> SVVV [] brackets are for exclusionist language

Old patterns of imperialism can be seen in the dominance of neoliberal policies in today’s global political economy. Transnational corporations often wield power over [developing] countries through their enticements of foreign investment and their threats to withhold or relocate their investments. In return for foreign investments and jobs, corporations are able to extract from impoverished and often corrupt [developing] governments tax concessions, energy and water subsidies, minimal environmental legislation, minerals and natural resources, a compliant labor force and the creation of Special Economic Zones (SEZ) which are essentially states of exception where the law is suspended in order for the business of economic extraction to continue. Thus, rather than marking the death of the nation-state as some theorists of globalization like to argue, the global economy is premised precisely on a system of nation-states. Neoliberal globalization can be seen as a marker for the final hegemonic triumph of the state mode of production. The nation-state then is a fundamental building block of globalization, in the working of transnational corporations, in the setting-up of a global financial system, in the institution of policies that determine the mobility of labor, and in the creation of the multi-state institutions such as the UN, IMF, World Bank, NAFTA and WTO. The unprecedented scale of government intervention in response to the global financial crisis in Europe, North America, Asia and Australia has been such that neoconservative circles have invoked the specter of socialism and the fears of the emergence of a state-run economy. Whether the financial crisis is indeed a reflection of the crisis in capitalism that could result in long-term re-engagement of the state in economic production or whether it will be business as usual remains to be seen, especially now that Germany, France and the United States appear to be coming out of recession. Imperial formations in the contemporary political economy are more “efficient” in the sense that formal colonies no longer need to be governed. Imperialism has learned to manage things better by using the elites of the former colonies to do the governing, and the structural power of supranational institutions like the World Trade Organization, World Bank and International Monetary Fund and markets to do much of the imperial work. I will describe three modes of management that enable accumulation by dispossession: management by extraction, management by exclusion and management by expulsion. Management by extraction arises from the ‘endowment curse’ and is an all too familiar discourse for millions of people in the Third World living and dying because of the oil curse and the minerals curse. Extraction of oil and minerals in many parts of the world is almost always accompanied by violence, environmental destruction, dispossession and death (Banerjee, 2008). Transnational oil companies, governments, private security forces are all key actors in these zones of violence and the communities most affected by this violence are forced to give up their sovereignty, autonomy, and tradition in exchange for modernity and economic development which continue to elude them. Shell in Nigeria, Chevron in Ecuador, Rio Tinto in Papua, Barrick in Peru and Argentina, Newmont Mining in Peru, Vedanta Resources in India and the Zapatista uprising in Chiapas, Mexico are but a few of the more well publicized cases of the endowment curse. The market, state and international economic and financial institutions are inextricably involved in management by extraction. The Chiapas region of Mexico for example, produces 54% of Mexico’s hydroelectric energy, 21% of its oil, and 47% of its natural gas also contains the country’s most impoverished people where 36% of the population do not have running water and 35% do not have electricity. There are 7 hotel beds for every 1000 tourists and 0.3 hospital beds for every 1000 locals. In one of the country’s richest regions in terms of natural resources and a source of wealth for the rest of the country, 71.6% of the indigenous population in the region suffers from malnutrition and 14,500 people die every year from treatable diseases (Banerjee, 2008). Transnational corporations extract wealth from Chiapas by mining their land, felling their forests, and selling a tourist experience at the expense of local communities who have the misfortune of ‘inhabiting’ the region. In 1994 thousands of Chiapians rose up against the Mexican government in an armed insurrection and temporarily took over the regional capital of San Cristobal. The Mexican government responded with military action and after a series of violent conflicts offered a ‘conditional pardon’ to the rebels. The market was not particularly sympathetic to the plight of the Zapatistas either. In a memo titled ‘Mexico – Political Update’ , the Chase Manhattan Bank, a major financer of the Mexican government concluded that the ‘government will need to eliminate the Zapatistas to demonstrate their effective control of the national territory and security policy’. Thus, international finance and infrastructure is a key requirement for ‘development’ to occur in ‘underdeveloped’ areas, of which governments must demonstrate ‘effective control and security’, which means certain communities need to be ‘eliminated’. Management by exclusion arises from the ‘democracy curse’ and is another practice that is commonly used to govern the political economy. During the negotiations leading up to the Kyoto protocol one of the tasks allocated to a policy group was to develop a global forest policy to offset greenhouse gas emissions. Conscious of the fallout from the protests that accompanied the 1999 World Trade Organization meetings at Seattle and similar protests at the World Economic Forum at Davos, Genoa and Melbourne, the organizers were careful to be seen to be inclusive and invited green groups, unions, community organizations, apart from corporations, policy makers and scientists. However, in their quest to come up with a global forest policy they omitted to invite a key stakeholder group: representatives of millions of people who actually live in the forest, mainly Indigenous tribes. The forest dwelling tribes held their own climate change summit and proclaimed their own resolution at the International Indigenous Forum on Climate Change: ‘The measures to mitigate climate change currently being negotiated are based on a worldview of territory that reduces forests, lands, seas and sacred sites to only their carbon absorption capacity. This world-view and its practices adversely affect the lives of Indigenous Peoples and violate our fundamental rights and liberties, particularly, our right to recuperate, maintain, control and administer our territories which are consecrated and established in instruments of the United Nations’ (IIFC, 2000). For indigenous people who inhabit the region, forests are not just carbon sinks - forests are their food, livelihood, source of medicine, housing, culture, society, polity and economy. Global trade and environmental policies are often made without taking into account the violence and dispossession of Indigenous communities that result from these policies. It becomes meaningless to debate issues of forest rights when there are no forests left. Dispossession of local communities also highlights both the failure of the market and state where ‘citizens’ of democratic states do not have the right to determine their future.

#### Imperialism turns and outweighs every other impact – it’s a threat multiplier, the root cause of all war and violence, and responsible for ongoing extinction that outweighs on scope, probability, and cyclical harms.

**Eckhardt 90** - (William Eckhardt; Lentz Peace Research Laboratory of St. Louis; “Civilizations, Empires, and Wars”; https://www.jstor.org/stable/423772?seq=1#page\_scan\_tab\_contents; February, 1990; **HS**)

Modern Western Civilization used war as well as peace to gain the whole world as a domain to benefit itself at the expense of others: **The expansion of the culture and institutions of modern civilization from its centers in Europe was made possible by imperialistic war**… It is true missionaries and traders had their share in the work of expanding world civilization, but always with the support, immediate or in the background, of armies and navies (pp. 251-252). The importance of dominance as a primary motive in civilized war in general was also emphasized for modern war in particular: '**[Dominance] is probably the most important single element in the causation of major modern wars'** (p. 85). European empires were thrown up all over the world in this processof benefiting some at the expense of others, which was characterized by armed violence contributing to structural violence**: 'World-empire is built by conquest and maintained by force… Empires are primarily organizations of violence' (pp. 965, 969). 'The struggle for empire has greatly increased the disparity between states with respect to the political control of resources, since there can never be enough imperial territory to provide for all'** (p. 1190). This **'disparity between states', not to mention the disparity within states, both of which take the form of racial differences in life expectancies, has killed 15-20 times as many people in the 20th century as have wars and revolutions (**Eckhardt & Kohler, 1980; Eckhardt, 1983c). When this structural violence of 'disparity between states' created by civilization is taken into account, then the violent nature of civilization becomes much more apparent. Wright concluded that 'Probably at least 10 per cent of deaths in modern civilization can be attributed directly or indirectly to war… The trend of war has been toward greater cost, both absolutely and relative to population… The proportion of the population dying as a direct consequence of battle has tended to increase' (pp. 246, 247).So far asstructural violence has constituted about one-third of all deaths in the 20th century (Eckhardt & Kohler, 1980; Eckhardt, 1983c), and so far as **structural violence was a function of armed violence, past and present, then Wright's estimate was very conservative indeed.** Assuming that war is some function of civilization, then civilization is responsible for one-third of 20th century deaths. **This is surely self-destruction carried to a high level of efficiency.** The structural situation has been improving throughout the 20th century, however, so that structural violence caused 'only' 20% of all deaths in 1980 (Eckhardt, 1983c). There is obviously room for more improvement. To be sure, armed violence in the form of revolution has been directed toward the reduction of structural violence, even as armed violence in the form of imperialism has been directed toward its maintenance. **But imperial violence came first, in the sense of creating structural violence, before revolutionary violence emerged to reduce it. It is in this sense that structural violence was basically, fundamentally, and primarily a function of armed violence in its imperial form. The atomic age has ushered in the possibility, and some would say the probability, of killing not only some of us for the benefit of others, nor even of killing all of us to no one's benefit, but of putting an end to life itself!** This is surely carrying self-destruction to some infinite power beyond all human comprehension. It's too much, or superfluous, as the Existentialists might say. Why we should care is a mystery. But, if we do, then the need for civilized peoples to respond to the ethical challenge is very urgent indeed. Life itself may depend upon our choice.

#### Western Medicine has been used empircally to coercively homogenize and a US method to imperialise the other

Schuelke 2017 (Lisa K, Degree of Doctor of Philosophy from University of Nebraska, “Nursing Reservations: White Field Nurses, Scientific Medicine, and Settler Colonialism, 1924-1955”, http://search.proquest.com/openview/94a4cf9872bc680ed10dc84e1157abcf/1?pq-origsite=gscholar&cbl=18750&diss=y)

Field nurses, primarily white women, encountered diverse cultures when they arrived on reservations in the American West between 1924 and 1955. Diseases were rampant, and many Native Americans had little knowledge of so-called modern medicine, frequently relying upon a combination of natural and spiritual remedies associated with various Indigenous traditions. White field nurses witnessed first hand the devastating impact numerous illnesses had on Native Americans, and there is no doubt that the majority of the women in this study genuinely sought to relieve suffering associated with illnesses. Still, most field nurses intended to replace Indigenous curing with what they regarded as the superiority of white scientific medicine, thus assimilating Native Americans, a prominent feature of the broader settler colonial project. Enriching Native American health went hand in hand with biomedical assimilation. While field nurses worked to meet the need for better healthcare, they concluded that Indigenous models were inferior to Western medicine. At the same time, many Native Americans valued traditional healing, and were slow to adopt scientific medicine. Divergent cultural perspectives toward healthcare created tension between the two groups, fostering negotiations and resistance on both sides. White nurses in this study sometimes attempted to restrain Indigenous curing while Native Americans equally drew lines designed to restrict the invasion of white medicine.

#### The aff attempts to transcend the nothingness at the core of America’s ethos – voting negative adopts a position of indifference towards the spectacle which intensifies the proliferation of said nothingness.

Spanos and Spanos ‘19

[William V Spanos, Literature at Binghamton, Rob Glass’ favorite, RIP to a real one, and Adam Spanos, University of Chicago. 2019. “American Spectacle and the Vietnam War Sublime,” published in “Neocolonial Fictions of the Global Cold War.” (eds. Steven Belletto and Joseph Keith)] pat – language [modified]

The Vietnam War teaches us, however, that the spectacle contains within it the germ of a more radical reckoning with the truth. Both the spectacle and the sublime constitute responses to the absence of any determining ground for being; but whereas the spectacle constructs an image meant to dissimulate this nothingness, the sublime disposition confronts it with what might be called an engaged reverence. Such a perspective understands that presence and absence belong together and that one cannot be extirpated without extreme damage to the other. The sublime task is not to calculate how one might most effectively transcend the nothing, but rather to reconstitute perception in such a way as to intensify one’s attunement to the nothing and proliferate the sites at which one is capable of discovering its insistence.

In conclusion, then, let us revisit two locations at which this nothingness can be detected within the terms of US political ontology. First, the ambivalent universalism at stake in American exceptionalism—which describes the United States as a country both distinct from others and capable of transforming them in its image—entails a necessary violence against the “unexceptional.” These figures, including the Vietnamese during the war, comprise a category of beings whose existence is deemed contingent or altogether denied. Such a construal of the other then allows for their annihilation, the literalization of their representational nonbeing. By virtue, however, of their spectral status or unrecognizability to the exceptionalist outlook, they can act with a license denied to those who are more visible—as the National Liberation Front (NLF) did in Vietnam. Furthermore, this position of internal exclusion, of subjection to the universal norm without belonging to the community of subjects who are understood to be its addressers, constitutes a privileged epistemological position. It allows for the understanding and critique of a universalist discourse such as that of American exceptionalism insofar as it can testify to the violence to which the latter remains [ignorant] ~~blind~~. Both the NLF and the various US social movements to which we earlier alluded undertook this critique in differing ways.

The nothingness of national being manifests also in the recognition that the foundation and subsequent rise to global predominance of the United States was not predestined (no more than that of any other nation, or indeed of the nation-form itself). In both its mere existence and in the position that it has historically achieved, the United States is the consequence of accident. Like Heidegger’s being, it is “thrown.” The implication of this observation is not simply that the United States, however monolithic its appearance, is a historical object and so capable of being changed. That is true enough. The point is rather that, insofar as its existence has no transcendentally determining principle, the actions to which it commits itself are not preordained. This means that the deeds carried out in its name cannot possibly impute to the nation the spectacular glory and ultimate justification for its existence that its apologists so desperately desire. Nothing done in the name of the United States can supply that foundation. The United States, like every other nation, is condemned to search perpetually and in vain for the meaning that will give its presence in the world a permanent justification. The task for its citizenry today is to learn indifference to the lures of a spectacle that would prescribe meaning at the expense of an interested polity.

### 4 1NC—OFF

#### Interpretation: Evaluate the affirmative as an object of research over just their plan text. To clarify, they need to weigh the totality of their aff, including their assumptions and ideologies, not just the causal consequences. It is not sufficient to prove their plan is good in the abstract. This is the only fw they didn’t provide a fw no 1ar late breaks of fw kills the debate andallows the 1ac to shift out of everything and go for a minute thing they do, dta util

#### 1] Debate is a site of scholarship production, not policymaking 101. Even if individual ballots do not change our subjectivities, iterative investments in research models influence our political orientations. Rejecting paradigms premised on imperialism in pedagogical spaces can act as a starting point for a counter discursive vision of politics.

#### 2] George Bush DA—justifications and representations influence our political advocacy. Even though George Bush and Spanos both hate Donald Trump, the reasons why matter as much. Winning a link argument means that their political advocacy looks more like a Hemanth Sanjeev trust fund rather than anti-imperial ist movements.

#### 3] Education—they arbitrarily restrict debate’s locus of contestation to an 8 second plan text. Forcing them to defend the entirety of their aff incentivizes better scholarship and is more real-world. Arbitrarily severing parts of the aff decks negative preparation.

#### 4] it’s the only exportable thing, the judges ballot doesn’t affect the wto or medicine but your rhethoric affects debate

#### 4] Slight unfairness valuable—when imperialist American Ethos modes of thinking in the academy are challenged through slight violations, it creates a cognitive dissonance that can produce new forms of scholarship.

#### 5] No fairness offense for them—even if they can’t weigh causal consequences, they can weigh the representations, justifications, and research models against the K. An example is to say liberalism good. This should be predictable because they have to research those things anyways before constructing the aff.