## 1AC v1

### 1AC – Adv

#### The Advantage is Africa:

#### African instability is on the brink but hope exists towards moves towards peace through solidarity on key continental security issues

Allison 20 Simon Allison 1-6-2020 "Conflict is still Africa’s biggest challenge in 2020" <https://reliefweb.int/report/world/conflict-still-africa-s-biggest-challenge-2020> (ISS Consultant)//Elmer

**For the African Union**, 2020 is supposed to be a landmark year. Its ‘silencing the guns’ initiative is aimed at ‘ending all wars, civil conflicts, gender-based violence, violent conflicts and preventing genocide in the continent by 2020.’ While no one can argue with that laudable goal, the continental body and its member states will have to work miracles to achieve it by the end of this year – especially **when** thetrend seems to be **heading in the other direction**. Patricia Danzi, Regional Director for Africa for the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), recently told journalists in Johannesburg that her organisation – along with other major humanitarian organisations – was struggling to cope with existing situations that strain already limited attention and resources. More concerning still was that new situations keep cropping up. ‘**Conflicts last and they don’t stop**. **And more are added**,’ she said. She used Burkina Faso as an illustrative example: in 2019, 750 000 people were displaced by violence there, forcing ICRC to set up a new emergency response, while maintaining their operations in neighbouring Mali and Niger. The pattern of new conflicts bubbling up alongside existing ones is likely to repeat itself Danzi’s opinion is worth paying attention to. With extensive footprints in conflict zones and disaster areas across the African continent, major humanitarian organisations have long functioned as a kind of canary in the coalmine – so if they are worried, other policymakers should be too. And looking ahead, it is not difficult to see the pattern she describes – of new conflicts bubbling up alongside existing ones – repeat itself. The Sahel is a region of particular concern, given the inability of either United Nations peacekeepers, the French military or the regional G5 Sahel security force to contain the conflict. A surge of violence this year in both Burkina Faso and Mali underscored the fragility of the governments in both countries. Nearby, conflict in and around the Lake Chad Basin area has continued. ‘Violence has dragged on for 10 years,’ observed ReliefWeb – while in northern Chad a new conflict is brewing over access to gold reserves. Further east, South Sudan’s peace deal is hanging by a thread. Repeated delays to the establishment of a government of national unity led the United States to recall its ambassador to Juba in November 2019. Meanwhile, new fighting between ethnic groups in central South Sudan left at least 79 people dead and forced the deployment of United Nations peacekeepers. The prospects of a resolution to this long-running conflict in 2020 look slim. The prospects of a resolution to South Sudan’s long-running conflict in 2020 look slim In Ethiopia, Nobel Peace Prize winner and Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s ambitious reform project is facing its greatest threat yet as various political groupings seek to take advantage of the newly-opened political space. This has resulted in widespread communal violence and tensions within the ruling party, with Abiy’s government struggling to get a grip on the situation. How the prime minister responds this year may well determine the future of Africa’s second-most populous country – and will have an enormous impact on the stability of the Horn of Africa as a whole. In the centre of the continent, regular flare-ups of violence in the Central African Republic suggest that the peace agreement is not holding firm there, either. And in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, conflict in the east of the country has greatly hampered the response to the outbreak of the Ebola virus. In the south, Mozambique last year officially concluded a peace deal to end fighting between the ruling party and Renamo, the main opposition group. Despite this, an offshoot of Renamo has continued to wage war against the government. More disturbingly, the insurgency in the northern Cabo Delgado province shows no sign of slowing down – even though the exact identity of the insurgents remains murky. The presence of Russian private contractors is likely to exacerbate the situation. And in the west, Nigeria’s long fight against Boko Haram has become entrenched. Analysts are keeping a nervous eye on tensions in Guinea, where President Alpha Conde appears to be angling to extend his time in office. In Côte d’Ivoire, elections next year look likely to bring old hostilities to the fore. Complicating any response to conflict is the impact of extreme weather events related to climate change Statistics bear out the impression that conflict on the continent is getting worse, not better. The Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project, which monitors incidents of conflict around the world, found that there had been 21 600 incidents of armed conflict in Africa in 2019 (up to 30 November). For the same period in 2018, that number was just 15 874. That represents a 36% increase. This is perhaps the greatest challenge facing Africa in 2020. What can African leaders, led by the African Union, do to reverse this trend? Complicating any response is the likely impact of extreme weather events related to climate change. As the ICRC’s Danzi noted: ‘The climate impact will not be going away. The storms are heavier ... These are issues we don’t plan for, but we probably have to.’ That planning needs to start immediately. Far from being silenced, the guns are getting louder. **There is a glimmer of hope,** however. In working together to sign the African Continental Free Trade Area, African leaders showed they are capable of taking a common position on a major continental challenge. If they can repeat and maintain that show of unity – and do it quickly – the forecast for **2021 might be better** than this one.

#### LAWs are in Africa, are a key continental challenge, and will rapidly proliferate – western countries use Africa as a training ground for new weapons that leads to usage in regional conflicts

Feugap 19 Guy Feugap, 12-17-2019, "Stop the killer robots, it’s now or never," No Publication, <https://una.org.uk/magazine/2019-1/stop-killer-robots-it%E2%80%99s-now-or-never> (Guy Feugap is a commissions officer and a member of the WILPF in Cameroon.)// Aadit+Elmer

Lethal Autonomous Weapons System (LAWS), which NGOs and some states have referred to as "Killer Robots", are the potential product of the technological development that is gaining momentum with research and innovation in the field of artificial intelligence. These are robotic weapons systems that, once activated, can select and attack targets without the additional intervention of a human operator. Countries that have vested interests are seeking artificial intelligence for military purposes; but this only protects their soldiers and exposes civilians. If the trend in technological development continues, humans could disappear from the decision-making circuit of certain military actions, possibly retaining only limited power of surveillance, or reduced to simply selecting general mission settings. Several autonomous weapon systems with reduced levels of human control are currently being used or being developed by advanced-technology armies, including the United States, China, Israel, South Korea, Russia and the United Kingdom. The ongoing global culture of war threatens humanity in its pursuit of economic, political, strategic, military, and other ways, with its disrespect for the value of human life. Consequently, we see the ongoing development of newer and innovative types of weapons, including fully autonomous weapons. The [Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF)](https://www.wilpf.org/) envisions a world without violence and armed conflict where human rights are protected, through processes that involve women at all levels. WILPF's mission in Cameroon and Africa is to contribute to the stability of social peace by building a women's peace movement to prevent war and to ensure that women are represented at all levels of peacebuilding processes. Working for peace justifies WILPF’s involvement in the fight against the development and proliferation of weapons of all kinds. For many in Africa, the issue of Killer Robots seems insignificant. From the regional campaign’s perspective, the view is that the Killer Robots issue does not fit neatly into working agendas in the same way as Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW). Often advocacy efforts emphasize issues that are considered to be more urgent such as the implementation of UNSC Resolution 1325 on women peace and security, the SDGs, improvement of human rights, and more topical crises of governance. But this argument risks creating an environment where we no longer consider human worth. Thus, we lead advocacy at the national and regional levels for the prohibition of the development and use of new types of weapons such as LAWS. It is clear that the challenges posed by Killer Robots are already in need of a response and pose a serious threat to human rights, hence the need to take urgent preventive action. For Cameroon, as for other African countries, prevention is the focus of the campaign message; as far as we know currently no African state is developing them, but our continent is exposed to the most significant consequences if they are used. Therefore WILPF is committed to the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots. Africa is often a field of experimentation for new technologies in order to satisfy the interests of Western countries. The potential risks of developing and using killer robots are enormous, at a time when states have failed in their quest to address the root causes of conflict. Cameroon and other sub-Saharan countries like Nigeria, Chad and Niger are facing the threat posed by terrorism, a situation that has prompted countries like France and the United States to develop remotely controllable weapons. But we should be alarmed by the potential for these weapons to be replaced by fully autonomous weapons systems. LAWS not only represent a huge danger for humanity, but also for "weak" countries that do not have such developed technologies and resources to resist this type of weaponry. Furthermore, the continent has for some years been the scene of endless wars that leave many victims and ravage entire communities. In the current security context, crises often lead to an increase in violent extremism. For countries with smaller economies, where conflicts are seemingly permanent, dictatorships’ and authoritarians’ thirst for power may drive them towards obtaining killer robots. How do we stop Killer Robots? The United Nations Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) limits the use of specific weapons according to two general customary rules of International Humanitarian Law - namely the prohibition of the use of indiscriminate weapons, and the prohibition of the use of weapons likely to cause unnecessary suffering. But it is necessary that more voices be raised. We at WILPF Cameroon are campaigning across Africa to raise awareness of the political and moral implications of LAWS. States are encouraged to speak up, engage substantively and actively support negotiating to promote the development of a core group of states championing a pre-emptive ban. It is time for governments to take responsibility and firmly denounce these weapons and support global advocacy for a binding legal instrument to ban Killer Robots.

#### Widespread LAW proliferation in Africa furthers instability and supporting terrorism – a preventive ban is key

Dube 19 Gugu Dube 8-28-2019 "Is Africa ready for weapons that call their own shots?," ISS Africa, <https://issafrica.org/iss-today/is-africa-ready-for-weapons-that-call-their-own-shots> (Visiting researcher with the NISAT project at PRIO. Normally, Gugu Dube is a researcher at the Arms Management Programme, Institute for Security Studies in Pretoria, South Africa.)// Aadit + Elmer

Robotic weapons that once activated can select and attack targets without any further human intervention are being developed by the United States, China, Russia, the United Kingdom, South Korea and Israel. Often listed as part of the ‘third revolution’ in warfare, after conventional weapons and nuclear weapons, lethal autonomous weapon systems (LAWS) will be unpredictable on the battlefield. As a result they will be able to target civilians and other protected people in violation of international humanitarian law. Even if they are used in law enforcement situations or during peace time, it is unlikely that they will comply with international human rights law. More importantly, if these weapons violate these important laws, there will be an accountability or responsibility gap. More than 70 countries gathered in Geneva this month for the United Nations Group of Governmental Experts (UN GGE) to discuss the imminent threat posed by these weapons. Twenty-nine states, the Campaign to Stop Killer [Robots](https://www.stopkillerrobots.org/), scholars and many tech workers have called for their ban. Likewise, [UN](https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/statement/2018-09-25/secretary-generals-address-general-assembly-delivered-trilingual) Secretary-General António Guterres has spoken out strongly against them. He noted that ‘machines with the power and discretion to take lives without human involvement are politically unacceptable, morally repugnant and should be prohibited by international law’. The threat of lethal automated weapons to African peace and security is real Although unconvincing, other participants in the UN GGE argue that lethal automated weapons may save lives since, unlike humans, they don’t act out of prejudice. They wouldn’t seek revenge in a way that humans would. Yet in the fields of big data and artificial intelligence on which LAWS rely, it has already been proven that prejudices exist. The power of artificial intelligence is ‘so incredible, it will change society in some very deep ways, some ways will be good and some will be bad’, said billionaire Microsoft co-founder Bill Gates at the 2019 Human-Centred Artificial Intelligence Symposium at Stanford [University](https://www.cnbc.com/2019/03/26/bill-gates-artificial-intelligence-both-promising-and-dangerous.html). ‘The world hasn't had that many technologies that are both promising and dangerous – you know, we had nuclear energy and nuclear weapons.’ And in a world where LAWS are easily accessible, Africa is likely to be the most affected by such weapons. Africa is prone to conflict – some conflicts of which are fuelled by access to weapons coming from western countries. According to an Institute for Security Studies [report](https://issafrica.org/iss-today/silencing-the-guns-by-2020-ambitious-but-essential), eight of the 15 UN peacekeeping missions are deployed in Africa. This shows how fragile the continent is compared to the rest of the world. This kind of fragility portends a number of challenges, particularly for civilian disarmament, the report says. Lethal automated weapons will be able to target civilians in violation of international humanitarian law Once lethal automated weapons are developed, they will undoubtedly proliferate. The history and experience with small arms and light weapons used by African states makes it likely that LAWS will be diverted to non-state armed groups, with no regard for the laws of war. Once this happens, it would become difficult, if not impossible, to regulate their use in Africa. The 2019 Global Peace Index [notes](http://visionofhumanity.org/app/uploads/2019/07/GPI-2019web.pdf) that the Middle East and certain parts of Africa remain the world’s least peaceful regions worldwide. Africa is home to four of the 10 least peaceful countries in the world, with no country from the region ranked higher than 30th on the index. Allowing the development of LAWS would have far-reaching repercussions for the continent. African states must therefore urgently work together to launch negotiations on a legally binding treaty prohibiting the development and deployment of these weapons. Yet, notwithstanding the threats posed by lethal automated weapons to the continent, participation of African states in the UN GGE have been very poor over the years. At the UN GGE this month, only four African states (Algeria, South Africa, Egypt and Uganda) participated. Prejudices exist in the fields of big data and artificial intelligence Of these four, only two made submissions. In its intervention, South Africa emphasised the importance of ethics when considering the regulation of LAWS. Ethics are important to Africans as they include notions of ubuntu (compassion or humanity) or human dignity. These weapons must be under human control since human dignity requires that the decision to use force against fellow humans be made by humans, not machines. In the same way that African states strongly advocated for the inclusion of small arms and light weapons in the Arms Trade [Treaty](https://thearmstradetreaty.org/), the continent’s nations must urgently take the lead and garner support for a legally binding instrument on LAWS. This is an opportunity for African states to be preventive rather than reactive in the disarmament arena. The threat of lethal automated weapons to African peace and security is real and a clear way forward is required. The current participation of African states in the UN international debate on these weapons is not impressive. In the lead-up to the UN Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons Meeting of the High Contracting Parties from 13 to 15 November 2019 in Geneva, there needs to be a mind shift from reaction to instilling preventive measures. This must be not only from the African diplomatic community, but also from stakeholders in Africa such as civil society organisations, the private sector and the media, who need to be more proactive.

#### African counterterrorism is working now but regional centrality and unity are crucial to prevent future risks from emerging

Ehiane 18, Stanley O. "Strengthening the African Union (AU) Counter-Terrorism Strategy in Africa: A Re-Awakened Order." Journal of African Union Studies 7.2 (2018): 109-126. (Research Fellow at the University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban, South Africa. He holds PhD in International Relations from the same university)//Elmer

An Assessment of the AU’s Counter-Terrorism Strategy Fighting terrorism **requires international cooperation**. The international system has developed a framework to measure the effectiveness of member states’ counter-terrorism strategies. In 1999 the OAU convention held in Algeria distinguished between a terrorist and a freedom fighter (Okeke, 2014; Ewi and Aning, 2015; Sturman, 2002). In June 1994 in Tunisia the AU’s ‘Declaration of the code of conduct on the commitment to fight the menace of terrorism’ was self-determined by member states (Ewi & Aning. 2010, 35). The Declaration of the Code of Conduct upholds cooperation and coordination among states in the fight against the phenomenon of terrorism. The declaration condemned, prevented and criminalised the act of terrorism. While equally addressing the root causes of terrorism, it **provides guidelines for interstate common stands** on counter-terrorism (Ewi and Aning, 2010). Apart from the 1999 OAU convention which was the first legislative framework, the AU has also adopted **additional conventions and protocols**. These include the counter-terrorism convention of 2002 and the 2004 protocols (Okeke, 2014). Okeke noted that the established protocols and conventions lack the political support of member states, hence there was little success in the implementation. In response to the 9/11 attack, the AU recruited anti-terrorist personnel to serve under the AU Commission on counter-terrorism, as one of the strategies to prevent and counter terrorism (Ewi and Aning, 2015). Immediately after 9/11, there was an adoption of the plan of action to provide strategies for individual states and to collectively fight terrorism through cooperation (Okeke, 2014; Kimunguyi, 2011). The member states’ cooperation and coordination include **illicit stockpiles of arms and explosives**, **coordination of border surveillance** and the establishment of border controls as well as addressing poverty and deprivation (Kimunguyi, 2011; Sturman, 2002). Kimunguyi notes that in addition to the plan of action, the AU in 2004 set up the African Centre for the Study and Research of Terrorism (ACSRT). This institute engaged in capacity building to educate member states about the threat of terrorism, to set up a database on intelligence sharing and a host of other functions (Ewi and Aning, 2015; Kimunguyi, 2011; Okeke, 2014). According to Mockaitis (2008), **through intelligence sharing** with North Atlantic Organisation (NATO) member states, the United States **was able to air strike the Taliban position**, interrogate terrorists and discharge both the military and paramilitary operations. However, the setting up of the Committee for Intelligence and Security in Africa (CISSA) by the AU for its member states **and its success** record **elevates the relevance of intelligence** in counter-terrorism (Ewi and Aning, 2015). The ACSRT also supports member states with expertise and skills on prevention and combating of the threat of terrorism (Sturman, 2002). The creation of African Union Mission for Somalia (AMISON) in 2007 by the AU Peace and Security Commission (PSC), was to counter Al-Shabaab and the threat it poses (Freear and Coning, 2013). Since the inception of AMISON, substantial **progress has been made**, especially in regaining the lost territories from the terrorist group, to further enhance the transitional government control of the state (William, 2012). It should be understood that with the collaboration of the transitional government and the Somalia National Army, **AMISON was able to restore relative peace** (Freear and Coning, 2013). Today AMISON has been officially recognised by the United Nations African peacekeeping mission, and the issue of human rights violations was levelled against them. Human rights violations have been an issue of serious concern in counter-terrorism which has not been accurately addressed. Beyond the issue of human rights, the AU has not been impressed by violations and other challenges as these jeopardise counter-terrorism efforts.

#### 2 Specific Internal Links:

#### a] LAWs makes terrorism more effective and hurts counter-terror responses

Ware 19 Jacob Ware 9-24-2019 "TERRORIST GROUPS, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, AND KILLER DRONES" <https://warontherocks.com/2019/09/terrorist-groups-artificial-intelligence-and-killer-drones/> (Davis Senior Fellow for Counterterrorism and Homeland Security at the Council on Foreign Relations, where Jacob Ware is a research associate.)//Elmer

Terrorists Will Be Interested in Acquiring Lethal Autonomous Weapons Terrorist groups will be interested in artificial intelligence and lethal autonomous weapons for three reasons — cost, traceability, and effectiveness. Firstly, killer robots are likely to be **extremely cheap**, **while still maintaining lethality**. Experts agree that lethal autonomous weapons, once fully developed, will provide a cost-effective alternative to terrorist groups looking to maximize damage, with Tegmark arguing that “small AI-powered killer drones are likely to cost little more than a smartphone.” Additionally, killer robots will minimize the human investment required for terrorist attacks, with scholars arguing that “greater degrees of autonomy enable a greater amount of damage to be done by a single person.” Artificial intelligence could make terrorist activity cheaper financially and in terms of human capital, lowering the organizational costs required to commit attacks. Secondly, using autonomous weapons will **reduce** the **trace left by terrorists**. A large number of munitions could be launched — and a large amount of damage done — by a small number of people operating at considerable distance from the target, reducing the signature left behind. In Tegmark’s words, for “a terrorist wanting to assassinate a politician … all they need to do is upload their target’s photo and address into the killer robot: it can then fly to the destination, identify and eliminate the person, and self-destruct to ensure nobody knows who was responsible.” With autonomous weapons technology, terrorist groups will be able to launch increasingly complex attacks, and, when they want to, **escape without detection**. Finally, killer robots could reduce, if not eliminate, the **physical costs and dangers of terrorism, rendering the operative “essentially invulnerable.”** Raising the possibility of “fly and forget” missions, lethal autonomous weapons might simply be deployed toward a target, and engage that target without further human intervention. As P. W. Singer noted in 2012, “one [will] not have to be suicidal to carry out attacks that previously might have required one to be so. This **allows new players into the game**, making al-Qaeda 2.0 and the next-generation version of the Unabomber or Timothy McVeigh far more lethal.” Additionally, lethal autonomous weapons could potentially **reduce human aversion to killing**, **making terrorism** even **more palatable as a tactic for political groups**. According to the aforementioned February 2018 report, “AI systems can allow the actors who would otherwise be performing the tasks to retain their **anonymity** and experience a greater degree of psychological distance from the people they impact”; this would not only improve a terrorist’s chances of escape, as mentioned, but reduce or even eliminate the moral or psychological barriers to murder.

#### b] LAWs create accountability gaps that increase violence, decrease AI usages that decrease inequality, and increases political instability

Chengeta 20 Thompson Chengeta 2-18-2020 “Curb your banphobia: It’s critical to ban killer robots now!” <https://together1st.org/proposals/297/pdf> (Dr. Thompson Chengeta studied law at Harvard Law School, University of Pretoria (UP) and Midlands State University (MSU). He is a Fellow at the South African Research Chair in International Law, University of Johannesburg (UJ), Adjunct Senior Lecturer at MSU and a Non-Resident Fellow at the Institute of International and Comparative Law in Africa, UP.)//Elmer

Reducing inclusivity and accountability in national and global governance A legally binding instrument prohibiting the development and use of killer robots will, in fact, **reduce chances of algorithmic bias in the use of force**. It will also that humans remain accountable for the use of force both domestically and at the international level. **Killer robots create an accountability gap**. Because they are unpredictable, it would be difficult or impossible to establish legal responsibility of humans in cases where killer robots commit crimes. In such cases, killer robots undermine accountability, a very important component of global governance. Further, in 2019, UN Group of Governmental Experts on Killer Robots and the UN Working Group on the Rights of Peoples of African Descent, noted that the development and potential use of killer robots may worsen racial and gender discrimination which can be perpetuated through algorithmic bias. As such, this proposal is in the interest of inclusive society that holds criminals to account. Conversing effect in increasing poverty and inequality One of the questions that is asked is whether a legally binding instrument banning killer robots will negatively affect other AI technologies meant for civilian use like those that can be useful in development and poverty alleviation. On several occasions and in this proposal, it is made categorically clear that **a ban on killer robots will not negatively impact on the civilian uses of AI technology**. If anything, with a ban on killer robots, States and other stakeholders will focus and invest more on the research and development of AI technology that is meant for the good of humanity instead of death and distraction. Just as the current theme of the African Union states “Silencing the Guns: Creating Conducive Conditions for Africa’s Development”, a ban on killer robots will create a conducive environment within which AI applications **meant for development and poverty alleviation are given a priority**. Reducing conflict and political violence As already indicated above, there is already an AI arms race between major powers that threaten global security. In January 2020, the United Nations Secretary General, Antonio Guterres, identified killer robots as one of the four main threats to global security. There are scholars who have identified killer robots as one of the likely causes of World War III. Killer robots **will make it too easy for states to go to war** **and will reduce the threshold** at which force is used in law enforcement situations. Just as armed drones were once thought to be the only game in the fight against terrorism, they ended up marking unprecedented **deaths of civilians**, among them, women and children. Furthermore, killer robots may be used for politically motivated violence, in particular**, political assassinations**. Targeted killings on the basis of facial recognition will become more prevalent. In contexts of demonstrations, for example **in contested elections in Africa**, it may make it too easy for dictators to crush any opposition. Therefore, a legally binding instrument banning or prohibiting killer robots will go a long way in **avoiding future conflicts and political violence**. Of course, there are some scholars who have argued or suggested that the use of killer robots will reduce or do away with the brutalities that are currently being committed by human soldiers. The main basis of this suggestion is that killer robots will not act out of prejudice or ill-will. Yet, this suggestion has already been disproved by the existence of algorithmic bias and prejudice against people of colour.

#### 2 Impact Scenarios:

#### a] Great Power Draw-in – new waves of African instability results in proxy conflicts that goes Nuclear to cold war brink levels

Yeisley 11, Mark O. "Bipolarity, proxy wars, and the rise of China." Strategic Studies Quarterly 5.4 (2011): 75-91. (assistant professor of international relations at the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies)//Elmer

**Bipolarity, Nuclear Weapons, and Sino-US Proxy Conflict in Africa** It is likely China will achieve economic and then military parity with the United States in the next two decades. China currently possesses 240 nuclear warheads and 135 ballistic missiles capable of reaching the United States or its allies; that number of nuclear warheads is **estimated to double** by the mid 2020s.43 As during the Cold War, a bipolar system in which war between the United States and China is too costly will lead to policy decisions that seek conflict resolution elsewhere.44 But why would China’s rising necessarily **lead to geostrategic competition** with the United States, and where would this most likely occur? Unlike the Cold War, access to strategic resources rather than ideology would lie at the heart of future US-Sino competition, and the new “great game” will most likely be played **in Africa**. Despite Communist Party control of its government, China is not interested in spreading its version of communism and is much more pragmatic in its objectives—securing resources to meet the needs of its citizens and improve their standard of living.45 Some estimates show that China will overtake the United States to become the world’s largest economy by 2015, and rising powers usually take the necessary steps to “ensure markets, materials, and transportation routes.”46 China is the leading global consumer of aluminum, copper, lead, nickel, zinc, tin, and iron ore, and its metal needs now represent more than 25 percent of the world’s total.47 In contrast, from 1970 to 1995, US consumption of all materials, including metals, accounted for one-third of the global total despite representing only 5 percent of the world’s population.48 China is the largest energy consumer, according to the International Energy Agency, surpassing the United States in consumption of oil, coal, and natural gas in 2009.49 As the two largest consumers of both global energy and materials, the United States and China must **seek foreign policy prescriptions to fulfill** future **resource needs**. While the United States can alleviate some of its energy needs via bio- or coal-based fuels, hydrogen, or natural gas alternatives, China currently lacks the technological know-how to do so and remains tied to a mainly nonrenewable energy resource base. Since the majority of these needs are nonrenewable, competition of necessity will be zero-sum and will be conducted via all instruments of power.50 Africa is home to a wealth of mineral and energy resources, much of which still remains largely unexploited. Seven African states possess huge endowments of oil, and four of these have equally substantial amounts of natural gas.51 Africa also enjoys large deposits of bauxite (used to make aluminum), copper, lead, nickel, zinc, and iron ore, all of which are imported and highly desired by China. Recent activity serves to prove that China seeks greater access to natural resources in Africa by avidly promoting Chinese development in a large number of African nations. South Africa, the continent’s largest economy, has recently allowed China to help develop its vast mineral wealth; it is China’s number one African source of manganese, iron, and copper.52 Chinese involvement in Africa is not wholly extractive; the continent provides a booming export market for China’s goods and a forum to augment its soft power in the region by offering alternatives to the political and economic **baggage that accompanies US foreign aid**.53 Of primary interest is open access to Africa’s significant deposits of oil and other energy resources. For example, China has 4**,000 military personnel in Sudan** to protect its interests in energy and mineral investments there; it also owns 40 percent of the Greater Nile Oil Production Company.54 Estimates indicate that within the next few decades China will obtain **40 percent of its oil and gas** supplies from Africa.55 Trade and investment in Africa have also been on the rise; trade has grown more than 10 percent annually in the past decade. Between 2002 and 2004, African exports to China doubled, ranking it third behind the United States and France in trade with the continent. Chinese investment is also growing; more than 700 Chinese business operations across Africa total over $1 billion. Aid and direct economic assistance are increasing as well, and China has forgiven the debt of some 31 African nations.56 Africa is thus a **vital** foreign interest for the Chinese and must be for the United States; access to its mineral and petroleum wealth is crucial to the survival of each.57 Although the US and Chinese economies are tightly interconnected, the nonrenewable nature of these assets means competition will remain a **zero-sum game**. Nearly all African states have been independent entities for less than 50 years; consolidating robust domestic state institutions and stable governments remains problematic.58 Studies have shown that weak governments are often prime targets for civil conflicts that prove costly to control.59 Many African nations possess both strategic resources and weak regimes, making them vulnerable to internal conflict and thus valuable candidates for assistance from China or the United States to help settle their domestic grievances. With access to African resources of vital strategic interest to each side, competition could likely **occur by proxy** via diplomatic, economic, or military assistance to one (or both) of the parties involved. Realist claims that focusing on third-world issues is misplaced are thus fallacious; war in a future US-China bipolar system remains as costly as it was during the Cold War. Because of the fragile nature of many African regimes, domestic grievances are more prone to result in conflict; US and Chinese strategic interests will dictate an intrusive foreign policy to be both prudent and vital. **US-Sino proxy conflicts over control of African resources will likely become necessary if these great powers are to sustain their national security postures, especially in terms of strategic defense.**60

#### b] Nuclear Terrorism – Increased African Terrorism makes a nuclear attack inevitable – Africa is uniquely vulnerable

Zwane 18, Tengetile. Nuclear Terrorism as a possible threat to Africa. Diss. University of Pretoria, 2018. (Department of Political Sciences, Faculty of Humanities, University of Pretoria)//Elmer

CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION The danger posed by terrorist groups in acquiring and using nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons **on the African continent is more pronounced now** than in the past, as terrorist groups have shown more interest in upgrading to more sophisticated tactics in their conduct of terror activity and adapt to more modern and advanced ways and means. To understand the real threat posed by the possibility of the terrorist use of WMDs on the continent, one needs only to consider the **progress made by various terrorist organisations such as al-Qaeda and Daesh-Sinai (operations of ISIS), with strong affiliations with alShabaab and Boko Haram**, operating in various North-Eastern and Western African regions. The continent therefore has a significant role to play in realising the security of nuclear and radioactive materials from these active terrorist organisations and preventing the possible threat of nuclear terrorism in Africa. This research investigated nuclear terrorism as a possible threat to Africa by means of a systematic literature review. It evaluated the findings of relevant individual studies focusing broadly on WMD in Africa; UNSC Resolution 1540 as a central counter-terrorism and nonproliferation instrument in Africa; and the network of global and regional instruments and conventions such as the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Pelindaba), the Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, and the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material in support of eliminating the usage of any kind of weapon of mass destruction – be it a nuclear, a biological or a chemical weapon. In the identification of the research theme and motivation of the research study, the paper proposed two policy questions that guide and direct the research, namely: (1) how real is the risk to Africa? and (2) what policy measures would be most effective in reducing that risk? Simply put: what is the appropriate and relevant response by African states to the risk of nuclear weapons in the hands of terrorist organisations? This embraces the research objectives and focus and provides clarity on the risks posed by WMD proliferation in Africa, and subsequently the possible threat of nuclear terror on the continent. 5.1 Overview of the Research Chapter 1 introduced the topic of nuclear terrorism as possible threat in Africa, and the objectives of the research study itself. It also investigated the literature overview and research methodology used in the research, an extended literature review, as it engages in a progressive scholarly discussion to understand the relationship between international nuclear terrorism and its relevance in Africa. Chapter 2 offered conceptual clarification and shed light on the relevant theories and principles underpinning nuclear security. The evaluation accounts for the logic of deterrence in the 21st century security environment which includes non-state actors seeking nuclear power. It demonstrated not just what is being dealt with, but also clarified how the threat has evolved and transformed the rules of global nuclear security to provide a useful understanding of the phenomenon of nuclear terrorism in the modern world and assist how state officials deal with it. Chapter 3 is fundamentally the policy chapter, and therefore attends to the action-steps essential to reduce the inadequate implementation of the multitude of international and regional non-proliferation treaties, specifically the UNSC Resolution 1540 (2004) which aims to strengthen the UN’s efforts to inhibit the proliferation of WMD by non-state actors such as terrorist organisations, as well as the Treaty of Pelindaba which in the same way as UNSC Resolution 1540, “imposes binding obligations on member states to adopt legislation to prevent the proliferation of WMDs and establish appropriate domestic controls to prevent their illicit trafficking” (United Nations 2004). Chapter 4 pointed out how the continent is vulnerable and at high risk to the unlawful trade and trafficking of weapons-usable radioactive uranium because of the prevailing poor control and regulatory mechanisms in Africa, especially the poor security measures in uranium mining and production sites, hence the relevance and importance of Africa surrounding the issues of non-proliferation and the overall issue of nuclear terrorism, and the responsibility of full implementation of UNSC Resolution 1540. It evaluated a variety of challenges that have hindered the full implementation of UNSC Resolution 1540 and proposed recommendations to overcome the marginal contributions by African states to the adequate implementation of the non-proliferation objectives under UNSC Resolution 1540. 5.2 Outcomes i. How real is the risk to Africa? This research was mindful of the various financial, technical, logistical, and military complications that make it extremely unlikely for any extremist organisation to successfully manufacture and launch a full-blown nuclear weapon to yield the aftereffects of nuclear panic and terror, and most likely death (Eaves 2016). Even though these extremist groups lack the resources to make this happen themselves, the continuing vulnerability to theft or possible **seizure of nuclear materials**, and the availability of sensitive equipment and materials in the nuclear black market, create a serious risk that terrorist organisations may eventually obtain the wherewithal to produce **and detonate a nuclear device**, or more plausibly, the trafficking of radioactive uranium, which once combined with high explosives, can be used to fabricate a “dirty bomb” (Carter et al. 2007: 2). The research confirmed that a “dirty bomb” is the most conceivable device of choice for terrorist organisations, who are not seeking to manufacture a sophisticated device, because of the various financial and technical complications that make it extremely unlikely for any terrorist organisation to successfully manufacture and launch a full-blown nuclear weapon. **The existing weak and easily accessible borders in Africa, and the inadequate security measures in uranium mining and production sites, is maybe the biggest African connection to the issue of non-proliferation that links it to the responsibility of full implementation of UNSC Resolution 1540, and the overall issue of nuclear terrorism**. Hence the need to safeguard nuclear material from the hands of terrorist organisations has taken on heightened significance on the continent. African leaders identify the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons as a common threat facing all member states and a threat that should be confronted collectively to ensure that these materials are secured from possible seizure or theft by terrorist organisations. For this reason (and in response to the opening question), even though the vast majority of countries on the continent report to no possession, or intention to acquire any nuclear weapons for these organisations to steal, and also with the shutdown of South Africa’s nuclear weapons programme, the risk of nuclear terror in Africa, even though low, is still significant, as risks posed by the theft and use of these nuclear materials, equipment, and technologies by terrorist organisations in the area are high due to the weak control and regulatory mechanisms which expose Africa’s mining and production sites and borders to illicit terrorist activity and possible acts of nuclear terrorism.

#### Nuclear Terrorism causes Global Nuclear War

Beres 19, Louis Rene. "Terrorism and global security: the nuclear threat." (2019). This book was initially published in 1987 but it was updated and electronically re-published on July 9, 2019. (Associate Professor of Political Science at Purdue University)//Elmer

Nuclear terrorism could even spark full-scale nuclear war between states. Such war could involve the entire spectrum of nuclear conflict possibilities, ranging from a nuclear attack upon a nonnuclear state to systemwide nuclear war. How might such far-reaching consequences of nuclear terrorism come about? Perhaps the most likely way would involve a terrorist nuclear assault against a state by terrorists "hosted" in another state. For example, consider the following scenario: Early in the 1980s, Israel and her Arab state neighbors finally stand ready to conclude a comprehensive, multilateral peace settlement. With a bilateral treaty between Israel and Egypt already several years old, only the interests of the Palestinians—as defined by the PLO— seem to have been left out. On the eve of the proposed signing of the peace agreement, half a dozen crude nuclear explosives in the one kiloton range detonate in as many Israeli cities. Public grief in Israel over the many thousand dead and maimed is matched only by the outcry for revenge. In response to the public mood, the government of Israel initiates selected strikes against terrorist strongholds in Lebanon, whereupon the Lebanese government and its allies retaliate against Israel. Before long, the entire region is ablaze, conflict has escalated to nuclear forms, and all countries in the area have suffered unprecedented destruction. Of course, such a scenario is fraught with the makings of even wider destruction. How would the United States react to the situation in the Middle East? What would be the Soviet response? It is certainly conceivable that a chain reaction of interstate nuclear conflict could ensue, one that would ultimately involve the superpowers or even every nuclear weapon state on the planet. What, exactly, would this mean? Whether the terms of assessment be statistical or human, the consequences of nuclear war require an entirely new paradigm of death. Only such a paradigm would allow us a proper framework for absorbing the vision of near-total obliteration and the outer limits of human destructiveness. Any nuclear war would have effectively permanent and irreversible consequences. Whatever the actual extent of injuries and fatalities, it would entomb the spirit of the entire species in a **planetary casket** strewn with shorn bodies and imbecile imaginations. This would be as true for a "limited" nuclear war as for an "unlimited" one. Contrary to continuing Pentagon commitments to the idea of selected "counterforce" strikes that would reduce the chances for escalation and produce fewer civilian casualties, the strategy of limited nuclear war is inherently unreasonable. There is, in fact, no clear picture of what states might hope to gain from counterforce attacks. This understanding is reflected by Soviet military strategy, which is founded on the idea that any nuclear conflict would necessarily be unlimited. Nuclear War Between the Superpowers The consequences of a strategic exchange between the United States and the Soviet Union have been the object of widespread attention. One account of these consequences is offered by Andrei D. Sakharov, the brilliant physicist who played a leading role in the development of Russia's thermonuclear capacity: A complete destruction of cities, industry, transport, and systems of education, a poisoning of fields, water, and air by radioactivity, a physical destruction of the larger part of mankind, poverty, barbarism, a return to savagery, and a genetic degeneracy of the survivors under the impact of radiation, a destruction of the material and information basis of civilization—this is a measure of the peril that threatens the world as a result of the estrangement of the world's two superpowers. 13 Presently, U.S. strategic arsenals contain approximately 9,000 strategic weapons and 4,000 megaton equivalents. Soviet strategic forces number approximately 3,000 weapons and about 5,000 megaton equivalents.14 An exchange involving any substantial fraction of these forces could promptly destroy more than half of the urban populations in both countries. The subsequent fallout could be expected to kill upwards of 50 percent of the surviving rural inhabitants as well as create worldwide contamination of the atmosphere.15 To better understand the effects of fallout, it is useful to recognize that radiation effects have three basic forms: (1) radiation directly from the explosion; (2) immediate radioactive fallout (first twenty-four hours); and (3) long-term fallout (months and years). In areas where radioactive fallout is of particularly high intensity, individuals will be exposed to high doses of radiation regardless of shelter protection. Those who do not become prompt or short-term fatalities and have suffered radiation exposures above 100 REMs will undergo hemo tological (blood system) alterations that diminish immunological capabilities. The resultant vulnerability to infection will seriously impair prospects for long-term recovery. The effects of a nuclear war between the superpowers, however, cannot be understood solely in terms of projected casualties. Rather, these effects must also include quantitative effects (i.e., availability of productive capacity, fuel, labor, food, and other resources); qualitative effects (i.e., political, social, and psychological damage); and interactive effects (i.e., the impact on the relationships between the social and economic factors of production).17 When these corollary effects are taken into account, it is easy to see that policy makers and public alike have typically understated the aggregate impact of nuclear war. This point is supported by a 1975 study of the National Research Council, National Academy of Sciences, entitled Long- Term Worldwide Effects of Multiple Nuclear Weapons Detonations. Going beyond the usual litany of crude physical measures of destruction (e.g., number of human fatalities, number of cities destroyed), the report portrays the long-term, worldwide effects following a hypothetical exchange of 10,000 megatons of explosive power in the northern hemisphere. These effects are cast in terms of atmosphere and climate, natural terrestrial ecosystems, agriculture and animal husbandry, the aquatic environment, and both somatic and genetic changes in human populations. While the report recognizes that the biosphere and the species Homo sapiens would survive the hypothesized nuclear war, it recognizes that the very idea of survival in such a context is problematic. Building upon this recognition, a more recent study prepared for the Joint Committee on Defense Production of the Congress—Economic and Social Consequences of Nuclear Attacks on the United States—identifies four discrete levels of postattack survival. This new taxonomy permits a more subtle look at the interactive effects of nuclear war and allows more precise judgments about the acceptability or unacceptability of nuclear attack damage. According to the study, there are four levels of survival, in decreasing order of damage. 1. Biological Survival of Individuals. Individuals or groups of individuals survive but not necessarily within the organized political, social, and economic structure of a modern society. 2. Regional Survival of Political Structures. Some subnational political units survive as viable entities, but without a functioning central government. 3. Survival of a Central Government. Some form of viable, central control over all preattack national territory survives, but the effectiveness of this control may vary over an extremely wide range, depending on the specific nature and pattern of the attack(s). 4. Survival Intact of Basic Societal Structure. Damage to the nation is characterized as relatively limited socially, politically and economically; nevertheless, the attack is militarily destructive. This is the concept of survival envisioned in the notion of limited or controlled nuclear war. However, it should be noted that the idea that effective strategic military attacks can be benign in their impacts on society is in dispute. It is used here as a criterion without any implicit acceptance that it can be achieved. 19 There are, however, levels of strategic exchange at which even the first listed category of survival might not be relevant. At such levels, the species itself—let alone organized political, social, and economic structures—would disappear. The plausibility of such levels is underscored by the fact that the magnitude of exchange postulated in the NAS report is really quite low. Were the superpowers to exchange between 50,000 and 100,000 megatons of nuclear explosives, rather than the 10,000 megatons assumed by the report, worldwide climatological changes would imperil the physical existence of Homo sapiens. Worldwide Nuclear War If nuclear terrorism should lead to worldwide nuclear war, the results would represent humankind's last and most complete calamity, defying not only our imaginations of disaster, but our customary measurements as well. As the culmination of what Camus once described as "years of absolutely insane history," worldwide nuclear war would represent the final eradication of the very boundaries of annihilation. In technical terms, the consequences of systemwide nuclear war would include atmospheric effects; effects on natural terrestrial ecosystems; effects on managed terrestrial ecosystems; and effects on the aquatic environment. Atmospheric effects would be highlighted by greatly reduced ozone concentrations producing increased ultraviolet radiation and a drop in average temperature. Even the possibility of irreversible climatic shifts cannot be ruled out. Natural Terrestrial Ecosystems would be affected by systemwide nuclear war through three principal stress factors: ionizing radiation; uv-B radiation; and climatic change. The cumulative effect of these three factors would render the entire planet a "hot spot" where even vast forests would show physiological and genetic damage.21

#### Nuke war causes extinction AND outweighs other existential risks

PND 16. internally citing Zbigniew Brzezinski, Council of Foreign Relations and former national security adviser to President Carter, Toon and Robock’s 2012 study on nuclear winter in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, Gareth Evans’ International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament Report, Congressional EMP studies, studies on nuclear winter by Seth Baum of the Global Catastrophic Risk Institute and Martin Hellman of Stanford University, and U.S. and Russian former Defense Secretaries and former heads of nuclear missile forces, brief submitted to the United Nations General Assembly, Open-Ended Working Group on nuclear risks. A/AC.286/NGO/13. 05-03-2016. http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/OEWG/2016/Documents/NGO13.pdf

Consequences human survival 12. Even if the 'other' side does NOT launch in response the smoke from 'their' burning cities (incinerated by 'us') will still make 'our' country (and the rest of the world) uninhabitable, potentially inducing global famine lasting up to decades. Toon and Robock note in ‘Self Assured Destruction’, in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists 68/5, 2012, that: 13. “A nuclear war between Russia and the United States, even after the arsenal reductions planned under New START, could produce a nuclear winter. Hence, an attack by either side could be suicidal, resulting in self assured destruction. Even a 'small' nuclear war between India and Pakistan, with each country detonating 50 Hiroshima-size atom bombs--only about 0.03 percent of the global nuclear arsenal's explosive power--as air bursts in urban areas, could produce so much smoke that temperatures would fall below those of the Little Ice Age of the fourteenth to nineteenth centuries, shortening the growing season around the world and threatening the global food supply. Furthermore, there would be massive ozone depletion, allowing more ultraviolet radiation to reach Earth's surface. Recent studies predict that agricultural production in parts of the United States and China would decline by about 20 percent for four years, and by 10 percent for a decade.” 14. A conflagration involving USA/NATO forces and those of Russian federation would most likely cause the deaths of most/nearly all/all humans (and severely impact/extinguish other species)

### 1AC – Plan

#### Plan – States ought to ban lethal autonomous weapons in the continent of Africa.

#### The plan solves – banning LAWs in African removes the biggest obstacle for further arms control. , Means it further stabilizes africa, specify ccw as enforcement

Wareham et al ‘20 (Mary Wareham; Advocacy director in the arms division at Human Rights Watch. Wareham coordinates the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots, the international coalition of more than 160 nongovernmental organizations in 65 countries working to prohibit fully autonomous weapons and retain meaningful human control over the use of force. This report was reviewed and edited by arms division executive director Steve Goose and senior researcher Bonnie Docherty. James Ross, legal and policy director, and Tom Porteous, deputy program director, provided legal and program review. This report was prepared for publication by Jacqulyn Kantack, associate in the arms division, Fitzroy Hepkins, senior administrative manager, and José Martinez, administrative officer; “Stopping Killer Robots,” <https://www.hrw.org/report/2020/08/10/stopping-killer-robots/country-positions-banning-fully-autonomous-weapons-and>, Human Rights Watch, 8-10-2020) Justin

\*Outlines implementation

Weapons systems that select and engage targets without meaningful human control are unacceptable and need to be prevented. All countries have a duty to protect humanity from this dangerous development by banning fully autonomous weapons. Retaining meaningful human control over the use of force is an ethical imperative, a legal necessity, and a moral obligation. In the period since Human Rights Watch and other nongovernmental organizations launched the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots in 2013, the question of how to respond to concerns over fully autonomous weapons has steadily climbed the international agenda.[1] The challenge of killer robots, like climate change, is widely regarded as a grave threat to humanity that deserves urgent multilateral action.[2] A growing number of legislators, policymakers, private companies, international and domestic organizations, and ordinary individuals have endorsed the call to ban fully autonomous weapons.[3] Since 2018, the United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres has repeatedly urged states to prohibit weapons systems that could, by themselves, target and attack human beings, calling them “morally repugnant and politically unacceptable.”[4] This report shows how 97 countries have responded to this challenge and elaborated their views on lethal autonomous weapons systems since the matter was first discussed at the Human Rights Council in 2013.[5] It surveys where these countries stand on calls to ban fully autonomous weapons and retain meaningful human control over the use of force. Such a legally binding instrument could come in the form of a new protocol to the Convention on Conventional W

eapons (CCW), which has discussed this concern since 2014.[6] Or, with sufficient political leadership, killer robots could be banned by a treaty negotiated via a standalone process similar to the initiatives that successfully prohibited antipersonnel landmines in 1997 and cluster munitions in 2008. The report draws on publicly available information, including statements made in various fora, such as the United Nations (UN) General Assembly. It tracks country participation in eight CCW meetings on lethal autonomous weapons systems held at the UN in Geneva in 2014-2019.[7] Related Content August 10, 2020 News Release Killer Robots: Growing Support for a Ban Shared Concerns, Desire for Human Control Should Spur Regulation Illustration of missiles being fired at a person Key Findings Since 2013, a total of 97 countries have publicly elaborated their views on fully autonomous weapons in a multilateral forum.[8] They have expressed a wide array of serious ethical, legal, operational, proliferation, moral, and technological concerns over removing human control from the use of force. Two-thirds are among the 125 High Contracting Parties (“states parties”) to the Convention on Conventional Weapons.[9] Most participated in CCW meetings on lethal autonomous weapons systems in 2014-2019.[10] Their active engagement in the CCW talks on killer robots demonstrates growing awareness of and concerns about removing human control from the use of force. There is widespread acknowledgment that technological developments are enabling militaries to incorporate autonomy into weapons systems. China, Israel, Russia, South Korea, the United Kingdom, and the United States are investing heavily in the development of various autonomous weapons systems, while Australia, Turkey, and other countries are also making investments. Despite this development, the vast majority of countries that have spoken to date regard human decision-making, control, or judgment as critical to the acceptability and legality of weapons systems. There is now widespread agreement about the need to retain some form of human control over the use of force, including over individual attacks. In 2018, Austria, Brazil, and Chile recommended launching negotiations on a legally binding instrument to ensure meaningful human control over the critical functions of weapons systems.[11] Banning fully autonomous weapons means prohibiting weapons systems that lack meaningful human control. Since 2013, 30 countries have called for a ban on such fully autonomous weapons: Algeria, Argentina, Austria, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Djibouti, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ghana, Guatemala, Holy See, Iraq, Jordan, Mexico, Morocco, Namibia, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, State of Palestine, Uganda, Venezuela, and Zimbabwe. China has called for a treaty to ban the use of lethal autonomous weapons systems, but not their development or production, which is unsurprising given that it is also among the nations most advanced in pursuing such weapons.[12] Several groups of states have endorsed statements calling for a ban on killer robots. The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), which is comprised of approximately 125 member states, has called for a “legally binding international instrument stipulating prohibitions and regulations on lethal autonomous weapons systems” several times since 2018.[13] Benin spoke in April and August 2018 on behalf of a group of African states to recommend launching negotiations on a legally binding instrument on fully autonomous weapons “at the earliest” as weapons systems “that are not under human control should be banned.”[14] All CCW meetings on killer robots in 2014-2019 saw strong interest or convergence on the importance of retaining human control over weapons systems and the use of force. This is reflected in a principle on human-machine interaction that CCW states agreed to in 2019.[15] Human-machine interaction attracted the greatest interest by far during the virtual Berlin Forum on lethal autonomous weapons systems attended by more than 60 countries on April 1-2, 2020. There was widespread recognition at the Rio Seminar on autonomous weapons on February 20, 2020 that human control is where states should focus their collective work. While the CCW talks were formalized in 2016, they have yielded little in the way of a lasting multilateral outcome. Decisions at the CCW are taken by consensus, which allows just a few or even a single state to block an agreement sought by a majority – and often results in lowest-common denominator decision-making. A handful of military powers, most notably **Russia** and the United States, have firmly rejected proposals to negotiate a new CCW protocol or standalone international treaty. At the last CCW meeting in August 2019, Russia and the United States again opposed proposals to negotiate a new treaty on killer robots, calling such a move “premature.”[16] The CCW meetings have heard proposals for political declarations and codes of conduct, as well as for greater transparency. Such measures have value, but are, by themselves, insufficient to deal with this serious threat to humanity. Some of the measures could be more productively undertaken after the international legal framework on killer robots has been put in place. A set of “guiding principles” was agreed to by states at the CCW in 2018 and 2019, but these were merely intended to guide their deliberations and, on their own, are not an adequate or appropriate response to the multiple concerns raised by increasing autonomy in weapons systems. At the end of 2019, states agreed to hold four weeks of CCW meetings in 2020-2021 to discuss developing “a normative and operational framework” for lethal autonomous weapons systems.[17] They committed to strive for results by the CCW’s Sixth Review Conference in December 2021. However, the onset of the Covid-19 pandemic has postponed the 2020 CCW meetings on killer robots. In the interim, the chair has urged CCW states to provide written commentaries or working papers. Focused deliberations would help lay the groundwork for the international ban treaty that is urgently required to retain meaningful human control over the use of force. To achieve progress, states should identify factors to help determine the necessary kind and extent of human control over weapons systems and the use of force.[18] They should comment on their preferred normative international framework. A legally binding instrument is the optimal framework for dealing with the many serious challenges raised by fully autonomous weapons. A new international ban treaty could lay down explicit rules to ensure appropriate constraints on autonomy in weapons systems and resolve differing views on human control over the use of force. Most importantly, a new treaty would show that states are serious about responding appropriately and with urgency to this existential threat to humanity. Recommendations Human Rights Watch calls on all states to: Work with other concerned states to launch and swiftly conclude negotiations on a new international treaty to retain meaningful human control over the use of force and prohibit weapons systems that lack such human control; and Adopt national laws and policies committing to retain meaningful human control over the use of force and establishing prohibitions on the development, production, and use of fully autonomous weapons. Country Positions on Killer Robots Algeria At a Human Rights Council debate on lethal autonomous weapons systems in May 2013, Algeria said it sees “a need to adopt appropriate measures so that the use of this technology respects human rights.”[19] Algeria has expressed numerous ethical, legal, and moral concerns over killer robots and has warned of the potential for an arms race and proliferation to non-state armed groups.[20] In April 2016, Algeria called for “a prohibition of acquisition, design, development, testing, deployment and transfer and use of lethal autonomous weapons systems through an international legally binding instrument.”[21] Algeria recommends that the concept of meaningful human control be at the center of the treaty’s negotiations.[22] Algeria participated in every CCW meeting on killer robots in 2014-2019. Argentina At the Human Rights Council in May 2013, Argentina delivered a statement on behalf of the Group of Latin American and Caribbean Countries (GRULAC) that raised several concerns over fully autonomous weapons, including the potential to foster reprisal, retaliation, and terrorism.[23] Argentina sees a need “to preserve meaningful human control at all phases of the development and use” of weapons systems.[24] It called for a “preemptive prohibition of the development of lethal autonomous weapons systems” in December 2016.[25] Argentina participated in CCW meetings on killer robots held in 2014-2019. Australia When Australia supported a proposal to begin multilateral talks on lethal autonomous weapons systems in November 2013, it expressed interest in discussing applicable international humanitarian law, definitions, military utility, and humanitarian aspects.[26] Australia does not see a need for a new international treaty to address concerns over such weapons. In March 2018, foreign minister Julia Bishop said it is “premature” to consider banning fully autonomous weapons.[27] Australia is developing and testing various autonomous weapons systems. It argues that “autonomous technology has distinct benefits for the promotion of humanitarian outcomes and avoidance of civilian casualties.”[28] Australia participated in every CCW meeting on killer robots in 2014-2019. Austria At the Human Rights Council in May 2013, Austria expressed interest in discussing the “multi-sectoral nature” of lethal autonomous weapons systems.[29] It has serious ethical and legal concerns with such weapons and sees destabilizing implications.[30] Austria called for a ban on autonomous weapons that are not under meaningful human control in April 2018.[31] It participated in every CCW meeting on killer robots in 2014-2019. At the CCW in August 2018, Austria, Brazil and Chile formally proposed launching negotiations on a legally binding instrument to ensure meaningful human control over the critical functions of weapons systems.[32] At the UN General Assembly in September 2019, Foreign Minister Alexander Schallenberg called for a ban “on weapons that are fully autonomous,” stating, “we cannot allow machines to decide over human life and death.”[33] Austria has announced its intent to convene an international meeting on killer robots in Vienna in early 2021. Bangladesh Bangladesh expressed its support for multilateral talks on lethal autonomous weapons systems at the UN General Assembly in October 2016.[34] However, it has never expressed its views on calls to ban them through a new international treaty. Bangladesh participated for the first time in CCW meetings on lethal autonomous weapons systems in 2019, but did not make any statements. Belarus Belarus said in May 2014 that it was “flexible” regarding calls to negotiate a new treaty on lethal autonomous weapons systems.[35] In November 2019, it expressed its opposition to the “indiscriminate, disproportionate use of fully autonomous weapons and use against the civilian population.”[36] However, Belarus has not supported calls for a new international ban treaty to retain meaningful human control over the use of force. Belarus participated in every CCW meeting on killer robots in 2014-2019. Belgium Belgium supported a proposal to begin multilateral talks on lethal autonomous weapons systems in November 2013.[37] It says that “from an ethical and humanitarian point of view,” it “fully shares the concerns on the possible risks and dangers” posed by such weapons.[38] In Belgium’s view, killer robots raise several problems for international law, particularly the notion that “humans would not intervene in the final decision to be taken with lethal consequences.”[39] In July 2018, Belgium’s national parliament adopted a resolution endorsing a ban on the use of lethal autonomous weapons.[40] Belgian officials have not explicitly proposed negotiating new international law, but in November 2019 acknowledged the need for international support to prohibit lethal autonomous weapons.[41] Belgium participated in every CCW meeting on killer robots in 2014-2019. Bolivia Bolivia said the right to life “should not be delegated to a machine” and called for a ban on lethal autonomous weapons systems in April 2015.[42] This was its first and only comment on killer robots to date. Bolivia participated in one CCW meeting on lethal autonomous weapons systems, in 2015. Botswana At the UN General Assembly in October 2015, Botswana expressed serious doubts that fully autonomous weapons would meets key standards of international humanitarian and human rights law.[43] In October 2018, it said that “critical decisions involving use of weapons of war and taking of human lives should not be abdicated to machines.”[44] Botswana has not elaborated its position on calls for a new treaty to ban or restrict fully autonomous weapons. It is not a CCW state party and did not participate in CCW meetings on lethal autonomous weapons systems in 2014-2019. Brazil Brazil expressed several concerns over lethal autonomous weapons systems at the Human Rights Council in May 2013, including “the consequences of a lowered human cost of conflicts like the trivialization of war” and “uncertainties surrounding the accountability for killings committed by autonomous weapons.”[45] Brazil has warned that “technology is not always the best solution for our challenges” and has raised ethical, legal, moral, and other serious objections to killer robots.[46] Brazil called for a ban on fully autonomous weapons in November 2017, stating that certain weapons systems with autonomous capabilities “will prove to be incompatible with international humanitarian law and international human rights law.”[47] Brazil participated in every CCW meeting on killer robots in 2014-2019. Austria, Brazil, and Chile formally proposed negotiating a legally binding instrument to ensure meaningful human control over the critical functions of weapons systems in August 2018.[48] Brazil held an international symposium on autonomous weapons systems in Rio de Janeiro in February 2020 that was one of the first multilateral meetings on killer robots to be organized by government outside of UN auspices.[49] Bulgaria Bulgaria supported multilateral talks on present and future developments of weapons technology at the UN General Assembly in October 2014.[50] In Bulgaria’s view, a human “must make the ultimate decision of taking another human being’s life,” as “such moral resolution cannot be delegated to an autonomous weapon system.”[51] However, it has not supported proposals to negotiate a new international ban treaty to retain meaningful human control over the use of force. Bulgaria participated in every CCW meeting on killer robots in 2014-2019. Burkina Faso At the UN General Assembly in October 2017, Burkina Faso highlighted the “essential” need to “search for durable solutions to the emergence of new challenges resulting from fully autonomous weapons systems.”[52] In Burkina Faso’s view, “development and projections of the use of weapons not requiring human intervention” is “a serious source of concern.”[53] Burkina Faso has not supported calls for an international ban treaty to retain meaningful human control over the use of force. Burkina Faso is a CCW state party, but did not attend CCW meetings on lethal autonomous weapons systems in 2014-2019. Cambodia Cambodia warned in November 2017 that “the short-term benefits of lethal autonomous weapons systems could be far outweighed by the long-term consequences” and regards meaningful human control as key to ensuring accountability and ethical use of weapons systems.[54] Cambodia believes that “machinery alone should not be making life and death decisions.”[55] However, it has not supported proposals to negotiate an international ban treaty to retain meaningful human control over the use of force. Cambodia participated in a CCW meeting on lethal autonomous weapons systems in 2017. Cameroon Cameroon supported continuing multilateral talks on lethal autonomous weapons systems in December 2016 and suggested future meetings should explore ethical and legal concerns.[56] Cameroon has not commented on calls to ban fully autonomous weapons and retain meaningful human control over the use of force. Cameroon participated in CCW meetings on killer robots in 2016 and 2017. Canada Canada supported a proposal to begin multilateral talks on lethal autonomous weapons systems in November 2013.[57] It says it has “no plans to ever acquire” such weapons systems, but Canadian officials have not supported calls to negotiate a new international treaty.[58] The Canadian Armed Forces say they are “committed to maintaining appropriate human involvement in the use of military capabilities that can exert lethal force.”[59] In December 2019, Prime Minister Justin Trudeau instructed his Minister of Foreign Affairs, François-Philippe Champagne, to advance international efforts to ban fully autonomous weapons systems.[60] Canada participated in every CCW meeting on killer robots in 2014-2019. Chile Chile said in April 2015 that it is “unacceptable for a machine to decide who lives and who dies.”[61] Chile has expressed multiple serious concerns over removing human control from the use of force.[62] Chile called for a ban on fully autonomous weapons in April 2016, arguing that existing international law is insufficient to regulate such weapons and highlighting the precedent provided by the ban on blinding lasers.[63] In August 2018, Austria, Brazil, and Chile formally proposed negotiating a legally binding instrument to ensure meaningful human control over the critical functions of weapons systems.[64] Chile participated in every CCW meeting on killer robots in 2014-2019. China At the Human Rights Council in May 2013, China supported beginning multilateral talks on lethal autonomous weapons systems, which it described as “highly complex.”[65] China has highlighted the potential for fully autonomous weapons to upset the international strategic balance and affect arms control.[66] In December 2016, China said it that such weapons “present considerable uncertainties” for compliance with international humanitarian law and expressed its desire for precautionary measures, highlighting the precedent provided by the ban on blinding lasers.[67] In April 2018, China called for a ban on fully autonomous weapons, but later clarified its call was limited to use only and not development and production.[68] Since then, China has not explicitly repeated its call for a new international treaty to ban fully autonomous weapons. China participated in every CCW meeting on killer robots in 2014-2019. Colombia Colombia said in April 2015 that that lethal autonomous weapons systems require regulation “at the multilateral level in order to ensure the control by humans persists at all times, so that no machine makes life or death decisions.”[69] Colombia has called such weapons “unethical, and a military and legal threat.”[70] Former Colombian president Juan Manuel Santos endorsed a 2017 declaration by Nobel Peace laureates that calls for a ban on fully autonomous weapons.[71] Colombia participated in every CCW meeting on killer robots in 2014-2019. It called for a new international treaty to retain meaningful human control over the use of force in April 2018.[72] Costa Rica At the UN General Assembly in October 2013, Costa Rica warned that “many problems identified with the use of armed drones would be exacerbated by the trend toward increasing autonomy in robotic weapons.”[73] Costa Rica has proposed that critical functions of weapons systems be subject to meaningful human control.[74] It called for a preemptive ban on lethal autonomous weapons systems in April 2016, advocating a preventive approach and citing the precedent provided by the ban on blinding lasers.[75] Costa Rica participated in CCW meetings on killer robots in 2016-2019. Croatia Croatia supported a proposal to begin multilateral talks on lethal autonomous weapons systems in November 2013.[76] It is concerned such weapons could potentially cause “significant humanitarian impact.”[77] In Croatia’s view, it “is not acceptable that fundamental moral judgments over life and death fall into the hands of automated technical systems.”[78] Croatia seriously doubts the capacity of existing international humanitarian and human rights law to deal with the challenges raised by fully autonomous weapons, but it has not called for a new international ban treaty to retain human control over the use of force. Croatia participated in every CCW meeting on killer robots in 2014-2019. Cuba At the Human Rights Council in May 2013, Cuba warned that lethal autonomous weapons systems could potentially result in “a large and perpetual battlefield.”[79] In Cuba’s view, it is “completely unethical and unacceptable to give a weapon or machine the ‘capacity’ to make life-and-death decisions.”[80] Cuba called for a ban on fully autonomous weapons in May 2014 and it has vigorously promoted that goal ever since.[81] In June 2017, Cuban Foreign Minister Bruno Rodríguez Parrilla said that existing international law is insufficient to deal with the killer robots challenge and called for it to be strengthened through the creation of a legally binding instrument.[82] Cuba participated in every CCW meeting on killer robots in 2014-2019. Czech Republic The Czech Republic warned in May 2014 that lethal autonomous weapons systems “could fundamentally change the way of fighting wars” and “could pose a serious threat for civilians.”[83] In the Czech Republic’s view, “the ultimate decision to end somebody’s life must remain under meaningful human control.”[84] It has not supported calls for a new international ban treaty to retain meaningful human control over the use of force, but has suggested that certain critical autonomous features of weapons systems be regulated or prohibited.[85] The Czech Republic participated in every CCW meeting on killer robots in 2014-2019. Denmark Denmark affirmed in April 2015 that “all use of force must remain under meaningful human control.”[86] It has expressed interest in determining “the necessary type and degree of human involvement to ensure that deployment and use of all weapons systems is compatible with the requirements of international humanitarian law.”[87] Denmark has not supported calls to ban fully autonomous weapons and retain meaningful human control over the use of force. Denmark participated in CCW meetings on killer robots in 2015-2016 and 2018-2019. Djibouti Djibouti called for a ban on fully autonomous weapons in April 2018.[88] It participated in CCW meetings on lethal autonomous weapons systems in 2016 and 2018-2019. Ecuador At the UN General Assembly in October 2013, Ecuador highlighted serious ethical, humanitarian, legal and other concerns with fully autonomous weapons.[89] In Ecuador’s view, “it is unacceptable that fundamental decisions about life and death could be assigned to lethal autonomous weapons.”[90] In May 2014, Ecuador became the second country to call for a ban on fully autonomous weapons, citing the precedent provided by the blinding lasers ban.[91] Ecuador has promoted a ban since then and supported an August 2018 proposal to negotiate a legally binding instrument to ensure meaningful human control over the critical functions of weapons systems.[92] Ecuador participated in CCW meetings on killer robots in 2014-2016 and 2018-2019. Egypt At the Human Rights Council in May 2013, Egypt warned that lethal autonomous weapons systems have “possible ramifications on the value of human lives [and] the calculation of the cost of war.”[93] Egypt was the third country to call for a ban on lethal autonomous weapons systems in May 2014, proposing specific prohibitions on acquisition, research and development, testing, deployment, transfer, and use.[94] Egypt often cites the precedent provided by the preemptive ban on blinding lasers and states that “technology should not overtake humanity.”[95] Egypt is not a state party to the CCW, but participated in CCW meetings on killer robots in 2014-2016 and 2018-2019. El Salvador At the UN General Assembly in October 2018, El Salvador said that “a machine that has the responsibility to decide about a person’s life is of great concern, and it raises great ethical and legal challenges.”[96] El Salvador called for an international ban on lethal autonomous weapons systems in November 2018.[97] El Salvador participated in CCW meetings on killer robots in 2014-2019. Estonia Estonia expressed support for continuing multilateral talks on lethal autonomous weapons systems in August 2016.[98] It considers them to be “any weapon system that can select and engage targets without human intervention,” and says that “lethality is, in our view, not a defining feature of any weapon system, autonomous or otherwise.”[99] Estonia has expressed interest in exploring how to retain meaningful human control over the use of force, but says it is “unpersuaded” on the need for a new international treaty.[100] Estonia participated in every CCW meeting on killer robots in 2014-2019. Finland At the UN General Assembly in October 2014, Finland expressed interest in continuing multilateral talks on lethal autonomous weapons systems, which it called “a complex issue.”[101] Finland says that the “development of weapons and means of warfare where humans are completely out of the loop would pose serious risks from the ethical and legal viewpoint.”[102] It says that “humans should always bear the ultimate responsibility when dealing with questions of life and death.”[103] Finnish officials have not supported proposals to negotiate a new international treaty to ban or restrict killer robots. However, in June 2019, Finland’s new government released a coalition platform that seeks to ban weapons systems based on artificial intelligence.[104] Finland participated in every CCW meeting on killer robots in 2014-2019. France At the Human Rights Council in May 2013, France said that “it does not possess and does not intend to acquire robotized weapons systems with the capacity to fire independently.”[105] It considers killer robots to be “weapon systems that have no human supervision once they are activated.”[106] France acknowledges that removing human control from the use of force raises complex ethical legal, operational, and technological concerns.[107] It has affirmed that “humans must retain the ability to take the final decision over the use of lethal force.”[108] In April 2019, Minister of Defense Florence Parly rejected calls to ban “weapons systems which would be able to act without any form of human supervision,” while also stating that “France refuses to entrust the decision of life or death to a machine that would act in a completely autonomous manner and would be beyond any human control.”[109] As CCW president, France launched multilateral talks on lethal autonomous weapons systems in November 2013 and chaired the first CCW meeting on the topic in May 2014. France participated in every CCW meeting on killer robots in 2014-2019. France and Germany have proposed the CCW agree to a non-legally binding political declaration. Germany At the Human Rights Council in May 2013, Germany urged states to be transparent with respect to their development of new weapons technologies.[110] In Germany’s view, it is “indispensable to maintain meaningful human control over the decision to kill another human being.”[111] The last two German government coalition agreements have committed to work toward a ban on weapons systems that lack human control. In September 2018, Germany’s foreign minister, Heiko Maas, called for a ban on fully autonomous weapons.[112] However, German officials have not supported proposals to launch treaty negotiations. Germany participated in every CCW meeting on killer robots in 2014-2019 and chaired the CCW meetings in 2015-2016. Germany and France have proposed the CCW agree to a non-legally binding political declaration. In April 2020, Germany convened the first online multilateral meeting on lethal autonomous weapons systems.[113] Ghana In November 2013, Ghana supported a proposal to open multilateral talks on lethal autonomous weapons systems.[114] Ghana called for lethal autonomous weapons systems to be prohibited in April 2015, affirming the need for a preemptive ban as “it is obvious that proponents of these systems believe they will not be the victims, but that others will.”[115] Ghana is not a CCW state party, but attended CCW meetings on lethal autonomous weapons systems in 2014-2016 and 2018-2019. Greece Greece supported a proposal to begin discussing lethal autonomous weapons systems in October 2013.[116] Greece has expressed discomfort with “the fundamental question of whether humans should delegate life and death decisions to machines.”[117] It defines killer robots as “a type of weapons that once launched or deployed (human decision) its mission cannot be terminated by human intervention,” and that “has the capacity to learn and undertake on its own a range of critical functions, such as detection and engagement of targets.”[118] Greece has expressed skepticism that international humanitarian and human rights law is sufficient to deal with the challenges raised by fully autonomous weapons. It has repeatedly emphasized the need to “ensure the appropriate human judgment over the use of force.”[119] However, Greece has not supported proposals to ban fully autonomous weapons and retain meaningful human control over the use of force. Greece participated in every CCW meeting on killer robots in 2014-2019. Guatemala Since May 2014, Guatemala has raised a host of concerns over fully autonomous weapons, warning of risks to “the most basic human rights” and their lack of compliance with “the standards and principles of international humanitarian law.”[120] Guatemala called for a ban on fully autonomous weapons in December 2016.[121] It participated in CCW meetings on lethal autonomous weapons systems in 2014 and in 2017-2019. Holy See In November 2013, the Holy See expressed grave ethical concerns over the inability of pre-programmed, automated technical systems to make moral judgments over life and death, respect human rights, and comply with the principles of humanity.[122] It regards killer robots to be “a weapon system capable of identifying, selecting and triggering action on a target without human supervision.”[123] The Holy See called for lethal autonomous weapons systems to be prohibited in May 2014, citing the precedent provided by the preemptive ban on blinding lasers, and warning of their potential to “increase the dehumanization of warfare.”[124] The Holy See provided the CCW with a ten-page statement in April 2015 outlining its ethical objections to lethal autonomous weapons systems.[125] The Holy See participated in every CCW meeting on killer robots in 2014-2019. Honduras Honduras first and last commented on killer robots in April 2018, when it expressed interest in exploring concerns relating to proportionality, proliferation, deployment, use, accountability, and human-machine interaction.[126] Honduras has not commented on calls for a new international ban treaty to retain meaningful human control over the use of force. Honduras attended CCW meetings on lethal autonomous weapons systems in 2015-2017 and 2019. Hungary In 2016, Hungary acknowledged that lethal autonomous weapons systems warrant “substantial consideration” and supported continuing diplomatic talks on the concerns.[127] Hungary attended most CCW meetings on killer robots in 2015-2019. However, it has not elaborated its views on concerns over removing human control from the use of force or commented on calls to ban or restrict fully autonomous weapons. India At the UN General Assembly in October 2013, India supported a proposal to begin multilateral talks on lethal autonomous weapons systems.[128] India has stated several times that challenges over such weapons must be resolved “in a manner that does not further widen the technology gap between states or encourage the use of lethal force to settle international disputes.”[129] India has expressed concern that using the concept of meaningful human control could risk legitimizing such weapons systems.[130] In March 2019, India said that “responsibility for development, production and deployment” of lethal autonomous weapons systems “should rest with the concerned state” but also said that “associated risks as regards proliferation (including to non-state actors), need to be covered under dual responsibility of the state and by strengthening international regulations.”[131] India is investing in the development of various autonomous weapons. However, in September 2019, Defense Minister Rajnath Singh reportedly stated that “the final attack decisions should be made by humans in the military, not by artificial intelligence.”[132] India participated in every CCW meeting on killer robots in 2014-2019 and chaired the CCW meetings in 2017-2018. Indonesia At the Human Rights Council in May 2013, Indonesia highlighted legal and other challenges raised by lethal autonomous weapons, particularly, “the possible, far-reaching effects on societal values, including … the protection and value of life and on international stability and security.”[133] At the UN General Assembly in October 2019, Indonesia delivered a statement on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement that asserted, “there is an urgent need to pursue a legally binding instrument on lethal autonomous weapon systems.”[134] Indonesia is not a CCW state party and did not attend CCW meetings on killer robots in 2014-2019. Iran At the Human Rights Council in May 2013, Iran expressed interest in opening multilateral talks on lethal autonomous weapons systems.[135] Iran has not commented on the concerns raised by removing human control from the use of force or supported proposals to negotiate a new international ban treaty. Iran is not a CCW state party, but it attended CCW meetings on killer robots in 2016 and 2018-2019. Iraq In November 2015, Iraq warned that fully autonomous weapons could generate “an arms race which could have catastrophic results,” and asserted that “no decision that could lead to the death of any human being can be given or entrusted to a machine; all decisions must remain under human control.”[136] Iraq called for a preemptive ban on lethal autonomous weapons systems in November 2017 and has repeatedly expressed its support for a prohibition since then.[137] Iraq participated in CCW meetings on killer robots in 2016-2019. Ireland At the UN General Assembly in October 2013, Ireland expressed interest in starting multilateral talks on lethal autonomous weapons systems.[138] Ireland has expressed concern at the “eventual use of these technologies outside of traditional combat situations, for example in law enforcement.”[139] It questions the relevance of lethality in considering fully autonomous weapons. Ireland has consistently emphasized the need for weapons systems to “remain under meaningful human control.”[140] Ireland has not supported calls to ban fully autonomous weapons or proposed a new international treaty, but expressed interest in the “regulation” of “weapon systems that incorporate emerging technologies with increasingly autonomous functions” in November 2019.[141] Ireland participated in every CCW meeting on killer robots in 2014-2019. Israel In November 2013, Israel said that lethal autonomous weapons systems “do not exist currently.”[142] It has urged states to keep “an open mind regarding the positive capabilities of future lethal autonomous weapons systems,” as it finds they “might ensure better compliance with the laws of armed conflict in comparison with human soldiers.”[143] Israel has rejected calls to negotiate a new international treaty to ban or restrict fully autonomous weapons. It is developing, testing, producing, and using weapons systems with autonomous functions. Israel participated in every CCW meeting on killer robots in 2014-2019. Italy Italy supported a proposal to begin multilateral talks on killer robots in November 2013.[144] In April 2018, it said that “existing automated weapons systems… are not LAWS [lethal autonomous weapons systems]” and asserted that “weapon systems do not present accountability gap issues, as long as responsibility for their effects can be ascribed to the human operators who decided to field and activate them.”[145] In October 2019, Italy emphasized that “any existing or future weapon system must be subject to human control, particularly in relation to the ultimate decision to use lethal force.”[146] Italy has not acknowledged ethical and moral concerns over removing human control from the use of force or supported proposals to ban fully autonomous weapons. Italy participated in every CCW meeting on killer robots in 2014-2019. Japan At the UN General Assembly in October 2013, Japan supported a proposal to begin multilateral talks on lethal autonomous weapons systems.[147] It regards killer robots as weapons systems that, “once activated, can effectively select and engage a target without human intervention.”[148] Japan urges the peaceful use of robotics and says it has “no plan to develop robots with humans out of the loop, which may be capable of committing murder.”[149] Japan has not supported calls for a new international ban treaty to retain meaningful human control over the use of force. Japan participated in every CCW meeting on killer robots in 2014-2019. In February 2020, Japan’s Foreign Ministry announced its intent to hold a regional meeting on killer robots concerns in December 2020.[150] Jordan In August 2016, Jordan emphasized the “urgent need to retain human control over the use of force.”[151] Jordan has warned that weapons systems that operate without effective human control could “trigger an arms race” and lead to a “clear change in the rules of war and the code of conduct for armed conflict,” with “pernicious consequences for all.”[152] Jordan called for a legally binding instrument to ban lethal autonomous weapons systems in August 2019.[153] Jordan participated in every CCW meeting on lethal autonomous weapons systems in 2014-2019. Kazakhstan Kazakhstan supported continued multilateral talks on concerns over killer robots in November 2015.[154] It sees a need to maintain human control over weapons systems and has expressed doubt that lethal autonomous weapons systems would comply with key principles of international humanitarian law.[155] In November 2017, Kazakhstan said there is an “obvious” need to adopt a legally binding measure to prohibit or regulate fully autonomous weapons.[156] Kazakhstan participated in the CCW meetings on killer robots in 2014-2019. Kuwait At the UN General Assembly in October 2015, Kuwait stated that lethal autonomous weapons systems “pose moral, humanitarian, and legal challenges” for the international community.[157] Kuwait has expressed interest in developing legislative controls to prevent “the potentially destructive effects” of fully autonomous weapons, but it has not explicitly called for a ban. Kuwait participated in CCW meetings on killer robots in 2017-2019. Latvia Latvia first commented on killer robots at the UN General Assembly in October 2016, where it supported continuing multilateral talks on lethal autonomous weapons systems.[158] Latvia has not elaborated its views on removing human control over the use of force or supported calls to prohibit or restrict fully autonomous weapons. A CCW state party, Latvia participated in every CCW meeting on lethal autonomous weapons systems in 2014-2019 and will chair CCW meetings on the topic in 2020. Lebanon At the UN General Assembly in October 2015, Lebanon urged that “human rights and international humanitarian law should remain our guiding principles” regarding new developments such as lethal autonomous weapons.[159] Lebanon has not elaborated its views on concerns over removing human control from the use of force or commented on calls to ban fully autonomous weapons. Lebanon ratified the CCW in 2017 and participated in CCW meetings on killer robots in 2018-2019. Libya At the UN General Assembly in October 2019, Libya expressed concern at the fast pace of technological developments and potential threats for peace and security.[160] Libya is not a CCW state party, but participated in CCW meetings on lethal autonomous weapons systems in 2014-2015. Liechtenstein Liechtenstein said that “technical developments clearly point to a need for new legal obligations” for lethal autonomous weapons systems at the UN General Assembly in October 2018.[161] It also proposed “stronger collective action” to “establish binding standards to ensure a human component in the decision-making processes of [weapons] systems.” Liechtenstein says it wants “regulation in the area of lethal autonomous weapons systems … to legally ensure a human component in the decision-making processes of such systems.”[162] It has not commented on calls to ban fully autonomous weapons. Liechtenstein is a CCW state party, but did not attend CCW meetings on lethal autonomous weapons systems in 2014-2019. Lithuania Lithuania supported a proposal to begin multilateral talks on lethal autonomous weapons systems in November 2013.[163] Lithuania has not elaborated its views on concerns over removing human control from the use of force or commented on calls to ban such weapons. It participated in every CCW meeting on lethal autonomous weapons systems in 2014-2019. Luxembourg In April 2018, Luxembourg said that “humans should continue to be able to make the ultimate decision in regards to the use of lethal force.”[164] It recommended developing a political declaration on lethal autonomous weapons systems, but cautioned it “should be viewed as a first step, and not an end in itself.” In March 2019, Luxembourg called for the development of a legally binding instrument with a positive obligation to maintain human control over the use of force.[165] Luxembourg participated in CCW meetings on killer robots in 2014 and 2017-2019. Madagascar Madagascar supported a proposal to begin multilateral talks on lethal autonomous weapons systems in November 2013 and suggested states “consider moral and ethical values in the use of these weapons.”[166] Madagascar has not elaborated its views on concerns over removing human control from the use of force or supported proposals to ban lethal autonomous weapons systems. It attended CCW meetings on killer robots in 2014-2015, but not those held in 2016-2019. Mali In May 2014, Mali expressed concern that lethal autonomous weapons systems may not be able to discriminate between soldiers and civilians, calling them “a step backwards for the international community.”[167] Mali participated in one CCW meeting on lethal autonomous weapons systems in 2014. Mexico Mexico warned that lethal autonomous weapons systems “might decide arbitrarily on the life and death of human beings” at the Human Rights Council in May 2013.[168] Mexico has expressed doubts such weapons systems would comply with key principles of international humanitarian law and sees a need to retain “a significant level of human control” in the use of force.[169] In April 2016, Mexico said that it favors “the negotiation of a legally binding instrument to preemptively ban fully autonomous weapons,” describing the proposal as preventive “since the weapons still do not exist” and noting that negotiations “should not necessarily be done through CCW.”[170] Mexico participated in every CCW meeting on killer robots in 2014-2019. Moldova The Republic of Moldova said in December 2016 that “all weapons must remain under effective (or meaningful) human control.”[171] It has not commented on calls to ban lethal autonomous weapons systems. The Republic of Moldova participated in CCW meetings on killer robots in 2014-2015 and 2017-2019. Montenegro Montenegro has supported continuing multilateral talks on killer robots on several occasions since December 2016.[172] It has not elaborated its views on concerns over removing human control from the use of force or commented on calls to ban fully autonomous weapons. Montenegro participated in CCW meetings on lethal autonomous weapons systems in 2014 and 2017-2019. Morocco Morocco expressed serious concern over allowing machines to “have the right to determine the life of human beings” at the Human Rights Council in May 2013 and expressed interest in discussing the “moral and legal implications” of lethal autonomous weapons systems.[173] Morocco called for a ban on lethal autonomous weapons systems in November 2018 because “the absence of a legal framework could leave the door wide open to the development and acquisition” of such weapons.[174] Morocco participated in every CCW meeting on killer robots in 2014-2019. Myanmar At the UN General Assembly in October 2017, Myanmar said that lethal autonomous weapons systems constitute “a security issue warranting serious consideration.”[175] In October 2019, it noted “growing concerns on new types of weapons such as lethal autonomous weapon systems and their destructive power.”[176] Myanmar has not commented on calls to ban fully autonomous weapons. Myanmar is not a CCW state party, but participated in CCW meetings on killer robots in 2017-2018. Namibia Namibia called for a ban on fully autonomous weapons at the UN General Assembly in October 2019, calling them “totally incompatible with international humanitarian law.”[177] Namibia is not a CCW state party and did not attend CCW meetings on lethal autonomous weapons systems in 2014-2019. Nepal Nepal said at the UN General Assembly in October 2018 that “a sound regulatory framework” is needed for artificial intelligence and “automated robots” that “pose serious threat to humanity.”[178] Nepal is not a CCW state party and did not attend CCW meetings on lethal autonomous weapons systems in 2014-2019. The Netherlands At the UN General Assembly in October 2013, the Netherlands supported a proposal to begin multilateral discussions on killer robots, which it said raise “many legal, ethical and policy questions.”[179] The Netherlands said it considers “fully autonomous weapon systems, which can change their goal-function themselves or alter pre-programmed conditions and parameters, not to be under meaningful human control and considers them therefore prohibited under international law.”[180] National policy is based on a 2015 report by two advisory councils and finds that meaningful human control in the programming phase before deployment of weapons systems is sufficient and not necessary over the selection and attack of targets.[181] The Netherlands has said it “has no plans for the development of completely autonomous systems.”[182] It has rejected calls to ban fully autonomous weapons as “inexpedient and unfeasible, mainly due to the fact that most artificial intelligence technology comes from civilian developments.”[183] In May 2019, the national parliament adopted a resolution calling for a legally binding instrument on new weapons technologies, including autonomous weapons.[184] The Netherlands participated in every CCW meeting on lethal autonomous weapons systems in 2014-2019. New Zealand At the UN General Assembly in October 2013, New Zealand said that governments should work with civil society to develop and implement effective solutions to challenges raised by new technologies such as fully autonomous weapons.[185] In May 2019, Minister for Disarmament and Arms Control Winston Peters said, “New Zealand has…concerns about the legal, ethical and human rights challenges posed by the development and use of lethal autonomous weapons systems.”[186] He said, “our view is that international law already sets limits” on such weapons and said New Zealand would focus on using existing law “to make sure there will always be meaningful human control over weapons incorporating autonomy.”[187] New Zealand participated in every CCW meeting on killer robots in 2014-2019. Nicaragua In November 2015, Nicaragua expressed concern that fully autonomous weapons would “not guarantee the distinction between civilians and combatants, nor the assessment of proportionality and precaution established by international humanitarian law.”[188] It has warned that such weapons “will be incompatible with human rights law.”[189] Nicaragua called for a preemptive ban on lethal autonomous weapons systems in April 2016.[190] Nicaragua participated in every CCW meeting on killer robots in 2014-2019. North Macedonia North Macedonia first commented on killer robots in 2019, when its representative chaired the CCW talks on lethal autonomous weapons systems. North Macedonia supports the development of “a normative and operational framework” to address rising concerns over killer robots.[191] North Macedonia first participated in CCW meetings on killer robots in 2019. Norway In May 2014, Norway acknowledged ethical and legal concerns raised by lethal autonomous weapons systems, which it warned “could blur lines of responsibility and accountability.”[192] Norway considers such weapons to be “weapons systems that would search for, identify, and attack targets, including human beings, using lethal force and without a human operator intervening.”[193] Norway said in August 2018 that it has not decided if lethal autonomous weapons systems “warrant the development of a new international instrument.”[194] Norway participated every CCW meeting on killer robots in 2014-2019. The ethics committee of the Norwegian Government Pension Fund Global recommended in June 2020 that the Fund add lethal autonomous weapons systems to the exclusion list of weapons that it will not invest in.[195] The Norwegian parliament will consider and vote on the proposal in 2021. Pakistan At the Human Rights Council in May 2013, Pakistan said that lethal autonomous weapons systems “raise complex moral, ethical, and legal dilemmas” and became the first nation to call for them to be prohibited, citing the precedent provided by the preemptive ban on blinding lasers.[196] Pakistan also delivered a statement on behalf of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, representing more than 50 states, which warned that removing human control from the use of force “fundamentally changes the nature of war” and raises the potential for an “accountability gap.”[197] Pakistan has repeatedly called for a new international ban treaty since then and has rejected lethal autonomous weapons systems as “illegal, unethical, inhumane, and unaccountable as well as destabilizing for international peace and security.”[198] Pakistan participated in every CCW meeting on killer robots in 2014-2019. State of Palestine The State of Palestine listed several concerns over removing human control from the use of force in November 2014.[199] Palestine called for a preemptive ban on fully autonomous weapons in November 2015. Palestine ratified the CCW in 2015 and participated in the CCW meetings on lethal autonomous weapons systems in 2015-2019. Panama Panama called for a preemptive ban on lethal autonomous weapons systems in December 2016, stating such weapons are “contrary to international humanitarian law.”[200] Panama has expressed ethical, legal, and technical concerns with such weapons, arguing, “it is inadmissible that mere machines can take independent decisions on the life and death of people,” and it cites the precedent provided by the CCW’s preemptive ban on blinding lasers.[201] In November 2019, Panama warned that fully autonomous weapons would not comply with international humanitarian law or international human rights law, would lead to an arms race and undermine international security, as well as be at risk from technical failures and cyber attacks.[202] Panama participated in every CCW meeting on killer robots in 2016-2019. Peru In December 2016, Peru called for an international treaty to prohibit development, acquisition, and use of fully autonomous weapons.[203] In November 2017, it called such weapons a threat to human rights and said that weapons systems that lack meaningful human control should be prohibited.[204] Peru has warned that lethal autonomous weapons systems could lead “a new arms race and an exacerbation of armed conflict,” with “a negative impact on our efforts to maintain international peace and security.”[205] Peru says it as “fundamental to have a certain level of human control” over the use of force.[206] Peru participated in CCW meetings on killer robots in 2014 and 2016-2019. The Philippines In April 2016, the Philippines supported continuing multilateral talks on lethal autonomous weapons systems and suggested that future meetings consider how to retain meaningful human control over the use of force.[207] The Philippines says that new technologies pose “an immense challenge to the disarmament community,” but it has not supported proposals to ban fully autonomous weapons.[208] The Philippines participated in CCW meetings on killer robots in 2016-2019. Poland Poland said that human beings must maintain control over “kill decisions” in April 2015, asking, “can a machine be allowed to decide whether to kill?” and answering, “the military answer to that question is simply NO, we want and have to be in control.”[209] Poland says “the type and degree of human control needs to be evaluated to establish limits on autonomy in weapons systems.”[210] At the UN Security Council in August 2019, Poland’s President and Minister for Foreign Affairs Jacek Czaputowicz flagged challenges posed by “new developments in contemporary armed conflict,” particularly “artificial intelligence and autonomous weapons” that “are reducing the role of humans more broadly.”[211] Poland has not supported calls to ban fully autonomous weapons. Poland participated in every CCW meeting on killer robots in 2014-2019. Portugal At the UN General Assembly in October 2014, Portugal supported continuing multilateral talks on lethal autonomous weapons systems.[212] Portugal says it “shares specific humanitarian, moral, and legal concerns” over such weapons and sees a need to retain human control over critical functions of weapons systems.[213] Portugal has not supported proposals to ban fully autonomous weapons and instead suggested in March 2019 that states focus on examining how existing international law applies to such weapons.[214] Portugal participated in every CCW meetings on killer robots in 2014-2019. Romania At the UN General Assembly in October 2015, Romania supported continuing multilateral talks on lethal autonomous weapons systems.[215] Romania has not elaborated its views on concerns over removing human control from the use of force or commented on calls to ban fully autonomous weapons. Romania participated CCW meetings on killer robots in 2014 and 2016-2019. Russia At the Human Rights Council in May 2013, the Russian Federation said that **lethal autonomous weapons systems** “could have **serious implications for societal foundations**, including the negating of human life,” and could “significantly undermine the ability of the international legal system to maintain minimal legal order.”[216] Russia has consistently opposed proposals to negotiate a legally binding instrument on such weapons or other measures, as it says “existing international law, including international humanitarian law, has some very important restrictions that fully cover weapons systems that have high degrees of autonomy.”[217] Russia says it disagrees that lethal autonomous weapons will be “a reality in the near future,” but it is researching, developing, and investing in autonomous weapons systems and has made military investments in artificial intelligence and robotics a top national defense priority.[218] In November 2019, Russia argued that the concepts of “human control” and “human involvement” involve subjective assessments and are irrelevant.[219] Russia participated in every CCW meeting on killer robots in 2014-2019. San Marino At the UN General Assembly in October 2019, San Marino said it “believes that meaningful human control is required over life and death decisions” and called for the development of new international standards on lethal autonomous weapons systems.[220] San Marino is not a CCW state party and did not participate in CCW meetings on killer robots in 2014-2019. Sierra Leone At the UN Human Rights Council in May 2013, Sierra Leone expressed support for national moratoria on lethal autonomous weapons “until an internationally agreed-upon framework is established.”[221] Sierra Leone has articulated several concerns over removing human control from the use of force, such as lack of accountability, “vulnerability to cyber attacks,” and “human rights and humanitarian impacts.”[222] It has expressed interest in developing a legally binding instrument to address concerns raised by lethal autonomous weapons systems.[223] Sierra Leone attended every CCW meeting on killer robots in 2014-2019. Slovakia In December 2016, Slovakia supported a proposal to formalize multilateral talks on lethal autonomous weapons systems.[224] Slovakia has not elaborated its views on concerns over removing human control from the use of force or commented on the call to ban fully autonomous weapons. Slovakia participated in every CCW meeting on killer robots in 2014-2019. Slovenia Slovenia supported formalizing multilateral talks on lethal autonomous weapons in December 2016.[225] It concurs that “such weapons raise a number of ethical, legal, moral, and technical, as well as international peace and security related questions.”[226] At the UN General Assembly in October 2016, Slovenia said it was “concerned” by “the growth of new weapon technologies” and stressed the “necessity for human control over all autonomous weapon systems.”[227] It has not commented on calls to ban fully autonomous weapons. Slovenia participated in every CCW meeting on killer robots in 2015-2019. South Africa At the UN General Assembly in October 2013, South Africa **expressed interest in beginning multilateral deliberations** on lethal autonomous weapons systems.[228] In South Africa’s view, the **possibility** of weaponizing **artificial intelligence** and robotics “raises fundamental **ethical, legal, operational, and political questions**.”[229] It has expressed **concern** at the “humanitarian implications” of fully autonomous weapons, their potential impact on human rights, and doubts they could **comply with “basic international humanitarian law rules** of **distinction**, **proportionality**, and **military necessity**.”[230] South Africa has affirmed the “**necessity** for human control in the selection of targets to enforce accountability.”[231] Since April 2018, it has called for **a legally binding** instrument to regulate lethal autonomous weapons systems.[232] South Africa attended **every CCW meeting on killer robots in 2014-2019.**

#### Circumvention inevitable – opacity and on-the-loop – but that’s good and doesn't take out solvency.

Wallach 17

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In concert with the compelling legal and ethical considerations LAWS pose for IHL, unpredictability and risk concerns suggest the need for a broad prohibition. To be sure, even with a ban, bad actors will find LAWS relatively easy to assemble, camouflage, and deploy. The Great Powers, if they so desire, will find it easy to mask whether a weapon system has the capability of functioning autonomously.

The difficulties in effectively enforcing a ban are perhaps the greatest barrier to be overcome in persuading states that LAWS are unacceptable. People and states under threat perceive advanced weaponry as essential for their immediate survival. The stakes are high. No one wants to be at a disadvantage in combating a foe that violates a ban. And yet, violations of the ban against the use of biological and chemical weapons by regimes in Iraq and in Syria have not caused other states to adopt these weapons.

The power of a ban goes beyond whether it can be absolutely enforced. The development and use of biological and chemical weapons by Saddam Hussein helped justify the condemnation of the regime and the eventual **invasion** of Iraq. Chemical weapons use by Bashar al-Assad has been widely condemned, even if the geopolitics of the Syrian conflict have undermined effective follow-through in support of that condemnation.

A ban on LAWS is likely to be violated even more than that on biological and chemical weapons. Nevertheless, a ban makes it clear that such weapons are unacceptable and those using them are deserving of condemnation. Whenever possible that condemnation should be accompanied by **political, economic, and** even **military measures** that punish the offenders. More importantly, a ban will help slow, if not **stop**, an autonomous weapons **arms race.** But most importantly, banning LAWS will function as a **moral signal** that international humanitarian law (IHL) retains its **normative force** within the international community. Technological possibilities will not and should not succeed in pressuring the international community to sacrifice, or even compromise, the standards set by IHL.

A ban will serve to inhibit the unrestrained commercial development and sale of LAWS technology. But a preemptive ban on LAWS will not stop nor necessarily slow the roboticization of warfare. Arms manufacturers will still be able to integrate ever-advancing features into the robotic weaponry they develop. At best, it will require that a **human** in the loop **provides** a real-time **authorization** before a weapon system kills or destroys a target that may harbor soldiers and noncombatants alike.

Even a modest ban signals a moral victory, and will help ensure that the development of AI is pursued in a truly beneficial, robust, safe, and controllable manner. Requiring meaningful human control in the form of real-time human authorization to kill will help **slow** the **pace of combat**, but will not stop the desire for increasingly sophisticated weaponry that could potentially be used autonomously.

#### The standard is maximizing expected wellbeing. Prefer –

#### Agent spec actors must use util since they have different moral obligations and tradeoffs

#### [1] Death outweighs— [a] agents can’t act if they fear for their bodily security—my framework constrains every NC and K and [b] biological life is a prerequisite to any alternative advocacy [c] it’s the worst form of evil

#### Moral uncertainty means preventing extinction should be our highest priority.

Bostrom 13 [Nick Bostrom, Professor in the Faculty of Philosophy @ University of Oxford, “Existential Risk Prevention as Global Priority,” Global Policy Vol. 4 Issue 1, February 2013]  
These reflections on **moral uncertainty suggest** an alternative, complementary way of looking at existential risk; they also suggest a new way of thinking about the ideal of sustainability. Let me elaborate.¶ **Our present understanding of axiology might** well **be confused. We may not** nowknow — at least not in concrete detail — what outcomes would count as a big win for humanity; we might not even yet **be able to imagine the best ends** of our journey. **If we are** indeedprofoundly **uncertain** about our ultimate aims,then we should recognize that **there is a great** option **value in preserving** — and ideally improving — **our ability to recognize value and** to **steer the future accordingly. Ensuring** that **there will be a future** version of **humanity** with great powers and a propensity to use them wisely **is** plausibly **the best way** available to us **to increase the probability that the future will contain** a lot of **value.** To do this, we must prevent any existential catastrophe.

### Method Underview

#### **The role of the ballot is to endorse the best policy position:**

#### [1] Policy education is key to advocacy – that outweighs on portable skills.

Nixon 2KMakani Themba-Nixon, Executive Director of The Praxis Project. “Changing the Rules: What Public Policy Means for Organizing.” Colorlines 3.2, 2000.

Getting It in Writing Much of the work of framing what we stand for takes place in the shaping of demands. By getting into the policy arena in a proactive manner, we can take our demands to the next level. Our demands can become law, with real consequences if the agreement is broken. After all the organizing, press work, and effort, a group should leave a decision maker with more than a handshake and his or her word. Of course, this work requires a certain amount of interaction with "the suits," as well as struggles with the bureaucracy, the technical language, and the all-too-common resistance by decision makers. Still, if it's worth demanding, it's worth having in writing-whether as law, regulation, or internal policy. From ballot initiatives on rent control to laws requiring worker protections, organizers are leveraging their power into written policies that are making a real difference in their communities. Of course, policy work is just one tool in our organizing arsenal, but it is a tool we simply can't afford to ignore. Making policy work an integral part of organizing will require a certain amount of retrofitting. We will need to develop the capacity to translate our information, data, stories that are designed to affect the public conversation [and]. Perhaps most important, we will need to move beyond fighting problems and on to framing solutions that bring us closer to our vision of how things should be. And then we must be committed to making it so.

#### [2] Pluralism is good.

**Bleiker 14** – (6/17, Roland, Professor of International Relations at the University of Queensland, “International Theory Between Reification and Self-Reflective Critique,” International Studies Review, Volume 16, Issue 2, pages 325–327)

Methodological pluralism lies at the heart of Levine's sustainable critique. He borrows from what Adorno calls a “constellation”: an attempt to juxtapose, rather than integrate, different perspectives. It is in this spirit that Levine advocates multiple methods to understand the same event or phenomena. He writes of the need to validate “multiple and mutually incompatible ways of seeing” (p. 63, see also pp. 101–102). In this model, a scholar oscillates back and forth between different methods and paradigms, trying to understand the event in question from multiple perspectives. No single method can ever adequately represent the event or should gain the upper hand. But each should, in a way, recognize and capture details or perspectives that the others cannot (p. 102). In practical terms, this means combining a range of methods even when—or, rather, precisely when—they are deemed incompatible. They can range from poststructual deconstruction to the tools pioneered and championed by positivist social sciences. The benefit of such a methodological polyphony is not just the opportunity to bring out nuances and new perspectives. Once the false hope of a smooth synthesis has been abandoned, the very incompatibility of the respective perspectives can then be used to identify the reifying tendencies in each of them. For Levine, this is how reification may be “checked at the source” and this is how a “critically reflexive moment might thus be rendered sustainable” (p. 103). It is in this sense that Levine's approach is not really post-foundational but, rather, an attempt to “balance foundationalisms against one another” (p. 14). There are strong parallels here with arguments advanced by assemblage thinking and complexity theory—links that could have been explored in more detail.

#### [3] Only the aff makes any radical movements possible – speaking the language of power redirects state policy against itself whereas their tactic fails and is coopted.

DeLeon 12 (Associate Professor & Assistant Dean for Curriculum and Programming Educational Leadership and Policy Studies @ UTSA (Abraham P, “Chapter 17: Against the Grain of the Status Quo: Anarchism behind Enemy Lines,” in Anarchist pedagogies : collective actions, theories, and critical reflections on education, edited by Robert H. Haworth, Published: Oakland, CA : PM Press, ©2012, p. 312-15)

Infiltration: a word that may evoke a host of thoughts and fantasies from soldiers operating behind enemy lines, police informants gaining access to criminal organizations, or to scenarios of radicals inserting themselves into corporations or research labs. Whatever the scenario, infiltration can be tactic that anarchists pursue when thinking about operating within current institutional realities, especially if interested in teaching in public schools. Although this claim is entangled within complex relationships of power and privilege, struggle arises wherever domination coalesces, especially within institutional structures and settings (Sharp, Routledge, Philo & Paddison, 2000). Power conjures, “the threadings, knottings and weavings” of social relationships through a intertwining of the social, political, moral, educational, and historical realities of a given society. In this way, power is “crucially and unavoidably spun out across and through the material spaces of the world” (Sharp, et al., 2000, p. 22). This chapter thus looks to situate itself and build radical pedagogy within the threads and knots of contemporary relationships of power; inbetween what Holloway (2010) has called the “cracks” of capitalism, trying to “desperately find . . . faults beneath the surface, or to create cracks by banging the walls” (p. 8). Cracks have emerged through environmental disaster, economic collapse, psychological alienation, a crisis of identity, and decades of war and imperial aggression conducted by the West. It is under these historical conditions that resistance needs to be conceptualized. Creating, finding and exploiting “cracks” within a diffused and networked capitalism demonstrates that dated narratives of revolutionary struggle are no longer viable and there is “no guarantee of a happy ending” (Holloway, 2010, p. 9). Unfortunately, although these narratives may provide comfort amid an onslaught of capitalism, war, death, terror, and alienation, they do not open up, nor allow, alternative possibilities of resistance to form outside the boundaries they construct. In some ways, these may only help to reproduce the current order we find ourselves in. This does not mean that we should resign ourselves to the throngs of nihilistic defeat, as there is indeed potential for radical hope within the cracks of Empire. The multitude, with its potential for infinite possibilities, can build a complex and dispersed resistance through the breaks, tears, and folds of our social order (Deleuze, 1992), and the tactics and pedagogies that we envision as radicals can attempt to capture this spirit. Although the manifestations of these cracks and folds is yet to be seen, I leave the reader to their own radical imaginations in devising ways to subvert a networked and diffused machine (Shukaitis, 2009). Evoking the metaphor of a “machine,” as I describe the multifaceted nature of contemporary capitalism, harkens to Trotter’s (1990) claim that colonialism operated in a very similar way, divorced from individual interactions and operating abstractly through “official” and “unofficial” discourses, forms of knowledge, ways of knowing, the morality of a given era, and the reproduction of knowledge to name a few. The analogy of a machine also challenges that human agency is solely at the center of how social system operate, because machines, “create, distribute, and organize populations and impose regimes of conduct, agency and effectivity” outside of individual actors and agency (Grossberg, 2010, p. 36). Radicals (within and outside the labor movement) had ingenious ways in which to deal with the machines of capitalism, occurring through tactics that spanned strikes, sit-ins, walking out, and subversion to even more direct forms like sabotaging machinery, bringing production to a halt. Sabotage is a tactic that anarchists need to rethink in light of how labor is now dispersed among a wide variety of institutional realities (factories, banks, corporations, and public institutions, for example), as well as the contemporary knowledge and abstract economies. The machines of capitalism that produced goods during the height of the Industrial Revolution of the nineteenth century provide us a way in which to think of societal machines and tactics that can be adapted for current conditions. How do we as anarchists, who want to teach and work with students, deal with the contradictions of being located within the same institutions that seek to discipline bodies and coerce us? How do we sabotage these machines and build a radical pedagogy from this perspective? Sabotage provides a provocative conceptual framework in which to think about building alternative forms of resistance and aligns with ways in which anarchists have historically conceptualized direct political action. This is even more interesting when we think of how this will emerge through educational practice, as teaching allows us to directly engage ideology, challenging students’ conceptions about the world around them. With this type of important, dare I say political work, why do some anarchists shun the world of public teaching and service? Education is at the “front lines” of the contemporary ideological war conducted by corporate media, official organs of the State, and influential economic institutions. Whether that emerges through corporate textbooks that omit subaltern experiences and worldviews, standardized testing that stress rote memorization, or a curriculum that reproduces Eurocentrism and Western ways of knowing, education is invested in reproducing dominant conceptions of the world. However, sabotage can take myriad forms, and this chapter will build on the conceptual idea of building politics of infiltration. It has been well established that police and other State agents have infiltrated radical political movements, especially with the rise of anarchist praxis over the past two decades (Borrum & Tilby, 2004). Anarchists should think about assuming this same tactic, using the idea of infiltration as a guiding way to think about our praxis within institutional realities and as a way to think about diffused forms of sabotage. Although anarchism is rife with identity and lifestyle politics that detests any signs of “selling out,” this has only proven to further marginalize us in the eyes of the larger society that we must work at convincing how terribly oppressive the current social arrangement is. In the end, our movement is going to have to be broadbased and span multiple identities, social locations, political affiliations, and a renewed sense of politics that seeks to look at how, “the contemporary world has been made to be what it is [and] make visible ways in which it can become something else” (Grossberg, 2010, p. 1). Stoler (2010) discusses the idea of reading and analyzing “against the grain” of archival documents to unearth new interpretations and voices. This chapter urges radicals to think of our social actions along these same lines of thought: against the grain of dominant ideologies that serve to support historically oppressive realities. In this chapter, I will attempt to propose a politics of infiltration through a peculiar anarchist lens that seeks to subvert capitalism and its accompanying institutional realities through a diffused resistance stemming from bodies; bodies immersed in oppressive institutional realities. I dance through theoretical traditions to demonstrate how infiltration can be conceptualized as not only a physical practice (such as our work in classrooms), but also can be a theoretical framework in which to situate our practice, always looking for cracks, weaknesses, and oppor- tunities to sabotage dominant conceptions of the world that demonstrates another world is possible. Although radicals may think of this action as “selling out,” I want to reframe teaching and working within institutions as a potential form of infiltration, inserting other ways of knowing and being into the academy to challenge systemically oppressive realities. Shannon (2009) reminds us that cooptation lurks around every corner and Shukaitis (2009) warns us of the recuperative nature of capitalism. Both of these realities are firmly acknowledged as risks, however, it should not immobilize us into inaction. Nor should this resign us to “ghettoizing” ourselves into intellectual enclaves where conversations are more about nodding our collective heads in agreement rather than challenging our own practices with alternative voices and tactics. Indeed, tensions can be the basis for a critical reflection about what we are actually doing in our practice and engaging a wide variety of techniques and approaches to explore these, such as writing and political organization. Communities of practice, whether in activism or through qualitative research, are an essential feature of building bridges with other like-minded activists and scholars (Rossman & Rallis, 2003). Cooptation and recuperation are indeed challenges we will face but should not stop us from doing something, keeping in mind the question that Lorde (2003) had when she struggled with the tools of the master (p. 25). This chapter will hopefully allow the conversation to continue about the role of anarchist theory in building alternative forms of praxis, pedagogy, and direct action, especially within the context of public education and the contradictions that anarchists face within hierarchical and coercive institutions.