## Off 1

#### Permissibility negates:

1) negate means “to deny the truth of,” so the neg can disprove an obligation through permissibility since the 1ac must defend an active obligation to act

#### 2) there is a trichotomy between obligation, prohibition and permissibility; proving one

#### disproves the other two.

#### 3) Ought implies proactive justification since we don’t take actions unless we have a reason to take the action.

**Presumption negates:**

1) We assume statements to be false until proven true. That is why we don’t believe in alternate realities or conspiracy theories. The lack of a reason to believe something is false does not mean it is assumed to be true. The black swan disproved the statement “all swans are white.”

2) Statements are more often false then true. If I say this pen is red, I can only prove it true in one way by demonstrating that it is indeed red, where I can prove it false in an infinite amount of ways

3) “To negate,” means “to deny the truth of,” which means any argument that renders affirming false is sufficient to negate. If an assumption the AC makes is false, the resolution is also false. I.e. if my parents don’t exist, then it’s impossible to say that they want me to do my homework because that statement presupposes my parents exist in the first place.

#### The meta-ethic is constructivism – morality is constructed through social interactions and does not exist a priori. Prefer –

a] Rule-following paradox—rules are infinitely regressive because they rely on more rules to explain them that are based in social understanding.

b] Epistemology—the way we interpret the natural world is necessarily framed by social constructs—we don’t call trees trees because of some natural fact about trees, rather the interpretation an individual subject places on them.

c] Externalism fails—even if a priori normative facts exist, they’re epistemically inaccessible because humans are products of their molecular biology—the mind can’t derive facts independent of material, external forces like gravity.

#### The state of nature necessitates infinite violence between conflicting world views –

a] Pre-emption—if there’s no basis to condemn actions, then everyone acts solely in their own self-interest—that means the most rational strategy is to take people out before they can hurt you

b] Resource Wars—a finite amount of material resources creates conflict between different people who want it

c] Action Theory—the imposition of your world view through action necessitates violence against the other since it de-legitimizes their perspective.

#### There is no objective solution to this conflict, because truth is relative. Instead, conflict requires the creation of the sovereign, to resolve disputes. In exchange for their safety, subjects agree to give up their claims to meaning to the sovereign.

Parrish 04 [Parrish, Rick, (Rick Parrish teaches at Loyola University New Orleans. His current research is focused on the play of violence and respect within justice.) "Derrida’S Economy Of Violence In Hobbes’ Social Contract" Theory &amp; Event, Vol. 7 No. 4, 2005, 2005, http://muse.jhu.edu/article/244119#back, DOA:6-30-2018 // WWBW]

All of the foregoing points to the conclusion that in the commonwealth **the sovereign's** first and **most fundamental job is to be the ultimate definer**. Several other commentators have also reached this conclusion. By way of elaborating upon the importance of the moderation of individuality in Hobbes' theory of government, Richard Flathman claims that peace "is possible only if the ambiguity and disagreement that pervade general thinking and acting are eliminated by the stipulations of a sovereign."57 Pursuant to debunking the perennial misinterpretation of Hobbes' mention of people as wolves, Paul Johnson argues that "**one of the primary functions of the sovereign** is to provide the necessary unity of meaning and reference for the primary terms in which men try to conduct their social lives."58 "The whole raison d'être of sovereign helmsmanship **lies** squarely **in the chronic defusing of interpretive clashes**,"59 **without which** **humans would** "fly off in all directions"60 and **fall inevitably into the violence of the natural condition.** 26. It is not surprising that so many noted students of Hobbes have reached this conclusion, given how prominently he himself makes this claim. According to Hobbes, "in the state of nature, where every man is his own judge, and differeth from others concerning the names and appellations of things, and from those differences arise quarrels and breach of peace, it was necessary there should be a common measure of all things, that might fall in controversy."61 The main categories of the sovereign's tasks are "to make and abrogate laws, to determine war and peace, [and] to know and judge of all controversies,"62 but each of these duties is a subspecies of its ultimate duty to be the sole and ultimate definer in matters of public importance. **It is only through the sovereign's effective continued accomplishment of this duty that the people of a commonwealth avoid the definitional problems that typify the state of nature.** 27. Judging controversies, which Hobbes lists as the third main task of the sovereign, is the duty most obviously about being the ultimate definer. In fact, Hobbes declares it a law of nature that "in every controversy, the parties thereto ought mutually to agree upon an arbitrator, whom they both trust; and mutually to covenant to stand to the sentence he shall give therein."63 As I repeatedly alluded to above, this agreement to abide by the decision of a third party arbitrator, **a sovereign** in the commonwealth, **is necessary because of the fundamentally perspectival and relative nature of persons' imputations of meaning and value into the situations they construct.** Hobbes understands this problem, as evidenced by his claim that "seeing right reason is not existent, the reason of some man or men must supply the place thereof; and that man or men, is he or they, that have the sovereign power"64 to dictate meanings that will be followed by all. The sovereign is even protected from potential democratic impulses, by which a 'true' meaning would be that agreed upon by the greatest number of people. Because "no one man's reason, nor the reason of any one number of men, makes the certainty," they will still "come to blows . . . for want of a right reason constituted by nature"65 unless both the majority and the minority agree to abide by the meanings promulgated by the sovereign. 28. These meanings are usually created and promulgated by the sovereign in the form of laws, another of the tasks with which Hobbes charges it. In one of his clearest explanations of the law, Hobbes writes that "it belongs to the same chief power to make some common rules for all men, and to declare them publicly, by which every man may know what may be called his, what another's, what just, what unjust, what honest, what dishonest, what good, what evil; that is summarily, what is to be done, what to be avoided in our common course of life."66 The civil law is the set of the sovereign's definitions for ownership, justice, good, evil, and all other concepts that are important for the maintenance of peace in the commonwealth. When everyone follows the law (that is, when everyone follows the sovereign's definitions) there are far fewer conflicts among persons because everyone appeals to the same meanings. This means that people know what meanings others will use to evaluate the actions of themselves and others, so the state of nature's security dilemmas and attempts to force one's own meanings upon others are overcome. 29. **There is to be no question of the truth or falsity of the sovereign's definitions because "there are no authentical doctrines concerning right and wrong**, good and evil, **besides the constituted laws in each realm and government."**67 In fact, Hobbes specifically says that one of the "diseases of a commonwealth" is that "every private man is judge of good and evil actions."68 **Only when individual persons agree to follow the meanings promulgated by the sovereign, which of course includes refraining from trying to impose their own meanings on others, can persons live together in peace -- when they take it upon themselves to impose meaning on situations of public import, they descend into violence again.**

#### Thus, the standard is consistency with the will of the sovereign.

#### Vote neg –

#### 1] states can’t have obligations to external standards like international law since their only obligation is to avoid the state of nature –the state can’t restrict its own power since it exists outside the law which means the res is impossible – vote neg on presumption

#### 2] the res implies an unchanging normative claim but this is impossible as truth is constructed through socialization and there’s no guarantee that all subjects would come to the same truth claims.

#### Prefer –

#### [1] Bindingness: Without the sovereign, each person becomes their own sovereign and attempts to put their own will over others until one sovereign is victorious. To escape the state of nature subjects become receptive to their own desires and use force to define and create the sovereign.

#### [2] Epistemic Humility: Allowing multiple conflicting schemes ensures that people will resist other’s schemes inevitably causing violence. Humans naturally have limitations so presuming we can deductively arrive at all ethical truths freezes action because we will never be able to fully be certain—empirically proven by the centuries of indeterminate ethical debate.

#### [3] Due Process: Social identities are inescapable since they’re necessary to assign obligations—for example, firefighters can only be assigned their unique obligation to fight fires based on social identities. Only the sovereign can unify conflicting social obligations into an overarching government—individual people may be able to identify injustice but they do not have the appropriate social identity to punish unjust acts.

## Case

### Offence

#### Submitting to international limits on power is a contradiction in will – it weakens the republic and has no binding force.

Waltz ’62 (Waltz, Kenneth N. "Kant, Liberalism, and War." The American Political Science Review 56, no. 2 (1962): 331-40. doi:10.2307/1952369.)

So long at least as the state "runs a danger of being suddenly swallowed up by other States," it must be powerful externally as well as internally. In international relations the difficulties multiply. The republican form is preferable, partly because republics are more peacefully inclined; but despotisms are stronger-and no one would expect or wish to bring the state into jeopardy by decreasing its strength.15 Standing armies are dangerous, arms races themselves being a cause of war, but in the absence of an outside agency affording protection, each state must look to the effectiveness of its army.'6 A freely flowing commerce is a means of promoting peace, but a state must control imports, in the interests of its subjects "and not for the advantage of strangers and the encouragement of the industry of others, because the State without the prosperity of the people would not possess sufficient power to resist external enemies or to maintain itself as a common- wealth."'7 Not only standing armies but also, indeed more so, the disparity of economic capacities may represent danger, occasion fear, and give rise to war. Kant's concern with the strength and thus the safety of the state is part of his perception of the necessities of power politics. Among states in the world, as among individuals in the state of nature, there is constantly either violence or the threat of violence. States, like "lawless savages," are with each other "naturally in a nonjuridical condition.'8 There is no law above them; there is no judge among them; there is no legal process by which states can pursue their rights. They can do so only by war, and, as Kant points out, neither war nor the treaty of peace following it, can settle the question of right. A treaty of peace can end only a particular war; a pretext for new hostilities can always be found. "Nor can such a pretext under these circumstances be regarded as un- just; for in this state of society every nation is the judge of its own cause."'19 More surely than those who extract and emphasize merely Kant's republican aspirations and peaceful hopes, Khrushchev speaks as though he had read Kant correctly. "War," in Khrushchev's peculiar yet apt phrase, "is not fatalistically inevitable." Kant does set forth the "shoulds" and "oughts" of state behavior.2' He does not expect them to be followed in a state of nature, for, as he says, "philosophically or diplomatically composed codes have not, nor could have, the slightest legal force, since the States as such stand under no common legal constraint.... 22 His intention clearly is that the "oughts" be taken as the basis for the juridical order that must one day be established among states, just as the rights of the individual, though not viable in a state of nature, provided the basis for the civil state.

#### Intellectual property is equivalent to actual property, and violations of it are coercive.

**Mossoff,** Adam. "Why Intellectual Property Rights? A Lockean Justification." *Library of law and liberty* (20**15**).

<https://lawliberty.org/forum/why-intellectual-property-rights-a-lockean-justification/>

One of the strengths of the Lockean property theory is that it recognizes that **IP rights are** fundamentally **the same as all property rights** in all types of assets—from personal goods to water to land to air to inventions to books. **These** and many other type of goods **are the byproduct of an individual’s value-creating, productive labor that creates them, acquires them, transforms and uses them, and ultimately disposes of them in voluntary transactions with other people in civil society.** This is why Locke himself expressly recognizes that **copyright is property.** He also wrote approvingly of inventions and the technical arts as exemplars of the value-creating, productive labor that creates all property (contrary to oft-repeated, mistaken claims about Locke’s view of IP rights by some scholars today[4]). The key moral insight in Locke’s Two Treatises of Civil Government is that all property arises from the fact that individuals must produce the values required for a flourishing human life. Accordingly, **property rights define the sphere of liberty required for an individual to create, use, and dispose of these values**. As I have explained, this is the essence of Locke’s “mixing labor” argument for property in the Two Treatises.[5] Here, “mixing labor” is a metaphor that refers to the productive labor that creates the physical goods required for a flourishing human life. Philosopher Stephen Buckle, for instance, writes that, for Locke, “labour is the improving, value-adding activity required by the duty to preserve oneself and others.”[6] Locke is absolutely clear about the meaning of value: “the intrinsick value of things . . . depends only on their usefulness to the Life of Man.” (TT II.37)[7] In this important respect, the concept of value in Locke’s labor theory of value and in his broader property theory is not economic or materialistic; as I have explained, it is a moral concept that refers to the intellectual and physical values that one creates to live a flourishing life, or what Locke repeatedly refers to in the Two Treatises as the “conveniences of life” (TT II.26, II.34, II.37, II.36, II.48).  This is unsurprising given Locke’s commitment to classical natural law ethical theory and its moral ideal of a flourishing life, consisting of both mental and physical values.[8] This important point is often missed by legal scholars and philosophers who read only the Second Treatise, or perhaps only just Chapter 5 (“Of Property”) of the Second Treatise, and thus fail to recognize the broader philosophical framework in which Locke situates his political theory generally and his property theory in particular. In the First Treatise, for instance, Locke explains that it is man’s nature as “an intellectual Creature” that makes him “capable of Dominion.” (TT I.30) A flourishing human life requires both intellectual and physical labor—the production of the intellectual and physical values that serve the “conveniences of life” through the uniquely human capacity for rationally guided action. **In brief, “mixing labor” occurs when a rational person engages in value-producing labor, and he creates property**—dominion in the Latin of the Roman Law and of modern political philosophy.[9] These foundational ideas from Locke’s ethical theory explain why his examples of value-creating labor in the Second Treatise consist mostly of the “Industry” of technological inventions, such as the bread made by the “Mill [and] Oven,” the “Plough” that tills the soil, and “all the Materials made use in the Ship,” among others. (TT II.43) And we must not forget the conceptual skills of artisans that made possible “the Labour of those who broke the Oxen, who digged and wrought the Iron and Stones, who felled and framed the Timber.” (TT II.43) This is what Locke means when he writes that “the ordinary Provisions of Life, through their several progresses, before they come to our use, … receive of their value from Human Industry.” (TT II.42) (original emphasis) Locke’s own explanation of his property theory is replete with examples of his moral approval of how technological inventions secure for an individual the “conveniences of life”—a flourishing human life. What to make of this deeper moral insight embedded in Lockean property theory, especially in justifying IP rights? Two important points are worth noting. First, it shows how legal scholars and philosophers have misconstrued Locke’s famous farming examples in the Second Treatise (TT II.32, II.37, II.40, II.43, II.48) in claiming that his property theory is restricted to only physical parcels of earth or goods. Those who assert that Lockean property theory establishes that property is solely about resolving conflicts over a preexisting physical resource (like the land used for a farm) have taken a premise from Locke’s explanation for the formation of civil society and grafted it onto Locke’s entirely separate explanation for why property is justified. Locke’s farming examples are illustrations of value-creating, productive labor because they are replete with conspicuous references to the intellectually-driven, technological inventions that make possible farming in the first place. Second, and directly related to the first point, it explains why Locke himself expressly justifies copyright as “property” and approvingly refers to “Inventions and arts” in his summation of his theory that property arises from value-creating, productive labor that supports the “conveniences of life” in § 44 of the Second Treatise. In 1690, the legal concept of patents (property rights in inventions) did not exist yet,[10] and so this is an explicit indication of Locke’s willingness to include what would later become the legal concept of patents within his property theory. With respect to copyright, which was slowly coming into existence as a legal concept in the late 17th century, Locke expressly endorses it as a property right in 1695. In an essay on the statutory printing monopoly granted to the Stationers Company by Parliament, Locke condemns such monopolies as violating the “property” in creative works that “authors” rightly claim for themselves.[11] In what might be a further surprising claim for many today who think copyright terms are too long, Locke writes in this 1695 essay that authors should have their property rights secured to them for their lifetimes or after first publication plus “50 or 70 years.”[12] The current copyright term is life of an author plus 70 years, which was set in 1998 by the much-maligned Copyright Term Extension Act.[13] And to be clear that Locke believes that it is authors who should have a property right in their literary works that can be freely alienated in the marketplace, he further proposes an amendment to Parliament that any new printing statute should expressly “secure the author’s property in his copy, or to his whom he has transferred it.”[14] The natural law ethical theory that informs Locke’s argument for property rights explains why he thinks his property theory applies to inventions and books. In § 34 of the Second Treatise, Locke explains that **the world exists for “the use of the Industrious and Rational”** **who obtain the “greatest Conveniences of Life they were capable to draw from it” by the “Labour [that] was to be his Title to it.”** (original emphasis) It is man’s rational nature as an “intellectual Creature” (TT I.30) that is the source of both the moral ideal (a flourishing life) and the means to that end (value-creating, productive labor). It is not lions, tigers, bears, or other “dangerous and noxious Creatures” (TT II.16) who invented the plough, the mill, and ships. Such **inventions represent the rationally-guided, value-creating, productive labor that serves a flourishing human life in civil society, and this is why Locke highlights them as exemplars of his property theory.** Lockean Theory in Modern American IP Law The genius and success of Anglo-American property law is that it has recognized and applied the central idea from Lockean property theory that property rights secure values, not just physical objects. As James Madison explains in a 1792 essay, property is more than just “a man’s land, or merchandize, or money,” as it has a “larger and juster meaning, [in which] it embraces everything to which a man may attach a value and have a right.”[15] Madison thus concluded that **“a man has a property in his opinions” and even that he has “a property in his rights.”**[16] This explains the hoary metaphor that the law should secure the fruits of one’s labors.[17] Just as with Locke’s “mixing labor” metaphor, the “fruits of one’s labors” is a metaphor that refers to the use and profit that one enjoys from laboring on one’s property. Of course, the idea that property rights secure justly deserved profit from the use of property was not novel to Locke; in 1628, for example, Lord Coke posited the rhetorical question, “What is the land but the profits therefrom?”[18] But Locke’s genius is to give this idea its moral import.  It is also the genius of early American courts that they applied this moral principle in the law. American courts recognized that “property … may be violated without the physical taking of property” following any act that “destroys it or its value.”[19] While there have always been scholars, judges, and even some prominent American Founders who thought otherwise about patents and other IP rights, the dominant approach among American courts was to secure patents, copyrights, and other IP rights as fundamental property rights. As I have explained in my scholarship, for instance, patents were defined as civil rights securing fundamental property rights, and thus identified at the time by the legal term of art, “privilege” (see here). American legislators and courts thus secured property rights in novel and useful inventions, creative works, trademarks, and trade secrets—securing the right to make, use, and profit from the value created by one’s productive (inventive) labors. For the sake of brevity, a few illustrative quotes must suffice. In a patent lawsuit in 1845, an American judge wrote that **“we protect intellectual property, the labors of the mind, productions and interests as much a man’s own, and as much the fruit of his honest industry, as the wheat he cultivates, or the flocks he rears.”**[20] This 1845 judicial opinion appears to be the first use of the phrase “intellectual property” in the official American legal records. In his famous 1826 treatise, Commentaries on American Law, Chancellor James Kent classifies copyrights and patents under the title, “Original Acquisition by Intellectual Labor.” Here, Kent argues for the Lockean principle that **“It is just that [authors and inventors] should enjoy the pecuniary profits resulting from mental as well as bodily labor.”**[21] As 19th century judges were wont to say, the patent laws ensured that an inventor would “enjoy the fruits of his invention.”[22] Even more explicitly invoking the Lockean theory I described earlier, one judge in 1843 explained that it is “difficult to draw a distinction between the fruits of mental and physical labor” and that this is a key reason why the patent laws provide that “a man should be secured in the fruits of his ingenuity and labor.”[23] These are only a few examples from a historical legal record of IP rights that are permeated with references to Lockean theory.[24] But many scholars today reject such evidence as mere “rhetoric.” The conventional wisdom is that, while such sentiments were perhaps widespread given American exceptionalism, they had no real impact in the creation and enforcement of IP rights in actual legal doctrine.[25] This is wrong for several reasons. I cannot address them all in a short essay here, but I will identify a couple to make the case that Lockean theory was determinative in designing novel legal protections for IP rights in the early American Republic. First, as a preliminary matter, my colleague, Eric Claeys, has shown that this critique results in part from foisting on Lockean property theory a deontological framework that is alien to Locke’s ethical and political theory. It was also alien to the American legal actors who understood Lockean theory and implemented it in the law. Thus, this indeterminacy critique is really a strawman attack on Lockean theory. Such deeper philosophical concerns, including a deeper conceptual dispute about what comprises the concept of property itself,[26] are beyond the scope of this essay. Here, it is sufficient to explain that Lockean theory was determinative in designing IP law, and in fact it drove the creation and application of many doctrines that have come to be settled IP law in the United States, at least with respect to legally securing patented innovation. To understand this point, though, one must first understand how legal doctrines are generally construed and applied by courts and other legal actors. As a general matter, the law functions through presumptions that are built into a legal doctrine according to the normative theory that justified the doctrine when it was created. According to Lockean political theory, the law functions by securing the rights to life, liberty, and property, which are limited by the equal protection of other people’s rights or by the rights-holder’s own default on his moral claims. To give a noncontroversial example: Adults have the constitutional right to vote in the United States, unless of course one commits a felony and is currently residing in prison. A right defines the scope of one’s liberty and the law implements this through the default rules and rebuttable presumptions that constitute much of the work of legal analysis. There are too many complexities to show how this works for all IP rights and so this essay will focus on early American patent law. As shown above, many legislatures and judges recognized that patents are property rights in innovation resulting from value-creating, productive labor. Accordingly, this defined the nature of the legal presumptions the courts applied in securing patents to their owners. This is evident in some of the basic doctrinal requirements in patent law. For instance, Lockean theory justifies the uniquely American approach of securing patents to the “first inventor,” which is a presumption that could be rebutted by the inventor’s own actions resulting in a default on his claim to a patent. This default occurs, for instance, when a first inventor publicly uses or sells an invention and thus creates moral interests and reasonable expectations secured under the law to third parties to its ongoing, unfettered use.[27] Furthermore, the doctrinal requirement that patents may issue only for technological innovation that is useful, and not for just abstract ideas, is also justified by Lockean property theory’s basic premise that productive labor creates the useful real-world values that serve a flourishing life.[28] Lastly, Lockean theory justifies the longstanding doctrinal presumption that an inventor is entitled to a patent unless it can be proven that his application fails the various doctrinal requirements for a valid patent (that the invention is novel, useful, and fully disclosed).[29] Beyond these basic doctrinal requirements for obtaining a valid patent, the justification of patents as property rights according to Lockean theory had additional and far-reaching practical effects in the law. It led judges to fashion other crucially important doctrinal presumptions, such as adopting the interpretative canon taken from common law judges’ interpretation of title deeds that patents should be construed liberally in favor of the inventor (we now refer to this as the presumption of validity, which is expressly provided for in the patent statutes).[30]This made sense to early American judges, who legally classified patents as “title” deeds[31] and who further defined patent rights according to concepts from common law property doctrines, such as identifying multiple owners of patents as “tenants in common.”[32] The policy justification that courts should secure to innovators the fruits of their inventive labors was embedded in the conceptualization of patents as property rights in the early American political and legal system. For similar reasons, Lockean theory inexorably led American judges to extend constitutional protections to patents under the Constitution, which directly contrasted with denials of similar protections for monopoly franchise grants. American judges often contrasted American property rights with the franchise grants in inventions in other countries, such as in England.[33] This was a point of difference often highlighted by American judges as to the superior treatment of American innovators—here, inventors received proper protection for the fruits of their inventive labors under the American laws that secured property rights in innovation.[34] Last, and certainly not least, the protection of patents as fundamental property rights justified by Lockean theory led courts to craft the important legal protections for patent owners in alienating their property rights in the marketplace. Courts expressly incorporated into patent law the common law property doctrines securing the right to freely transfer one’s property rights in the marketplace. Courts even adopted the same concepts used to describe such transfers by common law property owners—patent owners transfer their rights via “assignments” or “licenses.”[35] Award-winning economic historians like Zorina Khan and others have shown that this led to an explosion in commercial transactions in the United States, as inventors and capitalists embraced the efficiencies of the division of labor and market specialization.[36] This important economic activity was made possible in part by courts securing patents as property rights, applying Lockean property theory’s normative presumption in favor of private ordering of the marketplace through freedom of contract. The protection of IP rights as property rights under Lockean theory in early American law was not limited to patents, as scholars have shown for trademark and copyright.[37] It is undeniable that there were judges and even some Founders, such as Thomas Jefferson, who believed that IP rights were special grants of monopoly privileges. But their views were absent when courts crafted the key legal doctrines that defined American IP rights and secured these property rights against widely reviled “pirates.”[38] The intellectual history of IP rights, at least from the 18th century onward, is one in which the legal doctrines securing patents, copyrights, and trademarks were conceived as property rights and applied in real-world cases under the guidance of Lockean property theory. As Circuit Justice Bushrod Washington explained in 1817: **patent infringement is “an unlawful invasion of property.”**[39]**Prefer the mixing theory of labor as the theory by which we determine who has a right to a thing. a) you have no theory of property which makes it impossible to argue about who is owed what. b) if you mixed your labor with something to create an idea, it means taking that idea takes your labor which is coercive. c) simplicity: it's the easiest to use because all you have to think about is “did I mix my work, with something in reality”.**

#### of[[1]](#footnote-1) is to “expressing an age” but the rez doesn’t delineate a length of time

#### the[[2]](#footnote-2) is “denoting a disease or affliction” but the WTO isn’t a disease

#### to[[3]](#footnote-3) is to “expressing motion in the direction of (a particular location)” but the rez doesn’t have a location

1. https://www.google.com/search?q=of+definition&rlz=1C1CHBF\_enUS877US877&oq=of+definition&aqs=chrome.0.69i59j69i61l3.1473j0j7&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8 [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. https://www.google.com/search?q=the+definition&rlz=1C1CHBF\_enUS877US877&oq=the+definition&aqs=chrome..69i57j69i64j69i61j69i60l2.1976j0j7&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8 [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. https://www.google.com/search?q=to+definition&rlz=1C1CHBF\_enUS877US877&oq=to+definition&aqs=chrome..69i57j69i60l3.1415j0j7&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8 [↑](#footnote-ref-3)