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#### The coherence of the Western subject is formulated in opposition to the native – this death drive towards elimination structures settler futurity via the libidinal economy and its investments in native suffering because the native is the quilting point of settler subject formation.

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Bryanne Houston Young, “Killing the Indian in the Child: Materialities of Death and Political Formations of Life in the Canadian Indian Residential School System,” 2017 // sam

Against the politicized topographies and temporalities of indigeneity and race, I now move into a consideration of the contributions of psychoanalytic theory to the questions of politics and time presented thus far. The kinds of questions psychoanalysis is interested in asking, the registers upon which it performs analysis, and its unique emphasis on temporality, language, and difference provide an excellent conceptual apparatus through which we might begin to trouble/problematize stable, taken-for-granted oppositions between psychic and social, personal and political, self and other. Freud’s interest in time is evident in his work on the uncanny, and in his inaugural work on what we might now call trauma studies and conditions we now call post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). For Freud, this theory of hysteria introduces a provocative temporality in which traumatic events reoccur, flashing up in perfect replication of themselves, as though happening again and again. In his diagnosis of so-called shell-shocked soldiers returning from World War I, Freud was keenly aware that time did not always progress along an even plane. Though Freud’s analysis of trauma is captivating and critically rich, it is not within my purview here to take on the full extent of this scholarship. Instead, what is most salient to my analysis are the capacities of psychoanalytic theory to move critique outside and beyond prevailing notions of time and narratives of progress that only mean moving forward. This chapter writes from a stance that views it as imperative that scholarship reaches beyond, and thinks outside, the paradigms that invented it. Psychoanalytic theory, with its idiosyncratic temporal logics—particularly in conjunction with Foucauldian theory—offers a productive and robust way to critique the continuing primacy of normative disciplines whose chronologics have historically warranted a politics that kills in the name of life. Such an approach allows us to hold in productive tension any definition of “the political” as stable and finite, with—as in the case of liberal political philosophy—the legally constructed “person” as its primary epistemological unit. This conceptual capacity of psychoanalysis, in turn, allows us to politicize a form of life and modality of corporeal personhood hitherto constructed as what, in Bataillean parlance, we might call colonialism’s accursed share—colonialism’s pure waste. Additionally, psychoanalytic notions of the death drive, whose proper movement is explicitly circular, allows us to begin to locate the child within logics of futurity, onto which is laminated a kind of indelible whiteness. For the purpose of my analysis I engage Lacanian psychoanalysis, limiting myself to a consideration of the structure of the drives and to a Lacanian conceptualization of language, and its role in the formation of self and the suturing of the psyche to sociality. Freud, as Teresa De Lauretis (2008) emphasizes, elaborated the death drive between the First and Second World Wars, in a Europe living “under the shadow of death and the threat of biological and cultural genocide” (1). Situating her analysis of the death drive in the contemporary moment, De Lauretis points to this contextual, historical darkening, writing: “I wonder whether our epistemologies can sustain the impact of the real … If I return to Freud’s notion of an unconscious death drive, it is because it conveys the sense and the force of something in human reality that resists discursive articulation as well as political diplomacy, an otherness that haunts the dream of a common world” (9). Using psychoanalysis as reading practice, Freud’s suspicion that human life, both individual and social, is compromised from the beginning by something that undermines it, works against it, is (darkly?) generative. The death drive indicates a tension bordering psychic and libidinal relations, which marks Freud’s radical break with Cartesian rationality and points to a negativity that counteracts the optimistic affirmations of human perfectability. This dimension of radical negativity cannot be reduced to an expression of alienated social conditions, nor is it entirely something the body does on its own. Theorized as the destruction drive, the antagonism drive, or sometimes, simply “the drive,” it is impossible to escape. In psychoanalytic theory, therefore, particularly in the clinical setting, the objective is not to overcome the drive, but rather to come to terms with it, in what Slovenian Lacanian psychoanalytic theorist Slavoj Žižek (1989) calls “its terrifying dimension” (4). It is a fundamental axiom of Lacanian psychoanalytic theory that attempts to abolish the drive antagonism are precisely the source of totalitarian temptation. Žižek writes: “The greatest mass murders and holocausts have always been perpetrated in the name of man as harmonious being, of a New Man without antagonistic tension” (5). So it is that one of Canada’s greatest atrocities— the genocide of its First Peoples—took place in the name of Canada itself, that sought progress and unification as a single body politic with claims on a shared futurity. The fulfillment of this destiny relied upon the negation of the other, the bad race, the dangerous race, the race that stood outside the purview of the norm and had no share in its time-zone, the ones called to live in the between space—as nobody. As the relatively more benign civilization policies failed to convert Aboriginal forms of life into separate but civilized, Christian communities on reserves, the federal government intensified its tactics. Policies became more aggressive. As these more aggressive policies (such as enfranchisement) also failed, the federal government intensified its tactics once again, escalating the stakes and the strategies towards the horizon of assimilation. This ‘doubling down’ in the face of failure is a primary trace effect of the death drive, and indeed, it is not unreasonable to argue that the federal government Indian policy has, since confederation, been death driven. Because the aim of fully eradicating the otherness of the other can only fail—in Freudian parlance, it cannot be mastered—the trajectory of the aiming turns in a circularity, orbiting around that which can never be had: perfection. Caught in death drive circularity, the aiming towards the objective (i.e. a unified body politic) authorizes, and indeed recruits, escalating violence in the interest of—finally—closing the open. For Žižek, this compulsive ‘doubling-down’ in the face of failure to arrive at the impossible horizon of perfection tips towards totalitarian temptation, which, he tells us, is implicated in the drive to unify a singular body politic, a new man without antagonistic tension. The drive aims for the return to a moment of unity before the intrusion of language and the entrance of the subject into what Lacan calls the Symbolic—the universe of symbols in which all human subjects share. Because this economy of signifiers operates through a modality of difference by association, on the premise that language does not reflect or carry within it universal a priori meaning, spirit, or Truth, signifiers are always and already sliding along a chain of signification that is never truly fixed. Rather, for Lacan, meaning is constructed through quilting points, durable concepts that affix ideas to their signifiers and which, in their durability, structure entire fields of meaning. For Lacan, subjects are formed by their entrance into this system of sliding difference from a pre-linguistic state retroactively constructed through nostalgic affective associations with unity, perfection, and completion. The loss or lack occurs in the imaginary, the order of presence and absence, and is formalized in the symbolic. This is experienced by the subject as a loss of that to which she/he can never again return, but for which she/he perpetually yearns, and toward which she/he perpetually moves. The circularity of movement toward this impossible horizon is precisely the movement of the drive. It is my argument that the concept of “the Indian” is a quilting point through which the field of politics in Canada is sutured into signification, a durable concept that organizes the meaning of nation, citizen, sovereignty, and subjecthood. Further, the hypoxic vision of national unity and a harmonious white(ned) citizenry is a movement propelled by the drive, a circularity impelled by the belief that what is lacking in the present can be made good in the future—an imaginary that activates/harnesses a kind of libidinal energy that is, by its very nature, inexhaustible. It matters, in the instance of the Canadian Indian Residential Schools and their mandate, that before child subjects enter into the structuration of language/the Symbolic, their bodies are already marked as disprized, abject, inscribed into the signification for, and, I argue, as, loss itself. As I have argued above, reading through psychoanalytic theory facilitates a conceptualization of subject-formation that includes the role of signification in the contouring of subject/ivities. This analytic rubric is importantly brought to bear in my analysis of “the child” the Canadian Indian Residential School System announces into presence: a child fundamentally and constitutively tied to a death whose temporal structure is always deferred, always impartial, always unfolding, and yet always still to be. Indeed, even in circumstances in which her/his mode of being in the world is not a deliberate practice of making spectral, “the child” remains a notoriously ambivalent, slippery signifier. This plasticity—differently stated, this over-abundant availability of “the child” as concept—takes on an interesting significance within political thought, functioning not as that which is politicized, but as the signifier in whose name the political mobilizes itself. In this way, the child functions as the absolute outside to political thought and the logics of its temporality, functioning instead to condition its possibilities and organize, from beyond its borders, its spatial and temporal limits. An example of this conceptualization of the child as signifier—and certainly one of the more provocative articulations of this phenomena in the contemporary neoliberal moment—is the polemic Lee develops in his monograph No Future: Queer Theory and the Death Drive. For Edelman, the Child—in its conflation with the kind of futurity toward which the teleology of (neo)liberal discourse is mobilized—is not simply important to contemporary politics, but is that which “serves to regulate political discourse [itself]” (ii). Indeed, as Edelman points out, “the figural Child alone embodies the citizen as ideal, entitled to claim full rights to its future share in the nation’s good, though always at the cost of limiting the rights ‘real’ citizens are allowed. For the social exists to preserve for this universalized subject, this fantasmatic Child, a national freedom more highly valued than the actuality of freedom itself” (ii). In Edelman’s polemic, it goes without saying that the figural child is a white child and that children of colour, children of mixed heritage, Indian children—within the Ideological State Apparatus of the Indian Residential Schools—far from carrying the over-abundant significance Edelman so adeptly parses, signify on only the most spectral of registers. This child, I argue, as a kind of spectral(ized) partial subject, instantiates a subjectivity simultaneously over-exposed to the political and over-determined by the word of the law, while barely accorded even the status of bare life. This is a subject that is hailed into a circularity of misrecognition in a relationship with death that is virtually inescapable. This relationship with death is the suture that connects this subject to the social. Edelman’s argument does not address racialized formations of self-hood, but is no less relevant to the argument I seek to develop here. Indeed, it is perhaps all the keener in what it omits—which is the child of color. This omission points to the level of signification and the way in which the whitened child is effortlessly lifted from the problematically raced body—the body whose racialized status is found problematic. This fantasy of purification through signification speaks, in ways that are eloquent and disturbing in equal measure, precisely the fantasy of the Canadian Indian Residential School System: that the body of the Indian could be left behind in a transcendent movement away from the vexatious quagmire posed by the Indian body toward the realm of what Kantian philosophy calls pure spirit, the realm of whiteness, purity, and hypoxic visions of what Edelman calls, “a national freedom more highly valued than the actuality of freedom itself” (ii). This fantasy of corporeal abandonment points to the latent desire of Western philosophical thought that seeks, through the disavowal of bodily finitude and a fetishization of the logos, access to purity of form, a fantasy that relegates, leaves trapped, the sometimes racialized, sometimes feminized other, mired in flesh and finitude from which it is allowed no escape. The Indigenous person, we remember from Hegel’s Lectures on the Philosophy of World History, is imagined as always already outside the teleology of history, already extinct. This way of understanding difference, through the rubric of historical progress, remains central to liberal and neoliberal political thought, economic practices, and policies in the current moment. Prising the child away from the Indian, meanwhile, continues to have important implications in the way we imagine colonial forms, not only of life, but also of death.

#### Removal recasts indigenous land as property, turning natives into ghosts, displaced and severed from their land – this ontological violence is all-encompassing and incalculable within Western ethical frames.

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Eve Tuck and K Wayne Yang, “Decolonization is not a Metaphor”, Decolonization: Indigeneity, Education, and Society, Vol. 1, No. 1, 2012, pp. 1-40, <http://clas.osu.edu/sites/clas.osu.edu/files/Tuck%20and%20Yang%202012%20Decolonization%20is%20not%20a%20metaphor.pdf> // sam

Our intention in this descriptive exercise is not be exhaustive, or even inarguable; instead, we wish to emphasize that (a) decolonization will take a different shape in each of these contexts-though they can overlap-and that (b) neither external nor internal colonialism adequately describe the form of colonialism which operates in the United States or other nation-states in which the colonizer comes to stay. Settler colonialism operates through internal/external colonial modes simultaneously because there is no spatial separation between metropole and colony. For example, in the United States, many Indigenous peoples have been forcibly removed from their homelands onto reservations, indentured, and abducted into state custody, signaling the form of colonization as simultaneously internal (via boarding schools and other biopolitical modes of control) and external (via uranium mining on Indigenous land in the US Southwest and oil extraction on Indigenous land in Alaska) with a frontier (the US military still nicknames all enemy territory “Indian Country”). The horizons of the settler colonial nation-state are total and require a mode of total appropriation of Indigenous life and land, rather than the selective expropriation of profit-producing fragments. Settler colonialism is different from other forms of colonialism in that settlers come with the intention of making a new home on the land, a homemaking that insists on settler sovereignty over all things in their new domain. Thus, relying solely on postcolonial literatures or theories of coloniality that ignore settler colonialism will not help to envision the shape that decolonization must take in settler colonial contexts. Within settler colonialism, the most important concern is land/water/air/subterranean earth (land, for shorthand, in this article.) Land is what is most valuable, contested, required. This is both because the settlers make Indigenous land their new home and source of capital, and also because the disruption of Indigenous relationships to land represents a profound epistemic, ontological, cosmological violence. This violence is not temporally contained in the arrival of the settler but is reasserted each day of occupation. This is why Patrick Wolfe (1999) emphasizes that settler colonialism is a structure and not an event. In the process of settler colonialism, land is remade into property and human relationships to land are restricted to the relationship of the owner to his property. Epistemological, ontological, and cosmological relationships to land are interred, indeed made pre-modern and backward. Made savage. In order for the settlers to make a place their home, they must destroy and disappear the Indigenous peoples that live there. Indigenous peoples are those who have creation stories, not colonization stories, about how we/they came to be in a particular place-indeed how we/they came to be a place. Our/their relationships to land comprise our/their epistemologies, ontologies, and cosmologies. For the settlers, Indigenous peoples are in the way and, in the destruction of Indigenous peoples, Indigenous communities, and over time and through law and policy, Indigenous peoples’ claims to land under settler regimes, land is recast as property and as a resource. Indigenous peoples must be erased, must be made into ghosts (Tuck and Ree, forthcoming). At the same time, settler colonialism involves the subjugation and forced labor of chattel slaves whose bodies and lives become the property, and who are kept landless. Slavery in settler colonial contexts is distinct from other forms of indenture whereby excess labor is extracted from persons. First, chattels are commodities of labor and therefore it is the slave’s person that is the excess. Second, unlike workers who may aspire to own land, the slave’s very presence on the land is already an excess that must be dis-located. Thus, the slave is a desirable commodity but the person underneath is imprisonable, punishable, and murderable. The violence of keeping/killing the chattel slave makes them deathlike monsters in the settler imagination; they are reconfigured/disfigured as the threat, the razor’s edge of safety and terror. The settler, if known by his actions and how he justifies them, sees himself as holding dominion over the earth and its flora and fauna, as the anthropocentric normal, and as more developed, more human, more deserving than other groups or species. The settler is making anew "home" and that home is rooted in a homesteading worldview where the wild land and wild people were made for his benefit. He can only make his identity as a settler by making the land produce, and produce excessively, because "civilization" is defined as production in excess of the "natural" world (i.e. in excess of the sustainable production already present in the Indigenous world). In order for excess production, he needs excess labor, which he cannot provide himself. The chattel slave serves as that excess labor, labor that can never be paid because payment would have to be in the form of property (land). The settler's wealth is land, or a fungible version of it, and so payment for labor is impossible.6The settler positions himself as both superior and normal; the settler is natural, whereas the Indigenous inhabitant and the chattel slave are unnatural, even supernatural. Settlers are not immigrants. Immigrants are beholden to the Indigenous laws and epistemologies of the lands they migrate to. Settlers become the law, supplanting Indigenous laws and epistemologies. Therefore, settler nations are not immigrant nations (See also A.J. Barker, 2009). Not unique, the United States, as a settler colonial nation-state, also operates as an empire-utilizing external forms and internal forms of colonization simultaneous to the settler colonial project. This means, and this is perplexing to some, that dispossessed people are brought onto seized Indigenous land through other colonial projects. Other colonial projects include enslavement, as discussed, but also military recruitment, low-wage and high-wage labor recruitment (such as agricultural workers and overseas-trained engineers), and displacement/migration (such as the coerced immigration from nations torn by U.S. wars or devastated by U.S. economic policy). In this set of settler colonial relations, colonial subjects who are displaced by external colonialism, as well as racialized and minoritized by internal colonialism, still occupy and settle stolen Indigenous land. Settlers are diverse, not just of white European descent, and include people of color, even from other colonial contexts. This tightly wound set of conditions and racialized, globalized relations exponentially complicates what is meant by decolonization, and by solidarity, against settler colonial forces. Decolonization in exploitative colonial situations could involve the seizing of imperial wealth by the postcolonial subject. In settler colonial situations, seizing imperial wealth is inextricably tied to settlement and re-invasion. Likewise, the promise of integration and civil rights is predicated on securing a share of a settler-appropriated wealth (as well as expropriated ‘third-world’ wealth).Decolonization in a settler context is fraught because empire, settlement, and internal colony have no spatial separation. Each of these features of settler colonialism in the US context-empire, settlement, and internal colony-make it a site of contradictory decolonial desires. Decolonization as metaphor allows people to equivocate these contradictory decolonial desires because it turns decolonization into an empty signifier to be filled by any track towards liberation. In reality, the tracks walk all over land/people in settler contexts. Though the details are not fixed or agreed upon, in our view, decolonization in the settler colonial context must involve the repatriation of land simultaneous to the recognition of how land and relations to land have always already been differently understood and enacted; that is, all of the land, and not just symbolically. This is precisely why decolonization is necessarily unsettling, especially across lines of solidarity. “Decolonization never takes place unnoticed” (Fanon, 1963, p. 36). Settler colonialism and its decolonization implicates and unsettles everyone.

#### The ethical dilemmas of settler civil society can only cohere themselves through the genocide of the Native – the grammars of suffering that shape Settler ontology are fundamentally incompatible with Native grammars because the grammars of the Settler are only possible via genocide.

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Frank Wilderson III, “Red, White, and Black: Cinema and the Struture of US Antagonisms” Duke University Press, 2010 // sam

Today the United States is no longer self-consciously fascistic but instead self-consciously democratic. Clearing is completely disavowed as a verb. Instead, clearing as a noun makes itself known through the narrative of sovereign gain, civil society, and its external threat (the “Savage”). The imaginary of “Savage” positionality more often than not articulates (dialogues) with this Settler imaginary. In other words, the “Savage” narrative of sovereignty (Rudy’s plot points in the film) is dialogic with the Settler narrative of sovereignty (the Western’s genuflection to the Little Baby Civil Society). The narratives are disparate at the level of manifest content but dependent rhetorically on the same semiotics of gain and loss. Thus, even the “Savage’s” semiotics of sovereign loss fortifies and extends the interlocutory life of the Settler’s disavowal of clearing as a verb. Ironically, they work hand in hand to crowd out the ensemble of questions, and thus the ethical dilemmas, of genocide’s ontological imperatives. A semiotics of loss cannot be reconciled with a semiotics of genocide (provided genocide could even be apprehended through a semiotics, and there is no evidence that it can) because semiotics implies the possibility of narrative; and narrative implies the possibility of both a subject of speech and a speaking subject. Genocide, however, has no speaking subject; as such it has no narrative. It can only be apprehended by way of a narrative about something that it is not—such as sovereignty. (This is why a number of Jewish Holocaust films end up—or begin—in Israel: the impossible semiotics of genocide must be compensated for by way of a gesture of coherence, even if that coherence distracts the spectator from the topic at hand.) No single film could represent the clearing of a hemisphere. And no hemisphere, let alone a country, could maintain egoic consolidation of its psychic coordinates under the weight of the number and kind of films that it would take to even attempt to represent clearing as a verb. Though it is precisely the impossible “narrative” of genocide that positions the “Savage,” ensembles of questions that could elaborate more or less coherent ethical dilemmas regarding genocide—even if a coherent story of genocide could not be told—are often managed, constrained, marginalized, and disavowed in political discourse, metacommentaries on ontology, and the cinema of Native Americans. Skins’s simultaneous elaboration of and uneasiness with Mogie Yellow Lodge is emblematic of how this management, constraint, marginalization, and disavowal are rendered cinematically. Mogie’s surrealist demand, “Send me a big . . . fat woman . . . [to] cover up all the cracks in my shack,” goes to the heart of the matter. Red flesh can only be restored, ethically, through the destruction of White bodies, because the corporeality of the Indigenous has been consumed by and gone into the making of the Settler’s corporeality. Mogie wants what he has lost, not just his labor power, not just his language or land, but the raw material of his flesh. And, like most “grassroots Indians,” he knows precisely where it went—into the Settler’s “body”—and thus he knows precisely from where to repossess it. Though Mogie’s shack is small, we know from earlier scenes that it has at least two rooms. Therefore, to stretch a woman across its interior, window to window, wall to wall, corner to corner, and then stretch her across the door, would be to reconfigure her body into grotesque and unrecognizable dimensions. There are serious doubts as to whether a woman, even as large an (implicitly White) woman as Mogie Yellow Lodge is demanding from the president, “the Great White Father in Washington,” would survive such an ordeal. Imagine such a demand being made, such wallpapering taking place, en masse, on a scale which even Mogie’s inÂ ebriated imagination has not yet grasped. [General Andrew Jackson] instructed his troops to cut the noses of the corpses so that no one would be able to challenge the body count. They had bushel baskets full of noses that they brought back. This [practice] got him elected President. [He] campaigned on the basis that he had never met a recalcitrant Indian that he had not killed and never killed an Indian that he had not scalped and that anybody who wanted to question the validity of what he was saying was invited to tea in his parlor that evening so he could display the scalps and prove his point. [He] rode with a saddle bridle made out of the skin of an opposing Indian leader. This is the President of the United States.14 The Pleasures of Parity 215 One begins to see how wallpapering or insulating one’s room not with “bushel baskets” of White female skin but with even one White woman is simply out of the question. Mogie’s demand, then, is laughed off—managed, constrained, marginalized—by the script. “Hey! You wanna see me piss in my pants?” are the words he is made to utter next. His words are thus portrayed as the surreal ruminations of an Indian who has reached the end of his inebriated tether, and not as the wisdom of a man who could lead his people. The film is nervous in the face of Mogie’s demand not because of its absurdity but because of its authority. But Mogie is demanding no more of the Great White Father, no more of civil society, than he has already given. In fact, he is demanding less. His surrealism indicates a qualitatively similar ontological relationship between the Red and the White as exists between the Black and the White. The Middle Passage turns, for example, Ashanti spatial and temporal capacity into spatial and temporal incapacity—a body into flesh. This process begins as early as the 1200s for the Slave.15 By the 1530s, modernity is more self-conscious of its coordinates, and Whiteness begins its ontological consolidation and negative knowledge of itself by turning (part of) the Aztec body, for example, into Indian flesh.16 In this moment the White body completes itself and proceeds to lay the groundwork for the intra-Settler ensemble of questions foundational to its ethical dilemmas (i.e., Marxism, feminism, psychoanalysis). In the final analysis, Settler ontology is guaranteed by way of a negative knowledge of what it is not rather than by way of its positive claims of what it is. Ontological Whiteness is secured not through its cultural, economic, or gendered identities but by the fact that it cannot be known (positioned) by genocide (or by accumulation and fungibility). As Churchill observed in a book tour speech in Berkeley, California on July 31, 2004, this negative knowledge has its pleasures. [Unlike Jackson’s army of the early nineteenth century, the sixteenthcentury Dutch] didn’t take the noses and they didn’t take the scalps. They took whole heads because they wanted to identify the fact that they had eradicated the entire leadership of the opposition. They brought the heads back to the central square in New Amsterdam [now Manhattan] where the citizenry began to celebrate. They turned it into a sport. People who had participated in the expedition had themselves 216 chapter eight a jolly game of kickball using the heads and the citizenry sat around and cheered. It has a sense of affilial inclusion and filial longevity. [In 1864, the Third Regiment of the U.S. Calvary] returned to Denver [Colorado] with their trophies [the vaginas of Native American women stapled to the front of their hats] and held a triumphal parade. [They] proceeded down Larimore Street . . . and the good citizenry stood up and cheered wildly. . . . The Rocky Mountain News [described it as] “an unparalleled feat of martial prowess that would live forever in the annals of the history and nobility of the race.” And it has a capacity for territorial integrity. Scalp bounties . . . were officially claimed bounties that were placed on Indians in every antecedent colony in the Eastern Seaboard—French, English, and Spanish. I don’t know about the Dutch. They killed all the Indians around before they had the chance to need a bounty. But from the antecedent colonies this law transferred to every state and territory in forty-eight contiguous states.” In other words, it has the capacity to transform clearing from a verb into clearing as a noun. Every [state in the union] placed a bounty on Indians, any Indians, all Indians. [For example in the] Pennsylvania colony in the 1740s, the bounty [was] forty pounds sterling for proof of death of an adult male Indian. That proof of death being in the form of a scalp or a bloody red skin. . . . Proof of death in that form got the bearer of the proof forty pounds sterling. Forty pounds sterling in the 1740s was equivalent to the annual wage of your average farmer. This is big business. Twenty pounds sterling would be paid for proof of death in the same form of an adult female. Ten pounds sterling for proof of death of a child, a child being defined as human being of either sex under ten years of age down to and, yes, including the fetus. In Texas this law was not rescinded until 1887, [when] the debate in the Texas legislature concluded that there was no reason to continue because there were no longer sufficient numbers of living Indians in the entire state of Texas to warrant the continuation of it. It had accomplished its purpose.17 The Pleasures of Parity 217 And just like that, the Little Baby Civil Society was walking on its own two feet. To Grown-Up Civil Society (Mogie’s “Great White Father in Washington”) Mogie Yellow Lodge submits his own “personal” genocide reparations bill. A bill that accounts for the perfect symmetry through which Whiteness has formed a body (from the genitals to the body politic) out of “Savage” flesh. The symmetry’s perfection becomes clear when one realizes that today’s 1.6 percent-to-80.6 percent “Savage”-to-Settler ratio is a pure inversion of the sixteenth century’s “Savage” to Settler ratio.18 “Send me a big woman. Big fat woman! So that when I sleep with her she’ll cover up all the cracks in my shack and stop the wind from blowing through.” This is a demand so ethically pure that the film finds it unbearable and, as such, is unable (unwilling?) to let Mogie state it without irony. And yet, Mogie’s outbursts like this—“outbursts” because they are generally infrequent and contained by pity or humor—are the few moments when the film engages the ethical dilemmas of the Settler/“Savage” antagonism (genocide and its impossible semiotics) instead of the ethical dilemmas of the Settler/“Savage” conflict (sovereignty and its semiotics of loss). Again, it is not that Mogie’s demand is absurd and unethical but rather that it is a demand so pure in its ethicality that it threatens the quotidian prohibitions which, in modernity, constrain ethics. The demand is far too ethical for the film to embrace and elaborate at the level of narrative. It is a demand that must be policed by sovereign powers. Exploring Skins’s cinematic strategies reveals this containment as an effort to manage the spectator’s interpellation by the dilemmas of Mogie’s ruination and by the demand that ushers forth from his “flesh.” Mogie’s surrealism seeks to cull power directly from the subjectivity of the Settler, what Churchill calls “the imperial integrity of the U.S. itself.”19 This idea of culling power, resources, and Human life directly from the imperial integrity of the United States, especially when we think that imperial integrity through the banality of White bodies (in other words, through the “innocence” of today’s citizen), is indicative of the kind of unflinching paradigmatic analyses which allowed Churchill to embrace the 9/11 attack on the World Trade Center within forty-eight hours of its occurrence, a moment in time when Settler Marxists and Settler progressives either suddenly became mute or stumbled over their own tongues in half-hearted attempts to simultaneously condemn the attack 218 chapter eight and explain its political and historical rationale. Churchill’s embrace of the event is not synonymous with either celebration or condemnation. It goes without saying that Churchill also refused to be interpellated by the pageantry of mourning that followed in the wake of 9/11. But Settler radicals and progressives assailed him for meditating on the attack from within the questions of the genocided “Savage” rather than from within an ensemble of questions allied with Settler’s grammar of suffering, exploitation, and alienation. People on the left tried to shame Churchill for embracing incoherent terror (suicide bombers) instead of morally and politically sanctioned revolutionary action (like the Zapatistas or the Sandinistas). Others chided him for advocating violence in any form. Many said that now is not the time for a scathing critique; “our” nation is in mourning. And others wagged their fingers and reminded him that members of the working class (not just police agents and investment bankers) died in the Twin Towers. These naysayers all made their arguments at the level of experience, and Churchill, rather handily, answered them at this level as well. But I am neither interested in his interlocutors’ chiding nor in his response. The Left’s attack on Churchill’s embrace of the 9/11 attacks is important not for the social issues it raises, the myriad of things it claims it is concerned about, but rather for the grammar of suffering shared across the board, those building blocks through which loss is conceptualized in such a way that makes it impossible for the “Savage” to function, grammatically, as their paradigm of suffering, and even less as its paradigmatic agent for change. Had Churchill’s interlocutors been more honest, they would have used fewer words—not draped their rejoinders with the veil of issues from the realm of experience (i.e., tactics)—and said, quite simply, “We will not be led by the ‘Savage’; death is not an element constituent of our ontology.” Unlike the narrative and cinematic strategies of Skins, Churchill’s meditation on 9/11 embraces, rather than contains, Mogie Yellow Lodge’s demand. Churchill’s work is authorized by Mogie’s grammar of suffering which, inter alia, forecloses on Churchill’s passing judgment on the tactical ethics of either the attack on the World Trade Center or, for that matter, Mogie’s attack on the body of White femininity. Churchill accepts this foreclosure and works off of it. He does not feel constrained by it but finds that it enables a quality of reflection otherwise inconceivable: The Pleasures of Parity 219 There can be no defensible suggestion that those who attacked the Pentagon and the World Trade Center on 9/11 were seeking to get even with the United States. Still less is there a basis for claims that they “started” something, or that the United States has anything to get even with them for. Quite the contrary. For the attackers to have arguably “evened the score” for Iraq’s dead children alone, it would have been necessary for them to have killed a hundred times the number of Americans who actually died. This in itself, however, would have allowed them to attain parity in terms of real numbers. The U.S. population is about fifteen times the size of Iraq’s. Hence, for the attackers to have achieved a proportionally equivalent impact, it would have been necessary that they kill some 7.5 million Americans.20 Churchill reflects on the event of 9/11 in such a way as to make it impossible to talk about it as an event. This is a marker of the philosophical brilliance and rhetorical dexterity foundational to Churchill’s thirty-odd books, articles, and recorded speeches. This dexterity allows the work to be conversant with the actual details and “facts” of the event (as presented and cathedralized by White civil society). Yet instead of becoming mired in the bog of concerns which makes the event as “event” (details and common sense ethics), Churchill jettisons common sense and presses the details into service of an ensemble of questions animated by the ethical dilemmas of “Savage,” and not Settler, ontology. He can do this on behalf of those who are not even Native Americans (in this passage, Iraqis) because he provides them with the “Savage” as a lens through which they can do ethnographic and political work on the Settler as specimen. In other words, in his chapter on 9/11, his argument is made in such a way that, to be interpellated, the reader must adjust the logic of his or her political experience to fit the logic of “Savage” genocidal ontology—and not vice versa. The reader must be subordinated to, and incorporated by, Redness, or else the reader will experience the piece in the same way that the viewer is meant to experience Mogie Yellow Lodge: as a scandal, as a problem in need of fixing. Churchill continues to subordinate the “facts” of 9/11 to an ethical examination of Settlerism by reminding the reader that “the U.S. population is fifteen times the size of Iraq’s,” therefore 9/11 would have had to have killed “7.5 million Americans” in order to have “achieved a proportion- 220 chapter eight ately equivalent impact.” In the very next paragraph, Churchill corrects himself and insists that 7.5 million is the number of American children the attackers would have had to have killed in order to achieve parity. This is followed by a list of even more corrections, in which Churchill recalculates the meaning of parity based solely on the U.S. deracination of Iraq since 1990 (further down the correctives will lead him to the “Savage” and to the Slave). True parity would result in 7.5 million dead American children, 15 million dead American adults, the obliteration of “sewage, water sanitation and electrical plants, food production/storage capacity, hospitals, pharmaceutical production facilities, communication centers and much more.” The effects of which would be not just mass death but “a surviving population wracked by malnutrition and endemic disease.” “Indeed, applying such standards of ‘pay back’ vis-à-vis American Indians alone would require a lethal reduction in the U.S. population . . . of between 96 and 99 percent.” Suddenly, Mogie Yellow Lodge’s demand for parity (one big fat White woman “to cover up the cracks in [his] shack”) sounds downright generous. Mogie is demanding one Settler, a far cry from demanding parity for ontological death. Were he to demand parity the United States “would run out of people long before it ran out of compensatory obligation.”21

#### Their philosophy is built on genocide and exploitation of native bodies – metaphysical dualisms justify and inform settler colonialism by creating distinctions between the rational and irrational subject – this justifies colonialism because we will win indigenous people are never seen as rational subjects – they will be unable to answer how their framework binds settlers to treat indigenous people as agents which means you vote negative.

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Crispin Sartwell, “WESTERN PHILOSOPHY AS WHITE SUPREMACISM,” The Philosophical Salon, <http://thephilosophicalsalon.com/western-philosophy-as-white-supremacism/> // sam

The 17th and 18th centuries were characterized by the consolidation of European colonialism over much of the world and the rise of the Atlantic slave trade. This period is known in philosophy as the “modern” era. Modern philosophy was characterized above all by its dualisms, which have their origins, like Western philosophy, in the Greeks: between body and mind, culture and nature, civilized and savage, state and anarchy, human and animal. Applied at different scales, these are all the same dualism. They exalt the intellectual over the physical, and use spirit, mind, and culture, understood in a particularly self-serving way, as standards of who counts as a moral agent—as a human being—and of what groups or cultures are worthy of respect. As philosophical concepts, these allegedly opposed pairs are excruciatingly problematic. But they are not only philosophical ideas: they were precisely the content of the alleged difference between European people and people of color, as Europeans understood it; the abstract metaphysics became an all-too-concrete ideology of exploitation. Sub-Saharan African peoples, as well as the indigenous peoples of the Americas, were pictured relentlessly, even in the Enlightenment philosophical texts themselves, as sheer bodies, while the European thinkers were, in their own view, minds. Indigenous peoples were understood to be still part of nature (and were devalued in that identification), whereas Europe had supposedly emerged from nature into culture. That was the fundamental way that Europeans justified to themselves the oppression they were inflicting and congratulated themselves on their own alleged superiority and suitedness to be rulers and exploiters. In other words, white supremacy lurks at the heart of Western metaphysics. This structure is formulated with crystal clarity by Descartes, who separates mind and body as two fundamentally different sorts of things and arranges them in a hierarchy of value. “Reason alone makes us men and distinguishes us from the beasts,” he declares, echoing Plato and Pythagoras. “I am,” he argues, “precisely nothing but a thinking thing; that is, a mind, or intellect, or understanding, or reason.” We might think of this as the imaginary construction of white identity, and if any person, even René Descartes, considers himself “nothing but a thinking thing,” he is profoundly self-deluded, and other people are probably servicing his physical needs. Relentlessly, Western political tradition values mind over body, intellectual over manual labor, reason over passion. And European philosophy of the modern era, also relentlessly, associates mind with the sort of people who came to think of themselves as “white men,” and body with the sorts of people they were oppressing around the world, with somewhat different flavors depending on whether the people they were talking about were women, or Africans, or Asians, or Native Americans. Descartes held that each of us was two things: an angel and an animal, as it were, a pure soul and a bestial body. Colonialism and the nascent “science” of race simply externalized this dualism, so that some people (educated Europeans, primarily) were supposed to be pure minds—and hence suited to rule—while others (the people that Europeans were encountering all over the world, and on whom they were imposing their dominance) were supposed to be mere bodies. It is ironic, however, that ruling requires massive use of physical force, implying that white supremacism does anything but transcend the physical plane. Modern political theory circled around the same set of distinctions. Thomas Hobbes, in the Leviathan, purports to observe that “the savage people in many places of America . . . have no government at all; and live at this day in [a] brutish [animalistic] manner.”[2] The ethics of Immanuel Kant, and of many others up to the present day, emphasizes that to be rational is to be free, and hence that to be irrational is to be enslaved. Reason is the faculty by which the mind controls the body; reason is suited to control the physical world. The body in the world, for Kant, must be distinguished from the ‘transcendental subject,’ the moral agent, who is outside of space and time, and who is the lawgiver of himself, that is, the appropriate center of power. Exercised internally, this is the drama of self-control; one becomes a good person by bringing one’s unruly bodily desires to heel by rational deliberation. (There is even a contemporary neurological version that purports to distinguish the “executive region” from the amygdala, the primitive or animal or emotive bit.) Exercised externally, it is quickly adaptable into white domination over the colored world. Kant famously argues that rational creatures must be treated as ends and not merely as means. He calls that “dignity” and holds it to be a (or the) most basic moral principle that persons with such dignity must be treated with “respect.” The complement of this doctrine is that irrational creatures can legitimately be treated as mere means, and with disrespect. To claim of some person or some culture that it is irrational and hence animalistic, opens them to the use of creatures who regard themselves as rational, such as Kant’s European readership. In the first European defense of the African slave trade (1444), a Portuguese courtier (Gomes Eanes de Zurara) argued that Africans were better off in slavery, and claimed that in Africa “They lived like beasts, without any custom of civilized beings. . . They were without covering of clothes, or the lodgement of houses; and worst of all, they had no understanding of good, but only knew how to live in bestial sloth.”[4] The direct motivation for colonialism was economic, not metaphysical. But the structures mirror each other, and when Europeans came into contact with and conquered other peoples, they used the existing forms of thought, derived from figures such as Plato, to explain or rationalize the exploitation and even genocides that they were engaged in. “When soul and body are both in the same place,” wrote Plato in the Phaedo, “nature teaches the one to serve and be subject, the other to rule and govern.”[5] A couple of millennia later, the “place” where soul and body meet might be the Belgian Congo. Or for that matter South Carolina. This symbolic repertoire has been adapted to various issues and circumstances, but it is remarkably persistent. Through slavery and Jim Crow, lynching and mass incarceration, black people have been relentlessly regarded and treated as animal bodies by white people. That is not about black people at all, but about the hallucinatory self-image of people who regard themselves as white: it is an attempt to build and enforce a self-image for white people as being spiritual and intellectual beings, and hence suited to know and to rule, to command themselves and hence others, to manage everyone’s lives as one’s own mind should rationally control one’s body. Every white stereotype of black people, first, is relentlessly animalizing or physicalizing, and second, rests on a devaluation of the physical and an exaltation of the intellectual. The association of non-white people with violence and sexuality, with crime or laziness, and their economic exploitation as physical labor, are all rationalized by this application of basic metaphysical dualisms. This becomes a worldwide structure of oppression, in which rational Westerners, or “experts” of various sorts, are called upon to control unruly and irrational elements: the classic “white man’s burden.” Indeed, a pre-eminent issue in European philosophy at the end of the Modern period, around 1750-1850, was the relation of sheer material reality, conceived as a deterministic realm in which human beings were enslaved by physical causes, and the realm of Spirit or freedom. This was the fundamental dilemma of our lives and our world, as Kant, Schiller, Schelling, and Hegel, for example, framed it. But it was also the shape of the political rhetoric justifying colonialism, for example. Astonishingly, the whole network of views persists. For example, John Martin Fischer fills his book The Metaphysics of Free Will with the sort of observation that appears at the outset of many a classic work of Western philosophy: “The possession of regulative control is precisely what distinguishes us from non-persons,” he says as he concludes. “After all, the behavior of an animal appears to be the product of strong instinctual urges. . . . Non-human animals . . . are not persons; they do not have strong rights to continue to exist,” and are beneath our moral approval or disapproval: beneath contempt, we might say.[6] They can legitimately be used for our purposes, while only persons deserve moral respect. Fischer’s account of moral agency indicates that it is anomalous in the order of nature. In various moments in the tradition, the “rational subject” is supposed to be outside that order entirely. Rarely has there been a more bizarre or thorough self-deception. Many philosophers, right up to the present moment, take the fundamental view that rationality or ‘mind’ distinguishes humans from other sorts of things, and that rational creatures have a superior sort of value. “Reason is a power we have in virtue of a certain type of self-consciousness,” says the contemporary moral philosopher Christine Korsgaard, taking up the point of view of Descartes and Kant. “This form of self-consciousness gives us a capacity to control our beliefs and actions that the other animals lack, and makes us active in a way they are not; this form of self-consciousness makes it necessary to take control of our beliefs and actions.” Projected outward, it seems to make it necessary to take control of animalistic people, in order to create a rational society. I am not suggesting that Plato, Descartes, or Kant, much less Fischer and Korsgaard, are white supremacists. Descartes was probably writing too early to engage that set of beliefs directly, and Plato certainly was. Kant’s liberal politics are in many ways incompatible with racism, and the same goes for Korsgaard’s (and, I assume, Fischer’s as well). But I am suggesting that the sort of metaphysics and ethics they all endorse grew up in connection with white supremacism and helped shape it. They are, as it were, isomorphic. And I suggest that this structure of thought lies beneath some of our ill treatment of other animals and the environment as well. The whole picture is subject, I think, to compelling philosophical objections. And its social applications have been self-serving and profoundly oppressive.

#### The exclusion of geological agency means Kantian ethics devolve to settler colonialism

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Katherine Yusoff, “Geologic Realism: On the Beach of Geologic Time,” 2019 // aidan + sam

The Matter of Thought The question of thought’s materiality needs to be posed in relation to the genealogy of Western thought as much for what it leaves out of its accounts of the World as for the way Earth becomes within these trajectories. Considered either through the placement of Earth as an existential outside to Western thought or through the stabilizing of dynamic grounds on which the architectures of reason are built, the earth/ground became a point of negation for Western reason even as it spawned whole edifices of meaning to cover over that suppression of the real. Much like Kant’s overcompensation for the geologic nihilism of the Lisbon earthquake (1755) in his formation of the sublime (and concomitant racial/racist theories), the material exclusions of geologic agency are as much a product of psychic terror as they are of the geotrauma of earth events. That is, world building is a metaphysical accomplishment as much as it is a geophysical mastery of material registers. Geology represents a special kind of ground and grounding imbued with geophysical force or gravity. It seems geology in Western reason can be thought only through death, where death of subjective thought is tied to catastrophic death in the end of worlds, conjoining the subject and world in a phenomenological bind that refuses the world’s ability to go on before and after that thought (and subject). Western philosophy since Kant aimed at containing the realism of the world’s continuance after extinction within a representation that adheres to a notion of human meaning and purposefulness on Earth rather than through the unbounded openness of its geologic relation to the cosmos. The tradition of natural philosophy sought to overcome or transcend the universalism of extinction events (as they were being inscribed through the fossil facts of paleontology) with Cartesian logic and rationalism (defined most extensively by Kant and Hegel). It was thought forged in the materialization of a geologic praxis, in colonialism and slavery (1492 onward), and in the formal development of the discipline of geology (1700s). Geology delivered two kinds of realism: a realism of racial substrata labeled inhuman that comprised the subjective resource for extraction (and resistance), and a realism that was an epistemic-ontological confrontation with the history of the dynamic Earth events, told as a tale of beginnings and endings, of catastrophe and survival, of Beings in time.7 To say that geologic realism outside of the narrative of origins and endings has been problematic for Western thought is an understatement. Only through the retethering of geologic origination as a supplementary genealogy that amplifies human exceptionalism has geology been psychically brought inside the human story, told as the epic survival story of Homo sapiens where psychic and material location is plotted out to confirm the sanctity of here and now for some and “you are not here” for racialized others. Now is being told as a form of anthropogenesis of geologic forces through a postracial we that obscures the historical contours of race in the genealogies of species life.8 In Western natural philosophy, Earth has successively been pushed away as a problem for thought or excluded to a constitutive existence outside of or anterior to reason.9 Earth is materially positioned with reason’s “others” (the inhuman, the subhuman, the less than human) in its exclusion from the center of humanist thought, while it serves the realization of that production as subtending strata (as context, resource, buffer for earth shocks, bounty, reproduction, and labor) and as an exclusionary inclusion of matter without the individuate identity of the Western ethical subject (as racialized [non]subject). The earth and the slave as concomitant categories have no recognized identity in the extraction economy of geologic grammars outside their valuation in categories of matter. Geologic realism, then, offers a speculative opportunity in the engagement with geology not just as a means to unearth an anterior posthuman or inhuman position beyond humanism and its implicit reproduction of white heteropatriarchy but as a perspective that could come to terms with both the cosmic potentialities and vicious subjectifications of geologic relations (in racialized, gendered, and sexualized forms).10 One corollary of geologic realism is to take account of the asymmetries of inhuman nature.11 As Ray Brassier suggests, there is an “unavoidable corollary of the realist conviction that there is a mind-independent reality,” an asymmetrical reality that is oblivious to humanity and its concerns, a reality that cannot be made over as our home or ground, or worked into any kind of “meaningful” relationship to us. The other corollary is the recognition of the constitutive hinge that holds humanism and its production of hierarchical subjectivities through racialized “scenes of subjection” together with a production of the earth, both categorized as inhuman.12 The birth of the racial subject is tied to the material categorizations of colonialism, through the desire for gold, the conquest of space, and the codification of geology together with indigenous and black personhood as a resource praxis. Geologic resources and bodily resources (the extermination of indigenous peoples and commodification of racialized slavery) share a natal moment in the dual exploitation of subjects and Earth through the geologic grammars of the inhuman.13 As Achille Mbembe comments, The question of the world—what it is, what the relationship is between its various parts, what the extent of its resources is and to whom they belong, how to live in it, . . . what its borders and limits, and its possible end, are — has been within us since a human being of bone, flesh, and spirit made its first appearance under the sign of the Black Man, as human-merchandise, human metal, and human-money. Fundamentally, it was always our question. And it will stay that way as long as speaking the world is the same as declaring humanity, and vice versa.14 Riffing off of Denise Ferreira da Silva’s notion of racial knowledge and power as the construction site of global space,15 in which whiteness is the color of both universality and geography, the formation of the earth as world-object through the conquest of the New World could be understood as a praxis of global-World-space that establishes a world (white)/earth (black and brown) bifurcation. The afterlife of this racialized materiality in the Anthropocene rebounds with questions about the double life of the inhuman, as both inhuman geologic matter and inhumane racialization of personhood coded as matter. These racialized materialities are the constitutive outsides/exclusionary inclusion of humanism, as inhuman (Earth) and inhuman (race), and the hinge between them depends on “racial subsidies to exploit the planet’s resources.”16 There is a double extraction: race is materialized via inhuman matter (slave as chattel, and gold) and (non)personhood (labor, flesh, and fungibility). In the reification of Earth in formation with subjective modes outside of white Western Man (deftly articulated by Sylvia Wynter), racial subsidies are what form late liberalism’s substratum or extraction zone, thereby demanding a radical revaluation of what Césaire called the “measure of the world.” The historic assault on blackness made in proximity to the codification and valuation of the inhuman (as earth and race) established intimacy with the inhuman and made it a site of radical revaluation in critical black feminist thought and materialities. However, a more complicated understanding of the subjective life of the human does not mean giving up on the radical alterity of inhuman matter; rather it might be seen simultaneously as alterity and intimate possession. As Nigel Clark has argued, the inhuman does important work in situating subjectivity in a planet in which processes and forces are (in) differentially shared across human, nonhuman, and inhuman entities and their temporalities, rather than walled up in the individuation of impoverished versions of subjectivity that externalize that relation into neoliberal economies of environmental valuation.17 In the historical grammar of geology, the natality of the inhuman — as mineralogical and antiblack — is tied in a liberatory pursuit against the effects of extraction and the racial calculus of valuation. Before looking at how imaginaries of temporality produce racial subsidies alongside a conception of the earth, I want to outline the two subjective positions of the inhuman as earth and race.

#### “In the future, we would be singing about the moon that existed before” – colonial expansion into space inevitably destroys indigenous spiritual connections to Sky Country – theoretical frames that understand the earth and sky as fundamentally separate ignore the intimate connections between bodies that govern space. The alternative is a rejection of the 1ac’s relationships to place and space in favor of a relational approach that recognizes our infinite obligation to never take without giving back and to respect the nonhuman as we do ourselves – that’s mutually exclusive with their detached, utilitarian analysis of space.

**Mitchell et al 20** – Bawaka Country including A. Mitchell S. Wright S. Suchet-Pearson K. Lloyd L. Burarrwanga R. Ganambarr M. Ganambarr-Stubbs B. Ganambarr D. Maymuru R. Maymuru (this is a lot of authors; you can find qualifications on your own lol)

Mitchell, Audra et. Al. “Dukarr lakarama: Listening to Guwak, talking back to space colonization” Political Geography, Volume 81, August 2020 // sam

“There already are spirits up there, a spiritual story”, Rrawun says, “Guwak, the bird, it is someone’s spirit when someone passes away … When we talk about space, there are people already there”. The songspiral tells us that when Guwak flies with the spirit of a deceased person to Sky Country, that person joins ancestors and kin who dwell there and care for it. Rrawun explains further: “already a person who is related to us lives there for me, my burrku, is given to me as my identity and my authority … I will go there my place of belonging, the place of spirits to again join with my ancestors”. One’s identity and kinship, in other words, are linked not only to relations on earth but also to the relatives dwelling in Sky Country. The inhabitation of Sky Country by ancestors and other kin is common sense within the Guwak songspiral and the broader cosmology it sits within. Yolŋu people are not alone in this knowledge. For example, on Stradbroke Island, Queensland, a man called Mirabooka was placed in the sky by the ‘good spirit’ Biami in order to look after the people of the Earth, and he remains spread across the sky in the form of a constellation (Bhathal, 2006). Kamilaroi people have a communicative relationship with a giant emu whose body is composed of stars and the dark space between them that travels across the sky (Fuller et al., 2014). The Anishinaabe and Haudenosaunee peoples of Turtle Island are both descended from Ancestors who came to earth from sky worlds. In fact, the name ‘Anishinaabe’ refers to the fall of the first human from the sky to earth; while the Haudenosaunee descended from Sky Woman, the progenitor of all humans, who fell from a hole in the sky, pregnant with the first humans, and co-created earth with the animals (Johnston, 2010; Watts, 2013). All of these communities recognize and maintain kinship relations with beings (human and nonhuman) who dwell in what Yolŋu recognize as Sky Country (see Krupp, 1999). Activities that alter Sky Country damage the dwelling places of kin and disrupt their relations with people and other beings on earth. Disruptions such as these have had intensely unjust legal implications – for example for Indigenous people in Australia and Canada who have to prove continuity of inhabitation as understood by colonial law, in order to make native title claims (Borrows, 2010; Moreton-Robinson, 2015). Sky Country is, and always has been, continuously inhabited. The way the songspiral is sung confirms kinship structures and shared responsibility to care for Sky Country (Gaw’wu Group of Women et al., 2019). As Rrawun explains, he is responsible for part of the song as it maps onto specific places, but the duty of singing it is shared by others: My song in reality, in Yolŋu will stop at Jaraku, … that is where the song stops, the other clan will take over the story. In Yolŋu way we always share, we don’t own things, nature owns us. We don’t say to a particular animal we own you … Similar to when we sing, the exchanging of the song, half way they will swap over and show the other clan’s song, it’s about sharing, respect, deep understanding of the land, the skies and the universe. Rrawun’s words make clear that Yolŋu people and their kin co-create Sky Country. This does not translate into Western ideas of ownership – least of all those that suggest exclusive control over access, such as the SPACE Act. Instead, Sky Country is governed through plural, overlapping (perhaps sometimes conflictual) layers of responsibility and care undertaken by multiple more-than-human communities. Singing the songspiral is a crucial part of maintaining the negotiations between these communities. Waŋanydja ŋayi yurru dhawalnha ŋupan wanhaka wa€ŋa, yurru ŋayinydja Guwakdja ŋathili yana marŋgi nhalili € ŋayi yurru butthun. Guwak speaks and her echoes reach the lands and the sea of Muŋurru, and from there go up to the skies; she already knows to where she will fly. When Guwak speaks, her cries are heard, not only on earth but also across Sky Country. As Rrawun offers, “The Guwak calls when you arrive at your destination in the River of Stars. It is heard in the stars and the echo is heard in the sea of stars”. In this way, the songspiral tells us that Guwak, and Sky Country communicate and are heard by one another. They have sentience and agency, actively co-constitute one another and communicate through ceremony, song and journeys. Sky Country and the beings that inhabit it are kin. For instance, Djawundil and Ritjilili explain that ŋalindi (the moon) has a moiety – “it has a family, is kin … everyone is related to the moon” (see Burarrwanga et al., 2013). In other words, the more-than-human beings that co-constitute Sky Country are entwined in kinship structures and are part of the web of responsibilities and obligations that shape these structures. This is at odds with the understanding of those NewSpace entrepreneurs who argue that outer space has no ethical standing. Guwak has strong and intimate relationships with Sky Country, having made this journey through and as time/space innumerable times (Bawaka Country incl et al., 2016). Guwak recognizes these places and calls out to them, and they return the call. But what if Guwak cries out and the echoes do not reach the rivers or the seas? What if that Country is no longer there, or if it is damaged beyond recognition? Indeed, the destruction or transformation of Sky Country by space colonization could have detrimental effects on the songspiral, and on the relations it (re)makes. Banbapuy states that these actions would damage the songspirals themselves, and violate the Rom they embody. It might also fundamentally alter the relationships between Yolŋu people and their kin in Sky Country. As Banbapuy tells us, “songlines are there forever. Songlines remain. But in future [after space colonization, we] would be singing about the moon that existed before, but there is nothing there”. Djawundil worries about what would happen to the songspirals if the beings they connect to – the moon, stars, sun, Milky way and so on – were destroyed or tampered with. “I think it would mean danger,” she says, “singing about something that existed before but now it is gone”. The disruption of Sky Country and the songspirals that sing it into being, may not destroy the songspirals entirely – they have always been, and will always be – but the results would be unpredictable. The fact that songspirals are eternal does not justify activities that might damage them, particularly as the results are unknowable. As Sarah observes, this would be akin to arguing that, because a deceased loved one can live on in your heart, it is acceptable to murder that person. In short, permanence of the songspirals does not justify or excuse colonial violence. Bala ŋayi Guwakthu dhakay ŋakulana € watana guyŋarrnha. Guwak feels the cold wind, the south wind, Madirriny. Bala ŋarra yurru ŋurrungunydja marrtji ŋunha wata ŋupan watamirri rirrakay dupthurruna ŋathili € Milŋiyalili, ga Muŋurrulili. From here I will first go to the place from where the cold wind blows, to the stony Country, and speak where my voice will reach space, the River of Stars, Milŋiyawuy, and the sea of Muŋurru. Many advocates of space exploitation argue that their projects would help to protect earth by externalizing dirty industries such as mineral mining to space. But Banbapuy tells us that “there is no difference between the land and the sky. If they mine the land, they are mining the sky”. The reverse is also true: they are all part of Country. In Yolŋu cosmology, there is no clear separation between earth and Sky Country – they are continuous, threaded together by the songspirals that sing them into being. As Banbapuy reminds us, songspirals go all the way deep into the earth, to the depths of the ocean, and out beyond the realm that Western sciences designate as space. What Western thinkers define as Bawaka Country including climate and weather are as much a part of Sky Country as are the stars. Because they are continuous and entwined – literally co-respondent to one another – what happens in Sky Country affects earth, and vice versa. We can see this profound connection as the wind blows from earth all the way to milŋiyawuy, the Milky Way, and the River of Stars and back to the Muŋurru, the sea of stars. Importantly, the flow of continuity is reciprocal – as Ritjilili and Djawundil say, just as the songspirals extend from the center of the earth beyond the sky, “the stars and light shine down to light the rivers here on earth”. Banbapuy describes how the call of Guwak is heard simultaneously between Sea, Earth and Sky Country. “The sound goes up to the River [of Stars] and the echoes are heard in the sea, it bounces from the river to the sea. The echoes get heard by people still living”. Fuller and his colleagues write of resonant knowledge shared by Kamilaroi collaborators, for whom “everything up in the sky was once down on Earth, and the sky and the Earth reversed” (Fuller et al., 2014:23). Within that cosmology, constellations and star formations, including the Milky Way and Southern Cross, not only correspond to places on Earth but are entangled with them, such that what happens in either sphere affects the other – that is, “what’s up there is down here” (Fuller et al., 2014:23). A story shared by Banbapuy, describes the islands of Nalkuma, Murrmurrnga, Wakuwala, Gaywndji, to which the deceased travel, as existing simultaneously in Sky and Sea Country. As Banbapuy explains, “when you are alive you can paddle to the island [in the ocean], when you die you go to [the island in] Sky Country. Before Dad died he went to the island Nalkuma – he lay there – when he was sick – we took him there by helicopter, then he went back home and passed away”. Since these islands exist simultaneously in Sea and Sky Country, to visit one is to visit the other. So, not only is there constant communication and interchange between Sea and Sky Country, but they are connected, inseparably sensitive to each other. Just as the preceding verses of the songspiral tell us that the colonization and exploitation of Sky Country might rupture profound, co-constitutive relationships, this verse shows that the disruption of Sky Country would be reflected in the places on earth to which it corresponds. Reflecting on his grandfather’s maps (see above), Rrawun explains how the stars can be used to find one’s way around Country: When they are lost somewhere they will follow the stars. They will follow stars and also they will follow the wind; if you are lost somewhere in the bush if you see a tree or leaves blowing from the east you will know that I am in this area and that my family is this way and I will follow this in the day time. That’s why ancestors gave everything for our survival technique, so we can survive through that. It is only because of the co-respondence between earth, stars, wind and other beings that people with the right knowledge are able to interpret their connections, intimately know and be intimately known by Country. The model of a separate earth and space erases these relationships and may compromise their continuity by underwriting the disruption of Sky Country. The damage that occurs through the breaking of protocols and the damaging of relationships occurs in ways both known/knowable and unknown/unknowable. There is the clearing of sites on earth, the ’space junk’ orbiting earth (Gorman, 2005), the mis-communications and changing seasonal messages that come when the sky speaks differently, and the deep, lingering ramifications that occur from Law not followed. There is also damage done to the protocols and Laws of more-than-humans, many of which live beyond human understanding. And the ways that futurities/pasts/presents predicated on Indigenous absence, on possession and accumulation, and on the disrespect of protocols will always continue to re-create wrongs. Rrawun also expresses concern over the disruption of the links between Sky Country and Sea and Land Country if they are traversed by those who do not have sufficient knowledge. He asks what might happen if substances from Sky Country were brought back to Country on earth and sea: Say if you travelled 1 million miles up there and then you come back, bring back all the toxic and all the radiation back here on earth, and then go back to space. And could be taking dangerous toxic air waves and spread like viruses. Guwak knows how to travel to Sky Country and back without disrupting or displacing. But would-be space colonizers may not, and may inadvertently bring about cascades of destruction through their ignorance. This is another reason why it is so important to understand how deeply connected Sky Country is with Country on earth. Ŋunhili yukurrana nhina miyalk Nyapililŋu. There lives a sprit woman, Nyapililŋu. Guwak waŋana dhuwala ŋarra yurru marr ganana Dhithi, Gunbalka Rakila. I will leave this place, the essence of my people, with the seep name Dhithi, leave the stony Country, Gunbalka Rakila, from where the string came. Ŋunha ŋupan guyaŋirri watamirri Wurrtjinmirri Dharrpayina. I will chase and remember and fly towards to the Country from where the wind blows, to where it directs me to Maŋgalili Country, nation of Wurrtjinmirri, Dharrpayina, deep clan names for Maŋgalili. Bala butthurrunana warryurrunana burrkundja. I take and pull the string and together we will fly; entwined, we will start the journey, guided, directed by the Milky Way, we fly the universe After the string is finished, after the identification is finished, Guwak will cry to claim that body’s spirit. It’s time to put that body’s spirit into the string. Entwining5 the spirit into the string and flying together where the wind blows from. Starting to journey to the universe. (Banbapuy) As the echoes heard in the songspiral are echoes of Guwak, they are heard for the first time and every time. Guwak has been there all the time – and Guwak has been travelling through Sky Country forever – just as the songspiral has always been sung. But there is also an ethical requirement, an obligation and responsibility to keep singing it, to make sure that it is sung forever. The process of sharing Guwak is a process of intergenerational learning through which Rrawun (and hopefully others) will continue to learn and share the songspiral and carry out this responsibility. To gain permission to share Guwak with us for this paper and our new book, Rrawun spoke to old man Balaka Maymuru, his other eldest brother from an elder brother. Balaka said, “Do it. Because if I pass away, there will be no one else to share the Guwak”. Rrawun is worried that Balaka is getting sick, so he needs all his sons and daughters to wake up and learn the songspirals – “to ensure that our stories are not taken away”. By sharing the songspiral, Rrawun is carrying on the work of his grandfather, one of the first men in the community to open up an art gallery and invite ŋapaki € to participate in ceremonies in the 1970s. This was part of his grandfather’s vision of sharing knowledge through the generations. It is crucial that young men also sing Guwak, keeping it alive in contemporary song. Indeed, Rrawun wrote a song about Guwak and Milngiyawuy, the River of Stars, with his rock band, East Journey. This process of spiraling in, through and as time blurs any neat separations between then and now, between this moment and the eternity of the songspiral, and across generations. Rrawun sees this as part of the work of ensuring continuity: It is the same thing, we are using the same pathway in a different context. Like right now, we are discussing about how great the universe is. We are learning together. We are trying to discover, while we are alive, we are saying, what is going to happen when we pass away. We are all doing that. We are getting the songs, putting the songs in our souls and we will journey with that until later on, the time when we pass away, we will journey, begin the songs and stories, following the songs and stories until we get there, we will know ahh, this is what we were doing. Same thing, I know that song, I am going to put it into contemporary to show what the song talks about. Same thing with life. I know this story, this song, I am going to exercise and maintain it to reach the spiritual world, in a right path. This ethical obligation to make sure that Guwak is sung forever is an important way of taking care of the cosmos, and the kin who dwell throughout it. As Rrawun explains: Guwak is someone’s spirit when someone passes away. The spirit waits until Guwak calls out. It’s like opening the gates to the heavens, to the universe, for the spirit who is carrying the string. It is another way to tell people to look after the universe. When we talk about space, there are people already there. Already. You don’t see but if you believe, it gets passed on. Each time the ceremony is carried out, the songs are sung, the dances danced and Guwak’s flight repeated, Sky Country is remade. Indeed, Sky Country needs to be sung, danced and journeyed into becoming; it is coconstituted by these acts. The songs and ceremonies that re-create Sky Country will, as Rrawun says, continue to exist as long as Yolŋu sing songspirals. In sharing Guwak with you, we hope to learn and remind ourselves and others of our obligations to Sky Country, and how plans to disrupt it might break these bonds.

### 1nc – Framework

#### Our interpretation is that the 1ac is an epistemological project – before you evaluate the consequences of the plan text you should weigh its ideological underpinnings.

#### The role of the ballot should be to embrace an ethic of incommensurability that steps away from the endless “what abouts” of the settler and unconditionally commit to decolonization instead of moves towards settler innocence.

**Tuck and Yang 12** (Eve Tuck is a professor at SUNY New Paltz. Wayne K Yang is a professor at the University of California San Diego) “Decolonization is not a metaphor” Decolonization: Indigeneity, Education & Society Vol. 1, No. 1, 2012, pp. 1-40, July 17, 2017 // sam

An ethic of incommensurability, which guides moves that unsettle innocence, stands in contrast to aims of reconciliation, which motivate settler moves to innocence. Reconciliation is about rescuing settler normalcy, about rescuing a settler future. Reconciliation is concerned with questions of what will decolonization look like? What will happen after abolition? What will be the consequences of decolonization for the settler? Incommensurability acknowledges that these questions need not, and perhaps cannot, be answered in order for decolonization to exist as a framework. We want to say, first, that decolonization is not obliged to answer those questions - decolonization is not accountable to settlers, or settler futurity. Decolonization is accountable to Indigenous sovereignty and futurity. Still, we acknowledge the questions of those wary participants in Occupy Oakland and other settlers who want to know what decolonization will require of them. The answers are not fully in view and can’t be as long as decolonization remains punctuated by metaphor. The answers will not emerge from friendly understanding, and indeed require a dangerous understanding of uncommonality that un-coalesces coalition politics - moves that may feel very unfriendly. But we will find out the answers as we get there, “in the exact measure that we can discern the movements which give [decolonization] historical form and content” (Fanon, 1963, p. 36). To fully enact an ethic of incommensurability means relinquishing settler futurity, abandoning the hope that settlers may one day be commensurable to Native peoples. It means removing the asterisks, periods, commas, apostrophes, the whereas’s, buts, and conditional clauses that punctuate decolonization and underwrite settler innocence. The Native futures, the lives to be lived once the settler nation is gone - these are the unwritten possibilities made possible by an ethic of incommensurability.

#### Accountability DA – “weigh the aff” is a settler ruse to ensure a lack of accountability for anti-native representations – only our model of debate ensures we can challenge violent representations which internal link turns fairness because it makes debate unsafe for black, brown, and native debaters. Psychological violence outweighs – your role as an educator is to prioritize a model of debate that makes debate safer for students.

#### All of our 1nc K proper evidence justifies why thinking through land and relationships to land is imperative –if we win that is true than we win framework because only an interpretation that understands land as central to our epistemology can create a good politics.

## 2

#### Reject 1AR theory – a) 1ar theory means it’s game over for the 2nr because of the 2ar collapse – the negative will inevitably undercover something, b) I can respond to 1ar only once which both kills resolvability and kills reciprocity since they can respond to 1nc shells twice.

#### Reasonability on 1ar theory – 7 minutes of the 1nc means they will always find there’s something abusive we did – reasonability’s key to incentivizing in-depth discussion rather than a 2ar collapse on theory.

#### Drop the arg on 1ar theory – 1ar theory is incentivized to restart the debate and avoid the 1n. Drop the arg solves because if one position the 1nc was abusive, then ignoring it in the 2ar allows evaluation of substance.

#### RVIs on 1ar theory – anything thing else puts me in a double bind because I’ll either overcover substance and undercover theory or vice versa which makes negating impossible – RVIs solve by creating another route to the ballot to compensate.