## K

### K Proper (2:30)

#### The Eurocene is structured by a political ontology in which the slave and the savage constrain the possibilities of being for black and indigenous people – through genocide, the world itself comes into being, and the ecologies of the Eurocene render indigenous life and land casualties of the greater project of colonial incorporation. This means they have to grapple with the question of what the 1ac is worth in a world on fire.

**Juarez 21** – Nicolas Juarez is a Native American studies scholar with a focus on the political ontology of Amerindians within the Western hemisphere, the settlerist politics of love, and the connections between racialization and psychopathology. Their current research is focused on Lacanian psychoanalysis and Indigenous cosmology. They are also very cool and based. “THE WORLD IS BURNING: Racialized Regimes of Eco-Terror and the Anthropocene as Eurocene” in “THE ANTHROPOCENE: Approaches and Contexts for Literature and the Humanities” Routledge, 2021 // rose

It is imperative to begin without delay—time, despite its disturbing stillness, is always moving too quickly, and we are already behind before we even begin. Even by the time you finish this paragraph, around 60,000 tons of CO2 will be emitted, and the earth will creep dangerously closer to a climatic disaster that escapes imagination.1 Every day, it seems, it is another dozen or so species lost, a couple of hundred thousand acres of rainforest burned away, or a new record for some ecological catastrophe. Not to mention the human stories of climate change that proliferate across the news—a third of the global population subject to lethal heat at least 20 days a year, 100 million hungry as a direct result of climatic disaster, 10,000 dead a day from air pollution, and on and on—usually accompanied with some grim reminder that what we experience today, as horrific as it is, will quickly become mild, unspectacular, and common over the next couple of decades.2 This is, of course, an intimately familiar feeling: too much, too big, too late. All the while, one is expected to continue to keep living, keep consuming, keep working as if there is still anything remotely resembling a future to come. No doubt this is what is behind the growing proliferation of terms such as “ecoanxiety,” “ecological grief,” “climate trauma,” or “solastalgia.” These are the feelings that accompany the material and libidinal existence of what has been called the Anthropocene, a geological era in which “human activity is now global and is the dominant cause of most contemporary environmental change.”3 However, that definition, along with the anxious and grieving apathy produced from attempting to confront it, immediately brings to mind several questions: When did this start? What is human activity? What is to be done? I attempt to answer these questions in this chapter, arguing that the moniker of the Anthropocene misdirects our attention toward a generic, global Anthropos, thereby mystifying and occluding our capacity to recognize the origin and structural maintenance of the libidinal and political economies fueling the current crisis. In order to investigate this, I utilize Jarius Grove’s concept of the Eurocene, which he takes up in response to Sylvia Wynter’s critique that the Anthropocene too readily universalizes blame despite the fact that millions, if not billions, globally are not part of the lifeways that produce it. In deploying the term, Grove wishes to link “climate change, species loss, slavery, the elimination of native peoples, and the globalization of extractive capitalism [as] all part of the same global ordering.”4 However, rather than using the Eurocene as another alternative term for the Anthropocene, I show that despite the proliferation of alternative terms—Capitalocene, Plantationocene, Chthulucene, etc.—what is always spoken about is the proliferation of a regime of violence wherein “the West … brought the whole human species into its hegemonic … model of being human.”5 As such, the terminological centering of Europe speaks to the ways in which it is precisely the West qua Europe that historically and violently formed the contemporary understanding of what human and human activity is. Said another way, Grove deploys the prefix Euro- in order to signify how European colonialism institutes a way of being through genocide and slavery that becomes synonymous with what it means to be human, and that such an ordering is directly linked to the phenomena characteristic of the Anthropocene, in whatever parlance is used. To that end, this chapter traces potential starting points for the Anthropocene to argue that racialized eco-terror initiates the Anthropocene and that such terror occurs because of an ontological structure that takes Black and Native people as non-Human. There are three main considerations for the beginning of the Anthropocene: The Columbian Exchange (1610), the Industrial Revolution (1784), and the “Great Acceleration” (1945). While each of these events take place in radically different times and involve multiple countries, they each are made possible by the violence of settler colonialism and antiblackness, which animate time and space itself. In order to illuminate this claim, I turn to each event in turn and examine how its material and libidinal economies were made directly possible by these power structures such that it is impossible to consider the Anthropocene at all without them. The Columbian Exchange (1610) The Columbian Exchange—or the widespread flow and movement of flora, fauna, peoples, and technologies between Europe, Africa, and the Americas during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries—has the earliest claim to being a start to the Anthropocene. Geologists have identified the “Orbis spike” in 1610 because the literal mass death caused by European conquest produced a global drop in carbon emissions as millions of Indigenous people became ghosts through a depopulation of over 90 percent. This drop was sufficiently large that it likely contributed, in part, to the Little Ice Age’s globalization. Beyond this, geologists point to the ways in which species jumped continents and ecologies massively intermixed, beginning a homogeneity in Earth’s biosphere that is unparalleled in Earth’s geological history. These massive shifts—in carbon emissions changing Earth’s global climate and in the biome of Earth—mark this event as a particular candidate for the beginning of the Anthropocene.6 However, it is also necessary to note that such an “exchange” was anything but. Instead, it was both an act of unparalleled and unrivaled violence, the institution of a structure of death that was and is filled with torture, rape, enslavement, displacement, and murder. Such an approach was unusual not only in its scope but also in its raw brutality. Despite the history of warfare and land-grabbing in Earth’s history, never before had an entire race of people been indelibly marked by their skin color for death. While ethnic conflicts proliferate throughout history, this racial schema that marked the Indian as inevitably dead, dying, and deserving of death was a new appearance. At the same time, the “exchange” also allows us to focus on the ecological violence of such an encounter. In the first instance, the introduction of various foreign flora and fauna from Europe disrupted Indigenous food systems, introducing famine and malnutrition as a common part of Indigenous life. Combined with being displaced onto unfamiliar lands, this form of environmental violence mirrors the ecological devastation of today—lands in which food will not grow, forced migration into unfamiliar places, and sickness and disease resulting from environmental factors. Such displacement created a toxic geography “whereby life is systematically destroyed or compromised,” transforming genocide from a behavioral act to a geographic and climatic one.7 However, this “exchange” did not stop there. As Black populations were stolen off African coasts, enslaved, and shipped across the Atlantic, the European colonial plantation became the model for agriculture, combining exotic, imported labor with exotic, imported flora and fauna. This disrupted natural, ecological rhythms, destroying soil quality and creating a more brittle, unstable ecology.8 Outside of the spectacular brutality necessary to maintain such a slave system, the plantation also functioned as its own toxic geography such that antiblackness became the “total climate.”9 Outside of the laborious heat and exposure to new diseases Black slaves were forced to encounter, sewage and spoilage often contaminated food and water, and living spaces were often prone to decay, instilling disease and debility throughout all who were forced to live in those spaces.10 Such devastation not only killed millions of Black and Native people through environmental violence but also made possible the environment and lives of Europeans into today: “By itself, Europe’s biodiversity was probably insufficient to sustain its subsequent population growth. Without the American crops, Europe might not have been able to carry such heavy populations as she later did.”11 If the Eurocene is, as Grove remarks, the order which links “climate change, species loss, slavery, the elimination of native peoples, and the globalization of extractive capitalism,” then it is already clear at this point that the Anthropocene is nothing but the Eurocene. The Eurocene infects the logic of the Anthropocene to its core such that all of Europe is a settler colony and every European a settler-master whose lives depended and depend on that continued violence. As Indigenous Hawaiian scholar Haunani-Kay Trask reminds us, “civil society is itself a creation of settler colonies.”12 In articulating this, Trask illuminates an essential feature of the Anthropocene qua Eurocene: for those whose racialized body is synonymous with Humanity, life itself is synonymous with death for those who are positioned as the antithesis to that Humanity (marked here with a capital-H to denote its ontological designation rather than how the term is colloquially used). In examining this “exchange” between the Old and New Worlds, it was not only that Europe introduce death as normative for Black and Native American populations, but it relied upon that very death in order to give life to itself either through the raw wealth extracted through slavery or the transportation of essential American crops to Europe in order to stave off starvation. In this way, the civil society constructed through such violence is itself a settler colony, no matter where it finds itself. The transformation of the world into the colony-plantation, and its ecological effects, is the beginning of the Eurocene as such. The Industrial Revolution (1784) The second possible date for the beginning of the Anthropocene is the Industrial Revolution, a starting point that is most popular with social scientists. The reasoning for such preference is clear. The Industrial Revolution began the burning of fossil fuels which have radically changed the entirety of Earth’s landscapes and its geological processes. In the seventeenth century, gold and silver mined from the Americas through Black and Indigenous slave labor fueled the global expansion of European markets, making global trade possible and enabling Europe to both industrialize and develop its growing financial sector. When Britain emancipated slaves in the British Caribbean in 1833, slave owners received a compensation for the loss of their slaves that enabled them to build the physical infrastructure of the Industrial Revolution throughout Britain.13 Yet, the compensation to these slave owners was financed by Barings Bank, a bank that exactly three decades before had financed the Louisiana Purchase and used the resulting funds and status to invest heavily in the American slave trade and cotton production. Financing both of these would allow the bank to fund the completion of the Canadian-Pacific Railway that would establish Canada through its clearing of Indigenous peoples. Thus, in a perverse chain of events, Indigenous dispossession of land would revitalize the dying institution of slavery in the United States, which would, in turn, both line the pockets of British slave owners and fund the further clearing of Indigenous peoples in Canada.14 This set of events allowed companies to invest in cotton, steel, iron, coal, and other key industries. And the factories such industries built would, in turn, be modeled off of the plantation. By the time slaves were emancipated in the United States, cotton was no longer the driving force of industrialization. As Kathryn Yusoff writes, Enslaved “free” African Americans predominately mined coal in the corporate use of black power … The Alabama Iron Ore and Tennessee Coal and Iron companies were the largest convict labor companies and fed the coal mines of the U.S. Steel Corporation, which built the country.15 The environmental violence of this entire process is, quite literally, impossible to mention in full. The mining of gold and silver made death and debility every day for African and Indigenous slaves: they were held captive within the toxic geographies of the mines, and the environmental devastation collapsed Indigenous food economies and ruined ecosystems.16 The spread of plantations throughout the United States and the clearing of Indigenous peoples from their lands following the Louisiana Purchase possesses innumerable examples ranging from the deliberate overhunting of Buffalo, which pushed Indians into starvation, to the slave trade reducing the population of Africa to half of what it would have been otherwise in 1850.17 This is, of course, without even getting into the ways in which carbon dioxide has and will continue to destroy communities of color. If the Industrial Revolution is the beginning of the Anthropocene, it is no less defined by the Eurocene because it is part of that very same ordering which requires slavery, genocide, and extractive capitalism in order to function. European industrialists would not have had access to the financial, material, or biological resources they needed if it were not for slavery and genocide. Likewise, neither Europe nor the Americas could have built their nations or empires without the devastation they wrought not only on the land but also on the bodies they sacrificed on their path toward industrialization. Without the violences characteristic of the Eurocene, the Industrial Revolution qua Anthropocene could not have come into being. Furthermore, the logic of empire-building, industrialization, and the commodification of the environment is forged in the blood of those bodies, and their ghosts continue to haunt such logics into the modern day. The only thing that can be industrialized in the Eurocene is the murderous project of the world itself, and that is precisely what the Industrial Revolution was. The Great Acceleration (1945) The final period for consideration is the Great Acceleration, which marks a “major expansion in human population, large changes in natural processes, and the development of novel materials from minerals to plastics to persistent organic pollutants and inorganic compounds.”18 Two events tend to define this period: a spike in global carbon emissions, as consumption increases globally, and the detonation of nuclear bombs, which release elemental compounds that are not naturally occurring. Both events have shaped the world in ways often unnoticed or unthought. Three quarters of all carbon emissions have occurred since 1945, and the body of every human now contains the nuclear byproduct strontium-90. To begin with nuclearization, the uranium ore used in testing and building the American bombs used on Hiroshima and Nagasaki came from the Congo, as well as Indigenous territories in Northwest Canada and the Southwest United States. In the process of mining, Indigenous American and African communities were heavily exposed to radiation, subjecting them to massive increased risks to various cancers, infertility, or immune system disorders. Beyond the literal uranium ore, the Manhattan Project—the United States’ name for the secret government project that developed the nuclear bombs used in World War II against Japan—not only relied upon the military occupation of Indigenous land for testing but also would not have been able to function without cheap Native labor. Postwar, as the United States engaged in an arms race with the Soviet Union, the United States relied more heavily upon uranium mining in the American southwest, primarily on Diné territories, and continued to test nuclear bombs on Indigenous land, infamously at Bikini Atoll on the Marshallese. In both places, Indigenous peoples would become “living laboratories” as the United States government knowingly exposed populations to radiation poisoning in order to study the effects, with one scientist describing them as a “cross section of happy, amenable savages.”19 In sum, without the production of toxic geographies in Black and Native communities, the United States could not have mined the uranium, become a nuclear power, or learned about the effects of radiation. In contrast, the spike in carbon that defines the Great Acceleration relied more on deploying the technologies and paradigms developed throughout the planation and settler colony globally. By 1945, the West had cemented the model of the Human as ontologically synonymous with itself and its ways of life. Even as non-Western powers arose, they modeled themselves on the West. As Madina V. Tlostanova and Walter Mignolo point out, “it is clear that in the polycentric world order the colonial matrix of power is still at work. Only that now it also is at work outside its place of origin.”20 This drive toward Western living expressed itself particularly through industrialization because, as Eve Tuck and K. Wayne Yang remind us, the settler defines civilization as “production … in excess of the sustainable production already present in the Indigenous world.”21 Not only did the factory, itself based on the plantation, proliferate globally, but plantation ecology, developed under chattel slavery, became prominent globally. Furthermore, as oil was pursued globally, Indigenous peoples bore the brunt of its violence, with displacements and genocides of Indigenous people occurring throughout Canada, the United States, Ecuador, Peru, and Nigeria.22 Today, Black and Native peoples continue to face the most extreme effects of climate change, even as they gained the least from these extractivist policies. Not only this, but the massive deforestation that has resulted from plantation ecology has decimated ecosystems, spurring extreme biodiversity loss and the disappearance of global carbon sinks, creating an unparalleled ecological crisis.23 Even here, in the latest possible marker for the Anthropocene, we see the ways the Eurocene inheres itself. It is not simply the West, but the world which owes its existence to slavery and genocide because such violences not only set the model of “the good life” spread the world over by Western superpowers but enabled those superpowers to exist in the first place. The very ordering of Europe now infects itself into the non-European world, ensuring its continual reproduction. As Tuck and Yang remind us, “settler colonialism fuels imperialism all around the globe … Settler sovereignty over [the] earth, air, and water is what makes possible these imperialisms.”24 In this final stage, the Eurocene not only enables its possibility, but it spurs the desire for the Western model of living, ensuring that the move toward the Eurocene is not only driven by the political economy but by the libidinal economy as well. The Antagonism of the Anthropocene The Anthropocene proceeds through regimes of ecological violence against Black and Native American people. If that violence did not occur, there would be no Anthropocene. Such gratuitous violence, in turn, has created a political ontology in which Black and Native American people are non-Human. Political ontology names the “powers subjects have or lack, the constituent elements of subjects’ structural position with which they are imbued or lack prior to the subjects’ performance,” and which, despite being non-metaphysical since it arises from politics, “functions as if it were a metaphysical property across the longue durée of the premodern, modern, and now postmodern era.”25 The ecological terror of the Anthropocene demonstrates how Black and Native American populations have become structurally consigned to the status of Black Slaves and Indian Savages, as the rest of the world obtains and struggles over its Humanity. As Dylan Rodriguez writes, who will be subject to the terrors of the plantation and the colony has changed over time, but “there’s little mistaking the Black and Aboriginal common denominator in all of it.”26 The longue durée of such violence also displays its temporal stillness—from the Columbian Exchange to the Industrial Revolution to the Great Acceleration, the non-Humanity of Black and Native populations is sustained. One only needs to examine the ecological terror of events such as the Standing Rock protests or the continued poisoning of Flint, Michigan, alongside the continued police killings, imprisonment, and civilian murders of Black and Native peoples to see how such an ontological structure continues into the present. As such, an examination of the Anthropocene reveals a general antagonism between the Human qua Settler-Master and the Black and Red bodies who have been transformed into flesh and ectoplasm by slavery and genocide’s regimes of terror, especially in their ecological registers. Furthermore, the necessity of such violence for the Anthropocene’s existence and continued maintenance suggests that environmental struggles must ground themselves in abolition and settler decolonization, and that the struggle for abolition and settler decolonization is always already an environmental struggle. As Frank B. Wilderson III points out, “in this trio [of the Savage, Human, and Slave] we find the key to our world’s creation as well as to its undoing.”27 Likewise, since the Anthropocene arises from the creation and maintenance of the Human, it is clear that the global ordering signified by the Eurocene inheres itself in every single potential candidate and terminology for the beginning and meaning of the Anthropocene, no matter the internal debates within geology or the humanities. In this way, the fetishism for a “golden spike” in which the Anthropocene begins, or a perfect term to describe its processes, is pushed aside in order to recognize that “the marker is not the epoch.”28 Put another way, given the ways in which the gratuitous ecological violence necessary to the formation and maintenance of the Human persists without change throughout the entire “Age of Humans,” a particular starting point for the Anthropocene is nil. This is so because if “origins configure and prefigure the possibility of narratives of the present” such that “nothing that can be found in the end is not already prefigured in the origin,” then the Anthropocene itself was already prefigured in the formation of a global Anthropos that took European Man as model and ideal.29 Thus, to debate the terminology of the Capitalocene versus the Plantationocene versus the Chthulucene versus anything else figures as little more than rhetorical posturing. Such a debate ignores that what each signify—the rise of world integrated capitalism, the global plantation system, or the messiness that pushes bodies into bodies—is simply not possible without the antiblackness of Black chattel slavery or the settler colonialism of Native American genocide. So, the Eurocene is not an attempt to propose an alternative term that should enter into this endless play, but rather functions as a critique of this very proliferation. It is not that the term “Anthropocene” is insufficient in its characterization or focus; rather, it is us who are insufficient in our analysis of the Human, too easily fooled by “the enacting of a uniquely secular liberal monohumanist conception of the human” that views capitalism, the plantation system, or the collision between bodies as anything more than the formation of the Human.30 Conclusion: The World Is Burning It is difficult to conclude a chapter like this given both the scope of the issue across time and space and the indescribable direness of the situation. In lieu of such a cataclysm, one is often compelled to put forth some legible solution as an attempt to ward off feelings of despair or pessimism or tragedy. However, such a recuperative effort is unsupported by the arguments I’ve put forward, and, furthermore, it would be disingenuous, betraying the point of this chapter that the world is burning. The reason for the world’s burning is as tragic as it is perverse in that the flames are fanned precisely because the world’s deepest pleasures, both directly and indirectly, come from abusing, beating, torturing, raping, slaving, and killing Black and Native people. It is so committed to these pleasures that it is likely that several of us will live to watch the world enter a state of ecological collapse whose omnicidal intensity can hardly be fathomed today. Such a reality is heartbreaking, and we often ignore it in favor of liberal ideals of incremental reform or of working out our differences in some multicultural project. Yet, the sad truth is that there is simply not enough time for such things any longer, if there ever was. Such liberal processes may, at best, make us more comfortable as we prepare our graves, but they do nothing about our inevitable deaths. If there is any hope left—and uprisings from Haiti to Chiapas, among others, suggest there might be—it is in the complete destruction of this world. In destroying it, it might be possible to craft new joys and pleasures and forms of living that are not so reliant on the transmutation of bodies into flesh and ectoplasm or on the deputization of some into slave masters and settler-conquerors. The success of such a project is not guaranteed, but it is all we have, and so it is what we must do.

#### That creates a way of being on this earth that is terminally unsustainable – “an America for everyone” guarantees mass extinction to preserve one form of humanity.

**Grove 19** – Jairus Grove finished his PhD in 2011 and joined the UH Mānoa faculty the same year. He is currently the director of the Hawai’i Research Center for Futures Studies. “Savage Ecology: War and Geopolitics at the End of the World”, Duke University Press, 2019 pp. 50-53 // rose

Every day we are told things are worse than we thought.41 Sea-level rise is happening faster than we thought, species are disappearing faster than we thought, and the possibilities for reversal are slimmer and slimmer. The proposals for human survival gaining traction, including geoengineering, the centrally managed supercities of Stewart Brand and others’ “Ecomodernist Manifesto,” space colonization, and becoming digital beings all resemble the wonders of thriving planetary life less and less.42 On April 20, 2016, the Washington Post headline read, “And Then We Wept.” The news was in and it was not good. The Great Barrier Reef, the Amazon rainforest of the world’s oceans, is 93 percent bleached. The coral foundation of its vast ecosystem is dead or dying. 43 A year to the day before this announcement, we were told that the northern white rhino was extinct.44 The last white rhino, a male named Sudan, is being kept under guard twenty-four hours a day from poachers.45 No army or protection is sufficient for survival as there is no mate remaining. The young men carrying machine guns are Sudan’s only company as he waits to complete his species extinction, a task thoroughly accelerated by human male desires for the aphrodisiac qualities of rhino horns. Each event—a dying global reef system in Australia, the loss of a singular species in central Kenya, a slow shift in ocean levels—exists in an interregnum between the brutal facts of existence through which all things must pass. The crisis of our contemporary moment is that the cycle of passing and renewal has been interrupted by the metabolic rift of modern human animals. Which trajectory we are facing is unclear. Is the sixth great extinction upon us? The difficulty in classifying extinctions is differentiating a normal rise, decline, and extinction of species against which to compare and periodize “events” of catastrophic and lethal acceleration. Even the five great extinctions took place over unfathomable periods of time.46 In all the great extinctions, “events” are hundreds of thousands of years long. Furthermore, the incomplete nature of the fossil record makes population sampling very difficult. One has to figure out ways to reliably distinguish between whether the absence of evidence is indeed evidence or is merely the absence of evidence. After extensive review of excavations worldwide over at least 150 years of research, one can estimate what is called the “background” extinction rate. This is the expected rate of species loss over a given period of time. This rate is not definitive. At best, it is a kind of working rule of thumb. That being said, the academic debates over whether the current rate of extinction exceeds any version of the background rate is like two people on the Empire State Building bickering over whether it is the fall that kills you or the certain impact at the bottom.47 Even conservative estimates put the loss of species across the plant and animal kingdom at thousands of times the background rate from earlier human and prehuman eras. To put it another way, even if the most conservative estimates are right, we are in real trouble. To take just one example, thanks to habitat loss and the chytrid fungus, the amphibian extinction rate is forty-five thousand times higher than the background rate. Amphibians survived four of the five great extinction events in Earth’s history, yet one generation of human travel has spiked amphibian extinction rates above what was caused by multiple asteroid impacts, supervolcanoes, cataclysmic climate oscillations, and a collision with a comet.48 In an irony only humans will appreciate, the current apocalypse is marked by a noticeable lack of raining frogs. Amphibians are not alone in the race to extinction. As recounted by Elizabeth Kolbert, one-third of all reef-building corals, one-third of all freshwater mollusks, one-third of sharks and rays, one-fourth of all mammals, one-fifth of all reptiles, and one-sixth of all bird species are disappearing.49 What makes this particular era of disappearances unique is not just the rate of extinction but also the distribution. The entire ocean is facing unprecedented instability.50 Furthermore, extinctions are occurring globally, even in those areas spared by heavy industrialization and development. While climate change is unlikely to help, the current amphibian apocalypse is driven almost entirely by the human-induced movement of people and things around the planet.51 The chytrid fungus now affecting the majority of the planet is responsible for mass die-offs of amphibians, depriving them of oxygen and causing heart attacks. While climate change should certainly be important to any global political agenda, the already occurring sixth great extinction calls into question more than just the dependence on fossil fuels. From the perspective of those forms of life being wiped off the planet, the entire rhythm and circulation of just-in-time globalization enforced by great power navies—one of the most defining characteristics of the Eurocene—is threatening extinction.52 Insofar as an environmental agenda has gained political currency in the past two decades, no political party or significant constituency takes seriously the proposition that global travel should come to an end. Freedom of movement is almost unquestionably championed by liberal societies. Those who do challenge it are often reactionaries and xenophobes, not environmentalists. Since the first slow and then accelerating egress from Africa, humans have spread to every continent on the planet. That movement once resembled something like the linearity of diffusion but has reached, for some in the elite, terminal velocity. There are now humans who live in constant motion on permanent-residence cruise ships to avoid taxes, and there is a global class of anxious airport-hopping business elites who reside in no place in particular.53 The latter are so allergic to friction slowing their circulation that even in this age of security and checkpoints they have been granted special routes and forms of identification to avoid the coagulation of administration now managing planetary circuits.54 This is just one example of how liberal practices come up against McKenzie Wark’s reworking of what Marx calls metabolic rift. For Wark, following Marx, the advent of labor that freed humans from the animal world also put humans out of synch with natural processes. The result is that humans, to be human, require too much food, water, and energy for natural cycles to fulfill.55 From this perspective, there is no version of the contemporary order that can be egalitarian and sustainable. Disposable consumer-based economies cannot scale for any length of time. So in some sense, Wark and Marx are right. The cycles of Earth and much of its inhabitants are out of sync with humans and their love of labor. For Wark in particular, this leaves little else to do but accept that any viable human project will have to embrace geoengineering and even space colonization alongside other efforts to build a “post-scarcity society.” However, such concepts should be made more precise in identifying the particular forms of life that are at odds with or exceed multispecies ecological feedbacks. If humanity is to find itself in another dark age, rather than a unified global project for environmental management, there are many possible ways of living that could be sustained within the dynamic equilibrium of Earth systems. But the point stands. If we remain within the currently restricted vision of the future of global culture—an America for everyone—the adaptive character of even large Earth systems, such as the hydrologic cycle, will collapse or enter periods of extreme turbulence.56 To put this another way, the ought of the cosmopolitanism “good” as currently conceived and the ecological are not consonant. However you feel about transnational capitalism, it is indisputable that the uninterrupted movement of things and people around the planet comes at an extraordinarily high cost to human and nonhuman animals alike. This is at times difficult to discern as the human population steadily increases and the world seems suffuse with living things. Therefore, the problem of the current crisis is not reducible solely to some aggregate of living biomass. What is being lost is the diversity of life that inspires wonder. Apocalypses are not primarily about extinction—they are irreversible transformations. The often misguided debates over climate change capture this problem quite acutely. In fact, despite how difficult it is to admit that the deniers of anthropogenic climate change may be half-right, they are correct that fluctuations are a normal part of Earth’s history.57 However, what sustains the conservative bent of this claim is the sense of providence that the full argument entails. Those who champion adaptation and “natural” fluctuation trade on the presumption that Earth adapts and fluctuates for us. Fluctuations will occur and creatures will adapt, but in the past that has meant everything from a world of only single-celled anaerobic bacteria to vast seas of virtually nothing but trilobites. Climate denialism is, ironically, no less anthropocentric than many of its scientifically validated opponents.

#### In a world structured by finitude, engagement with apocalypse must be generative rather than subtractive – you should shift the frame of debate from “what can we do to save the world” to “what can we do to make the world worth saving.”

**Mitchell 17** – Audra Mitchell (she/her) is a settler of Ukrainian, Polish, Scottish and English ancestry, currently living and working on the Ancestral and Treaty lands of the Attawandaron (Neutral), Haudenosaunee (Six Nations of the Grand River) and Anishinaabe (Mississaugas of the New Credit) peoples. Prof. Mitchell holds the Canada Research Chair in Global Political Ecology at the Balsillie School of International Affairs. From 2015-18, she held the CIGI Chair in Global Governance and Ethics at the Balsillie School of International Affairs. Audra has previously worked at the University of York, UK (2010-15) and the University of St. Andrews, UK (2009-10), and in 2014 she was a visiting scholar at the Universities of Queensland (Australia) and Edinburgh (UK). Audra completed her PhD at the Queen’s University of Belfast, UK (2009), “Is IR going extinct?” European Journal of International Relations, Vol 23, Issue 1, 2017 // rose

Extinction is not only about endings; it can also be understood as a force that engenders ethico-political creativity in and with the conditions of finitude (Mitchell, 2016). Viewing (mass) extinction in this way consists of ‘a confrontation with perishing, finitude, and fragility but one that fills us with at least as much wonder as dread, more political energy than resignation, and takes seriously that apocalypses are not ends but irreversible transitions’ (Grove, 2015). This, in turn, involves reframing nihilism not as an apolitical collapse into apathy and submission to visions of the inevitable, but rather as a ‘speculative opportunity’ that opens up new futures (Brassier, 2007: xi). In other words, rather than promoting (only) a ‘will to nothingness’, let alone a malevolent extinction-wish, engaging with the possibilities of non-being can make it possible to embrace the indeterminacy of the universe and its creative forces. I shall now argue that it demands and enables a politics attuned to the biological, geological and cosmological forces of the universe: a cosmopolitics. According to Isabelle Stengers (2005), ‘cosmopolitics’ is politics rooted in the acknowledgement of the multiple, diverse and constantly transforming beings that constitute the cosmos. It hinges on the belief that all beings make interventions that shape, disrupt and transform political processes. Importantly, participation in these processes does not require representation in terms of human interests or even the ability to act or speak in a human-oriented sense. Indeed, Stengers (2005: 996) asserts that ‘the political arena is peopled with shadows of that which does not have, cannot have or does not want to have a political voice’. A range of beings — whether they are considered human and nonhuman, living and non-living, organic and inorganic — can intervene in politics by ‘forcing thought’ through their effects, properties, presence or absence. For instance, water can make its force felt politically by destroying human habitations and ecosystems in the form of floods, by withdrawing and creating droughts, or by sustaining and nurturing multiple life forms. For Stengers, these issues are not made political by humans: to the extent that they have an effect in the world, they are always-already political. According to Stengers, the interventions of multiple beings help to slow down processes of universalization central to traditional modes of cosmopolitanism. Indeed, the presence of other beings with conflicting interests and needs makes universalization, and political decisionmaking, ‘as difficult as possible’ (Stengers, 2005: 1003). Cosmopolitics is conflictual and agonistic: the insurgence of awkward subjects and the obstructions, disruptions and disjunctures they create can nurture pluralism and generate creative politics. Crucially, cosmopolitics is not simply an intensification or variant of cosmopolitanism. Whereas cosmopolitanism stresses the suffix -politan, cosmopolitics shifts emphasis to the prefix cosmo-, that is, it takes the cosmos, rather than human communities, as the basis and locus of political action. Cosmopolitanism, as Colebrook contends, is based on the extrapolation and expansion of a polity that, while it may be expanded to include other beings, is centrifugal to the figure of humanity. In other words, the cosmos of cosmopolitanism ‘is always an extension of the composed polity, an abstraction or idealization of man englobed in his world of human others’ (Colebrook, 2014a: 110). Even the most radical contemporary reframings of cosmopolitanism, in contrast, involve stretching the scope of the human-dominated polity to include all humans and (certain) nonhumans (see Linklater, 2011). Anthony Burke (2013, 2015) has attempted to radically rethink cosmopolitanism in terms of the intermeshing of complex processes, material conditions and (human and nonhuman) actors across planetary space-time. However, I want to argue that this project is better understood in the context of cosmopolitics, insofar as it seeks to render the cosmos the ontological basis of politics. I want to argue that a modified form of cosmopolitics — one attuned to the inhuman — is demanded by, and can ground meaningful responses to, (mass) extinction. Specifically, Stengers’s cosmopolitics acknowledges the role of the weak, marginalized and ‘shadowy’ subjects; it focuses largely on presence, that is, on the positive beings that interrupt human activities. In order to respond to mass extinction, cosmopolitics must place more focus on absence, negation and non-being. Colebrook hints at this in her call to ‘destroy cosmopolitanism for the sake of the cosmos’ (Colebrook, 2014a: 96) She claims that arguing that: if the crises of the twenty-first century were to prompt us to think at all it may be in a cosmic and inhuman mode, asking … what the elements of this earth are, what force they bear, how we are composed in relation to those forces. (Colebrook, 2014a: 114) If we consider (mass) extinction as one of these forces, a different kind of cosmopolitics emerges — one that responds to extinction and considerably adds to the conceptual mass of IR. This mode of cosmopolitics makes it possible to generate new forms of solidarity based not on the fear of collective annihilation, but rather on a sense of shared vulnerability that is the condition of earthly coexistence. For Rosi Braidotti (2013), such solidarities emerge from the defamiliarization of dominant norms of ‘humanity’, which, she argues, is best achieved by thinking as if ‘humanity’ were already extinct. This, she contends, compels humans to ‘think critically about who we are and what we are actually in the process of becoming’ (Braidotti, 2013: 49–50). From this perspective, attention to the inhuman, and to the possible extinction of humans, can produce an ‘enlarged sense of inter-connection between self and others, including the non-human or “earth” others’ (Braidotti, 2013: 49–50). The same processes of defamiliarization, Colebrook (2014a: 58) suggests, would make possible a radical new form of feminism that, in embracing ‘a thought of life beyond the human’, would place neither man nor woman at its centre (Colebrook, 2014b: 16). By unsettling the foundations of ‘humanity’ itself, she contends, thinking the inhuman makes it possible to transcend boundaries such as gender and race that essentialize characteristics as ‘essentially’ human. This would have profound importance for feminist, queer and decolonial international politics: it would undercut the metaphysical foundations of sources of exclusion and oppression against which they struggle. In short, contemplating the extinction of ‘the human’ makes it possible to imagine alternative, future life forms that bear resemblances to, but are not restricted by, existing norms of ‘humanity’. Moreover, a cosmopolitics attuned to the inhuman could profoundly transform global ethics by grounding it not in a politics of ressentiment, but rather one of gratitude. The geographer Nigel Clark (2011) argues that humans should embrace the finite, deeply contingent and potentially meaningless (in a transcendent, metaphysical sense) existence furnished by an indifferent Earth. Specifically, he claims that human existence is contingent upon conditions created by previous (largely extinct) life forms and by inhuman forces, both contemporary and temporally distant. From this perspective, existence is a gift given to humans (among others) but it is not given-for-us in the correlationist sense. Instead, humans are indebted to a chain of interlocking forces that are ultimately indifferent to their existence. Clark argues that humans should embrace this gift with the knowledge that it can, and eventually will, be withdrawn. This means accepting and honouring it without treating it as an entitlement or devaluing it on account of its finitude. His account contrasts sharply with the discourses of catastrophe, resilience and biopolitics discussed earlier, which devalue any mode of life that cannot be indefinitely sustained through human intervention. Clark finds an ethico-political alternative to these logics in an ethos of gratitude and reciprocation. For Clark, the latter is epitomized by the actions of the government of Kiribati — the small island state perhaps most imminently threatened by rising sea levels — in creating one of the world’s largest marine parks in 2006 (the Phoenix Islands Protected Area). In so doing, Clark contends, this community expressed unconditional gratitude for the gift of existence rather than resentment of its endangerment. Moreover, by seeking to protect and preserve the watery medium that threatens to destroy it, Kiribatians embodied a mode of meaningful response to disaster that was not constrained to sustaining survival-as-we-know-it. Moreover, a cosmopolitics attuned to extinction and to the inhuman would foster a new mode of future-oriented politics based not on the continuity of the present, but rather on the creative possibilities of discontinuity and unpredictable difference. For Evans and Reid (2014: 164), biopolitical responses to extinction reflect a ‘cult of mourning’ for the coming death of existing species life that ‘manages to turn the wondrous phenomenon of the emergence of new forms of life … into a problematic of security and threat’. Indeed, in popular literature on extinction, there is a marked tone of mourning and fear about what might ‘replace’ humans as Earth’s dominant species, and the readers’ focus is trained on monstrous figures such as robots, microbes or giant rats (see Zalasiewicz, 2008). In contrast, cosmopolitics attuned to extinction and the inhuman would be open to the new forms of being that might emerge from, or even in place of, humans. For instance, it might involve overcoming fear and revulsion of the hybrid or mutant creatures that are emerging, at least in part from human scientific interventions, treating them with love and care instead of abjection (see Haraway, 2011; Latour, 2012). Crucially, it would also involve embracing the defamiliarized modalities of currently existing humanity discussed earlier. This includes beings so transformed through technological and evolutionary change as to be almost unrecognizable to ‘us’ (currently existing humans), and the ‘defamiliarized’ beings no longer essentialized in terms of race, sex or gender. The cosmopolitics I am outlining here would embrace these beings-to-come instead of fearing and resenting them. This amounts to a kind of futural gratitude that mirrors the Kiribatian marine park — an ethics of comportment towards the unknowable other that might displace ‘us’. However, how can currently existing humans adopt such an ethics? Emmanuel Levinas (1998: 50) terms this mode of ethics ‘being-forbeyond-my-death’, that is, being ‘for a time that would be without me … in order to be for that which is after me’. Although Levinas is referring to human individuals and their comportment towards future generations of humans, this principle can be translated across species boundaries and to a collective register. It profoundly shifts the emphasis of human action — instead of attempting to secure existing conditions, it encourages ‘action for a world to come’, and responsiveness to the ethical demands of the (remote, unknowable) Other (Levinas, 1998: 51). Clark, writing in a Levinasian vein, agrees that embracing future life forms is not passive. Instead, it requires the ability to see ‘the intolerability of the world as it is presently imagined and demands the seemingly impossible; the creation of a new one’ (Clark, 2011: 195). Crucially, this ethos is not a replacement for security or the pursuit of indefinite survival, but rather a qualitatively different kind of politics. It cannot guarantee the survival of humanity-as-it-is — the goal to which all existing strategies and responses to extinction are oriented. It entails an ‘eschatology without hope for oneself’ (Levinas, 1998: 51): welcoming new worlds makes, and demands, no promises. While this ethos engenders cautious hope for undetermined futures, it cannot be made conditional on the survival of existing forms of life. Instead, it must be pursued ‘for the hell of it and for love of the world’ (Braidotti, 2010: 17). This shifts the logic of responsiveness to extinction from one of mastery and control to one of gratitude and hopeful, creative experimentation. As Clark (2011: 217, paraphrasing Allan Stoekl) puts it: we might have a better chance of prising the planet out of its downward ecological spiral accidentally, not as the goal of a grand, visionary project but as the unintended consequence of more joyous and generous living right here and now. In other words, adopting an attitude of hospitality and generosity towards other beings might help to open up a future of long-term flourishing for humans and other beings. However, as Clark argues, this kind of action needs to have the character of Derridean hospitality, that is, it needs to be undertaken without conditionality, or, in this case, the demand for security. Adopting this ethico-political orientation does not involve capitulation to extinction, and even less an extinction-wish. Instead, it widens the range of human responsiveness far beyond the spectrum of pre-emptive trauma, loss and tragedy, and a future of rapidly diminishing life lived in survival mode.

#### Contemporary apocalyptic analysis serves only the futures of whiteness – reject the logic of All Lives Matter.

**Mitchell and Chaudhury 20** – Audra Mitchell, Balsillie School of International Affairs, and Aadita Chaudhury, York University – Keele Campus

Audra Mitchell and Aadita Chaudhury “Worlding beyond ‘the’ ‘end’ of ‘the world’: white apocalyptic visions and BIPOC futurisms” International Relations 2020, Vol. 34(3) 309–332 // rose

Discourses that predict the imminent ‘end of the world’ are not as universal as they often claim to be. The futures they fear for, seek to protect and work to construct are rooted in a particular set of global social structures and subjectivities: whiteness. Whiteness is not reducible to skin pigmentation, genetics or genealogy. It is a set of cultural, political, economic, normative, and subjective structures derived from Eurocentric societies and propagated through global formations such as colonization and capitalism. These multi-scalar structures work by segregating bodies through the inscription of racial difference, privileging those they recognize or construct as ‘white’4 and unequally distributing harms to those that they do not.5 Whiteness is also a form of property6 that accrues benefits – including material, physical, and other forms of security – and pervasive forms of power, across space, time, and social structures. Due in part to its trans-formation through long-duration, global patterns of violence and conquest, whiteness takes unique forms wherever and whenever it coalesces, so it should not be treated as universal – despite its own internal claims to this status. Most of the leading contributors to mainstream ‘end of the world’ discourses discussed in this article are rooted in Euro-American cultural contexts, and in particular in settler colonial and/or imperial states such as the United States, Canada, Australia, and the United Kingdom. As such, the forms of whiteness they embody are linked to particular histories of settlement, frontier cultures, resource-based imperialisms, genocides of Indigenous communities, histories of slavery, and modes of anti-Blackness. Whiteness is remarkable in its ability to render itself invisible to those who possess and benefit from it. Many, if not most, of the (often liberal humanitarian) authors of ‘end of the world’ discourses seem unaware of its integral influence on their thinking, and would almost certainly be horrified at the thought of their work entrenching racialized injustices. We are not suggesting that these authors espouse explicit, intentional and/or extreme racist ideals, on which much public discussion by white people of racism tends to focus.7 Nor do we wish to homogenize or present as equivalent all of the viewpoints discussed in this paper, which display a range of expressions of whiteness and levels of awareness thereof.8 On the contrary, we work to center broad, everyday, structural ways in which underlying logics of whiteness and white supremacy frame and permeate mainstream paradigms and discourses, including those identified as liberal, humanitarian, or progressive. Even amongst white people who consciously and explicitly disavow racism, unconscious, habitual, normalized, structurally-embedded assumptions circulate, and are reproduced in ways that perpetuate race9 as a global power structure. This includes one of the authors of this paper (Mitchell), who, as a white settler,10 continues to benefit from and participate – and thus ‘invest’11 – in structures of whiteness, and therefore has a continual responsibility to confront them (although total divestment is not possible).12 The ‘habits’ of racism13 are reflected strongly in the way that contemporary ‘end of the world’ narratives frame their protagonists: those attributed with meaningful agency and ethical status in the face of global threats; those whose survival or flourishing is prioritized or treated as a bottom line when tradeoffs are imagined and planned; and, crucially, those deemed capable of and entitled to ‘save the world’ and determine its future. This is expressed in several key features of the genre, including its domination by white thinkers; the forms of subjectivity and agency it embraces; and the ways it contrasts its subjects against BIPOC communities. First, contributors to fast-growing fields like the study of ‘existential risk’ or ‘global catastrophic risk’ are overwhelmingly white. As we will see, almost all of the authors identified by the literature review on which this paper is based, and certainly the most influential thinkers in the field, are white. For example, the seminal collection Global Existential Risk, 14 which claims to offer a comprehensive snapshot of this field, is edited by two white male Europeans (Nick Bostrom and Milan Circovic) and authored by an almost entirely white (and all-male) group of scholars. Likewise, the most senior positions within influential think tanks promoting the study of ‘existential risk’, such as the Future of Humanity Institute, the Cambridge Center for the Study of Existential Risk and Humanprogress.org, are dominated by white men, with few exceptions.15 Another expression of this tendency toward epistemic whiteness is found in the habit, prominent amongst white academics, of citing all or mostly-white scholars, which entrenches a politics of citation16 that privileges whiteness and acknowledges only some intersectionalities as relevant.17 As mentioned above, Mitchell’s (2017)18 work offers an example of this tendency: while it engages critical, feminist, and queer postapocalyptic visions written by white authors, it does not center BIPOC perspectives or knowledge systems. These examples do not simply raise issues of numerical representation, nor can whiteness necessarily be dismantled simply by altering these ratios. More importantly, all-white or majority white spaces create epistemes in which most contributors share cultural backgrounds, assumptions, and biases that are rarely challenged by alternative worldviews, knowledge systems or registers of experience. In such epistemes the perceived boundaries of ‘human thought’ are often elided with those of Euro-centric knowledge. For example, influential American settler journalist David Wallace-Wells19 contends that there exists no framework for grasping climate change besides ‘mythology and theology’. In so doing, he ignores centuries of ongoing, systematic observation and explicit articulations of concern by BIPOC knowledge keepers about climactic change. The bracketing of BIPOC knowledges not only severely limits the rigor of discourses on global crises, but also, as bi-racial organizer and thinker adrienne maree brown20 argues, it produces distorted outcomes. For instance, it smuggles normative judgments that ‘turn Brown bombers into terrorists and white bombers into mentally ill victims’ into apparently ‘objective’ claims. Similarly, the influential work of Black American criminologist Ruth Wilson Gilmore21 demonstrates how white imaginaries of the threat posed by BIPOC bodies has produced the massive global penal complex and the radically unequal distribution of life chances. In short, imaginaries create worlds, so it matters greatly whose are privileged, and whose are excluded. Further, emerging narratives of the ‘end of the world’ explicitly center figures of whiteness as their protagonists – as the survivors of apocalypse, the subjects capable of saving the world from it, and as those most threatened. In these discourses, ‘survivors’ are framed as saviors able to protect and/or regenerate and even improve Western forms of governance and social order by leveraging resilience, scientific prowess, and technological genius. For example, the cover of American settler scientists Tony Barnosky and Elizabeth Hadley’s book Tipping Points for Planet Earth features a stylized male ‘human’ whom they identify as former California governor Jerry Brown (a powerful white settler politician) holding the earth back from rolling over a cliff.22 Similarly, presenting a thought experiment about the planet’s future, Homer-Dixon23 asks his readers to imagine ‘an average male – call him John’ (in fact, the most popular male name globally at the time of writing was Mohammed). This is followed by images of a Caucasian male dressed in safari or hiking gear – both emblematic of symbols colonial conquest24 – tasked with choosing from two forks on a path, as imagined by white American poet Robert Frost. This image of rugged masculine whiteness, embodied in physical strength, colonial prowess, and the ability to dominate difficult landscapes is mirrored in his framing of his former co-workers on oil rigs in the Canadian prairies25 as models of resilience. Similarly, American settler science writer Annalee Newitz26 proposes the Canadian province of Saskatchewan as a ‘model for human survival’, based on her perceptions of the resilience, persistence and collaborative frontier attitudes of its people. Saskatchewan is a notoriously racist part of Canada, in which violence against Indigenous people continues to be integral to its white-dominated culture27 – yet this polity and its culture are held up by Newitz as a model of ‘human’ resilience. By imagining subjects in whom whiteness is elided with resilience and survival, these discourses not only normalize and obscure the modes of violence and oppression through which perceived ‘resilience’ – or, in blunt terms, preferential access to survival – is achieved. They also work to displace the threat of total destruction ‘onto others who are seen as lacking the resourcefulness of the survivor’.28 In addition, many ‘end of the world’ narratives interpellate subjects of white privilege by assuming that readers are not (currently) affected by the harms distributed unequally by global structures of environmental racism. For instance, Barnosky and Hadley29 (italics ours) state, ‘if you are anything like we are, you probably think of pollution as somebody else’s problem. . . you probably don’t live near a tannery, mine dump or any other source of pollution’. For many people of color, living near a source of pollution may be nearly inescapable as a result of structural-material discrimination, including zoning practices and the accessibility of housing.30 Viewing ecological harms as ‘someone else’s problem’ is a privilege afforded to those who have never been forced contemplate the destruction of their communities or worlds.31 At the same time, these authors – along with many others working in the genre – invoke narratives akin to ‘all lives matter’ or ‘colour-blindness’32 that erase unequal distributions of harm and threat. For instance, during their international travels for scientific research and leisure, Barnosky and Hadley (italics ours) describe a dawning awareness that ‘the problems we were writing about. . . were everybody’s problems. . .no one was escaping the impacts. . . including us’. They go on to frame as equivalent flooding in Pakistan that displaced 20million people and killed 2000 with the inconveniences caused by the temporary flooding of the New York subway system in 2012. In addition, they cite evidence of endocrine disruption in American girls caused by pollution, stating that the youngest of the cohort are African American and Latina but that ‘the most dramatic increase is in Caucasian girls’33 (italics ours). In this framing, even though BIPOC children remain most adversely affected, white children are pushed to the foreground and framed as more urgently threatened in relative terms. These comparisons background the disproportionate burden of ecological harm born by BIPOC, and reflect a stark calculus of the relative value of white and BIPOC lives. The ‘all lives matter’ logic employed here constructs ‘a universal human frailty’34 in which responsibility for ecological threats is attributed to ‘humans’ in general, and the assignment of specific culpability is avoided. While Newitz avers that ‘assigning blame [for ecological harm] is less important than figuring out how to. . . survive’,35 we argue that accurately attributing responsibility is crucial to opening up futures in which it is possible to dismantle the structural oppressions that unequally distribute harms and chances for collective survival. Preoccupation with the subjects of whiteness in ‘end of the world’ discourses is also reflected in the framing of BIPOC communities as threats to the survival of ‘humanity’. These fears are perhaps most simply and starkly expressed in anxieties over population decline within predominantly white countries, paired with palpable fear of rising birth rates amongst BIPOC communities. Chillingly, such fears are often connected to the mere biological survival of BIPOC, and the reproductive capacities of Black and Brown bodies – especially those coded as ‘female’, and therefore ‘fertile’ within colonial gender binaries.36 For instance, in his treatise on ‘over’-population, American settler science writer Alan Weisman addresses the ‘problem’ raised by the likely significant increase of survival rates (especially amongst children) as a result of widely-available cures for illnesses such as malaria or HIV. Since, he avers, it would be ‘unconscionable’ to withhold these vaccines, Weisman suggests that malaria and HIV research funding should also promote family planning – that is, control of BIPOC fertility – since ‘there’s no vaccine against extinction’.37 Here, BIPOC survival and reproductivity is literally – even if not strictly intentionally – framed as an incurable disease that could culminate in ‘extinction’. Although some of these discussions examine total growth in human populations globally,38 much of this research focuses on relative population sizes, usually of BIPOC majority places to those inscribed as white. For instance, British doctor John Guillebaud predicts a ‘birth dearth’ in Europe while likening ‘unremitting population growth’ in other parts of the world to ‘the doctrine of the cancer cell’.39 Although these regions are described in various ways throughout the genre – for instance, as ‘poor’ or ‘developing’, the areas slated for growth are almost always BIPOC-majority. For example, Hungarian demographer Paul Demeny (italics ours) argues that Europe’s population is steadily shrinking ‘while nearby populations explode’.40 Drawing on Demeny’s work, HomerDixon warns of a future 3:1 demographic ratio between North Africa/West Asia and Europe, along with 70% growth in Bangladesh, 140% growth in Kenya, and a doubling of the populations of Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Nigeria. Directly after sharing these statistics, he appends a list of international news reports referring to, for example, clashes between Indigenous communities in Kenya, riots in Shanghai, and murder rates in Mexico.41 In so doing, he directly juxtaposes BIPOC population growth with stereotypes of violence and ‘incivility’. BIPOC are often represented in these narratives as embodiments of ecological collapse and threat, embedding the assumption that ‘black people don’t care about the environment’,42 and that the global ‘poor’ will always prioritize short-term economic needs above ecological concerns. This belief is reflected in travelogue-style descriptions of ecological devastation, including Barnosky and Hadley’s musings, while on holiday in Utah, that the ancient Puebloan society collapsed because they had run out of water – a situation which they project onto future Sudan, Somalia, and Gaza. In addition, they diagnose the fall of what they call the ‘extinct’ Mayan community to overpopulation and over-exploitation of resources – despite the survivance43 of over 6million Mayan people in their Ancestral lands and other places at the time of writing.44 These descriptions chime with the common refrain on the part of settler states that BIPOC are unable to care properly for their land, even in the absence of conflicting data. This constructed ignorance allows those states to frame BIPOC territories as ‘wasteland’ awaiting annexation or improvement, or as dumping grounds for the externalities of capitalism.45 What’s more, the use of BIPOC communities as cautionary tales for planetary destruction strongly suggests that the redistribution of global power, land ownership, and other forms of agency toward BIPOC structures would result in ecological disaster.

#### The alternative is refusal, a generative project of constructing alternative ways of being in the world.

**Grande 15** – Sandy Grande is a Professor of Political Science and Native American and Indigenous Studies at the University of Connecticut with affiliations in American Studies, Philosophy, and the Race, Ethnicity and Politics program. “Red Pedagogy: Native American Social and Political Thought” Rowman and Littlefield, 2015 pp. 6-7 // sam (note – the introduction and the accompanying essays were written in 2015, the rest of the book was written in 2004)

In working past and through the aporias of reconciliation and recognition, scholars of CIS have advanced theorizations of refusal—a politics that Garland (2013) defines as “the negation of that which negates us” (p. 375). The logic of refusal is “less oriented around attaining an affirmative form of recognition from the settler-state and society, and more about critically revaluating, reconstructing and redeploying culture and tradition in ways that seek to prefigure . . . a radical alternative to the structural and psycho-affective facets of colonial domination” (Coulthard, 2007, p. 456). For example, Gómez-Barris (2012) theorizes the hunger strikes staged by the Mapuche peoples for the return of their lands as acts of refusal: “As extreme bodily performance and political instantiation, the Mapuche starving body literally enacts the condition of precariousness, specifiying the meanings of social death for indigenous peoples living within a state of permanent war” (p. 120). Coulthard (2007) and Alfred and Corntassel (2005) similarly take up refusal as a pre-condition to (or in dialectical relationship with) the political project of Indigenous resurgence. Within the field of Indigenous research, Simpson (2011) theorizes refusal and sovereignty at the “level of method and representation,” exposing the colonialist underpinnings of the (academic) “demand to know” as an instantiation of settler logic. She posits ethnographic refusal as a stance/space wherein Indigenous subjects limit access to be known (p. 73). Mignolo (2011) and Quijano (1992) similarly take up refusal in relation to knowledge formation. Specifically, they assert Indigenous knowledge as a space of epistemic disobedience that is “delinked” from Western, liberal, capitalist understandings of “knowledge as production” or as a search for newness. They write, “Indigenous knowledges take us to a different place” and beginning— not just a “new temporality within the same space” but to an alternative site of “struggle and building” that represents an actual “paradigmatic break” (p. 45). Understood as a radical assertion of sovereignty, the act of “refusal” is threatening to the settler state and thereby dangerous for the Indigenous subject—Native peoples worldwide continue to be “disappeared” or murdered at disproportionate rates. While the sanctions for “refusal” in the academy are not about life and death, “refusal” to comply with the normative publish-perish, tenure-promotion disciplinary strategies can lead to increased marginalization, exploitation, and job loss as well as decreased funding. And, in a system where Indigenous scholars comprise less than 1 percent of the professorate, such consequences not only bear hardships for individuals but also whole communities. Nevertheless, the material gains accessed through reconciliatory and recognition agendas have even deeper costs and consequences. As Byrd (2011) reminds us, the colonization of Indigenous lands, bodies, and minds will not be ended by “further inclusion or more participation” (Byrd, 2011, p. xxvi). Indeed, particularly in this moment of a metastasizing settler state, I believe it is incumbent upon each and every one of us to refuse, reimagine, and rearticulate assimilative logics in all of their (low and high intensity) forms.

#### The role of the judge is to adopt an ethic of incommensurability – that means abandoning the logistical questions of the settler and committing to the end of the world.

**Tuck and Yang 12** (Eve Tuck is a professor at SUNY New Paltz. Wayne K Yang is a professor at the University of California San Diego) “Decolonization is not a metaphor” Decolonization: Indigeneity, Education & Society Vol. 1, No. 1, 2012, pp. 1-40, July 17, 2017 // rose

An ethic of incommensurability, which guides moves that unsettle innocence, stands in contrast to aims of reconciliation, which motivate settler moves to innocence. Reconciliation is about rescuing settler normalcy, about rescuing a settler future. Reconciliation is concerned with questions of what will decolonization look like? What will happen after abolition? What will be the consequences of decolonization for the settler? Incommensurability acknowledges that these questions need not, and perhaps cannot, be answered in order for decolonization to exist as a framework. We want to say, first, that decolonization is not obliged to answer those questions - decolonization is not accountable to settlers, or settler futurity. Decolonization is accountable to Indigenous sovereignty and futurity. Still, we acknowledge the questions of those wary participants in Occupy Oakland and other settlers who want to know what decolonization will require of them. The answers are not fully in view and can’t be as long as decolonization remains punctuated by metaphor. The answers will not emerge from friendly understanding, and indeed require a dangerous understanding of uncommonality that un-coalesces coalition politics - moves that may feel very unfriendly. But we will find out the answers as we get there, “in the exact measure that we can discern the movements which give [decolonization] historical form and content” (Fanon, 1963, p. 36). To fully enact an ethic of incommensurability means relinquishing settler futurity, abandoning the hope that settlers may one day be commensurable to Native peoples. It means removing the asterisks, periods, commas, apostrophes, the whereas’s, buts, and conditional clauses that punctuate decolonization and underwrite settler innocence. The Native futures, the lives to be lived once the settler nation is gone - these are the unwritten possibilities made possible by an ethic of incommensurability.

### K Framework (1:15)

#### Our interpretation is that the 1ac is an epistemological project – before you evaluate the consequences of the plan text you should weigh its ideological underpinnings.

#### Winning ontology wins us framework – the Eurocene operates through the naturalization of the structural antagonisms of antiblack settlerism – the generic overdetermines the particular because the world is defined by genocide, which means that debate must start and end with how the 1ac relates to genocide.

#### Accountability DA – “weigh the aff” is a settler ruse to ensure a lack of accountability for racist reps – only our model of debate ensures we can challenge violent representations which internal link turns fairness because it makes debate unsafe for black, brown, and native debaters. Psychological violence outweighs – your role as an educator is to prioritize a model of debate that makes debate safer for students.

#### Debate as an academic space is invested in genocide – its role is and has always been the reproduction of colonial ideology and the theft of indigenous knowledge – the only ethical relationship to this space can be epistemological skepticism.

**Mayorga et al. 19** Edwin Mayorga, Ph.D. is a parent, educator, scholar, activist and podcaster working for justice. An Associate Professor in the Department of Educational Studies and the Program in Latin American and Latino Studies at Swarthmore College (PA), his work centers on cultural political economic examinations of urbanism, urban education policy, Latinx education, digital social science, racial/ethnic studies and teaching for social justice. Lekey Leidecker is a Project Consultancy and Research Officer at WSA Community Consultants and a Writer and Culture Worker prioritizing Tibetan voices, perspectives, and communities. Daniel Orr de Gutierrez is an elementary school teacher in Sacramento. “Burn it Down: The Incommensurability of the University and Decolonization” Journal of Critical Thought and Praxis, Volume 8, Issue 1, Article 11, 2019 // rose

Throughout this history, and in every stage of its maturation, the university has been inextricably tied to state imperialism. Its authority has depended entirely upon state legitimacy; its intellectual practice evolved through the extraction and commodification of non-Western knowledges; its structure and methods fashioned to facilitate state agendas, such that all levels of the institution, including its disciplines, methodologies, administration, and funding conform to the imperial project (Atalay, 2006; Smith, 2012; Simpson, 2014). But, we are primarily concerned with that recent institutionalization of modern philosophy—analyzed in the following pages—because its adoption transfigured the essential function of the university into a colonization of knowledge. Birthed through and for the colonial state, modern philosophy does not coincidentally bear colonialist ideology, although we would not attempt a full accounting of that here. Rather, because knowledge production and regulation are the defining functions of the university, we analyze the epistemology of modern philosophy. In doing so, we find that modern epistemology not only justifies and authorizes colonial violence, but, in itself, demands epistemic violence. Operating upon these principles, the essential function of the modern university has become a colonization of knowledge: knowledge is processed to conform to colonial ideology and agendas, and, in turn, disseminated in order to assimilate the populace. To conceal the inherent violence of that mission today, the university employs a strategic negligence that reaffirms its own indispensability. Two epistemological assumptions narrate modern philosophy: (1) there are certain aspects of reality which are ubiquitously and invariably true, (2) observation and logical reasoning are the only means of accessing that absolute truth. From these two basic assumptions however, issue a number of derivative beliefs linking knowledge production to power. The first of these corollaries is the privileging of objectivity, assessing knowledge against the perceived contamination of subjective experience, by which modern scholars limit the scope of legitimate knowledges to those consistent with their own principles and tradition. In so doing, Western thinkers not only affirm the superiority of their knowledge systems but also claim for themselves the exclusive authority to define knowledge (Smith, 2012). Moreover, the assumption that absolute truth is ascertainable practically and ethically implies a responsibility to do so, creating an obligation for humanity to thoroughly investigate their reality. Given the exclusive authority of modern Western scholars to lead that investigation, instrumental reasoning insinuates, and hubris abets, that all reality need come under Western dominion. On the one hand, this epistemology leaves no room for enchantment, sacrificing the private and sacred for the pursuit of knowledge3 (Grande, 2015). On the other hand, it justifies imperialist ideation and, in fact, makes scientific investigation dependent upon the subjugation of non-Western peoples and lands. In order to understand reality, modern philosophy thus engenders material and symbolic violences against reality. But, more immediately, modern scientific investigation and knowledge production, in themselves, constitute epistemic violence. Modern philosophy is confronted by the same conflict as is any intellectual paradigm: incorporating and rectifying new knowledges with the old. In its pursuit of absolute truth, however, modern philosophy cannot engage in dialogic relations, but is confined to the dialectic, and, operating upon the presumed objective superiority of its own knowledge traditions, must contort new knowledge so that it takes on a form comprehensible within its own ideological framework. That framework, of course, extends far beyond modern philosophy itself, to a larger knowledge system metaphorically described as the Western cultural archive (Smith, 2012): cosmologies, ontologies, ethical systems, histories, symbols and their associations, which predate Christian civilization (Deloria, 2003), and from which the Western sociological imagination derives. In the wake of global colonization, this archive has also been overwhelmingly saturated by the imagery and ideology of colonial cultures (Nandy, 1983), including what Grande (2015) names the “deep structures of the colonialist consciousness” (p. 99): the conflation of progress with change, the separateness of faith and reason, the impersonal nature of reality, individualism, and anthropocentrism. Knowledge that has been extracted by the university must be sieved through this heterogeneous composition before it becomes legitimate within the modern paradigm. Of course, the only knowledge able to emerge from this processing is that which upholds the values, doctrines, and political necessities of the West (Smith, 2012). In particular, that which defines the violence of colonization as natural and/or necessary, and affirms the colonial state as the only entity able to exercise legitimate forms of violence (Rifkin, 2009). By mutilating and eradicating contradictory knowledges in this manner, the essential functions of the university, extracting, processing, producing, and regulating knowledge, become an epistemic colonization, enriching, evolving, and safeguarding the settler state. As with any colonialism however, those knowledge functions also entail a civilizational mission (Nandy, 1983), exporting assimilatory knowledge products in order to reproduce the colonialist consciousness. Assimilation was the explicit mission of colonial universities, Indian agents, and church missionaries (Grande, 2015), but, because the university is integrated within the state, its knowledges are also implicitly reified throughout state infrastructure. For example, such knowledge enters public education alongside official instructional content as a hidden curriculum (Anyon, 1980), latent norms, values, and beliefs which socialize students into colonialist worldviews and ways of knowing (Grande, 2015). This circulation and naturalization of assimilatory knowledges works to both colonize the mind of the indigenous (Fanon, 2005) and decivilize that of the colonizer (Césaire, 1955), inhibiting decolonial action and enabling further material, symbolic, and epistemic violences. While in earlier periods the university openly embraced this colonialist purpose, democratic social movements and anticolonial struggle of the twentieth century made doing so antithetical to its self-professed role of social institution. And yet, since the university first allied itself with the state, it has suppressed the social, in order to protect the state and thereby itself. The key, in this context, to concealing university violence while still maintaining a facade of social consciousness, is institutional negligence (Moten & Harney, 2004). All three authors, throughout their time in higher education, have witnessed and experienced this negligence firsthand. We have seen a university negligently undertake public discussion of genocide, while intentionally and explicitly defining their topic so as to exclude settler colonial violence. Negligently, a university has excused its failure to recruit and support indigenous students, as well as its responsibility to disrupt and remunerate colonial oppression, claiming that they won’t admit students who are incapable of thriving at the school. Negligently, following a Title IX investigation for the mishandling of sexual assault cases, a university centralized student services and activities, but remains reticent to punish rapists. Negligently, a university publicizes its benevolent charity and community-building projects in the Third World, while withholding the profits of that billion-dollar industry from the underdeveloped, Black community down the road. The epistemic manifestation of negligence is an immobilizing skepticism within the university: scholars - and administrators - must always be uncertain of their own claims (Moten & Harney, 2004). To be perpetually skeptical allows one to investigate all of reality, even one’s own coloniality, while discouraging the impetuous impulse to make conclusions and act upon them, sustaining a cycle of uninterrupted knowledge production and delaying decolonization indefinitely. Negligently, the university does not dismiss its coloniality, but closes off our vision of possibility to include nothing except itself. In summation, colonialism is not vestigial or superficial to the university; the university’s essential functions, producing and regulating knowledge, embody a colonization of knowledge, complete with its own civilizational mission. Nor does this framing of knowledge and knowing, the subjugation of knowledge to the capacities of coloniality, take place in ivory-tower isolation. The epistemic violence of the university mission exists in order to sustain and validate the colonial state, to make it inviolable in the minds of all, performing the intellectual labor behind indigenous elimination. We are led to believe that the university could be decolonized. In these appeals, the university is imagined as a force for the decolonial project, even becoming its primary vehicle. But the goals of the two are fundamentally incompatible, making it impossible to incorporate one into the other. Decolonization dislocates the colonial, divests its power from indigenous life. The university on the other hand, birthed by colonialism, is an essential agent of extant colonial violence, both materially, in extracting, accumulating, and withholding resources from marginalized communities, and epistemically, in monopolizing legitimate knowledges. It is dedicated to global colonization, to salvaging and defining settler futurity, through the construction of knowledge itself. Indigenous self-determination is not a possibility in either its political project or its conception of reality. To decolonize the university would, therefore, contradict its ideological purpose and impede its essential practice. Thus, we know that these decolonial appeals are hollow. Our own experiences and studies, as well as the histories and struggles of our communities, make it clear that the university could never be an agent of decolonization as long as this essential colonialist purpose remains intact. In fact, survivance will always be inhibited as long as an institution like the university has the authority to control and define our existence. As such, indigenous futurity depends upon eliminating these colonial agendas, so that we might imagine ways to look, live, and strive beyond them. And yet, it is both fashionable and tactful within these institutions to adopt the language of decolonization (Tuck & Yang, 2012). Just as multiculturalism and other agendas have been coopted by the university, these are specious attempts to salvage the settler project through reconciliation (Coulthard, 2014); including and thereby enclosing the colonized as subjects of the settler state (Grande, 2015). Whatever eloquence shrouds these policies however, it cannot hide the brazen negligence which allows one to speak of inclusivity, within an institution sustained by exclusion and exploitation; to offer global citizenship as consolation for the forcible domestication of indigenous sovereignty (Simpson, 2014); to grant mobility to the private individual, while criminalizing the communities one dislocates; and to boast of diversity within a project of cultural, political, and ideological homogenization Because the university is a fundamentally colonial institution, decolonization would require more than these self-serving half measures and instead, transforming its essential nature. As with all institutions, such transformation targets the university’s material dependency upon colonial exploitation, as well as its integration within and service to the settler state. For the university in particular however, we must attend to the colonialist ideology animating its knowledge functions. But without this, what remains of the university? Its research methods and methodologies, as well as knowledge packaging, sale, and institutionalization would have to be redirected from their current exploitative and repressive formulas (Smith, 2012; Simpson, 2014). Moreover, if we divest the university of its assumed authority over knowledge, what purpose does it serve? And upon whose authority does it act? In short, decolonization requires the university to become a totally new entity, vested with a new mission, organization, practices, and responsibilities. However, we realize that such comprehensive reform is not practically viable. The university is skilled in inhibiting structural reform. It does so not by simply dismissing or ignoring criticism, but by becoming ‘vigilant in its negligence’ (Moten & Harney, 2004, p. 106), incorporating critique nominally and adopting the appearance of sympathy, thereby circumventing a decolonial confrontation. In its vigilance, the university performs what Tuck and Yang (2012) term settler moves to innocence (p. 9), stratagems which, in the pretense of critical self-reflection, divert decolonial transformation into salvaging settler futurity and conscience. Swarthmore, for example, regularly employs "collections," convening the campus body, especially in response to an incident, inviting all attendees to speak. These gatherings demonstrate to a larger audience that the school is sensitive to campus concerns, that they are willing to give students and community members the space to express themselves, but without creating any responsibility to act upon those sentiments. In fact, the equal privilege afforded to all speakers, regardless of relations of power and personal benefit, makes the supposedly democratic space of the collection a venue for university representatives to discredit student and faculty concerns. Even when a school does sincerely critique its own coloniality, this “dialogue” is still undertaken for the purposes of absolvement and self-preservation rather than the restoration of indigenous sovereignty (Byrd, 2011). And as this nominal call for reform has become professional academic practice, the university reaffirms the necessity of its own existence through those who would question it (Moten & Harney, 2004). Thus the critical academic is made complicit in the institution’s negligence, locked into the university’s attempts to become amenable to those it oppresses. To be critical of the university traps one within settler futurity. And so, we, from our different positions, reject the desire for inclusion, for a more critically engaged university. Rather than confront an institution that will not, indeed cannot, recognize indigenous sovereignty, we seek self-recognition and indigenous modes of life independent of this settler apparatus (Coulthard, 2014). We acknowledge that the only possible relationship to the university is a criminal one (Moten & Harney, 2004), that those of us who survive the institution have a responsibility to betray it and appropriate its resources for our peoples (Fanon, 2005). Although the university cannot be salvaged—given how thoroughly it is defined by coloniality—it has engorged itself on the material and intellectual resources of indigenous peoples around the world, and these resources are worthy of preservation. Those of us with all the benefits and privileges of a college degree, best able to access those resources, are responsible for moving them back into the communities they came from, in an enriching and sustaining manner. This repatriation is not a “sharing” of university resources, which would engender relationships of dependency. Rather, it is theft, using the university’s own property to enable communities to thrive independent of the institution. While each of us possesses unique skills and capacities, if you are not leveraging your position in some manner to contribute to this theft, you are helping to maintain the settler colonial university. That is why we say loot

#### Models of research that isolate scenarios from their socio-political contexts kill scholarly creativity – that limits our ability to create new understandings of the world

**Grove 19** – Jairus Grove finished his PhD in 2011 and joined the UH Mānoa faculty the same year. He is currently the director of the Hawai’i Research Center for Futures Studies. “Savage Ecology: War and Geopolitics at the End of the World”, Duke University Press, 2019 pp. 13-15 // rose

The discreteness of objects and actors is a useful but often distracting fiction. If what we want to think through is the problem of geopolitics, then to atomize sectors, objects, and agents of geopolitics will defeat the systemic character of change, behavior, and the emergence of both. By systemic I do not mean structural in the sense of being mechanistic. An ecological approach to security expects a world of highly distributed and complex agencies. Coalitions of agents maintain consistency and contribute to the upheavals that defy the order from which an upheaval emerged. Thus I do not think that ecology is a metaphor for analyzing the world. Instead, relational thinking accretes from empirical scrutiny. Unfortunately, relational thinking is messy because, as John Law says, reality is a mess.19 The distributed and connective character of change can make things like case selection and variable choice seem arbitrary. Those who are compelled to pursue positivist analyses of politics via quantitative methods are not likely to find this insight about the world helpful. However, much will be lost to the possibility of analysis if we continue to isolate causally significant variables, or indivisible clusters of variables, from our work. One can, for instance, see how much time has been lost in investigating the relationship between climate change and instability. Thomas HomerDixon’s Environmental Scarcity and Global Security was largely ignored by mainstream international relations theory because of the methodological problems of studying ecological systems in the context of national security crises. Yet who would argue now, more than twenty years later, that we should not have prioritized climate change as a major factor in geopolitics? So how does one study complex systems rigorously if they, by definition, exceed the mathematical processing powers of our best computer-based tools or the accepted methodologies of the field? I think the answer lies in the rigor and insightfulness of so-called softer approaches. Concept creation when combined with historical analysis and field research can produce scholarship that is insightful beyond our ability to “prove” that it is insightful. Here, I seek to follow Eduardo Viveiros de Castro when he says that “we need a new theory of theory: a generalized theory of theory, one enabling us to think of theoretical activity in radical continuity with practice, that is, as an immanent or constitutive (as opposed to purely regulative) dimension of the intellect embodied in action.”20 This does not mean that quantitative analytic tools or computer-assisted modeling cannot be a vital part of critical work—quite the contrary. Climate modeling, for instance, allows researchers to experience scales of time and space that individual embodied humans cannot. Oral traditions similarly compress and extend time across lifetimes but are too often dismissed because of their nonmodern means of informatic storage and retrieval.21 Computers, like archives and books, are vital prosthetics in research. They allow us to encounter things in ways that extend our experience beyond ourselves and our native sensory capabilities. The pack of critical approaches I enjoy traveling with takes issue with the idea that data or modeled outcomes somehow speak for themselves. Rather, data in all forms—from ideas to calculations—are objects of encounter. Data compel us to think but cannot compel us to know. Georges Bataille aptly calls this category of research nonknowledge, “an understanding . . . that borders on knowledge.”22 Data do not transmit information; rather, data provokes further thinking and therefore are not determinative. What modeling, field research, reading, and watching films can do is create the conditions of possibility for encounters not of our own making. The relational nature of change and emergence means that we must cultivate an attentiveness that might find the most interesting research agenda during a routine check at the airport, or in the repeated failure of your car’s gps near military facilities. The value or rigor of a relational approach that emphasizes the fecundity of encounters is that it marginalizes the capacity of the investigator in favor of the world she investigates. In this sense, undermining anthropocentrism is not just an ethical practice. It also provides a necessary check on observation bias that imposes a telos on the people, things, and systems we encounter, which is a way to pursue the terrifying success and failures of technological interventions into global order. All technical apparatuses from the muskets in chapter 3 to geoengineering discussed in chapter 7 make a difference, but they rarely make the difference that was promised before they were deployed.