## 1

#### Interpretation: The aff must disclose the plan text and framing before the round. To clarify, disclosure can occur on the wiki or over message.

#### Violation: They didn’t disclose framing : they refused to disclose.

#### Kills education because we end up discussing potential plans that are not viable in the real world. Kills fairness because it prevents reciprocal prep.

#### First is prep and clash—two internal links—a) neg prep—4 minutes of prep is not enough to put together a coherent 1nc or update generics—30 minutes is necessary to learn a little about the affirmative and piece together what 1nc positions apply and cut and research their applications to the affirmative b) aff quality—plan text disclosure discourages cheap shot affs. If the aff isn’t inherent or easily defeated by 20 minutes of research, it should lose—this will answer the 1ar’s claim about innovation—with 30 minutes of prep, there’s still an incentive to find a new strategic, well justified aff, but no incentive to cut a horrible, incoherent aff that the neg can’t check against the broader literature.

#### Second is academic integrity – disclosing new affs is key to ensure that evidence isn’t miscut – 4 minutes of prep isn’t enough especially since I need to save some for the 2nr and also construct a 1nc

#### Third is Fact checking – can’t research during round means neg can’t determine if there are terminal flaws to a particular aff that can be discovered in 30 minutes of research. E.g. you could read an aff that defends a government that already has a recognized right to strike. They’ll say just prep all governments– but (a) that’s an unfair research burden there are 3 planks the res can specify, and (b) things can change – new news.

#### Voter: CA from 1st shell

#### Drop the debater on theory: CA from 1st shell

#### Competing interps: CA from 1st shell

#### No RVIs: CA from 1st shell

#### Interp solves all offense for new affs good – you get a huge innovation advantage because I can’t write a deep disad or counterplan file in 30 minutes – but with the net benefit of the shell.

## 2

#### The coherence of the Western subject is formulated in opposition to the native – this death drive towards elimination structures settler futurity via the libidinal economy and its investments in native suffering because the native is the quilting point of settler subject formation.

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Bryanne Houston Young, “Killing the Indian in the Child: Materialities of Death and Political Formations of Life in the Canadian Indian Residential School System,” 2017 // sam

Against the politicized topographies and temporalities of indigeneity and race, I now move into a consideration of the contributions of psychoanalytic theory to the questions of politics and time presented thus far. The kinds of questions psychoanalysis is interested in asking, the registers upon which it performs analysis, and its unique emphasis on temporality, language, and difference provide an excellent conceptual apparatus through which we might begin to trouble/problematize stable, taken-for-granted oppositions between psychic and social, personal and political, self and other. Freud’s interest in time is evident in his work on the uncanny, and in his inaugural work on what we might now call trauma studies and conditions we now call post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). For Freud, this theory of hysteria introduces a provocative temporality in which traumatic events reoccur, flashing up in perfect replication of themselves, as though happening again and again. In his diagnosis of so-called shell-shocked soldiers returning from World War I, Freud was keenly aware that time did not always progress along an even plane. Though Freud’s analysis of trauma is captivating and critically rich, it is not within my purview here to take on the full extent of this scholarship. Instead, what is most salient to my analysis are the capacities of psychoanalytic theory to move critique outside and beyond prevailing notions of time and narratives of progress that only mean moving forward. This chapter writes from a stance that views it as imperative that scholarship reaches beyond, and thinks outside, the paradigms that invented it. Psychoanalytic theory, with its idiosyncratic temporal logics—particularly in conjunction with Foucauldian theory—offers a productive and robust way to critique the continuing primacy of normative disciplines whose chronologics have historically warranted a politics that kills in the name of life. Such an approach allows us to hold in productive tension any definition of “the political” as stable and finite, with—as in the case of liberal political philosophy—the legally constructed “person” as its primary epistemological unit. This conceptual capacity of psychoanalysis, in turn, allows us to politicize a form of life and modality of corporeal personhood hitherto constructed as what, in Bataillean parlance, we might call colonialism’s accursed share—colonialism’s pure waste. Additionally, psychoanalytic notions of the death drive, whose proper movement is explicitly circular, allows us to begin to locate the child within logics of futurity, onto which is laminated a kind of indelible whiteness. For the purpose of my analysis I engage Lacanian psychoanalysis, limiting myself to a consideration of the structure of the drives and to a Lacanian conceptualization of language, and its role in the formation of self and the suturing of the psyche to sociality. Freud, as Teresa De Lauretis (2008) emphasizes, elaborated the death drive between the First and Second World Wars, in a Europe living “under the shadow of death and the threat of biological and cultural genocide” (1). Situating her analysis of the death drive in the contemporary moment, De Lauretis points to this contextual, historical darkening, writing: “I wonder whether our epistemologies can sustain the impact of the real … If I return to Freud’s notion of an unconscious death drive, it is because it conveys the sense and the force of something in human reality that resists discursive articulation as well as political diplomacy, an otherness that haunts the dream of a common world” (9). Using psychoanalysis as reading practice, Freud’s suspicion that human life, both individual and social, is compromised from the beginning by something that undermines it, works against it, is (darkly?) generative. The death drive indicates a tension bordering psychic and libidinal relations, which marks Freud’s radical break with Cartesian rationality and points to a negativity that counteracts the optimistic affirmations of human perfectability. This dimension of radical negativity cannot be reduced to an expression of alienated social conditions, nor is it entirely something the body does on its own. Theorized as the destruction drive, the antagonism drive, or sometimes, simply “the drive,” it is impossible to escape. In psychoanalytic theory, therefore, particularly in the clinical setting, the objective is not to overcome the drive, but rather to come to terms with it, in what Slovenian Lacanian psychoanalytic theorist Slavoj Žižek (1989) calls “its terrifying dimension” (4). It is a fundamental axiom of Lacanian psychoanalytic theory that attempts to abolish the drive antagonism are precisely the source of totalitarian temptation. Žižek writes: “The greatest mass murders and holocausts have always been perpetrated in the name of man as harmonious being, of a New Man without antagonistic tension” (5). So it is that one of Canada’s greatest atrocities— the genocide of its First Peoples—took place in the name of Canada itself, that sought progress and unification as a single body politic with claims on a shared futurity. The fulfillment of this destiny relied upon the negation of the other, the bad race, the dangerous race, the race that stood outside the purview of the norm and had no share in its time-zone, the ones called to live in the between space—as nobody. As the relatively more benign civilization policies failed to convert Aboriginal forms of life into separate but civilized, Christian communities on reserves, the federal government intensified its tactics. Policies became more aggressive. As these more aggressive policies (such as enfranchisement) also failed, the federal government intensified its tactics once again, escalating the stakes and the strategies towards the horizon of assimilation. This ‘doubling down’ in the face of failure is a primary trace effect of the death drive, and indeed, it is not unreasonable to argue that the federal government Indian policy has, since confederation, been death driven. Because the aim of fully eradicating the otherness of the other can only fail—in Freudian parlance, it cannot be mastered—the trajectory of the aiming turns in a circularity, orbiting around that which can never be had: perfection. Caught in death drive circularity, the aiming towards the objective (i.e. a unified body politic) authorizes, and indeed recruits, escalating violence in the interest of—finally—closing the open. For Žižek, this compulsive ‘doubling-down’ in the face of failure to arrive at the impossible horizon of perfection tips towards totalitarian temptation, which, he tells us, is implicated in the drive to unify a singular body politic, a new man without antagonistic tension. The drive aims for the return to a moment of unity before the intrusion of language and the entrance of the subject into what Lacan calls the Symbolic—the universe of symbols in which all human subjects share. Because this economy of signifiers operates through a modality of difference by association, on the premise that language does not reflect or carry within it universal a priori meaning, spirit, or Truth, signifiers are always and already sliding along a chain of signification that is never truly fixed. Rather, for Lacan, meaning is constructed through quilting points, durable concepts that affix ideas to their signifiers and which, in their durability, structure entire fields of meaning. For Lacan, subjects are formed by their entrance into this system of sliding difference from a pre-linguistic state retroactively constructed through nostalgic affective associations with unity, perfection, and completion. The loss or lack occurs in the imaginary, the order of presence and absence, and is formalized in the symbolic. This is experienced by the subject as a loss of that to which she/he can never again return, but for which she/he perpetually yearns, and toward which she/he perpetually moves. The circularity of movement toward this impossible horizon is precisely the movement of the drive. It is my argument that the concept of “the Indian” is a quilting point through which the field of politics in Canada is sutured into signification, a durable concept that organizes the meaning of nation, citizen, sovereignty, and subjecthood. Further, the hypoxic vision of national unity and a harmonious white(ned) citizenry is a movement propelled by the drive, a circularity impelled by the belief that what is lacking in the present can be made good in the future—an imaginary that activates/harnesses a kind of libidinal energy that is, by its very nature, inexhaustible. It matters, in the instance of the Canadian Indian Residential Schools and their mandate, that before child subjects enter into the structuration of language/the Symbolic, their bodies are already marked as disprized, abject, inscribed into the signification for, and, I argue, as, loss itself. As I have argued above, reading through psychoanalytic theory facilitates a conceptualization of subject-formation that includes the role of signification in the contouring of subject/ivities. This analytic rubric is importantly brought to bear in my analysis of “the child” the Canadian Indian Residential School System announces into presence: a child fundamentally and constitutively tied to a death whose temporal structure is always deferred, always impartial, always unfolding, and yet always still to be. Indeed, even in circumstances in which her/his mode of being in the world is not a deliberate practice of making spectral, “the child” remains a notoriously ambivalent, slippery signifier. This plasticity—differently stated, this over-abundant availability of “the child” as concept—takes on an interesting significance within political thought, functioning not as that which is politicized, but as the signifier in whose name the political mobilizes itself. In this way, the child functions as the absolute outside to political thought and the logics of its temporality, functioning instead to condition its possibilities and organize, from beyond its borders, its spatial and temporal limits. An example of this conceptualization of the child as signifier—and certainly one of the more provocative articulations of this phenomena in the contemporary neoliberal moment—is the polemic Lee develops in his monograph No Future: Queer Theory and the Death Drive. For Edelman, the Child—in its conflation with the kind of futurity toward which the teleology of (neo)liberal discourse is mobilized—is not simply important to contemporary politics, but is that which “serves to regulate political discourse [itself]” (ii). Indeed, as Edelman points out, “the figural Child alone embodies the citizen as ideal, entitled to claim full rights to its future share in the nation’s good, though always at the cost of limiting the rights ‘real’ citizens are allowed. For the social exists to preserve for this universalized subject, this fantasmatic Child, a national freedom more highly valued than the actuality of freedom itself” (ii). In Edelman’s polemic, it goes without saying that the figural child is a white child and that children of colour, children of mixed heritage, Indian children—within the Ideological State Apparatus of the Indian Residential Schools—far from carrying the over-abundant significance Edelman so adeptly parses, signify on only the most spectral of registers. This child, I argue, as a kind of spectral(ized) partial subject, instantiates a subjectivity simultaneously over-exposed to the political and over-determined by the word of the law, while barely accorded even the status of bare life. This is a subject that is hailed into a circularity of misrecognition in a relationship with death that is virtually inescapable. This relationship with death is the suture that connects this subject to the social. Edelman’s argument does not address racialized formations of self-hood, but is no less relevant to the argument I seek to develop here. Indeed, it is perhaps all the keener in what it omits—which is the child of color. This omission points to the level of signification and the way in which the whitened child is effortlessly lifted from the problematically raced body—the body whose racialized status is found problematic. This fantasy of purification through signification speaks, in ways that are eloquent and disturbing in equal measure, precisely the fantasy of the Canadian Indian Residential School System: that the body of the Indian could be left behind in a transcendent movement away from the vexatious quagmire posed by the Indian body toward the realm of what Kantian philosophy calls pure spirit, the realm of whiteness, purity, and hypoxic visions of what Edelman calls, “a national freedom more highly valued than the actuality of freedom itself” (ii). This fantasy of corporeal abandonment points to the latent desire of Western philosophical thought that seeks, through the disavowal of bodily finitude and a fetishization of the logos, access to purity of form, a fantasy that relegates, leaves trapped, the sometimes racialized, sometimes feminized other, mired in flesh and finitude from which it is allowed no escape. The Indigenous person, we remember from Hegel’s Lectures on the Philosophy of World History, is imagined as always already outside the teleology of history, already extinct. This way of understanding difference, through the rubric of historical progress, remains central to liberal and neoliberal political thought, economic practices, and policies in the current moment. Prising the child away from the Indian, meanwhile, continues to have important implications in the way we imagine colonial forms, not only of life, but also of death.

#### The ethical dilemmas of settler civil society can only cohere themselves through the genocide of the Native – the grammars of suffering that shape Settler ontology are fundamentally incompatible with Native grammars because the grammars of the Settler are only possible via genocide.

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Frank Wilderson III, “Red, White, and Black: Cinema and the Struture of US Antagonisms” Duke University Press, 2010 // sam

Today the United States is no longer self-consciously fascistic but instead self-consciously democratic. Clearing is completely disavowed as a verb. Instead, clearing as a noun makes itself known through the narrative of sovereign gain, civil society, and its external threat (the “Savage”). The imaginary of “Savage” positionality more often than not articulates (dialogues) with this Settler imaginary. In other words, the “Savage” narrative of sovereignty (Rudy’s plot points in the film) is dialogic with the Settler narrative of sovereignty (the Western’s genuflection to the Little Baby Civil Society). The narratives are disparate at the level of manifest content but dependent rhetorically on the same semiotics of gain and loss. Thus, even the “Savage’s” semiotics of sovereign loss fortifies and extends the interlocutory life of the Settler’s disavowal of clearing as a verb. Ironically, they work hand in hand to crowd out the ensemble of questions, and thus the ethical dilemmas, of genocide’s ontological imperatives. A semiotics of loss cannot be reconciled with a semiotics of genocide (provided genocide could even be apprehended through a semiotics, and there is no evidence that it can) because semiotics implies the possibility of narrative; and narrative implies the possibility of both a subject of speech and a speaking subject. Genocide, however, has no speaking subject; as such it has no narrative. It can only be apprehended by way of a narrative about something that it is not—such as sovereignty. (This is why a number of Jewish Holocaust films end up—or begin—in Israel: the impossible semiotics of genocide must be compensated for by way of a gesture of coherence, even if that coherence distracts the spectator from the topic at hand.) No single film could represent the clearing of a hemisphere. And no hemisphere, let alone a country, could maintain egoic consolidation of its psychic coordinates under the weight of the number and kind of films that it would take to even attempt to represent clearing as a verb. Though it is precisely the impossible “narrative” of genocide that positions the “Savage,” ensembles of questions that could elaborate more or less coherent ethical dilemmas regarding genocide—even if a coherent story of genocide could not be told—are often managed, constrained, marginalized, and disavowed in political discourse, metacommentaries on ontology, and the cinema of Native Americans. Skins’s simultaneous elaboration of and uneasiness with Mogie Yellow Lodge is emblematic of how this management, constraint, marginalization, and disavowal are rendered cinematically. Mogie’s surrealist demand, “Send me a big . . . fat woman . . . [to] cover up all the cracks in my shack,” goes to the heart of the matter. Red flesh can only be restored, ethically, through the destruction of White bodies, because the corporeality of the Indigenous has been consumed by and gone into the making of the Settler’s corporeality. Mogie wants what he has lost, not just his labor power, not just his language or land, but the raw material of his flesh. And, like most “grassroots Indians,” he knows precisely where it went—into the Settler’s “body”—and thus he knows precisely from where to repossess it. Though Mogie’s shack is small, we know from earlier scenes that it has at least two rooms. Therefore, to stretch a woman across its interior, window to window, wall to wall, corner to corner, and then stretch her across the door, would be to reconfigure her body into grotesque and unrecognizable dimensions. There are serious doubts as to whether a woman, even as large an (implicitly White) woman as Mogie Yellow Lodge is demanding from the president, “the Great White Father in Washington,” would survive such an ordeal. Imagine such a demand being made, such wallpapering taking place, en masse, on a scale which even Mogie’s inÂ ebriated imagination has not yet grasped. [General Andrew Jackson] instructed his troops to cut the noses of the corpses so that no one would be able to challenge the body count. They had bushel baskets full of noses that they brought back. This [practice] got him elected President. [He] campaigned on the basis that he had never met a recalcitrant Indian that he had not killed and never killed an Indian that he had not scalped and that anybody who wanted to question the validity of what he was saying was invited to tea in his parlor that evening so he could display the scalps and prove his point. [He] rode with a saddle bridle made out of the skin of an opposing Indian leader. This is the President of the United States.14 The Pleasures of Parity 215 One begins to see how wallpapering or insulating one’s room not with “bushel baskets” of White female skin but with even one White woman is simply out of the question. Mogie’s demand, then, is laughed off—managed, constrained, marginalized—by the script. “Hey! You wanna see me piss in my pants?” are the words he is made to utter next. His words are thus portrayed as the surreal ruminations of an Indian who has reached the end of his inebriated tether, and not as the wisdom of a man who could lead his people. The film is nervous in the face of Mogie’s demand not because of its absurdity but because of its authority. But Mogie is demanding no more of the Great White Father, no more of civil society, than he has already given. In fact, he is demanding less. His surrealism indicates a qualitatively similar ontological relationship between the Red and the White as exists between the Black and the White. The Middle Passage turns, for example, Ashanti spatial and temporal capacity into spatial and temporal incapacity—a body into flesh. This process begins as early as the 1200s for the Slave.15 By the 1530s, modernity is more self-conscious of its coordinates, and Whiteness begins its ontological consolidation and negative knowledge of itself by turning (part of) the Aztec body, for example, into Indian flesh.16 In this moment the White body completes itself and proceeds to lay the groundwork for the intra-Settler ensemble of questions foundational to its ethical dilemmas (i.e., Marxism, feminism, psychoanalysis). In the final analysis, Settler ontology is guaranteed by way of a negative knowledge of what it is not rather than by way of its positive claims of what it is. Ontological Whiteness is secured not through its cultural, economic, or gendered identities but by the fact that it cannot be known (positioned) by genocide (or by accumulation and fungibility). As Churchill observed in a book tour speech in Berkeley, California on July 31, 2004, this negative knowledge has its pleasures. [Unlike Jackson’s army of the early nineteenth century, the sixteenthcentury Dutch] didn’t take the noses and they didn’t take the scalps. They took whole heads because they wanted to identify the fact that they had eradicated the entire leadership of the opposition. They brought the heads back to the central square in New Amsterdam [now Manhattan] where the citizenry began to celebrate. They turned it into a sport. People who had participated in the expedition had themselves 216 chapter eight a jolly game of kickball using the heads and the citizenry sat around and cheered. It has a sense of affilial inclusion and filial longevity. [In 1864, the Third Regiment of the U.S. Calvary] returned to Denver [Colorado] with their trophies [the vaginas of Native American women stapled to the front of their hats] and held a triumphal parade. [They] proceeded down Larimore Street . . . and the good citizenry stood up and cheered wildly. . . . The Rocky Mountain News [described it as] “an unparalleled feat of martial prowess that would live forever in the annals of the history and nobility of the race.” And it has a capacity for territorial integrity. Scalp bounties . . . were officially claimed bounties that were placed on Indians in every antecedent colony in the Eastern Seaboard—French, English, and Spanish. I don’t know about the Dutch. They killed all the Indians around before they had the chance to need a bounty. But from the antecedent colonies this law transferred to every state and territory in forty-eight contiguous states.” In other words, it has the capacity to transform clearing from a verb into clearing as a noun. Every [state in the union] placed a bounty on Indians, any Indians, all Indians. [For example in the] Pennsylvania colony in the 1740s, the bounty [was] forty pounds sterling for proof of death of an adult male Indian. That proof of death being in the form of a scalp or a bloody red skin. . . . Proof of death in that form got the bearer of the proof forty pounds sterling. Forty pounds sterling in the 1740s was equivalent to the annual wage of your average farmer. This is big business. Twenty pounds sterling would be paid for proof of death in the same form of an adult female. Ten pounds sterling for proof of death of a child, a child being defined as human being of either sex under ten years of age down to and, yes, including the fetus. In Texas this law was not rescinded until 1887, [when] the debate in the Texas legislature concluded that there was no reason to continue because there were no longer sufficient numbers of living Indians in the entire state of Texas to warrant the continuation of it. It had accomplished its purpose.17 The Pleasures of Parity 217 And just like that, the Little Baby Civil Society was walking on its own two feet. To Grown-Up Civil Society (Mogie’s “Great White Father in Washington”) Mogie Yellow Lodge submits his own “personal” genocide reparations bill. A bill that accounts for the perfect symmetry through which Whiteness has formed a body (from the genitals to the body politic) out of “Savage” flesh. The symmetry’s perfection becomes clear when one realizes that today’s 1.6 percent-to-80.6 percent “Savage”-to-Settler ratio is a pure inversion of the sixteenth century’s “Savage” to Settler ratio.18 “Send me a big woman. Big fat woman! So that when I sleep with her she’ll cover up all the cracks in my shack and stop the wind from blowing through.” This is a demand so ethically pure that the film finds it unbearable and, as such, is unable (unwilling?) to let Mogie state it without irony. And yet, Mogie’s outbursts like this—“outbursts” because they are generally infrequent and contained by pity or humor—are the few moments when the film engages the ethical dilemmas of the Settler/“Savage” antagonism (genocide and its impossible semiotics) instead of the ethical dilemmas of the Settler/“Savage” conflict (sovereignty and its semiotics of loss). Again, it is not that Mogie’s demand is absurd and unethical but rather that it is a demand so pure in its ethicality that it threatens the quotidian prohibitions which, in modernity, constrain ethics. The demand is far too ethical for the film to embrace and elaborate at the level of narrative. It is a demand that must be policed by sovereign powers. Exploring Skins’s cinematic strategies reveals this containment as an effort to manage the spectator’s interpellation by the dilemmas of Mogie’s ruination and by the demand that ushers forth from his “flesh.” Mogie’s surrealism seeks to cull power directly from the subjectivity of the Settler, what Churchill calls “the imperial integrity of the U.S. itself.”19 This idea of culling power, resources, and Human life directly from the imperial integrity of the United States, especially when we think that imperial integrity through the banality of White bodies (in other words, through the “innocence” of today’s citizen), is indicative of the kind of unflinching paradigmatic analyses which allowed Churchill to embrace the 9/11 attack on the World Trade Center within forty-eight hours of its occurrence, a moment in time when Settler Marxists and Settler progressives either suddenly became mute or stumbled over their own tongues in half-hearted attempts to simultaneously condemn the attack 218 chapter eight and explain its political and historical rationale. Churchill’s embrace of the event is not synonymous with either celebration or condemnation. It goes without saying that Churchill also refused to be interpellated by the pageantry of mourning that followed in the wake of 9/11. But Settler radicals and progressives assailed him for meditating on the attack from within the questions of the genocided “Savage” rather than from within an ensemble of questions allied with Settler’s grammar of suffering, exploitation, and alienation. People on the left tried to shame Churchill for embracing incoherent terror (suicide bombers) instead of morally and politically sanctioned revolutionary action (like the Zapatistas or the Sandinistas). Others chided him for advocating violence in any form. Many said that now is not the time for a scathing critique; “our” nation is in mourning. And others wagged their fingers and reminded him that members of the working class (not just police agents and investment bankers) died in the Twin Towers. These naysayers all made their arguments at the level of experience, and Churchill, rather handily, answered them at this level as well. But I am neither interested in his interlocutors’ chiding nor in his response. The Left’s attack on Churchill’s embrace of the 9/11 attacks is important not for the social issues it raises, the myriad of things it claims it is concerned about, but rather for the grammar of suffering shared across the board, those building blocks through which loss is conceptualized in such a way that makes it impossible for the “Savage” to function, grammatically, as their paradigm of suffering, and even less as its paradigmatic agent for change. Had Churchill’s interlocutors been more honest, they would have used fewer words—not draped their rejoinders with the veil of issues from the realm of experience (i.e., tactics)—and said, quite simply, “We will not be led by the ‘Savage’; death is not an element constituent of our ontology.” Unlike the narrative and cinematic strategies of Skins, Churchill’s meditation on 9/11 embraces, rather than contains, Mogie Yellow Lodge’s demand. Churchill’s work is authorized by Mogie’s grammar of suffering which, inter alia, forecloses on Churchill’s passing judgment on the tactical ethics of either the attack on the World Trade Center or, for that matter, Mogie’s attack on the body of White femininity. Churchill accepts this foreclosure and works off of it. He does not feel constrained by it but finds that it enables a quality of reflection otherwise inconceivable: The Pleasures of Parity 219 There can be no defensible suggestion that those who attacked the Pentagon and the World Trade Center on 9/11 were seeking to get even with the United States. Still less is there a basis for claims that they “started” something, or that the United States has anything to get even with them for. Quite the contrary. For the attackers to have arguably “evened the score” for Iraq’s dead children alone, it would have been necessary for them to have killed a hundred times the number of Americans who actually died. This in itself, however, would have allowed them to attain parity in terms of real numbers. The U.S. population is about fifteen times the size of Iraq’s. Hence, for the attackers to have achieved a proportionally equivalent impact, it would have been necessary that they kill some 7.5 million Americans.20 Churchill reflects on the event of 9/11 in such a way as to make it impossible to talk about it as an event. This is a marker of the philosophical brilliance and rhetorical dexterity foundational to Churchill’s thirty-odd books, articles, and recorded speeches. This dexterity allows the work to be conversant with the actual details and “facts” of the event (as presented and cathedralized by White civil society). Yet instead of becoming mired in the bog of concerns which makes the event as “event” (details and common sense ethics), Churchill jettisons common sense and presses the details into service of an ensemble of questions animated by the ethical dilemmas of “Savage,” and not Settler, ontology. He can do this on behalf of those who are not even Native Americans (in this passage, Iraqis) because he provides them with the “Savage” as a lens through which they can do ethnographic and political work on the Settler as specimen. In other words, in his chapter on 9/11, his argument is made in such a way that, to be interpellated, the reader must adjust the logic of his or her political experience to fit the logic of “Savage” genocidal ontology—and not vice versa. The reader must be subordinated to, and incorporated by, Redness, or else the reader will experience the piece in the same way that the viewer is meant to experience Mogie Yellow Lodge: as a scandal, as a problem in need of fixing. Churchill continues to subordinate the “facts” of 9/11 to an ethical examination of Settlerism by reminding the reader that “the U.S. population is fifteen times the size of Iraq’s,” therefore 9/11 would have had to have killed “7.5 million Americans” in order to have “achieved a proportion- 220 chapter eight ately equivalent impact.” In the very next paragraph, Churchill corrects himself and insists that 7.5 million is the number of American children the attackers would have had to have killed in order to achieve parity. This is followed by a list of even more corrections, in which Churchill recalculates the meaning of parity based solely on the U.S. deracination of Iraq since 1990 (further down the correctives will lead him to the “Savage” and to the Slave). True parity would result in 7.5 million dead American children, 15 million dead American adults, the obliteration of “sewage, water sanitation and electrical plants, food production/storage capacity, hospitals, pharmaceutical production facilities, communication centers and much more.” The effects of which would be not just mass death but “a surviving population wracked by malnutrition and endemic disease.” “Indeed, applying such standards of ‘pay back’ vis-à-vis American Indians alone would require a lethal reduction in the U.S. population . . . of between 96 and 99 percent.” Suddenly, Mogie Yellow Lodge’s demand for parity (one big fat White woman “to cover up the cracks in [his] shack”) sounds downright generous. Mogie is demanding one Settler, a far cry from demanding parity for ontological death. Were he to demand parity the United States “would run out of people long before it ran out of compensatory obligation.”21

#### Their philosophy is built on genocide and exploitation of native bodies – metaphysical dualisms justify and inform settler colonialism by creating distinctions between the rational and irrational subject – this justifies colonialism because we will win indigenous people are never seen as rational subjects – they will be unable to answer how their framework binds settlers to treat indigenous people as agents which means you vote negative.

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Crispin Sartwell, “WESTERN PHILOSOPHY AS WHITE SUPREMACISM,” The Philosophical Salon, <http://thephilosophicalsalon.com/western-philosophy-as-white-supremacism/> // sam

The 17th and 18th centuries were characterized by the consolidation of European colonialism over much of the world and the rise of the Atlantic slave trade. This period is known in philosophy as the “modern” era. Modern philosophy was characterized above all by its dualisms, which have their origins, like Western philosophy, in the Greeks: between body and mind, culture and nature, civilized and savage, state and anarchy, human and animal. Applied at different scales, these are all the same dualism. They exalt the intellectual over the physical, and use spirit, mind, and culture, understood in a particularly self-serving way, as standards of who counts as a moral agent—as a human being—and of what groups or cultures are worthy of respect. As philosophical concepts, these allegedly opposed pairs are excruciatingly problematic. But they are not only philosophical ideas: they were precisely the content of the alleged difference between European people and people of color, as Europeans understood it; the abstract metaphysics became an all-too-concrete ideology of exploitation. Sub-Saharan African peoples, as well as the indigenous peoples of the Americas, were pictured relentlessly, even in the Enlightenment philosophical texts themselves, as sheer bodies, while the European thinkers were, in their own view, minds. Indigenous peoples were understood to be still part of nature (and were devalued in that identification), whereas Europe had supposedly emerged from nature into culture. That was the fundamental way that Europeans justified to themselves the oppression they were inflicting and congratulated themselves on their own alleged superiority and suitedness to be rulers and exploiters. In other words, white supremacy lurks at the heart of Western metaphysics. This structure is formulated with crystal clarity by Descartes, who separates mind and body as two fundamentally different sorts of things and arranges them in a hierarchy of value. “Reason alone makes us men and distinguishes us from the beasts,” he declares, echoing Plato and Pythagoras. “I am,” he argues, “precisely nothing but a thinking thing; that is, a mind, or intellect, or understanding, or reason.” We might think of this as the imaginary construction of white identity, and if any person, even René Descartes, considers himself “nothing but a thinking thing,” he is profoundly self-deluded, and other people are probably servicing his physical needs. Relentlessly, Western political tradition values mind over body, intellectual over manual labor, reason over passion. And European philosophy of the modern era, also relentlessly, associates mind with the sort of people who came to think of themselves as “white men,” and body with the sorts of people they were oppressing around the world, with somewhat different flavors depending on whether the people they were talking about were women, or Africans, or Asians, or Native Americans. Descartes held that each of us was two things: an angel and an animal, as it were, a pure soul and a bestial body. Colonialism and the nascent “science” of race simply externalized this dualism, so that some people (educated Europeans, primarily) were supposed to be pure minds—and hence suited to rule—while others (the people that Europeans were encountering all over the world, and on whom they were imposing their dominance) were supposed to be mere bodies. It is ironic, however, that ruling requires massive use of physical force, implying that white supremacism does anything but transcend the physical plane. Modern political theory circled around the same set of distinctions. Thomas Hobbes, in the Leviathan, purports to observe that “the savage people in many places of America . . . have no government at all; and live at this day in [a] brutish [animalistic] manner.”[2] The ethics of Immanuel Kant, and of many others up to the present day, emphasizes that to be rational is to be free, and hence that to be irrational is to be enslaved. Reason is the faculty by which the mind controls the body; reason is suited to control the physical world. The body in the world, for Kant, must be distinguished from the ‘transcendental subject,’ the moral agent, who is outside of space and time, and who is the lawgiver of himself, that is, the appropriate center of power. Exercised internally, this is the drama of self-control; one becomes a good person by bringing one’s unruly bodily desires to heel by rational deliberation. (There is even a contemporary neurological version that purports to distinguish the “executive region” from the amygdala, the primitive or animal or emotive bit.) Exercised externally, it is quickly adaptable into white domination over the colored world. Kant famously argues that rational creatures must be treated as ends and not merely as means. He calls that “dignity” and holds it to be a (or the) most basic moral principle that persons with such dignity must be treated with “respect.” The complement of this doctrine is that irrational creatures can legitimately be treated as mere means, and with disrespect. To claim of some person or some culture that it is irrational and hence animalistic, opens them to the use of creatures who regard themselves as rational, such as Kant’s European readership. In the first European defense of the African slave trade (1444), a Portuguese courtier (Gomes Eanes de Zurara) argued that Africans were better off in slavery, and claimed that in Africa “They lived like beasts, without any custom of civilized beings. . . They were without covering of clothes, or the lodgement of houses; and worst of all, they had no understanding of good, but only knew how to live in bestial sloth.”[4] The direct motivation for colonialism was economic, not metaphysical. But the structures mirror each other, and when Europeans came into contact with and conquered other peoples, they used the existing forms of thought, derived from figures such as Plato, to explain or rationalize the exploitation and even genocides that they were engaged in. “When soul and body are both in the same place,” wrote Plato in the Phaedo, “nature teaches the one to serve and be subject, the other to rule and govern.”[5] A couple of millennia later, the “place” where soul and body meet might be the Belgian Congo. Or for that matter South Carolina. This symbolic repertoire has been adapted to various issues and circumstances, but it is remarkably persistent. Through slavery and Jim Crow, lynching and mass incarceration, black people have been relentlessly regarded and treated as animal bodies by white people. That is not about black people at all, but about the hallucinatory self-image of people who regard themselves as white: it is an attempt to build and enforce a self-image for white people as being spiritual and intellectual beings, and hence suited to know and to rule, to command themselves and hence others, to manage everyone’s lives as one’s own mind should rationally control one’s body. Every white stereotype of black people, first, is relentlessly animalizing or physicalizing, and second, rests on a devaluation of the physical and an exaltation of the intellectual. The association of non-white people with violence and sexuality, with crime or laziness, and their economic exploitation as physical labor, are all rationalized by this application of basic metaphysical dualisms. This becomes a worldwide structure of oppression, in which rational Westerners, or “experts” of various sorts, are called upon to control unruly and irrational elements: the classic “white man’s burden.” Indeed, a pre-eminent issue in European philosophy at the end of the Modern period, around 1750-1850, was the relation of sheer material reality, conceived as a deterministic realm in which human beings were enslaved by physical causes, and the realm of Spirit or freedom. This was the fundamental dilemma of our lives and our world, as Kant, Schiller, Schelling, and Hegel, for example, framed it. But it was also the shape of the political rhetoric justifying colonialism, for example. Astonishingly, the whole network of views persists. For example, John Martin Fischer fills his book The Metaphysics of Free Will with the sort of observation that appears at the outset of many a classic work of Western philosophy: “The possession of regulative control is precisely what distinguishes us from non-persons,” he says as he concludes. “After all, the behavior of an animal appears to be the product of strong instinctual urges. . . . Non-human animals . . . are not persons; they do not have strong rights to continue to exist,” and are beneath our moral approval or disapproval: beneath contempt, we might say.[6] They can legitimately be used for our purposes, while only persons deserve moral respect. Fischer’s account of moral agency indicates that it is anomalous in the order of nature. In various moments in the tradition, the “rational subject” is supposed to be outside that order entirely. Rarely has there been a more bizarre or thorough self-deception. Many philosophers, right up to the present moment, take the fundamental view that rationality or ‘mind’ distinguishes humans from other sorts of things, and that rational creatures have a superior sort of value. “Reason is a power we have in virtue of a certain type of self-consciousness,” says the contemporary moral philosopher Christine Korsgaard, taking up the point of view of Descartes and Kant. “This form of self-consciousness gives us a capacity to control our beliefs and actions that the other animals lack, and makes us active in a way they are not; this form of self-consciousness makes it necessary to take control of our beliefs and actions.” Projected outward, it seems to make it necessary to take control of animalistic people, in order to create a rational society. I am not suggesting that Plato, Descartes, or Kant, much less Fischer and Korsgaard, are white supremacists. Descartes was probably writing too early to engage that set of beliefs directly, and Plato certainly was. Kant’s liberal politics are in many ways incompatible with racism, and the same goes for Korsgaard’s (and, I assume, Fischer’s as well). But I am suggesting that the sort of metaphysics and ethics they all endorse grew up in connection with white supremacism and helped shape it. They are, as it were, isomorphic. And I suggest that this structure of thought lies beneath some of our ill treatment of other animals and the environment as well. The whole picture is subject, I think, to compelling philosophical objections. And its social applications have been self-serving and profoundly oppressive.

#### Settler subjectivity is inevitably concerned with the construction of a smooth wholeness – a coherent imago, which the settler constructs through disidentification with the violence of their origins. The alternative is reidentification – this is an iterative process that requires the refusal and disruption of settler spaces of coherence – you should refuse the research project of the affirmative as a method of subject formation.

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Phil Henderson, “Imagoed communities: the psychosocial space of settler colonialism”, Settler Colonial Studies, Special Issue on Globalizing Unsettlement, 2015 // sam

Goeman writes as an explicit challenge to other indigenous peoples, but this holds true to settler-allies as well, that decolonization must include an analysis of the dominant ‘self-disciplining colonial subject’.73 However, as this discussion of subjective precarity demonstrates, the degree of to which these disciplinary or phenomenological processes are complete should not be overstated. For settler-allies must also examine and cultivate the ways in which settler subjects fail to be totally disciplined. Evidence of this incompletion is apparent in the subject's arrested state of development. Discovering the instability at the core of the settler subject, indeed of all subjects, is the central conceit of psychoanalysis. This exception of at least partial failure to fully subjectivize the settler is also what sets my account apart from Rifkin's. His phenomenology falls into the trap that Jacqueline Rose observes within many sociological accounts of the subject: that of assuming a successful internalization of norms. From the psychoanalytical perspective, the ‘unconscious constantly reveals the “failure”’ of internalization.74 As we have seen, within settler subjects this can be expressed as an irrational anxiety that expresses itself whenever a settler is confronted with the facts regarding their colonizing status. Under conditions of total subjectification, such charges ought to be unintelligible to the settler. Thus, the process of subject formation is always in slippage and never totalized as others might suggest.75 Because of this precarity, the settler subject is prone to violence and lashing out; but the subject in slippage also provides an avenue by which the process of settler colonialism can be subverted – creating cracks in a phantasmatic wholeness which can be opened wider. Breakages of this sort offer an opportunity to pursue what Paulette Regan calls a ‘restorying’ of settler colonial history and culture, to decenter settler mythologies built upon and within the dispossession of indigenous peoples.76 The cultivation of these cracks is a necessary part of decolonizing work, as it continues to panic and thus to destabilize settler subjects. Resistance to settler colonialism does not occur only in highly visible moments like the famous conflict at Kanesatake and Kahnawake,77 it also occurs in reiterative and disruptive practices, presences, and speech acts. Goeman correctly observes that the ‘repetitive practices of everyday life’ are what give settler spaces their meaning, as they8 provide a degree of naturalness to the settler imago and its psychic investments.78 As such, to disrupt the ease of these repetitions is at once to striate radically the otherwise smooth spaces of settler colonialism and also to disrupt the easy (re)production of the settler subject. Goeman calls these subversive acts the ‘micro-politics of resistance', which historically took the form of ‘moving fences, not cooperating with census enumerators, sometimes disrupting survey parties’ amongst other process.79 These acts panic the subject that is disciplined as a product of settler colonial power, by forcing encounters with the sovereign indigenous peoples that were imagined to be gone. This reveals to the settler, if only fleetingly, the violence that founds and sustains the settler colonial relationship. While such practices may not overthrow the settler colonial system, they do subvert its logics by insistently drawing attention to the ongoing presence of indigenous peoples who refuse erasure. Today, we can draw similar inspiration from the variety of tactics used in movements like Idle No More. From flash mobs in major malls, to round dances that block city streets, and even projects to rename Toronto locations, Idle No More is engaged in a series of micro-political projects across Turtle Island. 80 The micro-politics of the movement strengthen indigenous subjects and their spatialities, while leaving an indelible imprint in the settler psyche. Predictably, rage and resentment were provoked in some settlers; 81 however, Idle No More also drew thousands of settler-allies into the streets and renewed conversations about the necessity of nation-to-nation relationships. With settler colonial spaces disrupted and a relationship of domination made impossible to ignore, in the tradition of centuries of indigenous resistance, Idle No More put the settler subject into serious flux once more.

## 3

#### The standard is maximizing expected wellbeing.

#### 1] No intent foresight distinction for states – governments must use util because they don’t have intentions and are constantly dealing with tradeoffs—outweighs since different agents have different obligations—takes out calc indicts since they are empirically denied.

Enoch 07 Enoch, D [The Faculty of Law, The Hebrew Unviersity, Mount Scopus Campus, Jersusalem]. (2007). INTENDING, FORESEEING, AND THE STATE. Legal Theory, 13(02). doi:10.1017/s1352325207070048 https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/legal-theory/article/intending-foreseeing-and-the-state/76B18896B94D5490ED0512D8E8DC54B2

The general difficulty of the intending-foreseeing distinction here stemmed, you will recall, from the feeling that attempting to pick and choose among the foreseen consequences of one’s actions those one is more and those one is less responsible for looks more like the preparation of a defense than like a genuine attempt to determine what is to be done. Hiding behind the intending-foreseeing distinction seems like an attempt to evade responsibility, and so thinking about the distinction in terms of responsibility serves 39. Anderson & Pildes, supra note 38. I will use this text as my example of an expressive theory here. 40. See id. at 1554, 1564. 41. For a general critique, see Mathew D. Adler, Expressive Theories of Law: A Skeptical Overview, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1363 (1999–2000). 42. As Adler repeatedly notes, the understanding of expression Anderson & Pildes work with is amazingly broad, so that “To express an attitude through action is to act on the reasons the attitude gives us”; Anderson & Pildes, supra note 38, at 1510. If this is so, it seems that expression drops out of the picture and everything done with it can be done directly in terms of reasons. 43. This may be true of what Anderson and Pildes have in mind when they say that “expressive norms regulate actions by regulating the acceptable justifications for doing them”; id. at 1511. http://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 03 Aug 2014 IP address: 134.153.184.170 Intending, Foreseeing, and the State 91 to reduce even further the plausibility of attributing to it intrinsic moral significance. This consideration—however weighty in general—seems to me very weighty when applied to state action and to the decisions of state officials. For perhaps it may be argued that individuals are not required to undertake a global perspective, one that equally takes into account all foreseen consequences of their actions. Perhaps, in other words, individuals are entitled to (roughly) settle for having a good will, and beyond that let chips fall where they may. But this is precisely what stateswomen and statesmen—and certainly states—are not entitled to settle for.44 In making policy decisions, it is precisely the global (or at least statewide, or nationwide, or something of this sort) perspective that must be undertaken. Perhaps, for instance, an individual doctor is entitled to give her patient a scarce drug without thinking about tomorrow’s patients (I say “perhaps” because I am genuinely not sure about this), but surely when a state committee tries to formulate rules for the allocation of scarce medical drugs and treatments, it cannot hide behind the intending-foreseeing distinction, arguing that if it allows45 the doctor to give the drug to today’s patient, the death of tomorrow’s patient is merely foreseen and not intended. When making a policy-decision, this is clearly unacceptable. Or think about it this way (I follow Daryl Levinson here):46 perhaps restrictions on the responsibility of individuals are justified because individuals are autonomous, because much of the value in their lives comes from personal pursuits and relationships that are possible only if their responsibility for what goes on in the (more impersonal) world is restricted. But none of this is true of states and governments. They have no special relationships and pursuits, no personal interests, no autonomous lives to lead in anything like the sense in which these ideas are plausible when applied to individuals persons. So there is no reason to restrict the responsibility of states in anything like the way the responsibility of individuals is arguably restricted.47 States and state officials have much more comprehensive responsibilities than individuals do. Hiding behind the intending-foreseeing distinction thus more clearly constitutes an evasion of responsibility in the case of the former. So the evading-responsibility worry has much more force against the intending-foreseeing distinction when applied to state action than elsewhere.

#### 2] Only pleasure and pain are intrinsically valuable – all other frameworks collapse.

Moen 16 [Ole Martin Moen, Research Fellow in Philosophy at University of Oslo “An Argument for Hedonism” Journal of Value Inquiry (Springer), 50 (2) 2016: 267–281] TDI

Let us start by observing, empirically, that a widely shared judgment about intrinsic value and disvalue is that **pleasure is intrinsically valuable and pain is intrinsically disvaluable**. On virtually any proposed list of intrinsic values and disvalues (we will look at some of them below), pleasure is included among the intrinsic values and pain among the intrinsic disvalues. This inclusion makes intuitive sense, moreover, for **there is something undeniably good about the way pleasure feels and something undeniably bad about the way pain feels**, and neither the goodness of pleasure nor the badness of pain seems to be exhausted by the further effects that these experiences might have. “Pleasure” and “pain” are here understood inclusively, as encompassing anything hedonically positive and anything hedonically negative.2 **The special value statuses of pleasure and pain are manifested in how we treat these experiences in our everyday reasoning about values.** If you tell me that you are heading for the convenience store, I might ask: “What for?” This is a reasonable question, for when you go to the convenience store you usually do so, not merely for the sake of going to the convenience store, but for the sake of achieving something further that you deem to be valuable. You might answer, for example: “To buy soda.” This answer makes sense, for soda is a nice thing and you can get it at the convenience store. I might further inquire, however: “What is buying the soda good for?” This further question can also be a reasonable one, for it need not be obvious why you want the soda. You might answer: “Well, I want it for the pleasure of drinking it.” If I then proceed by asking “But what is the pleasure of drinking the soda good for?” the discussion is likely to reach an awkward end. The reason is that the **pleasure is not good for anything further**; it is simply that for which going to the convenience store and buying the soda is good.3 As Aristotle observes: “We never ask [a man] what his end is in being pleased, because we assume that pleasure is choice worthy in itself.”4 Presumably, a similar story can be told in the case of pains, for if someone says “This is painful!” we never respond by asking: “And why is that a problem?” We take for granted that if something is painful, we have a sufficient explanation of why it is bad. If we are onto something in our everyday reasoning about values, it seems that **pleasure and pain are both places where we reach the end of the line in matters of value.**

#### 3] Death is bad and outweighs – a] agents can’t act if they fear for their bodily security which constrains every ethical theory, b] it destroys the subject itself – kills any ability to achieve value in ethics since life is a prerequisite which means it’s a side constraint since we can’t reach the end goal of ethics without life

#### 4] Extinction outweighs

MacAskill 14 [William, Oxford Philosopher and youngest tenured philosopher in the world, Normative Uncertainty, 2014]

The human race might go extinct from a number of causes: asteroids, supervolcanoes, runaway climate change, pandemics, nuclear war, and the development and use of dangerous new technologies such as synthetic biology, all pose risks (even if very small) to the continued survival of the human race.184 And different moral views give opposing answers to question of whether this would be a good or a bad thing. It might seem obvious that human extinction would be a very bad thing, both because of the loss of potential future lives, and because of the loss of the scientific and artistic progress that we would make in the future. But the issue is at least unclear. The continuation of the human race would be a mixed bag: inevitably, it would involve both upsides and downsides. And if one regards it as much more important to avoid bad things happening than to promote good things happening then one could plausibly regard human extinction as a good thing.For example, one might regard the prevention of bads as being in general more important that the promotion of goods, as defended historically by G. E. Moore,185 and more recently by Thomas Hurka.186 One could weight the prevention of suffering as being much more important that the promotion of happiness. Or one could weight the prevention of objective bads, such as war and genocide, as being much more important than the promotion of objective goods, such as scientific and artistic progress. If the human race continues its future will inevitably involve suffering as well as happiness, and objective bads as well as objective goods. So, if one weights the bads sufficiently heavily against the goods, or if one is sufficiently pessimistic about humanity’s ability to achieve good outcomes, then one will regard human extinction as a good thing.187 However, even if we believe in a moral view according to which human extinction would be a good thing, we still have strong reason to prevent near-term human extinction. To see this, we must note three points. First, we should note that the extinction of the human race is an extremely high stakes moral issue. Humanity could be around for a very long time: if humans survive as long as the median mammal species, we will last another two million years. On this estimate, the number of humans in existence in the The future, given that we don’t go extinct any time soon, would be 2×10^14. So if it is good to bring new people into existence, then it’s very good to prevent human extinction. Second, human extinction is by its nature an irreversible scenario. If we continue to exist, then we always have the option of letting ourselves go extinct in the future (or, perhaps more realistically, of considerably reducing population size). But if we go extinct, then we can’t magically bring ourselves back into existence at a later date. Third, we should expect ourselves to progress, morally, over the next few centuries, as we have progressed in the past. So we should expect that in a few centuries’ time we will have better evidence about how to evaluate human extinction than we currently have. Given these three factors, it would be better to prevent the near-term extinction of the human race, even if we thought that the extinction of the human race would actually be a very good thing. To make this concrete, I’ll give the following simple but illustrative model. Suppose that we have 0.8 credence that it is a bad thing to produce new people, and 0.2 certain that it’s a good thing to produce new people; and the degree to which it is good to produce new people, if it is good, is the same as the degree to which it is bad to produce new people, if it is bad. That is, I’m supposing, for simplicity, that we know that one new life has one unit of value; we just don’t know whether that unit is positive or negative. And let’s use our estimate of 2×10^14 people who would exist in the future, if we avoid near-term human extinction. Given our stipulated credences, the expected benefit of letting the human race go extinct now would be (.8-.2)×(2×10^14) = 1.2×(10^14). Suppose that, if we let the human race continue and did research for 300 years, we would know for certain whether or not additional people are of positive or negative value. If so, then with the credences above we should think it 80% likely that we will find out that it is a bad thing to produce new people, and 20% likely that we will find out that it’s a good thing to produce new people. So there’s an 80% chance of a loss of 3×(10^10) (because of the delay of letting the human race go extinct), the expected value of which is 2.4×(10^10). But there’s also a 20% chance of a gain of 2×(10^14), the expected value of which is 4×(10^13). That is, in expected value terms, the cost of waiting for a few hundred years is vanishingly small compared with the benefit of keeping one’s options open while one gains new information.

#### 5] Reject calc indicts:

#### A] Empirically denied—both individuals and policymakers carry out effective cost-benefit analysis which means even if decisions aren’t always perfect it’s still better than not acting at all

#### B] Theory—they’re functionally NIBs that everyone knows are silly but skew the aff and move the debate away from the topic and actual philosophical debate, killing valuable education

## 4

#### Space Commercialization drives Tech Innovation in the Status Quo – it provides a unique impetus.

Hampson 17 Joshua Hampson 1-25-2017 “The Future of Space Commercialization” <https://republicans-science.house.gov/sites/republicans.science.house.gov/files/documents/TheFutureofSpaceCommercializationFinal.pdf> (Security Studies Fellow at the Niskanen Center)//Elmer

The size of the space economy is far larger than many may think. In 2015 alone, the global market amounted to $323 billion. Commercial infrastructure and systems accounted for 76 percent of that 9 total, with satellite television the largest subsection at $95 billion. The global space launch market’s 10 11 share of that total came in at $6 billion dollars. It can be hard to disaggregate how space benefits 12 particular national economies, but in 2009 (the last available report), the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) estimated that commercial space transportation and enabled industries generated $208.3 billion in economic activity in the United States alone. Space is not just about 13 satellite television and global transportation; while not commercial, GPS satellites also underpin personal navigation, such as smartphone GPS use, and timing data used for Internet coordination.14 Without that data, there could be problems for a range of Internet and cloud-based services.15 There is also room for growth. The FAA has noted that while the commercial launch sector has not grown dramatically in the last decade, there are indications that there is latent demand. This 16 demand may catalyze an increase in launches and growth of the wider space economy in the next decade. The Satellite Industry Association’s 2015 report highlighted that their section of the space economy outgrew both the American and global economies. The FAA anticipates that growth to 17 continue, with expectations that small payload launch will be a particular industry driver.18 In the future, emerging space industries may contribute even more the American economy. Space tourism and resource recovery—e.g., mining on planets, moons , and asteroids—in particular may become large parts of that industry. Of course, their viability rests on a range of factors, including costs, future regulation, international problems, and assumptions about technological development. However, there is increasing optimism in these areas of economic production. But the space economy is not just about what happens in orbit, or how that alters life on the ground. The growth of this economy can also contribute to new innovations across all walks of life. Technological Innovation Innovation is generally hard to predict; some new technologies seem to come out of nowhere and others only take off when paired with a new application. It is difficult to predict the future, but it is reasonable to expect that a growing space economy would open opportunities for technological and organizational innovation. In terms of technology, the difficult environment of outer space helps incentivize progress along the margins. Because each object launched into orbit costs a significant amount of money—at the moment between $27,000 and $43,000 per pound, though that will likely drop in the future —each 19 reduction in payload size saves money or means more can be launched. At the same time, the ability to fit more capability into a smaller satellite opens outer space to actors that previously were priced out of the market. This is one of the reasons why small, affordable satellites are increasingly pursued by companies or organizations that cannot afford to launch larger traditional satellites. These small 20 satellites also provide non-traditional launchers, such as engineering students or prototypers, the opportunity to learn about satellite production and test new technologies before working on a full-sized satellite. That expansion of developers, experimenters, and testers cannot but help increase innovation opportunities. Technological developments from outer space have been applied to terrestrial life since the earliest days of space exploration. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) maintains a website that lists technologies that have spun off from such research projects. Lightweight 21 nanotubes, useful in protecting astronauts during space exploration, are now being tested for applications in emergency response gear and electrical insulation. The need for certainty about the resiliency of materials used in space led to the development of an analytics tool useful across a range of industries. Temper foam, the material used in memory-foam pillows, was developed for NASA for seat covers. As more companies pursue their own space goals, more innovations will likely come from the commercial sector. Outer space is not just a catalyst for technological development. Satellite constellations and their unique line-of-sight vantage point can provide new perspectives to old industries. Deploying satellites into low-Earth orbit, as Facebook wants to do, can connect large, previously-unreached swathes of 22 humanity to the Internet. Remote sensing technology could change how whole industries operate, such as crop monitoring, herd management, crisis response, and land evaluation, among others. 23 While satellites cannot provide all essential information for some of these industries, they can fill in some useful gaps and work as part of a wider system of tools. Space infrastructure, in helping to change how people connect and perceive Earth, could help spark innovations on the ground as well. These innovations, changes to global networks, and new opportunities could lead to wider economic growth.

#### Strong Innovation solves Extinction.

Matthews 18 Dylan Matthews 10-26-2018 “How to help people millions of years from now” <https://www.vox.com/future-perfect/2018/10/26/18023366/far-future-effective-altruism-existential-risk-doing-good> (Co-founder of Vox, citing Nick Beckstead @ Rutgers University)//Re-cut by Elmer

If you care about improving human lives, you should overwhelmingly care about those quadrillions of lives rather than the comparatively small number of people alive today. The 7.6 billion people now living, after all, amount to less than 0.003 percent of the population that will live in the future. It’s reasonable to suggest that those quadrillions of future people have, accordingly, hundreds of thousands of times more moral weight than those of us living here today do. That’s the basic argument behind Nick Beckstead’s 2013 Rutgers philosophy dissertation, “On the overwhelming importance of shaping the far future.” It’s a glorious mindfuck of a thesis, not least because Beckstead shows very convincingly that this is a conclusion any plausible moral view would reach. It’s not just something that weird utilitarians have to deal with. And Beckstead, to his considerable credit, walks the walk on this. He works at the Open Philanthropy Project on grants relating to the far future and runs a charitable fund for donors who want to prioritize the far future. And arguments from him and others have turned “long-termism” into a very vibrant, important strand of the effective altruism community. But what does prioritizing the far future even mean? The most literal thing it could mean is preventing human extinction, to ensure that the species persists as long as possible. For the long-term-focused effective altruists I know, that typically means identifying concrete threats to humanity’s continued existence — like unfriendly artificial intelligence, or a pandemic, or global warming/out of control geoengineering — and engaging in activities to prevent that specific eventuality. But in a set of slides he made in 2013, Beckstead makes a compelling case that while that’s certainly part of what caring about the far future entails, approaches that address specific threats to humanity (which he calls “targeted” approaches to the far future) have to complement “broad” approaches, where instead of trying to predict what’s going to kill us all, you just generally try to keep civilization running as best it can, so that it is, as a whole, well-equipped to deal with potential extinction events in the future, not just in 2030 or 2040 but in 3500 or 95000 or even 37 million. In other words, caring about the far future doesn’t mean just paying attention to low-probability risks of total annihilation; it also means acting on pressing needs now. For example: We’re going to be better prepared to prevent extinction from AI or a supervirus or global warming if society as a whole makes a lot of scientific progress. And a significant bottleneck there is that the vast majority of humanity doesn’t get high-enough-quality education to engage in scientific research, if they want to, which reduces the **odds that we have enough trained scientists to come up with the breakthroughs** we need as a civilization to survive and thrive. So maybe one of the best things we can do for the far future is to improve school systems — here and now — to harness the group economist Raj Chetty calls “lost Einsteins” (potential innovators who are thwarted by poverty and inequality in rich countries) and, more importantly, the hundreds of millions of kids in developing countries dealing with even worse education systems than those in depressed communities in the rich world. What if living ethically for the far future means living ethically now? Beckstead mentions some other broad, or very broad, ideas (these are all his descriptions): Help make computers faster so that people everywhere can work more efficiently Change intellectual property law so that technological innovation can happen more quickly Advocate for open borders so that people from poorly governed countries can move to better-governed countries and be more productive Meta-research: improve incentives and norms in academic work to better advance human knowledge Improve education Advocate for political party X to make future people have values more like political party X ”If you look at these areas (economic growth and technological progress, access to information, individual capability, social coordination, motives) a lot of everyday good works contribute,” Beckstead writes. “An implication of this is that a lot of everyday good works are good from a broad perspective, even though hardly anyone thinks explicitly in terms of far future standards.” Look at those examples again: It’s just a list of what normal altruistically motivated people, not effective altruism folks, generally do. Charities in the US love talking about the lost opportunities for innovation that poverty creates. Lots of smart people who want to make a difference become scientists, or try to work as teachers or on improving education policy, and lord knows there are plenty of people who become political party operatives out of a conviction that the moral consequences of the party’s platform are good. All of which is to say: Maybe effective altruists aren’t that special, or at least maybe we don’t have access to that many specific and weird conclusions about how best to help the world. If the far future is what matters, and generally trying to make the world work better is among the best ways to help the far future, then effective altruism just becomes plain ol’ do-goodery.

# Case

#### Reject 1ar theory on face –

#### [1] 1ar theory time skews the rest of the round since they have the 1ar and 2ar, which is 7 minutes compared to my 2nr, which is 6 minutes. This gives them a whole minute advantage on the theory debate, that’s a lot in such a time crunched event and outweighs their strat args since I need time to execute strat and get ground.

#### [2] I lose the flex of being able to indict practices of the aff without going new in the 2nr, which gives them the ability to effectively weigh on the theory debate. Also outweighs on spikes because you have the ability to weigh an entirely conceded theory spike while I have to weigh my theory interp against all possible interps of the aff.

#### [3] 1ar theory is a no risk issue because the aff can go hard for no rvi in the 2ar, which skews my strat because either I either lose on substance or theory, screws the 2nr because I can’t respond to the initial spike, only the violation.

explicitly does so. And there is at least one potential loophole that could be exploited by appropriately worded legislation. There are two key assumptions in the legal argument used by opponents of off-planet property claims: 1) that the recognition by a government would only recognize claims by its own citizens; and 2) that it would defend them by force. That need not necessarily be so. Under the treaty, it would in fact be possible for a government, or group of governments, to recognize the property claims of anyone who met specified conditions, regardless of their citizenship or nationality. Such cooperation would obviate the need for physical force to defend claims. The argument that the treaty permits individual property rights was actually made from the very beginning. In 1969, two years after the treaty went into force, the late distinguished space-law professor, Stephen Gorove, noted that under it, “[A]n individual acting on his own behalf or on behalf of another individual or a private association or an international organization could lawfully appropriate any part of outer space, including the [M]oon and other celestial bodies.”32 This clearly provides support for the concept of individual claims off planet under Article II.