# UT R3 NC v Plano JN

## 1

#### Interpretation: The affirmative may not specify a just government in which a right to strike ought to be recognized

#### “A” is an indefinite article that modifies “just governmnt” in the res – means that you have to prove the resolution true in a VACCUM, not in a particular instance

CCC (“Articles, Determiners, and Quantifiers”, http://grammar.ccc.commnet.edu/grammar/determiners/determiners.htm#articles, Capital Community College Foundation, a nonprofit 501 c-3 organization that supports scholarships, faculty development, and curriculum innovation) LHSLA JC/SJ

The three articles — a, an, the — are a kind of adjective. The is called the definite article because it usually precedes a specific or previously mentioned noun; a and an are called indefinite articles because they are used to refer to something in a less specific manner (an unspecified count noun). These words are also listed among the noun markers or determiners because they are almost invariably followed by a noun (or something else acting as a noun). caution CAUTION! Even after you learn all the principles behind the use of these articles, you will find an abundance of situations where choosing the correct article or choosing whether to use one or not will prove chancy. Icy highways are dangerous. The icy highways are dangerous. And both are correct. The is used with specific nouns. The is required when the noun it refers to represents something that is one of a kind: The moon circles the earth. The is required when the noun it refers to represents something in the abstract: The United States has encouraged the use of the private automobile as opposed to the use of public transit. The is required when the noun it refers to represents something named earlier in the text. (See below..) If you would like help with the distinction between count and non-count nouns, please refer to Count and Non-Count Nouns. We use a before singular count-nouns that begin with consonants (a cow, a barn, a sheep); we use an before singular count-nouns that begin with vowels or vowel-like sounds (an apple, an urban blight, an open door). Words that begin with an h sound often require an a (as in a horse, a history book, a hotel), but if an h-word begins with an actual vowel sound, use an an (as in an hour, an honor). We would say a useful device and a union matter because the u of those words actually sounds like yoo (as opposed, say, to the u of an ugly incident). The same is true of a European and a Euro (because of that consonantal "Yoo" sound). We would say a once-in-a-lifetime experience or a one-time hero because the words once and one begin with a w sound (as if they were spelled wuntz and won). Merriam-Webster's Dictionary says that we can use an before an h- word that begins with an unstressed syllable. Thus, we might say an hisTORical moment, but we would say a HIStory book. Many writers would call that an affectation and prefer that we say a historical, but apparently, this choice is a matter of personal taste. For help on using articles with abbreviations and acronyms (a or an FBI agent?), see the section on Abbreviations. First and subsequent reference: When we first refer to something in written text, we often use an indefinite article to modify it. A newspaper has an obligation to seek out and tell the truth. In a subsequent reference to this newspaper, however, we will use the definite article: There are situations, however, when the newspaper must determine whether the public's safety is jeopardized by knowing the truth. Another example: "I'd like a glass of orange juice, please," John said. "I put the glass of juice on the counter already," Sheila replied. Exception: When a modifier appears between the article and the noun, the subsequent article will continue to be indefinite: "I'd like a big glass of orange juice, please," John said. "I put a big glass of juice on the counter already," Sheila replied. Generic reference: We can refer to something in a generic way by using any of the three articles. We can do the same thing by omitting the article altogether. A beagle makes a great hunting dog and family companion. An airedale is sometimes a rather skittish animal. The golden retriever is a marvelous pet for children. Irish setters are not the highly intelligent animals they used to be. The difference between the generic indefinite pronoun and the normal indefinite pronoun is that the latter refers to any of that class ("I want to buy a beagle, and any old beagle will do.") whereas the former (see beagle sentence) refers to all members of that class

#### Violation: they spec [x]

#### Standards:

#### [1] precision – the counter-interp justifies them arbitrarily doing away with random words in the resolution which decks negative ground and preparation because the aff is no longer bounded by the resolution.

#### [2] limits – the UN says there are 195 national governments but even that’s not an agreed upon brightline – explodes limits since there are tons of independent affs plus functionally infinite combinations, all with different advantages in different political situations. Kills neg prep and debatability since there are no DAs that apply to every aff means the aff is always more prepared and wins just for speccing. There’s been China, Hungary, EU, Kazakhstan, US, India, UK, Egypt and now brazil

#### [3] tva – just read your aff as an advantage under a whole res advocacy, solves all ur offense- Potential abuse doesn’t permit 1AC abuse – allows you to be infinitely abusive in the 1AC-– if the neg doesn’t have specific prep, they’ll resort to cheaty word PICs which are net worse

#### Fairness – debate is a competitive activity that requires fairness for objective evaluation. Outweighs because it’s the only intrinsic part of debate – all other rules can be debated over but rely on some conception of fairness to be justified.

#### Drop the debater – a] deter future abuse and b] set better norms for debate.

#### Competing interps – [a] reasonability is arbitrary and encourages judge intervention since there’s no clear norm, [b] it creates a race to the top where we create the best possible norms for debate.

#### No RVIs – a] illogical, you don’t win for proving that you meet the burden of being fair, logic outweighs since it’s a prerequisite for evaluating any other argument, b] RVIs incentivize baiting theory and prepping it out which leads to maximally abusive practices

## 2

Graphical user interface, text, application, chat or text message

Description automatically generated

Interp: Debaters must disclose advantage areas pre-round

Preparation –

Clash -

## 3

#### International Relations is the royal science of empire – the aff engineers “sustainable warfare” through a mutating geopolitics of violence.

Grove ‘19

[Jarius, PoliSci at the University of Hawai’i. 2019. “Savage Ecology: War and Geopolitics in the Anthropocene.”] pat – ask me for the PDF!

Because I wanted this book to inspire curiosity beyond the boundaries of international relations (ir), I considered ignoring the field altogether, removing all mentions of ir or ir theory. However, upon closer reflection, I have decided to keep these references as I think they are relevant for those outside the discipline and for those who, like myself, often feel alienated within its disciplinary boundaries. In the former case, it is important to know that, unlike some more humble fields, ir has always held itself to be a kind of royal science. Scholarship in ir, particularly in the United States, is half research, and half biding time until you have the prince’s ear. The hallowed names in the mainstream of the field are still known because they somehow changed the behavior of their intended clients—those being states, militaries, and international organizations. Therefore, some attention to ir is necessary because it has an all-too-casual relationship with institutional power that directly impacts the lives of real people, and ir is all too often lethal theory. As an American discipline, the political economy of the field is impossible without Department of Defense money, and its semiotic economy would be equally dwarfed without contributory figures like Woodrow Wilson, Henry Kissinger, and Samuel Huntington. The ubiquity of Huntington’s “clash of civilizations” thesis and Kissinger’s particular brand of realpolitik are undeniable throughout the field, as well as the world. Each, in their own way, has saturated the watchwords and nomenclature of geopolitics from an American perspective so thoroughly that both political parties in the United States fight over who gets to claim the heritage of each. Although many other fields such as anthropology and even comparative literature have found themselves in the gravitational pull of geopolitics, international relations is meant to be scholarship as statecraft by other means. That is, ir was meant to improve the global order and ensure the place of its guarantor, the United States of America. Having spent the better part of a decade listening to national security analysts and diplomats from the United States, South Korea, Japan, Europe, China, Brazil, and Russia, as well as military strategists around the planet, I found their vocabulary and worldview strikingly homogeneous.

If this seems too general a claim, one should take a peek at John Mearsheimer’s essay “Benign Hegemony,” which defends the Americanness of the ir field. What is most telling in this essay is not a defense of the U.S. as a benign hegemonic power, which Mearsheimer has done at length elsewhere. Rather, it is his vigorous defense that as a field, ir theory has done well by the world in setting the intellectual agenda for global challenges, and for creating useful theoretical approaches to addressing those problems. For Mearsheimer, the proof that American scholarly hegemony has been benign is that there is nothing important that has been left out. A quick scan of the last ten or twenty International Studies Association conferences would suggest otherwise.

That issues like rape as a weapon of war, postcolonial violence, global racism, and climate change are not squarely in the main of ir demonstrates just how benign American scholarly hegemony is not. As one prominent anthropologist said to me at dinner after touring the isa conference in 2014, “it was surreal, like a tour through the Cold War. People were giving papers and arguing as if nothing had ever changed.” These same provincial scholars aspire and succeed at filling the advisory roles of each successive American presidency. One cannot help but see a connection between the history of the ir field, and the catastrophes of U.S. foreign policy during the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. One could repeat the words of the anthropologist I mentioned to describe the 2016 presidential campaign debates over the future of U.S. foreign policy: it is as if “nothing had ever changed.” And yet these old white men still strut around the halls of America’s “best” institutions as if they saved us from the Cold War, even as the planet crumbles under the weight of their failed imperial dreams.

If international relations was meant to be the science of making the world something other than what it would be if we were all left to our own worst devices, then it has failed monumentally. The United States is once again in fierce nuclear competition with Russia. We are no closer to any significant action on climate change. We have not met any of the Millennium Development Goals determined by the United Nations on eradicating poverty. War and security are the most significant financial, creative, social, cultural, technological, and political investments of almost every nation-state on Earth. The general intellect is a martial intellect.

Despite all this failure, pessimism does not exist in international relations, at least not on paper. The seething doom of our current predicament thrives at the conference bar and in hushed office conversations but not in our research. In public, the darkness disavowed possesses and inflames the petty cynicisms and hatreds that are often turned outward at tired and predictable scapegoats.

After the fury of three decades of critique, most ir scholars still camp out either on the hill of liberal internationalism or in the dark woods of political realism. Neither offers much that is new by way of answers or even explanations, and each dominant school has failed to account for our current apocalyptic condition. One is left wondering what it is exactly that they think they do. Despite the seeming opposition between the two, one idealistic about the future of international order (liberals) and the other self-satisfied with the tragedy of cycles of war and dominance (realists), both positions are optimists of the positivist variety.

For both warring parties, ir optimism is expressed through a romantic empiricism. For all those who toil away looking for the next theory of international politics, order is out there somewhere, and dutifully recording reality will find it—or at least bring us closer to its discovery. For liberal internationalism, this will bring the long-heralded maturity of Immanuel Kant’s perpetual peace. For second-order sociopaths known as offensive realists, crumbs of “useful strategic insight” and the endless details that amplify their epistemophilia for force projection and violence capability represent a potential “advantage,” that is, the possibility to move one step forward on the global political board game of snakes and ladders. Still, the cynicism of ir always creeps back in because the world never quite lives up to the empirical findings it is commanded to obey. Disappointment here is not without reason, but we cynically continue to make the same policy recommendations, catastrophe after catastrophe.

I have an idea about where ir’s recent malaise comes from. I think it is a moment, just before the awareness of the Anthropocene, after the Cold War and before September 11, when the end of everything was only a hypothetical problem for those of a certain coddled and privileged modern form of life. The catastrophe of the human predicament was that there was no catastrophe, no reason, no generation-defining challenge or war. Now the fate of this form of life is actually imperiled, and it is too much to bear. The weird denial of sexism, racism, climate change, the sixth extinction, and loose nukes, all by a field of scholars tasked with studying geopolitics, is more than irrationalism or ignorance. This animosity toward reality is a deep and corrosive nihilism, a denial of the world. Thus ir as a strategic field is demonstrative of a civilization with nothing left to do, nothing left to destroy. All that is left is to make meaning out of being incapable of undoing the world that Euro-American geopolitics created. Emo geopolitics is not pretty, but it is real. The letdown, the failure, the apocalypse-that-was-not finally arrived, and we are too late.

Still, the United States of America continues to follow the advice of “the best and the brightest,” testing the imperial waters, not quite ready to commit out loud to empire but completely unwilling to abandon it. Stuck in between, contemporary geopolitics—as curated by the United States—is in a permanent beta phase. Neuro-torture, algorithmic warfare, drone strikes, and cybernetic nation-building are not means or ends but rather are tests. Can a polis be engineered? Can the human operating system be reformatted? Can violence be modulated until legally invisible while all the more lethal? Each incursion, each new actor or actant, and new terrains from brains to transatlantic cables—all find themselves part of a grand experiment to see if a benign or at least sustainable empire is possible. There is no seeming regard for the fact that each experiment directly competes with Thomas Jefferson’s democratic experiment. One wonders if freedom can even exist anywhere other than temporarily on the fringe of some neglected order. Is this some metaphysical condition of freedom, or is the world so supersaturated with martial orders that the ragged edges between imperial orders are all that we have left? It feels like freedom’s remains persist only in the ruins of everything else. No space is left that can be truly indifferent to the law, security, or economy. Such is the new life of a human in debt. The social contract has been refinanced as what is owed and nothing more: politics without equity. Inequity without equality.

What about the impending collapse of the post–World War II order, the self-destruction of the United States, the rise of China and a new world order? If humanity lasts long enough for China to put its stamp on the human apocalypse, I will write a new introduction. Until then, we live in the death rattle of Pax Americana. While I think the totality of this claim is true, I do not want to rule out that many of us throughout the world still make lives otherwise. Many of us even thrive in spite of it all. And yet, no form of life can be made that escapes the fact that everything can come to a sudden and arbitrary end thanks to the whim of an American drone operator, nuclear catastrophe, or macroeconomic manipulation like sanctions. There are other ways to die and other organized forms of killing outside the control of the United States; however, no other single apparatus can make everyone or anyone die irrespective of citizenship or geographic location. For me, this is the most inescapable philosophical provocation of our moment in time.

The haphazard and seemingly limitless nature of U.S. violence means that even the core principles of the great political realist concepts like order and national interest are being displaced by subterranean violence entrepreneurs that populate transversal battlefields, security corridors, and border zones. Mercenaries, drug lords, chief executive officers, presidents, and sports commissioners are more alike than ever. Doomsayers like Paul Virilio, Lewis Mumford, and Martin Heidegger foretold a kind of terminal and self-annihilating velocity for geopolitics’ technological saturation, but even their lack of imagination appears optimistic. American geopolitics does not know totality or finality; it bleeds, mutates, and reforms. Furthermore, the peril of biopolitics seems now almost romantic. To make life live? Perchance to dream. The care and concern for life’s productivity is increasingly subsumed by plasticity—forming and reforming without regard to the telos of productivity, division, or normative order.

There are, of course, still orders in our geoplastic age, but they are almost unrecognizable as such. When so many citizens and states are directly invested in sabotaging publicly stated strategic ends, then concepts like national interest seem equally quaint. We are witnessing creative and horrifying experiments in the affirmative production of dying, which also deprive those targeted and in some cases whole populations from the relief of death. To follow Rucker, I want to try to see the world for what it is. We can only say that tragedy is no longer a genre of geopolitics. Tragedy redeems. The occluded character of contemporary geopolitics shoehorned into experience produces the feeling that there is no relief, no reason, no victory, no defeats, and no exit within the confines of national security’s constricted world. This is not tragedy: it is horror. We live in an age of horror that, like the victims of gore movies who never quite die so that they can be tortured more, furthers our practice of collective violence and goes on for decades as a kind of sustainable warfare.

#### Hegemony never failing, strangely enough, makes its failure inevitable.

“Pathology of power” – cool Nietzsche thing.

* Systems learn from failure, but power prevents failure from being pointed out
  + Gulf War 1 sucked, but we pretended it didn’t, so Gulf War 2 also sucked – “institutions become stupid”
* Hegemony is self-defeating because it precludes the impact of failures on the system – makes it unsustainable because failures never impact strategy
  + Changing now because apocalypse is coming home – “crisis of meaning” – why do we even want hegemony anymore? What does our world order look like?
  + Also probably bad for the global south along the way lol

Grove ‘20

[Jarius, polisci at University of Hawai’i. 12/03/2020. Seminar hosted/sponsored by the University of Michigan Debate Team. “Dr. Jarius Grove on CJR, Debate and ‘Savage Ecology,’” <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=I-Gcwj_rg_0>] pat – transcription is from ~21:40-29:00, removed “uhs” and other verbal tics.

And in part, this is from a theory which I borrowed from an old social scientist – and I’m probably gonna skip ahead a little bit and take some questions – but this guy named Carl Deutsch developed this theory, “the pathology of power,” which is sort of throughout the book. I think this is a really interesting theory. It’s a reason why it puts, sort of, Nietzsche to the policy table, which is that, unfortunately, strength prevents learning. So, in cybernetics, we tend to think that learning comes from failure and the ability to remember or incorporate failure. The problem with the Eurocene and the way geopolitics work is it amassed so much material power, so much capability was drawn through it’s chance encounter with technology that it was able to just basically eliminate dissent. It was able to eliminate those who rebelled or pointed failure out. And as a result, it made large institutions incredibly stupid.

When you can leverage power as a way not to learn – meaning, when you make mistakes, you destroy the capability to have the failure follow you home – your system doesn’t learn. And I think maybe one of the best examples of this is the difference between the first Gulf War and the second Gulf War. The first Gulf War is declared an immense success, we take all the data from it, Elliot Cohen takes that data and tries to build this big dataset out of it so we can define how airpower works. We use that dataset and say “Oh! We can go back into Iraq and have exactly the same success.” The reality is that the first Iraqi conflict was not a success. In fact, it strengthened Saddam Hussein’s hold, it limited the rebellions that were against him, it nearly wiped out the Kurds, and it left hundreds of thousands of Iraqis starving as a result of sanctions. But we didn’t learn that lesson, because none of those lessons came to American shores. And so, we had a level of confidence and hubris going into the second war which made us think that the Iraq war would end very quickly. And that time we didn’t quite have the overwhelming authority or overwhelming resolve to eliminate failure, as it were, and as a result we were starting to see already, even now, more than a decade after, the long-term consequences of those kinds of failure.

So that’s kind of a core theme or concept – I mean, that’s the link argument for debate – which is the pathology of power, the degree to which actually strengthening hegemony caused the state to corrode. It caused leadership in democratic institutions to corrode. Order and security reinforces stupidity. When you can’t learn from your mistakes because you try to pretend they don’t exist, or you destroy them, or you vaporize them you get very stupid. And so as a result we’ve ended up in a kind of slow-motion catastrophe where, while the people most privileged in institutions haven’t borne the brunt of the last 500 years of failure, they are starting to come home. Right? They’re starting to show up in the forms of things like climate change, in the inability to negotiate international order in a way that would be more just or humane, in the incapacity to move towards trying to address things like indigenous genocide or slavery. Those incapacities – which really aren’t technical problems, they’re first and foremost political problems – are reaching the state of apocalypse, catastrophe, precisely because of the inability to learn.

So I need to skip a couple of things… and get to the end. So, the end of the book, I say that’s because we’ve been so invested trying to make the world what we want rather than believing in this world, is how Gilles Deleuze put it. The thing that’s most important we can do is believe in this world. So, in the book, I say that it’s more important to think about how we should live than if we live, and that this, sort of, attempt to get out of a world where the future is what disciplines the present, and how to think about that as a crisis of meaning rather than a crisis of technology or politics. We have a crisis of meaning! We don’t know even why we want hegemony anymore. And you see that, I mean… I wouldn’t have thought it in debate a million years ago, but I spend as much or more time with generals and members of NATO and the joint forces in South Korea than I do with the people who read the kind of French philosophy that I like to do when there’s nothing else to do. But it’s still even a crisis of meaning for them; they’re not sure what NATO’s for anymore, they’re not sure what we wanna build hegemony for. We’re not even really sure what kind of wars we want anymore. And I think that speaks a lot to the fact that there’s not a clear vision of what kind of order we’d even want if we could have it.

So, the book kind of ends with this idea that extinction is inevitable – like, the sun will burn out, humans will evolve into something else – but nihilism isn’t. Nihilism is a problem we can actually do something about. We can think about how to make more meaningful lives and less cruel lives even if those lives are not going to go on forever. So, in old-school debate terms – I have no idea if these apply anymore at all – that’s as close to an alternative as the book presents, which is how to formulate craft, practice, habits, forms of life which are not dependent upon homogenization or liquidation of other forms of life. How to, basically, find some joy in this world rather than investing all of our efforts in transforming the world into something which now we’re not even sure we want anymore. And certainly through a process of transformation that looks like it may kill the species.

So, that’s where it ends. It’s sort of an affirmative note, but I wouldn’t say a particularly happy note. And it ends with a question: if that’s the ethical move to make the world less cruel, then we have to ask the question “What if this future isn’t ours?” Right? What if humanity isn’t the punchline to the cosmic joke? What if there’s something else? What comes next? And maybe we should rethink who gets to decide what comes next, rather than presuming that those who are already in power, that already maintain the geopolitical institutions which currently define the agenda for planetary politics, who’ve done a lot of harm… maybe they should take a step back. And I think that’s the thing that makes people the most uncomfortable. People are willing to think about being critical, people are willing to think about incorporating climate change into security, people are willing to think about even incorporating human security or indigenous rights into a security framework. What they’re often not willing to do is to give up the sovereignty to decide what is included and what isn’t. And for me, that’s the most important thing for us to do, in positions of incredible privilege and incredibly destructive power, to be willing to put faith in those people we’ve basically tormented for 500 years and see what other kind of planet could be made. And that’s a big gamble, but I think that’s kind of where we are as a species.

#### The Role of the Judge is to adopt martial empiricism.

Bousquet et al ‘20

[Antoine Bousquet, University of London, Jairus Grove, University of Hawai‘i at Manoa, and Nisha Shah University of Ottawa. 2020. “Becoming war: Towards a martial empiricism,” <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0967010619895660>] pat

Haunting the formations and deformations of global life, war confronts us as an abyss in the face of which cherished interpretative frameworks perilously buckle and warp. Indeed, Tarak Barkawi and Shane Brighton (2011: 129) accurately identify a ‘conceptual black hole surrounding the notion of war’ that has insistently gnawed at the study of the phenomenon. Locating the source of this lacuna in the absence of an ‘ontology of war’, they propose to ground one in ‘fighting’ (Barkawi and Brighton, 2011: 136). Although we concur on the diagnosis, we take issue with the suggested remedy. War does not obey any neat philosophical division between epistemology and ontology. For us, the resolute elusiveness of any definitive understanding of war is inherent in that very object. Every attempt to conceptually shackle war is undone by the creative advance of its new modes, residences and intensities. This speaks against the value of ontology per se less than it calls for a strange, paradoxical and provisional ontology that is consonant with the confounding mutability of war. Such an ontology, suspended between infinity and totality, being and nothingness, the sheer fecundity and utter catastrophe of war, may not be too uncanny for its object. In fairness, Barkawi and Brighton (2011: 133) gesture towards this in acknowledging ‘war’s recalcitrance as an object of knowledge’ and allowing for war to unmake any truth. Yet they seem unwilling to embrace the full force of their own insight, which Marc von Boemcken (2016: 239) ultimately declares: ‘even the statement that “war is fighting” may well be eventually undone by war. In a very fundamental manner, war escapes human intelligibility.’

This special issue on ‘Becoming War’ grapples with war as obdurate mystery. In its recurring persistence yet constant reinvention, its paradoxical ordering of life for the generation of death, or its stubborn affront to the better world we all purport to want, war never ceases to perplex us. Our world is one shot through by war, manifest in the nation-states we inhabit, the ecologies of technics that bind us to one another, and the very thoughts ricocheting through our communities of sense. And yet we still do not know war.

Rather than endeavour yet again to ‘say something fundamental about what war is’ (Barkawi and Brighton, 2011: 134, emphasis in original), we choose to explore how war becomes. This is not to say that we deny any durability or regularities in the phenomenon of war over time. Simply that, as Alfred Whitehead (1978: 35) puts it, ‘there is a becoming of continuity, but no continuity of becoming’. Accordingly, we seek to trace the lines of becoming that congeal into what comes to count as war, even as it continually frays at the edges and insolently defies habituated frames of reference. We do not, therefore, offer a theory of continuity, a formula for what all lines of becoming war might have in common, but instead sketch a style of investigation that encompasses both the enduring cohesion and the radical dispersion of war. We call this endeavour ‘martial empiricism’ to renounce attempts to devise a definitive theory of war. Instead, we favour an open-ended conceptual arsenal for following the trail of war wherever it leads us, as opposed to camping in the places where we already expect to find it.

Although we do not aim to circumscribe the remit of its investigations, martial empiricism is nonetheless inherently situational, spurred by the impulse to grasp the present martial condition we inhabit in all its calamity and promise. We would be far from the first to point out the growing inadequacy of the conceptual frameworks of war inherited from the Westphalian historical interval. Yet we still collectively flounder in the face of a combined and uneven landscape of armed conflict populated by metastasizing war machines encompassing overseas contingency operations, fullspectrum hybrid theatres, ethno-supremacist militias, crowd-sourced paramilitaries, Incel shooters and narco-state assassins. The game is definitely up when a task force led by the former head of United States Central Command can write that ‘basic categories such as “battlefield,” “combatant” and “hostilities” no longer have clear or stable meaning’ (Abizaid and Brooks, 2014: 35). Confronted with this reality and the persistent bewilderment it induces, we contend that a certain epistemic humility is in order. Rather than professing to know where war begins and ends, martial empiricism starts in the middle, with only the barest tentative intuitions necessary to explore the logistics, operations and embodiments that engender armed conflict as an unremitting condition of global life.

#### Voting negative adopts failed IR for a healthy dose of pessimism – at the end of the world, all we can do is hope to be buried alive together.

Grove ‘19

[Jarius, PoliSci at the University of Hawai’i. 2019. “Savage Ecology: War and Geopolitics in the Anthropocene.”] pat – ask me for the PDF!

Failed ir affirms the power of this kind of negative thinking as an alternative to the endless rehearsing of moralizing insights and strategic foresight. The negative is not “against” or reacting to something. Rather, it is the affirmation of a freedom beyond the limits of life and death. That is, it is making a life by continuing to think about the world, even if that thinking is not recuperative, and even if nothing we think can save us. In the face of it all, one celebrates useless thinking, useless scholarship, and useless forms of life at the very moment we are told to throw them all under the bus in the name of survival at all costs. This is a logic referred to lately as hope and it is as cruel as it is anxiety inducing. Hope is a form of extortion. We are told that it is our obligation to bear the weight of making things better while being chided that the failure of our efforts is the result of not believing in the possibility of real change. In such an environment, pessimism is often treated as a form of treason, as if only neoliberals and moral degenerates give up—or so goes the op-ed’s insisting upon the renewed possibility of redemption.

In response to these exhortations, pessimism offers a historical atheism, both methodologically and morally. The universe does not bend toward justice. Sometimes the universe bends toward the indifference of gravity wells and black holes. Affirming negativity, inspired by Achille Mbembe, is grounds for freedom, even if that freedom or relief is only fleeting and always insecure. I am not arrogant enough to think a book can attain freedom of this sort, but this book is inspired by refusals of critique as redemption in favor of useless critique and critique for its own sake.

That the pursuit of knowledge without immediate application is so thoroughly useless, even profane, is a diagnosis of our current moment. The neoliberal assault on the university is evidence of this condition, as is the current pitch of American politics. Our indifference as intellectuals to maximizing value has not gone unnoticed. We are still dangerous, worthy of vilification, of attack, sabotage, and derision because we fail so decadently. We are parasites according to Scott Walker, Donald Trump, and the rest. So be it. We are and shall remain irascible irritants to a worldwide assault on thinking that is well underway and facing few obstacles in other jurisdictions.

What would failed scholarship do? Learn to die, learn to live, learn to listen, learn to be together, and learn to be generous. These virtues are useless in that they do not prevent or manage things. They do not translate into learning objectives or metrics. Virtues of this order are selfsame, nontransferable experiences. They are meaningful but not useful. These are luxurious virtues. Like grieving or joy, they are ends unto themselves. But how will these ideas seek extramural grants, contribute to an outcomes-based education system, or become a policy recommendation? They will not, and that is part of their virtue.

Even if there is no straight line to where we are and where we ought to be, I think we should get over the idea that somehow the U.S. project of liberal empire is conflicted, or “more right than it is wrong,” or pragmatically preferable to the alternatives. I hope this book can contribute to the urgent necessity to get out of the way by reveling in the catastrophic failure that should inspire humility but instead seems to embolden too many to seek global control yet again. Demolition may be an affirmative act if it means insurgents and others can be better heard. And yet this may fail too. If we can accomplish nothing at all, we can at least, as Ta-Nehisi Coates and other pessimists have said, refuse to suborn the lie of America any longer. Telling the truth, even if it cannot change the outcome of history, is a certain kind of solace. In Coates’s words, there is a kind of rapture “when you can no longer be lied to, when you have rejected the dream.” Saying the truth out loud brings with it the relief that we are not crazy. Things really are as bad as we think.

If there are those of us who want to break from this one-hundred-year-old race to be the next Henry Kissinger, then why do we continue to seek respect in the form of recognizable standards of excellence? I am not sure where the answer finally lies, but I do know that professionalization will not save us. To appear as normal and recognizably rigorous will not be enough to stave off the neoliberal drive to monetize scholarship, or to demand of us strategically useful insights. The least we can do in the face of such a battle is to find comfort in meaningful ideas and the friendships they build rather than try to perform for those we know are the problem. Some will ask, who is this “we” or is that “they”—where is your evidence? More will know exactly what I am talking about.

The virtues I seek are oriented toward an academy of refuge, a place we can still live, no matter how dire the conditions of the university and the classroom. It is not the think tank, boardroom, or command center. We are, those of us who wish to be included, the last of the philosophers, the last of the lovers of knowledge, the deviants who should revel in what Harney and Moten have called the undercommons.

In one of his final lectures, Bataille speaks of the remnants of a different human species, something not quite so doomed, something that wasted its newly discovered consciousness and tool-being on the art that still marks the walls of prehistoric caves. This lingering minor or vestigial heritage is philosophy’s beginning. Philosophy survives war, atrocity, famine, and crusades. Thinking matters in a very unusual way. Thinking is not power or emancipation. Thinking matters for a sense of belonging to the world, and for believing in the fecundity of the world despite evidence to the contrary.

How do you get all this from pessimism, from failure? Because willing failure is a temptation, a lure to think otherwise, to think dangerous thoughts. Pessimism is a threat to indifferentism and nihilism in the sense of the phenomenon of Donald Trump. Pessimism is a provocation and an enemy of skepticism, particularly of the metaphysical variety. It is not redemption from these afflictions, but in pessimism there is solace in the real. To put it another way, to study the world as it is means to care for it.

The exhortation that our care or interest should be contingent on how useful the world is and how much of it conforms to our designs is as much opposed to care as it is to empiricism. We can study airports, poetry, endurance races, borders, bombs, plastic, and warfare, and find them all in the world. To consider the depth of their existence can be an invitation to the world rather than a prelude to another policy report. One cannot make a successful political career out of such pursuits, but you might be able to make a life out of it, a life worth repeating even if nothing else happens.

At the end of Jack Halberstam’s The Queer Art of Failure, we are presented with the Fantastic Mr. Fox’s toast as an exemple of something meaningful in these dark times of ours.

They say all foxes are slightly allergic to linoleum, but it’s cool to the paw—try it. They say my tail needs to be dry cleaned twice a month, but now it’s fully detachable—see? They say our tree may never grow back, but one day, something will. Yes, these crackles are made of synthetic goose and these giblets come from artificial squab and even these apples look fake—but at least they’ve got stars on them. I guess my point is, we’ll eat tonight, and we’ll eat together. And even in this not particularly flattering light, you are without a doubt the five and a half most wonderful wild animals I’ve ever met in my life. So let’s raise our boxes—to our survival.

Halberstam says of this queer moment:

Not quite a credo, something short of a toast, a little less than a speech, but Mr. Fox gives here one of the best and most moving—both emotionally and in stop-motion terms—addresses in the history of cinema. Unlike Coraline, where survival is predicated upon a rejection of the theatrical, the queer, and the improvised, and like Where the Wild Things Are, where the disappointment of deliverance must be leavened with the pragmatism of possibility, Fantastic Mr. Fox is a queerly animated classic in that it teaches us, as Finding Nemo, Chicken Run, and so many other revolting animations before it, to believe in detachable tails, fake apples, eating together, adapting to the lighting, risk, sissy sons, and the sheer importance of survival for all those wild souls that the farmers, the teachers, the preachers, and the politicians would like to bury alive.

Although not as much fun as Halberstam’s monument to low theory, Savage Ecology is for all the other wild animals out there studying global politics. May we be buried alive together.

## FW

### OV

#### Utilitarian calculus doesn’t account for the geopolitical structure of aggregate conceptions of the good – that makes it incapable of grappling with the causes of apocalypse.

Grove ‘19

[Jarius, PoliSci at the University of Hawai’i. 2019. “Savage Ecology: War and Geopolitics in the Anthropocene.”] pat – ask me for the PDF!

Rather than see these two career trajectories as opposed, I think Crutzen’s thinking displays a continuous concern for the Northern Hemisphere and a particular cartography, rather than a geography, of human survival. Crutzen, as well as the concept of the Anthropocene itself, cannot escape preceding geopolitical conceptions of the Earth. Crutzen and others who rush so quickly to the necessity to transition efforts from climate abatement to climate modification are unsurprisingly not moved by claims that artificial cooling will likely cause droughts and famines in the tropics and subtropical zones of the global south; nor are they moved by how such plans may accelerate ocean acidification. The utilitarian risk calculus that favors the greatest good for the greatest number has no geographical or historical sensibility of how unequally aggregate conceptions of the good are distributed around the planet.

Global thinking, even in its scientific and seemingly universalist claims to an atmosphere that “we” all share, belies the geopolitics that enlivens scientific concern, as well as the global public policy agenda of geoengineering that seeks to act on behalf of it. Saving humanity as an aggregate, whether from nuclear war, Styrofoam, or climate turbulence, has never meant an egalitarian distribution of survivors and sacrifices. Instead, our new cosmopolitanism—the global environment—follows almost exactly the drawn lines, that is, the cartography or racialized and selective solidarities and zones of indifference that characterize economic development, the selective application of combat, and, before that, the zones of settlement and colonization. More than a result of contemporary white supremacy or lingering white privilege, the territorialization of who lives and who dies, who matters and who must be left behind for the sake of humanity, represents a five-hundred-year geopolitical tradition of conquest, colonization, extraction, and the martial forms of life that made them all possible through war and through more subtle and languid forms of organized killing.

I am not suggesting that Crutzen and others are part of a vast conspiracy; rather, I want to outline how climate change, species loss, slavery, the elimination of native peoples, and the globalization of extractive capitalism are all part of the same global ordering. That is, all of these crises are geopolitical. The particular geopolitical arrangement of what others have called the longue durée, and what I am calling the Eurocene, is geologically significant but is not universally part of “human activity” despite the false syllogism at the heart of popular ecological thinking that a global threat to humanity must be shared in cause and crisis by all of humanity.

Departing from Sloterdijk, I am hesitant to so easily locate modernity or explication as the root or cause of the global catastrophe. No single strategy, war, act of colonization, technological breakthrough, or worldview fully explains the apocalypse before us. However, there is something like what Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari call a refrain that holds the vast assemblage together, a geopolitical melody hummed along with the global expansion of a form of life characterized by homogenization rather than diversification. Accordingly, if we are to make some sense of such a vast world that is, even for Crutzen and Birks, “quite complex and difficult to model,” I think we must consider the particular refrain of geopolitics that is capable of, by scientific as well as more humbly embodied standards, destroying worlds along with the world. To eschew geopolitics simply because, as a refrain, it is too big, too grand, or too universal would ignore the conditions of possibility for nuclear weapons, power politics, and carbon-based globalization, and would greatly impoverish the explanatory capability of even the best climate models. So maybe it is not so strange that Crutzen and others’ attention to the nuclear threat of great powers has all but disappeared despite the fact that Russia and the United States still possess thousands of nuclear weapons, and as of late have been all too vocal about using them. Instead, the Anthropocene, as envisioned by Crutzen as a universal concern, requires with it a depoliticization of the causes of that concern.

#### Their demand for a uniform rationality inculcates a violent technocratic eradication of irrationality while only recapitulating a tragic ontology of ressentiment. The substance of the aff is irrelevant if the form in which it was read shouldn’t have existed in the first place.

Ossewaarde 10. Marinus Ossewaarde, Associate Professor in Sociology at the University of Twente, “*The Tragic Turn in The Re-Imagination of Publics: Resentment and Ressentiment*,” Animus 14, 2010

For Nietzsche, the Heraclitean vision sees the truth about reality while tragedy subsequently transforms this unbearable absurdity of life into an aesthetic public, without masking the horror itself. The Socratic dialectic and its Apollonian publics intellectually involve people who are incited to search for the good in the realm of ideas, in spite of the phenomenological flux and absurdity of things. Dionysian publics do not try to check the becoming of reality, but instead, incite the participants to live it as art, by making them become part of the story itself. In Socratic dialogues, disputing friends critically question all established orders in their search for the rational or good order. Both the Dionysian and the Apollonian publics can disturb an established order and institutions. The urge to control drives bureaucracies, which, in order to effectively fix one type of reality, have to destroy all forms of publics that have the potential to upset order. In modern societies, bureaucracies impose an enlightenment model of rational order devoid of mythical content and uncertain self-knowledge, upon a reality that is thereby made fully intelligible, controllable and correctible. Nietzsche considers the European enlightenment as the modern successor to the Socratic myth-annihilation, which characterizes the Apollonian publics.8 The enlightenment movement’s confidence in the capacity of reason and its belief in the rational order of reality are Socratic in origin. However, Nietzsche suggests that the enlightenment goes steps further than Socrates in its annihilation of myth. Although Socrates ridicules and destroys the legendary tales of the tragedians, his dialogues are premised upon the myth of the Delphic oracle (which revealed that there was no one wiser than Socrates). And, although Socrates maintains that reason rather than myth is the foundation of European culture, reason, the nous, is itself a mythical entity (Nietzsche 2000: 72): the ‘voice of reason’ is the ‘divine voice’ of Socrates’ daimonion, which makes itself be heard in the dialogues (Nietzsche 2000: 75). In the Dialectic of Enlightenment, Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno, inspired by Nietzsche (c.f., Wellmer 1991: 3), maintain that the enlightenment movement postulates a vision of reason that is devoid of mythical content. Enlightenment reason, in its origin, seeks to make people think for themselves and to liberate them from their fears and superstitions, but, in the modernization process, it becomes an instrument that serves bureaucratic objectives, such as enforcing laws effectively, fixing a machine, or making a business run more efficiently.9 Horkheimer and Adorno (2007: 57) emphasize that Nietzsche, like Hegel before him, had grasped this pathology of enlightenment reason that turns into a bureaucratic instrument. The reduction of the Socratic nous to an instrumental reason has far-reached political and cultural implications. Enlightenment reason provides the static concepts, mummified categories, classifications and catalogues that are required to construct bureaucratic limits and boundaries, which in turn rationally order reality (Honneth 2007: 70). Dialogical or democratic practices have no place in such a technical organization of reality. Bureaucracies, whose function is to implement the enlightenment or any other theoretical model of reality, have no need for the Socratic publics and consider dialogues and the need for intellectual justification rather troublesome and disorderly (Gouldner 1973: 76; Gardiner 2004: 35). The (potential) participants of Socratic dialogues are turned into bureaucratic subjects, like workers, consumers and clients, that is, into ‘spectators without influence’, whose lives are governed by the enlightened power elites and civil servants (Honneth 2007: 33). The identity of bureaucratic subjects is determined by typically large and powerful organizations, such as government agencies and enterprises (Mills 1956: 355). The Enlightenment movement is, in Nietzsche’s words (2000: 85), ‘the most illustrious opponent of the tragic world-view.’ Horkheimer and Adorno stress that the enlightenment movement, or perhaps more exactly, some kind of process deriving from it, eventually comes to substitute the plebeian entertainment of mass culture industries for the tragic art of the aesthetic publics. According to Nietzsche, bureaucratic subjects who live in a disenchanted world in which myths are annihilated by Apollonian reason cannot bear the horrific and absurd truth about their own existence.10 The subjects of the culture industries no longer have the opportunity to participate in enchanting tragic myths that cultivate powerful passions and the Dionysian will to live, which characterize Nietzsche’s ‘good European’. The entertainment provided by manufactured images and commodity forms, like music productions, films, television programmes and glossy magazines, ensures that the absurdity of life and the Dionysian abyss are forgotten (Horkheimer and Adorno 2007: 159).11 Being thoroughly rationalized, such subjects cannot develop the mythical imagination or a certain sensitivity that would have allowed them to ‘live the tragedy’ in and through the aesthetic publics. In a bureaucratic culture, subjects cannot experience, feel or live the tragic fate of the Dionysian hero, because, as Nietzsche (2000: 45) insists, shielded by bureaucracies, they are not ‘equipped for the most delicate and intense suffering.’ Bureaucracies expect and demand passive obedience from their subjects, which makes cultural movement nearly impossible. Such passive spectators or so-called ‘consumers of art’ (Shrum 1991: 349; 371), are, Horkheimer and Adorno (2007: 155; 166) point out, deluded en masse, governed to take refuge in comfortable, boring and mindless bureaucratic forms of entertainment. Culture industries provide ready-made experiences to a passive public that is willing to buy them to fill the emptiness of a disenchanted world and appease the cowardly fear of living in the flux, which they explicitly experience in temporary relationships and the continuous flow of new products and changed consumption patterns. The experience of the flux can also be more implicit or unconscious, resulting in a sort of malaise, feeling of insecurity or restlessness. However, the escape from life into a manufactured dream-world of cultural productions does not really quench the thirst, as the Socratic dialogue and the Dionysian festival do, which, therefore, allows the culture industry to carry on with its provision of manufactured dream-worlds, to fill an emptiness that never decreases.

##### Off ASPEC – A. We’ve Impact turned the intentions of governing bodies as sustaining the crumbling system of ir. B. Alt isn’t inaction – disengaging with policy reform is key to finding “life in death” C. Is/Ought fallacy – just because governments do use util doesn’t mean they should

### Case

#### The entire argument of this article is that we don’t know what will happen with a recession – also highlights alt causes

1AC Joske 18 Stephen Joske 10-23-2018 “China’s Coming Financial Crisis And The National Security Connection” <https://warontherocks.com/2018/10/chinas-coming-financial-crisis-and-the-national-security-connection/> (senior adviser to the Australian Treasurer during the 1997–98 Asian crisis)//re-cut by Elmer

The biggest national security issues, however, arise from the unpredictable political impact of a recession in China. We learned this, or should have, during the 1997 to 1998 Asian crisis. China may have had a disguised recession or near recession in 1998, but it was in a much smaller economy. Apart from that one episode there is no collective memory of recession and how to deal with it. As such, China is now psychologically unprepared to deal with the challenges of a recession. China’s coming recession will be accompanied by a large uncontrolled devaluation of the RMB as foreign exchange reserves evaporate, so it will be impossible to conceal this time. All asset prices, including housing prices, will be hit. Combine the shock of an unexpected economic setback with tensions in a one party state where a single individual has been calling the shots, and political instability could set in. While Xi’s anti-corruption campaign has not eliminated corruption, it has created many enemies who are biding their time. Minxin Pei has documented the activities of China’s powerful corruption networks. These networks, not a debilitated civil society, represent the alternative government of China. Competition between them could easily be destabilizing in a winner-take-all political environment. While our understanding of elite politics in China is poor, a recession would likely discredit the existing leadership and set off intense competition between corrupt factions for control of China. Bo Xilai, a former Chongqing party chief and Politburo member, was purged in 2012 but his son appears to still be interested in politics. While the outcome is impossible to predict, we can see the conditions in place for destabilizing events ranging from military adventurism to civil war. Alternatively, the regime could reassert its stability through increased repression, which would make China harder to deal with and would spill over into the Chinese diaspora. China’s Belt and Road Initiative has never had a real economic base. It is all about power projection (such as the Gwadar port) and would quickly be dropped by Beijing as a post-crisis China becomes focused on domestic political and economic stability. Any Chinese military adventurism is likely to be focused on Taiwan. China’s military is currently poorly equipped for an invasion of Taiwan, which has difficult geography and a substantial military, making an invasion of Taiwan unlikely to succeed. However, it is possible the Chinese leadership would miscalculate the risks, leaving it in a limited war with no clear resolution that would quickly draw in Japan and the United States. China has spent most of its history disunited, reflecting its geography. It has a number of widely dispersed economic centers. It was in outright civil war as recently as the 1960s. If competition between political factions remains unresolved, a civil war could develop, leaving China as a battleground where Russia, Japan, and the United States seek to influence the outcome. This scenario would stall or even end China’s rise as a global military and political power.

#### D - Chinese economy’s resilient

Reuters, 9/17/15- global news agency (Reuters, 9/17/15, “China's Xi says economy resilient, has huge potential - state radio,” <https://uk.news.yahoo.com/chinas-xi-says-economy-resilient-huge-potential-state-110701900--business.html#HCTFG6T>)

BEIJING (Reuters) - China's economy is resilient and has the capacity to maintain a long-term medium-to-high growth rate, state media reported President Xi Jinping telling U.S. business leaders and former officials. Xi said slowing growth was the result of the country shifting to a different mode of development, adjusting its economic structure and digesting earlier stimulus moves, according to the official Xinhua news agency and state broadcasters. Speaking to the business leaders in advance of his trip to the United States next week, Xi acknowledged that the economic slowdown has raised international concern. The economy has huge potential and room for manoeuvre, Xi was reported to have said. China's economy is on track to post its slowest growth in 25 years and a big crash in the stock market has added to uncertainty.

#### Slow Chinese growth doesn’t cause war

Levi et al 16 [Council on Foreign Relations’ Maurice R. Greenberg Center for Geoeconomic Studies and Asia Studies program workshop on the potential economic and geopolitical fallout of China’s slowing growth, led by Michael Levi, Director of the Maurice R. Greenberg Center for Geoeconomic Studies, PhD war studies, and Elizabeth Economy, C.V. Starr senior fellow and director for Asia studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, published widely on both Chinese domestic and foreign policy, PhD, “Insights from a CFR Workshop: Economic and Geopolitical Fallout From China’s Slowing Growth”, 2/25/16, http://www.cfr.org/china/economic-geopolitical-fallout-chinas-slowing-growth/p37554]//DBI

...But Beijing Is Unlikely to Wage War if the Economy Crashes∂ By the same token, analysts should probably discard the notion that a crash of the domestic economy would provoke a Chinese military adventure abroad in order to distract Chinese people from upheaval at home. This “wag the dog” scenario may gain currency with screenplay writers and conspiracy buffs, but it is not borne out by history. Although it is true that strife-torn countries often get embroiled in external wars, it is rarely because their leaders set out to generate a diversionary activity for their restive populace.∂ Indeed, most workshop participants argued that if China were beset by an acute internal crisis, the Communist Party would almost certainly refocus its energy and resources inward. The leadership and its security apparatus, including components of the military, would have their hands full protecting against social instability, tamping down the activities of Uighur and Tibetan separatists, and maintaining the cohesiveness of the party itself. To launch a foreign war in an atmosphere of domestic public grievance would be particularly dangerous for Beijing. If China sustained a defeat at the hands of the Japanese or U.S. navy, the leadership would compound its reputation for economic mismanagement with one for military ineptitude—a potentially lethal cocktail for the ruling party.

#### No collapse – interdependence checks

Jing 16 – (Liang Jing, reporter for Radio Free Asia, translated by David Kelly, 3/24/16, “Why China’s Economy Can’t Collapse,” <https://www.chinafile.com/viewpoint/why-chinas-economy-cant-collapse>, Accessed 7/30/16, HWilson)

China’s economic outlook once again became the focus of attention for many last week. For one thing, the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) listed the possibility of a hard landing for China’s economy as the topmost of the world’s top 10 risks. There was, nevertheless, no apparent reaction in U.S. or China stock markets, whose prices rose as expected, in stark contrast to their reaction to bad news from the Chinese economy earlier this year. In other words, while investors’ outlooks for the Chinese economy are not optimistic, they are not so pessimistic—at least not as panicky as it was some time ago. Does this mean the EIU’s warning about a possible hard landing of China’s economy was a bit exaggerated? Not having seen their research report, I don’t know how they defined “hard landing.” Going, however, by official Chinese understanding of economic hard landings in the past—when the economic growth rate is far below 8 percent or the adjusted figure of 6 percent—it has already occurred or is occurring. Virtually no experts, Chinese or foreign, now really believe the official economic growth rate figures. But few care publicly to pierce the veil. On the one hand, they want to save face for the officials; on the other, no one, not even the officials themselves, can give a clear idea of what China’s GDP actually is. This being the case, the substantive issue people really care about is whether the economy will totally collapse, entailing comprehensive social unrest and political crisis. At present, the mainstream judges that it will not. Does this judgment have solid grounds? I think so, although my grounds and those stated by Chinese officials are not the same. The officials claim the main reason is that the government not only has the ability to control the growth of debt, but can do so and reform as well, maintaining relatively rapid growth. But many processes now in train indicate the economic situation is still deteriorating; China’s economic policymakers have yet to find a way out of the woods. The recent vicious hike of housing prices in first-tier cities, and mass protests by coal mine workers in Heilongjiang, are proof. In fact, what best displayed the grimness of the economic situation was when Xi Jinping, receiving criticism from all sides, was forced to make major adjustments. Were he as optimistic about the economy as his officials claim to be, one can readily imagine that he would not likely have made such a switch. So, why can China’s economy not easily deteriorate to the point of fully collapsing? I think the most fundamental reason is that times have changed; the interdependence of human beings, especially between great powers, has developed to an unprecedented degree; and, from their own and global interests, the U.S.-led developed countries not only don’t want China to collapse economically, but have considerable ability to coordinate economic policy-making with China. Wen Jiabao’s 4 trillion stimulus policy decision of 2008 has been criticized. But Wen had no regrets: he had U.S. support for a decision that may in fact have saved the U.S. economy—that is to say, saved capitalism