## 1

#### Interpretation: Debaters must specify how they enforce the unconditional right of workers to strike.

#### Violation: you didn’t – no solvency under plan text proves

#### 1] Topic lit – enforcement is the core question of the topic and there's no consensus on normal means so you must spec- also proves this specific interp isn’t infinitely regressive bc it is grounded in topic lit (Weiss)

{Marley S. Weiss [Professor of Law, University of Maryland School of Law], 2000, “The Right To Strike In Essential Services Under United States Labor Law”, https://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2189&context=fac\_pubs}

2. Strikes, Lockouts, and Other Lawful Primary Weapons under the NLRA The parties, both labor and management, are under a duty to bargain in good faith with each other, “but such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession”. The essential idea here is that both sides must genuinely try to reach mutual agreement. However, this simple concept is extremely difficult to enforce, and employers too often resort to bad faith bargaining, bargaining on the surface with no real intention of concluding an agreement, as part of a strategy to eliminate union representation from the workplace. In addition, the duty to bargain is limited to matters falling within the Section 8(d) statutory phrase, “wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment”, and the right to strike is similarly limited to issues falling within the scope of mandatory bargaining as defined by that phrase. Although the phrase has been broadly construed in many respects, as to certain issues, the contrary has been the case. Capital redeployment, that is, relocation of operations, disinvestment in unionized plants, subcontracting, and plant closure decisions, provide employers with a potent set of weapons against unions. While bargaining over the effects of such decisions is plainly mandatory, the extent to which bargaining is required over the decisions themselves have been hotly contested.

#### This acts as a resolvability standard. Debate has to make sense and be comparable for the judge to make a decision which means it's an independent voter and outweighs.

#### 2] Stable advocacy – 1AR clarification delinks neg positions that prove why enforcement in a certain instance is bad by saying it isn't their method of enforcement – wrecks neg ballot access and kills in depth clash – CX doesn't check since it kills 1NC construction pre-round since I don't know advocacy till in round, and judges do not flow cross ex so its not verifiable.

#### 3] Prep skew – I don't know what they will be willing to clarify until CX which means I could go 6 minutes planning to read a disad and then get screwed over in CX when they spec something else.

#### Fairness is a voter because

#### a) gateway issue- the judge needs to evaluate the better debater

#### b) controls internal link to other voters

#### Drop the debater to deter future abuse, dta is incoherent

#### No RVIs

#### 1) its illogical you don’t win by proving that you’re fair – logic is a litmus test for args

#### 2) encourages theory baiting where good theory debaters bait the RVI to win

#### 3) creates a chilling effect – aff is uniquely dangerous on theory because they get to read a long counterinterp in the 1ar and then get the 2ar collapse: negs would always be disincentives from reading theory which leads to infinite abuse

#### Use competing interps it creates a race to the top where we set the best norms

## 2

#### International Relations is the royal science of empire – the aff engineers “sustainable warfare” through a mutating geopolitics of violence.

Grove ‘19

[Jarius, PoliSci at the University of Hawai’i. 2019. “Savage Ecology: War and Geopolitics in the Anthropocene.”] pat – ask me for the PDF!

Because I wanted this book to inspire curiosity beyond the boundaries of international relations (ir), I considered ignoring the field altogether, removing all mentions of ir or ir theory. However, upon closer reflection, I have decided to keep these references as I think they are relevant for those outside the discipline and for those who, like myself, often feel alienated within its disciplinary boundaries. In the former case, it is important to know that, unlike some more humble fields, ir has always held itself to be a kind of royal science. Scholarship in ir, particularly in the United States, is half research, and half biding time until you have the prince’s ear. The hallowed names in the mainstream of the field are still known because they somehow changed the behavior of their intended clients—those being states, militaries, and international organizations. Therefore, some attention to ir is necessary because it has an all-too-casual relationship with institutional power that directly impacts the lives of real people, and ir is all too often lethal theory. As an American discipline, the political economy of the field is impossible without Department of Defense money, and its semiotic economy would be equally dwarfed without contributory figures like Woodrow Wilson, Henry Kissinger, and Samuel Huntington. The ubiquity of Huntington’s “clash of civilizations” thesis and Kissinger’s particular brand of realpolitik are undeniable throughout the field, as well as the world. Each, in their own way, has saturated the watchwords and nomenclature of geopolitics from an American perspective so thoroughly that both political parties in the United States fight over who gets to claim the heritage of each. Although many other fields such as anthropology and even comparative literature have found themselves in the gravitational pull of geopolitics, international relations is meant to be scholarship as statecraft by other means. That is, ir was meant to improve the global order and ensure the place of its guarantor, the United States of America. Having spent the better part of a decade listening to national security analysts and diplomats from the United States, South Korea, Japan, Europe, China, Brazil, and Russia, as well as military strategists around the planet, I found their vocabulary and worldview strikingly homogeneous.

If this seems too general a claim, one should take a peek at John Mearsheimer’s essay “Benign Hegemony,” which defends the Americanness of the ir field. What is most telling in this essay is not a defense of the U.S. as a benign hegemonic power, which Mearsheimer has done at length elsewhere. Rather, it is his vigorous defense that as a field, ir theory has done well by the world in setting the intellectual agenda for global challenges, and for creating useful theoretical approaches to addressing those problems. For Mearsheimer, the proof that American scholarly hegemony has been benign is that there is nothing important that has been left out. A quick scan of the last ten or twenty International Studies Association conferences would suggest otherwise.

That issues like rape as a weapon of war, postcolonial violence, global racism, and climate change are not squarely in the main of ir demonstrates just how benign American scholarly hegemony is not. As one prominent anthropologist said to me at dinner after touring the isa conference in 2014, “it was surreal, like a tour through the Cold War. People were giving papers and arguing as if nothing had ever changed.” These same provincial scholars aspire and succeed at filling the advisory roles of each successive American presidency. One cannot help but see a connection between the history of the ir field, and the catastrophes of U.S. foreign policy during the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. One could repeat the words of the anthropologist I mentioned to describe the 2016 presidential campaign debates over the future of U.S. foreign policy: it is as if “nothing had ever changed.” And yet these old white men still strut around the halls of America’s “best” institutions as if they saved us from the Cold War, even as the planet crumbles under the weight of their failed imperial dreams.

If international relations was meant to be the science of making the world something other than what it would be if we were all left to our own worst devices, then it has failed monumentally. The United States is once again in fierce nuclear competition with Russia. We are no closer to any significant action on climate change. We have not met any of the Millennium Development Goals determined by the United Nations on eradicating poverty. War and security are the most significant financial, creative, social, cultural, technological, and political investments of almost every nation-state on Earth. The general intellect is a martial intellect.

Despite all this failure, pessimism does not exist in international relations, at least not on paper. The seething doom of our current predicament thrives at the conference bar and in hushed office conversations but not in our research. In public, the darkness disavowed possesses and inflames the petty cynicisms and hatreds that are often turned outward at tired and predictable scapegoats.

After the fury of three decades of critique, most ir scholars still camp out either on the hill of liberal internationalism or in the dark woods of political realism. Neither offers much that is new by way of answers or even explanations, and each dominant school has failed to account for our current apocalyptic condition. One is left wondering what it is exactly that they think they do. Despite the seeming opposition between the two, one idealistic about the future of international order (liberals) and the other self-satisfied with the tragedy of cycles of war and dominance (realists), both positions are optimists of the positivist variety.

For both warring parties, ir optimism is expressed through a romantic empiricism. For all those who toil away looking for the next theory of international politics, order is out there somewhere, and dutifully recording reality will find it—or at least bring us closer to its discovery. For liberal internationalism, this will bring the long-heralded maturity of Immanuel Kant’s perpetual peace. For second-order sociopaths known as offensive realists, crumbs of “useful strategic insight” and the endless details that amplify their epistemophilia for force projection and violence capability represent a potential “advantage,” that is, the possibility to move one step forward on the global political board game of snakes and ladders. Still, the cynicism of ir always creeps back in because the world never quite lives up to the empirical findings it is commanded to obey. Disappointment here is not without reason, but we cynically continue to make the same policy recommendations, catastrophe after catastrophe.

I have an idea about where ir’s recent malaise comes from. I think it is a moment, just before the awareness of the Anthropocene, after the Cold War and before September 11, when the end of everything was only a hypothetical problem for those of a certain coddled and privileged modern form of life. The catastrophe of the human predicament was that there was no catastrophe, no reason, no generation-defining challenge or war. Now the fate of this form of life is actually imperiled, and it is too much to bear. The weird denial of sexism, racism, climate change, the sixth extinction, and loose nukes, all by a field of scholars tasked with studying geopolitics, is more than irrationalism or ignorance. This animosity toward reality is a deep and corrosive nihilism, a denial of the world. Thus ir as a strategic field is demonstrative of a civilization with nothing left to do, nothing left to destroy. All that is left is to make meaning out of being incapable of undoing the world that Euro-American geopolitics created. Emo geopolitics is not pretty, but it is real. The letdown, the failure, the apocalypse-that-was-not finally arrived, and we are too late.

Still, the United States of America continues to follow the advice of “the best and the brightest,” testing the imperial waters, not quite ready to commit out loud to empire but completely unwilling to abandon it. Stuck in between, contemporary geopolitics—as curated by the United States—is in a permanent beta phase. Neuro-torture, algorithmic warfare, drone strikes, and cybernetic nation-building are not means or ends but rather are tests. Can a polis be engineered? Can the human operating system be reformatted? Can violence be modulated until legally invisible while all the more lethal? Each incursion, each new actor or actant, and new terrains from brains to transatlantic cables—all find themselves part of a grand experiment to see if a benign or at least sustainable empire is possible. There is no seeming regard for the fact that each experiment directly competes with Thomas Jefferson’s democratic experiment. One wonders if freedom can even exist anywhere other than temporarily on the fringe of some neglected order. Is this some metaphysical condition of freedom, or is the world so supersaturated with martial orders that the ragged edges between imperial orders are all that we have left? It feels like freedom’s remains persist only in the ruins of everything else. No space is left that can be truly indifferent to the law, security, or economy. Such is the new life of a human in debt. The social contract has been refinanced as what is owed and nothing more: politics without equity. Inequity without equality.

What about the impending collapse of the post–World War II order, the self-destruction of the United States, the rise of China and a new world order? If humanity lasts long enough for China to put its stamp on the human apocalypse, I will write a new introduction. Until then, we live in the death rattle of Pax Americana. While I think the totality of this claim is true, I do not want to rule out that many of us throughout the world still make lives otherwise. Many of us even thrive in spite of it all. And yet, no form of life can be made that escapes the fact that everything can come to a sudden and arbitrary end thanks to the whim of an American drone operator, nuclear catastrophe, or macroeconomic manipulation like sanctions. There are other ways to die and other organized forms of killing outside the control of the United States; however, no other single apparatus can make everyone or anyone die irrespective of citizenship or geographic location. For me, this is the most inescapable philosophical provocation of our moment in time.

The haphazard and seemingly limitless nature of U.S. violence means that even the core principles of the great political realist concepts like order and national interest are being displaced by subterranean violence entrepreneurs that populate transversal battlefields, security corridors, and border zones. Mercenaries, drug lords, chief executive officers, presidents, and sports commissioners are more alike than ever. Doomsayers like Paul Virilio, Lewis Mumford, and Martin Heidegger foretold a kind of terminal and self-annihilating velocity for geopolitics’ technological saturation, but even their lack of imagination appears optimistic. American geopolitics does not know totality or finality; it bleeds, mutates, and reforms. Furthermore, the peril of biopolitics seems now almost romantic. To make life live? Perchance to dream. The care and concern for life’s productivity is increasingly subsumed by plasticity—forming and reforming without regard to the telos of productivity, division, or normative order.

There are, of course, still orders in our geoplastic age, but they are almost unrecognizable as such. When so many citizens and states are directly invested in sabotaging publicly stated strategic ends, then concepts like national interest seem equally quaint. We are witnessing creative and horrifying experiments in the affirmative production of dying, which also deprive those targeted and in some cases whole populations from the relief of death. To follow Rucker, I want to try to see the world for what it is. We can only say that tragedy is no longer a genre of geopolitics. Tragedy redeems. The occluded character of contemporary geopolitics shoehorned into experience produces the feeling that there is no relief, no reason, no victory, no defeats, and no exit within the confines of national security’s constricted world. This is not tragedy: it is horror. We live in an age of horror that, like the victims of gore movies who never quite die so that they can be tortured more, furthers our practice of collective violence and goes on for decades as a kind of sustainable warfare.

#### Scenario planning colonizes decision-making – who’s future are they planning?

Ossewaarde ‘17

[Marinus, Public Administration at University of Twente. “Unmasking scenario planning: The colonization of the future in the ‘Local Governments of the Future’ program,” <http://dx.doi.org/doi:10.1016/j.futures.2017.07.003>] pat

Scenario planning is meant to be a dialectical quest for open futures, whereby alternative worlds are envisioned and judgement as to the most desirable world is suspended. Such a dialogical process, associated with democratic politics of world making, typically implies the critique, negation and transcendence of the established power constellation, which is by its very nature conservative. Hence, power holders are tempted to believe that their rule is indefinite and that history has ended – since all activities are directed towards the maintenance of the current order. Conversely, action, which ‘has an inherent tendency to force open all limitations and cut across all boundaries’ is discouraged (Arendt 1958: 190). Hannah Arendt therefore went so far as claiming that ‘action, seen from the viewpoint of the automatic processes which seem to determine the course of the world, looks like a miracle’ (Arendt 1958: 246). Established power elites may have an interest in scenario planning, but the future with which they are fascinated is the prolongation of their current worlds. In other words, scenario planning is used for colonizing the future. In a colonized ‘scenario planning’, predominant or currently powerful stakeholders do not search for alternative futures, but, instead, enact their own ideological discourses, imaginaries and frames. The current power constellation is left unquestioned, and taken for granted in the scenario planning, as if established power factions will perdure in the future. The negation of well-established biases and prejudices is held in check, in order to safeguard the status quo. Such conservativism is legitimized by referring to current trends that are endowed with the aura of necessity or inevitability (natural and eternal laws). A colonized ‘scenario planning’ therefore masks unequal and often illegitimate power relationships.

Historically, it appears that scenario planning has more often than not been a tool for colonization, designed to secure the future rule of the established power complex. In the 1940s, Herman Kahn and the RAND Corporation developed scenario planning to enable US military rulers to forecast the moves of potential opponents and to accordingly develop counteroffensives in the nuclear arms race (Tevis 2010). In the 1970s, Pierre Wack and Royal Dutch/Shell established scenario planning activities as an integral part of strategic management, to secure oil interests in the context of ecological crisis and the oil crisis (Wack 1985; Chermack and Coons 2015). The stimulus for scenario planning in these cases was the perceived rise of uncertainties in a world that had become more unpredictable and potentially apocalyptic. Horror scenarios of nuclear wars and a Third World War had become commonplace in the 1950s. Stories of ecological catastrophe, with a vision of large tracts of the earth rendered uninhabitable, the collapse of global food production, the acidification of the oceans, sea-level rise and storms, and droughts of growing intensity, became common since the publication of the Club of Rome report in 1972 (Wright et al 2013). In the hands of ruling military, governmental and corporate powers, ‘scenario planning’ became a method for ensuring strategic victory in a context of uncertainties and complexities. Since such scenario planning aimed at predictability, ambiguities were undesirable factors that were better eliminated, both in theory and practice (Amer, Daim and Jetter 2013). Computer simulations, game theoretic tools, forecasting methods, trend research, horizon scanning, and visual imageries filtered out all that which could not be mapped (O’Brien 2016).

Pierre Wack, who introduced scenario planning at Royal Dutch/Shell, emphasizes that the future is only half closed. He made a plea for the incorporation of both literary and technical methods in scenario planning, to facilitate both the imagination and calculation of probable futures (Chermack and Coons 2015). According to Wack, the future is partly determined by trends that cannot but persist (Van‘t Klooster and Van Asselt 2006). Population growth and ageing are examples of such trends; and the corresponding implications for food demand, transport, housing, and other kinds of infrastructure clearly have to be reckoned with in any scenario planning. At the same time, for Wack, the future cannot be fully outlined based on these data and graphics. The partial openness of the future lies in the unpredictability of future generations’ actions in reaction to these trends. Robotic warfare is one possible future; large-scale euthanasia is another. But it is also imaginable that ecological disasters may wipe off entire populations. These futures are imaginable and yet not simply fictive because the ‘material’ for their ‘creation’ is already available here and now. For instance, it is highly probable that white Americans will no longer be the majority population in the United States by 2050, but the question as to how white Americans will cope with living as a minority in the US invites different answers (Martín Alcoff 2015: 24; 26).

Colonization aims at ruling out openness, with the aim of shaping a future (preferably one that seems to be the product of predetermined trends that cannot be altered by human decisions) in which the current status quo is preserved. O’Brien (2016) explains that Royal Dutch/Shell’s interest in scenario planning is motivated by its will to shape a future in which remains a dominant key actor that moulds the world in its own interest: its scenario planning practices and its wish to maintain its hegemony are interconnected. ‘Shell’s scenario plans,’ O’Brien (2016: 334) notes, ‘are credited with the company’s success in outwitting the thugs, and thereby contributing to the larger project of securing Western interests amidst the turmoil of globalization.’ Such a hegemonic project has its prices in terms of human rights abuses, oil pollution and corporate crimes (Holzer 2007; Hennchen 2015). The organized fossil fuel industry is powerful enough to protect its vested interests and to promote a strategy of inaction (no reduction of fossil-fuel emissions), so that nothing really changes. Michael Mann, a leading climate scientist, explains that to safeguard the current status quo, the fossil-fuel industry, including Royal Dutch/Shell, funds a ‘climate change denial campaign’ to discredit climate science – which advocates radical change now – and prevent dialogues. In this campaign, a significant part of the established power elites, including the Koch Brothers, and influential politicians like John McCain and Joe Lieberman, makes a mockery of climatology, and of particular scientists (Wright and Mann 2013). The pertinent question that ought to be raised, O’Brien (2016: 341) therefore concludes is: ‘whose future is being planned, by whom, for whom and to what ultimate end?’ When scenario planning is a tool for colonization, the future is planned by and for the established power constellation, even if ‘larger’ entities such as national, European or Western interests are invoked. Such scenario planning is legitimized by discrediting ‘doom scenarios’, through discourses on the liberating potential of technology (which should be able to solve the problems that it creates) and (correspondingly) on the inevitable course of history.

#### Hegemony never failing, strangely enough, makes its failure inevitable.

“Pathology of power” – cool Nietzsche thing.

* Systems learn from failure, but power prevents failure from being pointed out
  + Gulf War 1 sucked, but we pretended it didn’t, so Gulf War 2 also sucked – “institutions become stupid”
* Hegemony is self-defeating because it precludes the impact of failures on the system – makes it unsustainable because failures never impact strategy
  + Changing now because apocalypse is coming home – “crisis of meaning” – why do we even want hegemony anymore? What does our world order look like?
  + Also probably bad for the global south along the way lol

Grove ‘20

[Jarius, polisci at University of Hawai’i. 12/03/2020. Seminar hosted/sponsored by the University of Michigan Debate Team. “Dr. Jarius Grove on CJR, Debate and ‘Savage Ecology,’” <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=I-Gcwj_rg_0>] pat – transcription is from ~21:40-29:00, removed “uhs” and other verbal tics.

And in part, this is from a theory which I borrowed from an old social scientist – and I’m probably gonna skip ahead a little bit and take some questions – but this guy named Carl Deutsch developed this theory, “the pathology of power,” which is sort of throughout the book. I think this is a really interesting theory. It’s a reason why it puts, sort of, Nietzsche to the policy table, which is that, unfortunately, strength prevents learning. So, in cybernetics, we tend to think that learning comes from failure and the ability to remember or incorporate failure. The problem with the Eurocene and the way geopolitics work is it amassed so much material power, so much capability was drawn through it’s chance encounter with technology that it was able to just basically eliminate dissent. It was able to eliminate those who rebelled or pointed failure out. And as a result, it made large institutions incredibly stupid.

When you can leverage power as a way not to learn – meaning, when you make mistakes, you destroy the capability to have the failure follow you home – your system doesn’t learn. And I think maybe one of the best examples of this is the difference between the first Gulf War and the second Gulf War. The first Gulf War is declared an immense success, we take all the data from it, Elliot Cohen takes that data and tries to build this big dataset out of it so we can define how airpower works. We use that dataset and say “Oh! We can go back into Iraq and have exactly the same success.” The reality is that the first Iraqi conflict was not a success. In fact, it strengthened Saddam Hussein’s hold, it limited the rebellions that were against him, it nearly wiped out the Kurds, and it left hundreds of thousands of Iraqis starving as a result of sanctions. But we didn’t learn that lesson, because none of those lessons came to American shores. And so, we had a level of confidence and hubris going into the second war which made us think that the Iraq war would end very quickly. And that time we didn’t quite have the overwhelming authority or overwhelming resolve to eliminate failure, as it were, and as a result we were starting to see already, even now, more than a decade after, the long-term consequences of those kinds of failure.

So that’s kind of a core theme or concept – I mean, that’s the link argument for debate – which is the pathology of power, the degree to which actually strengthening hegemony caused the state to corrode. It caused leadership in democratic institutions to corrode. Order and security reinforces stupidity. When you can’t learn from your mistakes because you try to pretend they don’t exist, or you destroy them, or you vaporize them you get very stupid. And so as a result we’ve ended up in a kind of slow-motion catastrophe where, while the people most privileged in institutions haven’t borne the brunt of the last 500 years of failure, they are starting to come home. Right? They’re starting to show up in the forms of things like climate change, in the inability to negotiate international order in a way that would be more just or humane, in the incapacity to move towards trying to address things like indigenous genocide or slavery. Those incapacities – which really aren’t technical problems, they’re first and foremost political problems – are reaching the state of apocalypse, catastrophe, precisely because of the inability to learn.

So I need to skip a couple of things… and get to the end. So, the end of the book, I say that’s because we’ve been so invested trying to make the world what we want rather than believing in this world, is how Gilles Deleuze put it. The thing that’s most important we can do is believe in this world. So, in the book, I say that it’s more important to think about how we should live than if we live, and that this, sort of, attempt to get out of a world where the future is what disciplines the present, and how to think about that as a crisis of meaning rather than a crisis of technology or politics. We have a crisis of meaning! We don’t know even why we want hegemony anymore. And you see that, I mean… I wouldn’t have thought it in debate a million years ago, but I spend as much or more time with generals and members of NATO and the joint forces in South Korea than I do with the people who read the kind of French philosophy that I like to do when there’s nothing else to do. But it’s still even a crisis of meaning for them; they’re not sure what NATO’s for anymore, they’re not sure what we wanna build hegemony for. We’re not even really sure what kind of wars we want anymore. And I think that speaks a lot to the fact that there’s not a clear vision of what kind of order we’d even want if we could have it.

So, the book kind of ends with this idea that extinction is inevitable – like, the sun will burn out, humans will evolve into something else – but nihilism isn’t. Nihilism is a problem we can actually do something about. We can think about how to make more meaningful lives and less cruel lives even if those lives are not going to go on forever. So, in old-school debate terms – I have no idea if these apply anymore at all – that’s as close to an alternative as the book presents, which is how to formulate craft, practice, habits, forms of life which are not dependent upon homogenization or liquidation of other forms of life. How to, basically, find some joy in this world rather than investing all of our efforts in transforming the world into something which now we’re not even sure we want anymore. And certainly through a process of transformation that looks like it may kill the species.

So, that’s where it ends. It’s sort of an affirmative note, but I wouldn’t say a particularly happy note. And it ends with a question: if that’s the ethical move to make the world less cruel, then we have to ask the question “What if this future isn’t ours?” Right? What if humanity isn’t the punchline to the cosmic joke? What if there’s something else? What comes next? And maybe we should rethink who gets to decide what comes next, rather than presuming that those who are already in power, that already maintain the geopolitical institutions which currently define the agenda for planetary politics, who’ve done a lot of harm… maybe they should take a step back. And I think that’s the thing that makes people the most uncomfortable. People are willing to think about being critical, people are willing to think about incorporating climate change into security, people are willing to think about even incorporating human security or indigenous rights into a security framework. What they’re often not willing to do is to give up the sovereignty to decide what is included and what isn’t. And for me, that’s the most important thing for us to do, in positions of incredible privilege and incredibly destructive power, to be willing to put faith in those people we’ve basically tormented for 500 years and see what other kind of planet could be made. And that’s a big gamble, but I think that’s kind of where we are as a species.

#### Voting negative adopts failed IR for a healthy dose of pessimism – at the end of the world, all we can do is hope to be buried alive together.

Grove ‘19

[Jarius, PoliSci at the University of Hawai’i. 2019. “Savage Ecology: War and Geopolitics in the Anthropocene.”] pat – ask me for the PDF!

Failed ir affirms the power of this kind of negative thinking as an alternative to the endless rehearsing of moralizing insights and strategic foresight. The negative is not “against” or reacting to something. Rather, it is the affirmation of a freedom beyond the limits of life and death. That is, it is making a life by continuing to think about the world, even if that thinking is not recuperative, and even if nothing we think can save us. In the face of it all, one celebrates useless thinking, useless scholarship, and useless forms of life at the very moment we are told to throw them all under the bus in the name of survival at all costs. This is a logic referred to lately as hope and it is as cruel as it is anxiety inducing. Hope is a form of extortion. We are told that it is our obligation to bear the weight of making things better while being chided that the failure of our efforts is the result of not believing in the possibility of real change. In such an environment, pessimism is often treated as a form of treason, as if only neoliberals and moral degenerates give up—or so goes the op-ed’s insisting upon the renewed possibility of redemption.

In response to these exhortations, pessimism offers a historical atheism, both methodologically and morally. The universe does not bend toward justice. Sometimes the universe bends toward the indifference of gravity wells and black holes. Affirming negativity, inspired by Achille Mbembe, is grounds for freedom, even if that freedom or relief is only fleeting and always insecure. I am not arrogant enough to think a book can attain freedom of this sort, but this book is inspired by refusals of critique as redemption in favor of useless critique and critique for its own sake.

That the pursuit of knowledge without immediate application is so thoroughly useless, even profane, is a diagnosis of our current moment. The neoliberal assault on the university is evidence of this condition, as is the current pitch of American politics. Our indifference as intellectuals to maximizing value has not gone unnoticed. We are still dangerous, worthy of vilification, of attack, sabotage, and derision because we fail so decadently. We are parasites according to Scott Walker, Donald Trump, and the rest. So be it. We are and shall remain irascible irritants to a worldwide assault on thinking that is well underway and facing few obstacles in other jurisdictions.

What would failed scholarship do? Learn to die, learn to live, learn to listen, learn to be together, and learn to be generous. These virtues are useless in that they do not prevent or manage things. They do not translate into learning objectives or metrics. Virtues of this order are selfsame, nontransferable experiences. They are meaningful but not useful. These are luxurious virtues. Like grieving or joy, they are ends unto themselves. But how will these ideas seek extramural grants, contribute to an outcomes-based education system, or become a policy recommendation? They will not, and that is part of their virtue.

Even if there is no straight line to where we are and where we ought to be, I think we should get over the idea that somehow the U.S. project of liberal empire is conflicted, or “more right than it is wrong,” or pragmatically preferable to the alternatives. I hope this book can contribute to the urgent necessity to get out of the way by reveling in the catastrophic failure that should inspire humility but instead seems to embolden too many to seek global control yet again. Demolition may be an affirmative act if it means insurgents and others can be better heard. And yet this may fail too. If we can accomplish nothing at all, we can at least, as Ta-Nehisi Coates and other pessimists have said, refuse to suborn the lie of America any longer. Telling the truth, even if it cannot change the outcome of history, is a certain kind of solace. In Coates’s words, there is a kind of rapture “when you can no longer be lied to, when you have rejected the dream.” Saying the truth out loud brings with it the relief that we are not crazy. Things really are as bad as we think.

If there are those of us who want to break from this one-hundred-year-old race to be the next Henry Kissinger, then why do we continue to seek respect in the form of recognizable standards of excellence? I am not sure where the answer finally lies, but I do know that professionalization will not save us. To appear as normal and recognizably rigorous will not be enough to stave off the neoliberal drive to monetize scholarship, or to demand of us strategically useful insights. The least we can do in the face of such a battle is to find comfort in meaningful ideas and the friendships they build rather than try to perform for those we know are the problem. Some will ask, who is this “we” or is that “they”—where is your evidence? More will know exactly what I am talking about.

The virtues I seek are oriented toward an academy of refuge, a place we can still live, no matter how dire the conditions of the university and the classroom. It is not the think tank, boardroom, or command center. We are, those of us who wish to be included, the last of the philosophers, the last of the lovers of knowledge, the deviants who should revel in what Harney and Moten have called the undercommons.

In one of his final lectures, Bataille speaks of the remnants of a different human species, something not quite so doomed, something that wasted its newly discovered consciousness and tool-being on the art that still marks the walls of prehistoric caves. This lingering minor or vestigial heritage is philosophy’s beginning. Philosophy survives war, atrocity, famine, and crusades. Thinking matters in a very unusual way. Thinking is not power or emancipation. Thinking matters for a sense of belonging to the world, and for believing in the fecundity of the world despite evidence to the contrary.

How do you get all this from pessimism, from failure? Because willing failure is a temptation, a lure to think otherwise, to think dangerous thoughts. Pessimism is a threat to indifferentism and nihilism in the sense of the phenomenon of Donald Trump. Pessimism is a provocation and an enemy of skepticism, particularly of the metaphysical variety. It is not redemption from these afflictions, but in pessimism there is solace in the real. To put it another way, to study the world as it is means to care for it.

The exhortation that our care or interest should be contingent on how useful the world is and how much of it conforms to our designs is as much opposed to care as it is to empiricism. We can study airports, poetry, endurance races, borders, bombs, plastic, and warfare, and find them all in the world. To consider the depth of their existence can be an invitation to the world rather than a prelude to another policy report. One cannot make a successful political career out of such pursuits, but you might be able to make a life out of it, a life worth repeating even if nothing else happens.

At the end of Jack Halberstam’s The Queer Art of Failure, we are presented with the Fantastic Mr. Fox’s toast as an exemple of something meaningful in these dark times of ours.

They say all foxes are slightly allergic to linoleum, but it’s cool to the paw—try it. They say my tail needs to be dry cleaned twice a month, but now it’s fully detachable—see? They say our tree may never grow back, but one day, something will. Yes, these crackles are made of synthetic goose and these giblets come from artificial squab and even these apples look fake—but at least they’ve got stars on them. I guess my point is, we’ll eat tonight, and we’ll eat together. And even in this not particularly flattering light, you are without a doubt the five and a half most wonderful wild animals I’ve ever met in my life. So let’s raise our boxes—to our survival.

Halberstam says of this queer moment:

Not quite a credo, something short of a toast, a little less than a speech, but Mr. Fox gives here one of the best and most moving—both emotionally and in stop-motion terms—addresses in the history of cinema. Unlike Coraline, where survival is predicated upon a rejection of the theatrical, the queer, and the improvised, and like Where the Wild Things Are, where the disappointment of deliverance must be leavened with the pragmatism of possibility, Fantastic Mr. Fox is a queerly animated classic in that it teaches us, as Finding Nemo, Chicken Run, and so many other revolting animations before it, to believe in detachable tails, fake apples, eating together, adapting to the lighting, risk, sissy sons, and the sheer importance of survival for all those wild souls that the farmers, the teachers, the preachers, and the politicians would like to bury alive.

Although not as much fun as Halberstam’s monument to low theory, Savage Ecology is for all the other wild animals out there studying global politics. May we be buried alive together.

#### The Role of the Judge is to adopt martial empiricism.

Bousquet et al ‘20

[Antoine Bousquet, University of London, Jairus Grove, University of Hawai‘i at Manoa, and Nisha Shah University of Ottawa. 2020. “Becoming war: Towards a martial empiricism,” <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0967010619895660>] pat

Haunting the formations and deformations of global life, war confronts us as an abyss in the face of which cherished interpretative frameworks perilously buckle and warp. Indeed, Tarak Barkawi and Shane Brighton (2011: 129) accurately identify a ‘conceptual black hole surrounding the notion of war’ that has insistently gnawed at the study of the phenomenon. Locating the source of this lacuna in the absence of an ‘ontology of war’, they propose to ground one in ‘fighting’ (Barkawi and Brighton, 2011: 136). Although we concur on the diagnosis, we take issue with the suggested remedy. War does not obey any neat philosophical division between epistemology and ontology. For us, the resolute elusiveness of any definitive understanding of war is inherent in that very object. Every attempt to conceptually shackle war is undone by the creative advance of its new modes, residences and intensities. This speaks against the value of ontology per se less than it calls for a strange, paradoxical and provisional ontology that is consonant with the confounding mutability of war. Such an ontology, suspended between infinity and totality, being and nothingness, the sheer fecundity and utter catastrophe of war, may not be too uncanny for its object. In fairness, Barkawi and Brighton (2011: 133) gesture towards this in acknowledging ‘war’s recalcitrance as an object of knowledge’ and allowing for war to unmake any truth. Yet they seem unwilling to embrace the full force of their own insight, which Marc von Boemcken (2016: 239) ultimately declares: ‘even the statement that “war is fighting” may well be eventually undone by war. In a very fundamental manner, war escapes human intelligibility.’

This special issue on ‘Becoming War’ grapples with war as obdurate mystery. In its recurring persistence yet constant reinvention, its paradoxical ordering of life for the generation of death, or its stubborn affront to the better world we all purport to want, war never ceases to perplex us. Our world is one shot through by war, manifest in the nation-states we inhabit, the ecologies of technics that bind us to one another, and the very thoughts ricocheting through our communities of sense. And yet we still do not know war.

Rather than endeavour yet again to ‘say something fundamental about what war is’ (Barkawi and Brighton, 2011: 134, emphasis in original), we choose to explore how war becomes. This is not to say that we deny any durability or regularities in the phenomenon of war over time. Simply that, as Alfred Whitehead (1978: 35) puts it, ‘there is a becoming of continuity, but no continuity of becoming’. Accordingly, we seek to trace the lines of becoming that congeal into what comes to count as war, even as it continually frays at the edges and insolently defies habituated frames of reference. We do not, therefore, offer a theory of continuity, a formula for what all lines of becoming war might have in common, but instead sketch a style of investigation that encompasses both the enduring cohesion and the radical dispersion of war. We call this endeavour ‘martial empiricism’ to renounce attempts to devise a definitive theory of war. Instead, we favour an open-ended conceptual arsenal for following the trail of war wherever it leads us, as opposed to camping in the places where we already expect to find it.

Although we do not aim to circumscribe the remit of its investigations, martial empiricism is nonetheless inherently situational, spurred by the impulse to grasp the present martial condition we inhabit in all its calamity and promise. We would be far from the first to point out the growing inadequacy of the conceptual frameworks of war inherited from the Westphalian historical interval. Yet we still collectively flounder in the face of a combined and uneven landscape of armed conflict populated by metastasizing war machines encompassing overseas contingency operations, fullspectrum hybrid theatres, ethno-supremacist militias, crowd-sourced paramilitaries, Incel shooters and narco-state assassins. The game is definitely up when a task force led by the former head of United States Central Command can write that ‘basic categories such as “battlefield,” “combatant” and “hostilities” no longer have clear or stable meaning’ (Abizaid and Brooks, 2014: 35). Confronted with this reality and the persistent bewilderment it induces, we contend that a certain epistemic humility is in order. Rather than professing to know where war begins and ends, martial empiricism starts in the middle, with only the barest tentative intuitions necessary to explore the logistics, operations and embodiments that engender armed conflict as an unremitting condition of global life.

## Case

#### Their demand for a uniform rationality inculcates a violent technocratic eradication of irrationality while only recapitulating a tragic ontology of ressentiment. The substance of the aff is irrelevant if the form in which it was read shouldn’t have existed in the first place.

Ossewaarde 10. Marinus Ossewaarde, Associate Professor in Sociology at the University of Twente, “*The Tragic Turn in The Re-Imagination of Publics: Resentment and Ressentiment*,” Animus 14, 2010

For Nietzsche, the Heraclitean vision sees the truth about reality while tragedy subsequently transforms this unbearable absurdity of life into an aesthetic public, without masking the horror itself. The Socratic dialectic and its Apollonian publics intellectually involve people who are incited to search for the good in the realm of ideas, in spite of the phenomenological flux and absurdity of things. Dionysian publics do not try to check the becoming of reality, but instead, incite the participants to live it as art, by making them become part of the story itself. In Socratic dialogues, disputing friends critically question all established orders in their search for the rational or good order. Both the Dionysian and the Apollonian publics can disturb an established order and institutions. The urge to control drives bureaucracies, which, in order to effectively fix one type of reality, have to destroy all forms of publics that have the potential to upset order. In modern societies, bureaucracies impose an enlightenment model of rational order devoid of mythical content and uncertain self-knowledge, upon a reality that is thereby made fully intelligible, controllable and correctible. Nietzsche considers the European enlightenment as the modern successor to the Socratic myth-annihilation, which characterizes the Apollonian publics.8 The enlightenment movement’s confidence in the capacity of reason and its belief in the rational order of reality are Socratic in origin. However, Nietzsche suggests that the enlightenment goes steps further than Socrates in its annihilation of myth. Although Socrates ridicules and destroys the legendary tales of the tragedians, his dialogues are premised upon the myth of the Delphic oracle (which revealed that there was no one wiser than Socrates). And, although Socrates maintains that reason rather than myth is the foundation of European culture, reason, the nous, is itself a mythical entity (Nietzsche 2000: 72): the ‘voice of reason’ is the ‘divine voice’ of Socrates’ daimonion, which makes itself be heard in the dialogues (Nietzsche 2000: 75). In the Dialectic of Enlightenment, Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno, inspired by Nietzsche (c.f., Wellmer 1991: 3), maintain that the enlightenment movement postulates a vision of reason that is devoid of mythical content. Enlightenment reason, in its origin, seeks to make people think for themselves and to liberate them from their fears and superstitions, but, in the modernization process, it becomes an instrument that serves bureaucratic objectives, such as enforcing laws effectively, fixing a machine, or making a business run more efficiently.9 Horkheimer and Adorno (2007: 57) emphasize that Nietzsche, like Hegel before him, had grasped this pathology of enlightenment reason that turns into a bureaucratic instrument. The reduction of the Socratic nous to an instrumental reason has far-reached political and cultural implications. Enlightenment reason provides the static concepts, mummified categories, classifications and catalogues that are required to construct bureaucratic limits and boundaries, which in turn rationally order reality (Honneth 2007: 70). Dialogical or democratic practices have no place in such a technical organization of reality. Bureaucracies, whose function is to implement the enlightenment or any other theoretical model of reality, have no need for the Socratic publics and consider dialogues and the need for intellectual justification rather troublesome and disorderly (Gouldner 1973: 76; Gardiner 2004: 35). The (potential) participants of Socratic dialogues are turned into bureaucratic subjects, like workers, consumers and clients, that is, into ‘spectators without influence’, whose lives are governed by the enlightened power elites and civil servants (Honneth 2007: 33). The identity of bureaucratic subjects is determined by typically large and powerful organizations, such as government agencies and enterprises (Mills 1956: 355). The Enlightenment movement is, in Nietzsche’s words (2000: 85), ‘the most illustrious opponent of the tragic world-view.’ Horkheimer and Adorno stress that the enlightenment movement, or perhaps more exactly, some kind of process deriving from it, eventually comes to substitute the plebeian entertainment of mass culture industries for the tragic art of the aesthetic publics. According to Nietzsche, bureaucratic subjects who live in a disenchanted world in which myths are annihilated by Apollonian reason cannot bear the horrific and absurd truth about their own existence.10 The subjects of the culture industries no longer have the opportunity to participate in enchanting tragic myths that cultivate powerful passions and the Dionysian will to live, which characterize Nietzsche’s ‘good European’. The entertainment provided by manufactured images and commodity forms, like music productions, films, television programmes and glossy magazines, ensures that the absurdity of life and the Dionysian abyss are forgotten (Horkheimer and Adorno 2007: 159).11 Being thoroughly rationalized, such subjects cannot develop the mythical imagination or a certain sensitivity that would have allowed them to ‘live the tragedy’ in and through the aesthetic publics. In a bureaucratic culture, subjects cannot experience, feel or live the tragic fate of the Dionysian hero, because, as Nietzsche (2000: 45) insists, shielded by bureaucracies, they are not ‘equipped for the most delicate and intense suffering.’ Bureaucracies expect and demand passive obedience from their subjects, which makes cultural movement nearly impossible. Such passive spectators or so-called ‘consumers of art’ (Shrum 1991: 349; 371), are, Horkheimer and Adorno (2007: 155; 166) point out, deluded en masse, governed to take refuge in comfortable, boring and mindless bureaucratic forms of entertainment. Culture industries provide ready-made experiences to a passive public that is willing to buy them to fill the emptiness of a disenchanted world and appease the cowardly fear of living in the flux, which they explicitly experience in temporary relationships and the continuous flow of new products and changed consumption patterns. The experience of the flux can also be more implicit or unconscious, resulting in a sort of malaise, feeling of insecurity or restlessness. However, the escape from life into a manufactured dream-world of cultural productions does not really quench the thirst, as the Socratic dialogue and the Dionysian festival do, which, therefore, allows the culture industry to carry on with its provision of manufactured dream-worlds, to fill an emptiness that never decreases.

#### Utilitarian calculus doesn’t account for the geopolitical structure of aggregate conceptions of the good – that makes it incapable of grappling with the causes of apocalypse.

Grove ‘19

[Jarius, PoliSci at the University of Hawai’i. 2019. “Savage Ecology: War and Geopolitics in the Anthropocene.”] pat – ask me for the PDF!

Rather than see these two career trajectories as opposed, I think Crutzen’s thinking displays a continuous concern for the Northern Hemisphere and a particular cartography, rather than a geography, of human survival. Crutzen, as well as the concept of the Anthropocene itself, cannot escape preceding geopolitical conceptions of the Earth. Crutzen and others who rush so quickly to the necessity to transition efforts from climate abatement to climate modification are unsurprisingly not moved by claims that artificial cooling will likely cause droughts and famines in the tropics and subtropical zones of the global south; nor are they moved by how such plans may accelerate ocean acidification. The utilitarian risk calculus that favors the greatest good for the greatest number has no geographical or historical sensibility of how unequally aggregate conceptions of the good are distributed around the planet.

Global thinking, even in its scientific and seemingly universalist claims to an atmosphere that “we” all share, belies the geopolitics that enlivens scientific concern, as well as the global public policy agenda of geoengineering that seeks to act on behalf of it. Saving humanity as an aggregate, whether from nuclear war, Styrofoam, or climate turbulence, has never meant an egalitarian distribution of survivors and sacrifices. Instead, our new cosmopolitanism—the global environment—follows almost exactly the drawn lines, that is, the cartography or racialized and selective solidarities and zones of indifference that characterize economic development, the selective application of combat, and, before that, the zones of settlement and colonization. More than a result of contemporary white supremacy or lingering white privilege, the territorialization of who lives and who dies, who matters and who must be left behind for the sake of humanity, represents a five-hundred-year geopolitical tradition of conquest, colonization, extraction, and the martial forms of life that made them all possible through war and through more subtle and languid forms of organized killing.

I am not suggesting that Crutzen and others are part of a vast conspiracy; rather, I want to outline how climate change, species loss, slavery, the elimination of native peoples, and the globalization of extractive capitalism are all part of the same global ordering. That is, all of these crises are geopolitical. The particular geopolitical arrangement of what others have called the longue durée, and what I am calling the Eurocene, is geologically significant but is not universally part of “human activity” despite the false syllogism at the heart of popular ecological thinking that a global threat to humanity must be shared in cause and crisis by all of humanity.

Departing from Sloterdijk, I am hesitant to so easily locate modernity or explication as the root or cause of the global catastrophe. No single strategy, war, act of colonization, technological breakthrough, or worldview fully explains the apocalypse before us. However, there is something like what Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari call a refrain that holds the vast assemblage together, a geopolitical melody hummed along with the global expansion of a form of life characterized by homogenization rather than diversification. Accordingly, if we are to make some sense of such a vast world that is, even for Crutzen and Birks, “quite complex and difficult to model,” I think we must consider the particular refrain of geopolitics that is capable of, by scientific as well as more humbly embodied standards, destroying worlds along with the world. To eschew geopolitics simply because, as a refrain, it is too big, too grand, or too universal would ignore the conditions of possibility for nuclear weapons, power politics, and carbon-based globalization, and would greatly impoverish the explanatory capability of even the best climate models. So maybe it is not so strange that Crutzen and others’ attention to the nuclear threat of great powers has all but disappeared despite the fact that Russia and the United States still possess thousands of nuclear weapons, and as of late have been all too vocal about using them. Instead, the Anthropocene, as envisioned by Crutzen as a universal concern, requires with it a depoliticization of the causes of that concern.

### Advantage

1. **Turn: More strikes lead to backlash bills that weaken unions – empirically proven. Partelow ‘19**

Lisette Partelow [Lisette Partelow is the director of K-12 Strategic Initiatives at American Progress. Her previous experience includes teaching first grade in Washington, D.C., working as a senior legislative assistant for Rep. Dave Loebsack (D-IA), and working as a legislative associate at the Alliance for Excellent Education. She has also worked at the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Education and Labor and the American Institutes for Research. “Analysis: A Looming Legislative Backlash Against Teacher Strikes? Why Walkouts Could Become Illegal in Some States, With Strikers Facing Fines, Jail, or Loss of Their License”. 02-18-2019. The 74. https://www.the74million.org/article/analysis-a-looming-legislative-backlash-against-teacher-strikes-why-walkouts-could-become-illegal-in-some-states-with-strikers-facing-fines-jail-or-loss-of-their-license/. Accessed 11-3-2021; MJen]

In 2018 and 2019, after a decade of disinvestment in education that led to stagnant teacher salaries, policymakers have introduced [proposals in states](https://thehill.com/homenews/state-watch/426030-states-race-to-prevent-teacher-strikes-by-boosting-pay) across the country to begin reinvesting, spurred in part by teacher walkouts and activism nationwide. While it is wonderful to finally see broad support for raising teacher salaries and investing in public schools, a predictable backlash has also emerged. Legislators in some states that were hotbeds of teacher activism are [introducing bills](http://nymag.com/intelligencer/2019/01/teacher-walkouts-gop-lawmakers-push-retaliatory-bills.html) to explicitly prohibit walkouts or punish teachers who participate, often with a sprinkling of additional anti-union provisions. **Weakening unions and refusing to invest in education** are long-standing conservative tenets, and these bills are evidence that we should expect conservative policymakers to return to them as soon as they believe them to be politically viable. The consequences of a decade of education funding cuts came into sharp relief last spring, after teachers staged walkouts in [half a dozen states](https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/16/us/teacher-walkout-north-carolina.html). The [decade of disinvestment](https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/education-k-12/reports/2018/09/20/457750/fixing-chronic-disinvestment-k-12-schools/) in education had its roots in the Great Recession, when many states were forced to drastically cut their K-12 education funding. But as the recovery got underway, many governors — particularly in red states — made intentional policy choices to cut taxes for wealthy residents and corporations rather than allow education funding to rebound to pre-recession levels as revenue increased. As a [result](https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/education-k-12/reports/2018/09/20/457750/fixing-chronic-disinvestment-k-12-schools/%5b), teacher wages stagnated, school budgets were strapped, and expenses such as building repairs and learning materials were deferred year after year. By 2018, reports of [crumbling schools](https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2018/01/its-not-just-freezing-classrooms-in-baltimore-americas-schools-are-physically-falling-apart/), students learning from [decades-old textbooks](https://www.cnn.com/2018/04/03/us/oklahoma-teachers-textbooks-trnd/index.html), high teacher turnover, and staff [shortages](https://tucson.com/news/local/we-continue-to-worsen-nearly-arizona-teaching-jobs-remain-vacant/article_1c8d665a-a422-5c7b-95b9-98afe0cb0c6f.html) in these states became common. Teachers had reached their [boiling point](https://morningconsult.com/opinions/americas-teachers-are-at-their-boiling-point/). The teacher walkouts have been very effective. Though they were a last resort, they finally got lawmakers’ attention in states that had seen the most chronic and severe cuts to education. In the states where teachers walked out, governors who hadn’t historically supported [education funding](https://www.americanprogressaction.org/issues/education/news/2018/10/09/171813/little-late-many-gubernatorial-candidates-education-funding/) agreed to enact significant [pay raises](https://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-teacher-funding-20180306-story.html) and increases in education funding. For example, in Arizona, Republican Gov. Doug Ducey was forced to sign off on a teacher pay bill he had [previously opposed](https://tucson.com/news/local/gov-ducey-teachers-aren-t-going-to-get-percent-pay/article_75a9b7dc-930b-5374-be12-61fb840e4ced.html) that provided a [20 percent raise](https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-education-arizona/arizona-governor-signs-bill-to-boost-teachers-wages-amid-strike-idUSKBN1I40N8) to the state’s teachers — some of the lowest-paid in the nation — and invested an additional $100 million in schools in the state. And now, in several states with low teacher pay that have so far avoided major protests, some governors have proposed salary increases. Remarkably, much of this movement is happening in [deep-red states](https://thehill.com/homenews/state-watch/426030-states-race-to-prevent-teacher-strikes-by-boosting-pay) with historically low education spending. In South Carolina, Gov. Henry McMaster wants to give teachers a 5 percent pay raise; in Texas, Lt. Gov. Dan Patrick has proposed a $5,000 increase; and in Georgia, Gov. Brian Kemp has proposed a $3,000 increase. In all three of these states, teachers are [paid less](http://www.nea.org/assets/docs/180413-Rankings_And_Estimates_Report_2018.pdf) than the national average. It’s likely that last year’s walkouts nudged these governors to consider teacher pay in a way that they wouldn’t have otherwise. Though it goes against traditional conservative principles, supporting these raises is smart politics for these governors. There is widespread public [support for increasing teacher pay](https://www.apnews.com/883e9d387709112a11ee8901c223294e), particularly in the states where walkouts occurred. But even as some conservative policymakers agree to raise teacher salaries, as the 2019 legislative sessions have begun, others in Arizona, Oklahoma, and West Virginia have introduced bills that would [make walkouts illegal](http://nymag.com/intelligencer/2019/01/teacher-walkouts-gop-lawmakers-push-retaliatory-bills.html) and penalize teachers with fines, loss of their teaching licenses, or even [jail time](https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2018/4/23/17270422/colorado-teachers-strike-jail-bill). Some of the bills also contain provisions designed specifically to weaken teachers unions, such as a requirement that teachers must [opt in to dues each year](https://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2019/01/28/us/ap-us-education-bill-west-virginia.html), which sponsors hope will reduce membership by adding an extra step to the process. Legislators in walkout states have also introduced stand-alone proposals designed to **make union membership more difficult** and, therefore, less likely, such as a prohibition on districts [withholding union dues](https://newsok.com/article/5593286/bill-is-revenge-for-teacher-walkout-unions-say) from teachers’ paychecks. These backlash bills hint at a much more familiar conservative education agenda of slashing funding and working to weaken teachers unions. After all, it is this agenda that led to stagnant teacher salaries, deplorable conditions in many school buildings, and consequences for students whose schools were chronically underfunded in the first place. Supporting increases to teacher pay and greater investment in schools is the right thing to do for America’s students. Unfortunately, this wave of backlash makes clear that for some policymakers, it’s all about politics — and as soon as they have the chance, they’ll once again slash education funding and attack hardworking teachers.

1. **Alt Solves both advantages -**
2. **Turn again: The right to strike just leads businesses to take stronger steps to stop unionization.**

Gordon **Lafer, 20** - ("Fear at work: An inside account of how employers threaten, intimidate, and harass workers to stop them from exercising their right to collective bargaining," Economic Policy Institute, 7-23-2020, https://www.epi.org/publication/fear-at-work-how-employers-scare-workers-out-of-unionizing/)//va

NLRB elections are fundamentally framed by one-sided control over communication, with no free-speech rights for workers. Under current law, employers may require workers to attend mass anti-union meetings as often as once a day (mandatory meetings at which the employer delivers anti-union messaging are dubbed “captive audience meetings” in labor law). Not only is the union not granted equal time, but pro-union employees may be required to attend on condition that they not ask questions; those who speak up despite this condition can be legally fired on the spot.[19](https://www.epi.org/publication/fear-at-work-how-employers-scare-workers-out-of-unionizing/#_note19) The most recent data show that nearly 90% of employers force employees to attend such anti-union campaign rallies, with the average employer holding 10 such mandatory meetings during the course of an election campaign.[20](https://www.epi.org/publication/fear-at-work-how-employers-scare-workers-out-of-unionizing/#_note20) ¶ In addition to group meetings, employers typically have supervisors talk one-on-one with each of their direct subordinates.[21](https://www.epi.org/publication/fear-at-work-how-employers-scare-workers-out-of-unionizing/#_note21) In these conversations, the same person who controls one’s schedule, assigns job duties, approves vacation requests, grants raises, and has the power to terminate employees “at will” conveys how important it is that their underlings oppose unionization. As one longtime consultant explained, a supervisor’s message is especially powerful because “the warnings…come from…the people counted on for that good review and that weekly paycheck.”[22](https://www.epi.org/publication/fear-at-work-how-employers-scare-workers-out-of-unionizing/#_note22) ¶ Within this lopsided campaign environment, the employer’s message typically focuses on a few key themes: unions will drive employers out of business, unions only care about extorting dues payments from workers, and unionization is futile because employees can’t make management do something it doesn’t want to do.[23](https://www.epi.org/publication/fear-at-work-how-employers-scare-workers-out-of-unionizing/#_note23) Many of these arguments are highly deceptive or even mutually contradictory. For instance, the dues message stands in direct contradiction to management’s warnings that unions inevitably lead to strikes and unemployment. If a union were primarily interested in extracting dues money from workers, it would never risk a strike or bankruptcy, because no one pays dues when they are on strike or out of work. But in an atmosphere in which pro-union employees have little effective right of reply, these messages may prove extremely powerful. ¶ It is common for unionization drives to start with two-thirds of employees supporting unionization and still end in a “no” vote. This reversal points to the anti-democratic dynamics of NLRB elections: voters are not being convinced of the merits of remaining without representation—they are being intimidated into the belief that unionization is at best futile and at worst dangerous. When a large national survey asked workers who had been through an election **to name “the most important reason people voted against union representation,” the single most common response was management pressure, including fear of job loss**.[24](https://www.epi.org/publication/fear-at-work-how-employers-scare-workers-out-of-unionizing/#_note24) Those who vote on this basis are not expressing a preferenceto remain unrepresented. Indeed, many might still prefer unionization if they believed it could work. Where fear is the motivator, what is captured in the snapshot of the ballot is not preference but despair. ¶To understand what union elections look like in reality, we have profiled two cases in which workers sought to create a union and met with a harsh (and typical) employer backlash. In both cases—a tire plant in Georgia and a satellite TV company in Texas—the employer response ranges from illegally firing union activists to engaging in acts of coercion and intimidation that are illegal in any normal election to public office but are allowed under the NLRA. ¶

1. **The turns outweigh the Aff. Their solvency is all about how *unionization* is key, not a stronger right to strike. Whatever marginal increase in bargaining power they achieve is drowned out by the fact that there will be much lower union density in the first place.**
2. **Plan Flaw – A. No evidence as to why us is just don’t led them read new ev because that creates a 7/6 time skew in their favor. B. The US isn’t just – kids in cages, right wing nationalism, and middle east intervention prove.**

#### 10% solvency at best, the vast majority of workers aren’t unionized.

BLS 1/22 - Bureau of Labor Statistics, “Economic News Release: Unions Members Summary,” January 22, 2021. <<https://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.nr0.htm>> AT

In 2020, the percent of wage and salary workers who were members of unions--the union membership rate--was 10.8 percent, up by 0.5 percentage point from 2019, the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics reported today. The number of wage and salary workers belonging to unions, at 14.3 million in 2020, was down by 321,000, or 2.2 percent, from 2019. However, the decline in total wage and salary employment was 9.6 million (mostly among nonunion workers), or 6.7 percent. The disproportionately large decline in total wage and salary employment compared with the decline in the number of union members led to an increase in the union membership rate. In 1983, the first year for which comparable union data are available, the union membership rate was 20.1 percent and there were 17.7 million union workers.

#### Non-Unique – Strikes are already high.

Greenhouse 11/5 - Steven Greenhouse [American labor and workplace journalist and writer], “Op-Ed: Why unions are striking — and winning more public support than in 50 years,” *Los Angeles Times* (Web). Nov. 4, 2021. Accessed Nov. 5, 2021. <https://www.latimes.com/opinion/story/2021-11-04/unions-strikes-economic-justice-agenda-public-approval> AT

The U.S. is experiencing an unusual surge of strikes — 10,000 John Deere workers went on strike in October, and so did 1,400 Kellogg workers, and now 35,000 Kaiser Permanente healthcare workers are threatening to walk out.¶ Workplace experts generally point to two reasons for this surge. First, after working so hard and often risking their lives during the pandemic, many workers believe that they deserve better pay and treatment. Second, American workers — especially long-underappreciated essential and low-wage workers — are suddenly feeling empowered because of today’s labor shortage.¶ These factors have certainly helped cause the wave of walkouts, but there’s another huge but often overlooked factor behind the strikes: It takes two to tangle.

#### Best data disproves heg impact

Benjamin H. Friedman et al 13, research fellow in defense and homeland security studies; Brendan Rittenhouse Green, the Stanley Kaplan Postdoctoral Fellow in Political Science and Leadership Studies at Williams College; Justin Logan, Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Cato Institute Fall 2013, “Correspondence: Debating American Engagement: The Future of U.S. Grand Strategy,” International Security, Vol. 38, No. 2, p. 181-199

Brooks et al. argue that the specter of U.S. power eliminates some of the most baleful consequences of anarchy, producing a more peaceful world. U.S. security guarantees deter aggressors, reassure allies, and dampen security dilemmas (p. 34). “By supplying reassurance, deterrence, and active management,” Brooks et al. write, primacy “reduces security competition and does so in a way that slows the diffusion of power away from the United States” (pp. 39–40). There are three reasons to reject this logic: security competition is declining anyway; if competition increases, primacy will have difficulty stopping it; and even if competition occurred, it would pose little threat to the United States.¶ an increasingly peaceful world. An array of research, some of which Brooks et al. cite, indicates that factors other than U.S. power are diminishing interstate war and security competition.2 These factors combine to make the costs of military aggression very high, and its benefits low.3¶ A major reason for peace is that conquest has grown more costly. Nuclear weapons make it nearly suicidal in some cases.4 Asia, the region where future great power competition is most likely, has a “geography of peace”: its maritime and mountainous regions are formidable barriers to conflict.5¶ Conquest also yields lower economic returns than in the past. Post-industrial economies that rely heavily on human capital and information are more difficult to exploit.6 Communications and transport technologies aid nationalism and other identity politics that make foreigners harder to manage. The lowering of trade barriers limits the returns from their forcible opening.7¶ Although states are slow learners, they increasingly appreciate these trends. That should not surprise structural realists. Through two world wars, the international system "selected against" hyperaggressive states and demonstrated even to victors the costs of major war. Others adapt to the changed calculus of military aggression through socialization.8¶ managing revisionist states. Brooks et al. caution against betting on these positive trends. They worry that if states behave the way offensive realism predicts, then security competition will be fierce even if its costs are high. Or, if nonsecurity preferences such as prestige, status, or glory motivate states, even secure states may become aggressive (pp. 36-37).9¶ These scenarios, however, are a bigger problem for primacy than for restraint. Offensive realist security paranoia stems from states' uncertainty about intentions; such states see alliances as temporary expedients of last resort, and U.S. military commitments are unlikely