The aff brings western ontological conceptions of property into space. Enforceable norms regarding property acquisition exist within a legal framework. Regulating property at all requires law. **Baca:**

**“**It is fundamental in property law that **property rights are defined**, **not against the thing** that is the subject of the property law, **but against the rest of the world.** The use of traditional Hohfeldian relationships illustrates the sense of this proposition. A right supposes a correlative duty. Thus the establishment by legislatures or courts of rights against a thing would be pointless since it is useless to establish the correlative duty in the thing to the one who possesses the right. No degree of exertion by the state is likely to result in a submission by the thing to any laws other than those of physics. The state can, however, enforce the duties it imposes on citizens. **The law of property** is **regulat[es]**ionof **the behavior of persons relative to one another with respect to the** various **things** that **persons may possess.** Indeed, if property is recognized as the rights of a person vis-a-vis other persons rather than things, it is easy to see that **[Thus] property cannot exist without law.”**

Baca, Kurt Anderson. “Property rights in outer space.” *Journal of Air Law and Commerce.* Vol. 58, no. 4, 1993.

That means that to affirm requires the assertion of sovereign state authority over the commons of space. This replicates the logic of colonialism: establish a regulatory regime with respect to property acquisition, and then use the authority of the state to dispossess Indigenous persons of the “property” they have lived with by tradition.

Formal property “rights,” allow “citizens” to leverage the violence of the state to exclude people from material resources that exist in the natural commons. By declaring appropriation of space resources “unjust,” the aff imposes regimes of “justice” — rights, ethical desert, and contract enforcement, among others — on the relationship between people and the galactic commons.

The normative authority of the state, backed by violence, is necessary both to permit and prohibit the acquisition of property. In a stateless commons, actors simply *are;* in the world of regulatory state authority, people only “are” insofar as they conform to the normative expectations of the state.

This recreates the colonialist project of imposing jurisdiction and enacting property rules in a commons. **Shiri Pasternak** describes:

**“**Among other strategies of perfecting settler sovereignty, **the imposition of Western property rights onto Indigenous forms of landholding has been pivotal to colonization** and has produced a rich field of scholarly attention. When I first began writing about colonialism in Canada, property rights seemed to offer the most cogent explanatory power for how the social relations of land were transformed in the ‘New World’ by settlers. Certainly, there is compelling evidence to support this framework. But through my work with teh Algonquins of Barriere Lake - a small Anishnabe community located in the northern region of the Ottawa River watershed in Quebec - I found that **the imposition of property rights onto indigenous lands** already **presumes the state’s authority to govern**, whereas **it is *the apparatus of jurisdiction* that determines which laws will apply in a given context.** In other words, **the problem that colonization introduces** is not just the leasehold, the fee simple estate, or the government’s regulatory land management system that institute new social relations on the land. The problem **is the machinery of jurisdiction that authorizes** **these proprietary** **regimes.** The utter confusion in the literature around how to define Indigenous peoples’ basis of ownership in contrast to Western property rights partly stems from this conflation between property and jurisdiction. Because **the issue in property literature** has moored on whether property did or did not exist in Indigenous societies prior to contact, **what tends to follow is a narrow debate about whether colonialism could actually *dispossess.***Even where the debate comes down on the side that Indigenous conceptions of property pre-existed contact, this approach still fences the debate into a rigid understanding of territorial belonging. Moreover, **it elides the fact that** in either case **Indigenous forms of *jurisdiction* govern the social relations of land on the territory,** **not a set of property** rights or **rules.** *Just as* on the other side of the ledger, claims to settler jurisdiction authorize Western property regimes**.”**

Pasternak, Shiri. "Property as a technique of jurisdiction: Traplines and tenure." *Contested Property Claims*. Routledge, 2017. 166-184.

This ontology of commodification reproduces all of the harms associated with neoliberalism: the oppression of Indigenous peoples; the overconsumption of resources leading to suffering; and the use of violence to compartmentalize resources and exclude alien Others from their use.

Thus, The role of the ballot is to vote for the debater who best performatively and methodologically rejects an ontology of consumption in favor of an ontology of care.

Prefer additionally

1. The ontology of consumption means that people aren’t treated as equals which is a pre-requisite to any utilitarian based theory because you assume they are accounted for
2. Extinction impacts are impossible to calculate, we should focus on impacts we know are happening such as colonial perpetrated violence which is a continuous harmful structure

Prohibiting appropriation in the name of rejecting capitalism is self-defeating because it maps the ontology of capitalist commodification onto the act of ownership and use. Both consumption and preservation echo that land is a standing reserve, and is distinct from Indigenous ontologies of comportment which treat the relationship between persons and resources as one of mutual care. **Pasternak:**

**“**One approach to understanding the differences between Indigenous and Canadian expressions of jurisdiction is through Bradley Bryan’s work, which offers insightful reflection on property as ontology. Bryan’s work stands out in the property literature on colonization because he comes closest to describing the respective social relations of jurisdiction I witnessed at Barriere Lake. He theorizes that **English ontologies of property are based on a conception of the world as “standing reserve.”**14 As Bryan explains: “Technology . . . makes a demand of nature, and that demand is one of supply.”15 **This** Heideggerian **concept** that describes **[of] a world of instrumental modern comportment can be contrasted to an Indigenous comportment that I** have been **call**ing **an ontology of care.** To specify for this context, I mean for **“standing reserve”** to **pertain[s] to two** interrelated **proprietary systems: the** provincial **leasehold system that permits resource extraction** on Barriere Lake lands **and the conservation regime that legislates restrictions on extraction** and exploitation. **Both** the leasehold property right and the conservation regime **express a technique of** provincial **jurisdiction whereby** Barriere Lake **lands are managed as supply.** Jurisdiction at Barriere Lake is exercised by the provincial state and the band towards these different respective ends of comportment: supply and care. Jurisdiction inaugurates property, and through its actualization as care at Barriere Lake, expressed in a proprietary form through land tenure, we can see how jurisdiction embeds the community in particular relations of mutual reciprocity on the land. In contrast to Indigenous jurisdiction, the commodity form of land in **liberal capitalist society aims to erase value other than that which can be expressed in market terms.** As David Harvey notes, **“The exchange process** is . . . perpetually **abstract[s]**ing **from the specifics of location through price formation.** This paves the way for **[Value is conceptualized]** conceptualizing values **in place-free terms.”**17 Of course, despite the premise of abstraction, value can never actually be disembedded from land. That is what led Karl Polanyi to label land as a fictitious commodity at the heart of capitalist crisis: the market seeks to treat it as supply, despite its unpredictable and finite nature. Polanyi recognizes the value of land, irrespective of its fictitious properties. Brett Christophers underscores this point, arguing that perhaps it is time to reevaluate the meaning of ‘fictitious’ in the context of contemporary capitalism, where land is more valuable than ever to the political economy of nations, for example, concerning resource extraction. Land is *real* as a commodity and it literally *supplies* the geographic context for the political economy of the settler state. Even as a principle of conservation, *supply* is a key goal of maintaining wildlife populations, for the purposes of human consumption, survival of the species, and recreational hunting**.”**

Pasternak, Shiri. "Property as a technique of jurisdiction: Traplines and tenure." *Contested Property Claims*. Routledge, 2017. 166-184.

The alternative is an ontology of care

To undercut neoliberalism as we embark upon extraterrestrial expansion requires a *reimagining* of what appropriation means with respect to the relationship between the space-farer and their environment. The ontology of care provides an alternative way of relating to resources that rejects the affirmative’s project of imposing western regulatory norms onto property acquisition and instead understands the process of appropriation as one of accepting responsibility. **Pasternak 2:**

**“What is the ontological basis of life that property expresses [for]** at Barriere Lake? I spent a summer learning **Anishnabemowin** in the bush at Barriere Lake. Curious about the language of property and jurisdiction in Algonquin society, I asked Toby Decoursay one day if there was a word for ownership in [Algonquin] their language. *Kadthaben-duck* or *debendan,* he answered. What about a word for belonging or “to belong”? I asked. “Same thing almost,” he said. “*Debendaygayzik* or *debendan.*” **[In Algonquin] “To own and to belong are almost the same**?” Toby answered affirmatively: “Yep, ours is the *tibenindiziwin*, or *debdendan* or *benjigaywaynan. Nin-diki-bendan. Debendeegayzik.*” **The land is *ni(n)daki* - it means** my **responsibility/autonomy/belonging while referring to everything** there: **the moose, the sun, the stars, the trees, the eagle, the beaver, moon, the earth, and even the planet.** Literally, *aki* is “ground” while *nin* would mean “my.”**”**

Pasternak, Shiri. "Property as a technique of jurisdiction: Traplines and tenure." *Contested Property Claims*. Routledge, 2017. 166-184.

**Pasternak 3 clarifies the alt further**

“As Audra Simpson poignantly summarizes, *Grounded Authority* seeks to contribute an account of **jurisdiction** as **[is] fundamental to “underwriting**… the concept of **authority**” **in settler colonial states. My interest** in this subject is not just theoretical; it **is preoccupied with** questions of **political** **economy** and the dynamics of investment **in places with insecure land tenure regimes**, like Canada, **where state sovereignty is claimed, but jurisdiction cannot be exercised** on the ground—where Canada’s laws have no effective authority in the face of Indigenous legal and political orders. I argue that **this is not a conflict over sovereignty, rather over *whose* laws govern in this territory. Based on an ontology of *care*,** it is **Barriere Lake’s kinship with life on the territory** that **sustains** what Winona Laduke calls **“continuous rebirth”—the principle governing Indigenous** knowledge and **land management in the Anishinaabe world.**[1] I **compare** these **responsibilities of care to the state and private resource management** regime **that operates** at multiple scales and across a vast range of institutions on Barriere Lake’s territory, naming it jurisdiction **based on an ontology of *supply*. It takes what it needs to reproduce capitalism and leaves the rest to die.”**

Pasternak, Shiri. “Settler colonial and Indigenous geographies: response by Shiri Pasternak.” *Society and Space,* June 26, 2019. [ellipses in original

For example, under an ontology of supply, a conservationist might work to preserve a balance of natural resources, but their motivation would be to maintain an available stock for human use: hunters, for instance, often support environmental projects because they want to make sure that future generations can still hunt. The ontology is still one of supply, the motivating concern only the availability of nature for human consumption. Under an ontology of care, a conservationist is motivated by their kinship relationship to the commons; the commons itself is both a provider and a subject of concern. The person exists as part of and in a reciprocal relationship with the natural commons

No perms: (A) the resolution describes a normative or rule-based ontology of appropriation; this is incommensurate with the K alt and thus can’t be incorporated without triggering the K; (B) a perm would require severance from resolutional text which (1) means the aff is not topical and (2) kills neg strat formation and (3) kills clash as the severing aff can simply shift out of neg arguments instead of engaging with them.