I affirm.

The topic is fundamentally a question of *property distribution.*

First, all persons are fundamentally morally equal. No natural distinction justifies giving some persons or groups of persons arbitrary power over others. This “ideal” definition of universal value precedes identity because:

(A) Universal moral worth is the basis of identity concerns. Were it not the case that all are morally equal we’d have no reason to critique structures that subordinate people arbitrarily.

(B) Material oppression is rooted in violations of universal value.

Since all people are fundamentally equal, all people have an equal initial claim to access naturally existing resources. **Roark:**

**“**The notion that **moral agents have an initially equal moral claim** in respect **to natural resources** is highly plausible because **an agent cannot appeal to anything that she has done or any** sort of **hereditary right** that she has **to establish a greater initial claim over natural resources than any other** agent can legitimately claim. All agents stand in the same initial moral relationship to natural resources. ***No* agent is morally**, **or** for that matter **causally**, **responsible for creating** or establishing in any way whatsoever **land, fresh water, the oceans, the atmosphere, crude oil, wild berries or any other natural resources.** Natural resources are simply established or given by Nature or God. **Appealing to an agent’s industriousness**, labor, or other aspects of her agency **cannot demonstrate that she possesses any greater *initial* claim to** natural **resources** than any other agent **because natural resources are not brought about as a result of labor** or any aspect of agency**.”**

Roark, Eric. *Removing the Commons.* Lexington Books, August 28, 2013. P. 3.

This right of equal access is no respecter of generational distinctions. One does not have a greater right to use common resources solely because of the arbitrary characteristic of having been born earlier. **Weiss:**

**“**The second fundamental relationship is that between different generations of the human species. **All generations are** inherently **linked** to other generations, past and future, in using the common patrimony of earth. To define intergenerational equity, it is useful to view **the human community** as **[is] a partnership** among all generations. In describing a state as a partnership, Edmund Burke observed that ‘as the ends of such a partnership cannot be obtained in many generations, it becomes a partnership not only **between those who are living** but between those who are living, those who are dead, **and those who are to be born.**’ The purpose of human society must be to realize and protect the welfare and well-being of every generation. **This requires sustaining the** life-support systems of the planet, the ecological processes, and the environmentalconditions necessary for a healthy and decent human **environment.** In this partnership, **no generation knows** beforehand **when it will be** the **living** generation**,** how many members it will have, **or** even **how many generations there will** ultimately **be.** It is useful, then, to **[So] take the perspective of a generation** that is placed somewhere **along the spectrum of time, but does not know** in advance **where it will be located.** **Such a generation would want to inherit the earth in at least as good condition as it had been in for any previous generation** and to have as good access to it as previous generations. **This requires each generation to pass the planet on in no worse condition than it received it in and to provide equitable access to its resources** and benefits**. Each generation is thus** both **a trustee for the planet** with obligations to care for it and a beneficiary with rights to use it**.”**

Since all people have a legitimate and equal claim to a proportional share of the global commons, any action that degrades the commons such that others either present or future have access to less of the commons or to a qualitatively degraded commons constitutes an arbitrary taking. Since all property derives from a commons, the individual’s right to exclusion requires justification. Thus, the criterion is **consistency with the Lockean proviso.**

If property is acquired in a way that creates scarcity that denies others the means of similarly obtaining property, then an unjust taking has occurred and the property claim of the appropriating agent is illegitimate.

And adherence to the proviso is fundamental to ethical interaction. **Ronit Kedar [brackets for clarity]:**

**“[A human is] fundamentally**, then, the *homo contractus* is essentially **a self-interested ‘I,’ who has internalized the contractualist ethos and is** genuinely **interested in forming a** decent, **peaceful mechanism to interact with others.** He **[They]** therefore **wish**es **to be licensed to act in accordance to [their]** his **own ends by forming** an **agreed upon** regulative set of **rules for cooperating with everyone.** Given that the *homo contractus* has refined his basic self-interestedness and sincerely values decency, **the governing ideal** in his interpersonal relations **is fair reciprocity.** He **therefore** believes that **[all] others have an equal right to common resources** (and in the moral world, one’s willingness to be moral is a primary asset) insofar as they contribute to the production of these common resources (acknowledging the reasons to be moral.) Under the moral scheme, then, other persons who are basically **potential adversaries become parties to the contract.** Thought of as parties to the moral agreement, they are **measured by their ability to contribute to** it, that is, to **the cooperative system** (agreeing on the principles for regulation.)**”**

Kedar, Ronit. “Reciprocity in morality and law.” *Law & Ethics of Human Rights,* vol. 6. issue 2, 2012.

CONTENTION

Private appropriation of outer space fails the Lockean proviso. This is because accessible space-based resources are neither renewable nor replaceable. Thus any taking of an outer space resource denies the access of others to “as much and as good” of that particular resource.

Gains and losses are most acceptably shifted when they’re primarily the results of circumstance, and least acceptably shifted when they’re principally the products of choices made by those who incur them. And **what counts as circumstance**, I suggest, **is** pretty adequately **captured by** what we would include under the heading of “**nature**.” “Nature” covers a lot: **there are places where it rains all the time and places where it never rains; places with oil deposits and places with serious geological faults**; crowded and less crowded cyberspace locations; and genes that code for Kentucky blue grass, poison ivy, viruses, koala bears, cystic fibro- sis, schizophrenia, Pavarotti-type vocal chords, some elements of human intelligence, and so forth. **Rights to** natural **resources** - to nature, compendiously construed - **are rights to bits of** all these various, and **variously valued, things.** So if we follow Locke and a number of other thinkers in that tradition, if we hold that **anyone claiming ownership over some bits of nature must leave “enough and as good for others”**, **we’re led** by a series of plausible steps to the conclusion that, in a fully appropriated world, **each person is entitled to an equal portion of the value of these bits of nature.** That is, **all owners of natural resources must pool the value of what they own in a fund - ultimately a global fund - to an equal portion of which everyone everywhere has a moral right.**

Steiner, Hillel. “Left libertarianism and the ownership of natural resources.” *Bleeding Heart Libertarians,* April 24, 2012.

And, wealth redistribution is a deontic entitlement not subject to aggregation, since it’s an outgrowth of fundamental negative rights. **Steiner 3:**

And what’s especially important for libertarians to note in this regard is that **we’re owed this** grant **not as a** basic **positive right** - for on this sort of theory, **there are no positive rights which are basic, but only negative ones**, with all positive rights being derived solely from antecedent contractual understandings or rights-violations. Rather, **we’re owed it as a matter of redress by those who do not forbear from acquiring or retaining more than “enough and as good”** natural **resources** - **a negative duty which they have by virtue of our ultimately foundational right to equal freedom.** It’s **this fundamental right to equal freedom that gives us both our rights to self-ownership and our rights to natural resources**.8 And **all our other just rights are created by exercises of these two rights and of the rights successively derived from those exercises.**

Steiner, Hillel. “Left libertarianism and the ownership of natural resources.” *Bleeding Heart Libertarians,* April 24, 2012.

This is true because, first, all persons have an equal claim to naturally occurring resources. These resources exist naturally, thus no *a priori* reason exists to assign exclusive ownership of commons to any individual. Access to capital resources is arbitrary, since (A) it depends on a just initial acquisition and (B) it depends on the lottery of birth. Also, since birth *order* is arbitrary, each succeeding generation has an identical claim to the overall quality of common resources. Even if it is possible to obtain exclusive property rights to some specific natural resource, each succeeding generation has a right to an initial store of available resources of equal quality.


Extractive activities which progressively degrade the environment constitute an unjustified taking of common resources from future generations, and no coincident amount of “savings” in the current generation can make up for what is taken. Stephen **Bickham:**

**“The idea that each generation’s obligation to the future can be met by** savings - by **salting away** **a certain amount of ‘capital’** - oversimplifies this obligation through **fail[s]**ing **to take account** accurately **of the diverse ways that a particular generation can injure later ones.** **No type of savings**, for instance, **could account for a** particular **generation’s obligation to the future** **with regard to [some kinds of damage]** nuclear war and overpopulation. These have nothing to do with wise utilization of capital, yet they are certainly two of the major threats to the well-being of future generations. There are other problems with this model. In many instances **the cost of** the creation of certain **pollutants** **cannot be** at all **accurately calculated.** We do not know what the effects of continuing to use fluorocarbons in spray cans would be. Moreover, in this case as in others **a polluting activity might have no effect on several subsequent generations and then a devastating effect on a particular later generation.** **This would leave one or two generations to pay for the practices of many.”**

Bickham, Stephen. “Future generations and contemporary ethical theory.” *Journal of Value Inquiry,* 15:169-177; 1981.

**UNDERVIEW**

1. Aff gets 1AR theory: otherwise a) the 1NC could have an infinite number of off-case positions and the 1AR would have no way of checking back b) the aff is already at a 7-4 time skew, allocating 4 minutes between 10 off case positions and extending the aff without being able to read theory becomes near impossible c) encourages debaters to read a bunch of arguments with zero evidence instead instead of crafting one or two warranted, creative positions, which takes away the educational aspect of debate -- outweighs on constitutivism since debate is an educational activity.
2. Debaters must disclose their contact information on both their affirmative and negative wikis
   1. Standard: Accessibility: only making the contact info available on one side of your wiki makes it harder to find, having it on both wikis is a better norm



1. Negative must check aff interpretations in CX: a) there needs to be a time during the round where both debaters can discuss and clarify their positions in front of the judge, otherwise we’re essentially just debating in a vacuum b) CX checks -- it’s 3 minutes where we can discuss what our positions entail and comply or conflict with any interpretations which isn’t possible during actual speeches.
2. Prefer competing interpretations: vote for the debater representing the better model for debate to set norms for future rounds a) reasonability brightlines are arbitrary and self-serving c) they create a race to the bottom by seeing how close to the brightline one can get and by constantly shifting it. No RVIs: a) a debater shouldn’t win the round simply proving that they weren’t being unfair b) encourages experienced theory debaters to bait theory and win on the RVI. Theory is drop the debater to deter future unfairness.
3. Aff gets 2AR weighing - a) we both have 6 minutes to weigh b) otherwise I would only be able to just repeat everything I already said in the 1AR in the 2AR without any clear implication of how it relates to the 2NR, key to clash since otherwise the aff wouldn’t have a speech to compare their arguments in the 1AR to those in 2NR.
4. The role of the ballot is truth testing because A) Isomorphism: alternative RTBs aren’t binary win/loss, and thus cannot function in debate B) Constitutivism: the ballot and tab software present decision as aff/neg, not who best achieves some good value. Also, “affirm” is “**To state that** (**a proposition**, or part of a proposition) **is true**; to give as an affirmative proposition,”[1] and negate is “**to deny the** existence or **truth of**; to deny.”, which independently proves truth testing C) Coordination, tournaments provide focal points for debaters by announcing a topic, giving it salience. Absent that focal point, debate is impossible since the chance of our being prepared to debate the same thing is literally zero.
5. Presumption affirms: A) Any reason affirming is harder is a reason to vote aff on presumption in the case of a tie a) 7-4-6-3 time skew, b) aff has to extend offense twice, more chances to make mistakes c) neg gets proactive theory in the first speech, aff can only be reactive d) We’re cognitively biased to maintain the squo so err on the side of change to rectify perceptual judge skew e) We presume statements true unless proven false—if I told you my name was Ria you’d intuitively believe it until told otherwise. Conspiracy theories don’t respond: f) The resolution isn’t a conspiracy and g) People assume conspiracies are true—the only reason we dismiss them as absurd is if we have prior knowledge that refutes them.