I negate the resolution: the appropriation of outer space by private entities is unjust.

The definition of appropriate:

: **to take** [**exclusive**](https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/exclusive#h1) **possession of** [ANNEX](https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/annex)

<https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/appropriate>

From Merriam-Webster

First, an observation: the affirmative debater must prove that the appropriation of outer space by private entities is actively unjust. Simply proving that appropriation of outer space is not a good idea is not sufficient to vote aff since the word “unjust” in the resolution requires proving an active moral statement in regards to private entities appropriating outer space. Thus, my proving that appropriation of outer space by private entities is either actively good or permissible is enough to vote negative, since the affirmative must prove the resolution as an active moral statement.

Outer space is defined as the space outside celestial bodies. **New World Encyclopedia 19:**

**Outer space** (often called space) **consists of the relatively empty regions of the universe outside the atmospheres of celestial bodies. *Outer* space is used to distinguish it from airspace and terrestrial locations.** There is no clear boundary between Earth's atmosphere and space, as the density of the atmosphere gradually decreases as the altitude increases. **For practical purposes, the Fédération Aéronautique Internationale has established the Kármán line,** at an altitude of 100 kilometers (62 mi), **as a working definition for the boundary between aeronautics and astronautics.** This line was chosen because, as Theodore von Kármán calculated, a vehicle traveling above that altitude would have to move faster than orbital velocity to derive sufficient aerodynamic lift from the atmosphere to support itself. The United States designates people who travel above an altitude of 50 miles (80 km) as astronauts. During re-entry, roughly 120 kilometers (75 mi) marks the boundary where atmospheric drag becomes noticeable, depending on the ballistic coefficient of the vehicle.

"Outer space." *New World Encyclopedia,* . 8 Jan 2019, 21:11 UTC. 18 Dec 2021, 03:22 <https://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/p/index.php?title=Outer\_space&oldid=1017020>.

An agent’s actions reflect philosophically on the nature of the agent themselves. **Wallace:**

To hold someone morally responsible is to view the person as the potential target of a special kind of moral appraisal. **People who are morally responsible** are not seen merely as acting in ways that happen to be good or bad; they **are not just causally responsible for certain** welcome or unwelcome **happenings, the way a clogged drain might be said to be responsible for the unfortunate overflowing of a basin. Rather, the actions** of morally responsible people **are thought to reflect** specially **on them as agents**, opening them to a kind of moral appraisal that does more than record a causal connection between them and the consequences of their actions. As Susan Wolf has suggested**, assessing people as morally responsible has a quality of "depth," going beyond mere description of the moral character of what they do, or of their causal role in bringing their actions about.** An account of what it is to hold people responsible should start by characterizing this quality of depth, so as to locate more precisely the distinctive aspect of the phenomenon that is to be explained. [1] Wallace, R. Jay (Professor of Philosophy, University of California, Berkeley). Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments. (1994).

Thus, it follows that the ability to bring conditions upon oneself is a prerequisite to moral judgement. The right to self-ownership is the basis of all ethics. It is epistemically foundational since any attempt to update belief in response to evidence requires that one possess ownership over one’s mental states, i.e. that one is free to adopt and discard beliefs. This means that self-ownership includes a right to control one's mind and identity as well as the body, as well as making the decision to engage in the principles of a moral theory. Epistemology comes prior since it governs our acceptance of all other philosophical claims. And this comes before other epistemological arguments since a right to revise one’s beliefs is a conceptual prerequisite to any particular theory of justification.

My framework is means-based--“Maximizing self-ownership” is contradictory since it empowers the state to impose trade-offs, violating one person’s self-ownership to protect others, but once the state has this authority there’s no longer a right of self-ownership since we can’t forbid its infringements. Rather, consistency requires that the state protects against infringements of self-ownership without violating the self-ownership of other natural persons.

Thus, the standard is consistency with self-ownership, defined as a moral actor’s right to control one’s self under principles of mutual restraint.

I contend that the appropriation of outer space by private entities is consistent with their self interest and an act of exercising their self-ownership under principles of mutual restraint.

Private entities’ ventures into space are a reflection of their self interest, and under principles of self-ownership are not unjust insofar as they do not violate the self ownership of another. Because outer space is defined as the space between celestial bodies, the resolution is not a question of the appropriation of entities such as stars, planets, or asteroids; it is a question of the appropriation of the relatively empty space between those entities.

Second, the violation of self ownership of another in terms of property acquisitions means there would have to be a present owner of those resources, which presupposes that the area has already been appropriated and that the negative world is true. Thus, the initial acquisition of such property cannot be unjust. **Feser ‘05**,

(Edward Feser, 1-1-2005, accessed on 12-15-2021, Cambridge University Press, "THERE IS NO SUCH THING AS AN UNJUST INITIAL ACQUISITION | Social Philosophy and Policy | Cambridge Core", Edward C. Feser is an American philosopher. He is an Associate Professor of Philosophy at Pasadena City College in Pasadena, California.https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/social-philosophy-and-policy/article/abs/there-is-no-such-thing-as-an-unjust-initial-acquisition/5C744D6D5C525E711EC75F75BF7109D1) [brackets for gen lang]//phs st

There is a serious difficulty with this criticism of Nozick, however. It is just this: **There is no such thing as an unjust initial acquisition of resources;** therefore**, there is no case** to be made **for redistributive taxation on the basis of alleged injustices in initial acquisition.** This is, to be sure, a bold claim. Moreover, in making it, I contradict not only Nozick’s critics, but Nozick himself, who clearly thinks it is at least possible for there to be injustices in acquisition, whether or not there have in fact been any (or, more realistically, whether or not there have been enough such injustices to justify continual redistributive taxation for the purposes of rectifying them). But here is a case where Nozick has, I think, been too generous to the other side. Rather than attempt —unsatisfactorily, in the view of his critics—to meet the challenge to show that initial acquisition has not in general been unjust, he ought instead to have insisted that there is no such challenge to be met in the first place. Giving what I shall call “the basic argument” for this audacious claim will be the task of Section II of this essay. The argument is, I think, compelling, but by itself it leaves unexplained some widespread intu- itions to the effect that certain specific instances of initial acquisition are unjust and call forth as their remedy the application of a Lockean proviso, or are otherwise problematic. (A “Lockean proviso,” of course, is one that forbids initial acquisitions of resources when these acquisitions do not leave “enough and as good” in common for others.) Thus, Section III focuses on various considerations that tend to show how those intuitions are best explained in a way consistent with the argument of Section II. Section IV completes the task of accounting for the intuitions in question by considering how the thesis of self-ownership itself bears on the acqui- sition and use of property. Section V shows how the results of the previ- ous sections add up to a more satisfying defense of Nozickian property rights than the one given by Nozick himself, and considers some of the implications of this revised conception of initial acquisition for our under- standing of Nozick’s principles of transfer and rectification. II. The Basic Argument **The reason there is no such thing as an unjust initial acquisition of resources is that there is no such thing as either a just or an unjust initial acquisition of resources.** The concept of **justice**, that is to say, simply does not apply to initial acquisition. It **applies only after initial acquisition has already taken place.** In particular, **it applies only to transfers of property** (and derivatively, to the rectification of injustices in transfer). This, it seems to me, is a clear implication of the assumption (rightly) made by Nozick that **external resources are initially unowned.** Consider the following example. **Suppose an individual A seeks** to acquire **some previously unowned resource R. For** it **to be the case that A commits an injustice in acquiring R, it would also have to be the case that there is some individual B** (or perhaps a group of individuals) **against whom A commits the injustice. But for B to have been wronged by A’s acquisi- tion of R, B would have to have** had a rightful claim over R, **a right to R.** By hypothesis, **however, B did not have a right to R, because** no one had a right to it—**it was unowned**, after all. **So B was not wronged and could not have been**. In fact, **the** very **first person who could conceivably be wronged by anyone’s use of R would be**, not B, but **A himself,** since A is the first one to own R. **Such a wrong would in the nature of the case be an injustice in transfer**—in unjustly taking from A what is rightfully his—**not in initial acquisition. The same thing**, by extension, **will be true of all unowned resources**: it is only after some- one has initially acquired them that anyone could unjustly come to possess them, via unjust transfer. **It is impossible,** then, **for there to be any injustices in initial acquisition**.7

Thus, because the affirmative must prove that the appropriation of private property by private entities is unjust, proving that it is either just or permissible is enough to negate. If the action is permissible, for example, then an individual may act upon their self-ownership in taking such an action so long as the self-ownership of another is not violated and under principles of mutual restraint.

Here are some aprioris you should vote on:

1. Zeno’s paradox. If I want to travel some distance, I must first travel half of that distance, but then I have to travel half of that distance and so on into infinity. This proves that motion is impossilbe. If motion is impossible you negate because the aff requires movement, ie moving your hand to sign a bill into law

2. Good Samaritan paradox. If I want to solve x problem, x problem has to exist first which would mean I want that problem to exist. Means the aff can’t actually solve their problems so doing the aff is pointless and you should negate.

3. We can’t be sure of anything, we can only know we exist. Thus I only know I exist, so you vote neg because I exist, while my opponent might not.

4. Decision making paradox. If I make a decision, I have to make a decision to make that decision, which would be a metadecision. But then I have to make a decision to make that decision, and so on into infinity. This means that decisions are impossible, so governments can’t make the decision that the appropriation of outer space by private entities is unjust, so you negate.

5. Place paradox. If x is in some place, then that place has to be in another place, but that place has to be in another place, and into infinity. This means that places can’t exist, and because space takes place in a place, so you negate.

6. Grain paradox. A single grain of wheat doesn’t make sound when dropped, but a handful do.

7. Negate means : to deny the existence or truth of, I am denying the truth of the resolution so you should auto-negate

8. The ROTB is TT - A) Isomorphism: alternative RTBs aren’t binary win/loss, and thus cannot function in debate B) Constitutivism: the ballot and tab software presents decisions as aff/neg, not who best achieves some good value. Also, “affirm” is “To state that is true” [1] and negate is “to deny the existence or truth of”, which independently proves truth testing. C) Key to 1) Ground Parity: The wording committee and topic selection process exist to identify topics with a range of defensible arguments on both sides, “role of the ballot” claims can frame the round in ways that make my ground either absurd or morally abhorrent 2) Predictability: The only face value of a resolution is it’s truth or falsity as a statement – not some inherent other framework

Now on the aff

Consequences fail – A) they only judge actions after they occur, which fails action guidance B) every action has infinite stemming consequences, because every consequence can cause another consequence. Probability doesn’t solve because 1) Probability is improvable, as it relies on inductive knowledge, but induction from past events can’t lead to deduction of future events and 2) Probability assumes causation, we can’t assume every act was actually the cause of tangible outcomes C) every action is infinitely divisible, only intents unify action because we intend the end point of an action – but consequences cannot determine what step of action is moral or not. D) if you’re held responsible for things other than an intention ethics aren’t binding because there are infinite events occurring over which you have no control, so you can never be moral as you are permitting just action E) There’s no objective arbiter to evaluate consequences F) You can’t aggregate consequences, happiness and sadness are immutable – ten headaches don’t make a migraine

#### **Economic freedom empirically correlates with higher levels of wellbeing.**

Daniel M. **Gropper et al** (20**11**) (Daniel M. Gropper, Robert A. Lawson, Jere T. Thorne Jr.). "Economic Freedom and Happiness." Cato Journal, July 6, 2011. https://www.ciaonet.org/attachments/18681/uploads

**Using the best available data for a sample of well over 100 countries, this article finds a positive relationship between national levels of happiness and economic freedom. GDP per capita also exerts a strong positive influence** on happiness. The statistical impact of both economic freedom and GDP per capita appears to diminish as the other increases, but the combined effect of simultaneously increasing both economic freedom and GDP per capita, particularly for poorer and less free nations, is positive. **Around the world, freer people generally are wealthier, live longer, and are happier.**

#### **And, this relationship is directly causal, not spurious correlation.**

Hans **Pitlik et al** (20**15**) (Hans Pitlik, Dulce M. Redín, and Martin Rode). “Economic Freedom, Individual Perceptions of Life Control, and Life Satisfaction.” Fraser Institute. <https://www.fraserinstitute.org/sites/default/files/economic-freedom-individual-perceptions-of-life-control-life-satisfaction.pdf>

The individual and societal determinants of happiness have been heavily investigated in recent years and the findings indicate that one important correlate of life satisfaction is the degree to which people feel they are in control of their own lives. In a parallel manner, it has been shown that **economic freedom exerts an independent impact on life satisfaction over and above its impact on per-capita income** levels **and other indicators of material well-being**. Following Buchanan (2005), we examine the impact of economic institutions built on the principle of free choice upon individual perceptions of life control and consider the potential benefit that accrues to individuals in terms of their life satisfaction. **We find that living in a country with high overall economic freedom is a relevant determinant of feeling in control of one’s own life.** As one might expect, a substantial share of the impact of economic freedom on life satisfaction is actually channeled through life control. **Therefore, economic freedom** also **influences** individual **happiness by giving people the feeling of being more in control of their own lives and having the freedom to choose between** different **options in the market.**

#### **And, this outweighs any cap bad arguments: happiness is the bottom-line measure of human wellbeing so it subsumes other impacts, e.g. even if cap produces some degree of alienation, the happiness statistics show that it produces gains that outweigh that alienation. So to win cap bad they need to either read counter-statistics or show that the happiness correlation is spurious.**

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