Willing to spec anything that was or wasn’t read BEFORE cross-x starts

I negate. (Resolved: the member nations of the world trade organization ought to reduce intellectual property protections for medicines)

**Reason justifies our abilities to act according to the representation of laws, Gobsch:**

What is reason, and how does it relate to sensibility in a human being? **Reason**, one might begin, **is a capacity to justify judgments**. To judge is to claim to think truly. And to think truly is to think something that is the case. Now, **there is no outside to the totality of that which is the case, the world; being is unbounded**: the form of being cannot be negated, the law of non-contradiction does not apply to it. That means that **being**, that which is the case, **cannot be the object of a limited capacity of representation**; the object of such a capacity could only be being with an index: being as it appears to particular subjects. So the capacity to judge, the intellect, must itself be unlimited or entirely general: νους, as Aristotle puts this, “has no other nature than to be capacity.”2 And because to judge is to claim to think what is the case, one cannot justify judgments through acts of a limited capacity either: one cannot reveal one’s judgment’s content as belonging to being by referring it to an activity incapable of representing being. So **reason**, as a capacity to justify judgments, **must be unlimited**, too. But obviously, there cannot be more than one unlimited capacity. So reason and the intellect are essentially the same. And this is to say, first, that reason is the capacity to justify judgments through acts of the intellect, i.e. through judgments, that it is the capacity to infer, and, second, that it is the only capacity to justify judgments.3

To justify a judgment, to infer it, is to explain why its content is something that is the case: part of the world. But the world has no outside. So in order to explain something’s being the case, one must appeal to what is part of the world, or more precisely—as the world is one cohering whole, and a circle no justification—to everything else that is the case. Yet every something is another something’s other. So every something’s being the case is to be explained in a way that looks to everything else and, thereby, back to that something itself. Now, for something to be explanatorily dependent on another is to be related to it under laws. And for something to be the case is, basically, for a thing to be determined in some way. So **to justify a judgment is**, basically, **to explain why** the thing that is the subject of **its content is determined the way it is through its activity according to the laws** (under which it falls in virtue of its definition) **that relate it to the activities of all other things** (in virtue of their definitions). Laws can only play this role in justification, if they constitute the form of the world. And because the form of the world cannot be negated, **laws** cannot be conceived of as merely induced from what happens to be the case; they **must be conceived as articulating a necessity that is prior to mere actuality**, or as Kant puts it: there is “necessity [. . .] thought in every law, namely objective necessity from a priori grounds.”4

**Reason**, then, **is the power to represent laws**. Now, rational beings are beings, too: they exist in the world. So **to exist as a rational being is to exist through representing laws**, or as Kant puts it: **Everything in nature acts according to laws. A rational being alone has the capacity to act from the representation of laws**.5 This holds for both human beings and merely prudentially rational animals alike, should these be possible at all. The laws from the representation of which a being of the latter sort would act would not be the laws that explain why it acts at all: **although** such **a being would act from the representation of laws, there would always be laws that govern the activity that constitutes its existence** that would not themselves be represented in this very activity as the laws from which it acts. In a merely prudentially rational animal, reason, in representing laws, would only serve to direct the animal’s practical activity toward the realization of its happiness—the most complete satisfaction of its desires throughout the whole of its existence—, while the very actuality of this activity itself would not be due to reason, but to sensible desire. Although such a being would essentially act with reason, reason itself would remain entirely theoretical for it.

In us human beings, however, pure reason is of itself practical, if all goes well: ideally, the laws from the representation of which we act are therein known by us to be the laws that explain why we act at all.6 They are practical laws. Thus defined, **a practical law is a self-applying law**: its application in the activity that constitutes a human being’s existence does not, if all goes well, have conditions the satifaction of which could possibly remain to be explained by other laws. So it cannot be hypothetical, it will be categorical: **it will be law in virtue of no other law**. As law, however, it will govern belonging in the totality that has no outside, the world. So there can only be one such law.7 In its necessary singularity, this law, then, is lawness itself, reason; or as Kant puts it: “**pure reason, practical of itself, is** here immediately **lawgiving**.”8

**In human beings, pure reason**, if all goes well, **determines itself to be practical** or will, the power the object of which is the good: that which is to be. Therein, **reason gives itself as law to itself**. Kant calls the practical law thus given the moral law.9 **As the moral law is given to reason itself, reason is**, qua will, **autonomous and** in this sense **free**, or as Hegel puts it: “The abstract concept of the Idea of the will is in general the free will which wills the free will.”10 So **to act in accordance with the moral law**—to be free in the positive sense of autonomy, and that is: to exist as a human being—**is**, in the first instance, **to act in such a way as to therein constitute and preserve oneself as acting for the sake of the moral law alone**; it is to act in such a way as to make it the case that one’s acting in this way is explained by nothing other than one’s consciousness of this very law.

Gobsch, Wolfram. "The Idea of an Ethical Community: Kant and Hegel on the Necessity of Human Evil and the Love to Overcome It." Philosophical Topics 42.1 (2014): 177-200.

**But, humans aren’t merely rational, we also have sensible desires that we use reason to act upon. Gobsch 2:**

To act as a human being is to actualize pure reason, if all goes well. But **no human being is pure reason. Human** being**s are** rational animals. So they are animals, **sensible organisms**, too. **Sensibility is a** receptive capacity of representation: a **capacity to represent objects through being affected by them**. Affection happens at a time and a place. So sensible organisms are spatiotemporal beings. And **affection depends on the existence of its object**. So sensibility is a capacity whose actualization has conditions the satisfaction of which cannot be the work of this capacity itself. Therefore, sensibility is limited by whatever else satisfies these conditions. And so it is a particular capacity, a capacity with a specific form. But if a capacity of representation is limited and particular, then its object—the content of its act in general—must be limited and particular, too: its object cannot be that which is, simply as such. It is for this reason that **sensibility differs infinitely from reason**, the unconditioned capacity, and that **no sensible organism can be pure reason**, so that the definition of a human being unites reason and sensibility as two distinct determinations.

To exist as an animal is, typically, to be engaged in sensible activity.11 So although human beings exist, if all goes well, through actualizing pure reason, **sensibility will have to play a role in their rational practical activity. A merely prudentially rational animal**, should such a thing be possible at all, **would be determined to act by sensible desire**. Reason would merely serve to direct it toward happiness. In a human being, however, reason is, if all goes well, of itself practical. And so the role of sensible desire cannot be that of the determinant, the motor, of human practical activity. As the activity of a rational animal, human activity, too, is oriented toward happiness. But **the subjective principles of a human being’s practical activity**, principles which, as such, determine the manner in which its orientation toward happiness becomes practical, are acts of free choice: **acts of a capacity to “be determined to actions by pure will**,”12 maxims, as Kant calls them. As conditioned by the moral law, **such maxims presuppose their subject’s acknowledgment of [their]**her **own happiness as prima facie good: as to be pursued at all in the activity of pure reason.**13 In this acknowledgment, a human being constitutes herself as a person: as individualized pure reason, as a particular manifestation of the moral law. Through her maxims, a person, a human being as a particular manifestation of pure reason, determines the character of her pursuit of happiness. And so it is **in [their]**her **maxims**, her acts of free choice, **a human being rationally displays [their]**her **sensible nature**: the individuality and finitude that make her an animal.

Gobsch, Wolfram. "The Idea of an Ethical Community: Kant and Hegel on the Necessity of Human Evil and the Love to Overcome It." Philosophical Topics 42.1 (2014): 177-200. [bracketed to avoid gendered language]

Thus, the standard is consistency with the ethical community. Prefer additionally:

#### **1. Freedom is actualized through participation within an ethical community**

**Wood 90**, Allen W. *Hegel’s Ethical Thought.* Cambridge University Press. 1990. NP 3/29/16.

We often hear that Hegel's ethical thought is oriented more toward society than toward the individual. There is a foundation in reality for saying this. Hegel's Philosophy of Right belongs to "objective" rather than "subjective" spirit: Hegel's ethical system is a theory of rational social life rather than a theory of individual conduct. But probably its chief foundation is Hegel's belief that **rational individuals actualize their freedom most fully when they participate in a state** (PR § 258). Like utilitarianism, Hegel's ethical theory tells individuals to devote themselves to the good of society, not solely to their own private good. But utilitarianism treats the social good as a simple sum of individual goods; Hegel thinks of it in terms of a certain institutional structure that is a "universal end," valuable in itself and not merely as a means to the good of individuals. That is doubtless one reason why Hegel's ethical theory culminates in the description of a rational social order, and not in an account of the good life for an individual or a doctrine of duties for the regulation of our private lives. Nevertheless, **the developmental structure of the theory presented in the Philosophy of Right is dictated not by collective ends but by** a certain concep­ tion of the modern human individual - or, more accurately, **a system or de­ veloping series of such conceptions. It is this system of self-images**, together **with the necessary forms of activity corresponding to it, that founds the com­ plex system of social institutions constituting the Hegelian rational state. The rational state is an end** in itself only **because the highest stage of individual self-actualization consists in participating in the state and recognizing it as such an end**. This means that **Hegel's ethical theory is** after all **founded on a conception of individual human beings and their self-actualization. Even the state's rationality is grounded on the fact that the individual will is actual­ ized through participating in it and contributing to it as a universal end.** In that sense, Hegel's ethical thought is oriented to the individual, not the collective. We can see this in Hegel's procedure in the Philosophy of Right. This book is a fuller version of the science of "objective spirit," part of the third volume of Hegel's Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences (EG §§ 483-552). As in the Encyclopedia, the Introduction to the Philosophy of Right presents a phil­ osophical propaedeutic to objective spirit (PR § 2) drawn from Hegel's treat­ ment of the will or "practical spirit" (EG §§ 469-482), which is the final stage in the development of "subjective spirit," of individual psychology (EG §§ 387, 440). Hegel's discussion of "the free will" in the Introduction deals with the human individual as a rational agent whose freedom is to be actual­ ized.

#### **2. Actualization of individuals can only occur by placing them within society – the person alone is an incomplete picture of the subject**

**Wood 90**, Allen W. *Hegel’s Ethical Thought.* Cambridge University Press. 1990. NP 3/29/16.

**The person and** the **subject are** abstractions, **incomplete** or one-sided **images of the individual human self, which are overcome only when individuals are considered in relation to "ethical life"** (Sittlichkeit). **Hegel identifies ethical life with "the objective ethical order"** (PR § 144), the "ethical substance," **to which particular individuals relate as "accidents"** (PR § 145). It is above all in his conception of ethical life that Hegel seems to assert the primacy of the social over the individual. But we have just seen that free subjectivity itself is the distinctive principle of modern ethical life. **Ethical life is more concrete than abstract right and morality** not because it emphasizes the collective over the individual, but **because the ethical image of the individual** is a more con­ crete one. It **addresses every side of the individual self, and situates the self in a living social order.**

**3. Bindingness: In order for an ethic to be binding, it has to explain where the principles come from and how they are actualized in the real world. Only my framework explains that because Hegel takes into account the infinite nature of the subject, its reason, and its limited capacities with the world around it, its sensibility.**

**4. Performativity: Our ability to debate is due to our self-legislation and free choice, as it allows you to choose what you want to do. This is only possible through our two-pronged subjectivity, made of rationality and subjectivity because, without it, we would not have the ability to act on anything. This outweighs because it’s a prerequisite to everything in this round. Without freedom, we couldn’t have this debate.**

Now negate:

**The actualization of our will occurs through intellectual property, Moore and Himma:**

Personality theorists such as Hegel maintain that **individuals have moral claims to their own talents**, feelings, character traits, **and experiences. We are self-owners** in this sense. **Control over physical and intellectual objects is essential for self-actualization—by expanding our selves outward** beyond our own minds **and mixing** these selves **with tangible and intangible items, we** both **define ourselves and obtain control over our goals** and projects. For Hegel, **the external actualization of the human will requires property** (Hegel 1821). Property rights are important in two ways according to this view. First, **by controlling and manipulating objects**, both tangible and intangible, **our will takes form in the world and we obtain a measure of freedom**. Individuals may use their physical and intellectual property rights, for example, to shield their private lives from public scrutiny and to facilitate life-long project pursuit. Second, **in some cases our personality becomes fused with an object**—thus **moral claims to control feelings**, character traits, **and experiences may be expanded to intangible works** (Humboldt 1792; Kohler 1969).

Moore, Adam, and Ken Himma. “Intellectual Property.” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Stanford University, 10 Oct. 2018, plato.stanford.edu/entries/intellectual-property/. Valley JS

**Property is necessary for the development of personhood, Priya:**

**Property rights**, it was observed, **are a means to protect the** personality interest or **“personhood” of individuals**; this seemed especially true with intellectual property rights that are draped over creations of the human mind.

The personhood theory of property focuses on the relationship between property and personality. **Property**, it is argued, **is justified because it is** conducive, perhaps **necessary, to the development of personality**.3 Personhood theory has been characterized as an alternative theory of property in the sense that the analysis is, to some extent, outside the mainstream of judicial, if not philosophic, thought.4.

Individuals in communal societies often have their interest in preservation well cared for as long as they fit the group’s conception of the good. **If**, however, **[individuals]** they **want to diverge from [a]**the **communal program** and venture out on their own path, **or express their own individuality, private property will facilitate that venture**. Kant, and later Hegel, saw this, the notion that **respecting private property is important for respecting personhood**.5

This alternative philosophy of property and its relationship to personality independent of natural rights or utilitarian justifications was developed by Hegel in the early nineteenth century, based on his conceptions of will, freedom, and personhood.6 Hegel believed that **each person has both an internal and an external existence**. One’s internal existence is her will, and one’s external existence is her sphere of freedom. Hegel stressed the importance of self-actualization, or the lack of dependence on another. However, **self-actualization and the extension of one’s sphere of freedom are achieved**, in Hegel’s view, not by withdrawing from the external world but rather **by** “overcoming it,” or **putting one’s will into** external objects - into **property**. Property, then, is central to Hegel’s theory of the fully selfactualized free person; it is the essence of personality.

Priya, Kanu. "Intellectual Property and Hegelian Justification." NUJS L. Rev. (2008): 359. [bracketed for grammatical clarity] Valley JS

Thus you negate.

Prefer additionally:

1. Reduce means to decrease the volume and concentrate the flavor of by boiling [Merriam-Webster]. Intellectual property protections are a concept and can’t be boiled off, so the resolution is incoherent.
2. Neg definition choice – the aff should have defined in the 1ac because it was in the rez so it’s predictable contestation, by not doing so they have forfeited their right to read a new definition – kills 1NC strategy since I premised my engagement on a lack of your definition.
3. Presumption and permissibility negate. a) if i said my name was rick astley you won’t believe me, b) there are more reasons why a statement might not be true than ones that directly prove the statement true. Permissibility flows neg because the aff has the burden to prove that the member nations of the wto ought to reduce intellectual property protections. In addition, permissibility negates because if we don’t know the permissibility of an action, it’s better to err on the side of caution and not do it. Thus, proving permissibility, which is distinct from obligation negates.

On the aff:

On framework: (extemped)

On contention:

1. **Waiving patents doesn’t work. Tabarrok:**

Alex Tabarrok, 21 — [Alex Tabarrok, “Patents are Not the Problem!,” Marginal REVOLUTION, 5-6-2021, <https://marginalrevolution.com/marginalrevolution/2021/05/ip-is-not-the-constraint.html>, bracketed for grammatical clarity] Valley JS

**Patents are not the problem**. All of the vaccine manufacturers are trying to increase supply as quickly as possible. **Billions of doses are being produced**–more than ever before in the history of the world. **Licenses are widely available. AstraZeneca [has]**have **licensed their vaccine for production** with [manufactures](https://www.astrazeneca.com/what-science-can-do/topics/technologies/pushing-boundaries-to-deliver-covid-19-vaccine-accross-the-globe.html) **around the world**, including in India, Brazil, Mexico, Argentina, China and South Africa. J&J’s vaccine has been licensed for production by multiple firms in the United States as well as with firms in Spain, South Africa and France. Sputnik has been licensed for production by firms in India, China, South Korea, Brazil and pending EMA approval with firms in Germany and France. Sinopharm has been licensed in the UAE, Egypt and Bangladesh. Novavax has licensed its vaccine for production in South Korea, India, and Japan and it is desperate to find other licensees but technology transfer isn’t easy and there are [limited supplies of raw materials](https://endpts.com/as-fears-mount-over-jj-and-astrazeneca-novavax-enters-a-shaky-spotlight/):

Virtually overnight, [Novavax] set up a network of outside manufacturers more ambitious than one outside executive said he’s ever seen, but they struggled at times to transfer their technology there amid pandemic travel restrictions. They were kicked out of one factory by the same government that’s bankrolled their effort. Competing with larger competitors, they’ve found themselves short on raw materials as diverse as Chilean tree bark and bioreactor bags. They signed a deal with India’s Serum Institute to produce many of their COVAX doses but now face the realistic chance that even when Serum gets to full capacity — and they are behind — India’s government, dealing with the world’s worst active outbreak, won’t let the shots leave the country.

**Plastic bags are a bigger bottleneck than patents. The US embargo on vaccine supplies** to India was precisely that the Biden administration used the DPA to prioritize things like bioreactor bags and filters to US suppliers and that meant that India’s Serum Institute was having trouble getting its production lines ready for Novavax. CureVac, [another potential mRNA vaccine](https://www.reuters.com/business/healthcare-pharmaceuticals/curevac-says-mass-vaccine-rollout-thrown-into-doubt-by-us-restrictions-2021-05-04/), is also finding **[makes] it difficult to find supplies** due to US restrictions (**which means supplies are short everywhere**). As [Derek Lowe said](https://blogs.sciencemag.org/pipeline/archives/2021/04/22/a-look-at-novavax):

**Abolishing patents will not** provide more shaker bags or more Chilean tree bark, nor **provide** more of the **key filtration materials needed for production**. These processes have a lot of potential choke points and rate-limiting steps in them, and **there is no wand that will wave that complexity away.**

Technology transfer has been difficult for AstraZeneca–which is one reason they have had production difficulties–and their vaccine uses relatively well understood technology. The mRNA technology is new and has never before been used to produce at scale. Pfizer and Moderna had to build factories and distribution systems from scratch. **There are no mRNA factories idling on the sidelines. If there were, Moderna or Pfizer would be happy to license since they are producing in their own factories 24** hours a day, **seven** days a week (monopolies restrict supply, remember?). Why do you think China hasn’t [yet produced](https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3128998/revolutionary-mrna-vaccines-made-chinese-firms-will-be-ready) an mRNA vaccine? Hint: it isn’t fear about violating IP. Moreover, even Moderna and Pfizer don’t yet fully understand their production technology, they are learning by doing every single day. **Moderna has said that they won’t enforce their patents during the pandemic** but **no one has stepped up to produce because no one else can.**

**The US** trade representative**’s announcement** is virtue signaling to the anti-market left and **will do little to nothing to increase supply.**

What can we do to increase supply? Sorry, there is no quick and cheap solution. We must spend. Trump’s Operation Warp Speed spent on the order of $15 billion. If we want more, [we need to spend more and on similar scale](https://science.sciencemag.org/content/371/6534/1107). The Biden administration paid $269 million to Merck to retool its factories to make the J&J vaccine. That was a good start. We could also offer Pfizer and Moderna say $100 a dose to produce in excess of their current production and maybe with those resources there is more they could do. South Africa and India and every other country in the world should offer the same (India hasn’t even approved the Pfizer vaccine and they are complaining about IP!??) We should ease up on the DPA and invest more in the supply chain–let’s get CureVac and the Serum Institute what they need. We should work like hell to find a s[ubstitute for Chilean tree bark](https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2020/10/single-tree-species-may-hold-key-coronavirus-vaccine/616792/). See [my piece in Science](https://science.sciencemag.org/content/371/6534/1107) co-authored with Michael Kremer et. al. for more ideas. (Note also that these ideas are better at dealing with current supply constraints and they also increase the incentive to produce future vaccines, unlike shortsighted patent abrogation.)

Bottom line is that **producing more takes real resources not waving magic patent wands**.

You may have gathered that I am angry. I am indeed angry that the people in power think they can solve real problems on the cheap and at someone else’s expense. This is not serious. I am also angry that **they are sending the wrong message** about business, profits and capitalism. So let me end on positive note. Like the Apollo program and Dunkirk, the creation of the mRNA vaccines by Pfizer and Moderna should be lauded with Nobel prizes and major movies. Churchill called the rescue at Dunkirk a “miracle of deliverance,” well the miracle of Moderna will rescue many more. Not only was a vaccine designed in under a year, an entirely new production process was set up to produce billions of doses to rescue the world. The creation of the mRNA vaccines was a triumph of science, logistics, and management and it was done at a speed that I had thought [possible only for past generations](https://patrickcollison.com/fast).

1. Tabarrok already says that big pharma isn’t enforcing patents so the aff is literally pointless.
2. **The WTO consistently screws over the poorest countries, they cause massive structural violence, Walker:**

But **the WTO membership has failed to deliver** the promised **pro-development changes**. Finding "development" in the Doha Development Round today is like looking for a needle in a haystack. **Developing countries** [**have been completely sidelined**](https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/poverty-matters/2011/jul/29/wto-doha-fails-poorest-countries) **by the economic and political interests of global powers.**

Here are 10 examples of how the WTO has failed the poor:

1. Cotton: the [Fairtrade Foundation revealed last year](http://www.fairtrade.org.uk/includes/documents/cm_docs/2010/f/2_ft_cotton_policy_report_2010_loresv2.pdf) how the $47bn in **subsidies paid to rich-country producers** in the past 10 years **has created barriers for the 15 million cotton farmers across west Africa trying to trade their way out of poverty**, and how **5 million of the world's poorest farming families have been forced out of business and into deeper poverty because of those subsidies.**

2. Agricultural subsidies: beyond cotton, WTO members have [failed even to agree how](http://www.ifpri.org/sites/default/files/publications/rb16.pdf) to reduce the huge subsidies paid to rich world farmers, whose overproduction continues to threaten the livelihoods of developing world farmers.

3. Trade agreements: **the WTO has** also **failed to clarify the** deliberately **ambiguous rules on** concluding **trade agreements that allow the poorest countries to be manipulated by the rich states**. In Africa, in negotiations with the EU, countries have been forced to eliminate tariffs on up to 90% of their trade because no clear rules exist to protect them.

4. Special treatment: the rules for developing countries, called ["special and differential treatment"](http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/devel_e/dev_special_differential_provisions_e.htm) rules, were meant to be reviewed to make them more precise, effective and operational. But the WTO has failed to work through the [88 proposals](http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min03_e/brief_e/brief21_e.htm) that would fill the legal vacuum.

5. Medicine: **the poorest in developing countries are unable to access affordable medicine because members have failed to clarify ambiguities** between the need for governments to protect public health on one hand and on the other to protect the [intellectual property rights](http://www.who.int/medicines/areas/policy/doha_declaration/en/index.html) of pharmaceutical companies.

6. Legal costs: the WTO pledged to improve access to its expensive and complex legal system, but has failed. In 15 years of dispute settlement under the WTO, [400 cases have been initiated](http://ictsd.org/i/events/dialogues/103446/). No African country has acted as a complainant and only one least developed country has ever filed a claim.

7. Protectionist economic policies: one of the WTO's five core functions agreed at its inception in 1995 was to achieve more coherence in [global economic policy-making](http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/discussion_papers13_e.pdf). Yet the WTO failed to curb the speedy increase in the number of [protectionist measures](http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news11_e/g20_wto_report_may11_e.doc) applied by G20 countries in response to the global economic crisis over the past two years – despite G20 leaders' repeated affirmations of their "unwavering" commitment to resist all forms of protectionist measures.

8. Natural disaster: **the WTO fails to alleviate suffering when it has the opportunity to do so**. In the case of natural disaster, the membership will have taken almost [two years to agree and implement temporary trade concessions](http://www.moneycontrol.com/news/current-affairs/eu-welcomes-india-allowing-wto-waiver-forpakistan_592122.html) for Pakistan, where severe flooding displaced 20 million people in 2010 and caused $10bn of damage. Those measures, according to the International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development, would have boosted Pakistan's exports to the EU by at least €100m this year.

9. Decision-making: the WTO makes most of its decisions by consensus – and **achieving consensus between 153 countries is nearly impossible**. But this shows another failure of the WTO: to break the link between market size and political weight that would give small and poor countries [a voice in the trade negotiations](http://www.globaleconomicgovernance.org/wp-content/uploads/Deere-and-Harbourd.Developing-Country-Coalitions-in-the-WTO.pdf).

10. Fair trade: 10 years after the start of the Doha Development Round, **governments have failed to make trade fair**. As long as **small and poor countries remain without a voice**, the role of campaigning organisations, such as [Traidcraft](http://www.traidcraft.co.uk/get_involved/campaign/time_to_nip_US_cotton_subsidies_in_the_bud) and [Fairtrade Foundation](http://www.fairtrade.org.uk/), which are working together to eliminate cotton subsidies, will remain critical.

Walker, Aurelie. “The WTO Has Failed Developing Nations.” The Guardian, Guardian News and Media, 14 Nov. 2011, www.theguardian.com/global-development/poverty-matters/2011/nov/14/wto-fails-developing-countries.