I affirm (resolved: the appropriation of outer space by private entities is unjust)

#### **The standard is maximizing expected wellbeing - hedonistic act util**

#### **1] Actor spec—governments must use util because they don’t have intentions and are constantly dealing with tradeoffs—outweighs since different agents have different obligations—takes out calc indicts since they are empirically denied.**

#### **2] Death is bad and outweighs – a] agents can’t act if they fear for their bodily security which constrains every ethical theory, b] it destroys the subject itself – kills any ability to achieve value in ethics since life is a prerequisite which means it’s a side constraint since we can’t reach the end goal of ethics without life**

#### **3] Pleasure and pain are the starting point for moral reasoning—they’re our most baseline desires and the only things that explain the intrinsic value of objects or actions**

Moen 16, Ole Martin (PhD, Research Fellow in Philosophy at University of Oslo). "An Argument for Hedonism." Journal of Value Inquiry 50.2 (2016): 267.

Let us start by observing, empirically, that **a widely shared judgment about intrinsic value** and disvalue **is that pleasure is intrinsically valuable and pain is intrinsically disvaluable**. On virtually any proposed list of intrinsic values and disvalues (we will look at some of them below), pleasure is included among the intrinsic values and pain among the intrinsic disvalues. This inclusion makes intuitive sense, moreover, for **there is something undeniably good about the way pleasure feels and something undeniably bad about the way pain feels**, and neither the goodness of pleasure nor the badness of pain seems to be exhausted by the further effects that these experiences might have. “Pleasure” and “pain” **are** here **understood inclusively**, as encompassing anything hedonically positive and anything hedonically negative. 2 The special value statuses of pleasure and pain are manifested in how we treat these experiences in our everyday reasoning about values. If you tell me that you are heading for the convenience store**, I might ask: “What for**?” This is a reasonable question, for when you go to the convenience store you usually do so, not merely for the sake of going to the convenience store, but for the sake of achieving something further that you deem to be valuable. You might answer, for example: “To buy soda.” This answer makes sense, for soda is a nice thing and you can get it at the convenience store. I might further inquire, however: “What is buying the soda good for?” This further question can also be a reasonable one, for it need not be obvious why you want the soda. You might answer: “Well, I want it for the pleasure of drinking it.” If I then proceed by asking “But what is the pleasure of drinking the soda good for?” the discussion is likely to reach an awkward end. **The reason is that the pleasure is not good for anything further; it is simply that for which going to the convenience store and buying the soda is good**. 3 As Aristotle observes: “**We never ask** [a man] **what** his **end is in being pleased, because we assume that pleasure is choice worthy in itself**.”4 Presumably, a similar story can be told in the case of pains, for if someone says “This is painful!” we never respond by asking: “And why is that a problem?” We take for granted that **if something is painful, we have a sufficient explanation of why it is bad**. If we are onto something in our everyday reasoning about values, it seems that **pleasure and pain are both places where we reach the end of the line in matters of value**. Although **pleasure and pain thus seem to be good candidates for intrinsic value and disvalue**, several objections have been raised against this suggestion: (1) that pleasure and pain have instrumental but not intrinsic value/disvalue; (2) that pleasure and pain gain their value/disvalue derivatively, in virtue of satisfying/frustrating our desires; (3) that there is a subset of pleasures that are not intrinsically valuable (so-called “evil pleasures”) and a subset of pains that are not intrinsically disvaluable (so-called “noble pains”), and (4) that pain asymbolia, masochism, and practices such as wiggling a loose tooth render it implausible that pain is intrinsically disvaluable. I shall argue that these objections fail. Though it is, of course, an open question whether other objections to P1 might be more successful, I shall assume that if (1)–(4) fail, we are justified in believing that P1 is true itself a paragon of freedom—there will always be some agents able to interfere substantially with one’s choices. The effective level of protection one enjoys, and hence one’s actual degree of freedom, will vary according to multiple factors: how powerful one is, how powerful individuals in one’s vicinity are, how frequent police patrols are, and so on. Now, we saw above that what makes a slave unfree on Pettit’s view is the fact that his master has the power to interfere arbitrarily with his choices; in other words, what makes the slave unfree is the power relation that obtains between his master and him. The difﬁculty is that, in light of the facts I just mentioned, there is no reason to think that this power relation will be unique. A similar relation could obtain between the master and someone other than the slave: absent perfect state control, the master may very well have enough power to interfere in the lives of countless individuals. Yet it would be wrong to infer that these individuals lack freedom in the way the slave does; if they lack anything, it seems to be security. A problematic power relation can also obtain between the slave and someone other than the master, since there may be citizens who are more powerful than the master and who can therefore interfere with the slave’s choices at their discretion. Once again, it would be wrong to infer that these individuals make the slave unfree in the same way that the master does. Something appears to be missing from Pettit’s view. If I live in a particularly nasty part of town, then it may turn out that, when all the relevant factors are taken into account, I am just as vulnerable to outside interference as are the slaves in the royal palace, yet it does not follow that our conditions are equivalent from the point of view of freedom. As a matter of fact, we may be equally vulnerable to outside interference, but as a matter of right, our standings could not be more different. I have legal recourse against anyone who interferes with my freedom; the recourse may not be very effective—presumably it is not, if my overall vulnerability to outside interference is comparable to that of a slave— but I still have full legal standing.68 By contrast, the slave lacks legal recourse against the interventions of one speciﬁc individual: his master. It is that fact, on a Kantian view—a fact about the legal relation in which a slave stands to his master—that sets slaves apart from freemen. The point may appear trivial, but it does get something right: whereas one cannot identify a power relation that obtains uniquely between a slave and his master, the legal relation between them is undeniably unique. A master’s right to interfere with respect to his slave does not extend to freemen, regardless of how vulnerable they might be as a matter of fact, and citizens other than the master do not have the right to order the slave around, regardless of how powerful they might be. This suggests that Kant is correct in thinking that the ideal of freedom is essentially linked to a person’s having full legal standing. More speciﬁcally, he is correct in holding that the importance of rights is not exhausted by their contribution to the level of protection that an individual enjoys, as it must be on an instrumental view like Pettit’s. Although it does matter that rights be enforced with reasonable effectiveness, the sheer fact that one has adequate legal rights is essential to one’s standing as a free citizen. In this respect, Kant stays faithful to the idea that freedom is primarily a matter of standing—a standing that the freeman has and that the slave lacks. Pettit himself frequently insists on the idea, but he fails to do it justice when he claims that freedom is simply a matter of being adequately (and reliably) shielded against the strength of others. As Kant recognizes, the standing of a free citizen is a more complex matter than that. One could perhaps worry that the idea of legal standing is something of a red herring here—that it must ultimately be reducible to a complex network of power relations and, hence, that the position I attribute to Kant differs only nominally from Pettit’s. That seems to me doubtful. Viewing legal standing as essential to freedom makes sense only if our conception of the former includes conceptions of what constitutes a fully adequate scheme of legal rights, appropriate legal recourse, justiﬁed punishment, and so on. Only if one believes that these notions all boil down to power relations will Kant’s position appear similar to Pettit’s. On any other view—and certainly that includes most views recently defended by philosophers—the notion of legal standing will outstrip the power relations that ground Pettit’s theory.

#### **4] Extinction outweighs**

MacAskill 14 [William, Oxford Philosopher and youngest tenured philosopher in the world, Normative Uncertainty, 2014]

The human race might go extinct from a number of causes: asteroids, supervolcanoes, runaway climate change, pandemics, nuclear war, and the development and use of dangerous new technologies such as synthetic biology, all pose risks (even if very small) to the continued survival of the human race.184 And different moral views give opposing answers to question of whether this would be a good or a bad thing. It might seem obvious that human extinction would be a very bad thing, both because of the loss of potential future lives, and because of the loss of the scientific and artistic progress that we would make in the future. But the issue is at least unclear. The continuation of the human race would be a mixed bag: inevitably, it would involve both upsides and downsides. And if one regards it as much more important to avoid bad things happening than to promote good things happening then one could plausibly regard human extinction as a good thing.For example, one might regard the prevention of bads as being in general more important that the promotion of goods, as defended historically by G. E. Moore,185 and more recently by Thomas Hurka.186 One could weight the prevention of suffering as being much more important that the promotion of happiness. Or one could weight the prevention of objective bads, such as war and genocide, as being much more important than the promotion of objective goods, such as scientific and artistic progress. If the human race continues its future will inevitably involve suffering as well as happiness, and objective bads as well as objective goods. So, if one weights the bads sufficiently heavily against the goods, or if one is sufficiently pessimistic about humanity’s ability to achieve good outcomes, then one will regard human extinction as a good thing.187 However, even if we believe in a moral view according to which human extinction would be a good thing, we still have strong reason to prevent near-term human extinction. To see this, we must note three points. First, we should note that the extinction of the human race is an extremely high stakes moral issue. Humanity could be around for a very long time: if humans survive as long as the median mammal species, we will last another two million years. On this estimate, the number of humans in existence in the The future, given that we don’t go extinct any time soon, would be 2×10^14. So if it is good to bring new people into existence, then it’s very good to prevent human extinction. Second, human extinction is by its nature an irreversible scenario. If we continue to exist, then we always have the option of letting ourselves go extinct in the future (or, perhaps more realistically, of considerably reducing population size). But if we go extinct, then we can’t magically bring ourselves back into existence at a later date. Third, we should expect ourselves to progress, morally, over the next few centuries, as we have progressed in the past. So we should expect that in a few centuries’ time we will have better evidence about how to evaluate human extinction than we currently have. Given these three factors, it would be better to prevent the near-term extinction of the human race, even if we thought that the extinction of the human race would actually be a very good thing. To make this concrete, I’ll give the following simple but illustrative model. Suppose that we have 0.8 credence that it is a bad thing to produce new people, and 0.2 certain that it’s a good thing to produce new people; and the degree to which it is good to produce new people, if it is good, is the same as the degree to which it is bad to produce new people, if it is bad. That is, I’m supposing, for simplicity, that we know that one new life has one unit of value; we just don’t know whether that unit is positive or negative. And let’s use our estimate of 2×10^14 people who would exist in the future, if we avoid near-term human extinction. Given our stipulated credences, the expected benefit of letting the human race go extinct now would be (.8-.2)×(2×10^14) = 1.2×(10^14). Suppose that, if we let the human race continue and did research for 300 years, we would know for certain whether or not additional people are of positive or negative value. If so, then with the credences above we should think it 80% likely that we will find out that it is a bad thing to produce new people, and 20% likely that we will find out that it’s a good thing to produce new people. So there’s an 80% chance of a loss of 3×(10^10) (because of the delay of letting the human race go extinct), the expected value of which is 2.4×(10^10). But there’s also a 20% chance of a gain of 2×(10^14), the expected value of which is 4×(10^13). That is, in expected value terms, the cost of waiting for a few hundred years is vanishingly small compared with the benefit of keeping one’s options open while one gains new information.

Now affirm

**Hendricks describes the Dark Forest theory:**

**The Dark Forest solution explains why we haven’t heard from aliens by positing that they are purposefully keeping quiet.**

The reasoning is laid out best in the science fiction novel [The Dark Forest](https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/23168817-the-dark-forest), by [Liu Cixin](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liu_Cixin). The plot of the book, the second in a series, concerns questions of how to best interact with potentially hostile alien life.

In the novel, the argument is laid out like this:

**All life desires to stay alive.**

**There is no way to know if other lifeforms can or will destroy you if given a chance.**

**Lacking assurances, the safest option for any species is to annihilate other life forms before they have a chance to do the same.**

**Since all other lifeforms** in the novel **are risk-averse and willing to do anything to save themselves, contact of any kind is dangerous, as it almost assuredly would lead to the contacted race wiping out whoever was foolish enough to give away their location**. This leads to all civilizations attempting to hide in radio silence.

The reasoning behind the paranoia is explained in this paragraph from the novel:

The universe is a dark forest. Every civilization is an armed hunter stalking through the trees like a ghost, gently pushing aside branches that block the path and trying to tread without sound. Even breathing is done with care. The hunter has to be careful, because everywhere in the forest are stealthy hunters like him. If he finds another life—another hunter, angel, or a demon, a delicate infant to tottering old man, a fairy or demigod—there’s only one thing he can do: open fire and eliminate them.

It’s a bit like the [prisoner’s dilemma](http://bigthink.com/videos/barry-nalebuff-explains-the-prisoners-dilemma) really, and the concept is based on applied [game theory](http://bigthink.com/laurie-vazquez/are-you-envious-or-trusting-game-theory-can-tell-you).

Is there a non-literary approach to this solution? Or is it just an idea that is good for a story?

It was also put forth by scientist [David Brin](http://www.davidbrin.com/biography.html) as a potential solution to the lack of radio evidence for alien life. While [the variant he describes](http://articles.adsabs.harvard.edu/cgi-bin/nph-iarticle_query?letter=.&classic=YES&bibcode=1983QJRAS..24..283B&page=&type=SCREEN_VIEW&data_type=PDF_HIGH&send=GET&filetype=.pdf) relies on robotic probes carrying out the task of killing off civilizations other than the one that created it, the core concept remains the same. In this excerpt, he explains why this solution an attractive one for scientific purposes and terrifying for existential reasons:

“It is consistent with all of the facts and philosophical principles described in the first part of this article. **There is no need to struggle to suppress the elements of the Drake equation in order to explain the Great Silence**, nor need we suggest that no ETIS anywhere would bear the cost of interstellar travel. It need only happen once for the results of this scenario to become the equilibrium condition in the Galaxy. We would not have detected extraterrestrial radio traffic- nor would any ETIS have ever settled on Earth- because all were killed shortly after discovering radio.”

He then reminds us that broadcasts of I Love Lucy are racing across the cosmos, ready to reveal our location and sense of humor to anybody who can pick them up.

How plausible is this theory?

**This theory** has the advantage of only affecting one of the variables in the Drake equation and affecting the one that is the most open to speculation. It also **doesn’t require us to make broad assumptions about how all alien civilizations behave; a single advanced race that acts this way would be enough to cause the observed situation.**

This would also explain why we haven’t found any mundane alien radio signals despite a century of being able to pick them up. Just as we accidentally send our radio signals, meant for us, out into space, another civilization would be likely to as well. One possible reason for this is that **other civilizations are so fearful of being detected that they purposely avoid sending out any radio evidence of their existence.**

Hendricks, Scotty. “Dark Forest Theory: A Terrifying Explanation of Why We Haven't Heard from Aliens Yet.” Big Think, 30 Sept. 2021, bigthink.com/surprising-science/the-dark-forest-theory-a-terrifying-explanation-of-why-we-havent-heard-from-aliens-yet/. Valley JS

**Multiple warrants for the Dark Forest, Davies:**

So why is **the Dark Forest Theory** so frightening? Because it **suggests that** there is **alien life** out there, but it **is hostile**. In fact, **it is staying silent for a reason**. The reason is this killer alien species wants to end human civilisation on Earth and take the planet for its own species.

If you think this is a storyline best suited for a Hollywood blockbuster, you only have to [look back at our own history](https://www.learning-mind.com/history-of-civilization-climate-change/).

When explorers set foot on the new unchartered territory, they do not acclimatise themselves with the local people. In fact, if they consider themselves to be more civilised, they take over the land and the rights of the indigenous people.

Here are **three reasons why experts believe in the Dark Forest Theory:**

**Survival of the fittest**

**All living creatures have an innate drive to live and to survive**. Whether they are a human, animal, fish, bird, or alien. **If one species cannot communicate effectively with another, and they don’t know their intentions, it is prudent to eliminate them first.**

**Limited resources in the universe**

We already know the Earth is a rare planet in the universe. How many [science-fiction movies](https://www.learning-mind.com/thought-provoking-sci-fi-movies/) feature plotlines where aliens attack because their planet is dying and they need our resources?

Other civilisations are keeping quiet to survive

Astronomer Dominik believes **the reason we have not made contact with life in outer space is simple. The more advanced civilisations are hiding from hostile aliens.**

Which begs the question, **should we be trying to make contact if we don’t really know what’s out there**? There are **some astronomers** that **would prefer to keep a much lower profile and** take the **‘wait and see’** approach.

Davies, Janey. “Dark Forest Theory and the Creepy Reason Why We Haven't Found Aliens.” Learning Mind, 3 July 2019, www.learning-mind.com/dark-forest-theory-aliens/. Valley JS

**First contact is incredibly dangerous, Andersen:**

Liu did not concede this point. To him, **the absence of these signals is** just further **evidence that hunters are good at hiding**. He told me that **we are limited in how we think about other civilizations**. “Especially those that may last millions or billions of years,” he said. “When we wonder why they don’t use certain technologies to spread across a galaxy, we might be like spiders wondering why humans don’t use webs to catch insects.” And anyway, **an older civilization that has achieved internal peace may still behave like a hunter**, Liu said, in part because **it would grasp the difficulty of “understanding one another across cosmic distances**.” And it would know that **the stakes of a misunderstanding could be existential**.

**First contact would be trickier** still **if we encountered a postbiological artificial intelligence that had taken control of its planet**. Its worldview might be doubly alien. **It might not feel empathy**, which is not an essential feature of intelligence but instead an emotion installed by a particular evolutionary history and culture. **The logic behind its actions could be beyond the powers of the human imagination**. It might have transformed its entire planet into a supercomputer, and, according to [a trio of Oxford researchers](https://arxiv.org/pdf/1705.03394.pdf), it might find the current cosmos too warm for truly long-term, energy-efficient computing. It might cloak itself from observation, and power down into a dreamless sleep lasting hundreds of millions of years, until such time when the universe has expanded and cooled to a temperature that allows for many more epochs of computing.

Andersen, Ross. “What Happens If China Makes First Contact?” The Atlantic, Atlantic Media Company, 16 Nov. 2017, www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2017/12/what-happens-if-china-makes-first-contact/544131/. Valley JS

**Applies to humans too, Andersen 2:**

Liu told me that **first contact would lead to a human conflict, if not a world war**. This is a popular trope in science fiction. In last year’s Oscar-nominated film Arrival, the sudden appearance of an extraterrestrial intelligence inspires the formation of apocalyptic cults and nearly triggers a war between world powers anxious to gain an edge in the race to understand the alien’s messages. There is also real-world evidence for Liu’s pessimism: **When Orson Welles’s “War of the Worlds” radio broadcast simulating an alien invasion was replayed in Ecuador in 1949, a riot broke out, resulting in the deaths of six people**. “**We have fallen into conflicts over things that are much easier to solve**,” Liu told me.

Andersen, Ross. “What Happens If China Makes First Contact?” The Atlantic, Atlantic Media Company, 16 Nov. 2017, www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2017/12/what-happens-if-china-makes-first-contact/544131/. Valley JS

**Unintentional radio waves can alert aliens to our presence**

**Haqq-Misra**, Jacob, **et al**. "The benefits and harm of transmitting into space." Space Policy 29.1 (2013): 40-48. Valley JS

Does transmitting **radio messages** into space pose a risk to human civilization? Efforts to send messages to potential extraterrestrial watchers1 have raised concerns that such actions may provoke unwanted attention. Similar transmissions into space, though unintentional, **occur as a result of radio communication on Earth, and pose[s]** similar **risks**. This paper analyzes deliberate and unintentional transmissions into space and the degree to which these activities could provide benefits or harms to Earth and humanity.

Electromagnetic waves have been used to communicate for over one hundred years. Television broadcasts, mobile phone conversations, satellite transmissions, and military, civil, and astronomical radars all use some part of the electromagnetic spectrum—particularly radio and microwave wavelengths—to transmit encoded information from a sender to a watcher. These technologies have transformed communication across the globe and have enabled human space flight and robotic exploration of the solar system. **Nearly all terrestrial electromagnetic transmissions used for communication also radiate into space**. Although such signals decrease in intensity as they move away from Earth, this **leakage radiation can be detected over interstellar distances with a sufficient**ly sensitive **telescope** [1,2].

Cocconi and Morrison [3] first suggested that a search for interstellar radio transmissions could uncover evidence of intelligent extraterrestrial life elsewhere in the galaxy. Over fifty years later, the search for extraterrestrial intelligence (SETI) has found no evidence of artificial signals in space, although efforts to broaden the search continue [4]. Another way to search for intelligence elsewhere in the universe involves transmitting messages toward target star systems. 1 Throughout this paper we use the term watcher to designate the recipient of an electromagnetic signal, although the term observer can be used interchangeably. This is known as “messaging to extraterrestrial intelligence” or METI [5]. The ultimate goal of METI is to transmit a signal that is eventually received by an extraterrestrial civilization, although the vast distances between stars renders any conversation a multigenerational project [6]. Nevertheless, a handful of attempts at METI have been made over the last half century with messages increasing in size and complexity [7]. These efforts can be considered as symbolic or demonstrations of human technology rather than serious efforts to converse with extraterrestrial civilizations.

**Both deliberate METI signals and unintentional leakage radiation contribute to the overall radio**2 **emission from Earth**. There has been concern that **this signature of our technological civilization could** constitute a risk because it **reveal**s **our location in the galaxy to any potentially hostile extraterrestrial civilizations** [8-18]. There have even been calls for a moratorium on deliberate METI transmissions until international agreements for how to proceed have been reached [19]. Others have argued that METI broadcasts do not pose a significant risk [7,20-23] because any extraterrestrial watchers would be able to establish the presence of life on Earth by the spectrum of reflected ultraviolet, optical, and near-infrared sunlight into space from the surface and the atmosphere. An extraterrestrial watcher could also potentially learn of our technological civilization by detecting artificial nighttime lighting of large urban areas [24].

Optimists suggest that contact with extraterrestrials could bring about great benefits for humanity [25], while others note that **contact with technological civilizations has often resulted in the collapse of stone-age societies on Earth** [14]. Contact with extraterrestrials could result in a number of consequences [26], so if the risk from transmission into space is non-zero, then should transmissions into space be permitted, regulated, or banned? If human activities can be detected across astronomical distances, then should humanity cease or attempt to disguise such actions? Does METI significantly increase risks to Earth and human civilization? These questions have been raised repeatedly in the research literature as well as in media and political coverage of SETI and METI research. We address these questions in this paper by reviewing existing knowledge of the Earth’s radio signature, which includes the relative strength of signals potentially detectable over interstellar distances. We then develop an analytical framework for evaluating the consequences of transmission and discuss this analysis in the context of existing policies and protocols.

**Space appropriation will increase radio waves, multiple warrants:**


1. **Colonies will have to communicate within themselves through radio, ie cities on Mars will have to communicate with each other**
2. **Colonies will have to communicate with each other, ie Earth has to communicate with Mars.**

That means vote aff:

Any action that increases the risk of extinction is unjust because it decreases utility.

Interpretation: Debaters must, on the page with their name and the school they attend, disclose their contact information

Violation: They didn’t. Ss for proof with time-stamp



Standards:

1] Inclusion – Novices would have a way to contact you about your positions and learn from them and debaters would tell you before round about triggering positions that you’ve read before. Independent voter because inclusion is a gateway issue for debate to occur in the first place

2] Research – disclosure increases research and gets rid of anti-educational arguments because debaters are forced to prepare cases knowing that people will have answers AND people get the opportunity to research answers to disclosed cases.

**Nails 13** - (Jacob [I am a policy debater at Georgia State University. I debated LD for 4 years for Starr's Mill High School (GA) and graduated in 2012.] "A Defense of Disclosure (Including Third-Party Disclosure)" http://nsdupdate.com/2013/a-defense-of-disclosure-including-third-party-disclosure-by-jacob-nails/)

I fall squarely on the side of disclosure. I find that the largest advantage of widespread disclosure is the educational value it provides. First, **disclosure streamlines research**. Rather than every team and every lone wolf researching completely in the dark, **the wiki provides a public body of knowledge that everyone can contribute to and build off of**. Students can look through the different studies on the topic and choose the best ones on an informed basis without the prohibitively large burden of personally surveying all of the literature. The best arguments are identified and replicated, which is a natural result of an open marketplace of ideas. Quality of evidence increases across the board. In theory, the increased quality of information [this] could trade off with quantity. If debaters could just look to the wiki for evidence, it might remove the competitive incentive to do one’s own research. Empirically, however, the opposite has been true. In fact, a second advantage of **disclosure** is that it **motivates research. Debaters cannot expect to make it a whole topic with the same** stock **AC** – that is, unless they are continually updating and frontlining it. Likewise, **debaters with access to their opponents’ cases can do more targeted and specific research**. Students can go to a new level of depth, researching not just the pros and cons of the topic but the specific authors, arguments, and adovcacies employed by other debaters. The incentive to cut author-specific indicts is low if there’s little guarantee that the author will ever be cited in a round but high if one knows that specific schools are using that author in rounds. In this way, disclosure increases incentive to research by altering a student’s cost-benefit analysis so that the time spent researching is more valuable, i.e. more likely to produce useful evidence because it is more directed. In any case, if publicly accessible evidence jeopardized research, backfiles and briefs would have done LD in a long time ago. Lastly, and to my mind most significantly, **disclosure weeds out anti-educational arguments**. I have in mind the sort of theory spikes and underdeveloped analytics whose strategic value comes only from the fact that the time to think of and enunciate responses to them takes longer than the time spent making the arguments themselves. **If [theory spikes]** these arguments **were made on a level playing field where each side had equal time to craft answers, they would seldom win rounds, which is a testimony to the real world applicability** (or lack thereof) **of such strategies**. A model in which arguments have to withstand close scrutiny to win rounds creates incentive to find the best arguments on the topic rather than the shadiest. Having transitioned from LD to policy where disclosure is more universal, I can say that debates are more substantive, developed, and responsive when both sides know what they’re getting into prior to the round. The educational benefits of disclosure alone aren’t likely to convince the fairness-outweighs-education crowd, but I’ve learned over the course of many theory debates that most of that crowd has a very warped and confusing conception of fairness. Debaters who produce better research are more deserving of a win. Debaters who can make smart arguments and defend them from criticism should win out over debaters who hide behind obfuscation. That so many rounds these days are resolved on frivolous theory and dropped, single-sentence blips suggests that wins are not going to the “better debaters” in any meaningful sense of the term. The structure of LD in the status quo doesn’t incentivize better debating.

K2 education because researching and preparing is a gateway issue to determine how much education and knowledge youve gained from the tournament.

3] evidence ethics: if they don't disclose or provide contact info, theres no way for me to confirm whether or not they keep up with their academic integrity. I won’t be able to see the case and cites until the NC, in which case its too late to find them because i need to focus on the round. EE is an independent voter since otherwise people can just use fake sources that literally dont exist.

DONT LET THEM SAY THIS IS BAD FOR NOVICES, TURN ITS BETTER FOR NOVICES TO LOSE EARLY IN PRELIMS SO THEY DONT LOSE ON SOMEHTING LIKE THIS IN THINGS LIKE BID ROUNDS. SO DROP THEM NOW TO CLEARLY SET A NORM THAT THIS IS HOW DEBATE AND THE WIKI OPERATE.

Ed: 1) only reason schools fund debate so it’s constitutive, 2) only tangible impact from round

Paradigm issues are read later

Underview:

1. I get 1ar theory A) otherwise the neg would be infinitely abusive and there would be no way to check back B) size of link – every reason 1AR theory is bad is just a reason it’s hard to respond to in general and should be erred against, not rejected, so they have to weigh that disad vs the actual shell. And drop the debater on 1ar theory - the time crunched 1ar is insufficient to win both theory and substance, so aff has no ability to check abuse leading to infinite harm. No 2N RVIs – a) They can create a massive 6 minute counter interp, while I only have 3 minutes to respond, extend the aff, and preclude the neg, making the aff near impossible, b) it creates a chilling effect for the aff. No new 2N responses a) gives them a 6-3 time skew b) 1AR strategy is predicated on what I can go for but new 2N weighing non-uniques all of that. Competing interps: reasonability is arbitrary and just leads to judge intervention

2. AFF RVI’s, Aff flex- neg can collapse to any layer so aff needs the same for the 2AR – this outweighs. 1) 2N collapse – time skew becomes 6-1 since I cover multiple layers, making it impossible to win 2) 1AR is too short to read theory compared to the neg so the aff needs each layer to be reciprocal.

3, The ROTB is TT -

A) Isomorphism: alternative RTBs aren’t binary win/loss, and thus cannot function in debate

B) Constitutivism: the ballot and tab software presents decisions as aff/neg, not who best achieves some good value. Also, “affirm” is “To state that is true” [1] and negate is “to deny the existence or truth of”, which independently proves truth testing.

C) Key to 1) Ground Parity: The wording committee and topic selection process exist to identify topics with a range of defensible arguments on both sides, “role of the ballot” claims can frame the round in ways that make my ground either absurd or morally abhorrent 2) Predictability: The only face value of a resolution is it’s truth or falsity as a statement – not some inherent other framework

4. Presumption and Permissibility affirm, If I tell you my name is Joe, you’ll believe me unless someone proves otherwise. Also affirming is harder because of a structural skew—so if the round is irresolvable, vote aff to combat it.

6. The Negative must use CX to check any interp or violation they want to read with the affirmative-deters frivolous theory which is key to education, also friv theory distracts from creating material change, means give me an I-meet for any shells they don’t check in cx because I would’ve been willing to spec to avoid the theory debate. And no Cx skew args since the purpose of Cx is to clarify and they get a positive time trade off since clarifying takes 10 seconds, but running theory takes minutes.

7. The resolution is already resolved, so you auto affirm.

8. Appropriation is defined as the act of taking or using something especially in a way that is illegal, unfair, etc. [Merriam-Webster] and unjust is defined as not [fair](https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/fair) [Cambridge English Dictionary]. That affirms because appropriation is definitionally unfair, and unjust means unfair, so you auto-affirm.

10. Give me 30 speaks for wearing school drip bc it helps fund debate, also i helped design this shirt so it incentives creativity