**1AC**

**1AC – Adv – Customary International Law**

**The right to strike is Customary International Law, but the US fails to meet *opinio juris* standards. Perception of US insufficiency breeds uncertainty with confidence in international law and spirals into noncompliance – that causes a legitimacy crisis. No alt causes to legitimacy – FOA is central to the ILO and the biggest internal link.**

**Brudney 21** [James; 2/8/21; Joseph Crowley Chair in Labor and Employment Law, Fordham Law School; “The Right to Strike as Customary International Law,” THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, Vol 46, [https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1710 HYPERLINK "https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1710&context=yjil"& HYPERLINK "https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1710&context=yjil"context=yjil](https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1710&context=yjil)] Justin \*\* Brackets in original

II. THE **INTERNATIONAL RIGHT TO STRIKE AS CIL**

That an **international right to strike** is widely recognized by governments does not mean the right has **assumed the status of CIL**. This Part seeks to forge that link, to show how the international right to strike **qualifies as CIL**. It begins (II.A) by identifying the two basic elements of CIL and explaining why the right to strike is an integral textual and conceptual component of FOA. It then establishes (II.B and C) that FOA and the right to strike satisfy both elements of CIL—a general practice accepted by States, stemming from a sense of legal obligation. While there are variations and qualifiers at the national level, the contours of CIL status are clear: a basic right subject to three substantive restrictions; a recognition that strikers retain their employment relationship during the strike itself; and certain procedural prerequisites or limitations. 105

This Part next demonstrates (II.D) that the **two U.S. practices discussed earlier** as **deviating from the international right to strike**—**denying all public employees the right** and **authorizing permanent replacement of lawful strikers**— co ntravene **core aspects of the right to strike as CIL.** Finally (II.E), this Part introduces the **complexities of the U.S. position on FOA and the right to strike as international rights**, reflected in the **failure to ratify Convention 87** while both Congress and the executive branch **embrace Convention 87 principles including the right to strike.**

A. Initial Definitions and Considerations

1. **CIL Standards**

The two basic elements that determine the existence and content of a rule of CIL are first, the **requirement of a general practice by States**, and second, the requirement that **the general practice be undertaken from a sense of legal right or obligation** (**opinio juris**).106 The first element is objective: whether there is a sufficiently widespread and consistent practice of States endorsing and adhering to the rule. Evidence of such a general practice may include governmental conduct in connection with treaties; legislative or administrative acts; decisions of national courts; conduct in relation to resolutions adopted by an international organization; diplomatic acts and correspondence; and executive operational conduct on the ground.107 The second element, opinio juris, is more subjective: the general practice must be **undertaken based on its acceptance as law, rather than being accepted based on mere usage or habit or some pragmatic motive**. As is true for general practice, evidence of acceptance as law may come in a range of forms. These include public statements made on behalf of States; government legal opinions; decisions of national courts; treaty provisions; diplomatic correspondence; and conduct related to resolutions adopted by an international organization.108

2. The **Right to Strike as Integral to FOA**

Freedom of association is **one of the core principles on which the ILO was founded and continues to exist**. 109 As set forth under Convention 87, FOA **includes a series of integral elements**, of which the **right to strike is one**. The **two ILO supervisory mechanisms** that have **regularly applied or interpreted Convention 87** have understood it **to include the right to strike** from the early days of the Convention’s existence.110 Leading U.N. human rights covenants also **recognize FOA as a basic right**, including the right to strike as a component. 111 And the labor provisions of the 2019 U.S.-Mexico-Canada trade agreement include the following statement: “For greater certainty, the right to strike is linked to the **right to freedom of association, which cannot be realized without protecting the right to strike**.”112 Accordingly, if FOA is seen as **Customary International Law** (CIL), and the right to strike is an essential component of FOA, then the right to strike should also be understood to be part of CIL.

Consider in this regard the following integral elements of Convention 87. The fact that as part of FOA, workers and employers “shall have the right to establish and . . . to join organizations of their own choosing without previous authorization”113 means the State may not impose unreasonably high membership requirements that hinder the establishment of organizations, or require that members may not join several different organizations. 114 Similarly, the fact that under FOA, workers and employers “shall have the right to . . . elect their representatives in full freedom [and that] public authorities shall refrain from any interference which would restrict this right or impede the lawful exercise thereof,”115 means the State may not impose limits on candidates due to their nationality, literacy, political opinions, moral standing, or for workers, their non-employment in the employer’s occupation or enterprise. 116 And the fact that as part of FOA, workers “shall have the right . . . to organize their. . . activities and to formulate their programs” free “from any interference [by the public authorities]”117 means that worker organizations, in order to defend the occupational interests of their members, have the right to hold trade union meetings, the right to have access to places of work and to communicate with management, and the right to organize nonviolent protest action including strikes. 118

B. FOA and the **Right to Strike as General Practice**

There is ample support that FOA is widely accepted in objective terms. Convention 87 has been **ratified by 155 countries, or 83 percent of the 187 ILO Member States**. 119 In addition, the ILO Constitution, endorsed by all members, specifies the **critical role of FOA both in its 1919 founding document** and the **1944 Declaration of Philadelphia as a constitutional addition**.120 More recently, ILO Declarations issued in 1998 and 2008, again embraced by all members, make clear that even Member States that have not ratified Convention 87 are obligated to act in good faith to respect and effectuate FOA principles.121

Beyond the ILO realm, workers’ **freedom of association**, including the right to form and join trade unions and expressly the **right to strike**, is recognized in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (**ICESCR**), adopted by the **United Nations General Assembly to be effective** 1976.122 The Covenant has been ratified by 171 countries, including two of the four large-population countries that have not ratified Convention 87.123 Another major UN Human Rightstreaty, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (**ICCPR**), also adopted by the U.N. General Assembly to be effective in 1976, recognizes FOA including the right to form and join trade unions. 124 The ICCPR has been ratified by 173 countries, including three of the four largepopulation countries that have not ratified Convention 87; its human rights committee has consistently recognized the **right to strike as part of FOA under the Covenant**. 125 Indeed, of the 187 ILO Member States, only 11 relatively smallpopulation countries have not ratified at least one of Convention 87, the ICESCR, or the ICCPR.126

FOA is also expressly **recognized in a labor setting in the European Convention on Human Rights, which has been ratified by all 48 countries in the Council of Europe**. 127 At a national level, the vast majority of constitutions provide for freedom of association, although some use general language that (unlike the international instruments just mentioned) does not specify workers or trade unions. 128

Apart from States’ nearly-universal embrace of FOA as a general matter, the right to strike itself has been broadly accepted by governments. As noted earlier, more than 90 countries have made a public commitment to the right to strike in their constitutions. 129 These commitments have translated to actual practice when national courts have relied on guidance from the CEACR and CFA in assuring compliance with their constitutional right to strike. Judicial interpretation of the international right as part of applying a domestic constitution often involves assuring compliance by governments or employers,130 though it also may require compliance by unions. 131 And compliance with the international right to strike may even emanate from application of a national constitution that endorses FOA without being explicit about the right to strike.132

Among the many national courts that have invoked the CEACR and/or CFA in support of a right to strike,133 two other cases worth noting involve Brazil and Kenya because neither country has ratified Convention 87. In 2012, the Labour Court in Brazil ordered reinstatement of workers terminated for participating in a work stoppage. 134 Under Brazil’s Constitution, “norms that define fundamental rights and guarantees are directly applicable.”135 Given that the Court found that the employer’s conduct had violated the principle of freedom of association and the free exercise of the right to strike, it seems that the “principle of freedom of association” was being directly applied as a matter of customary international law rather than through a ratified treaty or convention.136 In 2013, the Industrial Court of Kenya ordered the reinstatement of five workers dismissed for participating in a strike and strike-related activities. The Court’s reasoning derived from Kenya’s general participation in the ILO, including “respect for International Labour Standards,” rather than direct application of fundamental norms as in the Brazil case.137 The Industrial Court invoked a report by the CEACR and decisions by the CFA to support its decision; its recognition of FOA as an accepted international standard suggests that reports from the ILO supervisory bodies served as evidence of CIL.138

Finally, states’ widespread practice is reflected in the negotiation of trade agreements over the past two decades that recognize both FOA and the right to strike. Since 2003, labor provisions in U.S. trade agreements have regularly featured linkages to FOA as one of the fundamental ILO norms. 139 The commitment by signatory states to FOA as understood under the 1998 ILO Declaration has been progressively strengthened during this period—from providing that parties “shall strive to ensure” protection of FOA under domestic laws140 to specifying that parties shall “adopt and maintain [FOA rights] in [their] statutes and regulations, and practices thereunder.”141 The latest trade agreement, involving the United States, Mexico, and Canada (approved as a successor to NAFTA) expressly provides that the right to FOA necessarily includes protection for the right to strike.142 Trade agreements involving EU countries also feature commitments to respect and implement under domestic law the principles of FOA as understood in the ILO context. 143 This wide network of similarly worded, mostly bilateral trade agreements addressing the subject of FOA constitutes additional evidence of general practice for CIL purposes. 144

The pervasive nature of actual practice regarding FOA and the right to strike does not mean that the right’s content is static or fixed. To be sure, there is broad acceptance of the two previously discussed features on which U.S. law is **out of step**: the prohibition on **permanent replacements**145 and **public employees’ right to strike with certain exceptions**. 146 And although particular limits on the right may vary from one country to another, there is an **international consensus** that the **right exists and that any limits should be reasonable**.147 The International Court of Justice (ICJ) does not require uniformity in practice in order to establish CIL, and indeed, it has countenanced some degree of variation:

The **Court does not consider that, for a rule to be established as customary**, the corresponding practice must be in **absolutely rigorous conformity** with the rule. In order to deduce the existence of customary rules, the Court deems it sufficient that the conduct of States should, in general be consistent with such rules.148

C. **FOA** and the **Right to Strike as Opinio Juris**

There is also considerable support for the proposition that the general practice of states on FOA and the right to strike stems from **acceptance as a matter of legal obligation**. Admittedly, while the existence of opinio juris may be **inferred from a general practice**, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) has at times noted the **insufficiency or inconclusiveness of such practice**, instead seeking **confirmation that “[states’] conduct is ‘evidence of a belief that this practice is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law** requiring it.’”149 Trade agreements, for instance, may represent treaty law and may qualify as evidence of general practice, but they are typically entered into by States that have specific economic or political objectives rather than from a desire to embrace obligations arising under international law.150 Further, it is possible that even with respect to ILO conventions, **widespread ratification** is in part a function of **acculturation**, insofar as **endorsements across a region contribute to socialized acceptance of norms on FOA, reassuring peer countries that protecting rights to association including the right to strike will not place them in an inferior competitive position**.151

That said, the ICJ often does infer the existence of opinio juris from a general practice and/or from determinations by national or international tribunals.152 And there are ample reasons to draw such an inference here. To start, FOA is **consciously accepted** as an obligation by ILO member **states not simply through ratification of Convention 87** (covering more than 80 percent of them) but by **virtue of membership** itself. The ILO Constitution expressly **requires support for FOA** principles, and these principles are further imbedded through a **tripartite governance structure that allocates power-sharing roles** to worker organizations alongside governments and employers.153 Thus, ILO members understand there is an underlying obligation to respect FOA in law and practice.154

A second reason is that domestic law can **provide relevant evidence regarding the presence of opinio juris among states**. Commitments to FOA expressed in **national constitutions**, **statutes**, and **court decisions are not necessarily evidence of a state’s belief** that the principle is **international** as opposed to domestic law. Nonetheless, the **International Law Commission** has made clear that **evidence of acceptance as law** (opinio juris) “may take a **wide range of forms**,” including but not limited to “**official publications; government legal opinions; [and] decisions of national courts**.”155 In this regard, the CEACR in 2012 identified 92 countries where “the right to strike is **explicitly recognized, including at the constitutional level**”; the list includes six countries that have **not ratified Convention** 87.156

Recognition in domestic law of a right to strike alongside a conscious **decision not to ratify Convention 87 could give rise to an inference that these six countries are rejecting the right** as a principle of international law. However, as explained earlier, national courts for **two of the six non-ratifying countries** (Brazil and Kenya) expressly invoke **ILO membership and/or principles as guidance in their domestic law decisions**. 157 In addition, **Canada**—a country **not listed among the 92 endorsing the right to strike in the 2012 General Survey**— has since recognized a **constitutional right to strike under national law**, relying in part on international law principles including CEACR and CFA determinations. 158 The Canadian Supreme Court had previously been explicit in invoking Convention 87, ICESCR, and ICCPR as “documents [that] reflect not only international consensus but also principles that Canada has committed itself to uphold.”159

Further, a **third** country in the group of six—**South Korea**—has affirmed in its **trade agreements with the United States** and the EU its obligation to “adopt and maintain in its statutes and regulations, and practices” FOA in accordance with the ILO Declaration.160 And in various CFA complaints against South Korea for violating FOA principles, including the right to strike, the **Government** has disputed the facts of the complaints while at the **same time recognizing that such rights are embedded in international law**.161 Accordingly, a more relevant reference point in this setting may be that “when States act in conformity with a treaty provision by which they are not bound . . . this may **evidence the existence of acceptance as law (opinio juris) in the absence of any explanation to the contrary**.”162

Stepping back, domestic law on FOA and the right to strike, which for many countries developed after Convention 87 and its initial applications by the CEACR and CFA, may be viewed in part as a window into countries’ sense of obligation in law and practice. A state may at times adopt labor provisions of a trade agreement for reasons of comity or relative competitive advantage. These reasons may play a more modest role with respect to adoption of certain human rights treaties or ILO conventions. 163 But evidence of practice and obligation in the domestic law sphere—especially when informed by regard for international instruments—seems almost by definition to be a function of acceptance as law rather than susceptibility to strategic motivations. In this regard, there are numerous instances in recent years where governments have expanded their legislative protections for the right to strike following a period of dialogue with the CEACR, and that committee has recognized and applauded the changes in law.164 Of particular relevance to the U.S. setting, these expansions have included assuring the right to strike for public sector employees and prohibiting the hiring of replacements for strikers.165

A third reason to infer opinio juris (in addition to the centrality of FOA principles within the ILO Constitution and the strong evidence of FOA and rightto-strike practice and obligation under domestic law) involves recent statements from high officials in the United Nations indicating that the right to strike is understood by its leaders as CIL. In his 2016 report to the U.N. General Assembly, the U.N. Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and association explained, “The right to strike has been established in international law for decades, in global and regional instruments, and is also enshrined in the constitutions of at least 90 countries. The right to strike has, in fact, become customary international law.”166

In 2018, responding to a press briefing on a strike by U.N. employees following announced pay cuts, the Deputy Spokesman for the U.N. SecretaryGeneral reiterated the U.N. view that the right to strike is indeed CIL and did so in the context of the right being asserted by public employees not involved in the administration of the state:

Question: Does the Secretary-General believe that U.N. staff have a right to take part in industrial action?

Deputy Spokesman: We believe the right to strike is part of customary international law.167

These statements did not simply materialize in recent times. Two major U.N. Human Rights treaties—the **ICESCR and the ICCPR**—have been **interpreted by their relevant treaty bodies to include a right to strike**; these bodies have **reaffirmed their joint commitment to the right to strike as part of FOA**, and they regularly monitor governments’ **record of compliance with this right**. 168 And as noted earlier, the two treaties—each ratified by over 80 percent of U.N members—include a clause explicitly identifying respect for ILO Convention 87.

In sum, the principles of FOA including the right to strike would appear to **satisfy both prongs of the CIL test**. The widely recognized general practice on strikes has sufficient shape and contours: a basic right, three substantive exceptions (public servants involved in administration of the state, essential services in the strict sense of the term, and acute national emergencies), a recognition that strikers retain their employment relationship during the strike itself, and certain procedural prerequisites or attached conditions. 169 There are variations in national practice and also disagreements at the margins about what the right to strike protects, but these aspects are not different in kind from diversity and contests regarding international rights prohibiting child labor, or for that matter domestic constitutional rights involving freedom of expression or the right to bear arms. As for opinio juris, a broad range of sources combine to establish that the general practice stems from a sense of acceptance and obligation: ILO foundation and structure; two widely endorsed United Nations human rights treaties; national constitutions; government representations; domestic legislative and judicial decisions that expressly refer to or impliedly accept international standards and practices; and contemporary U.N. leadership.

**That prevents harmonization of norms and throws the functioning of international institutions into question – prefer empirics.**

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For several decades, the right to strike has been one of the **most controversial parts of the law of the International Labour Organisation** (ILO). Even though it has not been explicitly enshrined in the Conventions on the right to freedom of association (especially not in Convention 87 on Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise (1948) and in Convention 98 on the Application of the Principles of the Right to Organise and to Bargain Collectively (1949)), since the early 1950s, the ILO supervisory bodies have **recognised the right to strike as an essential element of trade union rights** enabling workers to **collectively defend their economic and social interests**. Since its seminal **recommendation** in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland case of 1952,1 the Governing Body’s Committee on Freedom of Association (CFA) has considered that **Article 3 of Convention 87 also guarantees the right to strike**, and has developed, since then, detailed ‘case law’ which has been summarised by the International Labour Office in a ‘Digest’ and since 2018 in a ‘Compilation’.2 The Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations (CEACR), another body established by the ILO Governing Body, has taken the same path since the late 1950s.3 Despite this **long-standing interpretive practice** of these two important supervisory bodies in respect of **Convention No. 87**, the right to strike has become **controversial** since the end of the Cold War. In the 81st session of the International Labour Conference (ILC) in 1994, it was **already being challenged by the employers’ group**.4 But the Rubicon was definitely **crossed in 2012**, when the employers’ representatives on the ILO **Conference Committee on the Application of Standards** (CAS) refused, for the first time, to deal—as it had done previously—with a list of Member States that had **seriously violated Conventions of the ILO** as long as the workers’ group would not accept a revision of the mandate of the CEACR.5 At the heart of this incident was the **recognition of the right to strike** by the CEACR even though, according to the view of the employers’ side, the Committee was **not empowered to interpret ILO law with binding effect**. This incident temporarily resulted in an **institutional crisis within the ILO supervisory system**, since the ILO’s tripartite structure which **underlies the constitution of the ILO presupposes that the three constituents cooperate in good faith** within the organisation’s bodies. An attitude of refusal on the **part of only one of the constituents** therefore necessarily brings into question the **functioning of the ILO.**

**Scenario one is SDG:**

**Harmonizing international labor standards are key to Sustainable Development Goals – compliance is key.**

**ILO 15** [International Labor Organization; The International Labour Organization is a United Nations agency whose mandate is to advance social and economic justice through setting international labour standards. Founded in October 1919 under the League of Nations, it is the first and oldest specialised agency of the UN; “The benefits of International Labour Standards,” No date stated but most recent event cited is 2015, <https://www.ilo.org/global/standards/introduction-to-international-labour-standards/the-benefits-of-international-labour-standards/lang--en/index.htm>] Justin

International labour standards are first and foremost about the development of people as human beings. In the Declaration of Philadelphia (1944), the international community recognized that “labour is not a commodity”. Labour is not an inanimate product, like an apple or a television set, that can be negotiated for the highest profit or the lowest price. Work is part of everyone’s daily life and is crucial to a person’s dignity, well-being and development as a human being. Economic development should include the creation of jobs and working conditions in which people can work in freedom, safety and dignity. In short, economic development is not undertaken for its own sake, but to **improve the lives of human beings**. International **labour standards** are there to ensure that it remains focused on **improving the life** and **dignity** of **men and women**. Decent work resumes the aspirations of humans in relation to work. It brings together access to productive and suitably remunerated work, safety at the workplace and social protection for families, better prospects for personal development and social integration, freedom for individuals to set out their claims, to organize and to participate in decisions that affect their lives, and equality of opportunity and treatment for all men and women. Decent work is not merely an objective, it is a **means of achieving** the specific **targets of the new international programme** of **sustainable development**. At the United Nations General Assembly in September 2015, **decent** work and the **four pillars of the Decent Work Agenda** – **employment creation**, **social protection**, **rights at work** and **social dialogue** – became the **central elements of the new Sustainable Development Agenda** 2030 . Goal 8 of the 2030 Agenda calls for the **promotion of sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth**, full and productive employment and decent work for all. Moreover, the principal elements of decent work are broadly incorporated into the targets of a large number of the 16 Goals of the United Nations new vision of development. An international legal framework for fair and stable globalization Achieving the goal of decent work in the globalized economy **requires action at the international level**. The world community is responding to this challenge in part by developing international legal instruments on trade, finance, the environment, human rights and labour. The ILO contributes to this legal framework by elaborating and promoting **international labour standards** aimed at making sure that **economic growth and development** go **hand-in-hand with the creation of decent work**. The **ILO’s unique tripartite structure** ensures that these **standards are backed** by governments, employers and workers alike. International labour standards therefore lay down the basic **minimum social standards agreed upon by all the players** in the global economy. A level playing field An international legal framework on **social standards ensures a level playing field in the global economy**. It helps **governments** and **employers** to avoid the **temptation** of lowering **labour standards in the hope that this could give them a greater comparative advantage** in inter- national trade. In the long run, such practices do not benefit anyone. Lowering labour standards can **encourage the spread of low-wage**, low-skill and high-**turnover industries** and prevent a country from developing more stable high**-skilled employment**, while at the same time slowing the economic growth of trade partners. Because international labour standards are **minimum standards** adopted by governments and the social partners, it is in everyone’s interest to **see these rules applied across the board**, so that those who do not put them into **practice do not undermine the efforts of those who do**. A means of improving economic performance International labour standards have been sometimes perceived as being costly and therefore hindering economic development. However, a growing body of research has indicated that compliance with international labour standards is often **accompanied by improvements in productivity and economic performance**. Minimum wage and working-time standards, and respect for equality, can **translate** into greater satisfaction and **improved performance** for workers and reduced staff turnover. Investment in vocational training can result in a better trained workforce and higher employment levels. Safety standards can reduce costly accidents and expenditure on health care. Employment protection can encourage workers to take risks and to innovate. Social **protection**, such as unemployment schemes, and active labour market policies can **facilitate labour market flexibility, and make economic liberalization and privatization sustainable** and more acceptable to the public. Freedom of association and collective bargaining can lead to better labour–management consultation and cooperation, thereby improving working conditions, reducing the number of costly labour conflicts and enhancing social stability. The **beneficial effects** of **labour standards** do not go **unnoticed by foreign investors**. Studies have shown that in their criteria for **choosing countries in which to invest**, foreign investors **rank workforce quality** and **political** and **social stability** above **low labour** **costs**. At the same time, there is little evidence that **countries which do not respect labour standards** are **more competitive in the global economy**. International labour standards not only respond to changes in the world of work for the protection of workers, but also take into account the needs of sustainable enterprises. A safety net in times of economic crisis Even fast-growing economies with high-skilled workers can experience unforeseen economic downturns. The Asian financial crisis of 1997, the 2000 dot-com bubble burst and the 2008 financial and economic crisis showed how decades of economic growth can be undone by dramatic currency devaluations or falling market prices. For instance, during the 1997 Asian crisis, as well as the 2008 crisis, unemployment increased significantly in many of the countries affected. The disastrous effects of these crises on workers were compounded by the fact that in many of these countries social protection systems, notably unemployment and health insurance, active labour market policies and social dialogue were barely developed. The adoption of an approach that balances macroeconomic and employment goals, while at the same time taking social impacts into account, can help to address these challenges. A strategy for reducing poverty Economic development has always depended on the **acceptance of rules.** Legislation and functioning legal institutions ensure property rights, the enforcement of contracts, respect for procedure and protection from crime – all **legal elements of good governance** without which no economy can operate. A market governed by a fair set of rules and institutions is more efficient and brings benefit to everyone. The labour market is no different. Fair labour practices set out in international labour standards and applied through a **national legal system ensure an efficient and stable labour market for workers and employers** alike. In many developing and transition economies, a large part of the work- force is engaged in the informal economy. Moreover, such countries often lack the capacity to provide effective social justice. Yet international labour standards can also be effective tools in these situations. Most ILO standards **apply to all workers, not just those working under formal employment arrangemen**ts. Some standards, such as those dealing with homeworkers, migrant and rural workers, and indigenous and tribal peoples, deal specifically with certain areas of the informal economy. The reinforcement of **freedom of association, the extension of social protection, the improvement of occupational safety and health, the development of vocational training**, and other measures required by international labour standards have proved to be effective strategies in reducing poverty and bringing workers into the formal economy. Furthermore, international labour standards call for the creation of institutions and mechanisms which can enforce labour rights. In combination with a set of defined rights and rules, functioning legal institutions can help **formalize the economy and create a climate of trust and order which is essential for economic growth and development**. (Note 1 ) The sum of international experience and knowledge International labour standards are the result of discussions among governments, employers and workers, in consultation with experts from around the world. They represent the international consensus on how a particular labour problem could be addressed at the global level and reflect knowledge and experience from all corners of the world. Governments, employers’ and workers’ organizations, international institutions, multinational enterprises and non-governmental organizations can benefit from this knowledge by incorporating the standards in their policies, operational objectives and day-to-day action. The legal nature of the standards means that they can be used in legal systems and administrations at the national level, and as part of the corpus of international law which can bring about greater integration of the international community.

**That’s key to head off a laundry list of interacting catastrophic risks, the combination of which causes extinction and amplifies every other threat.**

Tom **Cernev &** Richard **Fenner 20**, Australian National University; Centre for Sustainable Development, Cambridge University Engineering Department, "The importance of achieving foundational Sustainable Development Goals in reducing global risk," Futures, Vol. 115, January 2020, Elsevier. Recut Justin

4.1. Cascading failures Fig. 3 demonstrates that cascade failures can be transmitted through the **complex inter-relationships** that link the Sustainable Development Goals. Randers, Rockstrom, Stoknes, Goluke, Collste, Cornell, Donges et al. (2018) have suggested that where meeting some SDGs impact negatively on others, this may lead to “**crisis and conflict accelerators**” and “threat multipliers” resulting in conflicts, instability and migrations. Ecosystem stresses are likely to disproportionately affect the **security and social cohesion** of fragile and poor communities, **amplifying latent tensions** which lead to political instabilities that spread far beyond their regions. The resulting “bad fate of the poor will end up affecting the whole global system"(Mastrojeni, 2018). Such possibilities are likely to go beyond incremental damage and lead to **runaway collapse**. The World Economic Forums’ Global Risks Report for 2018 shows the top five global risks in terms of likelihood and impact have changed from being economic and social in 2008 to environmental and technological in 2018, and are **closely aligned** with many SDGs (World Economic Forum, 2018). The report notes “that we are much less competent when it comes to dealing with complex risks in systems characterised by **feedback loops, tipping points and opaque cause-and-effect relationships** that can make intervention problematic”. The most likely risks expected to have the greatest impact currently include **extreme** weather events **natural disasters**, cyber attacks, data fraud or theft, failure of **climate change** mitigation and **water crises**. These are represented in Fig. 3 by the following exogenous variables. “Climate change” drives the need for Climate Action (SDG 13), “Cyber threat” may adversely impact technology implementation and advancement which will disrupt Sustainable Cities and Communities (SDG 11); Decent Work and Economic Growth (SDG 8) and the rate of introduction of Affordable and Clean Energy (SDG 7), with reductions in these goals having direct consequences in also reducing progress in the other goals which they are closely linked to. “Data Fraud or Threat” has the capacity to inhibit innovation and Industrial Performance (SDG 9), reducing competitiveness (and having the potential to erode societal confidence in governance processes). “Water Crises” (linked with climate change) have a direct impact on Human Health and Well Being (SDG 3) as well as reducing access to Clean Water and Sanitation (SDG 6) and reducing agricultural production which increases Hunger (SDG 2). The causal loop diagram also highlights “Conflict” as a variable (driven by multiple environmental-socio-economic factors) which together with regions most impacted by climate degradation will lead to an increase in migrant refugees enhancing the spread of **disease and global pandemic risk**, thus impacting directly on Human Health and Well Being (SDG 3) 4.2. Existential and catastrophic risk The level and consequences of these **risks may be severe**. Existential Risks (ER) have a wide scope, with extreme danger, and are “a risk that threatens the premature extinction of humanity or the permanent and drastic destruction of its potential for desirable future development” (Farquhar et al., 2017,) essentially being an event or scenario that is “transgenerational in scope and terminal in intensity” (Baum & Handoh, 2014). With a smaller scope, and lower level of severity, global catastrophic risk is defined as a scenario or event that results in at least 10 million fatalities, or $10 trillion in damages (Bostrom & Ćirković, 2008). Global Catastrophic Risk (GCR) events are those which are global, but they are durable in that humanity is able to recover from them (Bostrom & Ćirković, 2008; Cotton-Barratt, Farquhar, Halstead, Schubert, & Snyder-Beattie, 2016) but which still have a long-term impact (Turchin & Denkenberger, 2018b). Achieving the Sustainable Development Goals can be considered to be a means of reducing the **long-term global catastrophic and existential risks** for humanity. Conversely if the targets represented across the SDGs remain unachieved there is the potential for these forms of risk to **develop**. This association combined with the likely emergence of new challenges over the next decades (Cook, Inayatullah, Burgman, Sutherland, & Wintle, 2014) means that it is of great value to identify points within the systems representations of the Sustainable Development Goals that could both lead to global catastrophic risk and existential risk, and conversely that could act as **prevention, or leverage points** in order to avoid such outcomes. This identification in turn enables sensible policy responses to be constructed (Sutherland & Woodroof, 2009). Whilst existential threats are unlikely, there is extensive peril in global catastrophic risks. Despite being lesser in severity than existential risks, they increase the likelihood of human extinction (Turchin & Denkenberger, 2018a) through **chain reactions** (Turchin & Denkenberger, 2018a), and **inhibiting humanity’s response** to other risks (Farquhar et al., 2017). It is necessary to consider risks that may seem small, as when acting together, they can have extensive consequences (Tonn, 2009). Furthermore, the high adaptability potential of humans, and society, means that for humanity to become extinct, it is most likely that there would be a **series of events that culminate in extinction** as opposed to one large scale event (Tonn & MacGregor, 2009; Tonn, 2009). Whilst the prospect of existential risk, or global catastrophic risk can seem distant, the Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change estimated the risk of extinction for humanity as 0.1 % annually, which accumulates to provide the risk of extinction over the next century as 9.5 % (Cotton-Barratt et al., 2016). With respect to identifying these risks, it is known that in particular, “**positive feedback loops**… represent the gravest existential risks” (Kareiva & Carranza, 2018), with pollution also having the potential to pose an existential risk. With respect to reinforcing feedback loops, there is **particular concern** about the effects of **time delay**, and the level of **uncertainty** when feedback loops interact (Kareiva & Carranza, 2018). It is difficult to identify the exact thresholds that are associated with tipping points (Moore, 2018), which leads to global catastrophic risk or existential risk, and thus it is necessary to understand the events that can lead to existential risks (Kareiva & Carranza, 2018). Table 1 identifies possible global catastrophic risks and existential risks as reported in the literature and from Fig. 3 these are aligned to the Sustainable Development Goals they impact on the most. 4.3. Linking risks with progress in the SDGs Generally it is the Outcome/Foundational and Human input SDGs that are most directly related. For example as the movement of **refugees** increases pandemic risk, poverty levels in low and middle income countries increase reducing the health of the population, and so restricting access to education which further enhances poverty and birth rates rise as family sizes increases generating unsustainable population growth which furthers the migration of refugees (Fig. 5). Fig. 3 shows that leverage points to reduce refugees lies in SDG 16 (Peace Justice and Strong Institutions), reducing malnutrition through alleviating SDG 2 (Zero Hunger) and taking SDG 13 (Climate Action) to avoid the mass movement of people to avoid the impacts of global warming. **Global warming** itself will drive disruptive changes in both terrestial and aquatic ecosystems affecting SDG 15 (Life on Land) and SDG 14 (Life Below Water) adding to their vulnerability to increases in pollution driven by a growing economy. Loop B (in Fig. 4)shows the constraints associated with SDG 13 (Climate Action) may slow the economic investment in industry and infrastructure reducing the pollution generated, encouraging adoption of SDG 7 (Affordable and Clean Energy) whilst stimulating carbon reduction and measures such as afforestation, which will also improve the foundational environmental goals. Depletion of resources and **biodiversity** are strongly linked to SDG 12 (Responsible Consumption and Production) through measures such as halving global waste, reducing waste generation through recycling reuse and reduction schemes, and striving for more efficient industrial processes. The more resources that are used, the less responsible is Consumption and Production which may thus reduce biodiversity (Fig. 3) and increase the **amounts of wastes** accumulating in the environment. The final driver of Global Catastrophic Risk is an **agricultural shortfall** which will increase **global Hunger** (SDG 2) and widen the **Inequality** (SDG 10) between rich and poor nations and individuals. Quality Education (SDG 4) is important as a key leverage point to stimulate the generation and adoption of new technologies to improve energy (SDG 7) and water supplies (6) which can enhance agricultural production. Such linkages are convincingly examined and demonstrated in the recent film “The Boy Who Harnessed the Wind” (2019), based on a factual story of water shortages in Malawi in the mid 2000s. These examples may appear self evident, but it is the connections between the goals and how they adjust together that is important to consider so the consequence of policy actions in one area can be fully understood. Because of the underlying system structures global threats can quickly transmit through the system. **Water Crises** will limit the water available for agriculture and basic needs which in turn will stimulate a decline in **Gender Equality** (SDG 5). Technology disruption from cyber attacks will restrict the ability to operate Sustainable Cities and Communities (SDG 11) and potentially expose populations to extreme events by disrupting transport, health services, and the ability to pay for adaptation and mitigation of climate related threats from a weakened economy. **Conflict** (in all forms) will increase **refugees and climate change** provides the backdrop against which all these interactions will play out.

**Scenario two is climate change:**

***Opinio juris* compliance with Customary International Law key to legitimacy – that determines our ability to solve environmental crises.**

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The two-pronged requirement for the **formation of customary law** requires both state conduct and opinio juris sive necessitatis that are in **compliance** with a **rule** of **law**, and not merely with concepts of morality, courtesy, or ceremony.29 The ICJ has recognized the existence of “obligations of a state towards the **international community** as a whole” distinct from those that arise between **individual** **nation**-**states**.30 These are obligations erga omnes, which prohibit the use of state territory for acts that may harm other states, such as the spread of transboundary pollution.31 Consequently, as more states adopt **environmental** **conservation** measures, basic principles of **environmental** **law** have been incorporated into **customary** **international** **law** through **state** **practice**, **multilateral** **treaties**, and **judicial** **decisions**. Such internationally recognized norms include the **precautionary** **principle**, the **polluter**-**pays** **principle**, and the principle of **transboundary** **harm**.32 Debate has arisen, however, over the precise legal status of many international environmental norms and principles assumed to enjoy **binding** **force** as **customary** **international** **law**. For example, assertions about the prohibition on transboundary harm and the precautionary principle that are based on the utilization of texts produced by state and non-state actors, such as courts, intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations, and legal scholars, seem to characterize these norms as “declarative” rather than customary law.33 However, these ambiguous legal roots still contribute **significantly** to the process of **custom** **generation**, and allow the norms to play an important role in terms of voluntary compliance and in bilateral and multilateral negotiations.34 The consistent articulation of certain rules in conventional regimes lends support to the argument that such rules have achieved the status of customary international law.35 Many critics would argue that biodiversity protection has not yet crystallized into a peremptory international norm for two related reasons. First, it remains an extremely underdeveloped legal regime dependent upon a non-integrated mix of soft law declarations and regional initiatives.36 Second, it takes place within the evolving framework of the concept of sustainable development. Despite these defects, however, a **colorable** **argument** still **exists** that the prevention of **biodiversity** **loss** is at least carving a path towards becoming a **principle** of **customary** **international** **law**, even if it has not yet reached its final destination. The World Commission on Environment and Development’s Experts Group on Environmental Law, for instance, linked the obligation to **cooperate** **closely** with the principle of **equitable** **utilization**, stating that, “the duty to **provide** **information** may in principle pertain to many factors . . . which may have to be taken into **account** in order to arrive at a reasonable and **equitable** use of a **transboundary** **natural** **resource**.”37 States are therefore under a binding obligation to notify, in form, and consult with neighboring nations regarding domestic actions with the potential to affect shared natural resources.38 This standard facilitates **international** **cooperation** towards the effective application of the equitable utilization principle in environmental law Transboundary natural resources do not exist in isolation, but form an integrated whole within which the legal concepts of biodiversity conservation and human development coexist. Likewise, cultural heritage and migratory species— such as the tiger—do not stop at arbitrary national borders. Rather, they exist in a transboundary state themselves. As a result, and consistent with the principles articulated above, species and the communities that utilize them as part of their cultural heritage should be protected under customary international law. “Indeed, regardless of whether or not they have formally achieved customary status, the sophisticated and detailed articulation of the rules and principles of international environmental law provides a comprehensive set of reference standards and procedures to assist the consideration of transboundary environmental impacts and benefits” in a wide variety of areas, including species conservation and cultural heritage preservation.39 A Concept of “World Heritage Species” under the World Heritage Convention The Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage (World Heritage Convention) was adopted by the UNESCO General Conference in Paris on November 16, 1972.40 In order to facilitate its goals of preserving sites important to the “common heritage of humankind,” the Convention called for the development of a World Heritage List to protect “cultural and natural heritage [sites] of outstanding universal value.”41 The notion of “outstanding value” embraces a common view of global history and recognizes that loss of such heritage would be irreplaceable. The World Heritage List “often serves as a catalyst to raising awareness for heritage preservation,” and can increase tourism to the heritage site, which in turn “can bring important funds to the site and to the local economy.”42 It can also serve as a catalyst for preserving the surrounding habitat of a site,43 often to the benefit of the species therein. Once a site is listed, parties must do their “utmost” to protect and conserve those sites and are precluded from taking “any deliberate measures” that might directly or indirectly damage listed sites.44 The concept of World Heritage Species has been discussed since early 2001, primarily in reference to the conservation of the world’s great apes.45 Whereas the World Heritage Convention protects cultural and natural sites of “outstanding universal value” to humankind, the World Heritage Species Protocol would protect species of comparable value.46 While the question remains open as to how to quantify such a value threshold, the increasing number of registers established by organizations such as UNESCO provide objective parameters for at least a prima facie determination of a given species’ international significance.47 Tigers, with their deep cultural connection to humans, clearly have such value, and their disappearance would constitute a critical loss for humanity. They, like other emblematic species, are “irreplaceable testaments to human evolution,” cultural pillars to many indigenous populations, and natural legacies to be passed on for future generations.48 Obviously, tigers are not cultural sites, such as monuments, buildings, or sites within the meaning of the World Heritage Convention. Therefore, any amendment to incorporate species into the World Heritage regime requires additional ratification by the parties; those who do not ratify the amendment would not be bound by it.49 However, a designation that highlights the significance of the area to the species, such as a “Malayan Tiger World Heritage Site,” could lend itself to listing under the current regime. As a result, the concept could benefit the conser vation of those species, such as the tiger, whose conservation status is diminished by a variety of threats or by a lack of political will, by bringing their conservation within the parameters of UNESCO’s World Heritage mandate. Consequently, a World Heritage Species register could be effectively established by amalgamating existing legal obligations with an emphasis on cooperative decision-making in species conservation and management.50 IV International Environmental Law and Human Rights A review of the existing multilateral agreements most applicable to tiger conservation—that is, CITES, the Convention on Biological Diversity, and the World Heritage Convention—concludes that none of these adequately protects the species from the various threats to their survival, including poaching and habitat destruction. It is therefore necessary to approach biodiversity conservation from a new perspective: its link to human rights and cultural identity. The 1972 Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment triggered the discussion on adopting a human rights approach to environmental protection.51 In its preamble, the Stockholm Declaration clearly established the link between these two legal realms, stating, “[b]oth aspects of man’s environment, the natural and the man-made, are essential to his well-being and to the enjoyment of basic human rights—even the right to life itself.”52 Vice-President Christopher Weeramantry later accentuated this linkage in his eloquent separate opinion to GabˇcíkovoNagymaros. 53 For the most part, biodiversity exists within a matrix of resources lying within the sovereign boundaries of nation-states and the local sphere. This dynamic contributes to an acute tension between conservation needs and economic and social development needs, especially in Southeast Asia. For example, of the 15 countries that feature prominently in terms of diversity of higher species (reptiles, birds and mammals), none has an average annual per capita income greater than $2000.54 In fact, most of these countries register annual incomes that are among the lowest in the world, around $200–$500 annually.55 Conservationists recognize that many of the primary threats to species survival are often driven by poverty, and that poverty reduction is thus essential if conservation objectives are to be achieved.56 The Millennium Development Goals, which commit the international community to halving poverty by 2015, indicate that several important targets for poverty reduction in these regions have or will be met by 2015, but that progress in many regions is far from sufficient to meet its stated goals.57 A Human Right to a Healthy Environment The human right to a **healthy** **environment** is defined through **diverse** and **controversial** **terminology**. For present purposes, it refers to a human right to live in an **environment** of such **minimum** **quality** as to allow for the realization of a life of **dignity** and **well**-**being**.58 The focus—neither rightly nor wrongly—is on humans and the global disparity between **communities** and their **development**, rather than the environment in its own right.59 Principle 1 of the Rio Declaration provides that “[h]uman beings are at the centre of concerns for sustainable development. They are entitled to a healthy and productive life in harmony with nature.”60 This principle was accepted without reservations by almost every nation and captures the ideals of linking a human right to a healthy environment with the principle of sustainable development, if not explicitly recognizing it as a right per se.61 Even if the right to a **healthy** **environment** cannot be regarded as a “human right” in any orthodox sense, it may still be considered a **political** and **civil** **right**, or an economic and social right, with particular applicability to indigenous peoples.62 The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, for example, contains complex language linking the rights of indigenous peoples, future generations, sustainable development, and the environment,63 as does the Organization of American States (O.A.S.) Proposed American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.64 Considering Principle 1 in conjunction with the contextual development of a right to a healthy environment, a right to sustainable development, and the rights of future generations, it follows that effects on health and a continuation of an established way of life are **integral** **components** of any right to a **healthy** **environment** for the local communities involved.65 Moreover, Article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights has been interpreted by the Human Rights Committee to ensure special entitlement to minorities and indigenous groups to have access to natural resources.66 Such **entitlement** necessarily entails a **negative** **obligation** not to **interfere** and a **positive** **obligation** to **protect** on the part of the state, in contrast to current international documents reaffirming exclusive state sovereignty over natural resources.67 A healthy environment thus entails more than a minimum quality of tangible resources, such as air, water, and shelter, and encompasses intangible elements, such as culture and a way of life. Emblematic species, such as the tiger, form pillars of cultural identity for communities around the world. For example, the Makah Tribe of the Olympic Peninsula in Washington is a seafaring culture in which whales and whaling hold a preeminent role in maintaining traditional culture and religious expression.68 Access to this species, a natural resource, is thus **essential** to their **way** of **life** and to enjoying a **healthy** **environment**. Without the whale, the Makah would not be able to realize their economic, social, and cultural rights to the full extent required by international law. Such a right consequently respects the complex linkages between local communities and their immediate environment and seeks to mitigate the global disparity in natural resource management, including of the species therein. As a result, the **articulation** of a human right to a healthy environment **ultimately** **seeks** to **influence** **domestic** **decisions** through international law.69 An international agreement on the issue would offer states an **aspirational** **framework** in which to operate to pursue the combined purposes of **promoting** **human** **development** and **environmental** **protection**. Such an endeavor, however, would require national conservation programs to move beyond principled legislation to the serious consideration of local needs and cultural norms.70 The interim gap between national and local levels of natural resource management capacity could be filled by non-governmental organizations, working with local communities to administer national programs. Moreover, the development of committed, sustainable sources of **funding** and **enforcement** **must** be **pursued** and may be more attainable if coupled with **regional** **commitments** that **facilitate** **cooperation** and **accountability**.71

**Extinction – contrary models are incorrect.**

**Specktor 19** [Brandon; 6/4/19; Writes about the science of everyday life for Live Science, and previously for Reader's Digest magazine, where he served as an editor for five years; "Human Civilization Will Crumble by 2050 If We Don't Stop Climate Change Now, New Paper Claims," livescience, <https://www.livescience.com/65633-climate-change-dooms-humans-by-2050.html>] Justin

The current climate crisis, they say, is larger and more complex than any humans have ever dealt with before. General climate models — like the one that the [United Nations' Panel on Climate Change](https://www.ipcc.ch/sr15/) (IPCC) used in 2018 to predict that a global temperature increase of 3.6 degrees Fahrenheit (2 degrees Celsius) could put hundreds of millions of people at risk — fail to account for the **sheer complexity of Earth's many interlinked geological processes**; as such, they fail to adequately predict the scale of the potential consequences. The truth, the authors wrote, is probably far worse than any models can fathom. How the world ends What might an accurate worst-case picture of the planet's climate-addled future actually look like, then? The authors provide one particularly grim scenario that begins with world governments "politely ignoring" the advice of scientists and the will of the public to decarbonize the economy (finding alternative energy sources), resulting in a global temperature increase 5.4 F (3 C) by the year 2050. At this point, the world's ice sheets vanish; brutal droughts kill many of the trees in the [Amazon HYPERLINK "https://www.livescience.com/57266-amazon-river.html"rainforest](https://www.livescience.com/57266-amazon-river.html) (removing one of the world's largest carbon offsets); and the planet plunges into a feedback loop of ever-hotter, ever-deadlier conditions. "Thirty-five percent of the global land area, and **55 percent of the global population, are subject to more than 20 days a year of** [**lethal heat HYPERLINK "https://www.livescience.com/55129-how-heat-waves-kill-so-quickly.html" conditions**](https://www.livescience.com/55129-how-heat-waves-kill-so-quickly.html), beyond the threshold of human survivability," the authors hypothesized. Meanwhile, droughts, floods and wildfires regularly ravage the land. Nearly **one-third of the world's land surface turns to desert**. Entire **ecosystems collapse**, beginning with the **planet's coral reefs**, the **rainforest and the Arctic ice sheets.** The world's tropics are hit hardest by these new climate extremes, destroying the region's agriculture and turning more than 1 billion people into refugees. This mass movement of refugees — coupled with [shrinking coastlines](https://www.livescience.com/51990-sea-level-rise-unknowns.html) and severe drops in food and water availability — begin to **stress the fabric of the world's largest nations**, including the United States. Armed conflicts over resources, perhaps culminating in **nuclear war, are likely**. The result, according to the new paper, is "outright chaos" and perhaps "the end of human global civilization as we know it."

**1AC – Plan**

**Plan text: The United States of America ought to recognize an unconditional right of workers to strike.**

**Courts are normal means and can enforce the right to strike as Customary International Law.**

**Brudney 21** [James; 2/8/21; Joseph Crowley Chair in Labor and Employment Law, Fordham Law School; “The Right to Strike as Customary International Law,” THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, Vol 46, [https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1710 HYPERLINK "https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1710&context=yjil"& HYPERLINK "https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1710&context=yjil"context=yjil](https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1710&context=yjil)] Justin \*\* Brackets in original

In order for the **international right to strike to receive protection** in a U.S. domestic law setting, this CIL right must be **cognizable** in **federal court**. Workers asserting **such a right** would be **seeking direct application** of CIL, stemming from **legal principles set forth in The Paquete Habana233** and **subsequent cases**. The Paquete Habana involved **U.S. seizure** of two Spanish fishing vessels during the **Spanish American War.** The Court relied on **customary international law** to hold that the vessels and their cargoes were exempt from capture as prizes of war.234 Justice Gray’s oft-quoted language, recognizing **that CIL is part of the law of the United States**, is as follows: International law is **part of our la**w and must be **ascertained** and **administered** by the **courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction** as often as **questions of right** depending upon it are **duly presented for their determination**. For this purpose, where there is no treaty and no controlling executive or legislative act or judicial decision, resort must be had to the customs and usages of civilized nations . . . . 235 In a **number of decisions** beginning in the 1960s, the Court has **applied CIL rules** when determining the legal status of **submerged offshore areas**, helping guide its application of **federal statutes and treaties** implicating the law of the seas. 236 The Court has also **invoked CIL** in determining when an instrumentality of a sovereign state becomes the **“alter ego” of that state**, a question not controlled by the **relevant foreign sovereign immunity statute**.237 Relatedly, the **Court** in **Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino238** relied on a judge-made principle of U.S. foreign relations law—the **Act of State doctrine**—to decline to **examine the validity** of the taking of property by a **foreign sovereign government** within its own territory.239 Turning to lower federal courts, the **courts of appeals have regularly applied the Vienna Convention** on the **Law of Treaties** “as an articulation of the **customary** **international** **law** of treaty interpretation, even though **the United States is not a party to the treaty itself**.”240 And at least one district court has **recognized FOA and the right to organize as CIL** when denying a motion to dismiss.241 Finally, the **executive branch** also has applied **CIL in certain circumstances**. Although the **U.S. voted against adoption** of the **1982** **UN** **Convention** on the Law of the Seas, **the U.S. government accepts its key provisions** regarding the **maximum breadth of territorial sea** and the extent of **exclusive economic zones as** **CIL**.242 In short, U.S. **courts and executive branch** **officials** have directly **applied CIL** and been guided by its **teachings in a range of doctrinal settings**. 243 As noted earlier, CIL on human rights has been **deemed applicable in U.S. courts** for suitably defined misconduct occurring in other countries. 244 These doctrinal precedents do not involve direct application of CIL in a domestic law setting akin to the labor and human rights claims being proposed here. That said, lower courts have invoked CIL when applying federal rules of decision in a range of domestic law contexts. Indeed, the use of CIL when **applying** and **construing various federal statutes** has increased markedly in recent decades.245 Examples include its use when applying an armed conflict statute to establish limits on detention of a U.S. citizen within the U.S.;246 when construing the same statute to help establish requirements for release and repatriation of a foreign national held on U.S. soil;247 and when limiting the scope of an immigration statute’s authorization of detention.248 In addition, CIL has been **applied to help courts apply the choice** between **indefinite detention** and **exclusion** under a different **immigration statute**,249 and to **assist judicial construction** of a **statute regulating recovery** of sunken warships in U.S. waters. 250 It is not obvious why CIL should be deemed inapplicable when construing federal statutes that implicate appropriately qualified labor/human rights misconduct occurring within our borders.251 Moreover, as previously noted, a number of other countries have **accepted the right to strike as a principle of international law** when applying their **own domestic law despite** their conscious decision not to **ratify Convention 87**.252 Once one accepts that recognized CIL has substantive traction in a domestic law setting, the focus should be on whether this CIL can be situated in relation to certain procedural or jurisdictional limitations that characterize the U.S. judicial context. Accordingly, application of CIL to sustain claims based on FOA and the right to strike requires consideration of how this CIL relates to other aspects of U.S. law. B. CIL as Federal Common Law A threshold question is whether U.S. courts should determine matters of CIL as federal common law or as state law in light of the Erie doctrine.253 The question has been extensively debated by able international law scholars,254 and I will not attempt to add new value in this setting. I am persuaded that CIL **should be understood and litigated as federal common law**, for reasons presented at **length in a range of sources**. 255 Indeed, as one international law scholar has recently and thoroughly explained, “[t]he law of nations was the original federal common law.”256 The basic contours of this position were set forth by the Supreme Court in Sabbatino, when it held that the Act of State doctrine is federal law, binding on the states and not within the scope of Erie. 257 In the words of Justice Harlan for an eight-member majority, “an issue concerned with a basic choice regarding the competence and function of the Judiciary and National Executive in ordering our relationships with other members of the international community must be treated exclusively as an aspect of federal law.”258 Subsequently, leading commentators have joined the Court in concluding that Erie was never meant to apply to CIL;259 that federal courts’ **incorporation of the CIL of labor** and **human rights** follows post-Erie precedent recognizing and helping to create a **federal common law** for labor relations and for other **uniquely federal interests**;260 that CIL may **reflect developments** in the **international arena of labor** and human **rights in addition to filling gaps with respect** to **jurisdictional statutes** such as the **ATS and the Torture Victim Prevention** **Act** (TVPA); 261 and that CIL remains subject to the democratic checks of supervision, endorsement, or revision by the federal political branches.262 Relying on the weight of these arguments in Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., Justice Scalia for the Court recognized that a few areas involving “uniquely federal interests” are committed to federal control, including the development of federal common law, and he cited Court precedent on CIL as one such area.263 C. The Presence or Absence of Controlling Law As indicated in The Paquete Habana excerpt above, an important additional consideration is whether there is a treaty or any “controlling executive or legislative act or judicial decision” that would preclude federal courts from recognizing a right to strike as CIL. Lower court decisions **invoking the “controlling law” principle** from Paquete Habana have applied a **fairly rigorous standard**, relying on a comprehensive scheme of **statutes and regulations** addressing the **precise issue**,264 or on a treaty ratified by the U.S. directed to the same problem.265 These lower courts also have invoked Supreme Court **statements that focus** on the central role of **legislative expression** when concluding that certain **controlling congressional acts** were taken with a purpose to **preclude the application** of CIL to a particular situation.266 Under this standard, **controlling U.S. domestic law** does not preclude **federal courts’ authority** to recognize a right to strike as CIL; on the contrary, it **arguably supports such authority**. As an ILO member**, the U.S.** is a party to the 1944 Declaration of Philadelphia, the 1998 Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, and the 2008 Declaration on Social Justice for a Fair Globalization.267 Each of these core ILO commitments specifies the **fundamental importance of FOA**. Congress in two separate trade statutes has incorporated FOA as an “internationally recognized worker right.”268 In addition, the U.S. has ratified the ICCPR, which has incorporated the right to strike as part of FOA, and has signed the ICESCR, which expressly recognizes that right within its text. 269 And both the Administration’s 2015 statement at ILO Governing Body proceedings and its most recent trade agreement, drafted and executed by the Trump Administration, have specified that the right to strike is an integral part of FOA.270

**Reject “strikes bad” offense – the aff increases agreements, while decreasing strikes.**

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2 ‘Strikes will erupt everywhere’ line This is again just not reality. Strikes **do not simply erupt if they become legal**. Countries that have a **collective bargaining system that has an effective right to strike** and a system of **preventing** and **settling disputes often have fewer strikes**. Right-wing politicians assert policy to **repress strikes**, but Romeyn (2008) argues it is not a power balance. Waters (1982) shows there are deeper and more significant economic and workplace issues contributing to strikes. Paradoxically, **a key factor in producing strikes** is the belief by right-wing politicians that they can be **eliminated**. History shows that under **repressive anti-strike regimes**, workers still **struggle and take industrial action** to defend their interests. The issue for unionists is: are we slaves or are we to be free?

**1AC – Framing**

**The standard is maximizing expected wellbeing-hedonistic act util**

**1] Actor spec—governments must use util because they don’t have intentions and are constantly dealing with tradeoffs—outweighs since different agents have different obligations—takes out calc indicts since they are empirically denied.**

**Underview**

**1] Aff gets 1AR theory since the neg can be infinitely abusive and I can’t check back. It’s drop the debater since the 1ar is too short to win both theory and substance. No RVI or 2NR paradigm issues since they’d dump on it for 6 minutes and my 3-minute 2AR is spread too thin. Competing interps since 2NR has enough time to flesh out a proper CI**