**The standard is maximizing expected well-being—to clarify, saving lives. Calc indicts don’t link—our impacts are bad because as far as we know, it would cause death.**

**Prefer:**

**1] Death is bad and o/w**

**It ontologically destroys the subject.**

**Paterson 1** – Department of Philosophy, Providence College, Rhode Island. (Craig, “A Life Not Worth Living?”, Studies in Christian Ethics, [http://sce.sagepub.com](http://sce.sagepub.com/))

Contrary to those accounts, I would argue that it is **death** per se that is really the **objective evil** for us, not because it deprives us of a prospective future of overall good judged better than the alter- native of non-being. It cannot be about harm to a former person who has ceased to exist, for no person actually suffers from the sub-sequent non-participation. Rather, death in itself is an evil to us because it **ontologically destroys the current existent subject** — it is the ultimate in **metaphysical lightening strikes**.80 The evil of death is truly an ontological evil borne by the person who already exists, **independently of calculations about better or worse** possible lives**. Such an evil need not be consciously experienced** in order to be an evil for the kind of being a human person is. Death is an evil because of the change in kind it brings about, a change that is destructive of the type of entity that we essentially are. **Anything**, whether caused naturally or caused by human intervention (intentional or unintentional) **that drastically interferes in the process of maintaining the person in existence is an objective evil** for the person. What is crucially at stake here, and is dialectically supportive of the self-evidency of the basic good of human life, is that death is a radical interference with the current life process of the kind of being that we are. In consequence, **death itself can be credibly thought of as a ‘primitive evil’ for all persons, regardless of the extent to which they are currently or prospectively capable of participating in a full array of the goods of life.**81  In conclusion, concerning willed human actions, it is justifiable to state that **any intentional rejection of human life itself cannot therefore be warranted since it is an expression of an ultimate disvalue** for the subject, namely, the destruction of the present person; a radical ontological good that we cannot begin to weigh objectively against the travails of life in a rational manner. To deal with the sources of disvalue (pain, suffering, etc.) we should not seek to irrationally destroy the person, the very source and condition of all human possibility.82

**2] Actor spec—governments must use util because they don’t have intentions and are constantly dealing with tradeoffs—outweighs since different agents have different obligations—takes out calc indicts since they are empirically denied.**

**3] Only consequentialism explains degrees of wrongness—if I break a promise to meet up for lunch, that is not as bad as breaking a promise to not kill because its intuitive. Outweighs—a) parsimony—metaphysics relies on long chains of questionable claims that make conclusions less likely b) hijacks—intuitions are inevitable since even every framework must take some unjustified assumption as a starting point.**

**1] Extinction outweighs:**

**A] Structural violence- death causes suffering because people can’t get access to resources and basic necessities**

**B] Moral uncertainty flows extinction Bostrom 12:**

**Nick Bostrom. Faculty of Philosophy & Oxford Martin School University of Oxford. “Existential Risk Prevention as Global Priority.” Global Policy (2012)**

These reflections on moral uncertainty suggest an alternative, complementary way of looking at existential risk; they also suggest a new way of thinking about the ideal of sustainability. Let me elaborate. Our present understanding of axiology might well be confused. We may not now know — at least not in concrete detail — what outcomes would count as a big win for humanity; we might not even yet be able to imagine the best ends of our journey. If we are indeed profoundly uncertain about our ultimate aims, then we should recognize that there is a great option value in preserving — and ideally improving — our ability to recognize value and to steer the future accordingly. Ensuring that there will be a future version of humanity with great powers and a propensity to use them wisely is plausibly the best way available to us to increase the probability that the future will contain a lot of value. To do this, we must prevent any existential catastrophe.

**Strong commercial space catalyzes tech innovation – progress at the margins and spinoff tech change global information networks**

Joshua **Hampson 2017**, Security Studies Fellow at the Niskanen Center, 1-25-2017, “The Future of Space Commercialization”, Niskanen Center, https://republicans-science.house.gov/sites/republicans.science.house.gov/files/documents/TheFutureofSpaceCommercializationFinal.pdf

Innovation is generally hard to predict; some new technologies seem to come out of nowhere and others only take off when paired with a new application. It is difficult to predict the future, but **it is reasonable to expect that a growing space economy would open opportunities for technological and organizational innovation**. In terms of technology, **the difficult environment of outer space helps incentivize progress along the margins.** Because each object launched into orbit costs a significant amount of money—at the moment between $27,000 and $43,000 per pound, though that will likely drop in the future —each 19 reduction in payload size saves money or means more can be launched. At the same time, the ability to fit more capability into a smaller satellite opens outer space to actors that previously were priced out of the market. This is one of the reasons why small, affordable satellites are increasingly pursued by companies or organizations that cannot afford to launch larger traditional satellites. These small 20 satellites also provide non-traditional launchers, such as engineering students or prototypers, the opportunity to learn about satellite production and test new technologies before working on a full-sized satellite. **That expansion of developers, experimenters, and testers cannot but help increase innovation opportunities**. **Technological developments from outer space have been applied to terrestrial life since the earliest days of space exploration**. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) maintains a website that lists technologies that have spun off from such research projects**. Lightweight** 21 **nanotubes**, useful in protecting astronauts during space exploration, **are now being tested for applications in emergency response gear and electrical insulation**. The need for certainty about the resiliency of materials used in space led to the development of an analytics tool useful across a range of industries. Temper foam, the material used in memory-foam pillows, was developed for NASA for seat covers. **As more companies pursue their own space goals, more innovations will likely come from the commercial sector. Outer space is not just a catalyst for technological development.** Satellite constellations and their unique line-of-sight vantage point **can provide new perspectives to old industries**. Deploying satellites into low-Earth orbit, as Facebook wants to do, can connect large, previously-unreached swathes of 22 humanity to the Internet. **Remote sensing technology could change how whole industries operate, such as crop monitoring, herd management, crisis response, and land evaluation, among others**. 23 While satellites cannot provide all essential information for some of these industries, they can fill in some useful gaps and work as part of a wider system of tools. **Space infrastructure, in helping to change how people connect and perceive Earth, could help spark innovations on the ground as well. These innovations, changes to global networks, and new opportunities could lead to wider economic growth.**

**Short innovation cycles mean every contract counts**

John J. **Klein 19**, Senior Fellow and Strategist at Falcon Research Inc. and adjunct professor at the George Washington University Space Policy Institute, 1-15-2019, "Rethinking Requirements and Risk in the New Space Age," Center for a New American Security, https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/rethinking-requirements-and-risk-in-the-new-space-age

Unfortunately, these variances in models between the MDAP’s lengthy development cycle and the commercial space sector’s 18-month innovation cycle are a result of stark differences in thinking about requirements and risk. Requirements and risk for MDAPs commonly focus on ensuring critical mission capabilities at a given cost. In contrast, the commercial space sector tends to focus more on providing innovation quickly using economies of scale. The commercial sector understands that time dynamically shapes decisions related to requirements and risk **because of the relatively short innovation cycle**. **In a highly competitive space sector with tight profit margins, those unable to innovate quickly will likely be out of business soon**. Alternatively, space systems with mission assurance requirements – where failures are detrimental to national security and military operations – often drive DoD’s timelines. Program managers of critical national security space systems commonly require additional time to test and verify that satellites can perform missions with a very low probability of failure.

**Tech innovation solves every existential threat – cumulative extinction events outweigh the aff**

Dylan **Matthews 18**. Co-founder of Vox, citing Nick Beckstead @ Rutgers University. 10-26-2018. "How to help people millions of years from now." Vox. https://www.vox.com/future-perfect/2018/10/26/18023366/far-future-effective-altruism-existential-risk-doing-good

If you care about improving human lives, you should overwhelmingly care about those quadrillions of lives rather than the comparatively small number of people alive today. The 7.6 billion people now living, after all, amount to less than 0.003 percent of the population that will live in the **future**. It’s reasonable to suggest that those **quadrillions** of future people have, accordingly, **hundreds of thousands of times** more moral weight than those of us living here **today** do. That’s the basic argument behind Nick Beckstead’s 2013 Rutgers philosophy dissertation, “On the overwhelming importance of shaping the far future.” It’s a glorious mindfuck of a thesis, not least because Beckstead shows very convincingly that this is a conclusion any plausible moral view would reach. It’s not just something that weird utilitarians have to deal with. And Beckstead, to his considerable credit, walks the walk on this. He works at the Open Philanthropy Project on grants relating to the far future and runs a charitable fund for donors who want to prioritize the far future. And arguments from him and others have turned “long-termism” into a very vibrant, important strand of the effective altruism community. But what does prioritizing the far future even mean? The most **literal** thing it could mean is preventing human **extinction**, to ensure that the species persists as long as possible. For the long-term-focused effective altruists I know, that typically means identifying concrete threats to humanity’s continued existence — like unfriendly artificial intelligence, or a pandemic, or global warming/out of control geoengineering — and engaging in activities to prevent that specific eventuality. But in a set of slides he made in 2013, Beckstead makes a compelling case that while that’s certainly **part** of what caring about the far future entails, approaches that address **specific threats** to humanity (which he calls “**targeted**” approaches to the far future) have to **complement** “**broad**” approaches, where instead of trying to **predict** what’s going to kill us all, you just **generally try to keep civilization running as best it can**, so that it is, as a whole, well-equipped to deal with **potential** extinction events in the **future**, not just in 2030 or 2040 but in 3500 or 95000 or even 37 million. In other words, caring about the far future **doesn’t mean just paying attention to low-probability risks of total annihilation**; it also means **acting on pressing needs now**. For example: We’re going to be **better prepared** to prevent extinction from **AI** or a **supervirus** or **global warming** if society as a whole makes **a lot of scientific progress**. And a significant bottleneck there is that the vast majority of humanity doesn’t get high-enough-quality education to engage in scientific research, if they want to, which reduces the odds that we have enough trained scientists to come up with the breakthroughs we need as a civilization to survive and thrive. So maybe one of the **best thing**s we can do for the **far future** is to improve school systems — here and now — to harness the group economist Raj Chetty calls “lost Einsteins” (**potential innovators** who are thwarted by poverty and inequality in rich countries) and, more importantly, the hundreds of millions of kids in developing countries dealing with even worse education systems than those in depressed communities in the rich world. What if living ethically for the far future means living ethically now? Beckstead mentions some other broad, or very broad, ideas (these are all his descriptions): Help make computers faster so that people

everywhere can work more efficiently Change intellectual property law so that technological innovation can happen more quickly Advocate for open borders so that people from poorly governed countries can move to better-governed countries and be more productive Meta-research: improve **incentives** and **norms** in **academic work** to better advance human knowledge Improve education Advocate for political party X to make future people have values more like political party X ”If you look at these areas (economic growth and technological progress, access to information, individual capability, social coordination, motives) a lot of everyday good works contribute,” Beckstead writes. “An implication of this is that a lot of everyday good works are good from a broad perspective, even though hardly anyone thinks explicitly in terms of far future standards.” Look at those examples again: It’s just a list of what normal altruistically motivated people, not effective altruism folks, generally do. Charities in the US love talking about the lost opportunities for innovation that poverty creates. Lots of smart people who want to make a difference become scientists, or try to work as teachers or on improving education policy, and lord knows there are plenty of people who become political party operatives out of a conviction that the moral consequences of the party’s platform are good. All of which is to say: Maybe effective altruists aren’t that special, or at least maybe we don’t have access to that many specific and weird conclusions about how best to help the world. If the far future is what matters, and generally trying to make the world work better is among the best ways to help the far future, then effective altruism just becomes plain ol’ do-goodery.\*

**The role of the ballot is to determine who did the best debating. Evaluate the plan relative to opportunity costs – anything else is self-serving and arbitrary while also erasing the AC which means we can’t catch up and crushes competitive equity. Prior questions are regressive, unpredictable, and make generating offense impossible.**

1. **Their ROB doesn’t matter –**
   1. **Macro level change doesn’t happen because a debate round in Milo Cup r1 won’t do anything in the real world. Its best to just debate a policy action because thats what we signe dup to do**

1. **Practicing policy making in debate is the best way to promote activism. Coverstone 995:**

Coverstone, A. (1995). An inward glance: a response to Mitchell’s outward activist turn. The Debater’s Research Guide. Winston-Salem, NC. Retrieved June 15, 2007 from http://groups.wfu.edu/debate/MiscSites/DRGArticles/Coverstone1995China.htm

However, contest debate teaches students to combine personal experience with the language of political power. Powerful personal narratives unconnected to political power are regularly co-opted by those who do learn the language of power. One need look no further than the annual state of the Union Address where personal story after personal story is used to support the political agenda of those in power. The so-called role-playing that public policy contest debates encourage promotes active learning of the vocabulary and levers of power in America. Imagining the ability to use our own arguments to influence government action is one of the great virtues of academic debate. Gerald Graff (2003) analyzed the decline of argumentation in academic discourse and found a source of student antipathy to public argument in an interesting place.¶ I’m up against…their aversion to the role of public spokesperson that formal writing presupposes. It’s as if such students can’t imagine any rewards for being a public actor or even imagining themselves in such a role. This lack of interest in the public sphere may in turn reflect a loss of confidence in the possibility that the arguments we make in public will have an effect on the world. Today’s students’ lack of faith in the power of persuasion reflects the waning of the ideal of civic participation that led educators for centuries to place rhetorical and argumentative training at the center of the school and college curriculum. (Graff, 2003, p. 57)¶ The power to imagine public advocacy that actually makes a difference is one of the great virtues of the traditional notion of fiat that critics deride as mere simulation. Simulation of success in the public realm is far more empowering to students than completely abandoning all notions of personal power in the face of governmental hegemony by teaching students that “nothing they can do in a contest debate can ever make any difference in public policy.” Contest debating is well suited to rewarding public activism if it stops accepting as an article of faith that personal agency is somehow undermined by the so-called role playing in debate. Debate is role-playing whether we imagine government action or imagine individual action. Imagining myself starting a socialist revolution in America is no less of a fantasy than imagining myself making a difference on Capitol Hill. Furthermore, both fantasies influenced my personal and political development virtually ensuring a life of active, pro-social, political participation. Neither fantasy reduced the likelihood that I would spend my life trying to make the difference I imagined. One fantasy actually does make a greater difference: the one that speaks the language of political power. The other fantasy disables action by making one a laughingstock to those who wield the language of power. Fantasy motivates and role-playing trains through visualization. Until we can imagine it, we cannot really do it. Role-playing without question teaches students to be comfortable with the language of power, and that language paves the way for genuine and effective political activism.¶ Debates over the relative efficacy of political strategies for pro-social change must confront governmental power at some point. There is a fallacy in arguing that movements represent a better political strategy than voting and person-to-person advocacy. Sure, a full-scale movement would be better than the limited voice I have as a participating citizen going from door to door in a campaign, but so would full-scale government action. Unfortunately, the gap between my individual decision to pursue movement politics and the emergence of a full-scale movement is at least as great as the gap between my vote and democratic change. They both represent utopian fiat. Invocation of Mitchell to support utopian movement fiat is simply not supported by his work, and too often, such invocation discourages the concrete actions he argues for in favor of the personal rejectionism that under girds the political cynicism that is a fundamental cause of voter and participatory abstention in America today.

1. **This encourages debaters to better appreciate one another’s arguments.**

**Galloway 7** — Ryan Galloway, Assistant Professor and Director of Debate at Samford University, 2007 (“Dinner and Conversation at the Argumentative Table: Re-Conceptualizing Debate As An Argumentative Dialogue,” *Contemporary Argumentation & Debate*, Volume 28, September, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via Academic Search Premier, p. 12)

Conversely, in a dialogical exchange, debaters come to realize the positions other than their own have value, and that reasonable minds can disagree on controversial issues. This respect encourages debaters to modify and adapt their own positions on critical issues without the threat of being labeled a hypocrite. The conceptualization of debate as a dialogue allows challenges to take place from a wide variety of perspectives. By offering a stable referent the affirmative must uphold, the negative can choose to engage the affirmative on the widest possible array of “counter- words,” enhancing the pedagogical process produced by debate.

**Victimization DA extempt**

Ballot paradox – either they want the ballot and prove the competition arguments, or they’re only here for the discussion in which case vote neg but recognize the aff’s education is valuable. But either way, the ballot shouldn’t be used to eval pain and suffering bc a) limits to ablist responses that make the debate space exclusionary, and b) has no impact because the judge can vote on it while not actually caring about it.

Creating the role of the judge as an educator that needs to enforce certain social norms forces the judge into the coercive role that makes any attempts at meaningful education pointless and actually re-entrenches an authoritarian logic of violence.

Thomas **Rickert**, “Hands Up, You’re Free”: Composition in a Post-Oedipal World, 2001 // DM

An example of the connection between violence and pedagogy is implicit in the notion of being "schooled" as it has been conceptualized by Giroux and Peter McLaren. They explain, "**Fundamental to** the principles that inform **critical pedagogy is** the conviction that schooling for self- and social empowerment is ethically prior to questions of epistemology or to a mastery of technical or social skills that are primarily tied to the logic of the marketplace" (153-54). A presumption here **is that** it is **the teacher** who **knows (best),** and this orientation gives the concept of schooling a particular bite: **though [critical pedagogy]** it **presents itself as oppositional to** the state and the **dominant forms** of pedagogy **that serve the state** and its capitalist interests, **it nevertheless reinscribes an authoritarian model** that is congruent with any number of oedipalizing pedagogiesthat "school" the student in proper behavior**.** As Diane Davis notes, radical, feminist, and **liberatory pedagogies "often camouflage pedagogical violence** in their move from one mode of 'normalization' to another" and "function **within a disciplinary matrix of power,** a covert carceral system, that aims to create useful subjects for particular political agendas" (212). Such oedipalizing pedagogies are less effective in practice than what the claims for them assert; indeed, the attempt to "school" students in the manner called for by Giroux and McLaren is complicitous with the malaise of postmodern cynicism. **Students** will **dutifully go through their liberatory motions**, producing the proper assignments, **but it remains an open question whether they carry an oppositional politics with them**.The "critical distance" supposedly created with liberatory pedagogy also opens up a cynical distance toward the writing pro duced in class.

Empirically proven by how debaters talk social justice and empowerment in round but never do anything out of round to actually change the system. Turns their impacts, even if debate should be empowering, their method inherently disempowers students by placing the judge as an authoritarian figure, which counts as a voting issue