I negate and value morality as “**an act** or course of action **to which a person is morally** or legally **bound**; a duty or commitment.” [Front page of Google]

Presumption Negates:

* Statements are more often false then true.  If I say this pen is red, I can only prove it true in one way by demonstrating that it is indeed red, where I can prove it false in an infinite amount of ways.
* To negate means to deny the existence or truth of.  [www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ought]

Therefore negating requires no positive justification so we always presume neg.

Permissibility negates:

* Semantics – Ought is defined as expressing obligation which means absent a proactive obligation you vote neg since there’s a trichotomy between prohibition, obligation, and permissibility and proving one disproves the other two.
* Safety – It’s ethically safer to presume the squo since we know what the squo is but we can’t know whether the aff will be good or not if ethics are incoherent.

The reason morality exists in the first place is to regulate our actions towards others. If any moral code is not motivational then there is no reason to do what is right. Motivational externalism collapses into internalism. **Joyce[1]**:

Back to the [Suppose] external reason[s]. Suppose it were claimed, instead, that I have a reason to refrain from drinking the coffee because it is tapu and must not be touched. This reason claim will be urged regardless of what I may say about my indifference to tapu, or my citing of nihilistic desires to tempt the hand of fate. [r]egardless of my desires (it is claimed) I ought not drink - l have a reason not to drink. But **how could** that reason ever explain any action of mine? Could the **external reason** even **explain** my **[action]** from drinking**?** Clearly, in order to explain it **the** external **reason must have some causal**ly efficacious **role [in]** among the antecedents of **the action** (in this case, an omission) — l must have. in some manner. "internalized" it. The only possibility, it would seem, consistent with its being an external reason, is that I believe the external reason claim [but] : I believe that the coffee is tapu. There's no doubting that such a belief can play a role in explaining actions - including my refraining from drinking the coffee. The question is whether the **belief alone can[not] produce action**, to which the correct answer is “No.” A very familiar and eminently sensible view says that **in order to explain** an **action** the **belief must couple with desire**s (such that those same desires had in the absence of the belief would not have resulted in the action). And this seems correct: if I believe that the coffee is [bad] tapu but really just don’t care about that, then I will not refrain from drinking it. So in order for the belief to explain action it must couple with [desire] elements - but in that case the putative **external reason collapses into** an **internal** one.3

Additionally, agents can only be motivated their own desires; not the external desires of another because A) They are epistemically inaccessible and B) Because individuals have unlimited wants and those are not communicated C) We only care about our own desires as individuals are self interested and don’t care about helping others.

Only a contractarian system that derives principles of mutual restraint from individuals’ self-interest account for this fact because contractarian principles are necessarily in the interest of all parties involved because they wouldn’t constrain their action against their will, **Gauthier[2]:**

**Moral principles are** introduced as the **objects of** full voluntary ex ante **agreement among** rational **persons.** Such agreement is hypothetical, in supposing a pre-moral context for the adoption of moral rules and practices.**But the parties to agreement are real,** determinate individuals, **distinguished by their** capacities, **situations, and concerns.**  In so far as **[Since] they** would **agree** **to constrain**ts **on their choices**,restraining their pursuit of their own interests, **they acknowledge a distinction between what they may and may not do.  As rational persons** understanding the structure of their interaction, **they recognize for mutual constraint**, and so for a moral dimension in their affairs.

Thus, the standard is **consistency with** **contractarian principles of mutual restraint**

Additionally, prefer the standard

**1. Consent-** Contractarianism is based on consent—implicit in acceptance of a contract—which ultimately determines what qualifies as a net good or harm, i.e. if euthanasia is murder. Moral theories must be based in consent otherwise actions could never be determinate.

**2. Infinite Regress-**  When we form morals, we can always continue to question them and ask why our conception of the good is right. Contacts is the only way to avoid this infinite questioning by establishing some things as mutually agreed to be true.

I contend that no contractarian principle exists that wills us to affirm.

Contractarianism requires parties to be equal when entering contracts. **Gauthier[3] [2]:**

But the strengths of a contractarian theory may seem to be accompanied by grave weaknesses. We have already noted that for a contractarian, morality requires **a context of mutual benefit**. John Locke held that 'an Hobbist . . . will not easily admit a great many plain duties of morality'. And this may seem equally to apply to the Hobbist's modern-day successor. Our theory does not **assume[s]** any fundamental concern with impartiality, but only a concern derivative from the **benefits of agreement**, and those benefits are **determined by the effect** that **each person can have** on the interests of her fellows. **Only beings whose** physical and mental **capacities are** either roughly **equal** or mutually complementary **can expect to find cooperation beneficial to all.** Humans benefit from their interaction with horses, but they do not co-operate with horses and may not benefit them. **Among unequals, one party may benefit most by coercing the other,** and on our theory would have no reason to refrain.  We may condemn all coercive relationships, but only within the context of mutual benefit can our condemnation appeal to a rationally grounded morality.

Thus - always negate because the WTO has unequal power compared to businesses and the inventors of products that are patented. This the WTO doesn’t have a contractual obligation to reduce intellectual property protections for medicines.

[1] Joyce, Richard (Professor of Philosophy at Victoria University Wellington, New Zealand). The Myth of Morality. 2001. ***[Bracketed for grammatical clarity]***

[2] Gauthier, David P. *Morals by Agreement*. Oxford: Clarendon, 1986. Print.

[3] Gauthier, David P. *Morals by Agreement*. Oxford: Clarendon, 1986. Print.

1. Ought means logical consequence [Merriam-Webster], this means the aff has to prove the resolution will happen while the reciprocal burden of the neg is to prove that the resolution will not happen. Given that they have failed their burden, you should negate.

“Ought.” Merriam-Webster, Merriam-Webster, <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ought>.

Paradoxes

1] Zeno's Paradox: The plan never passes since movement is impossible and infinitely subdivisible. For example, a turtle on a beach moves to the sea– to reach its destination, it must first go half of the distance. Once it has reached that halfway point, it must crawl halfway between that point and the sea. It continuously moves half of the remaining distance, but that is infinitely subdivisible in two, so the turtle will never reach the sea.

2] Good Samaritan paradox. If I want to solve x problem, x problem has to exist first which would mean I want that problem to exist, so affirming would logically negate.

A-priori’s and paradoxes negate under comparative worlds – in order to make comparisons those worlds need to be coherent, which we have proven are not

3] Moral agency requires the formation of intent and the ability to recognize and conceptualize relationships among agents. States cannot engage in these processes because they lack the concrete characteristics necessary to constitute agency. **Wall:**

**“**On the other hand, **if** social groups do exist (i.e., if **there are metaphysical entities beyond individuals** that somehow unite them and their activities), **it would be very difficult to attribute** intentions, desires, and other **properties of** **agency to them.** For, at this point, it seems that **the properties** would have to be transcendental, when commentators take them to be concrete properties of human relations. The attempt to establish any transcendental properties would be an enormous undertaking, to say the least; and even if such an attempt were successful, it is doubtful that the attempt **could [not] satisfy the more concrete demands of moral agency.** After all, **we cannot locate a corporate brain** or central nervous system. We can refer to the activities and relationships  between  certain  individuals  within  a  corporation,  each  of  whom  has  a brain, but we have seen that a genuine corporate act will have to include more than an agglomeration of disparate mental states.**”**

Wall, Edmund. “The problem of group agency.” *The Philosophical Forum,* Vol. 31, No. 2, Summer 2000.

This is an apriori reason to negate,WTO not being moral agents means the rez is incoherent.

AND NO NEW ROTB, PRESUMPTION, OR PERMISSIBILITY ARGS IN THE 1AR:

extempt

**NC theory first - 1] They started the chain of abuse and forced me down this strategy 2] We have more speeches to norm over it 3] It was introduced first so it comes lexically prior.**

**Abuse against the neg outweighs anything else – 1] Infinite prep time before round to frontline 2] 2AR judge psychology outweighs lets you persuade tehm however you want which you’re socially biased to believing 3] 1st and last speech outweighs gives them plan text choice and 2ar framing and recourse 4] Infinite perms and uplayering in the 1AR makes negating impossible and solves skew since smart 1ars can uplayer and read offense against offs**

**Reasonability on 1AR shells – 1AR theory is very aff-biased because the 2AR gets to line-by-line every 2NR standard with new answers that never get responded to**

**DTA on 1AR shells - They can blow up blippy 20 second shells in the 2AR but I have to split my time and can’t preempt 2AR spin which necessitates judge intervention**

**RVIs on 1AR theory – 1AR being able to spend 20 seconds on a shell and still win forces the 2N to allocate at least 2:30 on the shell which means RVIs check back time skew**

**No new 1ar theory paradigm issues- A] New 1ar paradigms moot any 1NC theoretical offense B] introducing them in the aff allows for them to be more rigorously tested**

Interpretation: Debaters must only justify their frameworks substantively. To clarify, TJFs bad.

Violation:

Standards:

[1] Inclusion: TJFs are bad for inclusion. 2 warrants – a) they exclude small schools and less wealthy students who can’t afford access to the best websites for frameworks like util which needs high quality prep. Proven by the fact that phil debaters use analytics mainly and b) novices, (extempt)