I negate and value morality as “**an act** or course of action **to which a person is morally** or legally **bound**; a duty or commitment.” [Front page of Google]

The reason morality exists in the first place is to regulate our actions towards others. If any moral code is not motivational then there is no reason to do what is right. Motivational externalism collapses into internalism. **Joyce[1]**:

Back to the [Suppose] external reason[s]. Suppose it were claimed, instead, that I have a reason to refrain from drinking the coffee because it is tapu and must not be touched. This reason claim will be urged regardless of what I may say about my indifference to tapu, or my citing of nihilistic desires to tempt the hand of fate. [r]egardless of my desires (it is claimed) I ought not drink - l have a reason not to drink. But **how could** that reason ever explain any action of mine? Could the **external reason** even **explain** my **[action]** from drinking**?** Clearly, in order to explain it **the** external **reason must have some causal**ly efficacious **role [in]** among the antecedents of **the action** (in this case, an omission) — l must have. in some manner. "internalized" it. The only possibility, it would seem, consistent with its being an external reason, is that I believe the external reason claim [but] : I believe that the coffee is tapu. There's no doubting that such a belief can play a role in explaining actions - including my refraining from drinking the coffee. The question is whether the **belief alone can[not] produce action**, to which the correct answer is “No.” A very familiar and eminently sensible view says that **in order to explain** an **action** the **belief must couple with desire**s (such that those same desires had in the absence of the belief would not have resulted in the action). And this seems correct: if I believe that the coffee is [bad] tapu but really just don’t care about that, then I will not refrain from drinking it. So in order for the belief to explain action it must couple with [desire] elements - but in that case the putative **external reason collapses into** an **internal** one.3

Additionally, agents can only be motivated their own desires; not the external desires of another because A) They are epistemically inaccessible and B) Because individuals have unlimited wants and those are not communicated C) We only care about our own desires as individuals are self interested and don’t care about helping others.

Only a contractarian system that derives principles of mutual restraint from individuals’ self-interest account for this fact because contractarian principles are necessarily in the interest of all parties involved because they wouldn’t constrain their action against their will, **Gauthier[2]:**

**Moral principles are** introduced as the **objects of** full voluntary ex ante **agreement among** rational **persons.** Such agreement is hypothetical, in supposing a pre-moral context for the adoption of moral rules and practices.**But the parties to agreement are real,** determinate individuals, **distinguished by their** capacities, **situations, and concerns.**  In so far as **[Since] they** would **agree** **to constrain**ts **on their choices**,restraining their pursuit of their own interests, **they acknowledge a distinction between what they may and may not do.  As rational persons** understanding the structure of their interaction, **they recognize for mutual constraint**, and so for a moral dimension in their affairs.

Thus, the standard is **consistency with** **contractarian principles of mutual restraint**

Additionally, prefer the standard

**1. Consent-** Contractarianism is based on consent—implicit in acceptance of a contract—which ultimately determines what qualifies as a net good or harm, i.e. if euthanasia is murder. Moral theories must be based in consent otherwise actions could never be determinate.

**2. Infinite Regress-**  When we form morals, we can always continue to question them and ask why our conception of the good is right. Contacts is the only way to avoid this infinite questioning by establishing some things as mutually agreed to be true.

I contend that no contractarian principle exists that wills us to affirm.

Contractarianism requires parties to be equal when entering contracts. **Gauthier[3] [2]:**

But the strengths of a contractarian theory may seem to be accompanied by grave weaknesses. We have already noted that for a contractarian, morality requires **a context of mutual benefit**. John Locke held that 'an Hobbist . . . will not easily admit a great many plain duties of morality'. And this may seem equally to apply to the Hobbist's modern-day successor. Our theory does not **assume[s]** any fundamental concern with impartiality, but only a concern derivative from the **benefits of agreement**, and those benefits are **determined by the effect** that **each person can have** on the interests of her fellows. **Only beings whose** physical and mental **capacities are** either roughly **equal** or mutually complementary **can expect to find cooperation beneficial to all.** Humans benefit from their interaction with horses, but they do not co-operate with horses and may not benefit them. **Among unequals, one party may benefit most by coercing the other,** and on our theory would have no reason to refrain.  We may condemn all coercive relationships, but only within the context of mutual benefit can our condemnation appeal to a rationally grounded morality.

Thus - always negate because the WTO has unequal power compared to businesses and the inventors of products that are patented. This the WTO doesn’t have a contractual obligation to reduce intellectual property protections for medicines.

[1] Joyce, Richard (Professor of Philosophy at Victoria University Wellington, New Zealand). The Myth of Morality. 2001. ***[Bracketed for grammatical clarity]***

[2] Gauthier, David P. *Morals by Agreement*. Oxford: Clarendon, 1986. Print.

[3] Gauthier, David P. *Morals by Agreement*. Oxford: Clarendon, 1986. Print.

2nd off:

A) Isomorphism: alternative RTBs aren’t binary win/loss, and thus cannot function in debate

B) Constitutivism: the ballot and tab software presents decisions as aff/neg, not who best achieves some good value. Also, “affirm” is “To state that is true” [1] and negate is “to deny the existence or truth of”, which independently proves truth testing.

C) Key to 1) Ground Parity:  The wording committee and topic selection process exist to identify topics with a range of defensible arguments on both sides, “role of the ballot” claims can frame the round in ways that make my ground either absurd or morally abhorrent 2) Predictability: The only face value of a resolution is it’s truth or falsity as a statement – not some inherent other framework

D) exempt

 Moral agency requires the formation of intent and the ability to recognize and conceptualize relationships among agents. “governments” cannot engage in these processes because they lack the concrete characteristics necessary to constitute agency. **Wall:**

**“**On the other hand, **if** social groups do exist (i.e., if **there are metaphysical entities beyond individuals** that somehow unite them and their activities), **it would be very difficult to attribute** intentions, desires, and other **properties of** **agency to them.** For, at this point, it seems that **the properties** would have to be transcendental, when commentators take them to be concrete properties of human relations. The attempt to establish any transcendental properties would be an enormous undertaking, to say the least; and even if such an attempt were successful, it is doubtful that the attempt **could [not] satisfy the more concrete demands of moral agency.** After all, **we cannot locate a corporate brain** or central nervous system. We can refer to the activities and relationships  between  certain  individuals  within  a  corporation,  each  of  whom  has  a brain, but we have seen that a genuine corporate act will have to include more than an agglomeration of disparate mental states.**”**

Wall, Edmund. “The problem of group agency.” *The Philosophical Forum,* Vol. 31, No. 2, Summer 2000.

This is an apriori reason to negate, governments not being a moral agent means the rez is incoherent.

3rd off: extempt

Interp: Debaters must not read eval after the AC in favor of blackness

Violation: they do 3 point

Standards

AND AFF SPIKES AGAINST ASIAN DEBATERS ARE A VOTING ISSUE

extempt

**Victimization DA – your claims of radical performance and resistance are merely circulated endlessly within debate to no avail – leading to debaters trying to put themselves into the shoes of the victim to understand them which leads turns their performance into an adventure playground where debaters experiment and fetishize the other – this is not just a commodification DA but also is a terminal no solvency to your aff because this process of victimization is exactly what allows the west to circulate images of pain under the ruse of change while not really doing**

Ballot paradox – extempt

Some other stuff might be extempt idk yet

Creating the role of the judge as an educator that needs to enforce certain social norms forces the judge into the coercive role that makes any attempts at meaningful education pointless and actually re-entrenches an authoritarian logic of violence.

Thomas **Rickert**, “Hands Up, You’re Free”: Composition in a Post-Oedipal World, 2001 // DM

An example of the connection between violence and pedagogy is implicit in the notion of being "schooled" as it has been conceptualized by Giroux and Peter McLaren. They explain, "**Fundamental to** the principles that inform **critical pedagogy is** the conviction that schooling for self- and social empowerment is ethically prior to questions of epistemology or to a mastery of technical or social skills that are primarily tied to the logic of the marketplace" (153-54). A presumption here **is that** it is **the teacher** who **knows (best),** and this orientation gives the concept of schooling a particular bite: **though [critical pedagogy]** it **presents itself as oppositional to** the state and the **dominant forms** of pedagogy **that serve the state** and its capitalist interests, **it nevertheless reinscribes an authoritarian model** that is congruent with any number of oedipalizing pedagogiesthat "school" the student in proper behavior**.** As Diane Davis notes, radical, feminist, and **liberatory pedagogies "often camouflage pedagogical violence** in their move from one mode of 'normalization' to another" and "function **within a disciplinary matrix of power,** a covert carceral system, that aims to create useful subjects for particular political agendas" (212). Such oedipalizing pedagogies are less effective in practice than what the claims for them assert; indeed, the attempt to "school" students in the manner called for by Giroux and McLaren is complicitous with the malaise of postmodern cynicism. **Students** will **dutifully go through their liberatory motions**, producing the proper assignments, **but it remains an open question whether they carry an oppositional politics with them**.The "critical distance" supposedly created with liberatory pedagogy also opens up a cynical distance toward the writing pro duced in class.