The reason morality exists in the first place is to regulate our actions towards others. If any moral code is not motivational then there is no reason to do what is right. Motivational externalism collapses into internalism. **Joyce[1]**:

Back to the [Suppose] external reason[s]. Suppose it were claimed, instead, that I have a reason to refrain from drinking the coffee because it is tapu and must not be touched. This reason claim will be urged regardless of what I may say about my indifference to tapu, or my citing of nihilistic desires to tempt the hand of fate. [r]egardless of my desires (it is claimed) I ought not drink - l have a reason not to drink. But **how could** that reason ever explain any action of mine? Could the **external reason** even **explain** my **[action]** from drinking**?** Clearly, in order to explain it **the** external **reason must have some causal**ly efficacious **role [in]** among the antecedents of **the action** (in this case, an omission) — l must have. in some manner. "internalized" it. The only possibility, it would seem, consistent with its being an external reason, is that I believe the external reason claim [but] : I believe that the coffee is tapu. There's no doubting that such a belief can play a role in explaining actions - including my refraining from drinking the coffee. The question is whether the **belief alone can[not] produce action**, to which the correct answer is “No.” A very familiar and eminently sensible view says that **in order to explain** an **action** the **belief must couple with desire**s (such that those same desires had in the absence of the belief would not have resulted in the action). And this seems correct: if I believe that the coffee is [bad] tapu but really just don’t care about that, then I will not refrain from drinking it. So in order for the belief to explain action it must couple with [desire] elements - but in that case the putative **external reason collapses into** an **internal** one.3

Additionally, agents can only be motivated their own desires; not the external desires of another because A) They are epistemically inaccessible and B) Because individuals have unlimited wants and those are not communicated C) We only care about our own desires as individuals are self interested and don’t care about helping others.

Only a contractarian system that derives principles of mutual restraint from individuals’ self-interest account for this fact because contractarian principles are necessarily in the interest of all parties involved because they wouldn’t constrain their action against their will, **Gauthier[2]:**

**Moral principles are** introduced as the **objects of** full voluntary ex ante **agreement among** rational **persons.** Such agreement is hypothetical, in supposing a pre-moral context for the adoption of moral rules and practices.**But the parties to agreement are real,** determinate individuals, **distinguished by their** capacities, **situations, and concerns.**  In so far as **[Since] they** would **agree** **to constrain**ts **on their choices**,restraining their pursuit of their own interests, **they acknowledge a distinction between what they may and may not do.  As rational persons** understanding the structure of their interaction, **they recognize for mutual constraint**, and so for a moral dimension in their affairs.

Thus, the standard is **consistency with** **contractarian principles of mutual restraint**

Additionally, prefer the standard

**1. Consent-** Contractarianism is based on consent—implicit in acceptance of a contract—which ultimately determines what qualifies as a net good or harm, i.e. if euthanasia is murder. Moral theories must be based in consent otherwise actions could never be determinate.

**2. Infinite Regress-**  When we form morals, we can always continue to question them and ask why our conception of the good is right. Contacts is the only way to avoid this infinite questioning by establishing some things as mutually agreed to be true.

I contend that no contractarian principle exists that wills us to affirm.

Contractarianism requires parties to be equal when entering contracts. **Gauthier[3] [2]:**

But the strengths of a contractarian theory may seem to be accompanied by grave weaknesses. We have already noted that for a contractarian, morality requires **a context of mutual benefit**. John Locke held that 'an Hobbist . . . will not easily admit a great many plain duties of morality'. And this may seem equally to apply to the Hobbist's modern-day successor. Our theory does not **assume[s]** any fundamental concern with impartiality, but only a concern derivative from the **benefits of agreement**, and those benefits are **determined by the effect** that **each person can have** on the interests of her fellows. **Only beings whose** physical and mental **capacities are** either roughly **equal** or mutually complementary **can expect to find cooperation beneficial to all.** Humans benefit from their interaction with horses, but they do not co-operate with horses and may not benefit them. **Among unequals, one party may benefit most by coercing the other,** and on our theory would have no reason to refrain.  We may condemn all coercive relationships, but only within the context of mutual benefit can our condemnation appeal to a rationally grounded morality.

Thus - always negate because the power relations between workers, governments, and businesses are unequal, they dont have contractual  obligations towards each other.

[1] Joyce, Richard (Professor of Philosophy at Victoria University Wellington, New Zealand). The Myth of Morality. 2001. ***[Bracketed for grammatical clarity]***

[2] Gauthier, David P. *Morals by Agreement*. Oxford: Clarendon, 1986. Print.

[3] Gauthier, David P. *Morals by Agreement*. Oxford: Clarendon, 1986. Print.

1. *The ROTB is TT -*

*A) Isomorphism: alternative RTBs aren’t binary win/loss, and thus cannot function in debate*

*B) Constitutivism: the ballot and tab software presents decisions as aff/neg, not who best achieves some good value. Also, “affirm” is “To state that is true” [1] and negate is “to deny the existence or truth of”, which independently proves truth testing.*

*C) Key to 1) Ground Parity:  extempt*

1] Moral agency requires the formation of intent and the ability to recognize and conceptualize relationships among agents. States cannot engage in these processes because they lack the concrete characteristics necessary to constitute agency. **Wall:**

**“**On the other hand, **if** social groups do exist (i.e., if **there are metaphysical entities beyond individuals** that somehow unite them and their activities), **it would be very difficult to attribute** intentions, desires, and other **properties of** **agency to them.** For, at this point, it seems that **the properties** would have to be transcendental, when commentators take them to be concrete properties of human relations. The attempt to establish any transcendental properties would be an enormous undertaking, to say the least; and even if such an attempt were successful, it is doubtful that the attempt **could [not] satisfy the more concrete demands of moral agency.** After all, **we cannot locate a corporate brain** or central nervous system. We can refer to the activities and relationships  between  certain  individuals  within  a  corporation,  each  of  whom  has  a brain, but we have seen that a genuine corporate act will have to include more than an agglomeration of disparate mental states.**”**

Wall, Edmund. “The problem of group agency.” *The Philosophical Forum,* Vol. 31, No. 2, Summer 2000.

This is an apriori reason to negate, if the rez is incoherent you cant affirm under truth testing

**3rd off ROB SPEC  
A-Interpretation: If either debater proposes an explicit role of the ballot that differs from the conventional truth testing model, they must specify how the round ought to play out under that role of the ballot in the AC. To clarify, the role of the ballot must specify:**

**1. How we determine what a legitimate advocacy is under their role of the ballot, i.e. whether topicality constrains each debater’s advocacy.**

**2. What area of the debate must be warranted, i.e. whether a normative framework needs to determine what counts as oppression**

**3. What advocacies are acceptable under the role of the ballot.**

**4. If the debate be driven solely by the flow. For example, a cap K role of the ballot must speak to whether I win if I prove voting for me has out of round benefits to cap whereas my opponent proves the resolution is capitalist. Pre and post fiat impacts must be distinguished.**

**5. What kind of theoretical objections can be made against the role of the ballot**

**6. How you weigh and compare between competing advocacies**

**7. What the implication of the role of the ballot is i.e. is it solely a framing issue or an independent reason to vote for you?**

**8. specify what counts as a critique of discourse of the 1AC, especially when asked for all 3 min of CX**

**B-Violation: They don’t do this**

**C-Standards:**

**Resolvability: Without specifying the aforementioned conditions in their role of the ballot, it’s impossible to debate and adjudicate especially when debaters derive offense under the role of the ballot using separate methods or the same method in different ways. Since these arguments are incomparable, the judge is forced to intervene. These two arguments are incomparable the only way the judge can decided which one is better is through intervening. This outweighs under their role of the ballot since it’s pointless to propose a new way to debate that’s impossible to debate under. Resolvability is an independent voter since every round needs a winner, which means that this shell is a prior question.**

**Critical Education: Their lack of specification of role of the ballot forces me to avoid their position because I don’t know what their moves or strategic tactics will be in the next speech--when they are forced to specify I understand the constraints placed on both debaters and understand how to respond to the position. Independent reason to drop them, their position delegitimizes any form of critical education because I am forced to spend my time debating how their position functions, rather than understanding and engaging in the warrants. And any arguments for why the shell is a bad form of engagement with the K is just a reason to prefer the interpretation because it is making ways to better engage with the way the K wants. Critical education controls the internal link to their role of the ballot because it is the type of education they are trying to gain.**

**Voters analytic**

Wu Wei ethics literally means do nothing, that negates **Cotton:**

**Wu wei means – in Chinese – non-doing or ‘doing nothing’.** It sounds like a pleasant invitation to relax or worse, fall into laziness or apathy. Yet this concept is key to the noblest kind of action according to the philosophy of Daoism – and is at the heart of what it means to follow Dao or The Way. According to the central text of Daoism, the Dao De Jing: ‘The Way never acts yet nothing is left undone’. **This is the paradox of wu wei. It doesn’t mean not acting, it means ‘effortless action’ or ‘actionless action’.** It means being at peace while engaged in the most frenetic tasks so that one can carry these out with maximum skill and efficiency. Something of the meaning of wu wei is captured when we talk of being ‘in the zone’ – at one with what we are doing, in a state of profound concentration and flow.

Cotton, Jess. “Wu Wei – Doing Nothing 無爲 -.” The School of Life Articles, 19 Nov. 2020, <https://www.theschooloflife.com/thebookoflife/wu-wei-doing-nothing/>.