I negate and value morality an obligation is “**an act** or course of action **to which a person is morally** or legally **bound**; a duty or commitment.” [Front page of Google]

Presumption and permissibility negates

Permissibility negates

[1]  The resolution says ought, which implies a moral obligation. The neg position proves that there isn’t a moral obligation, which includes permissibility, meaning you negate

[2] Safety – It’s ethically safer to do the squo since we know what the squo is but we can’t know whether the aff will be good or not if ethics are incoherent.

3) Statements are more often false then true.  If I say this pen is red, I can only prove it true in one way by demonstrating that it is indeed red, where I can prove it false in an infinite amount of ways.

The reason morality exists in the first place is to regulate our actions towards others. If any moral code is not motivational then there is no reason to do what is right. Motivational externalism collapses into internalism. **Joyce[1]**:

Back to the [Suppose] external reason[s]. Suppose it were claimed, instead, that I have a reason to refrain from drinking the coffee because it is tapu and must not be touched. This reason claim will be urged regardless of what I may say about my indifference to tapu, or my citing of nihilistic desires to tempt the hand of fate. [r]egardless of my desires (it is claimed) I ought not drink - l have a reason not to drink. But **how could** that reason ever explain any action of mine? Could the **external reason** even **explain** my **[action]** from drinking**?** Clearly, in order to explain it **the** external **reason must have some causal**ly efficacious **role [in]** among the antecedents of **the action** (in this case, an omission) — l must have. in some manner. "internalized" it. The only possibility, it would seem, consistent with its being an external reason, is that I believe the external reason claim [but] : I believe that the coffee is tapu. There's no doubting that such a belief can play a role in explaining actions - including my refraining from drinking the coffee. The question is whether the **belief alone can[not] produce action**, to which the correct answer is “No.” A very familiar and eminently sensible view says that **in order to explain** an **action** the **belief must couple with desire**s (such that those same desires had in the absence of the belief would not have resulted in the action). And this seems correct: if I believe that the coffee is [bad] tapu but really just don’t care about that, then I will not refrain from drinking it. So in order for the belief to explain action it must couple with [desire] elements - but in that case the putative **external reason collapses into** an **internal** one.3

Additionally, agents can only be motivated their own desires; not the external desires of another because A) They are epistemically inaccessible and B) Because individuals have unlimited wants and those are not communicated C) We only care about our own desires as individuals are self interested and don’t care about helping others.

Only a contractarian system that derives principles of mutual restraint from individuals’ self-interest account for this fact because contractarian principles are necessarily in the interest of all parties involved because they wouldn’t constrain their action against their will, **Gauthier[2]:**

**Moral principles are** introduced as the **objects of** full voluntary ex ante **agreement among** rational **persons.** Such agreement is hypothetical, in supposing a pre-moral context for the adoption of moral rules and practices.**But the parties to agreement are real,** determinate individuals, **distinguished by their** capacities, **situations, and concerns.**  In so far as **[Since] they** would **agree** **to constrain**ts **on their choices**,restraining their pursuit of their own interests, **they acknowledge a distinction between what they may and may not do.  As rational persons** understanding the structure of their interaction, **they recognize for mutual constraint**, and so for a moral dimension in their affairs.

Thus, the standard is **consistency with** **contractarian principles of mutual restraint**

Additionally, prefer the standard

**1. Consent-** Contractarianism is based on consent—implicit in acceptance of a contract—which ultimately determines what qualifies as a net good or harm, i.e. if euthanasia is murder. Moral theories must be based in consent otherwise actions could never be determinate.

**2. Infinite Regress-**  When we form morals, we can always continue to question them and ask why our conception of the good is right. Contacts is the only way to avoid this infinite questioning by establishing some things as mutually agreed to be true.

I contend that no contractarian principle exists that wills us to affirm.

Contractarianism requires parties to be equal when entering contracts. **Gauthier[3] [2]:**

But the strengths of a contractarian theory may seem to be accompanied by grave weaknesses. We have already noted that for a contractarian, morality requires **a context of mutual benefit**. John Locke held that 'an Hobbist . . . will not easily admit a great many plain duties of morality'. And this may seem equally to apply to the Hobbist's modern-day successor. Our theory does not **assume[s]** any fundamental concern with impartiality, but only a concern derivative from the **benefits of agreement**, and those benefits are **determined by the effect** that **each person can have** on the interests of her fellows. **Only beings whose** physical and mental **capacities are** either roughly **equal** or mutually complementary **can expect to find cooperation beneficial to all.** Humans benefit from their interaction with horses, but they do not co-operate with horses and may not benefit them. **Among unequals, one party may benefit most by coercing the other,** and on our theory would have no reason to refrain.  We may condemn all coercive relationships, but only within the context of mutual benefit can our condemnation appeal to a rationally grounded morality.

Thus - always negate because the aff a) concedes authority of the state, and b) the power difference between the government and individuals is unbalanced because the government can create laws that citizens have to abide by. This means governments don’t have a contractual obligation to recognize an unconditional right to strike

[1] Joyce, Richard (Professor of Philosophy at Victoria University Wellington, New Zealand). The Myth of Morality. 2001. ***[Bracketed for grammatical clarity]***

[2] Gauthier, David P. *Morals by Agreement*. Oxford: Clarendon, 1986. Print.

[3] Gauthier, David P. *Morals by Agreement*. Oxford: Clarendon, 1986. Print.

2nd off

A) Isomorphism: alternative RTBs aren’t binary win/loss, and thus cannot function in debate

B) Constitutivism: the ballot and tab software presents decisions as aff/neg, not who best achieves some good value. Also, “affirm” is “To state that is true” [1] and negate is “to deny the existence or truth of”, which independently proves truth testing.

C) Key to 1) Ground Parity:  The wording committee and topic selection process exist to identify topics with a range of defensible arguments on both sides, “role of the ballot” claims can frame the round in ways that make my ground either absurd or morally abhorrent 2) Predictability: The only face value of a resolution is it’s truth or falsity as a statement – not some inherent other framework

To is defined as expressing motion in the direction of (a particular location) [EOD]. Strike is not a particular location so the resolution is impossible and you auto-negate. negate means to deny the truth of I am denying truth of the aff means you vote neg cuz ive met my burden.

Good Samaritan paradox. If I want to solve x problem, x problem has to exist first which would mean I want that problem to exist, hence affirming logically negates

 Moral agency requires the formation of intent and the ability to recognize and conceptualize relationships among agents. “governments” cannot engage in these processes because they lack the concrete characteristics necessary to constitute agency. **Wall:**

**“**On the other hand, **if** social groups do exist (i.e., if **there are metaphysical entities beyond individuals** that somehow unite them and their activities), **it would be very difficult to attribute** intentions, desires, and other **properties of** **agency to them.** For, at this point, it seems that **the properties** would have to be transcendental, when commentators take them to be concrete properties of human relations. The attempt to establish any transcendental properties would be an enormous undertaking, to say the least; and even if such an attempt were successful, it is doubtful that the attempt **could [not] satisfy the more concrete demands of moral agency.** After all, **we cannot locate a corporate brain** or central nervous system. We can refer to the activities and relationships  between  certain  individuals  within  a  corporation,  each  of  whom  has  a brain, but we have seen that a genuine corporate act will have to include more than an agglomeration of disparate mental states.**”**

Wall, Edmund. “The problem of group agency.” *The Philosophical Forum,* Vol. 31, No. 2, Summer 2000.

This is an apriori reason to negate, governments not being a moral agent means the rez is incoherent and they don’t have obligations

ON CASE

1. **TURN, striking is always coercive and self interested, which isn’t virtuous. Smart:**

It is evident that some believe that MacFarlane has attempted to legitimise too powerful a right. For example, one reviewer, Nevi1 Johnson, complains: MacFarlane underplays some aspects of his problem. **Strike action is nearly always self-interested and directed to securing advantage, for particular groups of workers; it is necessarily coercive; its side effects in terms of damage to those not involved have become more and more unpredictable and incalculable**.. . it is far more difficult to justify its exercise than many people believe: **it is a right that is too lightly treated as a big stick with which to beat others** [10].

Smart, Brian. "The right to strike and the right to work." Journal of Applied Philosophy 2.1 (1985): 31-40.

Rest is extempt