As the Rock once said,

“Its about drive, its about power, we stay hungry, we devour”



I affirm,

Brackets for Clarity

Spikes on Bottom <3

**Framework**

**Any moral valuation presupposes the unconditional worth of humanity because when agents pursue any end, all value placed upon an object is contingent upon the agent for example a pencil is only valuable to me so long as it can write my paper. All agents have unconditional value because they possess the ability to confer value that stems from their reason. That outweighs.**

**All other frameworks collapse—other theories source obligations in extrinsically good objects, but that presupposes the goodness of the rational will.**

**That justifies universalizable ends – A) a priori principles like reason apply to everyone since they are independent of human experience and B) any non-universalizable norm justifies someone’s ability to impede on your ends e.g. if I want to eat ice cream, I must recognize that others may affect my pursuit of that end and demand the value of my end be recognized by others.**

**There are two models of universal freedom—the non-interference model and the non-domination model. The non-interference holds that someone’s freedom is violated if they are actually interfered with, whereas the non-domination model holds that someone’s freedom is violated if someone has the capacity to arbitrarily interfere. For example, a slave with a benevolent master would be free under non-interference b/c the master let’s them set and pursue whatever ends they want, but unfree under freedom as non-domination b/c their freedom is contingent upon the master who has the capacity to interfere arbitrarily.**

**Prefer the non-domination model:**

**Freedom is good but the non-interference model of freedom allows absolute institutional control—non-domination solves.**

**Pettit 97,** Philip Pettit (Laurence Rockefeller University Professor of Politics and Human Values at Princeton University). “Freedom with Honor: A Republican Ideal.” Spring 1997.<http://www.princeton.edu/~ppettit/papers/FreedomwithHonor_SocialResearch_1997.pdf>

And so to my claim about the constitutional consistency of freedom as noninterference with institutional humiliation. For the lesson of our reflections is that **if the task is to promote negative liberty** overall then **the best constitution**al arrangement for doing that **may involve leaving some** people **with** a certain **power of interfering in** the **lives of others**. But if some people have such a power of interfering with others then, cases of covert manipulation apart, it will generally be salient to relevant parties that they have that power: everyone is going to be interested, after all, in whether some people dominate others in this way and it will usually be evident from the allocation of resources that they do or do not exercise such domination (Pettit, 1997, ch. 2). And **where** it is salient to all that **a dominates b,** then it will equally be salient that **if b does anything in the domain of a’s power,** then **b does that by** the **implicit leave**—by the grace and favor—**of a. There may not be much actual interference** practiced in the relationship **but it will still be** the case, and it will still be saliently the case, **that b acts** and lives **at the mercy of a. With such manifest domination, of course, humiliation routinely follows**. The subordinate party has to look out for the moods and feelings of the dominating person. They have to make sure that they stay on their best side. **They will naturally seek to ingratiate themselves with their superior**, if that is possible, **and** they **may** even find themselves inclined to **bow and scrape**. The subordinate party will live in a position where **their grounds for self-respect are** severely **compromised**; they will be forced to accept a considerable measure of humiliation. I earlier associated the absence of humiliation with enjoying a voice and being given an ear. The connection between domination and humiliation comes out nicely in the loss of voice that domination entails. The dominated person is obliged to watch what they say, having an eye to what will please their dominators; they have to impress their dominators, wherever that is possible, and try to win a higher ranking in their opinion. But **such a person will naturally be presumed to lack an independent voice**, at least in the area where domination is relevant. They will fail to make the most basic claim on the attention of the more powerful, for they will easily be seen as attention-seekers: they will easily be seen in the way that adults often see precocious children. They may happen to receive attention but they will not command attention; **they may happen to receive respect but they will not command respect.**

**Aspec: Non-domination is the only notion of freedom that can apply to governments. Prefer: State interference promotes freedom if it ensures non-domination.**

**Waltman 2**, Jerry Waltman (taught political science at the University of Southern Mississippi for 25 years; in 15 of those he participated in the British Studies Program.  He currently holds an endowed professorship in political science at Baylor University, where he teaches British politics and comparative public law.  He received his Ph.D. from Indiana University, and is the author of eight books and numerous articles in academic journals on both British and American politics.  In addition to his years spent on the British Studies Program, he has traveled and taught in the UK on many occasions). “Civic Republicanism, The Basic Income Guarantee, and the Living Wage.” USBIG Discussion Paper. No. 25, March 2002.

Civic republicanism's origins lie in the ancient world, in the political theory undergirding several notable Greek city-states and the Roman republic. (2) Thereafter, it lay dormant until resurrected in the Italian city-states of the Renaissance, and then by the "Commonwealth men" of seventeenth century England. From the latter, it was transported to the American colonies and flowered during the Revolutionary era and immediately afterward. While republican thinkers from these various periods parted company on several matters, their unifying focus was that **the polity is a self-governing community of citizens**. The aim of the civic republican polity is maintaining the liberty of its citizens. **Since liberty cannot be achieved outside a community**-a wild animal can be "free" but it cannot be said to have "liberty"-**the individual** citizen must be intimately connected to the community. He **must believe that** his **[their] interests are inseparable from those of the community**, and that the role of citizen is a natural part of life. The state can rely on its citizens, who after all are the state, to exercise civic virtue and to consider the needs of the community along with their own. The citizenry governs itself by the process of deliberation, a deliberation devoted to finding and pursuing the public interest. To this end, political institutions in a republic should evidence a certain balance and be rather slow acting, at least under ordinary circumstances. Representative democracy, which allows republics to be larger than city-states, is a method for the further protection of liberty. It is not, pointedly, an end in itself. **Unlike liberal individualism, which posits no overriding end for the polity, civic**

**republicanism stands** emphatically **on liberty** as its central value. Liberty is taken to mean being free from domination. More formally, according to Richard Petit, a leading contemporary republican theorist, "One agent dominates another if and only if they have a certain power over that other, in particular a power of interference on an arbitrary basis." (3) Domination can therefore take either of two forms. In the first, one private individual holds power over another (dominium); in the second, it is the state which exercises the domination (imperium). Both are equally odious to republicanism. If I am dominated, I am not free, no matter what the source of the domination. **To be a citizen is to be** at all times and all places **free of domination**, since citizenship is synonymous with the enjoyment of liberty. Prohibiting dominium presupposes that no citizen can be the servant of another, for servanthood brings domination with it by its very nature. If you are my servant and I order you around, you are quite clearly being dominated. Nevertheless, it is important to note that **you are dominated even if I chose not to order you around** (for whatever reason). **You still cannot look me in the eye as an equal**, for we both know that "The Remains of the Day" is more realistic than Wooster and Jeeves. Not only may I alter my reserved role at any time without consulting you, but you will also be ever mindful of my ability to do so, and that cannot help but affect how you think, feel, and act. You and I are both aware that there may come a time when you will have to tread gingerly. Citizens of a republic simply cannot have such a relationship. As Petit said of civic republicans: The heights that they identified held out the prospect of a way of life within which none of them had to bow and scrape to others; they would each be capable of standing on their own two feet; they would each be able to look others squarely in the eye. (4)   Or, as Walt Whitman succinctly described a citizen, "Neither a servant nor a master am I." (5) **Governmental power can** of course **be a source of domination also**, for the enormous power of the state is ever pregnant with the potential for domination. **There is, however, a critical difference** here. **Where**as **interference**, real or potential, **by one individual over another**'s choices **is** by its nature **domination, government**al **interference** in one's affairs **may** or may **not be.** This is **because liberty can only be** made **meaningful in a community, and** the **needs of the community will** necessarily at times come into **conflict** with one or more individuals' autonomy, or at least with individuals' autonomy as they would define it. It is the community that makes liberty possible, and a citizen's freedom is inseparable from the interests and health of the community. As Blackstone noted, "**laws, when prudently framed, are** by no means subversive but rather **introductive of liberty**."

**Thus, the standard is consistency with universality as non-domination.**

**Prefer:**

**[1] Freedom is the key to the process of justification of arguments. Willing that we should abide by their ethical theory presupposes that we own ourselves in the first place. Thus, it is logically incoherent to justify the neg arguments/standard without first willing that we can pursue ends free from others.**

**[2] Consequentialism kinda fails a) induction – the past is not a reliable predictor of the future and we can’t use induction to prove induction because that would be circular b) they cascade – each consequence has another consequence and is infinitely regressive. c) aggregation – can’t compare 5 headaches vs 1 migraine. Answers to calc indicts prove them true because I chose these arguments predicting you wouldn’t beat them.**

**[3] Consequentialism is repugnant: a) it justifies atrocities since it justifies allowing us to harm some for the benefit of others – even if they spew some pain quantifiability argument that doesn’t solve since there are still instances some get great benefit from others harm, which ow on exclusion, by endorsing ideology that defends moral atrocities they make the debate space unsafe and exclude debaters.**

**[4] Solves DA’s caused by state actors, if they adopt Non-Domination as a model, no one can interfere with others as we are all equal which means actors can’t start nuke war.**

**[5]Interpretation: the neg must not contest the aff framework, read arguments that contest the ethical validity of the aff standard, or read an alternative framework provided that the aff standard is consistency with universality as non-domination.. Strat skew – neg is reactive and can up-layer the aff on fwk, procedures, etc  – AFC levels the playing field by forcing the neg to commit to the aff on substance, which ensures the AC matters. Procedural fairness is a voter and outweighs: Sequencing- unfair norms exacerbate structural skews; small school teams and minorities would leave debate if it was procedurally unfair. CI and DTD on 1AC theory – otherwise the 1nc can sandbag which wrecks deterrence No RVI on 1ac theory that has a pre-emptive violation--they would have 7 minutes to answer a minute-long shell and the debate would end right there-- the entire 1ac cant be the shell because then they could just choose not to violate it**

NOW AFFIRM,

**Absent a right to strike, workers are dominated –**

**Authority within the workplace arbitrarily resides in the hands of employers, which alienates and dominates workers, Gourevitch:**

Gourevitch, A.. “Quitting Work but Not the Job: Liberty and the Right to Strike.” Perspectives on Politics 14 (2016): 307 - 323. //LHP AV Accessed 7/4/21

The commodification of labor 2: contracts and government of the workplace Strikes are ways of resisting structural domination at its most immediate, concrete point – the job. But that is only one aspect of the unfreedom that produces strikes. **The other arises from personal domination in the workplace itself**. Most modern work is a continuous, coordinated activity of workers in a workplace. This **coordination is only possible through a system of authoritative decisions and standards that cover the complex, ongoing, ever changing set of workplace activities**. Here we meet the second way in which a contract-based social theory is not up to the task of giving an adequate account of the actual relationships in which workers find themselves. Though there are attempts to explain and justify the arbitrary authority that employers possess by reference to the labor contract, these fail, leaving an analytic and moral void. The view of the workplace as a product of private contracts makes it difficult even to grasp the political structure of the workplace itself, let alone understand the range of issues against which **workers** might **strike when resisting an employer’s arbitrary authority** (Anderson 2015; Gourevitch 2013; Hsieh 2005). **A workplace is a site of personal domination because workers are subject to the arbitrary authority of bosses**. **The bosses’ authority is arbitrary because it is not sufficiently controlled by workers.** The ruling legal and social assumption is that decisions about how to run the workplace are up to employers and their managers. **Workers are expected simply to obey**. In American law, this is enshrined as the “core of managerial prerogatives” regarding hiring and firing, work schedules, design of tasks, introduction of new technology and the like – and they extend to prerogatives of capital regarding purchase of goods, plant location, and other investment-related decisions. 11 A general set of, often poorly enforced, labor laws establish specific reservations against what an employer may order workers to do or require them to accept. But the very fact that these are specific reservations only reinforces the fact that the assumption is one of dependence on the arbitrary will of managers and owners. For examples, consider the fact that in many states employers have been within their rights when firing workers for comments they made on Facebook (Emerson, Huffington Post, October 17, 2011), for their sexual orientation (Velasco, San Gabriel Valley Tribune, October 7, 2011), for being too sexually appealing (Strauss, ABC News, August 2, 2013), or for not being appealing enough (Hess, Slate Magazine, July 29, 2013). Workers face being given more tasks than can be performed in the allotted time (JOMO, Dissent, Winter 2013; Greenhouse 2009, 53-55, 89, 111-112), locked in the workplace overnight (Greenhouse 2009, 49-53), forced to work in extreme heat or physically hazardous but not illegal conditions (Urbina, New York Times, March 30, 2013; Hsu, Los Angeles Times, September 19, 2011), or arbitrarily isolated from the rest of one’s coworkers (Greenhouse 2009, 26-27). Some workers are forced to wear diapers rather than go to the bathroom, refused lunch breaks or pressured to work through them (Jamieson, Huffington Post, May 8, 2013; Wasserman, Mashable, July 25, 2012; Vega, New York Times, July 7, 2012; Egelko, San Francisco Chronicle, February 18, 2011; Greenhouse 2009, 11-12), forced to keep working

after their shift is up, denied the right to read or turn on air conditioning during break (Bennett-Smith, Huffington Post, August 14, 2012; Little, ABC News, August 15, 2012), or forced to take random drug tests and to perform other humiliating or irrelevant actions (Bertram, Robin and Gourevitch, Crooked Timber, July 1, 2012). Notably, in these cases and in many others, the law protects the employer’s right to make these decisions without consulting workers and to fire them if they refuse. The bitterness of this experience of subjection is old and used to carry the complaint of “wages-slavery.” As an American labor agitator once wrote in 1886, once Liberty consists in being able to satisfy all one’s wants, to develop all one’s faculties, without in any way depending upon the caprice of one’s fellow-beings, which is impossible if man cannot produce upon his own responsibility. **So long as the workman works for a boss**, a master, **he is not free**. ‘You must obey,’ the master will say, ‘for since I assume the responsibility of the undertaking, I alone have the right to its direction.’ (Journal of United Labor, July 10, 1886, 2109– 2111) The point of greatest interest to us here is that **the employer’s claim to exercise this authority is intimately bound up with the commodification of labor**-power and the free exercise of property rights. As the quotation above suggests, the employer’s authority is supposed to derive from the way in which he “assumes the responsibility of the undertaking.” He is the agent, putting his idea and money on the line, taking all the risk. The worker, on the other hand, already received her reward. She has sold her commodity – her labor-power – to the employer, who pays her a wage in exchange for rights to that commodity. **To have a property-right in something is to have some kind of exclusive authority over it; therefore, the boss should not have to consult with the worker about how to use the labor-power he bought**. However, as labor reformers have long observed, the special thing about the sale of labor is that “**Labor is inseparably bound up with the laborer**.” A labor contract “assumes that labor shall not be a party to the sale of itself beyond rejecting or accepting the terms offered. This purchase of labor gives control over the laborer-his physical intellectual, social and moral existence. The conditions of the contract determine the degree of this rulership” (Journal of United Labor, January 7, 1888, 2554). In other words, there is no way for the boss to enjoy his property right in the purchased labor-power without also exercising that arbitrary power over the person of the laborer. But this is just the kind of power that the exchange of property is not supposed to give over the seller of property since the seller’s will is supposed to be separable from the commodity. The employer’s arbitrary authority is derived from the view that the worker has sold his property, his labor-power, but that same theory of property seems to deny that such arbitrary control may be claimed when the seller cannot withdraw his will from the property. There are a few ways that a contract-based social theory might respond to this challenge, but we shall focus here on the most important:12 the incompleteness of contracts. It is a well-known fact that all contracts are incomplete (Hart 1995). But in the case of the workplace, this incompleteness is intensified and magnified by the fact that the contract is to take part in a dynamic, continuous activity with other people. No matter what a worker has agreed to at the point of the contract it is impossible for a contract to specify all of the eventualities that arise in the complex, ongoing process of running a workplace. Something else has to explain who exercises control over all these unanticipated matters. This means, no matter how freely made a contract is, we cannot say that the authority to which a worker is subject is justified by that free consent. At most, the radical incompleteness of labor contracts is what allows the many aspects of law and cultural assumption to fill the void. For instance, in American law, employers enjoy a “core of managerial prerogatives” over issues like hiring, firing, investment, and work organization. Strikers may not strike to contest these decisions and employers may not be forced to bargain about them. They need not give any account of why such production decisions have been made, even if they have dramatic consequences for employees – like producing plant closures or changing the organization and definition of tasks. Courts have defended this managerial control and the narrowing of the right to strike by importing older, status-based ideas about contract and property to fill the void of incompleteness. Only by (often semi-articulated) reference to quasi-feudal master-servant law have they been able to fill out the authority that the contract leaves open. Courts have argued that worker deference to managers of a “common enterprise” is implied in the contract or by arguing that employers enjoy uninfringeable property rights in the worker’s labor or wider enterprise (Atleson 1983, 84-109). In other words, courts themselves have acknowledged the incompleteness and thus indeterminacy of the contract with respect to the organization of work, but generally resolved this authority in favor of employers by appeal to something outside the contract itself. So, to put the problem another way, the point about structural domination was that workers might be forced to make a variety of explicit concessions on any number of issues – wages, hours, conditions, stultifying jobs. But the point **about personal domination in the workplace is that the contract also seems to involve the tacit concession of generic control over a further set of unknown issues**. The problem from the standpoint of contract theory is that **the contract itself cannot adequately explain why this power is assumed to devolve to the employer** nor why law should support this assumption. At most, we can only say the worker agreed to give up this control, not that she in any way agreed to the various decisions about her work. Usually, however, **we do not think a human being has a right to such blanket alienation of their liberty.** In the case of work, the only reason supporting that worker’s alienation of control as authoritative seems to be that the worker sold her property – her labor-power – and therefore has no right to control that property for the duration of the work (within the reasonable boundaries of protective labor legislation) or that she owes obligations of deference to the employer.

**CX checks to prevent friv T debates, and CPs and PICs affirm b/c they do not disprove my general thesis**

**Thus, the plan: A just government ought to recognize an unconditional right of workers to strike. Gourevitch 2:**

Gourevitch, A.. “Quitting Work but Not the Job: Liberty and the Right to Strike.” Perspectives on Politics 14 (2016): 307 - 323. //LHP AV Accessed 7/4/21

“Is it peace or war:”1 What is a right to strike? **The right to strike is** peculiar. It is **not a right to quit**. The right to quit is part of freedom of contract and the mirror of

employment-at-will. Workers may quit when they no longer wish to work for an employer, employers may fire their employees when they no longer want to employ them. Either of those acts severs the contractual relationship and the two parties are no longer assumed to be in any relationship at all. **The right to strike**, however, **assumes the continuity of the very relationship that is suspended.** **Workers on strike refuse to work but do not claim to have left the job**. After all, the whole point of a strike is that **it is a collective work stoppage**, **not a collective quitting** of the job. This is the feature of the strike that has marked it out from other forms of social action. If a right to strike is not a right to quit what is it? **It is the right that workers claim to refuse to perform work they have agreed to do while retaining a right to the job**. Most of what is peculiar, not to mention fraught, about a strike is contained in that latter clause. Yet, surprisingly, few commentators recognize just how central and yet peculiar this claim is (Locke 1984).2 Opponents of the right to strike are sometimes more alive to its distinctive features than defenders. One critic, for instance, makes the distinction between quitting and striking the basis of his entire argument: the unqualified right to withdraw labour, which is a clear right of free men, does not describe the behaviour of strikers…Strikers…withdraw from the performance of their jobs, but in the only relevant sense they do not withdraw their labour. The jobs from which they have withdrawn performance belong to them, they maintain.

**The plan solves –**

**1] Power – it reverses power relationships and challenges the structure of economic control itself – that alleviates domination, Gourevitch 3:**

Gourevitch, A.. “Quitting Work but Not the Job: Liberty and the Right to Strike.” Perspectives on Politics 14 (2016): 307 - 323. //LHP AV Accessed 7/4/21

Quitting the work not the job We now have a way of explaining the right to strike as something decidedly more modern than just residual protection of some feudal guild privilege. **The right to strike springs organically from** the fact of **structural domination**. **Striking is a way of resisting** that **domination** at the point in that structure at which workers find themselves – the particular job they are bargaining over. It is not that workers believe they have some special privilege but quite the opposite. **It is their lack of privilege, their vulnerability, that generates the claim. Structural domination makes its** most immediate appearance in the **threat of being exploited** by a particular employer, even though the point of structural domination is that workers can be exploited by any potential employer. **The sharpest form that the structural domination takes is through the threat of being fired,** or of never being hired in the first place. The claim that **strikers make** to their job is therefore, in the first instance, a dramatization of **the fact that their relationship is not voluntary**, it is not accidental and contingent. **They are always already forced** to be **in a contractual relationship** with some employer or another. **The refusal to perform work** while retaining the right to the job is a way of **bring**ing to the fore **this social and structural element in their condition.** **It** **vivifies the real nature of the production relationship** that workers find themselves in. **Quitting the work but not the job is a way of saying that** this **society** is not and **cannot be just a system of voluntary exchanges**. There is an underlying structure of control, maintained through the system of contracts, that even the ‘most voluntary’ arrangements conceal. This is not just a dramaturgical fact about strikes, though the drama has, in many cases, been nearly Greek in its intensity and tragedy**. It is a point about power**. It would not have the drama if it were not a power play. By demanding the job as a matter of right workers do not just publicize their domination, **they attempt to challenge the forcing to which they are subject**. **Limiting the employer’s ability to make contracts with others, and preventing other workers from taking those jobs, is a way of reversing the power relationship**. It is a way of neutralizing the threat of losing the job, which is the most concrete, immediate point of contact with that background structure of domination. **If you cannot lose your job, you are less vulnerable, less immediately economically dependent. Of course, this does not do away with the background structure itself, but a particular strike can never do that**. Though even here, there are times when a strike, as it becomes a more generalized rejection of structural domination – say in large-scale sympathy strikes or **general strikes** – **can** begin to **challenge** the **broad structure of economic control itself** (Brecher 2014). As we have said, this is a challenge to the market logic that begins from within, at the location of the strike itself. At that point in the system, **strikers temporarily reverse the relationships of power by eliminating that employers’ ability to use the threat** of job-loss against them. They do that not just by claiming the job but by claiming it as a matter of right. The thought is that the **exploitation** of **workers is unjustifiable**, an unjustifiability that appears in the terms of the employment itself. Workers have the right to the job, and therefore to interfere with the employer’s property rights and other workers’ contract rights, because it is unjustifiable to subject workers to exploitative conditions. To be sure, many strikes and many strikers never articulate the argument in this language. But the point is not what workers always explicitly say, but rather what they do and what that doing presupposes. I am reconstructing the ideal presuppositions of a strike, and in particular, how to think about the peculiar set of assumptions about the right to a job. We have seen that it is no atavistic recovery of traditional rights and guild privileges but is a way of resisting a thoroughly modern form of social domination from a point within that structure of domination. Again, facing a freedom to quit the job but not the work, workers assert a right to quit working but keep the job. To put this all another way, though strikes are still about bargaining, and in that sense like market exchanges, they are simultaneously a challenge to the market as the appropriate standard by which to judge the fairness of workers’ compensation. The market is unfair because of workers’ structural disadvantage. Over and against the market value, strikers argue that there are shared, or at least shareable, standards of fair compensation that employers should adhere to. While here again we see the echoes of feudal theories of ‘just price’ and equity jurisprudence (Horwitz 1977, 160-211), we must note that in principle the claim is not, or does not have to be, based on special privilege. Rather, it begins by challenging the view that labor ‘freely’ finds its value on the market. Workers are always already in relationships with employers and they cannot leave the basic relationship of earning money only by selling labor-power, no matter how many jobs they

might quit. The standards we use for evaluating those kinds of forced relationships, like the state, are different, based on shared conceptions of justice and human need, not private agreement. Two final observations before we move to the workplace itself. If the foregoing analysis is correct then we can get a better sense of the way a right to strike relates to the rights of employers and replacement workers. The right to strike does not have to include the claim that employers have no right to use their property to pursue their own interests. It just means employers have no right to use their property in ways that allow them to exploit workers. That is why, from within the theory of the right to strike, employers do not have a unilateral right to hire whomever they please on whatever terms they please. If that latter right is permitted then, of course, employers may take advantage of the fact that every propertyless worker needs a job. Further, the right to strike does not have to mean replacement workers have no right to pursue their interests and make labor contracts. Rather, it means they do not have a right to use that power to reproduce the system of structural domination that puts all workers at an unfair disadvantage. That is why they may not take jobs that striking workers refuse to perform.

**F - is for Friends who do stuff together**

**U - is for Underview**

**N - is for aNyone and aNywhere at all down here in the deep blue sea :music:**


*UV stuff varies, dm me for previous ones*


SHELL

Interpretation: Debaters must, on the page with their name and the school they

attend, disclose their contact information

Violation: They didn’t, theres no wiki for them, meaning no contact info is possible. I meet. I have contact info





Prefer-

1] Inclusion – Novices would have a way to contact you about your positions and learn from them and debaters would tell you before round about triggering positions that you’ve read before. Independent voter because inclusion is a gateway issue for debate to occur in the first place

2] **Research – disclosure increases research and gets rid of anti-educational arguments because debaters are forced to prepare cases knowing that people will have answers AND people get the opportunity to research answers to disclosed cases.**

**Nails 13** - (Jacob [I am a policy debater at Georgia State University. I debated LD for 4 years for Starr's Mill High School (GA) and graduated in 2012.] "A Defense of Disclosure (Including Third-Party Disclosure)" http://nsdupdate.com/2013/a-defense-of-disclosure-including-third-party-disclosure-by-jacob-nails/)

I fall squarely on the side of disclosure. I find that **the largest advantage of widespread disclosure is the educational value it provides.** First, **disclosure streamlines research. Rather than every team and every lone wolf researching completely in the dark, the wiki provides a public body of knowledge that everyone can contribute to and build off of.** Students can look through the different studies on the topic and choose the best ones on an informed basis without the prohibitively large burden of personally surveying all of the literature. **The best arguments are identified and replicated, which is a natural result of an open marketplace of ideas. Quality of evidence increases across the board. In theory,** the increased quality of information **[this] could trade off with quantity**. If debaters could just look to the wiki for evidence, it might remove the competitive incentive to do one’s own research. **Empirically**, however**, the opposite has been true.** In fact, a second advantage of **disclosure is that it motivates research. Debaters cannot expect to make it a whole topic with the same stock AC – that is, unless they are continually updating and frontlining it.** Likewise, **debaters with access to their opponents’ cases can do more targeted and specific research. Students can go to a new level of depth, researching not just the pros and cons of the topic but the specific authors, arguments, and adovcacies employed by other debaters.** The incentive to cut author-specific indicts is low if there’s little guarantee that the author will ever be cited in a round but high if one knows that specific schools are using that author in rounds. In this way, disclosure increases incentive to research by altering a student’s cost-benefit analysis so that the time spent researching is more valuable, i.e. more likely to produce useful evidence because it is more directed. In any case, if publicly accessible evidence jeopardized research, backfiles and briefs would have done LD in a long time ago. Lastly, and to my mind most significantly, **disclosure weeds out anti-educational arguments. I have in mind the sort of theory spikes and underdeveloped analytics whose strategic value comes only from the fact that the time to think of and enunciate responses to them takes longer than the time spent making the arguments themselves. If [theory spikes] these arguments were made on a level playing field where each side had equal time to craft answers, they would seldom win rounds, which is a testimony to the real world applicability (or lack thereof) of such strategies.** A model in which arguments have to withstand close scrutiny to win rounds creates incentive to find the best arguments on the topic rather than the shadiest. Having transitioned from LD to policy where disclosure is more universal, I can say that **debates are more substantive, developed, and responsive when both sides know what they’re getting into prior to the round**. The educational benefits of disclosure alone aren’t likely to convince the fairness-outweighs-education crowd, but I’ve learned over the course of many theory debates that most of that crowd has a very warped and confusing conception of fairness. **Debaters who produce better research are more deserving of a win. Debaters who can make smart arguments and defend them from criticism should win out over debaters who hide behind obfuscation.** That so many rounds these days are resolved on frivolous theory and dropped, single-sentence blips suggests that wins are not going to the “better debaters” in any meaningful sense of the term. The structure of LD in the status quo doesn’t incentivize better debating.

K2 education because researching and preparing is a gateway issue to determine how much education and knowledge youve gained from the tournament.

3] evidence ethics: if they don't disclose or provide contact info, theres no way for me to confirm whether or not they keep up with their academic integrity. I won’t be able to see the case and cites until the NC, in which case its too late to find them because i need to focus on the round. EE is an independent voter since otherwise people can just use fake sources that literally dont exist.

**C/A the underview for the paradigm issues**