**1AC – Linguistics**

**已解决：私人实体占用外层空间是不公正的。**

**Linguistic features signify personhood and creates stereotypes. Vote Aff to interrogate racial ideologies of language.**

**Rosa et al 17 Rosa, Jonathan, and Nelson Flores. "Unsettling race and language: Toward a raciolinguistic perspective." Language in society 46.5 (2017): 621-647. (Assistant Professor of Anthropology and Linguistics and Associate Professor in the Educational Linguistics Division)//Elmer recut Nato**

**Similar to Bucholtz & Hall's (2005) approach to identity and interaction, we are interested in how processes of raciolinguistic enregisterment emblematize particular linguistic features as authentic signs of racialized models of personhood. This is found not only in sociolinguistic accounts of the features that compose categories such as ‘African American English’ (Green 2002) or ‘Chicano English’ (Fought 2003), but also popular stereotypes and modes of linguistic appropriation such as ‘Mock Spanish’ (Hill 2008), ‘Mock Asian’ (Chun 2004), ‘Hollywood Injun English’ (Meek 2006), and ‘linguistic minstrelsy’ (Bucholtz & Lopez 2011). In each of these cases, minute features of language, including grammatical forms, prosodic patterns, and morphological particles, are emblematized as sets of signs that correspond to racial categories. Crucially, as Meek (2006) demonstrates, these forms need not correspond to empirically verifiable linguistic practices in order to undergo racial emblematization. Moreover, as Lo & Reyes (2009) point out, the imagination of groups such as Asian Americans as lacking a distinctive racialized variety of English analogous to African American English or Chicano English, must be interrogated based on the racial logics that organize stereotypes about and societal positions of different racial groups on the one hand, and perceptions of their language practices on the other. Specifically, Lo & Reyes argue that racial ideologies constructing Asian Americans as model minorities who approximate whiteness are linked to language ideologies constructing Asian Americans as lacking a racially distinctive variety of English. In related work, Chun (2016:81) shows how emblematized Mock Asian forms such as ‘ching-chong’ are located across ‘the important boundary between ‘Oriental talk’ and English’, which sustains Asian Americans alternately as model minorities and forever foreigners. Thus, we must carefully reconsider seemingly ‘distinctive’ and ‘nondistinctive’ language varieties alike, by analyzing the logics that position particular racial groups and linguistic forms in relation to one another.** That is, no language variety is objectively distinctive or nondistinctive, but rather comes to be enregistered as such in particular historical, political, and economic circumstances.

**The 1AC’s translation is linguistic activism that reclaims cultural agency and critiques stereotypes.**

**Duan 15 [Asian] Duan, Carlina. " The Space Between: An analysis of code-switching within Asian American poetry as strategic poetic device"(English Honors) AND" Here I Go, Torching"(Creative Writing Honors). Diss. 2015. (BA in Honors English from the University of Michigan)//Elmer recut Nato**

**In an interview with Women’s Review of Books literary magazine, Hong further discussed the strategic role of translation as a form of linguistic activism within her poetic work. When asked why she does not include translations from Korean to English within her own poetry, Hong said: “I wanted to open up these schisms, to emphasize that memory, the filtering of human experience into poetry, is often fractured and not transparent, especially experiences which have always been bisected and undercut by two languages.” She added, “I think I want to debunk the idea of easy translation—whether it be the idea of literal translation or, as I said before, the translating of one’s experience into poetry” (Hong 2002a, 15). Hong’s intentional decision to leave out English translations in her poetry creates a power dynamic between speaker and reader of the poem. Not only are “easy” translations dismantled and withheld from the reader, but, according to Hong, codeswitching — without translation — also more accurately reflects her personal experiences of cultural and linguistic movement. Hong points out that human experiences and the world of memory, especially for bilingual speakers, are “not transparent” — not captured neatly by one language, but rather, “bisected” by the complexities of belonging to two (or more) languages, implying a movement between multiple spaces. Scholars describe poetic code-switching in this way as a navigation of power. Literary scholar Benzi Zhang argues that code-switching makes apparent different levels of cultural knowledge for speaker and reader: “[T]he insertion of […] foreign words effectively renders Asian sensibilities into English and signifies different positions of cultural agency” (Zhang 131). Building upon this idea of cultural agency, I argue that Hong uses Korean to consciously expose themes of exoticism and racial stereotyping that readers themselves may be (consciously or unconsciously) participating in. As a result, Hong creates agency for her speaker through critiquing culturally appropriative behavior, in addition to an agency in knowledge; Hong’s speaker can access cultural understanding that her readers do not have. Yet, Hong does more than negotiate questions of audience access; she uses code-switching to reflect her speaker’s lived experiences of Korean-American identity, grappling with multiple languages and cultural codes. In “An Introduction to Chinese-American and Japanese American Literatures,” Jeffrey Chan et al. writes, “The minority experience does not yield itself to accurate or complete expression on the white man’s language” (qtd. Zhang 137). As Chang et al. suggest, code-switching embeds itself as a natural part of the “minority experience,” and is documented as such in Hong’s poems. Thus, the poems not only act as social critique of exoticization, but further inhabit the embodied experiences of Korean-American female identities living in the U.S. — which, as Hong reveals, are complicated experiences of rage, agency, celebration, and shifting power dynamics. Critics who have reviewed Hong’s work, such as Jan Clausen, have raised questions about the effect of Hong’s play with translation. Clausen, in a review titled “The poetics of estrangement,” published through the Women’s Review of Books, writes of Hong’s collection Translating Mo’um: “Hong deftly dismantles the romance of language as homeland, with results especially unnerving for the non-Korean-speaking reader” (Clausen 15). According to Clausen, Hong’s work with code-switching subverts traditional notions of the ‘native tongue’ as representative of “homeland,” dismantling what a reader may expect of a Korean American author: that she use Korean language to specifically discuss her ethnic culture as a hyphenated American. In other words, Hong’s code-switches function as intentional poetic protest against the reader’s expectations of the relationship between multilingual text and ethnic identity. As Clausen points out, such readings may anticipate that mother tongue is only introduced to speak about cultural difference or history, rather than used additionally as formal poetic device. In this chapter, I reveal Hong’s awareness of Korean language and code-switching as tools in identity-construction. Rather than allow others to shape her identity for her, she remains dominant in shaping her identity — and her agency — for herself.**

**The 1AC embodies the oppressor and weaponizes language to rupture debate through radical mimicry – doing what debaters do, except in Taiwanese Chinese – that’s our form of implementation and proves code switching is a valuable**

**exercise**

**Conquergood 1, Performance Studies: Interventions and Radical Research, Dwight Conquergood, TDR (1988-) Vol. 46, No. 2 (Summer, 2002), pp. 145-156 (12 pages) Published by:** [**The MIT Press**](https://www.jstor.org/publisher/mitpress) **SJDH**

**Geertz's now classic depiction of the turn toward texts in ethnography and cultural studies needs to be juxtaposed with Zora Neal Hurston's much earlier and more complex rendering of a researcher reading the texts of subordinate others: The theory behind our tactics: "The white man is always trying to know into somebody else's business. All right, I'll set something outside the door of my mind for him to play with and handle. He can read my writ- ing but he sho' can't read my mind. I'll put this play toy in his hand, and he will seize it and go away. Then I'll say my say and sing my song." ([I935] I990:3) Hurston foregrounds the terrain of struggle, the field of power relations on which texts are written, exchanged, and read. Whereas Geertz does not problematize the ethnographer's will-to-know or access to the texts of others, Hurston is sensitive to the reluctance of the subordinate classes "to reveal that which the soul lives by" (2) because they understand from experience the ocular politics that links the powers to see, to search, and to seize. Aware of the white man's drive to objectify, control, and grasp as a way of knowing, subordinate people cunningly set a text, a decoy, outside the door to lure him away from "homeplace" where subjugated but empowering truths and survival secrets are sheltered (hooks 1990). In Hurston's brilliant example, vulnerable people actually redeploy the written text as a tactic of evasion and camouflage, performatively turning and tripping the textual fetish against the white person's will-to-know. "So driven in on his reading," as Williams would say, he is blinded by the texts he compulsively seizes: "knowing so little about us, he doesn't know what he is missing" (Hurston [1935] 1990:2). Once provided with something that he can "handle," "seize," in a word, apprehend, he will go away and then space can be cleared for performed truths that remain beyond his reach: "then I'll say my say and sing my song." By mimicking the reifying textualism of dominant knowledge regimes, subordinate people can deflect its invasive power. This mimicry of textualism is a complex example of "mimetic excess" in which the susceptibility of dominant images, forms, and technologies of power to subversive doublings holds the potential for undermining the power of that which is mimed (Taussig I993:254-55). Note that in Hurston's account, subordinate people read and write, as well as perform. With her beautiful example of how a text can perform subversive work, she disrupts any simplistic dichotomy that would align texts with domination and performance with liberation. In Hurston's example, the white man researcher is a fool not because he values literacy, but because he valorized it to the exclusion of other media, other modes of knowing. I want to be very clear about this point: textocentrism-not texts-is the problem. The constitutive liminality of performance studies lies in its capacity to bridge segregated and differently valued knowledges, drawing together legitimated as well as subjugated modes of in- quiry. From her ethnographic fieldwork in the coal camps and "hollers" of West Virginia, Kathleen Stewart documents an especially vivid example of text- performance entanglements: how official signs and local performances play off and with each other in surprising and delightful ways. After a dog bit a neighbor's child, there was much talk and worry throughout the camp about liability and lawsuits: Finally Lacy Forest announced that he had heard that "by law" if you had a NO TRESPASSING sign on your porch you couldn't be sued. So ev- eryone went to the store in Beckley to get the official kind of sign. Neighbors brought back multiple copies and put them up for those too old or sick or poor to get out and get their own. Then everyone called everyone else to explain that the sign did not mean them. In the end, every porch and fence (except for those of the isolated shameless who don't care) had a bright NO TRESPASSING, KEEP OFF sign, and people visited together, sitting underneath the NO TRESPASSING signs, looking out. (1996:141; see also Conquergood I997)4 Through the power of reframing, social performances reclaim, short-circuit, and resignify the citational force of the signed imperatives. Moreover, Ngugi wa Thiong'o's concept of "orature" complicates any easy separation between speech and writing, performance and print, and reminds us how these channels of communication constantly overlap, penetrate, and mutually produce one another (1998). The performance studies project makes its most radical intervention, I believe, by embracing both written scholarship and creative work, papers and performances. We challenge the hegemony of the text best by reconfiguring texts and performances in horizontal, metonymic tension, not by replacing one hierarchy with another, the romance of performance for the authority of the text. The "liminal-norm" that Jon McKenzie identifies as the calling card of performance studies (2001:41) manifests itself most powerfully in the struggle to live betwixt and between theory and theatricality, paradigms and practices, critical reflection and creative accomplishment. Performance studies brings this rare hybridity into the academy, a commingling of analytical and artistic ways of knowing that unsettles the institutional organization of knowledge and disciplines. The constitutive liminality of performance studies lies in its capacity to bridge segregated and differently valued knowledges, drawing together legitimated as well as sub- jugated modes of inquiry. There is an emergent genre of performance studies scholarship that epitomizes this text-performance hybridity. A number of performance studies-allied scholars create performances as a supplement to, not substitute for, their written research. These performance pieces stand alongside and in metonymic tension with published research. The creative works are developed for multiple professional rea- sons: they deepen experiential and participatory engagement with materials both for the researcher and her audience; they provide a dynamic and rhetorically compelling alternative to conference papers; they offer a more accessible and engaging format for sharing research and reaching communities outside academia; they are a strategy for staging interventions. To borrow Amanda Kemp's apt phrase, they use "performance both as a way of knowing and as a way of showing" (I998: I6). To add another layer to the enfolding convolutions of text and performance, several of these performance pieces have now been written up and published in scholarly journals and books (see Conquergood 1988; Becker, McCall, and Morris 1989; McCall and Becker I990; Paget I990; Pollock 1990; Jackson 1993, 1998; Allen and Garner 1995; Laughlin 1995; Wellin 1996; Jones 1997; Kemp I998). Performance studies is uniquely suited for the challenge of braiding together disparate and stratified ways of knowing. We can think through performance along three crisscrossing lines of activity and analysis. We can think of performance (I) as a work of imagination, as an object of study; (2) as a pragmatics of inquiry (both as model and method), as an optic and operator of research; (3) as a tactics of intervention, an alternative space of struggle. Speaking from my home department at Northwestern, we often refer to the three a's of performance studies: artistry, analysis, activism. Or to change the alliteration, a commitment to the three c's of performance studies: creativity, critique, citizenship (civic strug- gles for social justice). We struggle to forge a unique and unifying mission around the triangulations of these three pivot points: I. Accomplishment-the making of art and remaking of culture; creativity; embodiment; artistic process and form; knowledge that comes from doing, par- ticipatory understanding, practical consciousness, performing as a way of knowing. 2. Analysis-the interpretation of art and culture; critical reflection; thinking about, through, and with performance; performance as a lens that illuminates the constructed creative, contingent, collaborative dimensions of human com- munication; knowledge that comes from contemplation and comparison; concentrated attention and contextualization as a way of knowing. 3. Articulation-activism, outreach, connection to community; applications and interventions; action research; projects that reach outside the academy and are rooted in an ethic of reciprocity and exchange; knowledge that is tested by practice within a community; social commitment, collaboration, and contri- bution/intervention as a way of knowing: praxis. Notwithstanding the many calls for embracing theory and practice, universities typically institutionalize a hierarchical division of labor between scholars/re- searchers and artists/practitioners. For example, the creative artists in the Department of Fine Arts are separated from the "serious" scholars in the Department of Art History. Even when scholars and practitioners are housed within the same department, there often is internal differentiation and tracking, e.g., the literarytheorists and critics are marked off from those who teach creative and expository writing. This configuration mirrors an entrenched social hierarchy of value based on the fundamental division between intellectual labor and manual labor. In the academy, the position of the artist/practitioner is comparable to people in the larger society who work with their hands, who make things, and who are valued less than the scholars/theorists who work with their minds and are comparable to the more privileged professional-managerial class. Indeed, sometimes one of the reasons for forming schools of fine and performing arts is to protect artists/ practitioners from tenure and promotion committees dominated by the more institutionally powerful scholar/researchers who do not know how to appraise a record of artistic accomplishment as commensurate with traditional criteria of scholarly research and publication. The segregation of faculty and students who make art and perform from those who think about and study art and performance is based on a false dichotomy that represses the critical-intellectual component of any artistic work, and the imaginative-creative dimension of scholarship that makes a difference. A spurious, counterproductive, and mutually denigrating opposition is put into play that pits so-called "mere technique, studio skills, know- how" against so-called "arid knowledge, abstract theory, sterile scholarship." This unfortunate schism is based on gross reductionism and ignorance of "how the other half lives." Students are cheated and disciplines diminished by this academic apartheid. The ongoing challenge of performance studies is to refuse and supercede this deeply entrenched division of labor, apartheid of knowledges, that plays out inside the academy as the difference between thinking and doing, interpreting and making, concep- tualizing and creating. A performance studies agenda should collapse this divide and revitalize the connections between artistic accomplishment, analysis, and articulations with communities; between practical knowledge (knowing how), propositional knowledge (knowing that), and political savvy (knowing who, when, and where). This epistemological connection between creativity, critique, and civic engage- ment is mutually replenishing, and pedagogically powerful. Very bright, talented students are attracted to programs that combine intellectual rigor with artistic excellence that is critically engaged, where they do not have to banish their artistic spirit in order to become a critical thinker, or repress their intellectual self or political passion to explore their artistic side. Particularly at the PhD level, original scholarship in culture and the arts is enhanced, complemented, and complicated in deeply meaningful ways by the participatory understanding and community involvement of the researcher. This experiential and engaged model of inquiry is coextensive with the participant-observation methods of ethnographic research. The ongoing challenge of performance studies is to refuse and supercede this deeply entrenched division of labor, apartheid of knowledges, that plays out inside the academy as the difference between thinking and doing, interpreting and mak- ing, conceptualizing and creating. The division of labor between theory and practice, abstraction and embodiment, is an arbitrary and rigged choice, and, like all binarisms, it is booby-trapped. It's a Faustian bargain. If we go the one-way street of abstraction, then we cut ourselves off from the nourishing ground ofparticipatory experience. If we go the one-way street of practice, then we drive ourselves into an isolated cul-de-sac, a practitioner's workshop or artist's colony. Our radical move is to turn, and return, insistently, to the crossroads.**

**FW**

**Western Techno-Orientalist discourses present Asians as subhuman and robotic- beings that not only lack moral capabilities but worst of all, threaten Western dominance. Creates internalized oppression and chain Asian bodies to the oppressive capitalist system**

**Esaki 20**

Esaki, B. (2020) "Ted Chiang’s Asian American Amusement at Alien Arrival", Religions, 11(2), p. 56. doi: 10.3390/rel11020056. //AL

Namely, from an otherhood lens, Chiang’s stories focus on challenges to the goodness of the universe posed by technology (A versus C). That is, the central conflict is between nonhuman phenomena (the universe and technology), or Others. Others are in nearly every story of Chiang’s, such as a mythical tower, golems, angels, aliens, and so on. By locating the central conflict between Others, Chiang shifts the reader’s concern away from flawed humanity (B), even though there are many shortcomings of character in his stories. This shift in gaze can be important for those who have been othered, and Asian Americans who have been victim to multiple colonial projects may not want to affirm colonial perspectives. The colonial gaze—as John Reider has argued—undergirds much of science fiction, scrutinizes others “to maintain and reproduce the political and economic arrangements that establish the subjects’ respective positions” (Reider 2008, p. 7). **Centering on the effects of humans on technology and on the universe thus may focus the reader on humanity’s relationship to Others, and, by extension, the respective position of colonist to discovered and undiscovered (sub)humans**. Centering on the effects of Others on Others thereby subverts the colonial gaze, and shifts the central questions of the reader. Another reason to associate Others with technology is that **SF frequently reduces Asians and Asian Americans by associating them with technology. Even if Asians are not present in body, there are common plots that mirror the Yellow Peril, with hordes of subhuman aliens or robots threatening humanity.** In body, **Asians have come to represent a dangerous future, or what is called high-tech Orientalism** or techno-Orientalism (Morely and Robins 1995; Chun 2006). As historian Kenneth Hough has demonstrated, an early form of **techno-Orientalism emerged** during the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905**, where Japanese people were illustrated as “technologically adept, modern, chivalrous, and civilized, yet savage and ultimately an existential threat to the West**” (Roh et al. 2015, pp. 31–33). In this depiction**, the Japanese had superhuman control of pain and no morality**; as Jack London wrote in a 1904 The San Francisco Examiner essay, “Yellow Peril”: “From the West he has borrowed all of material achievement and passed our ethical achievement by … A marvelous imitator truly, but imitating us only in things material. Things spiritual cannot be imitated … and here the Japanese fails” (p. 38). This image continued and was eventually applied to China in the 1990s as it emerged in the high-tech global economy (p. 4). In this sense, **science fiction plots that focus on human relationships to Others may reiterate techno-Orientalism, especially the moral vacuity of Asians and Asian Americans**. In addition, **such narratives may exert a discursive control over Asians and Asian Americans, where Asian American readers can either identify with the reduced Other or the subjectivity and culture of the colonist**. As Wendy Hui Kyong Chun has **argued for high-tech Orientalism, this leaves Asian Americans with two oppressive options.** For one, **they can see themselves as absent or subhuman. Alternatively, they can choose “to be an individual—to exceed one’s culture in order to become incorporated into a global market”;** that is, Asian Americans can **be an individual yet one without culture and chained to a capitalist system.** In other words, the otherness **of techno-Orientalism erases subjectivity along with the richness of culture and religion**.

**Techno Orientalism is pervasive yet critically neglected in academia. Counter Dialogue is key to reconstruct Asian images in literature**

**Roh et al. 15**

DAVID S. ROH, BETSY HUANG and GRETA A. NIU, April 27. 2015, “Techno-Orientalism: Imagining Asia in

Speculative Fiction, History, and Media”,<https://www.rutgersuniversitypress.org/techno-orientalism/9780813570631> //AL

As this collection demonstrates, techno-Orientalism occurs across genres and disciplines—history, art, literature, film, television, video games—but **the majority of the criticism coalesces around literature and film,** particularly in the genre of speculative fiction (SF). This is unsurprising; **techno-Orientalism finds** some of **its most pervasive expressions in SF because of the genre’s futurist esprit of contemporary** existential, **racial, and technological anxieties**. Nevertheless, we identify a disciplinary narrowness to SF in the extant scholarship that our project attempts to broaden. Even as techno-Orientalism in SF has been documented by several incisive studies in recent decades, **critical studies of Orientalism** in the long history of SF **are scarce**. A survey of the essays published in the genre’s flagship journal, Science Fiction Studies, founded in 1973, confirms the critical neglect. A search with the term “Orientalism” in the journal’s archives yielded only nine substantive essays that address Orientalism, four of which are book reviews. **A search with the term “techno-Orientalism” yielded**, **even more negligibly, two review essays**. Similar searches in Extrapolations, another major academic venue for SF criticism, yielded equally scant results. And **when PMLA**, the lingua franca of academic scholarship in literature and languages, **published a special issue on science fiction in May 2004, no mention of Orientalism could be found— this despite the fact that SF’s propensity for projecting and amplifying contemporary racial and imperialist attitudes is well documented**.7 Indeed, the **conceptualization of techno-Orientalism as a recognizable discursive effect of the postindustrial age may have been the clarion call for addressing this gap in the genre**. Orientalism in SF during the pre-cyberpunk era may have **suffered critical neglect because of the perception that the “yellow peril” has been kept in check by the mechanisms of immigration and exclusion acts that were in place for much of the midcentury**. It took the repeal of the immigration acts in 1965, coupled with the entrance of Japanese capital and imports into the U.S. economy in the late seventies, to precipitate a renewed wariness toward all things Asian, onto which the West once again projected agendas of cultural hegemony and technological dominance**. Cyberpunk, with its fetishizing gaze upon Japan as a seductive and contradictory space of futuristic innovation and ancient mystique, sharply focused the SF critical and creative lenses upon Asia**. Substantial criticism of techno-Orientalism thus emerged in the mid1990s with the contributions of Morley and Robins, Ueno, and Sato. Critical momentum continued with Takayuki Tatsumi’s 2000 historiography of Japanese SF in Science Fiction Studies (SFS), and a 2002 special issue of SFS on Japanese speculative fiction, guest edited by Takayuki Tatsumi, Christopher Bolton, and Istvan Csicsery-Ronay, Jr., introduced Japanese SF and cyberpunk visions to the Western audience. Sato’s important and incisive 2004 intersectional analysis of what she describes as “the four different categorical spheres, namely, **Western cyborg philosophy, American cyberpunk, Japanese cyberpunk, and Japanese theory of uniqueness known as nihonjinron” (**335–336) and Christine Cornea’s chapter “Techno-Orientalism and the Postmodern Subject” in Jacqueline Furby and Karen Randell’s Screen Methods: Comparative Readings in Film Studies (Wallflower Press, 2006) sustained the necessary critical interest in the field. These studies, however, constitute the bulk of the critical history of technoOrientalism. Other studies in recent years, such as Mimi Thi Nguyen and Thuy Linh Nguyen Tu’s Alien Encounters: Popular Culture in Asian America (Duke, 2007), Wendy Hui Kyong Chun and Lynn Joyrich’s 2009 special issue of Camera Obscura, “Race and/as Technology,” Chun’s New Media, Old Media: A History and Theory Reader (Routledge, 2005), and Lisa Nakamura’s Cybertypes (Routledge, 2002), made significant contributions to critiques of Orientalism in popular culture and mainstream media. Yet, despite technoOrientalism’s growing prevalence in the Western cultural consciousness, and in SF more specifically, it has been generally ignored in academic and popular cultural spheres. A special issue of the literary journal MELUS, titled “Alien/Asians” (2008) and edited by Stephen Hong Sohn, expanded the critical scope of the phenomenon and drew it closer for theoretical scrutiny. Sohn’s introduction persuasively conveys the urgent need for vigilant documentation and analysis of the ever-growing techno-Orientalist vocabulary. The eight essays in the issue examine a range of techno-Orientalist instantiations in SF within U.S., Japanese, Chinese, and Indian contexts, from “a cyberpunk-inflected Asian future” to “the cyborg technologies intertwined with Asian American bodies” (Sohn 15). The essays, Sohn writes, “investigate how alternative imaginaries provide fertile terrains to consider the prospects of racial subjectivity and identity” (15). The essayists take a hard look at the work of SF luminaries such as Philip K. Dick, Ursula K. Le Guin, William Gibson, Neal Stephenson, and William S. Burroughs, whose work consciously or unconsciously traded in technoOrientalist tropes, as well as the work of Asian American and Asian Canadian writers such as Karen Tei Yamashita, Amitav Ghosh, and Larissa Lai, who mount metafictional critiques of techno-Orientalist tropes in SF. Techno-Orientalism: Imagining Asia in Speculative Fiction, History, and Media, therefore, has two objectives. The first is to continue the work begun by the aforementioned predecessors, to “**consider the prospective thesis that cultural production is still invested in parsing out how the yellow peril continues to be a mode to draw from, write against, challenge, negotiate, and problematize**” (Sohn 6–7). The volume argues that while Orientalism defines a modern West by producing an oppositional and premodern East, techno-Orientalism symmetrically and yet contradictorily completes this project by creating a collusive, futurized Asia to further affirm the West’s centrality. The second objective is constructive. While we critique the dehumanizing effects of the techno-Orientalist gaze, **we also see an opportunity for critical reappropriations in texts that self-referentially engage with Asian images;** indeed, as an example, Asian SF writers have already taken to the trope to create the SF cottage industry in which the subject and setting are Eastern. There is of course the danger that Asian and Asian American creators might internalize techno-Orientalist patterns and uncritically replicate the same dehumanizing model. However, thanks to its global and mass appeal, the speculative imagination in television, graphic novels, or science fiction is by no means the purview of single national traditions. **Even as techno-Orientalism has become more pervasive, it has also engendered counterdialogue in those same cultural and political spaces.**

**ROB**

**Discourse creates a social reality of what we believe to be the outside world**

**Holzscheiter ’14** [Anna, “Between Communicative Interaction and Structures of Signification: Discourse Theory and Analysis in International Relations” Anna has been Assistant Professor of Political Science and International Relations at the Otto-Suhr-Institute for Political Science since April 2015. During the academic year 2014-2015 she is John F. Kennedy Memorial Fellow at the Center for European Studies, Harvard University.]

Those not familiar with the term “discourse” often ask: Is everything discourse? Where is the boundary between discourse and the material (touchable and observable) world? Discourse scholars answer this question by stating that **discourse is the space where human beings make sense of the material world, where they attach meaning to the world and where representations of the world become manifest.** **The existence of a material world outside discourse is, thus, not denied**—what is refuted is the assumption that we can relate to this material world without discourse (Holzscheiter 2010). In its essence, **discourse analysis is an engagement with meaning and the linguistic and communicative processes through which social reality is constructed. Discourse can therefore be defined as, basically, the space where intersubjective meaning is created, sustained, trans- formed and, accordingly, becomes constitutive of social reality.** This preliminary and broad understanding of discourse already allows distinguishing discourse from language inasmuch as discourse is an inherently social concept. Rather than simply investigating the use of language in international politics, an explo- ration of **discourse asks for the social and political effects that result from using a particular vocabulary on the one hand and the productive effects of particular constructions of reality on the agency and identity of individuals and groups.** Any singular event of speaking or producing text, thus, is part of a larger social and political process: It is conceived of as “text in social context.”

**Learning spaces centered around educational discourse are built to exclude Asian Bodies. Thus the ROB is to reject every instance of anti-asianness in the classroom – anything else normalizes violence**

Eng & Han 4, DAVID L. ENG & SHINHEE HAN [David L. Eng is Richard L. Fisher Professor of English as well as Graduate Chair of the English Department at UPenn. He is also Professor in the Program in Asian American Studies, the Program in Comparative Litera Racial Castration: Managing Masculinity in Asian America (Duke University Press) as well as the Coeditor (with Alice Y. Hom) of Q&A: Queer in Asian America (Temple University Press, 1998). His current project is a co-edited collection (with David Kazanjian) entitled Loss: Mourning and Melancholia in the Twentieth Century. Shinhee Han, C.S.W., is a psychotherapist at the Counseling & Psychological Services of Columbia University. She is a doctoral candidate in the Shirley M. Ehrenkranz School of Social Work at New York University and maintains a private practice in New York City.], RACIAL MELANCHOLIA, RACIAL DISSOCIATION: On the Social and Psychic Lives of Asian Americans, DUKE UNIVERSITY PRESS, Durham and London, 2019, ghs//BZ Recut Mini M

NATIONAL MELANCHOLIA For Asian Americans and other people of color, suspended assimilation into mainstream culture may involve not only debilitating personal consequences; ultimately, it also constitutes the foundation for a type of national melancholia, a collective national haunting, with destructive effects. In Caucasia, the ambivalence characterizing the narrator’s passing into whiteness leaves her with the constant and eerie feeling of “contamination.”13 Writing about the nature of collective identifications, Freud notes in “Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego” (1921), “In a group every sentiment and act is contagious, and contagious to such a degree that an individual readily sacrifices his personal interest to the collective interest. This is an aptitude very contrary to his nature, and of which a man is scarcely capable, except when he makes part of a group.”14 Our analysis insists on a consideration of what happens when the demand to sacrifice the personal to collective interest is accompanied not by inclusion in—but rather exclusion from—the larger group. *It reorients psychic problems of racial melancholia toward social problems concerning legal histories of whiteness as property and, in particular, exclusion laws and bars to naturalization and citizenship for Asian Americans as a type of property right.* As we know, ***the formation of the US nation-state*** *entailed—and* ***continues to entail****—a history of* ***institutionalized exclusions,*** *legal and otherwise*. Part of our introduction focused on the transatlantic slave trade and indigenous dispossession. Here, it is vital to consider the long history of legalized exclusion **of Asian American** immigrants andcitizens alike—from Japanese internment and indefinite detention during World War II to earlier **exclusion acts** legislated by Congress, brokered by the executive, and upheld by the judiciary against every Asian immigrant group.15 For example, from 1882 to 1943, *Chinese immigrants experienced the longest legalized history of exclusion and* ***bars to*** *naturalization and* ***citizenship****—the first raced-based exclusions in US history.* To cite but one specific instance, in 1888 the US Congress retroactively terminated the legal right of some twenty thousand Chinese residents to reenter the United States after visiting China. Those excluded from reentry were also barred from recovering their personal property remaining in the country, underscoring the ways in which *race, citizenship, and property were simultaneously* ***managed by the state to control*** *and restrict* ***flows of*** *both* ***Asian labor and capital****.* This law was followed by a series of further exclusion laws, as well as accompanied by legislative **acts** against miscegenation and the ownership of private property, culminating in the National Origins Act (1924) and the Tydings-McDuffie Act (1934), which effectively **halted all immigration from Asia** for an indefinite period. As Teemu Ruskola notes, at the very historical moment when “the United States was pleased to refer to its China policy as Open Door … it hardly escaped the Chinese that the door swung one way only.”16 Yet, in our multicultural and colorblind age, *few people remember this history of racially motivated discrimination against Asian Americans that laid the legal foundation for the emergence of the figure of the “illegal immigrant” and of* ***“alien citizenship”*** *preoccupying so much of political debate concerning immigration today. This history of exclusion is* ***barely taught in*** *US universities or high* ***schools****—indeed, colorblindness and the model minority myth demand a forgetting of these events of group discrimination in the name of abstract equality and individual meritocracy.* A return to this history thus expands our prior analyses of race as relation and whiteness as property to consider how *the legal mechanisms of citizenship have broadly functioned as a kind of restricted property right. For Asian immigrants, these mechanisms have mediated a long history of social exclusion and inclusion in US law and society. Racial melancholia can be seen as one profound psychic effect marking these histories of legal exclusion from the nation-state and prohibitions from national belonging. Today, discourses of American exceptionalism and democratic myths of abstract equality and individualism demand a forgetting of these formative losses and exclusions, an enforced psychic amnesia that can return only as a type of repetitive national haunting—a type of negative or absent presence*.17 The contemporary model minority stereotype that defines Asian Americans is both a product of—and productive of—this negative or absent presence.18 Asian American model minority discourse emerged in the postwar period after the lifting of legalized exclusion—in the wake of Cold War conflict, the US civil rights movements, and the reformation of the Immigration and Nationality Act (Hart-Celler Act) of 1965. The Hart-Celler Act abolished the earlier immigration quotas based on national origins at the heart of US immigration policy for nearly half a century, replacing it with a system of preferences focused on the technical skills of immigrants and on family reunification. *It dramatically shifted immigration patterns to the United States and spurred a “brain drain” of settlers from Asia (and Latin America).* At the same time, Hart-Celler also created a vast and largely unacknowledged force of low-income and undocumented migrants from South Asia, new areas of China, particularly Fujian province, and Southeast Asia. *This* ***“yellowing” of the US*** *nation-state* ***reversed*** *a long history of* ***anti-Asian exclusion*** *precisely under the banner of model minority citizenship* ***and*** *the* ***collective forgetting*** *of this history of exclusion and its unauthorized subjects.* The model minority myth identifies the academic success of second-generation Asian American immigrant children as dispositive of the United States as a land of equal opportunity free of racial discrimination or distress. Thereby, it functions as a national tool that manages and erases a long history of institutionalized exclusion by characterizing Asian American success precisely as the result—rather than something that occurred despite the lack—of equal opportunity in the United States. In turn, the deployment of the model minority myth configures the unequal status of African Americans in US culture and society as a self-inflicted injury. Resisting the invidious political juxtaposition of Asian American “success” with African American “failure,” comparative race scholars have sought to reformulate this regulatory dialectic. Over a hundred years ago, W. E. B. Du Bois asked African Americans in The Souls of Black Folk (1903), “How does it feel to be a problem?”19 Today, comparative race scholars have revised Du Bois’s earlier inquiry, asking Asian Americans, “How does it feel to be a solution?”20 (We return to this dynamic in detail is chapter 3 on parachute children and psychic nowhere.) Put in terms of comparative race relations, Ellen Wu observes that during the prewar era of exclusion and yellow peril, Asians were defined as definitely not white. However, *following the postwar era of inclusion, citizenship, and the emergence of model minority stereotype, Asians were defined as definitely not black.*21 Understanding this triangulation is key to apprehending the ways in which racial binaries of black and white mask complex social relations of race while preventing political coalitions and alliances. Effacing unequal histories of racial discrimination, this divide and conquer strategy emerges most forcefully today in contemporary debates about affirmative action that seek to pit the interests of African Americans and Asian Americans against one another. The model minority stereotype is a myth because it homogenizes widely disparate Asian American and Asian immigrant groups by generalizing them all as academically and economically successful, with no social problems to speak of. In this manner, the stereotype works to deny, in Lisa Lowe’s words, the “heterogeneity, hybridity, and multiplicity” of various Asian American individuals and groups who do not fit its ideals of model citizenry.22 *The pervasiveness of the model minority stereotype in our contemporary national imagination thus works as one important melancholic mechanism facilitating the erasure and loss of repressed Asian American identities as well as histories of discrimination and exclusion. These identities and histories can return only as a type of ghostly presence.* In this sense, *the* ***Asian American*** *model minority* ***subject*** *also* ***endures in the US historical imaginary*** *as a melancholic national object—****as a haunting*** *specter to democratic ideals of inclusion that cannot quite get over these legislated histories of loss.* The psychic consequences that this model of national melancholia has exacted on the Asian American psyche are extensively explored and interrogated in Asian American cultural productions. One compelling example comes from Maxine Hong Kingston’s China Men (1980). In Kingston’s historical novel, an imaginary chronicle of several successive generations of male ancestors in the United States, the narrator speculates about the disappearance of the “Grandfather of the Sierra Nevada Mountains.” After he helps to complete the transcontinental railroad, the greatest technological feat of ﻿the nineteenth century, Ah Goong vanishes. Kingston writes, “Maybe he hadn’t died in San Francisco, it was just his papers that burned; it was just that his existence was outlawed by Chinese Exclusion Acts. The family called him Fleaman. They did not understand his accomplishments as an American ancestor, a holding, homing ancestor of this place.”23 *Kingston understands that the law’s refusal to recognize Chinese immigrants as citizens “outlaws” their existence, subjecting them to legal erasure as well as institutional violence*: “It was dangerous to stay,” she observes in the context of the “Golden Spike” ceremony commemorating the railroad’s completion. “The Driving Out had begun. Ah Goong does not appear in railroad photographs.”24 At the same time, Kingston also underscores how this historical repudiation of the Asian laborer gains its psychic efficacy through a simultaneous internalization of its interdictions on the part of those excluded themselves. That is, the grandfather’s own family members refuse to recognize him as “an American ancestor, a holding, homing ancestor of this place.” *They cannot perceive the “Fleaman’s” accomplishments building the transcontinental railroad as legitimizing his membership in the American nation.* How, in turn, can it be possible to see themselves as legitimate members of this society? In this regard, racial melancholia can be described as splitting the Asian American psyche. This cleaving of the psyche can be productively thought about in terms of an altered, racialized model of classic Freudian fetishism.25 That is, assimilation into the national fabric demands a psychic splitting on the part of the Asian American subject who knows and does not know, at once, that she or he is part of the larger social body. In the same breath, fetishism also describes mainstream society’s disavowal and projection of otherness onto a disparaged group that is then homogenized and reduced to a stereotype. In this manner, racial fetishism delineates a psychic process by which difference is assumed and projected and then negated and denied, returning us to social dynamics of Myrdal’s “American dilemma.”

**Offense**

**Discourse around the commercialization of space is not neutral, the US frames spending into the private sector as a military effort to prevent Asian countries from destroying US satellites**

**Broad 21**

William J. Broad Published Jan. 24, 2021 Updated May 6, 2021How Space Became the Next ‘Great Power’ Contest Between the U.S. and China. (2021). Retrieved 17 December 2021, from https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/24/us/politics/trump-biden-pentagon-space-missiles-satellite.html

Beijing’s rush for antisatellite arms began 15 years ago. Now, it can threaten the orbital fleets that give the United States military its technological edge. Advanced weapons at China’s military bases can fire warheads that smash satellites and can shoot laser beams that have a potential to blind arrays of delicate sensors. And China’s cyberattacks can, at least in theory, cut off the Pentagon from contact with fleets of satellites that track enemy movements, relay communications among troops and provide information for the precise targeting of smart weapons. **Among the most important national security issues now facing President Biden is how to contend with the threat that China poses to the American military in space and, by extension, terrestrial forces that rely on the overhead platforms.** The Biden administration has yet to indicate what it plans to do with President Donald J. Trump’s legacy in this area: the Space Force, a new branch of the military that has been criticized as an expensive and ill-advised escalation that could lead to a dangerous new arms race. Mr. Trump presented the initiative as his own, and it now suffers from an association with him and remains the brunt of jokes on television. But its creation was also the culmination of strategic choices by his predecessors, Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama, to counter an emboldened China that raised bipartisan alarm. “There’s been a dawning realization that our space systems are quite vulnerable,” said Greg Grant, a Pentagon official in the Obama administration who helped devise its response to China. “The Biden administration will see more funding — not less — going into space defense and dealing with these threats.” **The protective goal is to create an American presence in orbit so resilient that, no matter how deadly the attacks, it will function well enough for the military to project power halfway around the globe in terrestrial reprisals and counterattacks.** That could deter Beijing’s strikes in the first place. The hard question is how to achieve that kind of strong deterrence. Lloyd J. Austin III, a retired four-star Army general who was confirmed last week as Mr. Biden’s secretary of defense, told the Senate that he would keep a “laserlike focus” on sharpening the country’s “competitive edge” against China’s increasingly powerful military. Among other things, he called for new American strides in building “space-based platforms” and repeatedly referred to space as a war-fighting domain. **“Space is already an arena of great power competition,” Mr. Austin said, with China “the most significant threat going forward.”** Editors’ Picks Could Oreo Cookies Solve New York’s Rat Problem? Quiz: Do You Recognize These Notable People of 2021? A Love Language Spoken With Hands **The new administration has shown interest in tapping the innovations of space entrepreneurs as a means of strengthening the military’s hand — what Mr. Austin in his Senate testimony called “partnerships with commercial space entities**.” The Obama and Trump administrations both adopted that strategy as a uniquely American way of sharpening the military’s edge. Experts clash on whether the United States is doing too little or too much. Defense hawks had lobbied for decades for the creation of a military Space Corps and called for more spending on weapons. But arms controllers see the Space Force as raising global tensions and giving Beijing an excuse to accelerate its own threatening measures. Some go further and call it a precipitous move that will increase the likelihood of war. In decades past, **especially during the “Star Wars” program of the Reagan administration, conflict in space was often portrayed as shootouts in orbit**. That has changed. With few exceptions, the weapons are no longer seen as circling the planet but as being deployed from secure bases. So, too, the targets are no longer swarms of nuclear warheads but fleets of satellites, whose recurring, predictable paths while orbiting the Earth make them far easier to destroy. A main question is whether the antisatellite moves and countermoves will lower or raise the risks of miscalculation and war. That debate is just beginning. Beijing’s Surge For years, the Chinese studied — with growing anxiety — the American military, especially its invasions of Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003. The battlefield successes were seen as rooted in space dominance. Planners noted that thousands of satellite-guided bombs and cruise missiles had rained down with devastating precision on Taliban forces and Iraqi defenses. While the Pentagon’s edge in orbital assets was clearly a threat to China, planners argued that it might also represent a liability. “They saw how the U.S. projected power,” said Todd Harrison, a space analyst at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a Washington think tank. “And they saw that it was largely undefended.”

**China began its antisatellite tests in 2005. It fired two missiles in two years and then made headlines in 2007 by shattering a derelict weather satellite. There was no explosion. The** inert warhead simply smashed into the satellite at blinding speed. The successful test reverberated globally because it was the first such act of destruction since the Cold War. The whirling shards, more than 150,000 in all, threatened satellites as well as the International Space Station. Ground controllers raced to move dozens of spacecraft and astronauts out of harm’s way. The Bush administration initially did little. Then, in a show of force meant to send Beijing a message, in 2008, it fired a sophisticated missile to shoot down one of its own satellites. Beijing conducted about a dozen more tests, including ones in which warheads shot much higher, in theory putting most classes of American spacecraft at risk. China also sought to diversify its antisatellite force. A warhead could take hours to reach a high orbit, potentially giving American forces time for evasive or retaliatory action. Moreover, the speeding debris from a successful attack might endanger Beijing’s own spacecraft. In tests, China began firing weak laser beams at satellites and studying other ways to strike at the speed of light. However, all the techniques were judged as requiring years and perhaps decades of development. Then came the new idea. Every aspect of American space power was controlled from the ground by powerful computers. If penetrated, the brains of Washington’s space fleets might be degraded or destroyed. Such attacks, compared with every other antisatellite move, were also remarkably inexpensive. In 2005, China began to incorporate cyberattacks into its military exercises, primarily in first strikes against enemy networks. Increasingly, its military doctrine called for paralyzing early attacks. In 2008, hackers seized control of a civilian imaging satellite named Terra that orbited low, like the military’s reconnaissance craft. They did so twice — first in June and again in October — roaming control circuits with seeming impunity. Remarkably, in both cases, the hackers achieved all the necessary steps to command the spacecraft but refrained from doing so, apparently to reduce their fingerprints. Space officials were troubled by more than China’s moves and weapons. The modern history of the American military centered on building global alliances. Beijing was rushing ahead as an aggressive loner, and many officers feared that Washington was too hidebound and burdened with the responsibilities of coalition-building and arms-control treaties to react quickly. “The Chinese are starting from scratch,” Paul S. Szymanski, a veteran analyst of space warfare, argued in an Air Force journal. They’re not, he added, “hindered by long space traditions.” Washington’s Response In its second term, the Obama administration made public what it called an “offset strategy” to respond to China and other threats by capitalizing on America’s technological edge. Just as the United States had developed, first, a vast nuclear arsenal and, second, smart weapons, this so-called third offset would seek an advantage by speeding the rise of robotics, high-speed arms and other breakthroughs that could empower the armed forces for decades. **Unlike earlier offsets, officials said, the objective was to rely less on federal teams than the tech entrepreneurs who were fast transforming the civilian world**. “We must really capture the commercial sector,” Robert O. Work, a deputy secretary of defense, said in a 2015 speech explaining the new initiative. **The advances in space were to be defensive: swarms of small, relatively cheap satellites and fleets of recycled launchers that would overwhelm Beijing with countless targets**. For Mr. Obama, innovative leaps were to do for American space forces what Steve Jobs did for terrestrial gadgets, running circles around the calcified ministries of authoritarian states. After decades in which adversaries — from stateless terrorists to those with traditional militaries — sought to exploit narrow advantages over the more powerful United States, the Pentagon was now finding an unconventional edge all its own. The **Obama administration was already applying the commercial philosophy to NASA, turning the space agency into a major funder of entrepreneurial strides. It was pumping billions of dollars into the development of private rockets and capsules meant to carry astronauts into orbit. The** military joined in. **The beneficiaries included Elon Musk, the founder of Tesla, and Jeff Bezos, the founder of Amazon. Their space companies — Mr. Musk’s SpaceX and Mr. Bezos’s Blue Origin — sought to turn rocket launchers from throwaways into recyclables, slashing their cost**. Military officials believed that the new system would make it possible to quickly replace satellites in times of war. The third offset also sought to shrink the size of satellites. Over decades, the big ones had grown into behemoths. **Some cost $1 billion or more to design, construct, outfit, launch and keep in service. One type unfurled an antenna nearly as large as a football field.** But civilians, inspired by the iPhone revolution, were building spacecraft as small as loaves of bread. **Military planners saw smaller, cheaper, more numerous craft as making antisatellite targeting vastly more difficult — in some cases impossible — for an adversary.**

**Chinese Anti Satellite attacks are neither feasible technologically or desirable for the country. US fixation on this is simply the construction of the Asian threat**

**Sankaran 14**

Jaganath Sankaran Limits of the Chinese Antisatellite Threat to the United States (2022) Airuniversity.af.edu. Available at: https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/SSQ/documents/Volume-08\_Issue-4/SSQ\_2014-4.pdf (Accessed: 5 January, 2022).

In May of 2013, the Pentagon revealed that China had launched a suborbital rocket from the Xichang Satellite Launch Center in southwest Sichuan province that reached a high-altitude satellite orbit. According to Pentagon spokesperson Lt Col Monica Matoush, “the launch appeared to be on a ballistic trajectory nearly to geo-synchronous earth orbit.”1 An unattributed US defense official said, “It was a ground-based missile that we believe would be their first test of an interceptor that would be designed to go after a satellite that’s actually on orbit.”2 In fact, the anticipation of this launch had sparked reports in the United States that China would be testing an antisatellite (ASAT) missile that might be able to attack US global positioning system (GPS) navigation satellites orbiting at an altitude of 20,000 kilometers (km).3 However, the Chinese claimed the launch carried a science payload (a canister of barium powder) to study Earth’s ionosphere. Reporting on the launch, China’s state-run Xinhua news service announced that “the experiment was designed to investigate energetic particles and magnetic fields in the ionized stratum and near-Earth space. The experiment has reached expected objectives by allowing scientists to obtain first-hand data regarding the space environment at different altitudes.”4 Even though the barium payload release occurred at an altitude of 10,000 km, the Chinese did not clarify how high the missile actually went or what launch vehicle was used.5 The launch reignited the perceived threat of Chinese ASAT missile attacks on US military satellites. **The growing US concern about Chinese ASAT capability goes back to 2007 when Beijing shot down one of its own satellites in low Earth orbit** (LEO). China has also conducted “missile defense” tests viewed as proxies for ASAT missions.6 These Chinese activities are seen by many analysts as a threat to US space capabilities. The persistent refrain has been that the US military exploits space surveillance capabilities better than any other nation, resulting in an asymmetric advantage to its armed forces on a global scale.7 Given this US advantage, analysts posit China will find it prudent to directly attack US satellites—executing a space “pearl harbor” that would cripple US military capabilities for years.8 Without its eyes and ears in space to provide early warning and real-time intelligence, it is argued, the United States would be in a painfully awkward situation should China put direct military pressure on

Taiwan.9 **However, the argument that US armed forces are critically dependent on satellites and therefore extremely vulnerable to disruption from Chinese ASAT attacks is not rooted in evidence.**10 Instead**, it rests on untested assumptions—primarily, that China would find attacking US military satellites operationally feasible and desirable**.11 This article tests those assumptions by critically examining the challenges involved in executing an ASAT attack versus the limited potential benefits such action would yield for China. It first examines which US military satellites are most vulnerable to Chinese ASAT attack and then, by demonstrating the limited reach of China’s ballistic missiles and inadequate infrastructure capacity for launching multiple rockets, posits that it would be infeasible for China to mount extensive ASAT operations necessary to substantially affect US capabilities. The article next explores the limited benefits China would achieve from an ASAT attack, arguing that even if it manages to execute a very complex and difficult ASAT operation, the benefits do not confer decisive military advantage. Finally, it suggests policy actions—both unilateral US military-technical innovations and bilateral cooperative measures with China—to dissuade China and to demonstrate US resilience against ASAT attacks. The Challenges of Antisatellite Attacks Which US military satellites would China be able to destroy and how easily? The answer to this question gives a clear indicator of Chinese offensive space capabilities. Arraying the range of potential target satellites—US, allied, and private, operating across a spectrum of orbital space—against the capabilities of Chinese missiles and launch infrastructure clearly shows that China possesses very limited means to conduct an extensive ASAT operation against the United States. To make that case, one must first understand the various US military satellites, their operational parameters, and the services they provide. Based on military significance, US satellites can be primarily classed as (1) intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) satellites, (2) GPS satellites, and (3) communications satellites. All three operate from different altitudes dictated by the functions they provide (see table 1).12 ISR satellites can be further divided into imagery or signals intelligence (SIGINT) satellites. ISR imagery satellites operate in LEOs of around 1,000 km. A plethora of ISR imagery satellites, both government-owned and private, are used by US armed forces to construct a picture of adversary capability. Signals intelligence ISR satellites performing electronic intelligence (ELINT) and communications intelligence (COMINT) collection operate mostly from geosynchronous orbits (GEO) of 36,000 km and are used to develop data on adversary assets and functional capability, particularly during times of peace. US GPS satellites operate from an altitude of around 20,000 km. They are an important component to the successful execution of any modern US military operation in addition to their extensive commercial applications. They provide deployed forces with precise positioning, navigational, and timing information that facilitates rapid maneuvering and precise targeting. US military communication satellites operate farthest from Earth in GEOs at an altitude of approximately 36,000 km. The US military employs a variety of military and commercial communications satellites for different activities. **China’s Missiles Will Not Be Enough** The substantial range of orbital altitudes—1,000 km to 36,000 km— across which satellites operate poses a challenge to China’s ability to attack US military satellites. **Of the three sets of orbiters discussed above, ISR imagery satellites operating at altitudes less than 1,000 km are most vulnerable to ASAT attack by China’s intermediate range ballistic missiles** (IRBM). This was demonstrated by the 2007 Chinese ASAT test. On 11 January 2007, China launched a two-stage, solid-fuel, mediumrange Dong Feng (DF)-21 ballistic missile using a mobile transportererector-launcher (TEL) from the Xichang Space Center which slammed into one of its polar-orbiting LEO weather satellites (Feng Yun 1C) orbiting at an altitude of approximately 850 km.13 Caution should be exercised, however, in linearly scaling this Chinese ASAT capability to satellites operating at higher altitudes. The DF-21 ballistic missile used in the 2007 test cannot reach either GPS or communications satellites. In fact, even China’s most powerful solid-fueled intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) are unable to reach an altitude of 20,000 km where GPS satellites operate. These limitations of Chinese missiles are due to fundamental constraints of physics. To illustrate: a Chinese ICBM carrying a 2,000 kilogram (kg) payload with a burn-out velocity of 7.0 km/sec (traveling a ground distance of approximately 11,500 km) when launched straight up with a reduced payload of 500 kg reaches a maximum altitude of only 10,500 km. The same ICBM with a reduced payload of 250 kg reaches an approximate maximum altitude of only 15,000 km. **This limitation, as discussed above, implies that China would not be able to execute an ASAT attack against GPS satellites operating at 20,000 km or US military communications and SIGINT satellites operating at 36,000 km using its current missile inventory.** To reach these higher orbiting satellites, China would have to build new and more-powerful ICBMs. **Even if it manages to develop such an ICBM, China certainly will not be able to produce a large number of them without substantial financial stress. Alternatively, it can use its liquid-fueled space launch vehicles; however, this imposes other difficulties discussed below**. China’s Infrastructure Further Limits Antisatellite Operations There are other challenges for China in successfully executing an ASAT attack against US satellites. Any operationally relevant ASAT operation will require the destruction of more than one satellite. In the case of ISR imagery satellites, for example, shooting down one would have very little impact upon net US satellite-enabled surveillance capabilities. In real-world scenarios, a chain of ISR satellites orbiting over a location of interest at various times are used to gain information on an adversary. Take for instance US operations in the 1991 Gulf War. An assortment of US military, allied, and private ISR satellites like Landsat, SPOT, Okean, Resurs-F, Resurs-O, Lacrosse, KH-11, KH-12, White Cloud, RORSAT, EORSAT, Almaz, and others were used.14 In all probability, a US-China engagement in the Taiwan Straits would involve as many or more satellites. It would be exceedingly difficult for China to continue destroying such a number of satellites over a period of time without subjecting its launch infrastructure to counterattack. A similar challenge exists in the case of GPS satellites. The GPS constellation consists of around 30 satellites. To meaningfully dilute GPS signals in a local area such as the Taiwan Straits would require destroying six or more satellites, as discussed in detail below. Even after a loss of six GPS satellites, the signal degradation lasts for only 95 minutes. For China to force US armed forces to operate without GPS over a sustained period of time would require destruction of 10 or more of these satellites—a very difficult task. Similarly, a fleet of nine US military communications spacecraft provided coverage over the Persian Gulf area during the 1991 Gulf War. Allied military satellites like the Skynet (UK), MACSAT, and Telecom/ Syracuse (France) were utilized as well, as were nonmilitary space communication systems (INTELSAT, INMARSAT, EUTELSAT, ARABSAT, and PANAMSAT).15 In any future conflict between the United States and China, dozens of communications satellites could be used, making targeting very complicated. To locate and attack these targets, China would likely have to employ its liquid-fueled space launch vehicles performing complex and time-consuming orbit transfer maneuvers to reach the 36,000 km orbit where communications satellites operate. The time needed to transit from LEO to GEO on a transfer orbit is usually more than five hours. Even direct launches to GEO take several hours. The time delay between launch and actual attack would provide enough time for the United States to relocate its GEO military communications satellites if it suspects an ASAT attack is imminent. Such relocation maneuvers have been done before. For example, to meet growing bandwidth demands during the 1991 Gulf War, the Defense Satellite Communications System (DSCS) reserve West Pacific satellite was relocated from its 180o longitude geostationary parking slot to 65o E to service demands over the Gulf region.16 Even if Chinese space launch vehicles could reach these higher orbits in time to intercept US military communications satellites, executing dozens of such launches in quick succession is close to impossible. China’s infrastructure limits such a venture. The total number of space launches to orbits higher than LEO by China in 2012 was nine; there were also nine in 2011, eight in 2010, two in 2009 (with one failure), and four in 2008. In the last five years the two quickest back-to-back launches to orbits higher than LEO occurred with a gap of 15 days. However, the average time between launches is close to a month and a half.17 This launch record suggests that launching dozens of ASATs almost simultaneously as required to cripple US military operations is almost impossible for China. **Additionally, China has to date used only one space launch facility for higher-than-LEO launches, the Xichang Space Launch Center, which has only three launch pads**. **Achieving a number of simultaneous launches using just this one launch site questions the feasibility of China being able to successfully execute an ASAT attack without becoming subject to counterattack**. Unlike the ICBMs which can be quickly fired, liquid-fueled space launch vehicles take time to fuel, and these preparations are very visible. If the United States anticipates and observes the preparation for an ASAT attack, it could destroy the launch vehicles during preparation. Even if China were able to execute such an ASAT operation, would it be willing to weather the collateral consequences? **Destroying a US satellite might produce debris fields that invariably affect other satellites. The debris field created by the 2007 ASAT test is now generally seen as the most prolific and severe fragmentation event in five decades of space operations**.18 Additionally**, any major US military operation would involve satellites from coalition partners, neutral nations, and private companies. Would China shoot at satellites from neutral nations like Japan, India, or European nations leasing out their capabilities to the United States**? In the wake of the 2007 ASAT test, China faced sustained international pressure to explain its actions. Not only did the United States issue its own démarche to the Chinese foreign ministry, it successfully convinced the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, Japan, and the Republic of Korea to issue similar démarches. France and Germany made their independent protests to Chinese actions.19 Attacking a third-party satellite during a US-China conflict might impel these actors to side with the United States—an outcome China would certainly want to avoid. The array of factors discussed in this section raises reasonable doubts about Chinese potential to launch an operationally relevant ASAT mission to degrade US military operations.

**Advocacy**

**Techno-orientalist discourse is perpetuated every day, only a confrontation with pedagogical practices that prop it up solves. The aff confronts the ideas that justify private appropriation of space - I defend the rez as a whole and cx checks to prevent friv T debates**

**Lozano-Mendez 10** (Artur, Undergraduate Student Majoring in East Asian Studies, Published in 2010, “TECHNO-ORIENTALISM IN EAST-ASIAN CONTEXTS: REITERATION, DIVERSIFICATION, ADAPTATION”, pg. 184-186) RR Jr

Early in the history of exchange with Europeans, Japan was presented as the most conspicuous instance of il mondo alla riversa, “the world upside down”. After many decades of globalization, that topos from the Renaissance clings on to the Western imagination. The following words were written by the Jesuit Alessandro Valignano, who visited the East Indies from 1574 to 1606: “They also have other rites and customs so different from all the other nations that it would seem that they deliberately studied how to differ from everybody (…) because honestly it can be said that Japan is a world upside down compared to the ways of the world in Europe; as it is so different and contrary, that there is almost no issue where they adjust to us.”14 Such all-encompassing othering perceptions spread quickly and rooted deeply. Even today, after many decades of globalization, Japan is presented sometimes as the radical other versus Euro-American cultural horizon. Following the logics of schema of co-figuration, the identity of the West

had been supported by antonymous couplings such as civilized–uncivilized, modern–pre-modern, etc. According to Morley and Robins, the idea of the West draws legitimacy from the unequivocal and exclusive correspondence that bound together the words “West–Modernity–Progress”. Thus, techno-orientalism started to take shape when such discursive exclusivity was unmistakably refuted, when the other “refused” to render themselves as the docile signified to a preset signifier. As Morley and Robins write: “Those anxieties must be seen in the context of an increasing sense of insecurity about European and American modernity. Modernity has always been that ‘mysterious and magical word that puts a barrier between the European [and American] ego and the rest of the world’.16 If it was the West that created modernity, it was also modernity that created the imaginary space and identity described as ‘Western’. (...) however, the very dynamism of modernity also worked to undermine its Western foundations. The modernization project was cumulative, future-orientated, based upon the logic of technological progression and progress. Its various elements were also designed to be exported and to transcend their European origins and exclusiveness. Modernization and modernity, with their claims to universalism, could be transposed to other host cultures. In Japan this project found a fertile environment. The technological and futurological imagination has now come to be centered here; the abstract and universalizing force of modernization has passed from Europe to America to Japan.” An instrumental factor in the successful expansion and acceptance of techno-orientalist tenets lay in their early adoption by self-orientalist discourse in Japan. Self-orientalism takes the images supplied by Western orientalism and changes their polarization from negative to positive. The mutual feedback benefits power structures both internationally and within Japan, where the nihonjinron—a trend of publications analyzing the “particularism” of Japanese people—already promotes conformity to specific models of citizenship.18 Thus, discourse informally induces people to adopt certain lifestyles and values. Those perceived cultural traits are turned into cultural assets, and merchandised as such. What the techno-orientalist deformative lens perceives as robotic, gregarious and self-emasculated way of life is presented as a considerate, balanced and reliable behavior. Paradoxically, the **culture, tourism and entertainment industries from Japan have been exporting products that undergo symbolic negotiation in Western markets** 20 and, all too often, **become techno-orientalist avatars. The result** of such symbolic negotiation comes naturally since the mainboard of technologies of recognition is already printed with techno-orientalism and the “binary structuring schemata that are constantly utilized by the geopolitics of the modernization theory.”

**Impacts**

**The dehumanization of Orientalism is a form of racialized and gendered violence – it justifies military action and makes the Other dispensable.**

**Nayak ’06** (Meghana; Professor of Political Science at Pace University; March 2006; International Feminist Journal of Politics, 8:1; “Orientalism and ‘saving’ US state identity after 9/11;<http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14616740500415458>, accessed 7/14/16) Recut Mini

The third element has to do with the nexus of power and knowledge. US state identity making requires a particular social production of knowledge. ‘Knowing’ the Other is integral to protecting and securing what one ‘knows’ to be true about the Self (i.e. **the Self is good, normal, enlightened, progressive and right and the Other is backwards, barbaric, primitive and dangerous**). Indeed, the proliferation of books about ‘understanding Islam’, what is ‘behind/beneath the veil’ and ‘the Arab mind’ since 9/11 attests to the need to know, thus predict, ‘them’ as well as to justify occupation (Patai 2002; Lewis 2003; Warraq 2003; Manji 2004). Relatively speaking, Christian fundamentalism, as it underscores Bush’s rhetoric and replacement of human rights terminology with references to ‘Providence’, human dignity and biblical scripture (Mertus 2003), needs little to no explanation or interrogation for mainstream America. In effect, the only way to guarantee the persistence and prevalence of this hypermasculinist, religiously and morally superior Self, arising out of the ashes of 9/11, is to rely

firmly on US-specific orientalism. While Said underscores his thesis with references to racism and racialization, he fails to examine the intersectionality of race and gender in upholding orientalism. Further, he claims that orientalism has been an ‘exclusively male province’ (1979: 207), ignoring both historical and contemporary collusions between feminism and orientalism and between women and colonial projects. As such, while I rely on Said’s formulation of orientalism as an ideology with material and discursive effects, I argue that to fully understand both orientalism and its crucial role in US state identity making, one must extrapolate Said’s argument to recognize how orientalism only works because of the violent remaking, disciplining and construction of race and gender. Thus, I argue that the US state project could not work without gendered and racialized violence. These violent acts are not singular, pathologized events but are systematic oppressive acts that are integral to complex productions and significations of gender and race. Processes of gendering and racialization involve the solidification of categories of people, and their eligibility as political agents, based on sexuality, sex/gender, race, ethnicity, religion, geography, etc. Gendered and racialized violence secures, disciplines and maintains the boundaries of public and private, community, nation and state. Systematic and programmatic violence functions through the registers of gender and race, thus dictating what ‘men’, ‘women’ and racialized categories such as ‘white’, ‘black’, ‘Arab/Muslim’ or ‘oriental’ are supposed to be and do. To emphasize an earlier point, the gendered and racialized violence of orientalist US state identity making is nothing new or remarkable; however, since the US government and mainstream citizenry fervently believe that US state identity making is more crucial and urgent now than ever before, it is accordingly the task of this article to trace and resist the violence, in the forms of infantilization, demonization, dehumanization and sexual commodification, engendered by the desperate attempts to save the Self. The ‘feminist’ framework advanced here, then, brings together several themes on masculinity, orientalism, religion, race, gender, nation, state and violence in order to better understand and possibly resist particular forms of identity making. I rely upon feminisms that are cognizant of the historic collusion of orientalism and feminisms as well as of the contradictory practices of feminisms that at once promise emancipation from and transformation of oppressive structures/systems yet also problematically ‘make’ race, gender, community and territory and benefit from power relations (McClintock 1995). In fact, the very concept of the Other has not only enabled many ‘western’, upper class, hegemonic self-described feminist actors to exercise agency while leaving undisturbed the very systems that allow oppression, but has also been central to the development of feminisms (Mohanty 1991). Thus, in order for feminism to have resistance potential, it must acknowledge its own participation in orientalism and its self-referential activism during colonialism, conflicts and the War on Terror. As this article progresses, I grapple first with tracing the violence of orientalism, in the form of infantilization, demonization, dehumanization and sexual commodification, before concluding with thoughts on the type of theoretical shifts and political gestures that feminist responses must include. Infantilization is the representation of certain political actors/communities as vulnerable, helpless and backward children. As such, their lives depend on being saved from the vagaries and horrors of their cultures and religions by rational, enlightened, civilized and strong political actors. US policymakers’ documented reasons for late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century imperial expansion hinged on the need to save these ‘emotional, irrational, irresponsible, unbusinesslike, unstable, childlike’ people (Rosenberg 1991: 31–5). They were bolstered in this mission by the strongly gendered overtones of Social Darwinism, the perceived duty to teach Others how to live in a political society and the desire to ‘prove’ US power and strength through the assertion of American men’s military might, sexual prowess and ability to protect Other women from ‘their’ men (Hoganson 2000). As such, one can recognize infantilization in discourses and acts that appear to raise awareness about gender violence but that actually locate oppression squarely on Other cultures, rather than on local and international power relations, globalized capitalism or US foreign policy. As such, infantilization includes the following elements: descriptions of gender violence are racialized, to underscore that patriarchal violence does not exist in the West and that the only reason a woman may die in a nonwestern country is because of a monolithically oppressive, static Culture (Narayan 1997); promotion of a militaristic solution to end gender violence; and use of the ‘progress’ of Other women in achieving or exercising rights, such as voting, to justify US strategic actions. Thus, **infantilization is a form of racialized and gendered violence** because it violently denies agency based on race and gender and strongly justifies military action. As the USA attempts to ‘represent’ the voices of those who cannot speak, **it ironically erases these voices**, which in effect makes Other women dispensable. After all, if the West can represent, give voice to and talk about the experiences of Other women, what need is there for real women? Women’s voices are instead systematically forgotten, erased or taken out of context to prove the horrors of their cultures. These women cannot possibly tell their own stories, emphasize poverty or community over western liberal conceptions of freedom in terms of choice of clothing and the opportunity to vote, or revolutionize their societies without the help of the enlightened West. Critiques of particular misogynistic interpretations and politicizations of Islam find no place in the US ‘us versus them’ rhetoric to express such views without inadvertently ‘demonstrating’ Islamic oppression or ‘betraying’ men in their communities. Women elsewhere cannot be full agents, recalling my earlier point that orientalism cannot accept the agency of certain Others. Further, the ‘help’ comes in the form of militarism, which is the problematic search for the perfect ‘Other’, the easily differentiated and hence racialized enemy and the promotion of hypermasculinity. Infantilization thus

solidifies masculinist battles to prove who is manly enough to protect one’s land, to decide on a political system and to ‘protect’ women, all of which get played out on women’s bodies in the form of abduction, rape and forced impregnation and on men’s bodies as sexual violence and humiliation (Enloe 1993, 1998, 2000). After 9/11, the US government, the media and ‘experts’ collaborated to signify the oppression of Arab/Muslim women as the categorical proof of Islamic terror, and women accordingly became a central point of the war on terror. Despite US involvement in the regimes of the Taliban and Saddam Hussein, the USA suddenly turned the long-term persecution of women in Afghanistan and Iraq into a spectacle for public consumption and justification for military intervention. Images of Afghani women throwing off their burqas and Iraqi women marching and shouting political slogans alleviated some of the public concern about the validity of the military operations. In the State of the Union address in January 2002, Bush (2002) declared, ‘[t]he last time we met in this chamber, the mothers and daughters of Afghanistan were captives in their own homes ... Today women are free’, later emphasizing ‘[a]s a result of securing ourselves and ridding [sic] the Taliban out of Afghanistan, the Afghan people had elections this weekend. And the first voter was a 19- year-old woman. Think about that. Freedom is on the march’ (‘The Third Bush–Kerry Presidential Debate’ 2004). Regarding the war campaign in Iraq, the Bush administration employed graphic descriptions of Saddam Hussein’s ‘rape rooms’ and has consistently framed women’s political participation as the sign of progress. While many contest the reasons for and events in these two theaters of war, few doubt the inherently beneficial goal of ‘freeing’ women from the religious and cultural oppression of Islam, regardless of the US governmental role in creating some of the conditions for such oppression or of the particular political and historical specificities of the oppression. As discussed above, racialized and gendered violence is crucial in US attempts to promote hypermasculinity and religious ethics in the project to save the Self. The USA can save itself and its identity by protecting its power. The power to save is clearly articulated in the National Security Strategy (2002: prologue): Today, the United States enjoys a position of unparalleled military strength and great economic and political influence ... we do not use our strength to press for unilateral advantage. We seek instead to create a balance of power that favors human freedom. In order to prove and solidify this strength and power, the US state must ‘save’ violated women and emasculated men who cannot seem to defend their countries from terrorism or build democracies. If one counters infantilization, one effectively doubts the US ability to save others and thus threatens the very strength the USA proclaims it (still) has. The paternalist mission, wherein only a real man can save suffering women under the shadow of the gun, is crucial for alleviating the anxiety that the USA has experienced since 9/11. Because states feminize boundaries, the invasion of such translates into imagery of an impotent, emasculated man unable to protect his possessions from being violated and destroyed. Bush (2004d) demonstrates the militaristic solution to this masculinist anxiety: ‘And we have seen Americans in uniform storming mountain strongholds, and charging through sandstorms and liberating millions, with acts of valor that would make the men of Normandy proud.’ Further, infantilization serves Bush’s (2003b) perception that salvation is divine, as he notes: ‘[t]he liberty we prize is not America’s gift to the world, it is God’s gift to humanity’. Bush’s Christian-based salvation, despite its bloody history throughout colonizing missions, somehow poses little danger in comparison to the Islamic threat. Infantilization ‘works’ for the USA because it allows the redemption of the emasculated citizen and state that could not fight off 9/11. In her research on female slaves on the plantations in the south of the USA, Deborah Gray White (1985) describes two prevailing understandings of the women: the Jezebel archetype, the hedonistic, lascivious and morally corrupt woman who raises men to be rapists and women to be temptresses; and the Mammy archetype, the maternal, submissive, non-thinking woman. Both demonization and dehumanization are apparent in the diabolic Jezebel who deserves violence and the dispensable Mammy whose violent experiences really do not matter, as only certain ‘worthy’ bodies can truly experience suffering. In other words, Jezebels and Mammies are ineligible for inclusion in civilization. As the discussion of infantilization demonstrates, the politically expedient redemption and salvation of Other women reaffirms that their bodies are dispensable. One can recognize demonization and dehumanization by tracing competing discourses of disgust and apathy in the US attempts to save the Self. In particular, **these violent practices classify people as collateral damage** (not mattering at all), conditionally worthy (mattering only if they meet particular conditions such as expressing US patriotism), or dangerous (mattering in so far as they need to be identified in order to be targeted or eliminated). The event of 9/11 requires, as it harshly exposed the underlying anxiety always present in the US Self, that ‘Arabs’, ‘Muslims’ and various constructed categories of Others, be turned into something to be feared and hated, notquite-humans whose suffering must have been brought onto themselves, and thus is not really important. At the same time that infantilization constructs Other women as objects to be saved, demonization and dehumanization ensure that ‘their’ men and cultures are hated and despised. Depending on the type of state identity it wants to assert, the US state decides when to hate, save or ignore Other men and women. These contradictions, of saving yet hating the Other, sympathizing with yet neglecting the realities of the Other, proudly touting the freedom of Other women yet violating these very women by repressing political beliefs and expressions or through sexual and physical brutalization, are indicative of orientalist logic. Thus, the attempts to save the Self can result in infantilization, demonization or dehumanization simultaneously or alternatively. To demonstrate the absolute degeneracy of the ‘Orient’ depends on describing the condition of the most ‘vulnerable’: women. However, the ‘West’ must be able to retain positional superiority, in terms of deciding what happens in the ‘Orient’, thus the Other cannot be allowed to fully cross the line from ‘them’ to ‘us’, explaining the underlying contempt for ‘them’. Demonization and dehumanization are forms of gendered and racialized violence because these practices, like infantilization, erase agency based on gender and race. To invoke hatred and/or extreme apathy toward communities is to emphasize that they do not matter, and consequently, promotes the targeted violence and killings of Others and reduces the loss of human life to collateral damage. In effect, demonization and dehumanization are critical to the US hegemonic project, as the assertion of the US Self is as much about disciplining the Others at home as it is about objectifying Others ‘elsewhere’. The hypermasculinity required for the US state project results in and requires demonization and dehumanization, particularly of the Arab/ Muslim male, since 9/11. The limited horror expressed in the USA at the hypocrisy of the peaceful, secular, democratic USA inflicting sexualized violence and atrocities on those coded as the enemy in Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo Bay, shows the interrelationship of masculinity and patriotism enacted by both US male and female members of the military. Because the Arab/ Muslim male is so hateful and subhuman, the torture of potentially innocent people is acceptable in order to protect US strength and power. Any concern with scenes and stories from Cuba and Iraq deals with the ‘humiliation’ the men must have suffered as members of honor-based Arab society. This discomfort with the consequences of masculinist militarism marks the pain not as human horror but as a function of (superficial knowledge about) the Other society’s expectations of heterosexual men. Underlying the ambivalent responses is the assumption that the worst thing that can happen to a man, ‘here’ or ‘there’, is to be ‘treated like a woman’, i.e. raped and made powerless. Those invested in US state identity can comfort themselves by thinking of the torturers as ‘sick’ individuals rather than as agents of systemized hatred, racialization and misogyny.

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