I negate and value morality as ought is defined as “used to express moral obligation”

The reason morality exists in the first place is to regulate our actions towards others. If any moral code is not motivational then there is no reason to do what is right and that code merely fails to escape the skeptical conclusion. Motivational externalism collapses into internalism. **Joyce**:

Back to the [Suppose] external reason[s]. Suppose it were claimed, instead, that I have a reason to refrain from drinking the coffee because it is tapu and must not be touched. This reason claim will be urged regardless of what I may say about my indifference to tapu, or my citing of nihilistic desires to tempt the hand of fate. [r]egardless of my desires (it is claimed) I ought not drink - l have a reason not to drink. But **how could** that reason ever explain any action of mine? Could the **external reason** even **explain** my **[action]** from drinking**?** Clearly, in order to explain it **the** external **reason must have some causal**ly efficacious **role [in]** among the antecedents of **the action** (in this case, an omission) — l must have. in some manner. "internalized" it. The only possibility, it would seem, consistent with its being an external reason, is that I believe the external reason claim [but] : I believe that the coffee is tapu. There's no doubting that such a belief can play a role in explaining actions - including my refraining from drinking the coffee. The question is whether the **belief alone can[not] produce action**, to which the correct answer is “No.” A very familiar and eminently sensible view says that **in order to explain** an **action** the **belief must couple with desire**s (such that those same desires had in the absence of the belief would not have resulted in the action). And this seems correct: if I believe that the coffee is [bad] tapu but really just don’t care about that, then I will not refrain from drinking it. So in order for the belief to explain action it must couple with [desire] elements - but in that case the putative **external reason collapses into** an **internal** one.3

Additionally, agents can only be motivated by their own desires; not the external desires of another because A) They are epistemically inaccessible B) Individuals have unlimited wants that are not communicated and C) We only care about our own desires as individuals are self-interested and don’t care about helping others. This means that you can’t independently motivate people to affirm.

Only a contractarian system that derives principles of mutual restraint from individuals’ self-interest account for this fact because contractarian principles are necessarily in the interest of all parties involved because they wouldn’t constrain their action against their will, **Gauthier:**

**Moral principles are** introduced as the **objects of** full voluntary ex ante **agreement among** rational **persons.  Such agreement is hypothetical,** in supposing a pre-moral context for the adoption of moral rules and practices.**But the parties to agreement are real,** determinate individuals, **distinguished by their** capacities, **situations, and concerns.**  In so far as **[Since] they** would **agree** **to constrain**ts **on their choices**,restraining their pursuit of their own interests, **they acknowledge a distinction between what they may and may not do.  As rational persons** understanding the structure of their interaction, **they recognize for mutual constraint**, and so for a moral dimension in their affairs.

Thus, the standard is **consistency with** **contractarian principles of mutual restraint,** defined as those principles by which individuals would constrain their actions with the belief that doing so would serve their self-interest.

Additionally, prefer the standard

**1. Consent-** Contractarianism is based on consent—implicit in acceptance of a contract—which ultimately determines what qualifies as a net good or harm. Moral theories must be based in consent otherwise actions could never be determinate.

**2. Infinite Regress-** Only contractarianism can avoid an infinite regress. When we look to an external authority to derive normative conceptions of the good, we are left wondering why a certain good is actually good. Any conception of morality and what people are due begs the question of why our assessment of individual dues ought be preferred over other assessments of individual dues. Contractarianism avoids this by allowing individuals to construct conceptions of the good based on a rational restriction of their future actions. No other theory is derived from a morally neutral base.

Negate:

[1] Either A) The resolution wills that member nations reduce intellectual property protections for already existing medicines, which means they would be in direct violation/infringement upon existing contracts or B) The resolution wills that member nations reduce intellectual property protections generally, which is inconsistent with the contractarian principle of equal parties. Gauthier:

But the strengths of a contractarian theory may seem to be accompanied by grave weaknesses. We have already noted that for a contractarian, morality requires **a context of mutual benefit**. John Locke held that 'an Hobbist . . . will not easily admit a great many plain duties of morality'. And this may seem equally to apply to the Hobbist's modern-day successor. Our theory does not **assume[s]** any fundamental concern with impartiality, but only **a concern derivative from the benefits of agreement**, and those benefits are **determined by the effect** that **each person can have on** the interests of **her fellows. Only beings whose** physical and mental **capacities are** either roughly **equal** or mutually complementary **can expect to find cooperation beneficial to all.** Humans benefit from their interaction with horses, but they do not co-operate with horses and may not benefit them. **Among unequals, one party may benefit most by coercing the other,** and on our theory would have no reason to refrain.  We may condemn all coercive relationships, but only within the context of mutual benefit can our condemnation appeal to a rationally grounded morality.

Gauthier, David P. *Morals by Agreement*. Oxford: Clarendon, 1986. Print.

Thus, there can be no contractarian principle that wills that government actors are obligated to reduce intellectual property protections, because they are on a different power level than any agent to whom those reductions would apply. To clarify, even if it is the case that these governments *could* reduce intellectual property protections, they simply cannot be *obligated* to, because there is no agent with which they could have a contract that is consistent with contractarian principles.

**[2] IP rights are included in multiple international contracts – the aff violates that.**

**WIPO** (WIPO, 11-9-1998, accessed on 8-25-2021, World Intellectual Property Organization, "Intellectual Property and Human Rights", https://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/wipo\_pub\_762.pdf)

The World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) take pleasure in issuing the proceedings of the Panel Discussion on "Intellectual Property and Human Rights" which took place in Geneva on November 9, 1998, to mark the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). Intellectual property rights are enshrined as human rights in the UDHR. Article 27 of the Universal Declaration provides that: "(]) Everyone has the right.freely to participate in the cultural life of the community, to enjoy the arts and to share in scientific advancement and its benefits; (2) Everyone has the right to the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the author." These rights are further emphasized by Article 15 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 1966 (ICESCR), Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civii'and Political Rights, 1966 (ICCPR), the Vienna Declaration and Program of Action, 1993 (VDPA), and other international and regional instruments.

**[3] Consent – the aff disregards the consent of medicine producers and allows it to be violated by removing patents - negates because violating a party’s consent is an act of violating a hypothetical contract since their side of the contract isn’t accounted for**

[4] WTO member nations cannot make contracts among themselves because they are noton equal footing, developing member nations are always put at a disadvantage

**Walker:**

But **the WTO membership has failed to deliver** the promised **pro-development changes**. Finding "development" in the Doha Development Round today is like looking for a needle in a haystack. **Developing countries** [**have been completely sidelined**](https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/poverty-matters/2011/jul/29/wto-doha-fails-poorest-countries) **by the economic and political interests of global powers.**

Here are 10 examples of how the WTO has failed the poor:

1. Cotton: the [Fairtrade Foundation revealed last year](http://www.fairtrade.org.uk/includes/documents/cm_docs/2010/f/2_ft_cotton_policy_report_2010_loresv2.pdf) how the $47bn in **subsidies paid to rich-country producers** in the past 10 years **has created barriers for the 15 million cotton farmers across west Africa trying to trade their way out of poverty**, and how **5 million of the world's poorest farming families have been forced out of business and into deeper poverty because of those subsidies.**

2. Agricultural subsidies: beyond cotton, WTO members have [failed even to agree how](http://www.ifpri.org/sites/default/files/publications/rb16.pdf) to reduce the huge subsidies paid to rich world farmers, whose overproduction continues to threaten the livelihoods of developing world farmers.

3. Trade agreements: **the WTO has** also **failed to clarify the** deliberately **ambiguous rules on** concluding **trade agreements that allow the poorest countries to be manipulated by the rich states**. In Africa, in negotiations with the EU, countries have been forced to eliminate tariffs on up to 90% of their trade because no clear rules exist to protect them.

4. Special treatment: the rules for developing countries, called ["special and differential treatment"](http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/devel_e/dev_special_differential_provisions_e.htm) rules, were meant to be reviewed to make them more precise, effective and operational. But the WTO has failed to work through the [88 proposals](http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min03_e/brief_e/brief21_e.htm) that would fill the legal vacuum.

5. Medicine: the poorest in developing countries are unable to access affordable medicine because members have failed to clarify ambiguitiesbetween the need for governments to protect public health on one hand and on the other to protect the [intellectual property rights](http://www.who.int/medicines/areas/policy/doha_declaration/en/index.html) of pharmaceutical companies.

6. Legal costs: the WTO pledged to improve access to its expensive and complex legal system, but has failed. In 15 years of dispute settlement under the WTO, [400 cases have been initiated](http://ictsd.org/i/events/dialogues/103446/). No African country has acted as a complainant and only one least developed country has ever filed a claim.

7. Protectionist economic policies: one of the WTO's five core functions agreed at its inception in 1995 was to achieve more coherence in [global economic policy-making](http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/discussion_papers13_e.pdf). Yet the WTO failed to curb the speedy increase in the number of [protectionist measures](http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news11_e/g20_wto_report_may11_e.doc) applied by G20 countries in response to the global economic crisis over the past two years – despite G20 leaders' repeated affirmations of their "unwavering" commitment to resist all forms of protectionist measures.

8. Natural disaster: **the WTO fails to alleviate suffering when it has the opportunity to do so**. In the case of natural disaster, the membership will have taken almost [two years to agree and implement temporary trade concessions](http://www.moneycontrol.com/news/current-affairs/eu-welcomes-india-allowing-wto-waiver-forpakistan_592122.html) for Pakistan, where severe flooding displaced 20 million people in 2010 and caused $10bn of damage. Those measures, according to the International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development, would have boosted Pakistan's exports to the EU by at least €100m this year.

9. Decision-making: the WTO makes most of its decisions by consensus – and achieving consensus between 153 countries is nearly impossible. But this shows another failure of the WTO: to break the link between market size and political weight that would give small and poor countries [a voice in the trade negotiations](http://www.globaleconomicgovernance.org/wp-content/uploads/Deere-and-Harbourd.Developing-Country-Coalitions-in-the-WTO.pdf).

10. Fair trade: 10 years after the start of the Doha Development Round, **governments have failed to make trade fair**. As long as **small and poor countries remain without a voice**, the role of campaigning organisations, such as [Traidcraft](http://www.traidcraft.co.uk/get_involved/campaign/time_to_nip_US_cotton_subsidies_in_the_bud) and [Fairtrade Foundation](http://www.fairtrade.org.uk/), which are working together to eliminate cotton subsidies, will remain critical.

Walker, Aurelie. “The WTO Has Failed Developing Nations.” The Guardian, Guardian News and Media, 14 Nov. 2011, www.theguardian.com/global-development/poverty-matters/2011/nov/14/wto-fails-developing-countries