**Interp: The affirmative must only defend that appropriation of outer space by private entities is unjust through advocating for a full ban if reading a consequentialist framing.**

**“private entities” excludes governments**

**UpCounsel n.d.** [(UpCounsel, interactive online service that makes it faster and easier for businesses to find and hire legal help solely based on their preferences) “Private Entity: Everything You Need to Know”] JL

A **private entity** can be a partnership, corporation, individual, nonprofit organization, company, or any other organized group that is **not government-affiliated**. Indian tribes and foreign public entities are not considered private entities.

**Unjust means dialectically contrary to law – only ban does that.**

The Law Dictionary, ND, Def of Unjust, URL:<https://thelawdictionary.org/unjust/#:~:text=Contrary%20to%20right%20and%20justice,conduct%20furnished%20by%20the%20laws>, KR

Contrary to right and justice, or to the enjoyment of his rights by another, or to the standards of conduct *furnished by the laws*.

**Unjust means opposed to law.**

FreeDictionary  [TheFreeDictionary, Unjust, xx-xx-xxxx,https://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Unjust, 12-17-2021 amrita]

**UNJUST.** That which is done against the perfect rights of another; that which **is against the established law**; that which is opposed to a law which is the test of right and wrong.

**“The action of taking something for one's own use, typically without the owner's permission.” Oxford Dictionary**

**Violation: They defend a reduction- that’s not oppositional to the law because it means that there’s a world where the law would still permit private appropriation and they are reading utilitarianism. The PTD also applies to public entities which are not stated in the resolution.**

**Standards:**

**1] Predictable Limits – there’s hundreds of other ways in which the affirmative can defend the restriction of private entities in Outer space – they can make some fines, do a dance, etc, which makes it impossible for the negative to predict what process the affirmative is going to defend. Our interp is the most predictable because it’s grounded in the topic wording.**

**2] Topic ed – Bans are one of the most common and is most germane to the literature – increases the amount of ground and ability to have deep debates on the model which the majority of the literature is centered around as opposed to an irrelevant model that kills critical thinking abilities.**

**3]Clash – picking any grounds for debate precludes the only common point of engagement, which obviates preround research and incentivizes retreat from controversy by eliminating any effective clash. By adding in extra planks, there’s virtually no clash since I’m not prepared.**

**TVA solves) Read a whole res aff that says private appropriation is unjust because of your impacts b) Read a plan aff that advocates for solely banning private appropriation**

**Fairness is a voter**

**1] Debate is a competitive activity which mandates fairness otherwise no one would engage**

**2) Fairness double bind, either fairness matters and you vote my opponent down for being unfair or it doesn't matter and you hack against them arbitrarily.**

Drop the debater

A) to deter future abuse

B)Anything else would be severance since I’m indicting their entire position

.

No aff RVIs because

 A) Chilling effect: good theory debaters would always read abusive affs to bait theory and win the RVI.

 B) aff is dangerous in theory because they get final speech to weigh between layers, so they shouldn’t be able to win my theory.

Reject 1ar theory 1) Strat skew: The 1AR theory shell allows the aff to eliminate the entirety of the 1n, which eliminates the possibility of a coherent 2N strat. 2) Time skew: 1AR theory resets the round giving a 7/6 time skew to the aff. 3) Norm setting: if the shell is so important, you could have had a spike for it in the AC, instead, reading an interp in the 1ar baits bad theory debaters into a friv theory debate. Norm setting is an independent voter because its the purpose of theory. Competing interps because reasonability is arbitrary because people have different ideas of what’s reasonable.

CX doesn’t check, my strat was skewed from the start of the AC, that’s 6 minutes wasted. Incentivizes sketchiness because it allows debaters to shift advocacies when asked and be super vague in CX to allow them to shift later. Judges don’t flow CX it will never be binding.

**Security K**

Extinction rhetoric is used to beat back any counter-concerns. Prospective “future generations” are held hostage to the genocidal mindset of the state. **Neocleous 18:**

“Witness, for example, the phenomenon that has been described as neoliberalism. Much can and has been made of the ways in which neoliberalism involves a transformation of the individual: ‘economics are the method; the object is to change the heart and soul’, as Margaret Thatcher (Sunday Times, 1981) once put it. Taking such a claim seriously means reading neoliberalism not simply in terms of its destructive power, for example in destroying certain kinds of rights and institutions, but also in terms of its productive power: in its ability to create new kinds of social relations, new ways of living and new political subjects. The literature on the new neoliberal subject recognizes more than anything that what is being produced is an entrepreneurial self and a productive subject: a monetized, atomized and calculating subject that is required and expected to endlessly perform as a neoliberal subject in the social realm as well as in the marketplace (Dardot and Laval, 2013). This production of new subjectivities, however, is also very much an orientation of the subject around security: new political subjects forged through security, operating for security and organized around security. In other words, security- conscious neoliberal subjects. The connection between security and capital is thus integral to the neoliberal revolution and part of neoliberalism’s productive power and disciplinary core. (As with so many aspects of neoliberalism, what is of most interest is its disciplinary moment, and at the heart of this disciplinary moment lies the logic of security.) The explosion and expansion of security in the last two decades, while conventionally connected to the problem of terrorism (the ‘war on terror’), might just as properly be connected to the attempt to engrain neoliberalism into the hearts and minds of political subjects. Moreover, because the neoliberal subject is expected to be an active subject, this activity is also expected to respond to the demands of security as well as the demands of capital. As is well known, under neoliberalism it is no longer enough for us to simply work, earn our money, go home and spend it. Now we must believe in the work we are doing and actively show that we believe in it, identifying with the organization and signing up to the company’s mission, vision and values. The neoliberal workplace has become a ‘community of desire’, as Frédéric Lordon puts it, and yet this poses a problem for capital, which constantly questions the worker’s desire. In Lordon’s example: the employee- subject swears that they have no other passion than the manufacture of yoghurt, our company’s business, but can we really believe them? (Lordon, 2015, p. 84). The answer has to be no, and so the expected desire must be constantly expressed, measured and assessed, since it is always in danger of fading. A similar point might be made about the neoliberal polity, and likewise about the neoliberal security state: the citizen- subject swears that they have no other interest than the security of the social order, but can we really believe them? The answer must again be no,2 and so the expected desire must also be constantly expressed, measured and assessed, since it is always in danger of fading. Herein lies the basis for all the actions we are now being trained to undertake as security- conscious neoliberal subjects, such as being trained in ‘resilience’, being taught to be constantly ‘prepared for emergency’, and being encouraged to report any friends, family, lovers, neighbours and colleagues who we suspect might be doing something ‘suspicious’ (Neocleous, 2013, 2016, 2017). Part of the novelty of neoliberalism lies precisely in the idea that this active subject is not expected to remain content with the simple exchange of security for obedience, but, rather, is to be actively mobilized around the logic of security. **Security has become a neoliberal mobilization regime:** the people mobilized in the name of security as well as capital. Such **mobilization is** yet **a**nother **way** of incorporating the people into security and another way in which **security expresses its desire to exist without reply**, just like capital and the state. Part of **the illusion of security is that we are expected to bow down before it without** even **asking what it is** or how it came to begranted such a status**.** To exist without reply, **security seeks to nullify all dissent** and suppress any rebellion **even before** suchdissent **[it has]** and rebellion have **begun. Any objections** or resistance **to** any of **the policies** – not least the economic policies – being carried out by the powers **which claim to exercise security on our behalf are met either with [coercive]** security **measures** of the most coercive kind **or with the expectation that reason must abase itself before it –** all **our critical faculties set aside as security** and its leading **defenders tell us to shut up, listen and obey.** Those arguing against austerity, for example, are treated first and foremost as a threat to national security. Thus, far from security being emancipation, as some people working in the academic sector of the security industry like to claim and which is the very belief that security wants us to hold, the articulation of security as an overarching principle of politics – the idea, in other words, that security is the absolute foundation of all politics, or that security has to be the starting point for any political thought, or that security is the grounds on which we must accept the protection of the state, or that what all of us would most like for Christmas is security – is nothing less than the articulation of a demand for obedience. Security is in this sense central to the containment of social change, nothing less than the principle and process of pacification, if by ‘pacification’ we understand not simply the military crushing of resistance but, rather, the fabrication of social order (Neocleous, 2011, 2017; Neocleous, Rigakos and Wall, 2013). What does this obedience in the name of security produce? The answer is not difficult: obedience itself. Obedience produces obedience, as Foucault once commented (2014, p. 270) about what he called ‘pastoral power’. It reproduces itself as a system of obedience. That is, one accepts the principle of security in order to become obedient and one reproduces this state of obedience in a striving for the mythical state of security. Hence one is expected to manage oneself in the way that a security operative would have us be managed. This is the very point to which Hobbes alludes in the final paragraph of Leviathan; it is the very same point understood by all contemporary politicians when they speak the language of security; and it is the point implicit in much of the discourse and policies surrounding terrorism, which is why so much anti- terror legislation concerns itself with the obedience of the population. Obedience thereby becomes a permanent way of being, and we are encouraged and expected to believe that obedience is essential to the security of the subject. Obedience becomes fundamental to the principle of raison d’état, demanded by the state for security reasons, and our training in obedience a training of and for political order. And, given the security–commodity nexus, what we are being made obedient for is nothing other than the domination of our lives by capital. Security, then, demands that we bow down to security. It demands that we feel secure in our insecurity as bourgeois subjects but also insecure in our security as bourgeois subjects. It demands that we commit ourselves not to making history but, rather, to the eternal recurrence of the same: to securing capital and the state rather than anything against it or opposed to them. Like capital, security wants us to believe that it is our fate. Opening his book Politics and Fate, Andrew Gamble asks: ‘If politics were at an end, if this was our fate, what would this mean for us?’ (2000, p. 1). One answer: it would mean nothing less than being stuck in an endless security experience. ‘How was your security experience today?’, the questionnaire at Heathrow airport demands, after making us undergo a series of security rituals. An endless security experience, then, but one in which we are constantly asked to assess, measure and confirm our happiness in being able to participate in the rituals and thus in the process to confirm the extent to which security dominates our lives. A second answer to Gamble’s question: it would mean being subjected to one security innovation after another, including those innovations sold to us as being somehow ‘socially responsible’.**”**

Neocleous, Mark. “The bleak rituals of progress; or, if somebody offers you a socially responsible innovation in security, just say no,” in J. Peter Burgess, *Socially Responsible Innovation in Security,* pp. 133-6, 2018.

**IMPACTS**

The logic of “extinction first” is a political tool designed to facilitate political atrocities. **Moller:**

**“**Rather, **securitization** research in their sense requires an identification within a body of discourse of statements and claims which conform to the intrinsic logic or “grammar” of securitisation, which entails **claim[s]**ing **the issue to be of “existential” importance** and extremely urgent. **Unless solved without delay such a problem may allegedly destroy all other values, which warrants assigning absolute first priority** to it **and justifies** a resort to **extraordinary measures.** What should count as extraordinary will depend on context. For instance, whereas violating international obligations or using torture may be “business as usual” for some states, for others such measures will constitute very dramatic departure from common practice. Certain words would often be used in such securitisation attempts, e.g. “genocide” (often in the vague sense of “the most heinous of all crimes”) or “emergency” as in “state of emergency,” which is often the legal framework used for extraordinary measures—which may explain the otherwise rather bizarre interest taken by securitisation theorists in the works of Carl Schmitt (1888-1985), the classical theorist of states of emergency, according to whom “Not every extraordinary measure, not every police emergency measure or emergency decree, is necessarily an exception. **What characterizes an exception is principally unlimited authority, which means the suspension of the entire existing order.”**

Moller, Bjorn. “Securitisation and genocide: two chapters from work in progress.” No year. https://cric.ku.dk/publications/cric-papers/Securitisation\_and\_Genocide.pdf

Treating existential threats as states of exception perverts the purpose of democratic societies to suborn ethical requirements and justify collective violence. **El-Affendi:**

**“The ‘state of exception’** currently overshadowing liberal polities cannot thus be deemed their ‘essence’ (otherwise it would be meaningless to discuss ‘exception’) but as **[is] a mark of liberal democracy’s vulnerability to narratives of insecurity.** We may not know when the ‘State of Exception’ will ever end, but ‘we all know when it began.’ ‘We can no longer quite ‘remember’ that moment, for the images have long since been refitted into a present-day fable of innocence and apocalypse: the perfect blue of that late summer sky stained by acrid black smoke … Since that day ten years ago we have lived in a subtly different country.’ [Ellipsis in original] The significance of this imperceptible migration to a ‘different country’ stems from the remarkable transparency of the process of wholesale securitization (Macrosecuritization, as Buzan and Waever put it) that brought it about. Nevertheless, the camps at Guantanamo Bay and Baghram are not (yet) Auschwitz, and their significance is seriously eroded by such comparisons. The argument has often been made, sometimes by towering intellectual figures, that **genocidal excess reflects the ‘dark side of Enlightenment’** (Adorno and Horkheimer), or the ‘dark side of modernity’ (Hinton, Zygmunt, Bauman) or the ‘dark side of democracy’ (Michael Mann). The reflections in question present important and deep insights into **the** unintended or **unforeseen consequences** and by-products **of intellectual and social trends:** the arrogance of **self-validating** reason preached by the Enlightenment, utopian grand **schemes to control nature and humanity’s future;** the foregrounding of instrumental reason; ***the evolution of*** modern **armies** and bureaucracies **as** formidable (and **self-perpetuating) instruments of control [and]**; **the** fragmentation and **dilution of individual ethical responsibility;** the rise of new ideologies and exclusivist national mythologies; imperialist hubris; etc**.”**

El-Affendi, Abdelwahab. *Genocidal Nightmares: Narratives of Insecurity and the Logic of Mass Atrocities.* Bloomsbury; 2016.

Their rhetoric models the genocidal mindset of securitization, which justifies any atrocity in the name of preventing even marginal risks of existential threats;

And “extinction first” rhetoric is a *self-fulfilling* - it causes the genocidal violence it claims to be concerned with. **Abrams:**

**“Building upon [the]** Horowitz’s **threat of extinction,** the creation of a security dilemma between competing ethnic groups **can** also **create a basis for violence.** Barry Posen frames the problem of ethnic groups emerging from post-colonial/post-imperial situations within the discourse of the realist concept of the security dilemma. For Posen, the dilemma arises in the anarchy created in the transition from colonial/imperial rule to independence. In this period of fluidity it is hard to distinguish between another group’s offensive and defensive intentions. The inherent instability of this period creates a fear that the other side might renege on peace agreements. Making this determination even more difficult is the similarity between offensive and defensive weaponry used in low-level conflict. The result is that **groups ‘invest in and prepare for violence, and thereby make actual violence possible.’** In the end, the security dilemma creates a fear of the other group’s offensive intentions and capabilities and therefore a fear for survival. Again the existence of an existential threat creates legitimacy for extreme and often preemptive offensive action which will ‘save’ the group. Therefore by **creating a sense of threat** by “the other” **against the** very **existence of the** ethnic **group**, group security” **[justifies] action** **by elites against other** ethnic **groups.** **The fear of extinction** felt by self-assessed backwards groups and the inherent security dilemma create in transitional period help **explain[s] the willingness of the masses to support extreme tactics perpetrated by** their **leaders.”**

Abrams, Brian Eric. “Strategy of domination: Zanu-PF’s use of ethnic conflict as a means of maintaining political control in Zimbabwe, 1982-2006.” Master of Arts in Law and Diplomacy Thesis, April 2006.

**Thus, the ROB is to vote for the debater who better deconstructs securitization**

**Prefer additionally**

1. **Securitization is the root cause of all violence, it’s what justifies predictive policing, police brutality, and genocide.**
2. **Securitization warps our epistemology since we’re conditioned to believe that we’re always in danger of something. We need to first resolve that epistemic skew to engage in the debate.**

1. Securitization first makes the debate space unsafe. Extinction first says that racism, sexism, transphobia, slavery, and genocide are all secondary considerations. Extinction framing implicitly tells me that my bodily agency doesn’t matter and can be subordinated based on any fractional probability of extinction. **Advocacies that conditionally justify genocidal ideation have to be rejected forcibly regardless of the flow.** Debaters have to be held accountable for the implications of their speech acts. **Vincent:**

**“**The question then becomes how does our discourse justify what we believe? For many debaters it is **the gaming aspect of debate** that **allows us to** assume that our speech can be **disconnect**ed **from the speech act.** The speech can be defined as the arguments that are placed on the flow, and is evaluated in the context of what [will] is the most logical and rational argument to win the round. The critical distinction is the speech act, which is the performance of that discourse. It’s not what you say, but what you justify. **Understanding the speech act requires** critically **assessing the ramifications of the debaters’ discourse.** Debate is in and of itself a performance. To claim that it is not is to be divorced from the reality of what we do. **We must evaluate what a debater’s performance does and justifies.** For white debaters it is easy to view the discourse as detached from the body. For **those with privilege in debate,** they **are never forced to have their performance attached to them** but instead their arguments are viewed as words on paper. **They are taught to separate themselves from** any **ideologies** and beliefs, **and feel that there is no consequence to what they say**. It becomes the way in which they justify what is deemed as ‘rational’ and ‘logical’ thought. The argument sounds like it will be competitive so it is read but it is deemed as just an argument. **Judges evaluate this as just a speech.** **This** becomeswhat I deem as a performance by the body, rather than a performance of the body. Performances by the body **allow[s] debaters to not be held accountable to the words they say. Words are** seen as **divorced from any meaning outside of the flow**, versus the performance of the body where the words are attached to the body itself. Debaters often insert the performance by the body, when they make arguments that they claim that they do not believe, but think it is the best strategy for the round. This is a false assumption, since for black debaters meaning is always connected to their bodies. The best strategy should never be one that at the same time justifies acts of racism**.”**Vincent, Christopher. “Re-conceptualizing our performances: accountability in Lincoln Douglas debate.” *VBriefly,* October 26, 2013.

1. **Spillover from academic criticism is empirically proven. Be skeptical of the entirety of the AC since security logic alters our evaluation of truth since hierarchies end up co-opting it via security threats.**

**Jones ’99**

[Richard Wyn Jones, Professor International Politics at Aberystwyth University, Security, Strategy, and Critical Theory, 1999, p. 155-163]

**The central political task of the intellectuals is to** aid in the construction of a counterhegemony and thus **undermine** the **prevailing** patterns of **discourse** and interaction **that make up** the currently **dominant hegemony**. **This** task **is** **accomplished through educational activity**, because, as Gramsci argues, “every relationship of ‘hegemony’ is necessarily a pedagogic relationship” (Gramsci 1971: 350). Discussing the relationship of the “philosophy of praxis” to political practice, Gramsci claims: It [the theory] does not tend to leave the “simple” in their primitive philosophy of common sense, but rather to lead them to a higher conception of life. If it affirms the need for contact between intellectuals and “simple” it is not in order to restrict scientific activity and preserve unity at the low level of the masses, but precisely in order to construct an intellectual-moral bloc which can make politically possible the intellectual progress of the mass and not only of small intellectual groups. (Gramsci 1971: 332-333). According to Gramsci, this attempt to construct an alternative “intellectual-moral bloc” should take place under the auspices of the Communist Party—a body he described as the “modern prince.” Just as Niccolo Machiavelli hoped to see a prince unite Italy, rid the country of foreign barbarians, and create a virtu-ous state, Gramsci believed that the modern price could lead the working class on its journey toward its revolutionary destiny of an emancipated society (Gramsci 1971: 125-205). Gramsci’s relative optimism about the possibility of progressive theorists playing a constructive role in emancipatory political practice was predicated on his belief in the existence of a universal class (a class whose emancipation would inevitably presage the emancipation of humanity itself) with revolutionary potential. It was a gradual loss of faith in this axiom that led Horkheimer and Adorno to their extremely pessimistic prognosis about the possibilities of progressive social change. But does a loss of faith in the revolutionary vocation of the proletariat necessarily lead to the kind of quietism ultimately embraced by the first generation of the Frankfurt School? The conflict that erupted in the 1960s between them and their more radical students suggests not. Indeed, contemporary critical theorists claim that the deprivileging of the role of the proletariat in the struggle for emancipation is actually a positive move. Class remains a very important axis of domination in society, but it is not the only such axis (Fraser 1995). Nor is it valid to reduce all other forms of domination—for example, in the case of gender—to class relations, as orthodox Marxists tend to do. To recognize these points is not only a first step toward the development of an analysis of forms of exploitation and exclusion within society that is more attuned to social reality; it is also a realization that there are other forms of emancipatory politics than those associated with class conflict.1 This in turn suggests new possibilities and problems for emancipatory theory. Furthermore, the abandonment of faith in revolutionary parties is also a positive development. The history of the European left during the twentieth century provides myriad examples of the ways in which the fetishization of party organizations has led to bureaucratic immobility and the confusion of means with ends (see, for example, Salvadori 1990). The failure of the Bolshevik experiment illustrates how disciplined, vanguard parties are an ideal vehicle for totalitarian domination (Serge 1984). Faith in the “infallible party” has obviously been the source of strength and comfort to many in this period and, as the experience of the southern Wales coalfield demonstrates, has inspired brave and progressive behavior (see, for example, the account of support for the Spanish Republic in Francis 1984). But such parties have so often been the enemies of emancipation that they should be treated with the utmost caution. Parties are necessary, but their fetishization is potentially disastrous. History furnishes examples of progressive developments that have been positively influenced by organic intellectuals operating outside the bounds of a particular party structure (G. Williams 1984). Some of these developments have occurred in the particularly intractable realm of security. These examples may be considered as “resources of hope” for critical security studies (R. Williams 1989). They illustrate that ideas are important or, more correctly, that change is the product of the dialectical interaction of ideas and material reality. One clear security-related example of the role of critical thinking and critical thinkers in aiding and abetting progressive social change is the experience of the peace movement of the 1980s. At that time **the ideas of** dissident defense **intellectuals** (the “alternative defense” school) encouraged and **drew strength from peace activism**. Together **they** **had an effect not only on short-term policy but on the dominant discourses of** strategy and **security**, a far more **important result in the long run**. The synergy between critical security intellectuals and critical social movements and the potential influence of both working in tandem can be witnessed particularly clearly in the fate of common security. As Thomas Risse-Kappen points out, the term “common security” originated in the contribution of peace researchers to the German security debate of the 1970s (Risse-Kappen 1994: 186ff.); it was subsequently popularized by the Palme Commission report (Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues 1982). Initially, mainstream defense intellectuals dismissed the concept as hopelessly idealistic; it certainly had no place in their allegedly hardheaded and realist view of the world. However, notions of common security were taken up by a number of different intellectuals communities, including the liberal arms control community in the United States, Western European peace researchers, security specialists in the center-left political parties of Western Europe, and Soviet “institutchiks”—members of the influential policy institutes in the Soviet Union such as the United States of America and Canada Institute (Landau 1996: 52-54; Risse-Kappen 1994: 196-200; Kaldor 1995; Spencer 1995). These communities were subsequently able to take advantage of public pressure exerted through social movements in order to gain broader acceptance for common security. In Germany, for example, “in response to social movement pressure, German social organizations such as churches and trade unions quickly supported the ideas promoted by peace researchers and the SPD” (Risse-Kappen 1994: 207). Similar pressures even had an effect on the Reagan administration. As Risse-Kappen notes: When the Reagan administration brought hard-liners into power, the US arms control community was removed from policy influence. It was the American peace movement and what became known as the “freeze campaign” that revived the arms control process together with pressure from the European allies. (Risse-Kappen 1994: 205; also Cortright 1993: 90-110). Although it would be difficult to sustain a claim that the combination of critical movements and intellectuals persuaded the Reagan government to adopt the rhetoric and substance of common security in its entirety, it is clear that it did at least have a substantial impact on ameliorating U.S. behavior. The most dramatic and certainly the most unexpected impact of alternative defense ideas was felt in the Soviet Union. Through various East-West links, which included arms control institutions, Pugwash conferences, interparty contacts, and even direct personal links, a coterie of Soviet policy analysts and advisers were drawn toward common security and such attendant notions as “nonoffensive defense” (these links are detailed in Evangelista 1995; Kaldor 1995; Checkel 1993; Risse-Kappen 1994; Landau 1996 and Spencer 1995 concentrate on the role of the Pugwash conferences). This group, including Palme Commission member Georgii Arbatov, Pugwash attendee Andrei Kokoshin , and Sergei Karaganov, a senior adviser who was in regular contact with the Western peace researchers Anders Boserup and Lutz Unterseher (Risse-Kappen 1994: 203), then influenced Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev. Gorbachev’s subsequent championing of common security may be attributed to several factors. It is clear, for example, that new Soviet leadership had a strong interest in alleviating tensions in East-West relations in order to facilitate much-needed domestic reforms (“the interaction of ideas and material reality”). But what is significant is that the Soviets’ commitment to common security led to significant changes in force sizes and postures. These in turn aided in the winding down of the Cold War, the end of Soviet domination over Eastern Europe, and even the collapse of Russian control over much of the territory of the former Soviet Union. At the present time, in marked contrast to the situation in the early 1980s, common security is part of the common sense of security discourse. As MccGwire points out, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) (a common defense pact) is using the rhetoric of common security in order to justify its expansion into Eastern Europe (MccGwire 1997). This points to an interesting and potentially important aspect of the impact of ideas on politics. As concepts such as common security, and collective security before it (Claude 1984: 223-260), are adopted by governments and military services, they inevitably become somewhat debased. The hope is that enough of the residual meaning can survive to shift the parameters of the debate in a potentially progressive direction. Moreover, the adoption of the concept of common security by official circles provides critics with a useful tool for (immanently) critiquing aspects of security policy (as MccGwire 1997 demonsrates in relation to NATO expansion). The example of common security is highly instructive. First, it indicates that critical intellectuals can be politically engaged and play a role—a significant one at that—in making the world a better and safer place. Second, it points to potential future addressees for critical international theory in general, and critical security studies in particular. Third, it also underlines the role of ideas in the evolution in society. CRITICAL SECURITY STUDIES AND THE THEORY-PRACTICE NEXUS Although most proponents of critical security studies reject aspects of Gramsci’s theory of organic intellectuals, in particular his exclusive concentration on class and his emphasis on the guiding role of the party, the desire for engagement and relevance must remain at the heart of their project. The example of the peace movement suggests that critical theorists can still play the role of organic intellectuals and that this organic relationship need not confine itself to a single class; it can involve alignment with different coalitions of social movements that campaign on an issue or a series of issues pertinent to the struggle for emancipation (Shaw 1994b; R. Walker 1994). Edward Said captures this broader orientation when he suggests that critical intellectuals “are always tied to and ought to remain an organic part of an ongoing experience in society: of the poor, the disadvantaged, the voiceless, the unrepresented, the powerless” (Said 1994: 84). In the specific case of critical security studies, this means placing the experience of those men and women and communities for whom the present world order is a cause of insecurity rather than security at the center of the agenda and making suffering humanity rather than raison d’etat the prism through which problems are viewed. Here the project stands full-square within the critical theory tradition. If “all theory is for someone and for some purpose,” then critical security studies is for “the voiceless, the unrepresented, the powerless,” and its purpose is their emancipation. The theoretical implications of this orientation have already been discussed in the previous chapters. They involve a fundamental reconceptualization of security with a shift in referent object and a broadening of the range of issues considered as a legitimate part of the discourse. They also involve a reconceptualization of strategy within this expanded notion of security. But the question remains at the conceptual level of how these alternative types of theorizing—even if they are self-consciously aligned to the practices of critical or new social movements, such as peace activism, the struggle for human rights, and the survival of minority cultures—can become “a force for the direction of action.” Again, Gramsci’s work is insightful. In the Prison Notebooks, Gramsci advances a sophisticated analysis of how dominant discourses play a vital role in upholding particular political and economic orders, or, in Gramsci’s terminology, “historic blocs” (Gramsci 1971: 323-377). Gramsci adopted Machiavelli’s view of power as a centaur, ahlf man, half beast: a mixture of consent and coercion. Consent is produced and reproduced by a ruling hegemony that holds sway through civil society and takes on the status of common sense; it becomes subconsciously accepted and even regarded as beyond question. Obviously, for Gramsci, there is nothing immutable about the values that permeate society; they can and do change. In the social realm, ideas and institutions that were once seen as natural and beyond question (i.e., commonsensical) in the West, such as feudalism and slavery, are now seen as anachronistic, unjust, and unacceptable. In Marx’s well-worn phrase, “All that is solid melts into the air.” Gramsci’s intention is to harness this potential for change and ensure that it moves in the direction of emancipation. To do this he suggests a strategy of a “war of position” (Gramsci 1971: 229-239). Gramsci argues that in states with developed civil societies, such as those in Western liberal democracies, any successful attempt at progressive social change requires a slow, incremental, even molecular, struggle to break down the prevailing hegemony and construct an alternative counterhegemony to take its place. Organic intellectuals have a crucial role to play in this process by helping to undermine the “natural,” “commonsense,” internalized nature of the status quo. This in turn helps create political space within which alternative conceptions of politics can be developed and new historic blocs created. I contend that Gramsci’s strategy of a war of position suggests an appropriate model for proponents of critical security studies to adopt in relating their theorizing to political practice. THE TASKS OF CRITICAL SECURITY STUDIES If the project of critical security studies is conceived in terms of war of position, then **the main task** of those intellectuals who align themselves with the enterprise **is** **to** attempt to u**ndermine the prevailing hegemonic security discourse. This may be accomplished by utilizing** specialist information and expertise to engage in an immanent **critique** **of** the prevailing **security regimes**, that is, **comparing the justifications** of those regimes **with actual outcomes. When this is attempted** in the security field, the **prevailing** **structures** and regimes are found to **fail grievously on their own terms**. Such an approach also involves challenging the pronouncements of those intellectuals, traditional or organic, whose views serve to legitimate, and hence reproduce, the prevailing world order. This challenge entails teasing out the often subconscious and certainly unexamined assumptions that underlie their arguments while drawing attention to the normative viewpoints that are smuggled into mainstream thinking about security behind its positivist façade. In this sense, proponents of critical security studies approximate to Foucault’s notion of “specific intellectuals” who use their expert knowledge to challenge the prevailing “regime of truth” (Foucault 1980: 132). However, critical theorists might wish to reformulate this sentiment along more familiar Quaker lines of “speaking truth to power” (this sentiment is also central to Said 1994) or even along the eisteddfod lines of speaking “truth against the world.” Of course, traditional strategists can, and indeed do, sometimes claim a similar role. Colin S. Gray, for example, states that “strategists must be prepared to ‘speak truth to power’” (Gray 1982a: 193). But the difference between Gray and proponents of critical security studies is that, whereas the former seeks to influence policymakers in particular directions without questioning the basis of their power, the latter aim at a thoroughgoing critique of all that traditional security studies has taken for granted. Furthermore, critical theorists base their critique on the presupposition, elegantly stated by Adorno, that “the need to lend suffering a voice is the precondition of all truth” (cited in Jameson 1990: 66). The aim of critical security studies in attempting to undermine the prevailing orthodoxy is ultimately educational. As Gramsci notes, “every relationship of ‘hegemony’ is necessarily a pedagogic relationship” (Gramsci 1971: 350; see also the discussion of critical pedagogy in Neufeld 1995: 116-121). Thus, by criticizing the hegemonic discourse and advancing alternative conceptions of security based on different understandings of human potentialities, the approach is simultaneously playing apart in eroding the legitimacy of the ruling historic bloc and contributing to the development of a counterhegemonic position. There are a number of avenues of avenues open to critical security specialists in pursuing this educational strategy. As teachers, they can try to foster and encourage skepticism toward accepted wisdom and open minds to other possibilities. They can also take advantage of the seemingly unquenchable thirst of the media for instant pundistry to forward alternative views onto a broader stage. Nancy Fraser argues: “As teachers, we try to foster an emergent pedagogical counterculture …. As critical public intellectuals we try to inject our perspectives into whatever cultural or political public spheres we have access to” (Fraser 1989: 11). Perhaps significantly, support for this type of emancipatory strategy can even be found in the work of the ultrapessimistic Adorno, who argues: In the history of civilization there have been not a few instances when delusions were healed not by focused propaganda, but, in the final analysis, because scholars, with their unobtrusive yet insistent work habits, studied what lay at the root of the delusion. (cited in Kellner 1992: vii) Such “unobtrusive yet insistent work” does not in itself create the social change to which Adorno alludes. The conceptual and the practical dangers of collapsing practice into theory must be guarded against. Rather, through their educational activities, proponent of **critical security studies** should aim to **provide** **support** **for** those **social movements that promote** emancipatory **social change. By providing a critique of the prevailing order and legitimating alternative views, critical theorists** can **perform a valuable role in supporting the struggles of social movements**. That said, the role of theorists is not to direct and instruct those movements with which they are aligned; instead, the relationship is reciprocal. The experience of the European, North American, and Antipodean peace movements of the 1980s shows how influential social movements can become when their efforts are harnessed to the intellectual and educational activity of critical thinkers. For example, in his account of New Zealand’s antinuclear stance in the 1980s, Michael C. Pugh cites the importance of the visits of critical intellectuals such as Helen Caldicott and Richard Falk in changing the country’s political climate and encouraging the growth of the antinuclear movement (Pugh 1989: 108; see also COrtright 1993: 5-13). In the 1980s peace movements and critical intellectuals interested in issues of security and strategy drew strength and succor from each other’s efforts. If such critical social movements do not exist, then this creates obvious difficulties for the critical theorist. But even under these circumstances, the theorist need not abandon all hope of an eventual orientation toward practice. Once again, the peace movement of the 1980s provides evidence of the possibilities. At that time, the movement benefited from the intellectual work undertaken in the lean years of the peace movement in the late 1970s. Some of the theories and concepts developed then, such as common security and nonoffensive defense, were eventually taken up even in the Kremlin and played a significant role in defusing the second Cold War. Those ideas developed in the 1970s can be seen in Adornian terms of the a “message in a bottle,” but in this case, contra Adorno’s expectations, they were picked up and used to support a program of emancipatory political practice. Obviously, one would be naïve to understate the difficulties facing those attempting to develop alternative critical approaches within academia. Some of these problems have been alluded to already and involve the structural constraints of academic life itself. Said argues that many problems are caused by what he describes as the growing “professionalisation” of academic life (Said 1994: 49-62). Academics are now so constrained by the requirements of job security and marketability that they are extremely risk-averse. It pays—in all senses—to stick with the crowd and avoid the exposed limb by following the prevalent disciplinary preoccupations, publish in certain prescribed journals, and so on. The result is the navel gazing so prevalent in the study of international relations and the seeming inability of security specialists to deal with the changes brought about by the end of the Cold War (Kristensen 1997 highlights the search of U.S. nuclear planners for “new targets for old weapons”). And, of course, the pressures for conformism are heightened in the field of security studies when governments have a very real interest in marginalizing dissent. Nevertheless, opportunities for critical thinking do exist, and this thinking can connect with the practices of social movements and become a “force for the direction of action.” The experience of the 1980s, when, in the depths of the second Cold War, critical thinkers risked demonization and in some countries far worse in order to challenge received wisdom, thus arguably playing a crucial role in the very survival of the human race, should act as both an inspiration and a challenge to critical security studies.

**ALTERNATIVE**

**REFUSE TO CONSENT TO SECURITIZATION - PUSHING BEYOND SECURITY REQUIRES FORMING A NEW ETHICAL RELATIONSHIP WITH THE OTHER THAT REFUSES THE SECURITY OF THE SELF. Burke:**

**Burke 2002** [Anthony, Lecturer in the School of Humanities and Social Sciences at Univ of New South Wales, “Aporias of Security,” Alternatives 27.1, jstor, GDI-ALG]

“It is perhaps easy to become despondent, but as countless struggles for freedom, justice and social transformation have proved, a sense of seriousness can be tempered with the knowledge that many of the tools are already available – and where they are not, the effort to create a productive new critical sensibility is well advanced. There is also a crucial political opening within the liberal problematic itself, in the sense that it assumes that **power is most effective when it is** absorbed as truth, **consented to and desired – which creates an important space for dissent, critique and refusal.** As Colin Gordon argues, Foucault thought that the very possibility of governing was conditional on it being credible to the governed as well as the governing.79 This throws weight onto the question of how security works as a technology of subjectivity. It is to take up Foucault's challenge, framed as a reversal of the liberal progressive movement of being we have seen in Hegel, not to discover who we are so much as to refuse what we are.80 **Just as security rules subjectivity as** both **a totalising** and individualising **blackmail** and promise**,** it is at these levels **we too can intervene.** **We can critique the machinic frameworks of** possibility represented by **law,[and] policy**, economic regulation and diplomacy, **while challenging the way these institutions deploy language to draw** individual subjects **into their consensual web.** This suggests, at least provisionally, a dual strategy. The first asserts the space for agency, both in challenging available possibilities for being and their larger socio-economic implications. **Pushing beyond security requires tactics that** can work at many levels: that **empower individuals to recognise the** larger social, cultural and economic implications of the everyday **forms of** desire, **subjection and discipline they encounter, to challenge and rewrite them,** and which in turn contribute to collective efforts to transform the larger structures of being, exchange and power that sustain (and have been sustained by) these forms. As Derrida suggests, this is **to open up** aporetic **possibilities that** transgress and **call into question the boundaries of** the **self, society and the international that security seeks to** imagine and **police.** The second seeks new ethical principles based on a critique of the rigid and repressive forms of identity security has heretofore offered. Thus writers such as Rosalyn Diprose, William Connolly and Moira Gatens have sought to **imagine a new ethical relationship**, which thinks difference not on the basis of the Same, but **on the basis of a dialogue with the Other that might allow space for the unknown and unfamiliar**, for what Gatens calls a 'debate and engagement with the other's law and the other's ethics' – an encounter which involves a transformation of the self rather than the other.81 (The potentials and limits of these models of ethics are explored in more detail in Chapter 3, where I critically analyse the political possibilities offered by the thought of Emmanuel Levinas, Martin Heidegger and Martin Buber.) In short, while **the** sweep and **power of security** must be acknowledged, it **must** also **be refused**: at the simultaneous levels of individual identity, social order and macroeconomic possibility, it would entail another kind of work on 'ourselves' – a political refusal of the One, the imagination of an Other that never returns to the Same. It is to imagine a world in which alternative possibilities of society, justice and existence are free to develop, independent of sovereign ontologies and their animating forms of geopolitical control, desire and violence. It is to ask if there can be a world or a security after security, and what its shimmering possibilities might be.”

This refusal requires voting down the “extinction first” position - it’s the only method of rejection available in the debate space. A vote for the position is a vote to normalize genocidal reasoning.

P+P is subjective, justifies atrocities.

Extinction first justifies actions such as Japanese Internment Camps

O/V

1. **Probability – 0.1% chance of a collision.**

**Salter 16** [(Alexander William, Economics Professor at Texas Tech) “SPACE DEBRIS: A LAW AND ECONOMICS ANALYSIS OF THE ORBITAL COMMONS” 19 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 221 \*numbers replaced with English words] TDI

**The probability of a collision is currently low. Bradley and Wein estimate that the maximum probability in LEO of a collision over the lifetime of a spacecraft remains below one in one thousand,** conditional on continued compliance with NASA’s deorbiting guidelines.3 However, the possibility of a future “snowballing” effect, whereby debris collides with other objects, further congesting orbit space, remains a significant concern.4 Levin and Carroll estimate the average immediate destruction of wealth created by a collision to be approximately $30 million, with an additional $200 million in damages to all currently existing space assets from the debris created by the initial collision.5 The expected value of destroyed wealth because of collisions, currently small because of the low probability of a collision, can quickly become significant if future collisions result in runaway debris growth.

1. **Time frame – Kessler effect 200 years away**

**Stubbe 17** [(Peter, PhD in law @ Johann Wolfgang Goethe University Frankfurt) “State Accountability for Space Debris: A Legal Study of Responsibility for Polluting the Space Environment and Liability for Damage Caused by Space Debris,” Koninklijke Brill Publishing, ISBN 978-90-04-31407-8, p. 27-31] TDI

The prediction of possible scenarios of the future evolution of the debris p o p ulation involves many uncertainties. Long-term forecasting means the prediction of the evolution of the future debris environment in time periods of decades or even centuries. Predictions are based on models84 that work with certain assumptions, and altering these parameters significantly influences the outcomes of the predictions. Assumptions on the future space traffic and on the initial object environment are particularly critical to the results of modeling efforts.85 A well-known pattern for the evolution of the debris population is **the so-called Kessler effect’**, which assumes that there is a certain collision probability among space objects because many satellites operate in similar orbital regions. These collisions create fragments, and thus additional objects in the respective orbits, which in turn enhances the risk of further collisions. Consequently, the num ber of objects and collisions increases exponentially and eventually results in the formation of a self-sustaining debris belt aroundthe Earth. While it has long been assumed that such a process of collisional cascading is likely to occur only in a very long-term perspective (meaning a time 1 n of several hundred years),87 a consensus has evolved in recent years that an uncontrolled growth of the debris population in certain altitudes could become reality much sooner.88 In fact, a recent cooperative study undertaken by various space agencies in the scope of i a d c shows that the current l e o debris population is unstable, even if current mitigation measures are applied. The study concludes:

Even with a 90% implementation of the commonly-adopted mitigation measures [...] **the l e o debris population is expected to increase by an average of 30% in the next 200 years. The population growth is primarily driven by catastrophic collisions between 700 and 1000 km altitudes** and such collisions are likely to occur every 5 to 9 years.89

1. **Non UQ – squo debris already exists and the aff has no solvency**

**Orwig 16** [(Jessica, MS in science and tech journalism from Texas A&M, BS in astronomy and physics from Ohio State) “Russia says a growing problem in space could be enough to spark a war,” Insider,’ January 26, 2016, https://www.businessinsider.com/russia-says-space-junk-could-spark-war-2016-1] TDI

**NASA has already warned that the large amount of space junk around our planet is growing beyond our control**, but now a team of **Russian scientists has cited another potentially unforeseen consequence of that debris: War.**

**Scientists estimate that anywhere from 500,000 to 600,000 pieces of human-made space debris between 0.4 and 4 inches in size are currently orbiting the Earth and traveling at speeds over 17,000 miles per hour.**

**If one of those pieces smashed into a military satellite it "may provoke political or even armed conflict between space-faring nations**," Vitaly Adushkin, a researcher for the Institute of Geosphere Dynamics at the Russian Academy of Sciences, reported in a paper set to be published in the peer-reviewed journal Acta Astronautica, which is sponsored by the International Academy of Astronautics.

**Space debris creates existential deterrence and a taboo**

**Bowen 18** [(Bleddyn, lecturer in International Relations at the University of Leicester) “The Art of Space Deterrence,” European Leadership Network, February 20, 2018, https://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/commentary/the-art-of-space-deterrence/] TDI

Fourth, **the ubiquity of space infrastructure and the fragility of the space environment may create a degree of existential deterrence. As space is so useful to modern economies and military forces, a large-scale disruption of space infrastructure may be so intuitively escalatory to decision-makers that there may be a natural caution against a wholesale assault** on a state’s entire space capabilities **because the consequences of doing so approach the mentalities of total war, or nuclear responses** if a society begins tearing itself apart because of the collapse of optimised energy grids and just-in-time supply chains. In addition, the **problem of space debris** and the political-legal hurdles to conducting debris clean-up operations mean that **even a handful of explosive events in space can render a region of Earth orbit unusable for everyone. This could caution** a country like **China** from excessive kinetic intercept missions **because its own military and economy is increasingly reliant on outer space**, but perhaps not a country like North Korea which does not rely on space. **The usefulness, sensitivity, and fragility of space may have some existential deterrent effect.** China’s catastrophic anti-satellite weapons test in 2007 is a valuable lesson for all on the potentially devastating effect of kinetic warfare in orbit.