I negate the resolution.

My value is morality as the word ought indicates moral obligation.

I offer the following definitions to clarify the debate,

**Strike:**

In business terms, **a strike can be understood as a curtailment of work, due to the collective refusal of workers to work, which occurs as a response to employee grievances.** It involves, dropping out of work by any number of workers, employed in a particular industry, **with an aim of creating pressure on the employers, to accept their demands** relating to pay scale, working conditions, trade practices and so forth

[What is Strike? definition, causes and types - Business Jargons](https://businessjargons.com/strike.html) .

According to Oxford dictionary, “acknowledgment of something's existence, validity, or legality.”

I offer the following framework

1) Principle of equality is true: Identity features lack moral significance. Treating individuals differently for certain identity features is the basis of oppression.

2) Principle of non-contradiction is true: Denial results in a double bind, either A) the system is contradictory and cannot arrive at normative judgement or B) the system doesn’t care about applying itself to action, in which case you default to the truth of the premise. And, non-contradiction controls truth value, means that alternative frameworks must provide an alternative conception of framework weighing because they cannot rely on the truth of the framework arguments, since a rejection of my framework is a rejection of the notion that we are bound to believe things because they are true.

Thus, since all persons are ethically equal, and since logic requires that no proposal can be both true and false, it follows that any ethical proposal must be true in principle for all ethical actors. The standard is **the Categorical Imperative,** defined as “the principle that people must always be treated as ends in themselves, never merely as means to the ends of others.”

Prefer:

First, bindingness: Any other type of obligation is escapable because it doesn’t produce a direct contradiction i.e. there’s no clear tension between saying x is wrong and doing x because it’s conceivable, but end setting is inherent to an obligation so end setting is inescapable. **Gewirth**:

As we have seen, judgments of **Moral obligation[s] are categorical [and]** in that what persons morally ought to do sets requirements for them that they cannot rightly evade by consulting their own self- interested desires or variable opinions, ideals, or institutional prac- tices. For moral judgments are critically evaluative of all of these. but such inescapable obligations **can[’t]**not **be derived from variable contents**. Moreover, ultimate Moral disagreements can [only] be rationally resolved only if moral obligations are based on necessary contents. **For if moral principles [are]** have **contingent** contents, so that their obligatoriness may vary with the variable desires or opinions of different protagonists, **then no finality can be rationally imposed** on their differing moral beliefs. **To ascertain** which among the various possible or actual **moral principles** are right or correct hence demands that **one [must] adopt a standpoint** that is **superior to** these **variable elements, [to]** so that it can be seen to **impose** rational **requirements on them.** Such a superior standpoint, to avoid the variability and relativism of the subject matter to which it is addressed, must have a rational necessity of content as well as of form. But how can such contentual necessity be established by reason? To answer this question, the subject matter of morality must be considered; this consideration, being performed through conceptual analysis, is itself a product of reason in the sense of deductive rationality. If there is a subject matter with which all moralities and moral judgments must be concerned directly or indirectly, then this will provide a necessary content for all such judgments. If it can be further shown that this content has certain determinate logical consequences regarding the criteria of moral rightness, then the principle that upholds these criteria will emerge as materially or contentually as well as formally necessary. The subject matter of morality will thus be at least part of the justifications of the supreme moral principle; and since this justifications is contentually necessary, so too will be the moral principle that is its justification. **This** necessary content of morality **is** to be **found in** action and its generic features. For **all** moral **precepts**, regardless of their further contents, deal directly or indirectly with how persons ought to act. The specific modes of action required by different moral precepts are, of course, highly variable but [all] amid these variations, the precepts require actions; and there are certain invariant features that pertain generically to all actions. I shall call these the generic features of action because they characterize the genus or category of action as a whole, as delimited by moral and other practical precepts. Thus. just as action provides the necessary content of all morality, so the generic features provide the necessary content of all action. It will be of the first importance to trace how these features determine the necessities of moral rightness, so that from the ‘is’ of the generic features of action there is logically derivable the ‘ought’ of moral principles and rules. Insofar as these generic features of action constitute the justifications of the supreme principle of morality, [they] the latter, as their justification, will also have a necessary content. These generic features, in turn, are ascertained by deductive rationality, so that the ultimate justifications of the supreme principle consists in reason. Now just as the concept of reason, which I have confined to deduction and induction, is morally neutral and hence not question- begging, so too the concept of action that is to be used as the basis of the justificatory argument is morally neutral. For since this concept comprises the generic features of all action, it fits all moralities rather than reﬂecting or deriving from any one normative moral position as against any other. How, then, can it be shown that from such morally neutral premises there follow determinate, normatively moral conclu- sions about the necessary content of the supreme principle of moral- ity? This question poses one of the major challenges the present work must meet. The answer consists in showing that, because of its generic features, **Action has** what I shall call **a ‘normative structure,’ in that** evaluative and deontic **[all people’s] judgments** on the part of agents **are** logically **implicit in [it]** all action;and when these judgments are subjected to certain rational requirements, a certain normative moral principle logically follows from them. To put it otherwise**:** Any agent. simply by virtue of being an agent, must admit, on pain of self-contradiction, that he ought to act in certain determinate ways.The relation of action to morality bears importantly on the question raised earlier about the correspondence-correlates moral judgments must have if they are to be true by virtue of correspondence. Since action comprises the factual subject matter of moral and other practical precepts, it serves for moral philosophy a function analogous to that which empirical observational data may be held to serve for natural science: that of providing an objective basis or subject matter against which, respectively, moral judgments or rules and empirical statements or laws can be checked for their truth or correctness. It must be emphasized that this function is only analogous: a moral judgment does not become true simply by stating that some action or kind of action is actually performed. As we shall see, it is rather thataction,through its generic features and normative structure, [It] entails certain requirements on [persons] the part of agents, and moral judgments are [only] true [if] insofar as they correspond to these requirements and hence to the normative structure of action**.** But because action provides the necessary content of moral judgments, these are not left, so far as concerns truth, completely unsupported by relevant objective stan- dards or data. Although the importance of action for moral philoso- phy has been recognized since the ancient Greeks, it has not hitherto been noted that the nature of action enters into the very content and justification of the supreme principle of morality.

Alan Gewirth, “Reason and Morality”. Unversity of Chicago Press, 1978. Quals: Prof. of Philosophy, UChicago. Ram Prasad do you remember him? 10/11/13

Second, Self-ownership is forwarded by oneself as the means of discursive exchange. Hence, denial of the right to self-ownership is impossible and the function of any human being is thus to be a self-owner. **Hans-Hermann:**

**Argumentation does not consist of free-floating propositions but is a form of action requiring the employment of scarce means;** and that the means which a person demonstrates as preferring by engaging in propositional exchanges are those of private property. For one thing, **no one could** possibly **propose anything**, and no one could become convinced of any proposition by argumentative means**, if a person’s right to make exclusive use of his physical body were not already presupposed. [This]** It is this recognition of each other’s mutually exclusive control over one’s own body which explains the distinctive character of propositional exchanges that, while one may disagree about what has been said, it is still possible to agree at least on the fact that there is disagreement. It is also obvious that such a property right to one’s own body **must be** said to be **justified a priori, for** anyone who tried to justify **any norm** whatsoever would already have to **presuppose[s]** the exclusive right of control over his body as a valid norm **[it].**  simply in order o say, ‘I propose such and such.’ **Anyone disputing [this]** such a **right would [commit]** become caught up in **a practical contradiction** since arguing so would already imply acceptance of the very norm which he was disputing.”

Hans-Hermann Hoppe, *The Economics and Ethics of Private Property*, p. 334

For instance, workers can strike only for certain purposes — better wages or working conditions. Prior to the introduction of these conditions, workers often went on strike for immoral purposes. For instance, white workers often went on strike to demand discrimination against their Black coworkers. **Brenner** explains:

**“Hate strikes afflicted a variety of industries in many cities during World War II.** In most cases **they were driven by racial antagonism**s in the workplace. Whatever problems **white workers** had with weak unions, low income, and little say on the shop floor, they had the **[skin] color** of their skin, and that **brought material** as well as **[and] psychological advantages.** As WEB DuBois pointed out, even the poorest white Americans understood the importance of race and used it to set themselves apart from their black counterparts. In American industry, **white workers held the cleanest, best-paying jobs, while black workers [had]** were relegated to **the dirtiest, most dangerous labor.** **Hate strikes** quite often **grew from white workers’ attempts to keep control of the best jobs in the face of black workers’ demands.”**

Brenner, Aaron et al. *The Encyclopedia of Strikes in American History.* Routledge, 2015.

To be clear: this argument is not that “strikes should be prohibited because there have been hate strikes.” The negative agrees *some* strikes are moral. But an *unconditional* right to strike which is what the affirmative advocacy is not good. The condition that workers cannot strike for immoral purposes is a necessary and just limitation on the right to strike.

**Therefore, an unconditional right to strike can not be moral or recognized under a just government:**

**NLRB 85** [National Labor Relations Board; “Legislative History of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947: Volume 1,” Jan 1985;<https://play.google.com/store/books/details?id=7o1tA__v4xwC&rdid=book-7o1tA__v4xwC&rdot=1>] Justin

\*\*Edited for gendered language

As for the so-called absolute or **unconditional** right to strike—there are no absolute rights that do not have their **corresponding** **responsibilities**. Under our American Anglo-Saxon system, each individual is **entitled** to the maximum of freedom, provided however (and this provision is of first importance), his [their] freedom has **due** **regard** for the **rights** and **freedoms** of **others**. The very **safeguard** of our freedoms is the recognition of this fundamental principle. I take **issue** very definitely with the suggestion that there is an absolute and **unconditional** **right** to concerted action (which after all is what the **strike** is) which **endangers** the **health** and **welfare** of our people in order to attain a **selfish** **end**.

**Police Strikes are used to combat racial progress and attempts to limit police power. Making them legal and easier only make progress much harder.**

Andrew **Grim 2020** What is the ‘blue flu’ and how has it increased police power? https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2020/07/01/what-is-blue-flu-how-has-it-increased-police-power/

But the result of such protests matter deeply as we consider police reform today. Historically, **blue flu strikes have helped expand police power, ultimately limiting the ability of city governments to reform, constrain or conduct oversight over the police**. They **allow the police to leverage public fear of crime to extract concessions from municipalities.** This became clear in Detroit more than 50 years ago. In June 1967, tensions arose between Detroit Mayor Jerome Cavanagh and the Detroit Police Officers Association (DPOA), which represented the city’s 3,300 patrol officers. The two were at odds primarily over police demands for a pay increase. Cavanagh showed no signs of caving to the DPOA’s demands and had, in fact, proposed to cut the police department’s budget. On June 15, the DPOA escalated the dispute with a walkout: 323 officers called in sick. The number grew over the next several days as the blue flu spread, reaching a height of 800 absences on June 17. In tandem with the walkout, the DPOA launched a fearmongering media campaign to win over the public. They took out ads in local newspapers warning Detroit residents, “How does it feel to be held up? Stick around and find out!” This campaign took place at a time of rising urban crime rates and uprisings, and only a month before the 1967 Detroit riot, making it especially potent. The DPOA understood this climate and used it to its advantage. **With locals already afraid of crime and displeased at Cavanagh’s failure to rein it in, they would be more likely to demand the return of the police than to demand retribution against officer**s for an illegal strike. The DPOA’s strategy paid off. The walkout left Detroit Police Commissioner Ray Girardin feeling “practically helpless.” “I couldn’t force them to work,” he later told The Washington Post. Rather than risk public ire by allowing the blue flu to continue, Cavanagh relented. Ultimately, the DPOA got the raises it sought, making Detroit officers the highest paid in the nation. This was far from the end of the fight between Cavanagh and the DPOA. In the ensuing months and years, **they continued to tussle over wages, pensions, the budget, the integration of squad cars and the hiring of black officers.** The threat of another blue flu loomed over all these disputes, helping the union to win many of them. And Detroit was not an outlier. Throughout the 1960s, ’70s and ’80s, the blue flu was a [ubiquitous and highly effective](https://www.akpress.org/our-enemies-in-blue.html) tactic in Baltimore, Memphis, New Orleans, Chicago, Newark, New York and many other cities. In most cases, as author Kristian Williams writes, “When faced with a walkout or slowdown, the authorities usually decided that the pragmatic need to get the cops back to work trumped the city government’s long term interest in diminishing the rank and file’s power.” But each time a city relented to this pressure, they ceded more and more power to police unions, which would turn to the strategy repeatedly to defend officers’ interests — **particularly when it came to efforts to address systemic racism in police policies and practices.** In 1970, black residents of Pittsburgh’s North Side neighborhood raised an outcry over the “hostile sadistic treatment” they experienced at the hands of white police officers. They lobbied Mayor Peter F. Flaherty to assign more black officers to their neighborhood. The mayor agreed, transferring several white officers out of the North Side and replacing them with black officers. While residents cheered this decision, white officers and the Fraternal Order of Police (FOP), which represented them, were furious. They slammed the transfer as “discrimination” against whites. About 425 of the Pittsburgh Police Department’s 1,600 police officers called out sick in protest. Notably, black police officers broke with their white colleagues and refused to join the walkout. They praised the transfer as a “long overdue action” and viewed the walkout as a betrayal of officers’ oath to protect the public. Nonetheless, the tactic paid off. After several days, Flaherty caved to the “open revolt” of white officers, agreeing to halt the transfers and instead submit the dispute to binding arbitration between the city and the police union. Black officers, though, continued to speak out against their union’s support of racist practices, and many of them later resigned from the union in protest. Similar scenarios played out in Detroit, Chicago and other cities in the 1960s and ’70s, as **white officers continually staged walkouts to preserve the segregated status quo in their departments**. These blue flu **strikes amounted to an authoritarian power grab by police officers bent on avoiding oversight, rejecting reforms and shoring up their own authority**. In the aftermath of the 1967 Detroit walkout, a police commissioner’s aide strongly criticized the police union’s strong-arm tactics, saying “it smacks of a police state.” The clash left one newspaper editor wondering, “Who’s the Boss of the Detroit Police?” But in the “law and order” climate of the late 1960s, such criticism did not resonate enough to stir a groundswell of public opinion against the blue flu. And police unions dismissed critics by arguing that officers had “no alternative” but to engage in walkouts to get city officials to make concessions. Crucially, the very effectiveness of the blue flu may be premised on a myth**. While police unions use public fear of crime skyrocketing without police on duty**, in many cases, **the absence of police did not lead to a rise in crime**. In New York City in 1971, [for example](https://untappedcities.com/2020/06/12/the-week-without-police-what-we-can-learn-from-the-1971-police-strike/), 20,000 officers called out sick for five days over a pay dispute without any apparent increase in crime. The most striking aspect of the walkout, as one observer noted, “might be just how unimportant it seemed.” Today, municipalities are under immense pressure from activists who have taken to the streets to protest the police killings of black men and women. Some have already responded by enacting new policies and cutting police budgets. As it continues, **more** blue flus **are likely to follow as officers seek to wrest back control of the public debate on policing and reassert their independence.**